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The Development of Reasoning Heuristics in Autism and in Typical Development University of Plymouth PEARL https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk 04 University of Plymouth Research Theses 01 Research Theses Main Collection 2010 The development of reasoning heuristics in autism and in typical development Morsanyi, Kinga Ella http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/1804 University of Plymouth All content in PEARL is protected by copyright law. Author manuscripts are made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the details provided on the item record or document. In the absence of an open licence (e.g. Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher or author. The development of reasoning heuristics in autism and in typical development. Kinga Ella Morsanyi ' A, O Doctor of Philosophy School of Psychology 2010 11 Abstract Kinga Ella Morsanyi: The development of reasoning heuristics in autism and in typical development. Reasoning and judgment under uncertainty are often based on a limited number of simplifying heuristics rather than formal logic or rule-based argumentation. Heuristics are low-effort mental shortcuts, which save time and effort, and usually result in accurate judgment, but they can also lead to systematic errors and biases when applied inappropriately. In the past 40 years hundreds of papers have been published on the topic of heuristics and biases in judgment and decision making. However, we still know surprisingly little about the development and the cognitive underpinnings of heuristics and biases. The main aim of my thesis is to examine these questions. Another aim is to evaluate the applicability of dual-process theories of reasoning to the development of reasoning. Dual-process theories claim that there are two types of process underlying higher order reasoning: fast, automatic, and effortless (Type 1) processes (which are usually associated with the use of reasoning heuristics), and slow, conscious and effortful (Type 2) processes (which are usually associated with rule-based reasoning). This thesis presents eight experiments which investigated the development of reasoning heuristics in three different populations: typically developing children and adolescents between the age of 5 and 16, adolescents with autism, and university students. Although heuristic reasoning is supposed to be basic, simple, and effortless, we have found evidence that responses that are usually attributed to heuristic processes are positively correlated with cognitive capacity in the case of young children (even after controlling for the effects of age). Moreover, we have found that adolescents with autism are less susceptible to a number of reasoning heuristics than typically developing children. Finally, III our experiments with university students provided evidence that education in statistics increases the likelihood of the inappropriate use of a certain heuristic (the equiprobability bias). These results offer a novel insight into the development of reasoning heuristics. Additionally, they have interesting implications for dual-process theories of reasoning, and they can also inform the debates about the rationality of reasoning heuristics and biases. IV Contents Chapter I. Introduction to the heuristics and biases research program and dual-process theories of reasoning. 1.0. Introduction 1 1.1. What are heuristics? 2 1.1.L An introduction to the heuristics and biases research 2 program. 1.1.2. Where do heuristics come from? 9 1.2. Dual-process theories of reasoning 15 1.2.1. Distinguishing between two types of reasoning processes 15 1.2.2. Evidence for the existence of Type 1 and Type 2 processes 19 1.3. New additions to dual-process theories and alternative 22 approaches 1.3.1. The effect of knowledge on reasoning, and the revised 22 heuristic-analytic theory 1.3.2. How many systems, and how do they differ? 25 1.3.3. Gigerenzer's critique of dual-process theories 27 1.4. Questions to be answered and the outline of the chapters to 30 follow. Chapter 2. The development of reasoning skills. 2.0. Introduction 35 2.1. Developmental dual-process accounts, and the expected 36 developmental trajectories of reasoning performance 2.1.1. Research into the development of children's reasoning 36 using heuristics and biases tasks 2.1.2. Developmental dual-process theories 43 2.1.3. The links between the development of memory and 48 reasoning: The fijzzy-trace theory. 2.1.4. An alternative (single process) approach to the 5i development of reasoning heuristics: the intuitive rules research program 2.2. The role of memory retrieval and contextualisation in 57 logical reasoning: The case of conditional inferences 2.2.1. The role of the activation and integration of real-life 57 knowledge in everyday conditional reasoning 2.2.2. Developmental research on conditional reasoning. 60 2.3. Research on the development of children's reasoning 64 abilities - Summary Chapter 3. The development of heuristic reasoning in childhood and 68 adolescence (Experiments 1-3.) 3.0. Introduction to Chapter 3. 68 V 3.1. Experiment I: Changes in reasoning performance on some 69 typical heuristics and biases tasks between the age of 5 and II. 3.2. Experiment 2: The development of heuristic reasoning in 88 adolescence and its relationship to executive functioning 3.3. Experiment 3. The development of heuristic reasoning in i03 adolescence, and its relationship with analogical reasoning ability. 3.4. General discussion (Experiments 1-3.) 127 Chapter 4. Cognitive theories of autism, and research on reasoning in 131 autism. 4.0. Introduction to Chapter 4. 131 4 Autism and the cognitive theories of autism I3i 4.1.1. The theory of mind deficit hypothesis of autism 132 4 12. Xhe weak central coherence theory 136 4.1.3. The executive dysfunction theory of autism 139 4.1.4. The extreme male brain theory of autism 142 4 2. Reasoning and autism 146 4.2.1. Analogical reasoning in autism 146 4.2.2. Memory retrieval and everyday conditional reasoning in i48 autism 4.2.3. Heuristics and biases in autism 152 4.3. Discussion 156 Chapter 5. Heuristic reasoning in autism (Experiments 4 and 5) 159 § Q Introduction to Chapter 5 159 5 / Experiment 4: The development of heuristic reasoning in i62 autism and its relationship to cognitive abilities and executive functioning. 5 2 Experiment 5: Susceptibility to heuristics, and analogical 172 reasoning ability in autism. 5 J General discussion 197 Chapter 6: The role of education and knowledge in heuristic reasoning 206 (Experiments 6-8) 6 0. Introduction to Chapter 6. 206 5 7 Heuristics in probabilistic reasoning and their relationship 2O8 with cognitive ability, thinking styles and educational background. (5 2 Experiment 6. The role of education, discipline, cognitive 217 abilities and cognitive styles in heuristic reasoning. VI 5. J. Experiment 7. The replication of Experiment 6 with Italian 227 psychology students. (5 4 Experiment 8. The effect of instructions on susceptibility to 233 the representativeness heuristic and to the equiprobability bias. (J 5 General discussion 240 Chapter 7: A review and interpretation of the experimental findings, and 245 recommendations for future research. •J Q Introduction to Chapter 7. 245 7 / Experimental findings regarding the development of 246 heuristics and biases in autism and in typical development, and the role of education in heuristic reasoning. 7 / I A summary of the predictions of dual-process theories 246 regarding the development of heuristic reasoning. 7 12, Contrasting our experimental findings with the predictions 250 of dual-process theories. 7.y.i. findings regarding heuristics and biases, and executive 255 functioning in autism 7AA. The role of knowledge and thinking dispositions in 258 reasoning. 7 2. Are two systems better than one? 262 7 2. y. Are the results of our studies in line with the intuitive rules 262 approach? 7.2.2. Some theoretical issues regarding dual-process theories of 266 reasoning. 7 3 Concluding comments and possible ftiture directions 270 7 5 / Is "rational thinking" more rational than heuristics and 270 biases? 73.2, Possible future lines of research and conclusions 273 References 277 Appendices APPENDIX A: Task used in Experiments I, 2, and 4. 310 APPENDIX B: Judgment tasks used in Experiments 3 and 315 5. APPENDIX C: Syllogistic reasoning problems used in 328 Experiment 3 APPENDIX D: Instructions for the analogical reasoning 333 problems APPENDIX E: The tasks administered in Experiments 6-8. 335 APPENDIX S1: Supplementary tables for Experiment 1. 341 APPENDIX S2: Supplementary tables for Experiment 2. 342 VII APPENDIX S3: Supplementary tables for Experiment 3. 345 APPENDIX S4: Supplementary tables for Experiment 4 347 APPENDDC S5: Supplementary tables for Experiment 5. 350 APPENDIX S6: Supplementary tables for Experiment 6. 355 APPENDIX S7: Supplementary tables for Experiment 7. 357 APPENDIX S8: Supplementary tables for Experiment 8. 359 VIII Tables Chapter 2 2.1. Stanovich et al.'s (2008) taxonomy of heuristics and biases. 45 2.2. Developmental trajectories predicted by developmental dual- 55 process theories, and the cognitive foundations of these changes. Chapter 3 3 1 The mean proportion of heuristic, analytic and "other" responses gi on the different tasks across the three age groups. 3 2. Correlations between the individual differences measures 82 3 3 Correlations between age, cognitive ability and response types 34 across tasks. 3 4 Intercorrelations between heuristic responses on the reasoning 35 and decision-making tasks. 3.5. Proportion of heuristic, analytic and "other" responses on the 94 different types of reasoning tasks across age groups. 3 6 Correlations between age and the cognitive ability measures. 95 3 7 Correlations between the individual differences measures and 97 heuristic responding on the different tasks. 3 g The proportion of participants choosing each type of response \ \ 5 across age groups and conflict conditions on the engineers and lawyers problem with a representative description. 3 9 The proportion of children choosing each type of response across [ j 5 age groups and conflict/non-conflict tasks on the engineers and lawyers problem with a non-representative description.
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