13 Goul Effects on Action and Cognition

PETER M. GOLLWITZER GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ

focus on describing the impact of a-goal on social j"ig- D esearchand theorizing on goals and their effects on (goal conten"t)to explaining the willful control of ll affect, behavior, and cägnition has become very PoP- ments proZesses involved in producing j-udgments ular in social psvchology,as äocumented by the many re- the -(goal- regulation). This has produced a metaphor ot cent edited Uäoks (".e1, Frese & Sabini, 1985; Gollwitzer relatäd asY'flexible strategists" who perhaps have a pre- & Bareh. 1996; Haliich & Kuhl, 1987; Higgins & Sor- humans ';cognitive toward being misers," but are ca- rentinol 1990; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985rPervin, 1989) and disposition of exerting their riill-aid controlling the nature of review chapters (e.g.,Bargh, 1990; Chaiken,''Liberman,& p^lit" piocessing they expend on a given task' guslu. 198ö; Karnio"l& Rois, 1996; Karoly, 1993; Kruglan- the cognitive iri volitional control of cognitive processing .kil ibgO, Mclntosh & Martin, 1992; Tetlock, 1992) on This inierest has embraced the goal concept' Thus' despite thii theme. The reasons for this are manifold' Some are similarly of the cognitive övolution on social psychol- rooted in the theoretical developments in the psychology ift" i*pÄ"t the attemp-ted neglect of- motivational terms of motivation (see Geen, 1995;-Gollwitzer, t99l; Heck- ogv Jd .t""dt. motiväs), the goal concePt could not be h"or"t, 1991; Kuhl, 1983),others within the impact of the iul.L.. ar""y (see Miller, Gälanter, & Pribram, 1960; cognitive revolution on social psychology (see Fiske, i*äpt rgtiZl. Perhaps the goal concePt was spared be- f9ö3b; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Smith, 1994; Stevens& ii*ä", cause goals and plari-are h-ighly zuitable to.a.c^ognitivl Fiske, 1995). (Carver^& Scheier, 1981; Kruglanski, 1996) and The psycholoqyof motivation has progressedwithin re- analysil plaväd an important role in cognitive Jcience and artifi- cerrt v"ä.i from"ä focus on describinfi the choice of action (e.g.,Wilensky, 1983). no"Ir'("tt emphasis on goal contenl) to explaining the äi"i int"llig"nce 3.o""rr", inväved in thJwillful control of goal-directed äction (an emphasison goal-relatedbehavioral regulation)' AND REGULÄTION AS This new inteiest in volition led to the embracing ot..tfq CONSTRUCTION willtul BASIC PRINCIPLES Eoalconcept, as goalsare at the starting point of the äontrol ofäction-. Assuming that cognitive activity serves focused on goal content, within the domains of purpose of controlling äcdon (as noted by James,1890, Research the how the type of goal a "ltti al*ays for my doing"), both action and thougit, examines thinking is first anä Process vari- on cognition person selects deterriines some measured outcome moäels have-begun to examine goal -effects i""ft research begins with a basic assumption that that- mediates thä regulation of thä individual's actions' äUf". people buildeis ofwhat is experiencedas reality' g,rt go^lt also affäct cognition for the purPose of aiding 'Btfi" are active it is meant that people bring to their meetings with the peiception of others and deriving meaning trom ob- from the envirönment more than the appropriate ,"r',,,ädsoc^ial events (though one might argue that ultimately stimuli hardware that simply awaits being triggered by someprop- such cognitions are ,rt"dto help äne plan actions-what "Goodtto*, "instru- that enviränment. People have selective interests Bruner, & Austen, 1956, p' 12, called ertv of (reilected by their needs, motives, and goals)'either tran- ;entJ'activity").'In examining this theme within social long t"r*, that help to shape thJconstrual of their psychology, there has been a similar progression from a ti""i.t

of this chap- Roman for their helpful comments on an earlier draft thank ute Bayer, Adam Galinsky, Gabriele oettingen, and Robert J. we wish to this chapter was fncili- *o, it th" university of Konstanz, G"rrr,,.^ry The prep:rration of ter. when this chapter w:rs started., Gordon Moskowitz to Peter Gollwitzer and Gordon Moskowitz' tated by a grnnt from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 36I 363 PERSONAL MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM

social u,orld. T]ris makes action and cognition more than prior beliefs, reevaluationsof previously processedinfor_ enr.ironnrentallv ^ determined responses."Weshall refer to mation, and selectiverecall and-attention. this fundarnenial assumption as^the principl e of actiai Oyr objective in this chapter is to review the evidence constntction. ^ for these goal-related principles as demonstrated through Thus behavior is not triggered simply by features of the researchon goal effects on action and social cognition. Yn environment, but by thJlnteractLin'of those features each of these domains, we focus first on what üe have Ia_ rvith the properties of the individual. peopie choose be_ beled as goal content research and then on what we have tween many possible courses of action withlin particular a labeled as regulated-process research. In each section, situation, with any given individual's chosen reisponse to goal content research is described as concerned with goal identical environmental features subiected to thä review influences on some outcome-how having " god 5f " of that person's prevailing idiosyncrätic goals. Similarly, particular content versus one of a differeit coätent (or teaturesol the environment do not automatically trigger having no goal specified) determines responses. Goal cognrJion. Rather than there being a one_to_one coäe_ content research on both action and cognition contains spo_ndencebetween the physical at-tributes of a stimulus assumptions about the sources and the se'iection of goals. and its mental representätion (in which the processine but each has focused- mor-e on the impact of " gä of system is seen as a recorder or camera, transcrfuine factf specified content rather than on the äanner ln"which perception and inference are viewed as subjectivEty a"_ that content becomes specified. Regulated-process re_ termined (Allport, lg54). people choose between many search is described as concernea irittr thä processes possible interpretations within a particular situation, ,e through which goals help the individual regulaie a goal- with any given individual's judgmänts and inferences g directed response--how people go about negotiäting trom identical environmental features subjected to the their strivings. We begin with goal influences oi behavl review of prevailing goals. The individual contributes "a ior because traditional-ly goals t'arre been analyzed as di_ E somewhat more than healthy pair of eyes and the ap_'& rectors ofaction. f propriate re,sponsemechanismsn (postman, + B.uner, Before turning to the analysisof goal effects McGinnies, 1948, *Wiren on action : p. 142). As Vives (1540) noted: and cognition, we wish to stress ,:. we the following two points: altirm that a thing is or_is ooJ . . . we judge not ac_ cording to the-things ihemsel.,es, but rathei acäordins to l. The goal-related_principlespreviouslyintroduced are the concept of our mind, becausefor us the . mind is m"ea_ rn tact partly derived from an assumption about human sure of reality, not reality itself.,' pllchologicd functioning that has littlä to do with goals. Researchfocused o,n tfe processes through which goal I his initial assumptionis simply the belief that humarisare effects are exerted also beg'ins with- a basic assumption. bounded in their abilities tdrespond to the social world. Tfrg is that p"oil" have desired .ass.umption states toward Thus, with regard to action, all possible behavioral strate- whichthey aspire and continue striving toward these ends gie,s within Si"9n situatiori cannot be implemented, until the experienced state sufficientlly approximates 1n/ the and thus needs and desiresmust be fulfilled bv specifvins desiredstate (or the desired state is "lt".ed). Attainine this subsets of goal-directed behavior, only some of .,it i"titt E state providesa senseof coherencefor individuals ^s"it al_ individual can carry out. Additionally, certain behaviors lows them to experience the world in a manner that con_ within this subsetmay not be feasibleio enact becausethe torms to their beliefs, wishes, desires,values, and needs. plrson lacks the "opibltlty to do so. It is within this realm Failure to attain it energizes the indiviäual to strive toward of first deliberating on wiihes and desires and then imple_ achievingcoherenc-e._Süch strivings, however, are ofa pro_ menting the processesthrough which these qet translaied ceduralnature, and the procedurei must somehowbe .äg,r_ into action (in the face of-obstructions anä diversions) lated. They need to be protected frorn obrt^"I;, "la;.äi" where goals exert their impact, and the choice as to how to ot changing environments - :ne 1ac,e and needs, and brought regulate behavior begins. to a halt when either deemed no longer attainable or wh"en Similarly, with regärd to cognition, the stimuli presented sufficiently reached. We shall ,uf", ?o ttis ;;sumption re_ in any situation are too numerous and complex for-total rep_ garding processesthrough which people pursue'goals as resentation by the information processin! system.l Thu's, the principle- of regulated coherenci. Th"s, in examinins ac_ only certain^ e]ements from biäoming tron we shall see -the-"great , buzzing that the processesthrough which äoak confusion of the (Lippman, desiräd outer world" lgZZ,7.55) arä fl'9^"^r_lii"i"g loward statesare *fii"täifrrffi selected_for cognitive p.ocessing,-iith other in?ormatlon steps such as deliberating, planning, shielding 'filtered; an ongoins being out (s6e Broadü'ent,Ig58; Bruner, Ig57; course ofaction, steppin{up effortl', and evaTuati;;;;t Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Treisman& Geffen, Similarty, 1967).Ad- process models in social colnition dltionally, oescrlbe.peoplei::llf*ar certain information that the individual desires to as striving toward having a senseof"coher_ p.o:::r that passesthrough the attentional fllter may ence with respect to their judgments not be "rrä i.rf"r"rrces. This {-easibleto deliberate on Lecause he desrredstate is or she lacks thä cosni_ met when curräntly acceptedknowledee is tive experienced capacity to do so. Whereas performance of many täks as being valid or sufficient fii"., fr"fa *i* 8."_ (such rloence/. as identifying the letters on this page)proceeds ,el"_ lhe processesthrough which people strive to_ tively automatically (Bargh, Chapter O, tfis "olume), rvard this desiräd state are ,"dt"r"J-ih;ol"gitru"p, other such as more effortful tasks (such.as uti I i zing (or riot *äking complexjudgments) utilizing) ""t?go, ir"ü-o*,*3"'lr"*"r, "l"b o_ rations require mental operationsthat usurp"cap""ity "nd ä"y,uf- on new information, effärtful "orrrid"r"tion-i"iä^rrtent of indi_ fer deficits when requisite capaciiy ii unalvailable'(e.s.. 'iduating information ""d' info.Ä"ir"" with Gilbert, 1989). It is within thisiealm of first selecti.,gafrj GOAL EFFECTSON ACTIONAND COGNITION then processing information where needs, motives, and changesby actionsthat correspondto tlie variationsof the goals exert t}eir impact, and the struggle as to how the in- goal.Finally, besidespersistenie and appropriateness,goal- dividual will perceive a given piece of information begins. directed organismsalso show hyperaciivity rvhen expäsed This human siruggle to %aptuie" elements from the Jom- to the stimuli associatedwith ä previousl;, experiänced ^understandplex stimulus array bombarding their senses,and in so doing goal.This restlessnessis commonlyieferred io as^searching and attain meanirie from their social world ii for the goal. the focus ofsocial cognition. The 6ehaviorists spelled out the observable features of 2. In discussine willful control of action and thoueht, goal-directed behavior (persistence,appropriateness, and goals as related tJissues of volition, and people as guiäed searching), but what qualifies "t utt ""t^,i"I goal?,lccoiding by selectirseinterest, we are not suggesting that such con- to the behaviorists, goals specify powerful incentivesl trol and selection must be conscious and effortful. Control whereby incentives are defined as o\ects and events that can be passive-and this does not mean that people do affect an organism's behavior radically and reliably (e.g., not have volition, have not selected their goals, or are food, sexual stimulation, sudden loud noise). Wheiher än under the control of the environment (see also Fiske, object or event is treated as a goal or an incentive, how- 1989; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). When goal ever, depends solely on the investigator's perspective on puqsuit is surrendered to an environmental triggeiing the organism's behaviors. If the investigator selects a cer- stimulus, this is not equivalent to saying the environment tain in"centive as the reference point for"the description of alone is determining responses. The environment is still behavior, this incentive becomes a goal. A behaviorist re- interacting with goals simply in a passive way by routiniz- searcher's statement that food is a loal to the hungry or- ing the goals so that they operate efficiently and effort- ganism means nothing more than (D that it is knoum'that lessly (see Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994). People food is an incentive to this organism, and (2) that the re- are active. flexible constructors of social realitv. but this searcher has chosen to describe the behavior ofthe organ- construction and their contribution to it eithär can be ism in relation to food rather than in relation to anv olher under conscious control, or it can be passive-exertions of *i:"rtt"Jfä#trist the will need not be effortful and cärried out only after tradition,the referencepoint *, **a other passive processes, such as inference or belief for- directed behavior is apparently not the intention or the mation, have already been carried out (a position in con- goal set by the organisms themselves. Behaviorists do not trast to arguments by Devine, 1989; Gilbert, Tafarodi, & analyzethe internal goal or the goal-setting pqocesses,and Malone. 1993. and one we will return to later). whether or how a self-set goal affects behavior. For the behaviorist, a goal is just an'incentive that is chosen by the investigator as a reference point for describing observed GOAL INFLUENCES ON BEIIAVIOR behavior. Skinner (1953) phrased this most cogently when he referred to goal directedness as an effective and easy-to- Historical Background handle catego;y for the description of behavior t"rnitirrg from some kind of operant conditioning. Behaaiorisnt The reference point of modern goal theories is, in con- Accordinq to the behaviorists, goal-directed behavior trast to the behavioristic view, the internal, subiective is easily iecognized by a number äf obser,rable features. goal. Goal-directed behavior is studied in relation tb goals Tolman (1925) highlighted the following characteristics: [eld by the individual (e.g., a person's goal to stop säok- ing serves as a reference point for his or her efforts to When a rat runs a maze,it is to be observedthat his running achieve this goal). Research questions focus on whether and searchingactivities persist until food is reached.And iI and how setting such goals affects a person's behaviors. appearsthat"his persisteirceis the result of the physiological Some critics of modern theorizing on goals claim that conditionof hunger.We do not know whether the rat, in so "conscious"; "feeis goals are not important determinants of behavior; if any- "persisting,"is we do not know whetherhe thing, goals qualify as effective categories for the objec- a purpose"(to usethe terminologyof the mentalists);but we do know that, given (I) the physiologicalcondition of hunger tive description of a Derson's course of action. This andgiven (2) the objectiveconditions of the maze,the rat thus criticism, häwerrer, is un^calledfor, given the many empir- persistsuntil the food is reached.It is this purely objective ical demonstrations ofthe behavioral and cognitive effects fact of persistenceuntil a certain specific type of goal object of subjective goals in recent years (to be reported in this is reachedthat we defineas goal seeking. (pp. 285-286) chapter). This critique'is obviously stimulated by the be- haviorist tradition ofusing goal-directedness as a descrip- Later behaviorists(e.g., Bindra, 1959)extended this def- tive category. But behaviorists never doubted that inition. Besides persistence. the main definitional feature subjective goals may affect a person's behavior; they sim- mentioned by Toiman, researcherspointed to the appropri- ply did not bother to analyze such effects and the mecha- atenessofgoal-directed behavior in the sensethat the goal- nisms on which they are based (seeBindra, 1959). directed oiganism adopts an effective course of aötion Another behaviorist tradition has survived in modern in responseto variations in the stimuli connected with the theorizing about goals, this one being more profitable than goal. If one route to goal attainment is blocked, another harmful. It is the classic distinction between needs (mo- course of action to the same goal is taken. Or if the goal tives), incentives, and goals. As seen in Tolman's vivid de- changesin its location (e.B.,arät trying to escapea cat).-the scription of the hunEy-rat's persistent striving for food, it goal-directedorganism (i.e., the cat) readily adaptsto these is the need (hunger) that points to a respective incentive PERSONAL MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM

(food). and it is the animal's efforts at approachingthe in- is William McDougall. In his Social Psychology (1908/1931) centive thrrt qualifies as goal striving. In a parallel wal', !o- he was so intrigued by the issue ofpurpose- cial psvchologiststodalz speak of needs (e.g., need for ful or goal-directed behavior that he proposed a novel approval) as öircurnscribingvarious classesof incentives psychological theorizing (i.e., hormic psychology) to ac- tä.g..bei"g popular or accoäplishingoutstanding scientific count for its uniqueness. McDougall exphcltly saw the :rchievements),and of goals as intentions to attain these in- reference point for goal-directed behavior in a person's centives.Geen (1995)Las defined the concept ofincentive subjective purpose or goal. He postulated that subjective as denoting a broadly defined desired outcome that sub- goals guide a person's behavior. This guidance is thought sumesseveral classes oflower order goals.Incentives (e.g., to be achieved through cognitive activity that pertains to being popular with friends or outstanding scientiiic the analysis ofthe present situational context and the en- achievements)are consideredto be the product of a per- visioned event or goal state to be realized. Furtheimore, son'sneed (i.e., the need for socialapproä) and aspeclsof progress toward "i.d "tt"i.t*ent of the goal are seen as the experienced situational demands (i.e., the person's pleasurable experiences, and thwarting and failure are friends or the scientific community, respectively). The in- seen as painful or disagreeable. With respect to the ob- tentions to attain the incentive to be popular or to accom- servable features of goal-directed activity, however, Mc- plish outstanding achievements are understood as higher Dougall referred to the same aspects as the behaviorists order goals that may be served by a multitude of lower (e.g., persistence, appropriateness). order goals (e.g., intending to use the weekend to visit friends or to write an outstanding article, respectively). German WilI Psychology In the history of German psychology, the issue of goal- Mentolism directedness of behavior played a particularly prominent The modern theoretical perspective that goal-directed role and resulted in an intensive exchangeofopinions. This behaviors are to be analyzedin relation to people's subjec- controversy started at the beginning of this century and tive goals has its own historical precursors. These reach lasted up to the 1930s.The main protagonists were Narziss Ach (1905, 1910; for a summary,see Ach, 1935) on the one back far beyond the heyday of behaviorism. William James (1890), tn his Principles of Psychology, included a chapter hand, and Kurt Lewin (1926) on the other. In an attempt to on the will in which he discussed the following questions: establish a scientific analvsisanalysis of the phenomenon of voli- How is it possible that a behavior which a person intends tional action or willing (Willenspsychologie),Ach employed to perform (i.e., has been set as a goal by this person) fails a simpleexperimental paradigm. Subjects were trained to to be executed? Tamesreferred to such problems as issues respond repeatedly and consistently to specific stimuli (e(e.g., o n of the obstructeä wiil, but he also raised' questions.related \''ö',.''b') numbers,---*-----'^- meaningless----*^---b- syllables) with certain re- to what he called issuesof the explosive*ill (1..., How is it sponses(e.g., add, rhyme). When these responseshad ha- possible that an undesired behavior is performed even bitualized, subjects were instructed to employ their will and execute antagonistic responses (e.g., subtract, read). though ,we have set ourselves the goal'io suppress it?). How different Ach discovered that forming the intention to respond to the James'sanalysis of goal-directed behaviors "to is to that of the behaviorists becoöes quickly apparent by critical stimuli with an antagonistic response helps get one'swill." considering James's well-known example, in wLich goal setting fails to have its desired effect: The theorizing on how an intention achieves the reliable execution ofthe:intended action was based on the concept We think how late it shall be, how the duties of the day will of determination. Ach assumed that linking in one's miid suffer;we say,I must get up, this is ignominious,etc. But still an anticipated situation to a concrete intönded behavior the rvarm bed feelstoä deiicious,thä cold outside too cruel, createswhat he called a determination, and that this deter- and the resolutionfaints awayand postponesitselfagain and mination in turn would urge the person to execute the in- againjust asit seemedon the vergeof burstingthe resistance tended action when encountering the specified situational and pa-ssingover into decisive ""1. No* howäo we ever get stimulus. The strength of the detärminaiion should depend up undersuch circumstances? on how concretely people specify the anticipated situation; concretenesswas thought to intensify determination. More- This examplerests on the assumptionthat behavior can over, the intensity of the act of intending (willing) should potentially tre regulated by a perön's resolutions (or in- also increase determination, because intensive willing tentions, subjective goals) even though in certain situa- induces a heightened commitment. Determination was ei tions and at certain times this may be difficult. In any pected to diiectly elicit the intended behavior without case, the individual's subjective goai is the referenc-epoint a person's conscious intent to get started. Ach speculated for the goal-directed action and-not a powerful ince^ntive that determination may affect perceptual and attentional focusedon by an outside_observer(or söientist). The ques- processesso that the specified situation is cognized in a tion raised by James-is whether people meet their goälr in way which favors the initiation of the intended action. their actions, not whether theiiactions toward "tr"incen- Kurt Lewin (1926),who scornfullytermedAch's ideasa "linkage tive carry features of persistence, appropriateness,and theory of intention," proposed a need theory of searcnlng. goal striving. Intentions, like needs,are assumedto assign A furtler prominent historical figure in the theorizing a valence (in German: Aufforderungscharakter) to objects about subjective goals and their-effects on behavioi and events in people's social and nonsocial surroundings. GOAL EFFECTSON ACTION AND COGNITION

For a person who intends to mail a letter (Lewin's favorite comprehensivepresentation of these manv different vie*'s. exampie), a mailbox entices (or at least calls or reminds) we have grouped them according to aspectsof sirnilaritv, him 6r her to deposit the letter, much like food entices a which has led to two major categories: hungry person to eat. Becauseneeds can be satisfied by r'".örr iwes of behaviors, which may all substitute for 1. Content theories of goal striving, which attempt to each otheiin reducing need tension (e.g.,eating fruit, veg- explain differences in goal-directed behaviors and lheir etables,or bread), *"ltty diff"."nt inteniion-reläted behav- consequencesin terms of what is specified as the goal by iors qualify for satisfying the quasi-need associatedwith the inäividual. Differences in goai content (in te"rms Jf an intention. The amouit of the tension associated with structural or thematic features) are expected to drasti- the quasi-need was assumed to directly relate to the in- cally affect a person's behaviors. tensity of a person's goal strivings. Tle exact amount of Z. Self-regulation theories of goal striving, w}ich at- tension may vary. Fiist, it is affected by the dggree of tempt to explain the volitional processesthat mediate the ouasi-need'fulfiilment (i.e., tension comes to a final rest effe'cts of goals on behavior. bf th. two types of self- only when the goal is achieved), but it is also thought to regulation iheory, one is more motivational, the other is derrend on the strength of relevant real needs (i-e., super- more cognitive. oräinate drives and-general life goals) and how strongly For a person-with these are related tolhe quasi-need. GoaI Content Theories strong affiliative needs bu1 weak achievement needs (or profeisional goals) a mailbox, for example, acquires more Goal contents vary as goals may be challenging or modest, .'alence when that person intends to send off letters invit- specific or vague,'abstiact or concrete, proximal or distal, ing people to a pari' than when he plans to send out.a job fiamed with a negative or positive outcome focus, and so "p"pii""[ion. Lewin'i tension state metaphor effectively ac- forth. But goal coitents *"y diffet not only in these struc- cäirntr for the flexibility of goal strivirrt (which is pointed tural featuies, but also in their thematic issues, as goals to by the behaviorists *itÜ the "oo""-pt of appröpriate- cover different themes depending on the type of needs n"rr). It is assumed that people commonly see more than and incentives on which fh.v *tä based' Möreover' the (e.g., a kind of implicit theory the individual holds on the func- 'friend),iust one route to goal achievement contacting and that all"these routes may sob-ttitnte for eäch tioning of füe subject matter involved further determines other (e.g.,phone, fax, e-mail, letter). In other words, an "goal content. intention"ca^n be realized many different ways, and the Goal content theories analt"zcthe effects of differences blocking of one of them should readily lead to attempts to in goal content on various aspects of goal achievement with realize ihe intention through alternative routes (Lissner, (e.gl, quantity and quality of gäal achievement)and (e.g., well- 1933; Mahler, 1933; Ovsiankina, 1928). r"Jp""i to rälevant side effäcts subjective The major difference between Ach's and Lewin's ac- beine) of the goal pursuit at hand. The research strategy counts of[öw intentions affect behavior is the following: adop-tedby go;l content theorists contrasts goals ofthe di- 'uague Lewin employed classic motivational variables such as merision of"interest (e.g., specific-'t .rs. goals, goals needs andincentives (valences), and attempted to predict based on autonomv ne"eds s. goals baöd on material (e.g', the effects of intentions on the basis of these.variables. needs) on a re'levant dependent variable quantity or Ach, however, focused on how people form intentions, and quality of performance or subjective well-being). attempted to predict the effects of intentions by the inten- sifv oi the aci of intention formation and the framing of Goal Specificity. The prototype of a goal content the- th6 intention. He postulated that these volitional (willing) ory is thä go"l-sJtti.tg thöry pui forth by the organiza- (for variables functioned independently of the motivational tional psychologists Locke and Latham a summary, see Lolcke & iatham, 1990). The theory was meant to basis of an intention. "theory offer applied psychologists a of work motivation that wdts." fire basicihesis is that öhallenging goals that Modern Goal Theories are spelled out in specific terms have a particularly posi- Many of the ideas on goal-directed behaviors as presented tive ;ffect on behavior. In more than 400 mostly experi- (as counted by Locke & Latham, f990)' by fimes, McDougall,"the German psychology ofwill, and mental studies t6 ä smalier degreäthe behaviorlsts,witl beäcognized by challenging, specific goals were superior to modest, spe- -we (i.e-, "do the reader as proceed to present-day goal theories. cific goäklas *tll "t io challenging-,vague goals in a work There is a general-difference in style of theorizing and 'settinsvorr.6.st'; soals).In a typical s-t,tdycottdncted doing research between then and now, however. Historic (Laiham & Yukl, i^gZS),wooä-cutters were sent out theoiizing on goals is characterizedby relentlessconcep- to thJforest equipped with goals of different contents or at all. Cliallenging goals (i.e., standards above tual and änipirical battles (e.g., McDougall against lhg b"- no soals haviorists, iewin against Ach), but a scarcity of different whaYtcan be achieved wi[h noimal effort expenditure) led ideas on the functiöning of goals (e.g., only two opposing to higher productivity than that observed in the no-goal views in the German will psychology: Ach vs. Lewin)- contöl grorrp, but only when these challenging goals were Today there are no big theoretical controversies, and we formulaied in specific terms (e.g., exact number of trees hardiy observe experiments that critilllly compare differ- to be cut o, ,rrrÄbt, of m2). Spec*ific nonchallenging goals implying modest standards failed to increase productivity, ent theories; but t-hereis a wealth of different theories and "db ideas on goals and goal-directed behavior. To arrive at a "r äid "f,"ll"nging but vague goals, such as your best'" ,JOt) PERSONAL MOTIVATIONÄL SYSTEM

Over rnany years of research, Locke and Latham have "created that rrot all goals are equal.,' According to Deci explored rnoderators and mediators of the observed.soal and tryan, goatsattect a person'sbehavior diffeiently de_ specificity effect. What modifies the effectp Subi8cts pe+ng on the^kind of neäd that is the source of u p;;;, get frequent performance feedback, they should 1re:d,lo, goal setting. If two students in an art class contemplate leeJ highly to work on the tasks at händ, the - -committed creating an interesting painting, Student A may set hJrself tasks should not be too complex, and limitations in talent the goal ot pleasing her parents, whereas Student B fo_ or situational constraints ihould not make task per_ cuses on her intrinsic joy in creating an interesting oiece formance impossible. What does not seem to matte'i is of work. Based on thöii self-deterrfiinationth;;ü';;; whether goal setting is determined from outside (i.e., as_ and Ryan postulate that signed,goals) goals in the servic" of ",rio.ro*u. o^rfreely chosen by the individuals them_ competence, and social integration needs lead to bettJr selves (1.e., selt_setgoals) or in interacting with others performan-ces in the r"rrs" öf greater higt;; (i.e., participative göals). Locke and Lath?m ^creativity, .p"""lui" cognitive flexibility, greater deplh of information that,assignedgoals with high proöss_ standardscreate a ciallenge r1ng,ano more effective^^coping r.]-11"t with failure. D-eci and to. selt-set goals of'the same difficulty, and that dif_ that, these effecis a"remediated by a "".t"i" iicult.assignedgoals are interpreted as a hint that some_ llT itgy: klnd ot selt-regulation;the respective needs ofautonomy, body believesthe individual cän achievethe goai. This in competence, and social integralion are turn should stimulate stronger assumed to furthJi feelings of sem_:ffi;act;;; autonomous, self-determineä, thus better performance. and authentic goal striving.-U.i"? This positive kind of goal activity is contrasr&- -ii, Locke anä Latham also raised the question of what me_ unreflectively_controlled from outside (e g, ;sri# diates.the goal specificity effect. Specific eo*t "h"fi""ei"g by""tithorities).or from inside (e.f.. goalsrncrease peo-ple's f^:iT g."t r"tt?r.g persistence_they work loneei oi basedon leelings the ofobligation). task at hand. Il the time to be spent on the task i"slim_ R{3; aho diicuss side effects of goal_directed neode work with greater iitensity or effort. As - .Deci Tld ited, actions.The ef f'ectsof a person,sgoal_directeä actions nelghtened persistence and effort affect quantity are the and not only analyzed in terris of the"successful quality ot most task performance, realizati;;i these variatles o,_ralifu thg go^11,but also in terms as effective mediatois of various desired and undesired of the goal specificitf;?1"ä;. Fj1 side effects. nally, Goals based on autonomy,competence, and so- Locke and Latham ,"pori thatieople,i,itt ,p""fi" are associatedwitli positive challenging goals focus theii attention^on^th" execution :.t-* ^t$:q*aio:n,needs .more of sub.;ectivewell-being and hlgher life satisfaction.- Dehavlorsthat lead to goal achievement, Kasser while ignorine and Ryan (1993) difierentiatä possible distractions. the contents of "urio*lii" Inädütion, it i, ,pec,rl"i"ä ti;";;;;;: goals in terms ple with,specific of how well they correspond to ".rtoot* challenging goals shäw a g.eater readi_ competence, and social integration needi. Goal contents in nessto plan their goal puisultiwhich leads to conceiving accordancewith these needi are, for instance, more and better strategies to implement to cultivate the eoal. Bui one'srelationships to friends, or to mo"stlikel),, specific challenging become active in com_ gdals have f"La?,""1 "J munal services. Goal contents serr-m_onrtoringadvantages such as making money, be- as is assumed by Bandura and coming famous, schylk q98ll for and_acquiringhigh status do nät q""tify. if p_rox'imalgoals ""*p".äa with distal people are setting goaß(to be discussed). themselvei goäh of the latter type. thev experience a reduced- But what are the so^y931 level of subjective *ell_bäine. ec'_ of specific challenginggoals? cording to Kasser Latham (1990) and Ryan, this is partic"l".lt-1fi;'f* !.gkq pd list t.iuodeterminants, each af_ peoplg who lected by difl'erent feel highly efiicacious witir respect to relevant factors. The first is the individual,s goal-dir-ected capability; actions. This finding implies fhat people who lL1.^"1:9f.lflTl^"^"" thesecond r, ifr" 1"._ g:tt"fu I impJgmelt materialiitic cerved.desi-rabilityof performance. T" ly loah- are parti cul arly The former is lnflu_ at risk tor low subiectivewell_beine. en1e,o ny the individual's previous performance historv Subjective weil-being anct frow it is interpreted . has beä analyzed.within the by the individual (i.e., rele,u"rit rramew_o^rk^ot_9tfe.r outcome expectations, goal content approaches as well. Em_ causalattributions, perceived abil_ mons (1989, rtl; and,eTperienced Ig96) focuses on goäls that specify what a feelings of self_effica"jr;. ft " latter is person is. typically trying to dö. Examples^of s'uch per_ by outside fäctors (e.g., goal asjignments, role "trying 11:"1"o sonal strivings are to overcoire shyness .irith TYdglt, group norms, competitionsl g.o,rp and in_ [oak) strangers,","avoiding be_ingdependent on oihers,,, (e.g., the,valence of-the göal ai and il1".ltfl.:: d-etermined by others feel good about themselves.,'These the rndividual's needs, dissatisfactio--n Tltt"g soals. with previous oei_ whrch cannot be achieved formances,or mood).For Locke by a single course of ötion *Ji"tfr"-"öö, ffi_ are, like other ever, it is not the difference personality ättributäs, relativ"ly ,tut1" in sources(e.g., diifer""t over time and consistently needs) that matters. Wfrat expressed in a varlety of situ_ matters i, *fr"ifr%, ;i;-öi ations. Emmons (f99I, contentis framed in a challenging l9g6f reports that a srrong pre_ jpecific o, ,rorrspecoifi" dictor of person's j":"r o: a structuial"f.ät,rr" .a. positive zubjective ;"ll_ilid-;, XZ TZ of goal Jort"ot a proportion challenge), l"tt:g lrgh of intimacy strivings withinlhe and not whethei the goal is total number of strivings. l':l:rtl_"1t1'lity,oasedon one source Ä high proportion of achieve_ or another. ment and power strivinfs, howe;,rei t""d, to be related to nrgher levels ot negative well_being. as Sourcesof The level of con_ .Needs Coals. Deci and Ryan (1ggl; see creteness/abstractness alsoDeci, 1992) '"iew of a person,sltri.rings also seems have criticized,dö;"f by stating to play an important role [Emmons, lg92]. Hiehlevel GOAL EFFECTSON ACTIONAND COGNITION strivings (e.g., making new friends) tend to be associated would deal with the other person's disreputable actions with piychJogical ditress, particularly anxiety and de- or transgressions, entity thleorists p.opdru punishnrent pression, whereas lowlevel strivings (e.g., speak clearly and retaliation, incremental theorisfs proporä education and plainly to strangers) are linked to greater levels of and reform. psychological well-being but also to more physical illness. It also makes a difference whether people frame their Further CoaI Content Dffirences. Before ending the goal as approaching a positive outcome (e.g., spend time section on goal content theories, two important struciural with others or try to stay calm even under taxing circum- differenceJ between types of goal conlents need to be stances) versus avoiding a negative outcome (e.g., avoid mentioned. The first is discussedby Bandura (1989, lggl) being lonely or avoid getting upset). Hol&ng a high pro- and relates to the time frame of goal attainment. Proximal portion of avoidance strivings is associated with sup- goals relate to what the individual does in the present or pressed positive moods, reduced life satisfaction, the near future, whereas distal goals point far into the fu- heightened anxiety, and weaker physical health. ture. Bandura and Schunk (1981) observed children who were deficient and uninterested in mathematics Dursue a Inwllclt Theories as Sources of Coals. Dweck (1991: program of self-directed learning (7 sessionspei30 -itr- Ellioit & Dweck, 1988) has suggästeda different type of utes; total of 42 pagesof instructions) under conditions in- goal content theory than discussed so far. Dweck's theory volving either tiJ distal goal only (i.e., 42 pages in 7 focuses on achievement goals and postulates a distinction sessions),proximal subgoals that led up to the distal goal between learning goals and performance goals. The (i.e., 6 pagesper sessionfor 7 sessions),or without refer- source of goal setting considered here is a person's implicit ence to concrete goals (i.e., subjects in the control group theory about the nature of abihty-not a person's needs as were asked to complete as many pages as possible). The focused on in Deci and Ryan's theorizing. Whether in a distal goal alone had no effect compared with the control given achievement situation people set themselves either group, whereas entertaining proximal goals improved the one or the other type of goal depends on whether they children's arithmetic attainments. This effect was medi- hold an entity theory (i.e., believe that the amount of abil- ated by an increase in the children's strength of self- ity is fixed and cannot be easily changed) or an incremen- efficary and intrinsic interest in mathematics. Ls adopting tal theory (i.e., believe that the amount of ability can be additional proximal goals leads to receiving more feedback improved by learning). People with different theories on performance than adopting only a distal goal, subjects about the nature of ability set themselves quite different with proximal goals should find it easier to monitor the types of goals in achievement situations. Ehtity theorists progress oftheir goal pursuit. Apparently, distal goals are try to find out through task performance how capable they too far removed in time to effectively guide a person's ac- are, thus making inferences on the amount of their respec- tions and fail to provide small successesthat promote self- tive talent. Accordingly, they set themselves performance efficacy and interest. goals. But incremental theorists want to know where and A second important difference in the framing of goals why they are making mistakes in order to learn how to im- has recently been introduced by Higgins et al. (Higgins, prove, and thus they set themselves learning goals. These Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Roney, Higgins, & Shah, distinct types of goals have important behavioral conse- 1995) and pertains to the valence of the goal pursuit. It is quences, particularly when coping with failure. For indi- argued that goals with a positive outcome focus (i.e., goals viduals with performance goals, negative outcomes signal concerned with the presence or absence of a positive out- a lack of intelligence and thus result in helpless reactions come, such as being popular) are responsive to nurturance (e.g., low persistence).People with learning goals,on the needs and associated with a predilection for approach other hand. view setbacks as cues to focus on new behav- strategies. Goals with a negative outcome focus (i.e", goals ioral strategies. Their behavior is oriented toward master- concerned with the presence or absenceof a negative out- ine the ""uius of the setback. Similar distinctions between come, such as being lonely), on the other hand, are said to rr"iio,tr types of achievement goals have been suggested be responsive to security needs and associated with a by Ames and Ärcher (1988) who talk about mastery versus predilection for avoidance strategies. Finally, individuals performance goals,or by Nicholls (1979), who differenti- with chronic discrepancies between their actual and ideal ates between task involvement and ego involvement. selves (i.e., people who fall short of their ideals) show a Dweck (i996) has recently extended her theorizing to predilection for goals that aim at approaching matches to the issue of moral character, thus moving beyond issues desired end states. Individuals with actual/ought self- of goal effects on achievement. Entity theorists are con- discrepancies (i.e., people who fall short of their dirties) on traited to incremental theorists in their choice of goals the other hand select goals that aim at avoiding mismatches where another person's disreputable actions and tians- to desired end statesand goals that aim at avoiding matches gressions raise the question ofhis or her moral character. to undesired end states.T-his new conceptualizatiön and re- Whereas entity theorists set themselves the goal of ludg- search raises the interesting question of whether goalswith ing the other person's relevant moral attributes, incre- a positive or negative outcome focus have a better chance mental theorists pursue the goal of understanding the to be attained depending on whether they are framed as ap- dynamics of the other person's behavior in the given sit- proach or avoidance goals,and whether the typical framing uation. Aqain, these different goal contents have behav- of goalsassociated with different self-zuides(i.e., ideal vs. ioral conöquences. When subiects are asked how they o"g1rt) leads to differences in performa-nceand action. PERSONAL MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM

Self-Regulation Theories of GoaI Strü:ing theorizing. There, too, it is assumed that the attitude to- ward an action (i.e., its expectedvalue) and the perceived As experience tells us, there is often a long way from goal controllability of this-action (i.e., its feasibility) äonjointly setting to goal attainment. Having set a goal is just a first determine whether the individual decides to execute it. step ö*aä goal attainment, whlch is ömmonly associ- Whereas the action phases model talks of action goals as ated with a host of implementational problems that need the result of this decision, the theory of planned behavior to be solved successfully. These problems of goal pursuit speaksof behavioral intentions. are manifold, as they pertain to initiating goal-directed - But the action phasesmodel was introduced as a critique actions and bringing them to a successful ending. To ef- of traditional motivational theorizing on goal-directed äc- fectively solve these problems, the individual needs to tion, and therefore suggestsa host of further hypotheses. seizegood opportunities to act, ward offdistractions, flex- Gollwitzer (1990; see also Klinger, 1977; Kuhl, 1983) ibly step up efforts in the face of difficulties, bypass bar- arguesthat for issuesof goal choicl (or the choice of goal- riers, compensate for failures and shortcomings, and diiected actions) the clasiic motivational variables ofdäsir- negotiate conflicts between goals. Self-regulation theories ablhty and feasibility may suffice. But when it comesto the anälye how the individual äffectively soives these prob- implementation of a chosen goal (or goal-directed behav- lems of goal implementation. Often they focus on one of ior), further variables need to be taken into account. The these problems in particular and ignore the others. But all action phases model was designed to explicate the differ- ofthem try to propose general principles that apply to the encesbetween the motivational issue of goal choice and the problems of implementation of all goals despite differ- volitional (willful) issue of goal implementation (a concep- ences in context. In addition, one type of self-regulation tual distinction proposed by the German will psychologists, theory is primarily based on ideas cultivated in the psy- but also more recently by Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & chology of motivation, whereas the other type prefers a Sears,1944), and to stimulate hypotheses on the conditions purely cognitive view. and processesof the willful impiJmentation of chosengoals. Nuttin (1980) defined the central features of a motiva- The model takes a comprehensive temporal (horizontal) tional goal theory as follows, Goals and action plans are "cold"cognitions view of goal pursuit, rvhich extends from the origins of a not simply that specify standards or ref- Derson's wishes and desires to the evaluation of attained erence points. Rather, goals and plans are cognitively ex- äutcomes. It is suggestedthat goal pursuit entails four dif- pJicated and elaborated needs. Whereas goals describe ferent, consecutive action phases.At each phase, people are desired events and outcomes, plans specify how the per- expected to face a qualitatively distinct task that must son intends to attain these events and outcomes. The be accomplished to promote goal completion. The first of intensity of goal-directed actions is thought to be deter- these tasks, which is accomplished in the predecisional mined by the individual's motivation to reach the goal phase,is deliberating wishes in light of the evaluative crite- and by t6e instrumentality of the plan on which thesäc- ria of feasibilitj' and desirability to arrive at a decision on tions are based. whether to act on one's wishes. A positive decision trans- fers the wish or desire into a blnding goal, which is ac- The Model of Action Phases. In their mod.el of action companied by a feeling of determination or obligation. phases, Heckhäusen and Gollwitzer (1987; see also Goll- Accordingly, the-next task to be solved is promoting the ini- witzer, 1990;'Heckhausen, 1991) followed Nuttin's pre- tiation and successful execution of goal-directed action. scription of a motivational goal theory and explicated it in This may be simple when the necessary goal-directed ac- more detail. The model assumes that a person's motives tions are well-practiced or routine or complex when the and needs produce more wishes and desiies than can pos- person is still undecided about where and how to act. In sibly be räized. Therefore, the individual is forceä to complex cases,the execution of goal-directed action needs make a choice, which is preceded by deliberating the fea- to be prepared. The action phases model refers to this pe- sibility and desirability öf his or her wishes and desires. riod as the preactional phase. In moving from wishes to ac- Only the feasible and attractive wishes are chosen for tion, the individual createsplans by reflecting and deciding implementation and thus turned into goals.Whether goal- on when, where, how, and how long to implement action. directed behaviors are initiated in a given situation With the initiation of eoal-directed behaviors. the indi- dgpendson the desirability and feasibility ofthe goal, but vidual enters the actiona"lphase, which involves bringing also on the perceived suitability of the piesent sit"uational goal-directed behaviors to a successful conclusion. For this context with respect to the execution of relevant goal-di- f*pose, the individual must readily respond to situational rected actions. all of this is considered in relatiorito the opportunities and demands, must jump at all opportunities desirability and feasibility of other competing goals that that allow progress toward the goal and, when encountering also press ior realization in the given siträtiot-"id to pos- difficultles and hindrances, should readily increase his or sible future situational contextithat may be *o.e orl"r, her efforts. This responsivenessto situational opportunities suitable than the one at hand. and demandspromotes goal achievement. These ideas of the action phases model relv on the clas- The final a^ctionphaie is called postactional. Here the sic motivational variables (sei Atkinson, 1964i of desirabil- task is to evaluate goal achievement by comparing what ity. (i e., expected value of the goal) and feasibility (i.e., has been achieved with what has been desired. Often re- beliefs on w:hetherand how the gäd can be realizedi. They ality does not live up to our wishes and desires even when are reminiscent ofAjzen's (1985, lg88) theory ofplanneä we are determined to act on them. We may have to admit behavior that is also based on traditional motiirational that we simply did not perform as well as we had hoped or GOAL EFFECTSON ACTiON AND COGNITION that the environment was not as supportive as we had ex- type of information relevant to makinq decisions)is anir- attaining our goals' lr.zed in a relatively obiective, nonilluiionarv rvar'.Com- ^Butpected, and therefore we fell short-of even if we fully attain them, w-e may learn that our pared with a control gtö,tp, Gollwitzer and Kinnev (l98g) successesare not as sweet as we had hoped. Accordingly, äbserlr"d reduced illision of control judgments rvith sub- in the postactional phase we look back it the original de- iects in a deliberative mind-set, and Taylor and Goll- liberation and evaluätion of our wishes and desires, which *It e, (1995) obtained more modest self-perceptions(on triggers renewed deliberation and reevaluation of their personal attributes such as creativity, intellectual ability, (i.e., feai-ibilitv and desirability. Rs a consequence'we may re- iocial intelligence) and self-evaluations answers on docu ooi standards of pärformance with respect to the the Rosenbeie Self-Esteem Scale). The various features of the coenitive orientation associated with the delibera- goal at hand, but *e **y also start to consider other, com- "good" should facilitate the making of (i.e., ieting wishes and desiies that now apPear comparatively tive mind--set it more"feasibleand desirable.In this sense,the postactional realistic) goal decisions,_because prevents perceiv_ing well as the future and, wishes (i.ei, the potential goals) as more desirable or fea- 'mostphase directs us toward the past as importantly, brings ui to where we started-our sible than they actually are. implementation wishes and desires. When subiects are aiked to plan the of a chosen eoal är proiect, a cogniti't e orientation (i"e., the irn- quite different attributes origi- Action Phasesand Mind-Sets. The primary objective of ^nates:plemenäl minä-söt) with sensethat the action phasesmodel is to identify the typical problems Subiects become clösed-minded in the people encäunterin their goal pursuits. But the model has they are no longer distracted by irrelevant information in process- äkJ stmnlated theoretica*lconcepts that help to under- (Gollwitzer, f9S6). fhey are also very effective issues stand people'sfunctioning at the värious stagesof goalpur- ing information related- to implementation-related et aI.' 1990)' suit. dne äf theseis the öoncept of mind-set. This concept (ele., the sequencing of actions; Gollwitzer is in was introduced by the Würzburg school of thor-rght(Ktilpe, Mä"reorrer,del irability-related information processed pros cons (Beckmann & 1904; Watt, f905) to explain the experimental observation a partial manner favoring over information is that instructing subjectsto solvea specitic task createsa re- Göll*itzer, 1987), and fäaiibility-related This lated cosnitive"orientation(i.e., a sät) that furthers the so- analyzed in a manner that favors illusionary optimism. in the face of lution of that task, but hampers solving other, unrelated ootimism extends to the illusion of control (Gollwitzer Kinney, 1989), but tasks. Apparently, when ^ p"iton becomes involved with a u'ncontrollable outcomes & of important personal at- eiven tait, releväntcognitive proceduresbecome activated also to a person's self-perception sensitivity to änd hence more easily"accessible'Applying this idea to the tributes (^e.g.,cheerfulness, academic ability, ability), model of action phasäs(Gollwitzer,-f990, 1991),it follows others, seFrespect, drive to achiev-e,leadership and un- that different mind-sets (i.e., general cognitive orientations to the perceiveä.'ulnerability to both controllable (e.g., to- with distinct features) shodJ emerge when a person ad- controilable risks dev-eloping an addiction Pre- an early death, dressesthe distinct tasksassociated with the various action scription drugs or lo.-singa pärtner to phases. These mind-sets should be endowed with those resnlctively)."finullv, thä implemental mind-set elevates Of importance is that äognitive features that facilitate the respective tasks and pedpl"'s^mind-set mood attd tüeir self-eiteem. and perceived r'rl- arö thus beneficial to task completion. ihe effects on self-perception self-esteem By initiating the mind-setithat correspond to the ac- nerability to risk are not *"äi"t"d- by moodbr (see the listed fea- tion phasesthäy are currently traversing, people c-anef; chanses Taylor & Gollwitzer, fggS). All facilitate goal fectively promote their goal pursuits. Studies conducted tures" of the implemental mind-set should to effectively on the äind-sets attoöiat"ä either with deliberating achievement as they allow the individual goal such as wishes and desires (i.e., the deliberative mind-set of the cope with classic problems of implementation, phase) planning the initiation of being distracted ivith irrelevänt things' doubting the at- 'eoal-directedoredecisional or with äctions (i.e, the^implemental mind-set of tractlveness of the pursued goal, or being pessimistic about ihe preactional phase) support this- idea. When subjects its feasibility. of goa-l are äsked to englagein int-e^nsivedeliberation of whether In summäry, it appears that the stages Pursuit adopts the to turn an important personal wish or-desire into a.goal, are more effi'clently traversed when a person of goal pur- a cognitive oiientation (i.e', the deliberative mind-set) appropriate mind-sbts at the various phases seemsmost with"the following features originates:- become rüit. for setting goals, a deliberative mind-set Qqbjecls mindset by in- more open-mindeä in processing availabl.e information; conducive. Thä indivldual can create this and feasibility of heeded'information is irocessedmore effectively while tensively weighing the desirability chosen-goals, peripheral information is also encoded (Gollwitzer, 1991; wishes änd däsire"s. When implementing more conducive' h""th"nt"tt & Gollwitzer, 1987). Second, subjects pro- however, an implemental mind-Jet seems by the imple- cessinformation that is relevant to making decisions (e'g', People can establish this mind-set planning desirability related information) more öffectively than *"tit"tiotr of their goals. implemeniation-related information (e.g., information on Heckhausen, & Implementation Intentions oersus Goal Intentions' A thä sequencing-Finally, of actions; Gollwitzer, concePt stimulated by the action-phases model is Stel ler,' I 990 ). with desirabi] ity-related- informa- ,""orrd (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1996)' It is a tion. the pros and cons of making a decision are analyed implementatio:n intention the individual's commitment in an imp'artial manner (Beckmann & Gollwitzer, 1987)' foim of planning that involves behavior in responseto a Moreolre'r, feasibility-related information (i.e., another to perfoim a cerlain goal-directed 370 PERSONALMOTIVÄTIONÄL SYSTEM particular situation. Implementation intentions take the In summarv. forming an implementation intention is an "I iormat of intend to dö r when I encounter situation y" act of will that changei "o.rr"üu, control of goal-directed (Bargh thus Iinking an anticipated future situation (opportunity) to action over to dir,eöt, environmental control & a certain goal-directed behavior, Implementation intentions Gollwitzer, 1994). The situational stimuli specified in im- are diffeönt from goal intentions. fh" latt"t take the for- plementation intentions become direct elicitors of goal- "I mat of intend to a-chiever"; the r specifies a desired end- äirected action. People may turn to this self-re-gulitory state. which mav be the execution of a desired concrete strategy when they anticipate problems with ma[ing u-sb behavior or the ättainment of a desired outcome' Goal in- of eooä opportuniiies to aöt (e.[., when they are tired, ab- tentions are commonly the end result of the deliberation of roib.d irisome other activity, l-ostin thoughts) and when wishes and desires in the predecisional phase, and thus they attempt to fight bad habits or unwanted stereotypical mark the transition to the preactional phäse (accordingly, thought p":tt"rns. It the latter case,the stimuli that habit- the behavioral intentions dlsic,rssedin thä theory ofplanied uallri tneeer the unwanted responses only have to be behavior qualify as goal intentio-ns; Ajzen, 1985, 1988). linkäd toäsired antagonisticresponses. Äll of this is rerh- iniscent of Ach's analisis of willing, as described earlier' Goal intentions-create a feeling of commitment to achieve "linkage the specified desired end-state-but do not commit the indi- The data obtained ur" itt sopport oT Ach's theory viduäl to execute a certain goal-directed behavior when a of intention" and weaken Lewin's critique. Apparently, specified situational contexl arises. Such additional com- implementation intentions (i.e., intentions that link situa- riitments may be added with implementation intentions tioins to behaviors) strongly affect a Person's goal-d-irected whenever protl"*t of goal realizatiän are anticipated. behaviors. They are noi iuperfluous, as Lewin thought- Implemäntation intentions constitute- a powerful strat- On the other händ, recent däta suggest (Gollwitzer, 19-96) egy tö overcome these problems. First, forming implemen- that a vital goal intention is the precondition for the ef- tation intentions increases a person's commitment to the fects of impl-ementation intentions, which is in line with respective goal intention (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Lewin's view of the primacy of goal intentions. Ratajczak, 1990). Second, it helps people get started with goal-directed actions. GoaI intentions with implementation Competing Coal Pursuits and. Action Control -Strategies. intentions are completed about three times more often Kuhl (i983, tg84; for a recent summary, see Kuhl & Beck- than mere goal intentions (see.Gollwitzer, 1993). Because mann, 1994) focuseson self-regulatoryprocesses that con- implementa-tion intentions spell out links between situa- tribute to goal achievement in t}re face of competing action tio^nalcues and goal-directeä behaviors, it is assumedthat tendencies. Following Atkinson and Birch's (1970) theoriz- by forming sucf intentions people pass on the control of ing on the dynamicJ of action, it is assumed that at any goal-directed behavior to envirönmental cues thus facili- giien point many different action tendencies coexist with tating the initiation of goal-directed actions. On a mi- iua*ing and wan-ing strengths. Atkinson and Birch's ideas crole"vel of analvsis. it i; h\,pothesized that the mental did not initially reöeive due attention, as most research on representation o? th" specifiäd situational cues becomes motivation and goals traditionally analyzeda person's striv- highly activated, thus äaking these cuejsmore accessible. ings separately in an episodic fashion. However, Kuhl as- Results of various experiments support this view (for a sumes that for an ordered action sequence to occur, a summary, see Gollwitzer, 1993, 1996). Situational cues current guiding goal has to be shielded from competing goal specifieä in implementation intentions are more easily de- intentiois (e.g" the goal of making an important phone call tected and remembered, as well as more readily attended from the comleting"intention to iidy np ötte's mössy desk). to than comparable nonintended situations. Moreover, it is He terms this'shieläing mechanism'aciion control änd dif- hypothesized that implementation intentions create strong ferentiates a number äf dfferent, but compatible control associative links between mental representations of situa- strategies, such as attention control, emotion control, moti- tions and actions that are commonlv only achieved throueh vatioricontrol, and environment control. Through environ- repeated and consistent acting in these situations. Äccorä- ment control, for example, the individual pövents the ingly, the initiation ofthe intended goal-directed behavior derailing of an ongoing goal pursurt by removing any.com- in the presenceof the critical situation should resemblethe peting tömptationJor eniicementsfrom the situationalcon- initiation of a habitualized resoonse. Various exDeriments iext ii whiäh goal pursuit is to occur. demonstrate that the eoal-diräted behaviors sp'ecified in Whether and how effectively these strategies are em- implementation intentions are initiated swiftly änd effort- ployed depends on the currenf control modJof the indi- lessly in the presence of the critical situation. Moreover, "lanal. Ai action-oriented person concentrates on the the iubliminai presentation ofthe critical situation suffices planning and initiating of -contextualgoäl-directed action, responds to activate cognitive concepts and knowledge relevant to ilexibly"to the respec"tive demands, anä em- the efficient execution of the intended behavior. The ploys the listed control strategies effectively. Things are heightened accessibility of these concepts should in turn quile different with a state-or"iented person. This plrson faci"litate the efficient initiation of the irtended behavior. Jannot disengage from competing iicomplete goals, is Finally, patients with a frontal lobe injury-who are caught up in" rincontrollabld p"tö.t"t^tion- of- t-houghts kno*n tdbe plagued by deficient conscioüs and effortful relaled io aversive experiences or to dysfunctional control of behavior but known to be blessedwith effective thoughts about future successes. State orientation may effortless control of habitualized behaviors-greatly bene- be nduced by situational variables (e.g., a surprising fit from having formed implementation inteniions when it event, persistent failure) but is also found"edin a pärsonal comesto the sivift initiation of intended behaviors. disposition. The model of action control has seen many GOAL EFFECTS ON ACTION AND COGNITION 3;l

refinements (see Kuhl & Beckmann, 1gg4) and has ar- Researchon self-completiontheory also has discoverecl rived at a high level of complexity. It is assumed that ac- that effective s,elf-symbölizingneeds' social reality. I " l; ;; tion control cannot be understood without considering wrth the social reality-notion developed by Lewin,s stu_ the many different mental subsystems (e.g., " memory (Lissner, dents 1933; Mahler, lg33), ömpensatory efforis r{rl:T specialized onjhe retention ofgoak) involved. In were found particularly to be effective *hen othe'r ";i; aoortron, experrmental research on state orientation (Gollwitzer, as a noticed them 1986). Self-completi., iüä;; personality attribute has &scovered a further volitional also point_s_tothe interpersonal costs of compensatory goil handicap called self-infiltration (Kuhl & Kazen, fgg4). pursuits. When subjects respond to incomplet"""rJ#itt State-oriented individuals misperceive assigned _readily compensation, they interpret the presencä of others in goals as self-generated, and the d-egree^ofsuch false"self- terms of theircapability to notice t-heir compensatoryef_ ascriptions is closely associated w:ith a reduced enact- torts and thus lack social se-nsitivityabout th6 personalin_ ment of self-chosen as compared with assigned goals. terests of these people (Gollwitzer& Wicklunä, lgS5b). Selt-completiontheoryis reminiscent of Lewin's (1926) Resu,mption of Disrupted Goal pursuit Kuhl,s action quasi-need theory of goal pursuit. As with Lewin;s the_ ",ollr,.l theory focuses o-n self-regulatory strategies that ory, it is-assumed that a person's goals persist until they shield goal pursuit from distractiois. But'even ifä certain are reached. A person's readinesi to äct o., a goal i's attempt to achieve a_goalgets disrupted or fails, the indi- greater w-hen tension is hlgh or,-as self-completion Theory vidual does not need-to gi re up on the goal. Many goals states,when a senseof the goal's incompletenessis pre_ have multiple alternative pathwäys to appioach them."fhe sent. It differs from Lewin's-theorizing ii the assessrÄent latter is particularly true fbr higher ordäi goals(e.s.. beine of the commitment to the goal. Follolwing Lewin, com- popular), as they can be approached thrögh maiy alterl mitment.depends on how-wäll the goal is integrated into native lower order goals(eg-., giving -others)l partie{ making com- relevant higher order needs. Becausä self-compietion the- pliq91ts, heJping Sätf-cömpletion theor"y has ory focuses on self-defining goals, which in I-eivin,s terms explicitly addressedthe issue of comp-ensation with alter- would,already. qualify as hgher .order needs by them- p-tive goal-directed_efforts by analyzing a certain type of serves(e.9., belng a good mother), commitment cannot be higher order goal called self-defining göals (Gollwiiier & assessedby considering the integration with higher order Wicklund, t985a; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). Self- needs. Accordingly, cömmitmeit is assessed"more di_ defining goals-specify some kind of identity as the desired rectly in terms of a person's hanging on to the goal and re- end state, such as being good-mother. phvsi- a scientist, fusing to let go. It iiinquired wlietfier people äonsistently cia.n,or politically liberäl_person. As riany different things use opportunities to act on their goal, and whether peoplä indicate the possession ofsuch identities, the theory coi- would consider the idea of having to quit their ceives the individual's striving for an foal^as identity as an ändur- highly aversive. In all the .es."t"[ or, ölf-"o*pleTion, it ing colle_ctingthesä indicators (oi prgc.es:.of self-defining was always the individuals with high commitmeirt (in the symbols). These indicators extend from possessingthe rell sense described) who showed cornjpensatory efforis as a evant material symbols (e.g., books, iournals, anä awards responseto incompleteness,whereä. .torrco-mitted indi- for a scientist) to relevant (e.g., Jelf-descriptions using ti- viduals failed to dö so. In other words, goal commitment tles) and performances- (e g., obtain_ing and pu6lishin{n-"that is a powerful-moderator of self-completiön effects. This is teresting research findings). The theorv pöstulates in line with other findings on the möderating role of com- whenevär shortcomingsriith respect to änä type of sym- mitment on goal effects, for instance, the eoal specificitv bol are encountered, the i.tdivicinal will expöience ielf- effect (see Locke & Latham, 19g0) or the-effecis of pei- definitional incompleteness, which leads to äompensatory sonalstrivings on subjectivewell-being (Brunstein, fgg3). efforts aimed at sübstitution. These may take thä form of ,_-Selt-completion theory may sound similar to Steele,s either pointing to the possession of alteinative symbols or (1988) self-affirmation theory but self-affirmation is a acquiring new symbols. self-esteemtheory, not a goal ih.ory. According to Steele, The compensation principle has been supported in anything that makes you fäel good will reaffirri your self_ many studies with various ielf-definine eoaii and dif- esteem. In other words, when self-esteem is thieatened, ferent types of symbols (e.g., Gollwitzär,"Wicklund, & the individual can do a broad array of things (e.g., affirm Hilton, 1982; Wagner, Wicklünd, & Shaigan,"and 1g90; Wick- values) to reaffirm self-esteem. For self-cämpläion the- lund & Gollwitier, 198I). Brunstein Gollwitzer ory, the focus is on self-defining goals in whicL an incom_ (1996) demonstrated that easily (e.g., accessiblesymbols pletenes.s can only be. substitiöd for by acquiring an self-descriptions) are equally-powerful sutstitutes fä alternative symbol of this self-defining goä1.When aielf_ symbols that are harder to come (e.g., by relevant per- detinition is threatened, the things thö ierson can do are formances). This implies that newcöm"rr"to " field oi in- more limited as he or she must aäqrrirJa substitute with terest science) can already symbolize having the to this very self-definitioni _(e.g., ::rp:"t rather than anything related idäntity even thouqh thev arä not vet in fulläom- tnat ls allrrnung. mand of the-relevant pärformances. Further. elderlv do "läave qegple not have to the field" when age-relateä Mobilizatio.n of Effort. People may promote goal deficits hamper performance (see Gollwitze."& Kirch- achievement by compensatingfor experienceä failures,-but :i hof, in p.ess) us sälf-descriptive allusions to relevant ^andper- they may also iry tdavoid cämmittiirg failures in the first l; tormances in the past or to acquired possessions place.-Warding off failures becomes Jpressing issuewhen- titles * effectively suLstitute for weäk perfärmaoces. ever difficulties are mounting and sr]ccessLecomes less g 'iilai F! gE *J !t 372 PERSONALMOTIVÄTIONÄL SYSTEM

likely or even impossible.When do people step up their ef- solitary. People set themselves many goals, and these goals forti to confronttxperienced üfficultles and when do they *"u "ä-" iito conflict with each'oiher. When goali ate succumbto failureP Brehm (Brehm & Self, 1989; Wright & short ter-, it makes senseto shield an ongoing goa"ipursuit Brehm, l-989) has offered an energization theory of motiva- from competing others until the ongoing goal pursgit is tion that offers answersto these questions. completed- (see Kuhl's research described earlier)' Things This theory assumesthat a person's energization in terms get irore tricky, however, when the conflicting goals aie of the readiness to exert effort is directly determined by önduring, such as self-defining goals (Wicklund & Goll- the perceived difflculty of the task at hand. As the per- witzer, 1982), personal strivings (Emmons, 1989), or life ceived difficulty increases,so does the person's effort ex- tasks (Cantor, lgg+). Emmons and King (1988) observed penditure, and this is true unless the task is perceived as that conflict between and within personal strivings is asso- unsolvableor impossible. But there is a second limit to this ciated with poor well-being. Coriflict was found-to relate linear increase oT effort expenditure in response to height- to negative affectivity and physical symptomatology, both ened task difficulty. Brehm introduces the concept of po- concürrently and prospectively. Emmons (1996) argues tential motivation to describe this limitation. What feeds that creative integrations of a person's strivings might re- into potential motivation are the classic motivational vari- verse the negative effects ofconflict. The observation that ablei of the strengths of the related need or higher order so-calledgenerativity strivings (i.e., strivings that demand goal, the incentivJvalue of the task, and the instrumental- both the äreating uttd gi,rit{,tp of a prodrict) are associ- l-tv of task completion for need satisfaction or attainment of ated with higher levels of subjective well-being_is cited in the higher ordär goal. For the individual with high poten- support of this idea, as generativity may be understood as tial motivation, the linear relationship between the per- thä'creative blending äf itrti*"ry stiivings and power ceived difficulty of the task at hand and respective effort strivings. Through creative integration of agentic (power) expenditure is expected to extend even to tasks ofvery high and coämunal (intimacy) strivings, the generative individ- diificultv levels. ihereas with low levels of potential'mofi- ual is able to achieve a reconciliation between power and vation this linear relationship is expected to end at tasks of intimacy. It appears then that subjective well-being needs moderate difficulty. When the level of potential motivation more than the possession and progression toward impor- is low, people do not find it worthwhile to extend more ef- tant life goals. Ii demands the inte[ration of separate goal fort when an easy task becomes more difficult. When po- strivingsinto a coherent gestaltor philosophyoflife. tential motivation is high, however, an increase in difficulty Conilict between goali has also been äiic,tssed in the is matched by investing more effort, and this responsive- theoretical frame*o* of life tasks (Cantor & Fleeson, nessholds up to high levels of difficulty. 1991, 1994). Life tasks, such as doing well academically, Empirical tests of the theory have varied potential mo- exert specific influences on behavior as they are inter- tivation either by offering rewards for task completion preted differentlv over the life course and acrosssituational (that were described as either low or high) or by suggest- äontexts. Life tasks are often confronted with dlfficultles, ing to subjects that successfultask completion makes them frustrations, anxieties, and self-doubts, and the individual's eligible for winning an attractive prize {and the probabil- style of appraising these hindrances leads to a typical pat- ity of winning was described as either low or high). Effort tern of action goals aimed at overcoming such obstacles.For mobilization was assessedeither directly in terms of psy- example, colleige students who worry äbout their abihties chophysiological arousal (i.e., systolic blood pressure; when they experience failure (i.e., outcome-focusedindi- Wright & Gregorich, 1989) or indirectly in terms of the at- viduals; Harlow & Cantor, 1994), may, in a strategic effort tractiveness ofsuccess iust before the subject began work- to meet their academic life task, turn for reassurance to ing on the task (Biner-& Hammond, 1988), beöausethe others whom they regard as confidants and encouragers. In theory defines immediate attractiveness of successas a di- this case, social goals are put in the service of academic rect function of the amount of energy mobilized. In gen- goals. But for others, different patterns ofaction goals may eral, low potential motivation curbs the predicted linear 5" *or" suitable to meet the äcademic life task. College relationship between task difficulty and exerted amount students who worry abo.utlosing their composure and thus of effort; if potential motivation is low, people no longer failing to perform in an upcoming test or exam (i.e., defen- mobilize more effort when task difficulty increases. This sive pissimists; Norem & Cantor, 1986) may instead try to finding parallels observations made in iesearch on self- meei their academic life task by mentally playing through completion theory: Only people who were strongly com- worst case scenarios prior to taking the test. Apparently, mitted to their self-definitions (or higher"compensatory order goals) people tune the goal'pursuits in tlie service of*their liie responded to failure with heightened ef- iaskl to their ideographic appraisals of experienced obsta- forts. As people with weak commitments can be assumed cles, thus trying to find the most suitable solutions for them to experience low levels of potential motivation at a given personally. self-definitional task, it appears that the exertion of effort to prevent failure (effort mobilization) as well as efforts Goals and Discrepancy Reduction. The goal theories aimed at the compensation of failure (self-symbolizing) discussed so far implicitly or explicitly conceive goals as can only be expected when the respective goäl pursuitls somethingattractive (i.e., a positive incentive correspond- perceived as motivationallyworthwhile. ing to soö vital need) that fhe individual feels committed to attain. The goal thus pulls the individual in the direc- - Negotiating betuceenGoals. Researcherson goals are tion of goal attainment. This motivational perspective is becorningincleasingly aware that goals are not cieated in rivaled by a mo.e cognitive view that conceives goals as 373 GOAL EFFECTSON ACTIONAND COGNITIO\

for.a program is the standard' Prototvpical are For example,the reference criterion solelyspecifying a performance knorvs its the-self-regulatiönof ac- output of th" respective principle. Each loop ää"ä"'ät iisg5, r'ggriiJ""t on activated goals nö motivational o*i "orrrp"rator, which ii thought to becorne ffi.;;äi'j'to n-a"ra, \av9 föcused on the respective thevonlv"specify the conditions that when thJ person's attention is "'J*"qu"n"", i'"r,", goal. Beha:vioris usually regulated at the program level, o, n"g"tiv" sJlf-ä"aluation' If the set goal allow a positive higher levels suspendeduntil attention is to- a positive- self-evalu ation ivith action at tr ;äi":älhto.tgh otl"' t actions, criteria (e'g., when the in- Ieads to a nega- cusedon hgher ievel reference *U"reai staying below goal The *"""ift, -onö's.tliu.s i1 pushedbv the äividuat beäomes self-aware; Scheier & Carver, r9$)' ii.,,ä;1i;;;i;.lio". tr'Jmdividual discrepanciesand to trigger with the discrepancv' comDarator's task is to discover äil; seH-e.raloationassociated geared ät discrepancy reduc- '"lf-"t'tluation thät lo*"11".'"1 goals or behaviors anä pulled bv the ""ti;P;t"d;;;i'it'" to goal-directed behaviors are en- cläsing gap betweenthe tion. When i"mpediments ir':t"*"u"irrv;iritr."a'to lhe is halted' An individual is expected to (i'e', the stand-ard)' "o,rt t"t"d, striving ',J;';;;"'iüä;";ic ;;äir'" g"a pärformänce goal only when outcome expetta- stimulateeffortful act- "o.tti""" to strive Tor the -Scheier, ideaJimplytlrat goä1s (Carver 1982)' A positive affec- Bandura calls high il;; ;;" hlgh & t;'.**J !o"i-motivation) "tt"i"""ent iwhat consequence.of.goalattainment is not when-people cognize a dis- tive responseas a o"?foi*un"" only is ihe detection of error associated set goal(öano.ura urr,r-",i, however, nor ir"o"n"y betweenthe statusquo a-ndthe speed of progress"toward glvrnglre- ;tü';ä;;e affect. Rather, -the & öervöne,1983). Bandura theretbre proPoses or negative te€lrngs a per- a soal is"seen as the source of positive äent f""aü"ck as a powerful measureto-stimulate ot these ieelrngs rs to.engage irri person's goal pu^rsuit'The intensity l;"-';;;;l;;suit. Mo'reover,people- are expected the speed meets a set when reeuiated "g"In in " feedbacklöp: If i;;;d""" the experienöeddiscrepancy onlv whereas neg- ;';ifil; ac- ;F";; "?it"tlo", positive feelings emerge' with respectto the requtreo stays thev feel self-efficacious "ii"e, *ill b"' "*perienced- iith anlspeed that (Bandura& Wood, 1989)' Possesslng "iJ"E tiois -Doubts.about a below this öriterion (Carver & Scheier' l99ul' necessitatedby theseactions undermrne the Carver ihe "up"bilities The most pronounced difference,between o"rroi, readinessto act on the goal' ideas is the role of af- ""w;;;;iil;;.i"g theory is ""ä;;ü;; "".J"i""a Bandura's in Bandu"ra'sgoal the,hy discrepancy red-uc- to an endwnen f;.-h Bandura s view, anticipated oothesisthat goalpursuit doesnot come state (i'e" a positive pursuitends with tion implies a positive affective fi;'ö;itt't"ir*al rt'l ia"" that goal "ii" "t tt'ä i"ai" iaual to act'änd the voiöd the behaviorists ;'.j'f:.äil;i"" I irt"i'" goalattainment was originally. Pt with the experience of a dis- later goaltheorists' .r"n"ii"" affect associated ;;ä;;;;;iiically acc"epteibvmost toward reducing the dis- however' ;'-5;;;;;r'ät ir-," individual Wood and Banduras(1989) research-suggests' and scheier model' action-is cacyfeelings' ;;;;;;;;.i; the Carver that soalattainment'"i'"' p"opl"'s - self-e"f-fi has discovered a dis- rn tnrs ;;i-"-";ä ü.h" comparatorthat whicf, results in setting more challenginggo,ats' processis the eI- ;;"X%;; ft" .*p"tiäntial aspect of this discrepanciesare createdthat stimulatenew (i'e'' the way,new .dät"" of the räspectivereference criterion foits' at discrePancYreduction' needsto be focused on the goll), An- similarities.to control the- Derson'sattention ä;ä;;;; ü;;6;;' certain feature of the Carver and Scheler scheierat the beginningof tther differential .';;;;;;;tila uy's"h"i"' c*""' and nature' Maly goal theories (in- 1988)' But what are ;;ü i, itrlhi"t"t"hical ää üäi""aiöal, & Carver' g""a"ra's) acknowledgethat goal pur- ofengineering "f"Ji"* implicitly ;i;; Jifi;;";"es? Control theory is a branch büt.^thevdo,Pl machmesto oo ;il':;-hi;;"'"t'i"itty oiganized, that was originally developedto enable theorizing (tor an exPt-fclt (Powers'-re78)'As sug- explicitly consider it in their ;ili;s;;;i"X'tyäo"" bv people action' see VaI- apply i.-"?-.itt of the hierarchical nature of rtritt"i "t ui. tigi6ol] catuet-at'd Scheier äää'b; lacher & Wegner, 1985, 1987)' :ä;'ä ää"'".i"J fiume*o'kto the-studv'i gP"l- s ggal unit ot their The most pronoorr""d similarity between !an{ur-a äiää ""tior,' The central co:rceptual is that both theories a negativefeed- til;;;; t["i of Caruer and Scheier analvsisis the negativefeedback loop' In of the goal' As wrtn a per- ä;;;i "äJ*tt trt" motivational importance b"ck loop, a refeiencecriterion is-comparect "cbld" mental representa- is a difference ""a"a. the goal is conceived as a ceotual input in a comparator'If theie conceptualization ot an erroris de- tion oi " päfot*"nce standard' This ;:i;;";^äil*;'; 'l;;"i is generated-(i'e'' why a person's motiva- that reduces nä"tt-*^tl"t it difficult to explain i**äj.-rft" detecti e"or"elicits behavior of potential and the il;;';;h"* itt" e"a (s"e Btehm't ttoiiott ii"- air"r"o*cy between the referencecriterion task ctrl- (1973)proposal that motivation) moderates the relationship between räil.*i"g Powers's and Carver/ ;";ö.Jöit. "ttä s"h"i"' Ii""f,t ""ä effort. According to Bandura behaviori, org"n,r"ä"hi"t?t"rtr""ly''c"t"äi supPress loop Scheiär, heightened task difficulty should- Peo- loop structure" In the feedback an in- ;;;;;"t.?A"g related ple's efforts"to try to complete the task' because "; .h"1;;'? the'hiera-rchv' self- p":I" is com*ottly associatedwith ;i;ä concepts,'descrloe ll; fl: ä;""'in^;J äirri""tty Leins a nice person), termed system (Bandlra) and less positive "reference^ termeo t"ä""La self-efficacy feelings criterion' Abstract action goals' As -Brehmano the outcome expectations(Carver-& (e.g., friendly to one's.colleagues]'qro.vlfe *l"i-"1]' ;;l";;ilrt be (see & Sell 1989; Wright. &, Brehm' level Ioop And at the associates Brehm' ih. ,"f"r"r,"e"criterion at the middle however' high action 1989) have repeatedly demonstrated, Po.ten- rt"at thaf specify a.coirse-of to mobrlrze ö;i;;i;"" !t"ts tial motivatioi-t makei it worthwhile for p-eople elg" s"ttdlt'g^agreeting iso-."ll"d Programs; i"Jll;^- '^^^ "ffort *h"tt height"tted diificttltiet threaten the outcome oi a hlgner,IooP additional The moäeläss,tmes that high ömmltment to superordinate next-lower loop' *f. ""-pf"tlon. And "onriit'rt"t the reference criterion for the PERSONAL MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM

self-defining goals does stimulate compe-nsatory-efforts whetherpeople'sgoals are basedon one type ofneed or an- when failuräs are experienced (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, other. one kind of implicit theory or another, determines 1982), although experienced incompletenesses should how successfullythey pursue their goals,and how success- create low self-efficaiy feelings and negative outcome ex- fuliy they go through their lives in terms of psychological pectations. ""d phyii.äl well-b"eing. Future research on-göal coritent theoiies should inciudJ questions about furthör important Automatic Coal Pursuits. For all the goal theories dis- goal content dimensions.in addition, goal content tlieorists cussedso far, investigators would agree that a person's goal ihould start to explore how goal contänt effects are medi- striving may presenf both an intentionally controlled, ef- ated by self-regulätory p.oceises, thus suggestingdifferent fortful and consciousendeavor and an environmentally con- self-regulator/systems^ for different kinäi of foals (e.g., trolled, effortless process that proceeds outside the Deci & Ryan, 1991; Dweck, 1995; Higgins et al., 1994). person's awareness.'.'Butthe possibility of direct goal ef- This type of theorizing would transcend the common self- iects almost always remains just a tacit assumption, and no rezulatöry notions of goal pursuit, which assume that the explicit efforts are made to theoretically and empirically saäe principles of seli-regül"tion apply to all kinds of dif- explicate this possibility. There are a few exceptions to the ferent goal pursuits. rule however. First, as mentioned, the concept of imple- Seco.-nd.goal striving is recognized as a volitional (will- mentation intentions has been used to explore when and ful), self-re"gulatoryenäeavor. Ölassic theorizing on moti- how people switch from conscious control ofgoal-directed vation (Atkinson, 1964; McClelland, 1951; Nuttin, 1980; actions to a more automated control (Gollwitzer, 1993, Weiner, 1972) construes goal pursuit as an issue of need person's . 1996).It is argued that this route to direct control is strate- satisfaction.A näeds^"te conceived as the ulti- gically employed by the individual to attain desired goals mate source of goals,as needs (e.g., the need for affiha- when üfficulties in attaining desired ends are anticipated, tion) produce riishes and desireslhat specify attractive and forming implementation intentions places the initiation incentives. The demands of situational contexts determine of goal-directed actions under direct environmental con- what becomes a person's action goal, becausedepending troi But a further type of automated control of goal- on the situation, certain actions are seen as more instru- directed actions is spölied out in Bargh's (1990; Bargh & mental than others for the satisfactionof needs (i.e., ac- Barndollar, 1996) auto-motive theory. It is suggestedthat quiring the respective incentives). Following this line of strong mental links develop between the cognitive repre- tliought, it is tempting to assume that the inten_sity of a sentaiionsofsituations and the goals the individual chroni- person's goal pursuit is exclusively determined by the cally pursues within them. Ä a consequence of this itrength of hir or her need and the instrumentality ;f the repeatedand consistentpairing in the past, these goalsbe- pursued goal-directed behaviors. cÄe automatically activated"when the individuäl enters Most Äodern goal theories do not deny that people's the relevant situation. The automatically activated goal needs or motives affect their goal pursuits, but they do not then guides behavior within the situation, without the indi- rely solely on motivational determinants of goal pursuit vidual choosing or intending the respective goal-directed either. The focus of modern goal theories is on the suPer- line of action. There may have been a deliberate choice of imposed self-reguJatorystrategies. These strategies are as- the goal in the past, but this conscious choice is now by- sr.läed to help ihe individual oivercomethe many problems purräd. The situational cues directly guide the p"tsot's of goal implementation. Even when goals are highly attrac- are highly instrumen- goal-directed- actions. tivä and the respective action plans If, for example, a person has repeatedly and consistently tal, people^*arding still may experience problems with getting chosensocial gatherings (e.g., parties) to discusshis work startäd, off distiactlons, cämpensating for-shortl problems, the"contextuäl cuäs ässociatedwith parties will comings, mobilizing effort, and negotiating conflicts be- sooner or later directly trigger behaviors serving this goal. tlveen-goals. In this sense, modern goal theories have The goal then operates without the need for conscious at- returneä to the theories ofwilling suggästedby Ach (1905, (1908), tention or guidance and without the individual having a 1910), James(f890), and McDougall which were phenomenal experience of choosing that line of behavior. pre'ualentprior to the heyday of mötivational need theories Data from recent experiments (Bargh & Barndollar, 1996; tatkinro.r, 1964; Lewin,' Lgi6; McClelland, 1951; Murray, Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994) support the central hypotheses 1938). Today, goal pursuits are again seen as subject to vo- deri"vedfrom auto-motive thäiy. Chronic goak cän be di- lition, and modern goal theorists attempt to identify those rectly activated by environmental cues, and these goals volitional (willful) strategies that make a person's goal- then'guide behaviörs without the individual's awareness. directed efforts most successful. According to contemporary theories (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990, 1993; Kuhl, 1983), the will is noiconstrued as Summary akrasia, however-the term of the Greek philosophers Research stimulated by modern theorizing on goals has for the character trait of willpower. Rather, modern goal resulted in several discoveries about goal pursuits: theories analyzethe willful eiaployment of self-contröl as First, it matters how people frame their goals and their anticipated by Walter Mischel's analysis of the two voli- choice of thematic conient. How people formulate their tionaliy most taxing tasks or goals, delay of gratification goals-in specific or vague terms,'chailengingor modest, (i.e., röjecting an iömediate säaller re*ard fär a delayed proximal or distal, as an approach or avoidance goal-af- bigger reward; Mischel, 1974) and warding off attractive fects horv successfullytheyitrlve for the goals.Similarly, diüractions while performing a boring task (Mischel & GOAL EFFECTSON ACTION AND COGNITIO\ .t /t

Patterson, 1976; Patterson & Mischel; 1976): In both with the predecisionalor postdecisionalaction phase.Part cases, it was the quality of the mental strategies em- of this kriowledge is categirical or episodic and' related to ployed that determined whether subjects were successful the specific tasf, at hand"(i.e.,makine a decision between in their tasks. Delay of gratification was affected by the certain wishes or coming up with plans on how mental construction of the goal object (i.e., cold vs. hot to,implement a specific choien proiect, reipectively). The cognitions), whereas warding off distractions was influ- otheipart is pro6edural and reläteJto Lorv^wishesäre d"- enced by the mental construction of the action plan (i.e., liberated (deliberative mind-set) or how projects are distraction-inhibltlng plans vs. task-facilitating plans ). planned (implemental mind-set) in general.The"dellbera- Future research on the self-regulation of goal pursuit tive and implemental mind-sets carr| more of the qualities should continue to search for effective mental strategies of active sets than of passivesets (Higgins & King, lgSl). and ask questions of when these are employed and w:hat Although subjects are not aware of möst of the äind-set cognitive processesthey are based on. Two issues deserve effects observed(e.g., illusion of control in the implemental enhanced attention in future research. The first extends to mind-set; Gollwitzel & Kinney, 1989), if sub;äcts rvere the termination of goal pursuit, the second to the self- made aware of them, they should be able to hait (control) defensive aspects of self-regulation. Because people hold them. In addition, deliberative and implemental mind-set various different goals at the same time and keep adding effects would not occur in the absenceöf an explicit inten- goals to the ones already set, goals can easily come into tion to deliberate an unresolved problem or to pfan a chosen conflict. When these conflicts are resolved through cre- project, respectively. ative integration (Cantor, 1994; Emmons, 1996), people Klinger's (1977; Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, tg80) re- can keep theirgoals. Butwhenever they tail to discover an search on current concerns also analyzesgoal effects on the integrative solution, they will have to disengagefrom con- processing of information. Klinger assumes that setting flicting goals to achieve psychological well-being and goals activates current concerns,which stay active until thä physical health. With respect to the self-regulation of dis- individual either reaches or abandons these goals. One of engagementfrom goals,we still observe a scarcity oftheo- the effects of current concerns is that they make people rizing. Although Klinger (1975) offered a stage theory of particularly sensitive to stimuli in the environment that disengagementthat describes the phases ofa person's giv- pertain to those concerns (i.e., specify what the individual ing up on an incentive, there should be more theorizing . wants to attain). In support of thls hypothesis, Klinger and and research on both the conditions that trigger disen- associatesdemonstrate that subiects in a dichotic listening gagement and the self-regulatory processesthat promote it task attend more to material rölevant to subiects' cnrr"tti (Oettinsen, 1996). concerns than to irrelevant material. Follow-uo research Finall-y, most self-regulation theories of goal pursuit suggeststhat information relevant to current conöernsis at- portray the individual as nondefensive (e.g., Gollwitzer, tended to more than other information, becauseit is affec- 1990). The individual attempts to achieve his or her goals tively arousing (e.g., Bock & Klinger, 1986). Nikula, with the best of efforts. Bu1 people do not only have to Klinger, and Larson-Gutman (f993) had subjects listen to serve their goals, they also ieeä to protect their self- recordings ofwords that either were closely related to sub- esteem. As Jonesand Berglas (1978) pointed out in their jects' current concerns or unrelated. Greater increasesin research on self-handicapping, people often undermine skin conductance were elicited by words associated with the attainment of an achievement goal in an effort to pro- current concerns than by unrelated words. tect self-esteem. Researchers shorild therefore try to^ ex- Although Klinger's theorizing is based on a similar ra- plore how people integrate self-regulatory strategies of tionale than that of the mind-set research, it appears that goal pursuit with self-defensive strategies aimed at the current concerns are more similar to so-called passive protection of self-esteem( Baumeister, 1996). sets (Higgins & King, 1981) than the deliberative and implemental mind-sets. Klinger's current concerns de- scribe goal outcomes that the individual is committed to GOAL INFLUENCES ON SOCIAL achie,rJin a decisional act. As long as this decision is not INFORMÄTION PROCESSING revoked, any stimuli associated with the goal outcome are affectiväly charged, and processed moö effectively. In the previous section, the effects of goals on information Mind-set theory, on the other hand, postulates the effec- processing have been discussed, but in the context of self- tive processing' of mind-set "ongrrroim information (e.g., regulation and goal-directed behavior. The reported re- implementation-related information in the implemental search on mind-sets is most relevant (Gollwitzer, 1990). mind-set; Gollwitzer,-Heckhausen, and Steller, 1990), Researchcomparing the effects of deliberative and imple- because this type of information helps perform the task mental mind-sets on information processing showed that at hand. The ini'olvement with delib6rat^ine a decision or these mind-sets differentially affect subjects' thought pro- planning the implementation of it makeslertain types -. duction, the recall of task-relevant information, the analysis of information more useful (i.e., functional for solving : of desirability-related information, the inferences based on the task at hand) than others, and consequently, thesä '= feasibility-related information, and finally the attentional congruous types of information are processed more processes associated with the encoding of task-irrelevant effectively. information. These findings suggest thät the deliberative Apparently, Klinger's current concerns and Gollwitzer's :; and implemental mind-sets make any knowledge more ac- mind-sets point to different steering mechanismsby which F 4i cessible that helos to solve the distinct tasks associated goals affect a person's cognitive activity. Klinger focuses FI

u fit*i PERSONALMOTiVATiONÄL SYSTEM primarily on mechanismsrelated to holding onto (or disen- discussion of categorization, assimilation, and the search gaglng fiom) the goal, as he anallzes cognltions related to for coherence.It iJ also seen in Heider's Q944) behef that assignsas an explana- [hä eöd state. Go]lwitzer, on the other hand, focuses pri- the type of dispositionalcause one successfully accomplish- tion bi anothei's behavior depends on the value of that *"räy on mechanismsrelated to "If ine the various tasks that need to be tackled when the person in the life-space. -? ate inclined to disparage inäividual traversesthe various action phases on his or her iri- *" shall attribute his failures to his o*n persätt, Üs wishes to action. Both notions (current con- successesto his eood luck or unfair practices.When Niet- long way from 'Sucöss ""itrr ^nd mind-sets) are similar, however, in the sensethat zsche says is the greatest iiar,' he- refers to this (p. More it is seen in they explore cognitive activity as it relates to a -person's error in ättributlon" SOi). generaily, goals. Bruner's (1957) peräptual readinöss and'the research ^oni.olt äod ultiÄate attainment of his or her "New can that came to be known as the Look" (see Erdelyi, B,rt the effects of goals on information piocessing "newness" also be analyzed from a different perspective that focuses 1974, for a review). The was the empirical ex- more on the processing of the outside social world, and less amination of the assumption that the meaning we derive on the individual's progresswith his or her goal pursuit. It from the environment däpends not only on thelesponse of is to this inrpact of goäls on person perception and social the sensory organs to thä qualities of the enviroimental cognition that we turn to in this section. stimuli (autochihonous factors), but on the qualities of the perceiver as well (behavioral factors; e.g., Ittelson & Slack, 1958).2This was seenin researchexamining the im- Historieal Background pact of needson perceptual selection (e'g., Postmanet al., Social psychological examinations of person perception ig+s) ""d judgment (ä.g., Bruner & Göodman, 1947, in "Holistic" "Instrumentalist" "*etgeä irom tEe and philo- which pooi chlldren thalt desired wealth had biased per- sophiöal perspective. After its incorporation within ceptionlsof coin sizes). of active- construction, Gästalt psy"hoiogy and William James's6rand of Pragma- in demonstrating the principle research these researchers täok a iunctiönal approach to the study tism, this perspective was passed down to early "What can be achieved in person perception aimed at demonstrating that PerceP- of person perception-they ask, tion of thä socäl world is actively built-determined 6y by^"ng"giig in^active constructions?" The answers in- person-based factors meeting environmental data and ".'ltablvätä* from Tames'sobservation that the stimulus shapingits interpretation. field isioo complex for complgte representation and direct (1890)*as amongthe challengers-tothe gmpiricist discerning of uieaning from^data. B^runeret al. (1956, p. 1) Jämes "regards poiitiott that thl creature is absolutely passive referred t-o this as a paradox-we possessthe capacity to ölay upon which experience rains down. The clay will be discriminate at minute levels betw6en stimuli ("an exq-uis- fall ihickest" ite capacity for making distinctions"), but if we were to impteised most deeply where the drops "overwhelmetl (p. a03). Opposing this view of humans as passive mirrors, utilize thii capacity, vie would be by the of äur environment . . . slaves to the particu- 1ä*"r sngglited:-"subjective interest m{y, by laying its complexity weighty index finger on particular items bf experience, so lar."^ By äctively constructing, we negotiate around the accönt-them as to give to the least frequent associationsfar paradoi by allowing our interösts to aid in the selection of more power to shape our thought than the most frequent information attendöd to and its categorization. orr", porr"rr. The interest itseHl . . mnkes experience more Categorizinginvolves placing a stimulus input into a class anJ discerning tlie fit between than is madeby it" (James,p. a03). Jamesnot only believed by virtüe of iis attributäs that selective interests shape how information is inter- tte properties of the stimulus and the spöcifications of the preted, but that they also detärmine which information will "^t"lgoty (Bruner, 1957).Älthough thereäre infinite waysof items of the gtotüi"g things into classesof equivalence, actively deter- be orocessed at all-which of the millions of "placing" outward order presented to the senseswill pass through at- äining äategoiies allows for the process to appear tentional filters and enter into one's experience. mote imrne-diate(i.e., it makes another's attributes seem The assumotion that selective interests of the individual less ambiguous) and to proceed with greater ease' Allport shapesp"r""|tio.tr of others represents a direct applica- (1954)labeled this propensityto use simplifying strategies, tion of-the of active construction, similar to while hoarding capaciiy-draining discriminätoiy skilli' principle "the .as Lewin's use äf it to describe behavior as based on aspects principl" äf l.ärt "ifott." This allows for meäning to be ofthe observeddata speakingto one's needs. This princi- derived fr6m complex/ambiguous stimulus arrays without ple can prominently be seen in Lippman's (1922, the individual being a slave to the particular. "perceive P._55) iuggestion that we that which we have picked Thus, one function of actively constructing categories outin the form stereotyped for us"; Sherif's (f936, p. 6a) is that it serves to reduce the complexity of the environ- preparedness, in which^expectations established by cul- ment, and in a manner that is not perceived as taxing a tural norms gu.idewhat is nöticed and how it is perceived; bounded processing system. A second function is evident, why need to Allport's (19"5a,p. 768)autisti.cthinking, in which -Kelly'sprivate ho*e,rer,^*hen we"further consider stimuli obsessionscoloi interpretation of thJ situation; be catesorized at all. Bartlett (1932) discussedthe effort (1955) personal constructs that serve as idiosyncratic de- of cognltion as operating in the service of findlng mean- vices through which individuals scan the environment and ing. öategorizin! satisfies this general need because it detect meaning; Harvey's (1963) systems of meaning, pövides äeanirig through ordeiing and relating classe-s through which"impinging events arö coded,- translateä, äf events (Brunei et al.,igSo), whi'ie minimizin! the ef- and slamped wlth pe"rsöal effects; and Tajfel's (f969) fort. It enables one to go beyond the information given GOAL EFFECTSON ÄCTIONAND COGNITiO\

of the causal origins, transforrn irreversible changes into and predict as yet untested properties by virtue .re- "predictive versibleonäs" (p. 361).Thus, there is a tendencyto ascribe ä"0ö"a relations between categories' This ; changesto persöns,although such.changes are often caused *r"riäi"ality" allows one to estimate attributes, predrct :,i bv faätorsfü the environment either instead of' or in con- what can Le expected from others, and prepare.action "be- in- cärt with, factors related to This tendencyfor .l """otdi"elv. It provides the foundation for effective Persons. havior to engulf the field"- (Heider, 1944, f958) and to :il t"ra"tloti'and'the direction for instrumental activity' only interpret beliavior in terms of traits (noted first by Ich- il ifr"-ai*"t1"" provided, however, is dependent not ::l "the fit heisä, 1943, in his discussionof the tendencyto overesti- on en,irdnmental probabilities of objects that mate the unity of personality) is best known as the these cateqories, but also [on] the search requirements correspondenc" bi"t (Jo.t"t, 1979) By utilizing this ten- i-p.t"a bimy needs, my ongoingactivities, my defenses' ac- derr"yio see actions as cor.esponding with traits, behavior etö." (Bruner, 1957, p. I32)-on what categorresare that im- is tränsformed into disposition, doubt into meaning' and ""siUf". From this ierspective, the cognition control for the action is placed within the observed other' oels planning interpeisonäl action oPeratesin the service thus makine their actionJseem predictable and coherent' äf cäenltive" needi. As Allport (l-954, p' 167) states: poJtion does not maintain that gaining control ;ifti"il"g is basically an erfüeavor to antlcipate reality' This ac- throush^trait inference is the basf strategy to adopt' One Bv thinki'ng we try to foresee consequences and plan could"arsue,as did Mischel and Shoda(1995)' that the best tiä"t tttut #ill ""oi.l whatever threatens us and will bring is wav to Stt"blith control is through learning about situa- our hopes and dreams to pass."Thus, cognitive activity tioiis; the more one knows about how people behave in sp.e- ;i;;lät"d by the need io place thingsl to identify and the better they can piedict and control the t""""i"g to them, to plän approprlate- action, and in "lfi"'rit""ti"ns, l., ni". environment. Bui ubiquitous inference, control o'u..ä dynääic social world' interactive -trait 3o-- aoi"e sai; an easy,well-learned strategy linking the function while not the best strategy, is er rääa earlier, this approach it al- to thJiotallv accounts foöhanges in the environment; of oerson perception to cognitive needs owes a debt "repreünt io*t ttt" indirridual to the disturbing change in i.,.^ir,r*"r,t^"listsl such as C-. S. Peirce and ]ohn Dewey' its entirety" (Heider, Lp-aa,p.S0|! to end doubt' and pro- Unl*e Associationists, who saw data as strictly driving the äxperienceof having sufficient judgments' perception and humans as seeking acc-urate knowledge vides ih. "or,täquence of this is"that people are depicted as r:i-i*: i*,rumental i sts instead pqtitld t hat people. seek i,l".ft5, n'ew information; prefe*ing to cling to theirjn- j;,t: simply an end to doubt' Peirce states (1877' "rrirnil"tittg 'i* not truih, but "doubt to actively construct,a reality that and dis- terests and'expectancies; ili.I irr'itätion of is an unhappy ji;{ o. OO)ttt"t the 'Äta i;;;";;, stab'le, and understandable; to see the world in'a iatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves with what they already believe (thus adding =it of belief, while*[the feeling of believ- *"n """tit,"nt ;'seeing l:ll and.^isoass into a state is believing")' üE ;# ;;;ils to the old expiession ,!31* a calm and satisfactorystate which,we do not wish ing] positiori that the default processingstrategy'.as a belief in anything e|3"' This holds #;;;'d, ;; change into lhe t*5 ,,rse"'rt"d by Allport's (1954) least effort principle' is the rl"nef"'a ettd dJ"bt was labeled-as a process of Inquiry .?tE' onZih"t ""t l""d to coherence through the use of as little ;ilT;;d;";ä what Gestaltists called äosure'3 According i:il: as is necessary.Rathär than expending ef- i!li; (1938), this process of turning indeterminate oio"".ri.re effort io lä*"u judgment, instead I:: iort to o.äd.t"" the most accurate people l:ji ;it""ti"; to deteiminatä ones, of turning a state of incon- 'like wüat and Davis (1965) called'reason enough"or of constancy, all activity is stimulated seek Jones ;i"*t1;one Lsufficient'reason." the search for an explanation ii concerned is Thus, .ti: ;;;]";;i";t, and the p"',tic"l^t discomfoit ',i,i 'a*Ut,; (what Kelley, 1973, called p-sychological"pitt:1:l"gyJ "lff"a as hunger is the discomfori that stimu- lust to a stoP once people feel they have what Allport "rid thi.tt is"the discomfort that stimulates comes fi: ü;; ""ii; -itffi"iuttt wärrant" and iajfel (1969) called a in the lissa) ""Il"d l.: Jr-f.Jg.;"rhus, the processing system operates )."tlrf""totv explanation" to support thäir iudgments and r"r"i".?f needs to g"itt " ."tttJof'control, seekmeaning' U"ti"ft. This cÄ be subjectively experienced.despitenot ;;;;il;"eoubt (similar to what Festinger.,1957' labeled ieekine to be as accurateand effortful as possible' avoidance of dissonance).An upset or^imbalanced system' "in people adopt these simplifying strategies the p"itot' off on to what Dew-ey Alth?ueh o"" ["t.t by doubt, sets economy" (Jones& (see also Tajfel's' 1969' the serviäe of cägnitive"f52) and emotional irszgl callJd a quest fo. ceräinty ifriU*t, f 958, p. , sucha B-ureaucraticmind, which ig- ;;;;Ä ioi "oh"ä.t"e). This q""ti ""tt occur through pur- any nores variety, cän turn toward becoming a slave to the par- suinq accurate knowledge or through-the pursuit ot ticular. If ptople require a greater sense of confidence in i."ä'Fr"äg" ittat will "r,ä'do'tbt- quiökly and-produce-clo- or itt" ptoa""'tt oi their äognitirä processing,people sure (soiättg ut it is experienced asbeing a good enough "cognitive :."" ?t:* from beittg misers" and use a more retlnecl drs- sufficient conciusion). on active constructions stated that in- criminatoiy anJysis. But this hinges Heider (1944; Hamilton, 1981) similarly "least in- rr"i"""a ittto"gl this effoit" route being deemed. f"**e tt"its in others is motivated out of a desire for "reason iufficient (whei one }acks enough"),such as when "oh"ränce. When we observe behavior, we assign an ex- i"t"i"rtt and intent lead the individual tdquestion his or her planation to it because a situation that was once comPre- for "*itti.te knowledge.As and Thibaut O-9-58)posited'.al- il;Jfi;"o* u""" changed' Attributing the cause Jones tvpically apply the most readily availablelty- in anoth"er'sdisposition is one resolu- thousfpeople the change as lying behavior, this is neither it ß one that most easily oothZsii to account fot 6bsett'ed ;;; ,*H #ltfig doubt' And 'n"""rr"ry a strat- "otherwise ir- nor inevitable. Goals can lead to forsaking returns equilibriuä in the life spacewhen egy of cognitive economy; goals that promote accuracy can ;;;;;;l;i"'';h*n"t t'""" disturböd it' Persons' as absolute J/ö PERSONAL MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM

have such an effect. Closure and coherencecan be achieved processproduces a tension,likened to the desire produced through effortlessly assimiiating new information in a con- by blocked sexual activity. They postulate that such a ten- sistent manner. but it can also be achieved through effort- sion provides a kind of feedback that resulates search be- fully seekingaccurate representations.a havioir and keeps it going. It yields greaier discrimination "exquis- This implies that goals can not oniy guide the type of and entices the individual to more fully engagethe conclusionsu'e draw, btrt regulate the amount of effort ex- ite capacity for making distinctions." pended in evaluating sociJinformation as well. Thus, an This historical review suggeststhat social psychological äntidote to the potöntially nonveridical perception pro- approachesto the study of ['ö* people cogniz^eiheir söcial duced by the bureaucratic mind is what Bruner (1957) world developed with needs, motives, and goals being con- "the called constant close look." Bv this. he meant that sidered conjointly with cognition, and with questions re- with enough time, capacity, and desire, some stimuli could garding their relationship central to the discipline (Fiske, be assessedto determine their best fit to a category. A per- 1993b; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Like the goal content theo- ceiver's goal-directed strategies for pursuing coherence ries in the action domain, early research in thls domain fo- "potential are flexible and reflect the notion of motiva- cused on documenting the impact that goals of a particular tion" reviewed earlier. For tasks that require cognitive ef- content had on outcomes, with the outcomes in the current fort, hlgh potential motivation is required to instigate a case being cognitive in nature (e.g., attitudes, judgments, strategy other than least effort and consistency seeking. decisions).With the cognitive revolution in psychology, so- "temporarily However, the manner in which it is determined when cial psychology abandonfed] motivationai simplifying strategies are not sufficient or valid, when in- constructs to concentrate upon those informational, per- creased discrimination will yield a satisfactory cognitive ceptual, and cognitive factors" (Ross,1977, p. 183). But, in product and the quest for knowledge can be halted, and how the past 20 years,research on goalsand cognition has been the system reacts to hindrances to close looks, discrimina- growing, as will be seenin the next section. tion, and seeking accuracy, are all issues that move beyond the mere functional question and toward the ouestion of cognitive regulation. Tie functional question is Ä essential Modern Goal Theories (1956, first step, for as Bruner et al. p. 12) noted, without In the 1970s,researchers embraced cognitive methods as understanding the functional and motivational underpin- "the a tool to assess information processing, moving from a nings of the perceptual process later questions a6out 'how: focus on cognitive potentid/c äpabilities" to otr" -o"nheuris- [regulation occurs] must surely miscarry." But the tic strategies utilized by a limited processing system (what "the functional question alone, and the focus on the general im- Fiske & Taylor, 1991, called a switch from naive sci- "cognitive "little "the pact of needs" is not sufficient and is more entist" approach to cognitive miser" approach). But than a restatement of the fact that cognitive activity even thJäarliest research .iith a focus on "6gttiti.'" p.o- (p. achievessomething for the organism" t"O).For the goal cessingheuristics continued to stressthe active and öon- notion to be viably apphed, it must specify the antecedent structive nature of person perception (e.g., Markus, Lg77; conditions that arouse the need to reduce doubt, allow us to Rogers,Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977;Taylor & Crocker, 1981). anticipate which strategy the flexible processing system Consider the following from Markus (1977): will pursue, and describe the regulated processesthrough which cognitive behavior is directed. Only relatively re- Self-schematawill be generatedbecause they are useful in cently have questions emerged that focus on the regulatory understanding intentions and feelings and in identifying processes involved in the search for coherence and moved likely or appropriate patterns of behavior. While a self- lhe field beyond illustrating the functional aspectsofperson schemais an organizationof the representationsof past be- "deposltory." perception (such as producing confidently held judgments havior, it is morä than a It servesan iriportant änd bäliefs, shaped by persona"leffects, thät produce"a per- p-roces-singfunction and allows an individual to go beyond (p. ception-Perhaps of the world äsiontrollable and comdrehensiblej. the information available. 64) the clearest links between the äarlv outcome- oriented approach and more modern-day theories con- What is striking, aside from the similarity to Bruner's cerned with repulationregulation are found within Biuner'sBmner's research. (1957) discussionofthe active nature ofcategorization, is An example is Lis discussion of how the stagesinvolved in a dissimilarity. Gone is any reference to needi(or Bruner). "go categorization, from identification to inference, allow for a What now was described as allowinq the individual to coherent senseofothers to develop by letting the perceiver beyond the information" and actively construct reality wäs infer beyond the information given. The presenceär lack of the activation of a cognitive structure. a schema. For ex- coherence regulates-the whetheithe indiviäual need further ample, Rogerset al. (1977) showedthat tasks that activate elaborate ott qualities of the other or terminate the a self schema, and a reservoir of self-related information, "knowing" inference process*ith u sufficient senseof the lead to e_mbelhshingand elaborating on incoming informa- observed other. This is seen in Postman and Brüner's tion. Anderson and Pichert (1978) added that nof only self- (1948) demonstration that when the ability to identify stim- schemas, but tasks as simple as taking a particular "reckless" "casing" uli is frustrated, it results in identification be- perspective (a burglar a home vl. a person in- cause the categorizations produced are the result of tending to buy a home) can determine how information is inadequate cues, that leave tlie individual searchingfor dis- interpreted. confirmation in subsequent stimulation. Bruner et al. In such early research, goals were 'task_social-cognitive "instructions." (1956) further suggestedthat the frustrated categorization equated with sets" or Büt research GOAL EFFECTS ON ACTION AND COGNITIO\ adoptins this simplified, explicit role for goals,as well as GoaI Content Theories igiore goalsaltogither, did carry .ese'a.cli'thatappäared to Goals sometimesfocus the individual on acconrplishinga "t=^n "*umple, research fo- an implicit tolä?o. goak. fake specific task; to processinformation a certain kind of siry versusincon- cused-onthe processingof schema-consistent (ä.g., form an imlression of a person from a set of stirnuii Wyer (1989, Postulate 5) sistent inforäation. Siull and vs. trying to memorize stimuli) that establisl'resinstruc- "Once of a person is formed, posit: an evaluative concePt tional sets (e.g.,impression set vs. memory set).These are in terms of it'" This ih" o"rrorr', behaviors are interpieted concrete and proximal goalsthat describe short-tenn ob- with Carlston's (tbSO) point that later judg- is cänsistent iectives. Goais can alsö be more abstract, self-defining, evaluative implications of ear- ments are biased toward the iong term, and distal (e-g.,-saving processingcapacit!, by Stangorand Ruble (1989, lier inferences. As summarized 'filter' achieving accuracy, establishing control, defending the "strong wili lead to p. 20), expectations perceivers ego). Thäse provid'e the individual with general dirötion in an attempt to main- or ignore inconsistent information, "id ^llo* persistence in the face of obstaclesto proximal tain-the establishedexpectancy intact . . ' they rely on'top 'boltom goals. In this section, we will review how these different down' rather than up' processesto guide impres- of information processing. [oals affect the outcomes sion formation." The reason iuggested by Srull and'Wyer implicates an implicit goal in impression formation-to on cognitive tun- form a coherent representation. Goalsas Proximal Tasks' In research & Fromkin, 1968; However, coherence does not always mean consistency ins effects (Zaionc,1960;see also Brock are (e.g., Trope & Bassok, 1982). When expectancies are Cähen, 196I; Leventhal, 1962), proximal goals ana- of other *eäk, or when beharrior is unambiguously inconsistent lyzed in terms of how they affect the perception tuning para- with existing knowledge, it creates what Sruil and Wyer people (i.e., target persons).In a cognitive :uncertain-ties'" For example, (1989) call that need to be reconciled; äisä, subiects alre issigned different tasks. of a target person to not unlike the doubt that earlier models labeled as creat- haff "re töld to transmil impressions (i.e.. play whereas ins a need that impels cognition. Asch and Zukier (1984) others to the role of communicators), impressionsof the de"scribepeople säeking coherence in such a fashion- the other half aie tbld to receive others' recipients). Subse- through räconciling apfarently discrepant pieces of in- target person (i.e., to play the role of information forma-tion. In the Srul-l-and Wyer model' the manner in quäntlv, it is observed-how subjects organize is sup- which uncertainty impels cognition is borne out in Postu- on the- target person and what kind of information to steer organization lates 6 and 7. inco:nsisterit information (that which pressed. Täsk ässignments are shown communicators polar- cannot be assimilated easily into existing structures) in- äf the presented iiformation so that to a greater extent stigates extensive (bottom-up) processingin which asso- ize anä distort stimulus information and Fondacaro(1982) ciitive links form between the concept-inconsistent than recipients. Higgins, McCann, point and listeners (or, items and other locations in memory (Bargh & Thein, extend this bv noting that speakers engagein commu- 1985). Such links lead to superior recall for inconsistent *or" g"n"räily, enöoders änd decäders) such as information, and an increaseä chance of utilizing such in- nicatiön to achieve higher order proximal goals, "social goals" (e.g., initiating or maintaining formation in judgments (though this does not mean peo- relationship "face" social bonds with a öommuniöative partner), goals ple will abandoi using consistent information in their osocial reality" goals thus resulting in a low correlation between (e.g., maximizing self-image),1nd iudgments, reality). i."äll "nd judgment; see Hastie, 1980; Hastie & Kumar, (e.ä., achie.ringä common definition of social individual's interpreta- 1979; Rothbat-t, E,r"ttt, & Fulero, 1979). There is an im- Thäse eoals put constraints on an oflis- plicit goal of striving for coherence either through assim- tion ofihe taik goals associatedwith playing the role (even tener (e.g.,try tö understandthe message)or speaker(e.g., ilating"information io match prior knowledge when "communication game" (for inconiistent information hai been reflected upon) or trv to bä unäerstood) in the see Grice, through establishing new structures to accommodate uie of the communication game metaphor, inconsistencies. 1975; Gumperz & Hymes, 1972). paradigm proximal Goals have not simply been examined as explicit in- Another classic research examining knowlädge is the structional tasks, leavin^gmore abstract goals such as seek- goals and their role in constrirctinglocial on how ing coherence compleiely implicit. Läte1 research on änalysis of the effects of observational purpose . öbservational ,r^ii"bl"r such as n"äd foi cognition, need for structure, the'behavior of others is cognized. Suöh include tasks desire for control, and uncertainty orientation (to name purposes (or information-proöessing goals) an observed sequence of behaviors' iust a few) explicitly returned the concept of needs, and i.l"t "r memorizing in new situ- ih"l, linkr to^eait, to the discussion.Finally, in the 10 predicting the behaiior of an observeä petsott of a target years followin[ Sorrentino and Higg-ins's(1986) Hand- ätiot t, or simply forming an impression Person' 'book were demon- of Mottoitton and Cognition (id. l) there has b9e^n The effects of information processinggoals such an e',,6r-increasing trend för social psychologists to shift strated on a multitude ofdiverse cognitive processes, (Jeffery trait ascrip- from a focus on ihe impact of goals on the outcomes ol. as categorization & Mischel, 1979), 1981), personal cognitive processingtoward exp-loringgoal influences on tion (Cähen er Ebbeseq 1979; Higgins, (Hoffman, & Mazze, 1981)' and thä regulation of iriformation processing. In this section, soal ascription Mischel, (inderson Cohen & Ebbesen, we firit review research focuied on the impact of goal ä"*oru & Pichert, 1978; the cognitive tuning content on cognitive outcomes and then turn to the regu- 1979; Tefferv & Mischel, 1979).Like observational purposes lation of social cognition. ,"r""röh. thä focus of research on PERSONAL MOTIVÄTIONAL SYSTEM

restson the questionof how thesepurposes (or-processing as the organizing principle did not contain several com- goals)affect the cognizing ofinformation related to a target peting categories. In other words, if the stimulus items all ö"rron. Whether ".td ho* the subiect meets her or his ob- pertained to the same target person (no competing cate- iervational purpose is not at issue. It is not surprising then gories) then the target person was not seen as a logical that researöh on information processing goals employs a superordinate cue. Thus, no person node was established similar generalepistemic strategy as the goal content theo- anä there could, therefore, be no facilitation of links be- ries of aätion reuie*ed earlier; tlat is, thJeffects of differ- tween items and the node to give subjects with an impres- ent types of goals,(this-timeinformation-processing goals) sion set an advantageat recall. are comparedwith each other. These studies dämonstrate that when no meaningful For eiample, Hamilton, Katz, and Leirer (1980) demon- organizing principle exists, subjects do not organizJin- strated that recall for information was affected by the foimation, regardless of their processing goal. But if subjects' processing goal when encoding stimulus infor- there is a logical organizing principle in the stimuli, goals mation. Subjects were given a set of behavior statements can point subjects to it. Thus, an impression set can sug- to read either under ins[ructions to memorize the material gest using p"iron nodes for organizätion because such-a or to form impressions of the persons in the stimulus sen- foal promoles both trait inferences being formed from tences. When an impression set existed, subiects recalled iti*nh-,r items and attempts to integrate-these isolated the information in dlusters of related traitsi thematically inferences into a unified representation (e.g., Carlston & related information was stored together, linked in mem- Skowronski, 1986; Newman & Uleman, 1993). According ory. But when subjects had " -J*ory goal, information to many person memory researchers, without an impres- was not thematically organized. Instead, it was recalled in sion sel,'sublects wlth ihe mere goal of memorizittg itt- the order in which it was presented; this suggestssubjects formation would neither spontaneously infer traits while did not cluster the information or make linkages between encoding the behavioral stimuli nor attempt^person to subse- items. Additionally, the impression set actually led to bet- quently rYntegratethese inferences around a node ter recall of the stimulus information than the goal of (e.g.,Bargh & Thein, f 985,p. 1130;Srull, 1983,p. 1161). trying to memorize the items for a recall test (säe also Thus, the less developed cognitive structure, which Hamilton, 1981; Srull, 1981, 1983). failed to make links between persons, behaviors, and These findings have been replicated and extended traits, suffers in comparison during memory tests (even within an area of social cognition labeled as person nxen'L- though the goal was to memorize). ory (Hastie, Ostrom, Ebbesen, Wyer, Hamilton, & Carl- While this research is process oriented. it is not focused ston, 1980) that examines memory for information about on the role that goals play in regulating the process. Goals particular individuals (see Srull & Wyer, 1986, 1989, for ofdifferent contents are simply said to affect the extent to comprehensivereviews). Srull (1983) posited that the su- which inferences are formed from individual stimulus perior recall associated with having an impression set items and the extent to which links are formed between arises because the goal initiates attempts to consider be- these inferences and the stimulus items. Thus. its focus is haviors in relation to one another-a process that Asch goal content; but a particular type ofgoal content is exam- and Zukier (f984) labeled as servinq the higher order ined-goals as processing objectives or task instructions. goal of seeking coherence. That is, traits arä inferred An exception to this is found in Srull and Brand (1983), from several stimulus sentences pertaining to the same who in aäditio.r to asking su\ects to form an impression of individual, and these traits, behaviors, and persons are target persons also led them to expect to interact with tar- then integrated when forming impressions of the target get persons. Such an expectancy produces a higher order persons. Forming such links facilitates recall because the goal of being accurate in addition to the impression set retrieval process is said to occur through traversing the (though Srull & Brand do not discuss this implication of pathwaysistablished in the network. Tlie more patlis es- their expectancy manipulation); it leads subjects to feel tablished, the better the recall, and impression gbals lead accountable for their impressions (e.g., Tetlock, 1992). to more pathways than memory goals. Srull also shows that manipulations other than pröcessing o\ectives can Coals as Distal Tasks. In the earlv 1980s. researchers promote the formation of links, such as presenting infor- beganto consider higher order (distal) goalsthat were more mation blocked by target persons(e.g., Ostrom, Pryor, & than simple processing objectives. The general theme that "blocked -Si1nps9n,1981). A format" similarly promotes cut across such research was that although people often hnks by making salient a hlgher order category (target apply simple heuristics in their social information process- "top persons) with which to ease organization of t-he'stimulus ing (top-down, or of the head" processing, Taylor & sentencesin memory. Fiske, 1978), higher order goals can limit such effects not Srull and nrand (1983) also examined the conditions by instigating a ipecific prJcessing strategy, but through a "more that promote using personsas an organizingprinciple (i.e., general desire for what seem to the individual to be utilizing'person nodes"), once again rt ggästingt-hat pro- valid" judgments. Such goals raise the individual's thresh- cessingobjectives affect encoding-impiessioi sets iead old for deciding they have, what Allport (1954) called, suf- to organizationin person nodes,mLmory sets do not. This ficient warrant. resultsin superioriecall under an impressionset. In a sec- For example, Tetlock (f9$) suggested that the goal of ond experiment, however, they founä that having a mem- forming accurate judgments can attenuate top-of-the-head ory set versus an impression set did not lead to recall effects and lead to vigilant information processing (see differencesrvhen the superordinatenode that was serving. also Chaiken, 1980). Focusingon beliefperseverance (the COAL EFFECTSON ACTIONAND COGNITION 381

tendency to maintain existing beliefs, even in the face when a need for structure existed (see Kruslanski, lgg0). of evidence that suggestsrevising them), the investigator Participants with a high need for structure ivere shorvn to initiated an accurary goal by telling participants they utilize stereotypes more readily_arrd exhibit primacy ef- rvould be held accountable for their impressions. Those fects. An oppositepattern was exhibited by subjectswith a rvithout the goal exhibited belief perseverance, their im- heightenedTear oi invalidity. Like Tetlöck's"(1983) ac- pressionsof the target emphasized information presented "o,irtubihty manipulation,-and such a state promotes a goal of äarly. Those with the goal (but only if the goal was Pre- forming acturate valid judgments ind avoidanJe of a senfed before receiving information about the target) hasty conclusion. were immune to such primacy effects. Borgida and Whete^r Kruglanski focused on manipulations such Howard-Pitney (f983) eximined-the delimiting öffects of as time constraint to initiate goals within a particular qoals on salience effects (the tendency for salient stimuli situation, other researchers turned toward examining io attract attentional focus and lead to causal power being long-standing needs that were not induced by situal thrust on them; Taylor, Crocker, Fiske, Sprinzen, & Win- tioris-chron"ic needs that individuals carry between sit- kler, 1979).They expected the goal ofhaving a vested in- uations. Such an approach sidesteps a potential criticism terest in the task would lead subiects to abandon ofthe situational strategy, that it is not really a goal that top-of-the-head processing (such "r salie.rceeffects). As is being initiated by ih" situational manipulalion but expected, low iriterest led'to salient targets being rated some oiher variable that similarly affects cognitive pro- most favorably (a salience effect); high involvement led to cessing (such as a strain on c-ognitive capacity in the favorable ratings of targets who agreed with subjects, re- caseof time pressure and need for structure, e.g', Lutz & Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, and -gardless ofsalience. Chaiken, 1893). In addition to its focus on higher order goals, research Moskowitz (1992) reconöeptualized the need for struc- began once again to focus on the impact ofcognitive needs ture as an individual diffeience variable and found sup- in ionstructing social judgments and this placed additional port for Kruglanski's notion that a heightened need emphasison examining the links between needs and higher p.oduc"s a gräater reliance on cognitive sli-ortcuts. High order goals in impelling information processing. One exam- need for strücture was shown to lead to increased use of ple is research based on theorizing about the interaction categories to label another's behavior (Moskowitz, Letween social needs(e.g., the need-for dominance) and so- 1993;) and heightened use of stereotypes (Naccarato, cial situations. Assor, Aronoff, and Messe (1981) had sub- 1988; Neuberg & Newsome, 1993; Schaller, Foyd, jects high on the need for dominance observe two persons_ Yohannes, & Ö'Brien, 1995). Webster and Kruglanski working together on a series oftasks. The relative status of (f994) similarly reconceptualized Kruglanski's earlier these target persons was manipulated, and subjects were need for struclure notioi as an indiviäual difference made to expect to interact with them at a later point. Dom- variable with what they describe as a broader constmct inance needs interacted with the status of the target per- termed need for closure. They found similar results ex- sonsand äffected the favorability of reported impressions. amining the overattribution effect-heightened closure Subjects high in need for dominance gäve more^favorable promotäd the correspondence bias. It should be noted evaiuations of the low-status persons than the high-status ihat Neubetg (1995) has reported that this need for clo- ones;the reverse was found for low-dominance perceivers. sure scale ii totally redundant with the earlier need Apparently, to a highly dominant person, the upcoming in- for structure scale, so that it is presently less clear as to teraction offord" a better chance for implementing domi- whether need for closure actually is a broader construct nance goals (i.e., dominate the partner) if the presumed or a noisier measure of the same construct. interaciion partner is oflower status. The general approach Sorrentino and colleagues (e.g., Sorrentino, Bobocel, reflected in this study focuses on social needs and the in- Gitta. Olson, & Hewitt, 1988; Sorrentino & Short, 1986) teraction goals produced by these needs. It is anallzed in introduced a cognitive need called uncertainty orienta- what direc"tion ti"t" interaötion goals affect the perbeption tion based on the bellef that individuals differ in their of the interaction partner. Again, the question of whether preferences for environrnental uncertainty or ambiguity. and how these goals are met is not at issue, and the leading Üncertaintv-oriented persons seek uncertain situations so researchstrategyis one ofstudying the effects ofentertain- that thev ri"u r"rol,n"^th'e uncertainty: certainty-oriented ing or not entertaining a certain type of interaction goal 'uationspefsons ävoid uncertainty altogether änd thus seek out sit- (e€., a dominance goal) on some distinct outcome (i.e., a characterized by elemänts of certainty. Both tlpes and coherence; they differ in social ludgment) or comparing the effects of different in- of inüviduals seek clarity produce it for themselves or seek already teractiän [oals (e.g., dominanäevs. dependency)on social whether they judgments. existing fornis.^Therefore, certainty-oriented people tenä Kruglanski and Freund (1983) focused on epistemic to purzue the goal of attaining coherence by a cognitive ratherlhan interaction needs. They described people as strätegy of igrioring inconsisänt informatiän (Diiscoll, being placed in a state ofneed for structure when they are Hamilton, & Sorrentino, 1991), whereas uncertainty- placäci in a judgmental situation marked by time-pressure oriented individuals prefer attending to new information. constraints. This need instantiates a goal of reaching clo- Bareh (1990) lists chronic needs, in addition to the ones sure on a judgmental task as quicklyäs possible. Thä im- previouslrn discussed, that drive cognition across situa- foicognition, desire for pact of such a . goal on cognitive outcomes was iio.rtr rr""d for achievement, need demonstrated by showing that there was a heightened re- control, authoritarianism, self-consciousness,and so forth' Iiance on judgäental häuristics and cognitivä shortcuts But more than simply presenting a taxonomy of needs, PERSONAL MOTIVÄTIONAL SYSTEM

Bargh suggeststhat the impact ofneeds and goals on cog- suggestthat the reasonhas to do with the assurnptionsre- nition need not be consciously controlled. as there seit-ch"ts in the person memory versus the spontaneous "the Just may be development of an automatic associative inference domain make about goals. As earlier stated, the link between situational features and behavioral inten- person memory research often treats goals simply as prox- tions" (p. 102) that guides action, so, too, may there be an imal tasks. This approach perhaps coästrains äoncluilon. automatic activation of higher order goals and motives in regarding the ability of memory goals to produce trait in- the presence of appropriate environmental stimuli. f"i"n""r]If distal eoals that facäitate trilt inference are "auto-motives" Such become routinized so that they exert ignored, or perhaps undermined by either a conflicting their effects outside awareness and without attentional proximal task or a conflicting stimulus environment, their monitoring (passively); all through direct environmental it *ieht be expected that tiait inference formation and activation. the äganizati6n of memory structures around person This section on goal content highlights not only that nodes will be impoverished if proximal goals do not ex- goals determine how information is interpreted, but plicitlv^ request them. that goals have a hierarchical nature. People entertain sev- whät diital eoalswould qualify as directors of inference eral joak simultaneously, some -or" pro*^i*al than others, formation? He"ider (1958; iee älso Anderson & Deuser, and these interact in affecting cognition. A focus only on 1993; Pittman & Heller, 1987) believed that perceptual task goals inadequately represents the conditions under processesaid the individual in controlling the environ- which the processing system operates.We will use two ex- ment. Such control gives the person a senseofpower over amples (spontaneous trait inference and accessibility ef- the perceived object in a stimulus array that would other- "In fects) to illustrate how examining the interaction ofgoals in wise'be o.'erly cömplex and orrerwhelming. He states: socialcognition leadsto different conclusionsthan ifeither Lewin's (1936) terms, an unstructured region, that is, a a proximal goal or a distal goal was examined in isolation. region whose properties are not known to the person, can be considered a barrier which makes action and therefore The lnteraction of Goals in Spontoneous Trait lnfer- control dlfflcult if not impossible. Perception helps to ence. As reviewed earlier, person memory research has structure the region and to remove this barrier" (p. 71) shown that goals lead to differences in recall because Thus, the need to derive meaning from the environment is they affect i?npressions formed at encoding. People do served by the distal goal of controlling and structuring it, "without not form impressions of others at encoding in- which induces the cognitive system to generateinferences tervening conscious intent" (explicitly being asked to do about the characteristics of others. White (f959) labeled so; Bargh, 1990, p. 94). It is only when a conscious goal to this ffictance-the goal of the individual being the main- form an inference exists that persons and their behaviors, tenance ofcontrol over the environment through effective doers and their deeds, beco-ä hnked by trait inferences. interactions. This goal was seen as so widespröad that the However, Heider (1944) believed that behaviors serve as tendency to see peisons as causesfor behaviörs (earlier la- "data" "correspondence through which we learn about the source of those beled bias") was said to be afundarnen- behaviors; that a person who commits a bad act is judged tal attributifn s77s7-invoked even when dispositional "not to be a bad person. He makes the point that the causesare not sufficient to explain the behavior (e.g., Hei- "susceptible doing only but the doer" is to a value judg- der, 1958;Jones & Davis, 1965; Ross,1977). ment" (p. 365). But does the person's process of forming How does this relate to the divergent conclusionsofper- "doer" an impression of the depend on consciously adopt- son memory and spontaneousinfeience research?Lewin ing a goal to do so? Or can the inferential leap from (reviewed earlier) believed a stimulus acquires valence deeds to dispositions be made in the absence of explicit when it speaksto a goal. Thus, it is not simpiy the individ- goals related'to the imputation of responsibility? Ju^stas ual's qoal, but the ability of obiects in the environment to our intended actions can have unintended consequences speak'io that goal that leads to goal-directed interpretation (see Wundt's, 191I, notion of Heterogonie d.er 7-rcecke, oTthe socialworld. Ifthe distal goal driving trait inference p. 766), is it not possible that intended strategies for pro- is control, then behaviors that suggesttraits, or are diagnos- cessing social information, such as memorizinq items, can tic in terms of traits, will be able to acquire valence and en- have u:nintended consequences as well, such a-sinference tice an inference by speaking to this dßtal goal-even if a formation? -notproximal goal does not explicitly ask for an inference. But Research on spontaneous trait inference (see Uleman all stimuli can acquire this valence becausenot all be- et al., 1996) has addressedthis question. As with person havior is trait implying. Such behaviors would not be er- memory research, investigators äxamine recall fo? sen- pected to be able tb sätisfy a distal goal of having control tences to assesswhether trait inferences are made at en- thro,,,eh a trait inference-jsuch -""iirrg is not reiealed in coding. These inferences are said to be spontaneous the st'imuli. It is not functional for thJindividual (unless becauie they occur even when subiects are irnaware of specifically askedto make an attempt) to draw an inference having formäd them and, more impoitantly for the current alout dispäsition based on information that does not imph discuision,when proximal goalsdä not lead su\ects to in- traits, thät is not trait diagnostic-this information has tend to form infärences. This occurs with a-variety of no valence. goals(e.g., Uleman & Moskowitz,Igg4) including a simple However, it is precisely these types of nondiagnostic(in memory set (Winter & Uleman, 1984). Little explanation terms of traits) stimuli (e.g.,"rented an apartment near has been offered for the disparity between this cönclusion where he works") that are provided in the person memor\- and that suggested by the p".söt memory research. We experimentsdiscussed. Giien an impressioirset, one coultl GOAL EFFECTSON ACTIONÄND COG\ITIO\

(see the proximal judgment to be consistentu'ith the primed construct irttempt to generateinferences that satisfy ac- Ulggins, Chapter 5, this volunte, for a review). ooirl:on€ can come up with a trait consistentwith the goal that üä*"'t "t, judgments are sornetimes contrasted to a ,',* ä"t.ttUed in thä stimuli' Given a proximal that person in- prime (e.g., a target to be conceited, when con- tio.t not force an inference, it makes sense iudglng But'this does iidence i'ad bäeti the trait; see Skurnik & ;ä;;;;;" ""i dr"*r,-Lotn such stimuli' lrimed in the ab- Moskowitz, 1996a, 1996b, for a discussionof the process- ;;i;;" people never draw person inferences or that ing mechanisms that underlie contrast effects andihe role ä"" "itö""ific instructionsio form imp-ressions, elaborative ofgoals, context, and type of prime in determining the ,u.tt pto*i*ul goals are required to.produc,e *^i."r in which contratted judgments are produced). i"e""ir^tio" of"information that inciudes the storage^of (c'f' 1990; Martin (1986; see also Herr, 1986) suggestedthat whether ir"Tl*lott, trait inferences,and persons Barg\, entice assimilation or contrast effects will be found may be de- lr,rii t Wyer, 1989). A simple memory set should have termined by whether the individual is aware of the ac- irf"r"n""t'"Uout the target iersons when the stimuli cessible construct. A blatant prime, clearly conscious to ']"i"n"" (see also McArihui& Baron, 1983)' Thus, how a the subjects at the time_ they are asked to make a judg- "."-lr*i g""l such as a memory set interacts with a distal t"i,rJ löd to contrast rather than assimilation.The impact a"o"""at on the stimuli in the situation' By consider- ment, inter- of consciousnessfor primes on judgment was initially as- i,e Uotit the situation (diagnostic stimuli) and the sessed by correlatinf recall foi and assimilation *"?lng goutt of the perceivär, we see that people do not -prlmes (e.s.. Lombardi, Hiegins, & Bargh, 1987; Newman & Ule- need"consciorrsintent to form inferences' Distal goals-pro- (or *"?. fSeO). Moskoöitz and Roman (f992) manipulated urote trait inference, and proximal goals other distal (IJIe- the conscious awareness of a prime-through a perceiver's no"tr) """ either underminä or facilitäte this process goals to determine the extenf to which awarenessof the inan & Moskowitz, 1994). led to assimilation or contrast. Utilizing the fact Moskowitz (1993a) provided evidence for this inter- irime ihat neopl" spontaneously draw inferences when asked to action of distal and proiimal goals by identifying subjects ientences' they had subjects read ...*,ho*er" chronicalli high and-lo* on the,goal of structur- *e*äriä tra^it-implying sentenceiwith"a memory goal so that they would ine their social enviionäent (as measuredby the personal stimulus infer traits outside oT awareness.These in- näd fot structure scale,Thompson et al', 1992)'These sub- soontaneously memorizinga set fär.ed traits activated the trait constructs implied in the lectswere then given the proxim-algoal of but because the inference was spontaneous,the äf trait-implyin[ sentencäs'Su\eits for whom the two sentences, of this activation. Subjects with an qoalswere^ comllementary (high structurer-s)were more subiects were unaware goal inferred the same traits, but the infer- fik"lv to form tiait inferencesäuring encoding-andwere impression th"eprime were consciousto them. These proxi- *or. Iik"lu to form unified memory structures that repre- erräes".rd goals dit"ät"d the outcome of processingthat served sentedthe person, their actions, and the inferred traits' mal goal of inferring traits. W-henthe proximal goal Subiectsfoiwhom the two goalswere not complementary the distal "passi,te promoted inference (so that the potential influ- (lori structurers)still formeä trait inferences;they simply juägment could not be detected) assimilation oc- iu".u l"s, likely to do so, less likely to take the infereptial ärr". o., it consciousinference (so that the leap from deeds to disPosition. curred. Whä promoted detected), contrast occurred' potential' influenice could be and Crelia (f990) demonstratedthat goals The Interaction of Goals in Accessibilitg-Effects' Martin, Seta, people assimilate or contrast their While Bruner (1957i focused his discussion of percep- determine whether primes by^creating goals that either did or tual readiness on need and expectancy-related factors iudgments to with the distal goal of preserving cogni- rvithin the person that made " ""tegoty accessible, Iater äid"not confliöt being primäd and asked to form an accessibiliti research treated conStruct activation in two tive resources. After p..io.t, some of their subjects-\tr€r-e rvays.One iesembles Bruner's model in terms of focusing impression of a target experimenter was concernedwith on'chronic sotirces, but concentrates on chronically ac- thän informed that-the personal and they were askedto put their cessible cognitive structures, not needs (g'^St,^B-*S!' their responses The rest of the subjectsin the Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Bargh & Pratto, 1986;Bargh ,r"*"i on their t"lpotttes. their responsesanonymous' They & Thein, isAS; Ffiggi"s, King, dMavin, 1982).A second group were told toieep subjectsin the group who were notrespon- placed the control over what cognitive construct 'sibleöredicted that "social judgments wouiä ."glgg in loafing" irchie,resa higher state of activation within the control for their "primed," oT the target person be of environmeintal stimuli that or increased and in their efforiless evaluation "read.iness" su\ects who were re- the of, stored knodledge (e.g.' Bargh & euided by the primes. However, facedä conflict between the goalsofpreserving Pietromonaco, 1982; Higgins, Rholes, & jones,-1977; iponsible accurate. Resolving this conflict led Srull &Wyer, f979, 1980I As reviewed earlier,such cog- ,äroor"u, and being and careful in their judgments; nitive theäries involve an implicit motivational assumP- them to be more efTortful and simply rely on the most tion reeardins why people ise primed constructs and they could not afford to loaf "ivait by the primes' other eiplan"iio"r ittät at the top of the head." The accässibleexplanation provided (i992) and Martin et al' individuäl is assumed to have a distal goal of forming a Both Mosklowitz and Roman being defeatedby-agoal (e'8'' at coherent impression through the least äffortful method' (1990) show assimilation makessubiects aware ol the prime and Thus, faced.with an ambig;ous behavior (that is applica- imoressionset) that Recentiy, researchershave also pur- ble to the activated construct) perceivers use primed its'ootential influence' of whether goals can eliminate constructsto capture the stimulus, or to assimilatetheir ,rrJd th" general question PERSONAL MOTIVATIONALSYSTEM

assimilation to primes even when people are unausareof attention (e.g.,Eagly & Chaiken's, 1993, least effort prin- "liixon's, "trouble the primes' influence on their ludgjneit. Sedikides(1990) ciple; Giibeit & 1991, of think^ing"; examined the impact of communication goals on whether Sedikides& Skowronski's, 1991, law of cosnitive strüc- judgments were assimilated. Subjects werö not aware of the ture activation). The regulation of epistemic processes impäct of accessibleconstructs on their judgments,nor did then is said to involve a slruggle betwe-en prer"tuing p.o- they consciouslyseek to correct or utilize idifferent stan- cessingresources and having ädequate iudgments-äid- dard in making their judgments (as with contrast effects). ance struck between least effort and selective interests They simply adopted a goal of communicating a particular that promote deeper processing (Bohner, Moskowitz, & type of impression and this goal was able to overpower the Chaiken, 1995). influence of an accessible construct. When su6iects had Several goal-directed models of cognitive processing the goal of tailoring a messageto suit an audienceihey *"t" have developed that describe this trade--off (e.g., Bte*er] not ihown to be iifluen""d'by primes (relative to control 1988; Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Fiske & subjects who had no communica[ion goal). Neuberg, 1990; Kruglanski, 1990; Kunda, 1990; Lichten- Finally, Thompson, Roman, Mos[owitz, Chaiken, and stein & Srull, I9B7; Martin & Achee, 1992; Smith, 1994; (1994) Fargh examined how accuracy goals affect assimi- Tetlock, 1992).In these models (see Smith, 1994. for a re- lation to activated constructs, even whän the activation is view), goals are described as directing the cognitive not aware to the person (passive priming) and when they processes of a flexible perceiver, flexible because these are not explicitly attempting to adopt a particular intei- processes can lead to information being processed in a pretation. Complementary to the finding of Martin et al. manner that is either individuating and systematic or cate- (1990) that goals emphasizing accuracyi-ed subjects to at- gorical, schematic, and heuristic (Fiske, 1993b). Goals tempt to correct for the influence of blatant piimes, sub- (one's potential motivation), and the stage of cognitive jects with accuracygoals in Thompsonet al.'s äxperiments processing at which goals are introduced, determine how did not assimilatä lh.i. lrrdg*eits to the pri^med con- cognitive processingproceeds. We will briefly review two structs. Accountability led to an effortful cärrection. or -ddels (säe Chaikön, Eagly, & Wood, Chapter 23, and debiasing of the primäs'. influence, even though sublects Kruglanski, Chapter 17, this volume) to illustrate how the were unaware of the influence. Instantiating a goäl of struggle between goals, such as least effort and accuracy, being accurate in one's judgments led to moreLlabärative may. affect the process through whlch information pro- and systematicprocessing, rather than relying simply on cessrngproceeds. dßtal goalsthat promote using the first readili accäsiible According to the theory of lay (Kruglanski, "the epistemics interpretation that lay waiting at top of the head." 1990),the person'sprocess ofgeneraling and evaluatingso- We began this section by iliustrating tle active and con- cial knowlädge is iiitigated rihen curänt judgments"and structive nature of person perception. Goals of a particu- opinions are äeemed tJbe invalld (when vaiid,"the system "frozen"). lar content shaped^the eicodiis of social infJrmation is at rest, or what Lewin called Invalidity moti- acrossmany goais-,and a variety oiinformation-processing vates (unfreezes)the epistemic process.Two broad'classes domains. Throygh examining goal influences on sponta- of needs-conclusional needs and closure needs-deter- neous trait inference and accessibility effects in social mine the type-ofprocessing required to restore the system judgment, we have illustrated how proiimal goals and dis- to rest; they determine whether the epistemic process is tal goals may interact in the active construc-tion of social frozen early (less effort exerted) or thäwed o.,"i " longer iudgments. We turn next to examining hou goalsexert ef- period through systematic examination of relevant evi- fects on information processing ind thi regulatory äence. Closuö .r"ädr "t"o*pass goals that promote either processesinvolved in person perception. ge-ek-ingor avoiding closure, such-as the ort-hogonalneeds "need "need labeled for closure" and to avoid clösure." Clo- "Quest sure seekingis similar to Dewey's (1929) for Cer- Regulation Theories of Goal Strh:ing "Intolerance tainty" and Frenkel-Brunswik's (1949) of The s^trivingfor coherent knowledge through the process- PerceptualAmbiguity" (gestaltrnehrd.eutigkeit),marked by "percäptual ing of social information was earlier labeled the principle rigidity, inab-ility to change sä, and tendencies of regulated coherence. The manner in which unclrtainty, to primitive and rigid structuring" (p.122).It "insufficieni" is alsolinked doubt, inconsistency, and a sense of having 'invalid" to ihe gestalt notion of prrignaÄ2. ä clear-cut and closed or judgmänts is reconciled (to iroduce coher- structure in which new experiences are viewed and classi- ence) is the ?ocüs of recent social-cogniti,e models that fied from the standpoint of an old set (Block & Block, reflect many of the ideas presented ii o,rt historical re- 1951). Conclusionalneeds include any goals that require view Cutting across these models is an assumption "sufficient that reachinga conclusion,and occur alongä "ätinuo* ranging warrant," or the feeling of having valid iude- from specific conclusions (a particulär answer) to nonJpel ments, can be attained through eit-her effortful o. eifo.T- cific conclusions(any sufficlent answer). less processing.In _eachcase,-knowledge is actively built, According to the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; the perceiver simply remains unawarJof his or här own Bohner et al., 1995; Chaiken et al., 1989, 1996; Eaely & active contribution to the process when the construction Chaiken, 1993) social knowledge is constructed thfoleh is effortless.This passive_influenceis seen,for example,in two broadly defined informatlon-processing strategiä.-top- the effects of scliemas,heuristics, mindlessness,cÄronic Heuristic processingis an effortlesi, theory-äriven, goals, and accessible constructs that exert their impact down.type of-procäsing. Sgstematic procelssingls an Jf- without the individual devoting much, if "rry, "o.rr"1orrc fortiul, data-driven, bottom-up type of processing.The GOALEFFECTS ON ACTIONAND COGNITION

(a as HSM assumesthe default processingstrategy will be one correlation tendency to seedistincf events or people that requires the least effoit-the he-uristic ioute. How do being related because they appear to stand out together; ".ooorri-tttittded processors become motivated to be sys- for siereotyping this is a pertäi"ed relationship bät*een tematicP The ansr.ieris said to involve a trade-off between gronp *u-6".ihlp and so^metrait; Hamilton & Gifford, the HSM's sufficiency and least effort principles. While 1e76). people desire least effort, they also desire a certain degree More prototypical, however, is research demonstrating (even in the face ofcontradictory äf "änfid"n"e in their iudgments. In the HSM, this point that steräotypes are rigid of sufficient confidence iJconceived as a threshold, with evidence), and this resistance to change is not always con- norms with Deoplemotivated to exert enough effort to allow them to sciouslv enforced throueh reflectinq on societal i""äh th" threshold. If their lävel of actual confidence """h iJdg."nt made. Räther, these"normsbecome internal- falls short of the threshold (their desired confidence ized ändlreate passively operating standards that are used level), they will effortfully process until they achieve- a to guide iudgments.New information is seen as consistent way, feeling of'sufficiency and äither reach or surpass the witl intärnälized standards-stereotypes' In this even strengthened, because threshold.Goals (such as those instigatedby being Person- stereotypes are maintained, allv vested or held accountable) serve to raise the desired the searöh for coherence (Tajfel, 1969) Ieads us to ignore would leJel of confidence (e.g., Maheswaran& Chaiken, 1991). stereotype-inconsistent aspects to stimuli that Both models make links between information process- *ak" "atego.izationeffortful (e.g', Darley & Gross,1983; ing and goals,with goals serving to initiate and then direct Hamilton & Rot", 1980). Such mäintenanceof stereotypes (the thä qua"ntity and quality of cognitive processing. Both through stereotype-quidedcategorization search for (Taylor' *od"ir explicitly prädict'that ^ dit"t"p".,"y betweän a de- coheränce) is r'eilei"ted in reseärch on salience (e.g', sired goafstate and an actual state produces insufficient Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), attribution Jack- "orrfii"rr"e in social knowledge, wliich instantiates goal son, Sullivan, & Hodge, 1993; Pettigrev, 1979; Taylor & (e.g., Wyer, striving toward coherence anä confidently held knowl- Jaggi,1974), decision making Bodenhausen& (e.g., edge. Eoth assume that the goal of having accurate and i9"8"5;Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), socialjudgments ualld iudsments leads perceivers to exert greater process- Banaji, Hirdin, & Rothman, 1993; Manis, Paskewitz, & ing effotl while without such a goal morJcategorical and Cotler, 1986; Pratto & Bargh, 1991),and outgroup homo- can be expected. Both as- geneity (e.g., Linville, Salovey, Fischer, 1986; see eflortless types of processing "narcissism -& sume that tLä tendency to ref on simple itructures can be Ällport's, 1054, of small differences"). enhanced by goals that promote a reliance on schemas, fhis research assumesthat people typically Pursue co- world stereotypes, Äd heuristics. Finally, both reflect ideas herence through strategies that simplify the social pr"r"ni"ä in our historical review that people prefer least (Rosch, tgTg).ihis is äst likely to äccur when situations äffort, that doubt can promote people moving toward ex- are ambiguous or when behavioral information is complex, erting effort, that goals can promote experiencing such allowing people to force interpretations on it. However, is doubi, that these döubts are allayed throügh a search for se.re.al"stirdiässuggest that when inconsistent behavior coh"rer"" and the pursuit of knowledge belief, and that highly diagnostic änd too salient to ignore, it forces aban- "reason" this search is halte-d when sufficient (Jones & dolnment öf stereotype-maintaining interpretations. Thus, "warrant" Davis, 1965) or (Allport, 1954) is experienced. stereotlpe inconsistent information is sometimes utilized & From this view, percei'n"., utd flexible, capablä of exert- in impielsions (e.8., Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Hamilton ing as much procässing effort as their goals dictate. In the Rose,-study3, 1980; Locksley, Bor-gida,Bre$e, -&.H"p- räainder oi this t""iioo, we review the processes that burn, 198Ö;Manis, Nelson, & Shedler, 1988) and this is regulate this flexibility as they have be^enexamined in re- most likelv to occur when the data are unambiguous-when ,rä .oo- for interpretation. Diagnostiö information seärch on stereotyping and impression formation. there is "hitting can overpower what waits^at the top of t-hehead by Goals and Stereotype rJse. Stereotypes are sets of be- us over the head" with its clarity. this research addresses liefs about a group äf people. They are a mental list or the point that stereotype use can be defeatedby requiring picture of the"traits, chäraöteristici, and behaviors a par- the target ofthe stereolypes,the victim ofone's perceptual iic,rlar social group is likely to possess.While such behefs biases,"to act in a männer that is somehow diagnostic they öriginate in the culture of enough, consistent enough, and_salient enough to-hit the exist in p"opiä't äi.tdt, "a those indiviäuals. Lippman (ISZZJ called stereotyping stereätyped person o'oet the head and awaken the ability to "imposes form of perception" lhat a certain chardcter on individuäte. if strensthening the data is one method to de- the data; becäuse the environment is far too complex to limit stereotype use]then pärhaps even in the presence of attain meaning without such classifications (see also weak d.ata(i.ä- ambiguous änd no-ndiagnosticiniormation) a Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen,1994). Stereotypes, how- challenge to stereotype use can come from strengthening ever. need room to impose character on the data-the be- anotheifactor in active perception-the goals of the per- havior being observed^must be ambiguous enough to be ceiver(e.g., Moskowitz, 1996). open to intelpretation (Duncan, 1976), but given the am- This ap"proachwas adopted by Fiske and her colleagu-es bizuitv inheränt in interpersonal behavior, not much room (e.e.. Eiüer & Fiske,^ f984; Fiske & Von Hendy, is"neäded. Research flom this cognitive perspective I9ö2; Neuberg, 1989; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). Fiske and initially addressedthe ability of stereotypes to develop Neuberg (199ö) developed a continuum model of impres- simply'asa function of cognitive processessuch as catego- sion formation that linked goalsto information-processing .i"^ilär, (Tajfel, 1969; Taj"fel & Turner, 1986) and illusöry strategies ranging from caiegory-based (stereotypical) to PERSONALMOTIVÄTIONAL SYSTEM

as in a friendship, or forrning negative-im- individuating. Thev state that perceivers initially catego- impressions, commitment to a€rouP one doe^s rize others iapidlv and seek to confirm that categoriza- ^notprässions, as in a forced with), with drastically different ef- tion. This deiauli strategy is not ideal in that it can wish to associate processing. This allows for the possi- produce what Bruner (1957) called nonveridical PerceP^- fects on information control, structure, and long-term iion, but it generally produces impressions that are suf- bility that goals such-as with other goals such as ac- ficient, or enough. the impression is not dependenci can be in conflict food -When and that the mannerin satisfactory,"ifthere is äoubt in its validity, further atten- cuiacv and short-term dependency is resoLred determines informa- tion is directed toward the impression formation process' whicli this eoal conflict Such feelings of insufficiency ä.e said to be triggered by tion-processingstrategies. (1988)-suggestthat goals soch äs those arising from self-relevant impression lärley, Fleäing, Hilton, and Swann (iee & Thibaut, 1958), such as iormation tasks.Thus, the social perceiver is described as interaction soals also fones must evaluate, or with a per- a motioated tactician, whose goals direct processingop- interacting öith a Person you a partner on a task, arise from tions bv determining the cost of judgments' son who w"ill subseQuentlybe dependent on one an- For äxample,Erbär and Fiske (1984) used outcome de- situations where people äre out-come pendency (äaking subjectsdependent on one another for other. Such goals nof only guide the processing of informa- of information. Whereas irr"cursfr.rl comple"tionöf th"it täsk) to manipulate accuracy tion, but aiso the gatheling (1:987) shöw that people attend to in- soalsand raiseihe cost ofiudgment. Suchinterdependence Neubere and Fiske presentid to them, Darley öas believedto increasetlie näed for prediction and control consistJnt information that is with such interaction because people need to know how their partner can help et al. (1988) showed that subjects information to verify them accomplishthe codependenttask. In particular, peo- goals actually seekout inconsistent of others-they ole are likelv to attend to iharacteristics inconsistent with Ind erraluate their negative expectancies stereofypeswhen involved with such a task, but focus ask more diagnostic questions. irior be overcome by being än characteriiics consistentwith stereotypeswhen no goal Thus, steräotype ule can not only information, but b.y the exists. Presumably this occurs because inconsistent infor- inundated by cointerstereotypic strate.giesborne mation is more diagnostic and informative and can help sat- perceiver aiopting goals thai ivill defeat exert their effect by in- isfy the goal offoriring accurateimpressions. äf cognitive eäottöttiy. Such goals strategies the per-^ Outcome dependencyas a meansto overcomingstereo- fluenäing the information-präcessing -of a wide range of typins bearssiäilarity io the classicSherif (1966)research ceiver, lJading them to deliberatelyässess that is inconsistent oi suöerordlnate goaßas a meansto resolveintergroup ten- information, including information is discovered sions. In Sherif'Jwork, mutual, codependentstriving to- with the stereotype änd information that so far, how- ward a desired goal led to the breakd^ownof prejudiöe, a later in the interäc^tion. In the cases reviewed by prediction not Jo different from the effects Erber and ever, these goals are always suggested-tothe individ]'al Can self-selected iriske sho*ed to be due to interdependence.What Fiske's an experimänter,^also not fräely ääopted. in judgment? researchadds, however, is an expliCit link.between interde- goals attenuate stereotyping effects to this pendence and information-processing strategies,suggesting Flske and Von Hendy (1992) provide one answer people that they are th"t the beneficialeffects äf"od"p"id"nceärise fröm s"b- ouestion by sugqestingthat telling 'iLitt"d leads them t-o häve an enhanced iects being more individuating and effortful in the types of inäiuidätors; con- judgments"theyform about störeotypedoutgroup members. senseof self and to subsequently adopt goals that are Thus, Further, Ruscherand Fiske (1990) point out that in addi- sistent with this salient and egalitarian senseof self. context was used to make accessible one tion to cooperating with another forä ioint success,peoPlg the experimental context-dependent asPects of self^ (e.g', are outconie depe"ndenton competitors because successof of the many, "self- a competitor wiil indicate persönd failure. Thus, it is not Markus & Kunda, 1986). Subiectsgiven the senseof coopeiation that leads to tiie cognitive effects of seeking as-individuator" paid greatei attention to the inconsistent better information, but the goal of attaining accurate in- information (but-only when they were low self monitors foruration that arises from a state of interdependence. and thus likely to use dispositional information as a guide Competing individuals attend to stereotype and expectancy to behavior). inconsistent information about their opponentsmuch as co- Thus, a consistent pattern of results from Fiske and her operating individuals do. colleaguessuggests thät goalsare able to promote individu- ^ plsk" Neuberg and Fiske (1937) add that outcome dependency ation."Recenflv. (tgga") has turned attention to does not a-lt'ayslead to increased attention to target infor- power goals thät might serve to push perceivers in the op- jud-gments. mation nor to individuating, more comprehensi,röimp.es-- posite äirection, toward making categorical sion formation. These effäcts depend on what types of hirk" rngg"tts that power encouräggsstereotyping because when stereotypes goals are generated by outcome dependency thät- then stereotyfäs help mäintaln Polvqr. Even to mäderate infoimation pro""tiittg. In itereotyping are eeneially positive, suchlabels are limiting and serve to ierve "fenZ" studies (as r.vith manv judgment tasks in the natural envi- in" thä stereotyped group-"power is control and (p. ronrnent), the relationship with the outcome-dependent stereotypesare one "ä| to äxetl conttol" 623). Those partner is short terrn and task oriented. Theseoutcome-de- with power are proneto stereotypealso because they lack a pendent relationshipsare said to promote accuracy-driven, ,o""ih" eoal tliat encouragesihem to do otherwise. To what individuating irnpiession formaiion. However,'we also "i""1 ond" advance, the suEordinate needs to know enter into long-term, outcou-re-dependent relationships qualities are valued by the outcorte-controlling supervisor that may fostei different, distal goals (forrning positive (ässuggested by Jones& Thibaut's, 1958,interaction goals); GOALEFFECTS ON ACTIONAND COGNITION "the subordinates depend on the powerful for outcomes and Bruner (1957), in his discussionof constant close evaluation.As discussedearliei, such outcomedependency Iook," hints at this shortcoming of a strategy of relying on often leads to increased effort and deliberation in process- effortful correction as an antidote to nonveridical percep- ing. The powerful have no such goal; in fact, they have de- tion. He statesthat while some stimuli can be assessedso ,trändson their time that render such individuation toward that their best fit to a category can be discovered, other stimuli are equivocal and cannot result in veridical catego- subordinatesnear impossible. However, Fiske's suggestion "mostly that the powerful have more demands on their attention rization. Suc^hstimuli are in the sphere of io- perceiving raisesthe possibility that power promotesstereotyping not called interpersonal perception; the states of becauseof the goal of maintaining power and using stereo- other peoplä . . . it is äo"bt'ftl whäther a thärapeutic regi- types to fence others in, but because the powerful have *"n oi cüse looking will aid the misperceivär much"in (p. sirained cognitive capacity. dealing with more complex cue patterns" 142). We Other goals that promote a reliance on c_ognitivestruc- echo t-his sonssln-when stereotypes,expectancies, and tures and- prior experience, such as need for structure other biasesexist, even systematicprocessing can produce (e.g.,Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Naccarato, 1988), raise nonveridical judgments when the äblect beiing jüd-ged is whät Bruner (f957) suggestsare the costs of deliberating something subieötively determined (such as attitudes to- and make stereotype ,tie mote likely. As sugge^stedby *ard andimpiessions of others; see Eagly & Chaiken's, Hilton and Darley (lggf), many goals that arise from so- 1993, discussionof biased systematicprocessing),- cial interaction place cognitive demands on p,erceiv_ers Additionally, even when goals get perceivers to be unbi- who are already prone to relying on impressions formed in ased in their systematic processing,such processing re- abilitv and caöacity to Le carriäd out, wlich a relatively effoitless fashion. Such demands should only ouires the "The increase the robustness of stereotype use. However, with Äav not be afforäed by e']eryday social interactions: most researchthat attempts to demonstratehow goalsin- "ori of close looks is feneraily ioo high under the condi- crease stereotype use, it i^sdifficult to determine whether tions of speed, risk, and limited capacity imposed upon or- the manipulatidns used lead to a goal being adopted or ca- ganisms Ly their environment" (Bruner, p. l-42). Neuberg This makäs discnsiion äf goal ef- IfSSS, pp. :S+-SAS) expressedthis same concern in stat- pacity bäirrg sttoined. "Motivating iects- on prömoting stereotype use less clear. Alihough ing, perceivers to form accurate impressions fe* *oolä doubt ihat goals^can enhance the extent to cläarly will noi äl*ays reduce behavioral biases against which people rely on steieotypes, research must disentan- stigmätized targets . . . accu-racygo-als may be less effec- gle s,-rc'he?fects'from limiti än cognitive capacity. Indi- tivä when co*p"tittg *ith other goals and tasks for limited vidual differences in chronic goals is one suöh approach coqnitive andbehavioral resources." Finally, consciously (e.g.,Neuberg & Newsome,1993). Another approachis to deöiding -to pursue the goal of eliminating stereotyPes ind--ucegoals that do not simultaneously limit capacity, from orie's iäpressions, either throu-gh choosing to do so (e.g., such as ägo-protection and self completion (e.g., Crocker to alleviate an emotional state of compunction & Luhtanen, 1990; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & In- Allport, 1954; Devine, Montieth, Zuwerink, & Elliot, tgdt) or to satisfya motive to be egalitarian and fair (what german,1987). "härd Fiske, 1989, caläd making the choice" to intend to Goalsand StereotypeActioation. In discussinggoal ef- be non-biased), can have"paradoxical effects. Conscious to correct fects on stereotype use, the operational assumption llas attempts^i,rdq*"nts to suppress stereotypes, as a means be controlled-goals lead to o.,"', ond make ihem bias-free, can lead to been that stereotype use can "rebounding" effortful strategies that allow one to fight against the other- those iteräotypes and being used to an even wise biasing effects of activated stereotypes. However, this greater extent^in subsequentJudgments (Macrae, Boden- literature does not saythat goals can stop people from acti- hansen,Milne, & Jetten. 1994). vating stereotlpes, fiom p.i*"t being äade äccessible,or There appear to be compelling reasonsto believe that a from"initial iud^ementsbeing determined by passiveforces. strategy of üsing systematic information processing to cor- föi biased initial inferences may often fall short. This is What it sayi is"that if a söreotype has ilieady bg.en-in- rect ferred or äctivated, stereotype use may be controlled by not intended to suggestabandoning such strategies. To the these inferences being adl"tiä and corräcted through con- contrarv. the point"ii explicitlv to süggestthat in-clusionof a However, stereotype use and qoal orientatiän re',reals^otherstratelLs in addition to, not sciouselaboration strätegies. "constant stereotvpeactivation arä separateissues. Whereas attenu- instead of, the close look"' One such strategy is in the first place. ating stäreotype effects oi irrdg*"nt has been widely ^preventing stereotype activation dem"onstratedby getting subleöts to adopt goals that allow orr" ."äro.r't.r"'tian approachhas not been considered for either an on-line correction to prevent stereotype use or Iies in the languagethathäs been used to describe stereo- correction at recall to prevent stereotype use, the even type effects. Beöause they are effortless and often un- more fundamental stratägy of fighting stereotype effects co'nsciously applied, there has been an assumption that on judgment by preoenting their actioation has not been stereotype aciiiation is automatic; that the mere Presence pnri,rä. A steieätype canriot bias if it is not activated. Cor- of a mämber of an outgroup triggers the stereotype for iection for already activated stereotypes requires effort that group, as seeing blue ink automatically triggers the :rnd thus can be limited in its success(dependent on capac- const"ruct-forthe color blue. Despite the ample evidence ity and abihty to engagein such corrections-see Thornp- that stereotypes are effortless and pervasive, do they son et al., f994), buis;ch limits are nonproblematicif the meet all the features that make a Process automatic stereotvpeis never activated. (Bargh, 1984, i994)? This is not simply i semanticissue. If PERSONALMOTIVÄTIONAL SYSTEM

stereotypes are unconditionally automatic, then by defini- several asDectsto this experiment leave this issue still open tion, tlieir activation cannot bö controlled. The only avail- to investiäation (see Locte, Macleod, & Walker, 1994, för a able strategy to combat their use would be to prevent their review ofthese concerns). For example, Devine's research application, a strategy the field has aggressively pursued in establishesthat oieces of stereotypic knowledge are stored thä past 10 years. If-not automatic, häiever, then a second together, and if'one aspect of titä kno*ledge"structure is routä to deiimiting stereotype effects in judgment is re- primed. then activation can spreadto other aspectsof the vealed, one focused on preventing stereotype activation itereotype (similar to Cantoi & Mischel's, 1tl77, demon- (e.q.,Moskowitz, Wasel, Gollwitzer, & Schaal,1996). stration with schemas). However, this does not mean, as Empirical support for the position that stereotypes are Devine posits, that the mere presentation of a member of a "automatically actiüäted" provides a second reasonwhy re- stereot!|ed group will be enough to activate the stereo- searchersmay have ignored goal effects on stereotype acti- type, or that priming part of a stereotype will always acti vation; Devine's (1989) intriguing model suggests such 'oate that sfereotypä. Stereotype activation may be inhibitlon would be impossible. By illustrating the auto- controllable so that either (I) one's goals inhibit stereotype matic nature of stereotype activation, Devine concluded activation or (2) some other construct besides the stereo- that stereotypes can only be defeated by later correction, type may be activated instead,what Allport (195a, p. 20) through adopting the conscious goal of debiasing one's Jil"d ^'-o.e dominant category being altivated (sei also judgments. Devine's interpretation of her findings was opti- Macrae,Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995). mistic in that they supported the fact that there is one For example,Bargh and Pietromonaco(1982) primed the strategy that can prevent stereotype use. Specifically, sub- trait of hostllity, but varied the prime frequency from \Vo jects with goals to establish or maintain a nonprejudiced to 20Voto 80Vi between subjects. Their data suggest that identity, while equally likely to have their stereotypes acti- they only found the priming effect for the 8070 condition; vated, can intentionally inhibit the effects of those acti- the'category was not^activ"i"d *hett only 20Voof the stim- vated stereotypes on judgments. However, an even more uli werJprime words. Showing that constructs are not al- optimistic interpretation (particularly given the potential ways actiiated by the *"t" p."Lo"e of the prime raisesthe "constant "m"r" limits to the close look") exists if we can chal- '*"rrrb"rpoisibility that tie pi"t"ttce" of a stigmatized grorp lenge Devine's conclusion regarding the inevitability of 6r of a stereotypeirelevant trait doe-snot inevitab! stereotlpe activation; Gilbert and Hixon (1991) presented lead to stereotype activätion. Moreover, if people's goak tä such a challenge. iudge a certain itereotyped group in a fair manner can be- Gilbert and Hixon (1991) began with the assumption äorie chronically heldi ihtotigh recent and frequent appli- that judgments occur in stages. The first stage, in which cation of the goal, there is reasbn to expect an automatic categorization processeslead to an initial inference, is ef- inhibition of siereotyped responses(see Bargh & Barndol- fortless. Later stagesare consciously controlled, and it is lar, 1995).In fact, Moskowitzet al. (1996) found that peo- here where the iriference from the'first stage is weighed ple who had internalized the goal of being egalitarian, so against situational factors and adiusted (coriected) tö ar- lhat it was chronically held, failed to have stereotypes acti- rive at a more complete judgmänt. The'more effortful vated. They demonstrated that while non-chronics had stages can be d.isrupted by simultaneous processing tasks stereotwes activated by simply seeingpictures of members that place a cognitive load on the perceiver. The earlier of stigÄätized groups, p"oplä with ch'ränic goals to be non- stage, if automatic, cannot. Stereotype use, therefore, biased inhibited stereotype activation. should be dependent on the processing stage in which a Gollwitzer and Moskowitz (1994) suggest a second way cognitive load is introduced. When introdueed after an ini- of demonstrating that stereotype activation may not be tiai inference had been formed, these strains ön capacity automatic; it re'iolves around'äanipulating the iypes of increasedstereotype use-subjects didn't have the capacity intentions subjects form. Implementation intentions are to correct their initial stereotwic inference. However. described ut ä litrk"g" betuäen qoal-directed behavior "cognitive when busynest" " ^L'buQore a stereotype had and situational conteit, laying down a specific plan that been activated, load had the opposite effect. Subjectswere promotes the initiation and execution of goal-directed less likely to use stereotypes in judging others. It prevented Lehavior (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Golhiitzer, 1993). the initial stereotlpic inference from ever being formed, When people-fot* implementation intentions, they are suggestingthat such inferences are not automatic. Ifstereo- said to^suriender initialion of their goal-directed action type activation is dependent on capacity, then it is not to environmental stimuli so that the presence of the stim- automatic; and if not automatic, activation may also be goal- uli can activate goal striving. Such p?ocessing is similarly dependent(Bargh, 1989) as well as capacity dependent- described as oöurrins in"an autömatic fation. Thus, volition may also lead to decreased stereotype activation Gollwitzer and Moskoüitz suggest that having an imple- and a decreasedlikelihood of subsequently using a stereo- mentation intention that works toward the goal of being type. This discrepancybetween Devine (1'9Sg)aid Cilbert nonpreiudiced would establish a competition, or race, to and Hixon (1991)is an emoirical issue that is vet to be re- ""ptrrrä the stimulus input. If the imilementation inten- solved. Gollwitzer and Molkowitz (1994) suggästtwo ways tio'n wins the race, theri the goal of b^eingnonprejudiced of using goals to attempt to do so. can prevent stereotype activation. If it loses the race, The first is by examining whether subjects with chronic then^activation of th'e^stereotypewill occur. egalitarian/fairness goals are less likely to have stereotypes In conclusion, it is suggested that goals can affect activated.Although Devine's (1989) subjectsdid not differ stereotype use through their impact on information pro- in stereotype activation as a function of egalitarianism, cessing ät serreral stages. Although stereotlpes are fast, GOAL EFFECTSON ACTIONAND COGNITION "automatic," inferences are not but are instead sim- they also can be controlled' initial effortiess, and easily applied' then the explanation can be con- ri" i*t, unintended, and unaware, The question we raise frere is whether-they (Gilbert, remains un- an in- ioi the correspondencebias 1989) fy correcting for them, but by exerting iJä""i Ho#ever, an additional way to control it opens activation as-well' Stereotypes "h"ng"d. fluence ovei stereotypä preventing trait interence' infer-encesin this re- up-through-'foi mav be similar to spontaneous trait (1982) demonstrated,by chang- were initially claimed to be "*"rfiplä, Quattro"ne ä^?a."r"t', ät;;;[ Ha"t""ces led to see as salient information' & uleman' k g *tr"t su^blecti were t"'""tch (see Newn-ran people form are ffi;-'";i;,-t;;;q,-,"." (and bv ifrä t"*.tities the initial inferences iöäät;;;ä"d tfr"m to be restricted enhanced) on their ex- their occur- ""i'atto*i,i"nal, but situational, dependent ;ä;;, *Ltay in their expression'llt i.t they perceiv_efhe stimulus informa- (Ülernan& Mo^skowitz'1994)' because """,""ä"r-", the time i"""" "t *al ]ust 'iü;.;L *", borro*"d ftotn the correspondence bias often effortlessly*d i,of,. ri"i"ttyp"t are P.,1t:i::! i!tT"^" t" which subjectsview a speechon a topic that does not mean that tn"y "ät"atä, (i.e., witiout awareness) 11"':,": assignedto write ör choseto write' but several ways goals can re-gulate fi;;ä;";;ither vo.rä "onttol. There are asked to ascertain subtle influ- o-neof them ;i*il;;lt subjects *Ere i#;;;; th"i d"t"t-ine stereotype use' Thus' ences of experimenters on subjects in- experiments' ttt" passive inhibition of stereotype activation' were now fo- ü"it! ä;;;;ft"g-tt" iutgt perion, subie6ts Krull (1993) "rrr"d o' theimpact Jf tü" experimänter' Formation of Trait lnferences' Earlier Goals and the " ti*if"t effect of^inferentiai goals in deter- (1944) beli"f thaipeople tend to at- ä;";i;ä *" ,Ll,il*"a Heider's inference is dispositionally or not to the con- ;;;ü whether-t"t"a. an initial irlU"t" ""t"s fo, .,r"r,ts to other-peoplö'. appropriltl,god;"-1?tll- be indicative of r#ä;dry Given.the text the person is in. Acts are talien io "nat- di'sappsalsd'the ettect re- in a spondentinferences not only "ärt"""fri" * that doer and deed are equated situation'As Krull andDavis i'ä;;äü;"pt" o""'"tttiblted täihe I;J, il;äil;nt'al Gestalt"(Jones, Ie7e)'-Jones lth! '"-ilI" (p' 3a0)'rhis is this logicby sug- ;;;;1;J";, grist change(s)the itg65,To.r", & Harris'196Ö extended and Hutcherson's(1990) s -be- ;;;;i;** *iih L"pf"., c"lark, ttt^t people f otm correspondent. inJ-dispositionerence sP"ta- o"tii"n' of ;l*f il tit""tio"? inferencesmay !e formed f,ffiä *ä ut"lä]", "o""tpotdt with the that promotessitu- will be taken """rtf" *ft"n backgroundinformation ih";&;;; "roducing;;Ja thatbehavior The conclusion.that. goals generatemultiple highly ffi;;i ;;tb*t"Jis present' ilf"ä;i$':*l""i doesnot i,,if""tt"e is alsoreached by uleman 108)' ;;;;;;1 atto"tr.l*"I expected*äil;;;;ä effects" (Jones, 1979, p' (1994) who found tt'at spontaneoustrait (e'g', 1e89;Gilbert & ;ä M"rk.;itz t'i' "ätt""goes Gilbert' b1a subjecfs proximal.goal' 1990;Gilbert & Os- ;l;;;; ""Ja ü" inüibited ffi-"", fbgit iilbert, ffirtt, t lüalone' i"feien""i "t" not completely p"lhu*, 1e88; Gilbert' il;;;;"I;d"d th"t such b";;;;^r-e6;-Gilbeit, & Krull' model in autJmatic,-*n"t"iti"e but are goal dePendent' t M"lor,", isss; ptoposedthat their i-nferenceis not i"iär"&, (reviewed the inipact oi goalson trait are *id to L" io'*"d in stages inferencesin which inferences ;;i; ii*inish ihe impärtance of such give ,it" to ttt" "orrespondencebäs' The infer- trait in- earlier)can "automatic"'These ;;;ä;; psvchologicalfuictioning' |ust because ir'" i"lti"r stageaie be- not #;tToifr;ä'i" "unbeii"t'ud" ;#;;';;;;a ifevitable and calib-econtrolled does to be in later stageswhere wish to it"ä .;;;;;"d *""" ift"t they do not usually occur' We do not *.ü;;f"*;;"' o"""' (Gilbertet;I" 1990)' "ä;"tiää,t i;d" ;h;i conirolling dispositionalattribution byprevent- correction requiresexerting t$,"iti"-".:l theoppo- but this il;; ;ä;iiilü;i"r"'"""""ix^tiä--it thedefault' In fact' iort, which requireihaving cognitive capacity'' typically occur'. and assumptronll=t:-tlf]:tnat t"ee"sted; trait inferences l^, to ."s""r"h^onstereotyping' there is an make them tunctronal is automatic there are äistal goals in place that ;;;;;l;;;";e from ou't"'i"a behavior role for volitional con- (1993)referred to asa ""äiir..iu.lhus,"the moie typical iCäU"", 1989),a positionthat Krull initial dispositional infer- )fi*"a assumption'as it was ;;;j;';ä;iööb t" "o"""iä" *"aa." fhä it"pli"ationof this next) rather than to,Prevent wayto controloverat- ;;; (*fü"ti *ä t,t.tt to with stereotyperesearch, is that the ever occurring' but tnrs applicationof a dispositional inferences from tributins to dispositiottit to prevent tiie the tendency to its-occur- ä"ät ""t mean that goals-cannot override p"J""it"it inierence,rathei than preventing of social judgment' and Hixon's ;*ib*; io truitt in"the early stages ä; i;;"*tat paraäoxical given-Gilbert infeänce is not automatic)' t"nn"tii"""-?il?;;Jä.aa that steieotypic "fundamental Cor,rection of Dispositional Attributions' tt'" view of the Goals and the "iäi"tl' activation has'been depicted as pas- as a bi-asor tendency'The Iust as stereotype attribution ".ro." (no" , Lg77) but open to goal-driven correction' so' drawn and usedwas not sug- "i""tu o"""ttlng ;;;;;tih which tiaits are i*ptätsions öf personality foy'.|'e " fixed proc-ess'but merely ;;;Jr" ;h" i"it"ial 1e sestedbv lones (19ö i" U" goals can serve to determine wnetner stratägy'In assertingthat have iust seen that ffi;ä"ä". i"ü;;;ff;il"'", default initial trait inferences' A second automätic'it is not our in- ;";;i"-;"";;;ü f";* iä""t"*t"" i".mation maynot be revolves around how and when th"'"fo'", consciouslvregulate d' ffiä;f;ltrlorial control i:5Jä öäil;l;l ";;t;;l their initial, effortless judgments..(if earlier' interence r"ätf"^ To the "oä."ry, as reviewed Processes more deliberat-eänd-controlled anctare uolq- f*ti"äl il,ioogh ro*"*hut freouentlv occur without awarenessor intent how informati9i ^iiriUlrtiorr"t ä"soning. This issue of understanding "tiL" t" iuäö"" " i"g,r'o"ial . initiatä and regulate the processesthrougn that it islt essentratI: f :",::i"llto and when goals becauseof tüelr passiveoccurrence is separäte from the well "purely automatic" which attributions are ,"""hä ;;k";; ;itle'disünction betwee-n how goals äirect the content of "oassive rI established iiterature on and but controllable" inference Processes' PERSONAL MOTIVÄTIONALSYSTEM one's attribution, as demonstrated in research on attribu- cost of Dremature closure is raised even further, closure tional biases(see Ross & Fletcher, 1985,for a review). mav beöome too expensive, and control will be forfeited Gilbert et al. (1988) demonstratethat correcting an in- alongwith overattriLution to disposition.The price of clo- ference requires cognitive capacity. They followed " pto- sure is said to be determined by goals that make closure cedure used by Snyder and Frankel (1976) in which either desired or avoided. Thus, if the overattribution ef- subjectswatch a tape ofa nervous, anxiety-ridden person. fect is caused by a tendency to attribute causesto disposi- Some subiects were told that the reason for this arxiety tional factoru t""urrr" sulh categorical inferencei ate was the discussion topic the person was speaking about-- easiest,while adjusting those inferäncesto take the situa- sexual fantasies. These subiects formed an initial infer- tion into """onti is effortful, then goals that promote clo- ence that the person was anxious but corrected this sure (in this case, working on an unattractive task) should inference by taking into account the topic. Other subjects augment the likelihood öf forming correspondent infer- were told the topic was bland (e.g., world travel). These enöes. However, goals that promote the avoidance of clo- subiects did not correct their initial inference by subtract- sure and highligit the coits associated with early or ingtut the input from the context-the person *", ,""n ", premature freezing (in this case,working on an attractive dispositionally anxious. However, an interesting twist ap- iask) should be likely to instigate extönded processing peared when subjects in the same circumstances were (e.e., Kruglanski & Mayseless,1987). If correction of ini- made cognitively busy. Busy subjects who were told the tiai correipondent infärences is indeed effortful, goals topic wal anxiety producing now failed to take this infor- that promdte the exertion of the required effort should to disposition. *ätion into accouit. They froceeded to judge the person elimi'nate the tendency to overattribute as dispositionally anxious, forming a correspondent infer- Converging evidence for this role of goals as_instigators ence that failed to be corrected despite the anxiety- of more diliEerate processing in which initial, more ef- provoking nature of the situation. When cognitive capac- fortless inferences "ie corte"i"d and adjusted is provided ity is not available, perceivers do not take into account in the work of Tetlock (1983, 1985, 1992; Tetlock & Kim, contextual factors that can correct an initial inference. 1987). Tetlock (1985b) examined the impact of a goal of However, even having the available capacity for effort- forming accurate and justifiable judgments on the over- ful correction is often not enough. People may freeze at attribuiion effect. Some subjects weie led to expect that the earlyinferential stage, failing to consider context, even they would have to justify their impressions as part of the when nä capacity consiraints aä placed on them. This is experimental proceduteithus being held accoüntable for precisely what is shown in the basic demonstration of the thäir attributions. Others simply performed- the judg- öorrespondencebias (Tones& Harris, 1967). Earlier, it ment task with no goal provided for them. Accountable was stfugested in the principle of least effort that people su\ects were less lä

other effects based on the value it provides for boosting information (cf. Snyder & Swann, 1978). There is no need to equate the individual's senseof self-worth and virtue. This codä closure with structured and schematic solutions arrived at quickl\.. have-perceptual implications, such as a perceiver favor- People can either desire to approach or avoid closure as gerreial mö- ably-biasingthe impressionsof those who give indications tives, and each of tnese motives can be achieved through processing -nging of liklng thL perceiver.- the äorrespondence from structured and categorical thought to complex and inl for_ex,ample, dividuated thought (thus, perhaps the earliei language of need bias may be facilitated by belongingnessgoalsihat for pre- structure and fear of invalidity more accurately captures this vent a person from possi- seeing constraintJ on a d.esired oth-er's bility). In more recent revisions to his model, Kruglansh (lgg6; behavior. To date, the litärature on goal-focus, effects on person explicitly discussesthe possibility that closure and accuracy are not perception has retained a narrow giving fär less . incompatible. emphasis to-interaction 4. But it can be traced at least as far back to (I8g0, p. 451) be- goals other than öekiig coher- 'The lames's ence, control, and cognitive mastery/clarity. liel stream of our thought is like a iirer. On the ,ihole, easy simple flowing predominates in it, the drift of things is with the puil Finally, this review highlights thät goals have been ex- of gravity, and effortless attention is the rule. But ät intervals a loe- amined almost exclusively as independeit variables in order jam occurs, stops the current, creates an eddy, and makes things to understand their impaät on cognitiue processesservicing temporarily move the other way. If a real river could feel, it *ould the pursuit of cohere-nce.Relat'ively liitle has been saiä feel these eddies and set-backs as Dlacesofeffort." about how goals may serve as dependent variables, with the fo3us 9n how cogniiiv" pro""rr"^, may determirr" ih" typ", of goals that we ädopt. Whereas the literature on goak'änd REFERENCES action has focused on goal setting, how people's äognitive processesaffect the goal-setting process-reriains viitually Abelson, R. P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. M., Rosen- unexplored What haibeen demäistrated, however, by thä berg, M. J., & Tannenbaum,P. H. (1968).Theories ofcognitioe con- literature^ on go_alsand cognition, is not simply the active sistency : A soircebook. Chicago: Rand-McNally. n"Iu.: of social cognitionlbut the flexible'processes in- Ach, N. (1905). Über d.ie Willenstätigkeit und dai Denken. Göttinsen: Vandenhoeck volved in the constrüction ofsocial knowledeel and the role & Ruprecht. Ach, N. 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