13 Goul Effects on Action and Cognition PETER M. GOLLWITZER GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ focus on describing the impact of a-goal on social j"ig- D esearchand theorizing on goals and their effects on (goal conten"t)to explaining the willful control of ll affect, behavior, and cägnition has become very PoP- ments proZesses involved in producing j-udgments ular in social psvchology,as äocumented by the many re- the -(goal- regulation). This has produced a metaphor ot cent edited Uäoks (".e1, Frese & Sabini, 1985; Gollwitzer relatäd asY'flexible strategists" who perhaps have a pre- & Bareh. 1996; Haliich & Kuhl, 1987; Higgins & Sor- humans ';cognitive toward being misers," but are ca- rentinol 1990; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985rPervin, 1989) and disposition of exerting their riill-aid controlling the nature of review chapters (e.g.,Bargh, 1990; Chaiken,''Liberman,& p^lit" piocessing they expend on a given task' guslu. 198ö; Karnio"l& Rois, 1996; Karoly, 1993; Kruglan- the cognitive iri volitional control of cognitive processing .kil ibgO, Mclntosh & Martin, 1992; Tetlock, 1992) on This inierest has embraced the goal concept' Thus' despite thii theme. The reasons for this are manifold' Some are similarly of the cognitive övolution on social psychol- rooted in the theoretical developments in the psychology ift" i*pÄ"t the attemp-ted neglect of- motivational terms of motivation (see Geen, 1995;-Gollwitzer, t99l; Heck- ogv Jd .t""dt. motiväs), the goal concePt could not be h"or"t, 1991; Kuhl, 1983),others within the impact of the iul.L.. ar""y (see Miller, Gälanter, & Pribram, 1960; cognitive revolution on social psychology (see Fiske, i*äpt rgtiZl. Perhaps the goal concePt was spared be- f9ö3b; Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Smith, 1994; Stevens& ii*ä", cause goals and plari-are h-ighly zuitable to.a.c^ognitivl Fiske, 1995). (Carver^& Scheier, 1981; Kruglanski, 1996) and The psycholoqyof motivation has progressedwithin re- analysil plaväd an important role in cognitive Jcience and artifi- cerrt v"ä.i from"ä focus on describinfi the choice of action (e.g.,Wilensky, 1983). no"Ir'("tt emphasis on goal contenl) to explaining the äi"i int"llig"nce 3.o""rr", inväved in thJwillful control of goal-directed äction (an emphasison goal-relatedbehavioral regulation)' AND REGULÄTION AS This new inteiest in volition led to the embracing ot..tfq CONSTRUCTION willtul BASIC PRINCIPLES Eoalconcept, as goalsare at the starting point of the äontrol ofäction-. Assuming that cognitive activity serves focused on goal content, within the domains of purpose of controlling äcdon (as noted by James,1890, Research the how the type of goal a "ltti al*ays for my doing"), both action and thougit, examines thinking is first anä Process vari- on cognition person selects deterriines some measured outcome moäels have-begun to examine goal -effects i""ft research begins with a basic assumption that that- mediates thä regulation of thä individual's actions' äUf". people buildeis ofwhat is experiencedas reality' g,rt go^lt also affäct cognition for the purPose of aiding 'Btfi" are active it is meant that people bring to their meetings with the peiception of others and deriving meaning trom ob- from the envirönment more than the appropriate ,"r',,,ädsoc^ial events (though one might argue that ultimately stimuli hardware that simply awaits being triggered by someprop- such cognitions are ,rt"dto help äne plan actions-what "Goodtto*, "instru- that enviränment. People have selective interests Bruner, & Austen, 1956, p' 12, called ertv of (reilected by their needs, motives, and goals)'either tran- ;entJ'activity").'In examining this theme within social long t"r*, that help to shape thJconstrual of their psychology, there has been a similar progression from a ti""i.t of this chap- Roman for their helpful comments on an earlier draft thank ute Bayer, Adam Galinsky, Gabriele oettingen, and Robert J. we wish to this chapter was fncili- *o, it th" university of Konstanz, G"rrr,,.^ry The prep:rration of ter. when this chapter w:rs started., Gordon Moskowitz to Peter Gollwitzer and Gordon Moskowitz' tated by a grnnt from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 36I 363 PERSONAL MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM social u,orld. T]ris makes action and cognition more than prior beliefs, reevaluationsof previously processedinfor_ enr.ironnrentallv ^ determined responses."Weshall refer to mation, and selectiverecall and-attention. this fundarnenial assumption as^the principl e of actiai Oyr objective in this chapter is to review the evidence constntction. ^ for these goal-relatedprinciples as demonstrated through Thus behavior is not triggered simply by features of the researchon goal effects on action and social cognition. Yn environment, but by thJlnteractLin'of those features each of these domains, we focus first on what üe have Ia_ rvith the properties of the individual. peopie choose be_ beled as goal content research and then on what we have tween many possible courses of action withlin particular a labeled as regulated-process research. In each section, situation, with any given individual's chosen reisponse to goal content research is described as concerned with goal identical environmental features subiected to thä review influences on some outcome-how having " god 5f " of that person's prevailing idiosyncrätic goals. Similarly, particular content versus one of a differeit coätent (or teaturesol the environment do not automatically trigger having no goal specified) determines responses. Goal cognrJion. Rather than there being a one_to_one coäe_ content research on both action and cognition contains spo_ndencebetween the physical at-tributes of a stimulus assumptions about the sources and the se'iection of goals. and its mental representätion (in which the processine but each has focused- mor-e on the impact of " gä of system is seen as a recorder or camera, transcrfuine factf specified content rather than on the äanner ln"which perception and inference are viewed as subjectivEty a"_ that content becomes specified. Regulated-process re_ termined (Allport, lg54). people choose between many search is described as concernea irittr thä processes possible interpretations within a particular situation, ,e through which goals help the individual regulaie a goal- with any given individual's judgmänts and inferences g directed response--how people go about negotiäting trom identical environmental features subjected to the their strivings. We begin with goal influences oi behavl review of prevailing goals. The individual contributes "a ior because traditional-ly goals t'arre been analyzed as di_ E somewhat more than healthy pair of eyes and the ap_'& rectors ofaction. f propriate re,sponsemechanismsn (postman, + B.uner, Before turning to the analysisof goal effects McGinnies, 1948, *Wiren on action : p. 142). As Vives (1540) noted: and cognition, we wish to stress ,:. we the following two points: altirm that a thing is or_is ooJ . we judge not ac_ cording to the-things ihemsel.,es, but rathei acäordins to l. The goal-related_principlespreviouslyintroduced are the concept of our mind, becausefor us the . mind is m"ea_ rn tact partly derived from an assumption about human sure of reality, not reality itself.,' pllchologicd functioning that has littlä to do with goals. Researchfocused o,n tfe processes through which goal I his initial assumptionis simply the belief that humarisare effects are exerted also beg'ins with- a basic assumption. bounded in their abilities tdrespond to the social world. Tfrg is that p"oil" have desired .ass.umption states toward Thus, with regard to action, all possible behavioral strate- whichthey aspire and continue striving toward these ends gie,s within Si"9n situatiori cannot be implemented, until the experienced state sufficientlly approximates 1n/ the and thus needs and desiresmust be fulfilled bv specifvins desiredstate (or the desired state is "lt".ed). Attainine this subsets of goal-directed behavior, only some of .,it i"titt E state providesa senseof coherencefor individuals ^s"it al_ individual can carry out. Additionally, certain behaviors lows them to experience the world in a manner that con_ within this subsetmay not be feasibleio enact becausethe torms to their beliefs, wishes, desires,values, and needs. plrson lacks the "opibltlty to do so. It is within this realm Failure to attain it energizes the indiviäual to strive toward of first deliberating on wiihes and desires and then imple_ achievingcoherenc-e._Süch strivings, however, are ofa pro_ menting the processesthrough which these qet translaied ceduralnature, and the procedurei must somehowbe .äg,r_ into action (in the face of-obstructions anä diversions) lated. They need to be protected frorn obrt^"I;, "la;.äi" where goals exert their impact, and the choice as to how to ot changing environments - :ne 1ac,e and needs, and brought regulate behavior begins. to a halt when either deemed no longer attainable or wh"en Similarly, with regärd to cognition, the stimuli presented sufficiently reached. We shall ,uf", ?o ttis ;;sumption re_ in any situation are too numerous and complex for-total rep_ garding processesthrough which people pursue'goals as resentation by the information processin! system.l Thu's, the principle- of regulated coherenci. Th"s, in examinins ac_ only certain^ e]ements from biäoming tron we shall see -the-"great , buzzing that the processesthrough which äoak confusion of the (Lippman, desiräd outer world" lgZZ,7.55) arä fl'9^"^r_lii"i"g loward statesare *fii"täifrrffi selected_for cognitive p.ocessing,-iith other in?ormatlon steps such as deliberating, planning, shielding 'filtered; an ongoins being out (s6e Broadü'ent,Ig58; Bruner, Ig57; course ofaction, steppin{up effortl', and evaTuati;;;;t Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Treisman& Geffen, Similarty, 1967).Ad- process models in social colnition dltionally, oescrlbe.peoplei::llf*ar certain information that the individual desires to as striving toward having a senseof"coher_ p.o:::r that passesthrough the attentional fllter may ence with respect to their judgments not be "rrä i.rf"r"rrces. This {-easibleto deliberate on Lecause he desrredstate is or she lacks thä cosni_ met when curräntly acceptedknowledee is tive experienced capacity to do so.