<<

InInNo. 6FBriefBrief- July 2004

Comparing EU free agreements Trade Facilitation Olu Fasan, London School of Economics and Political Science

The aim of this InBrief series is to provide a synthesis of various chapters of the ten agreements (FTAs) recently concluded by the European Union with developing countries, as well as other relevant trade agreements when appropriate. Each InBrief offers a detailed and schematic overview of a specific set of trade and trade-related provisions in these agreements.

Trade facilitation may be defined as a 'com- average on trade in industrial goods in improved trade facilitation would increase prehensive and integrated method of redu- industrialised countries - 3.8 percent1.Atthe intra-APEC trade by about USD 280 billion. cing the complexity and cost of trade same time, several studies have recognised The greatest gains to developing countries processes'. The aim is to reduce the red tape the magnitude of the potential gains from come from improvements in ports and cus- associated with the international supply trade facilitation, which can be a win-win toms efficiency and hence the possibility of chain, particularly at the actual cross-border issue for all countries. In particular, developing attracting inward investment. The latter stage. Complicated and unnecessary docu- countries stand to gain enormously from such prospers from a climate of transparent and mentation and data requirements for efforts. For instance, the United Nations (UN) streamlined trade procedures to facilitate the and , as well as cumbersome estimates the potential savings from trade smooth supply of raw materials and compo- and border crossing procedures, are obstacles facilitation to be some USD 490 billion2,while nents and the efficient distribution or to flows. And as tariffs are Wilson et al.(2002)3 show, for instance, that of goods. progressively reduced, there are increasing concerns that and export procedures may create or represent effective non-tariff Box 1 Gains from trade facilitation barriers. 1. Increased transparency and predictability 3. Greater business opportunities ·Immediate substantial decrease in ·EfficientCustoms and trade procedures administrative costs for companies enable companies to profit from poten- Main issues in trade facilitation ·More revenue from customs duties tial business opportunities ·Minimisation of costly human errors and ·Fewer 'brain drain' problems for smaller There are essentially two issues with respect to fewer opportunities for corruption countries trade facilitation. The first is the multitude of ·Increase in foreign directinvestment ·Indispensable basis for all e-business customs systems and procedures, and the (FDI) activities, estimated to be worth trillions second is the huge number of regulations and ·Enhanced overall efficiency of countries' of dollars in the future documentation requirements facing traders. export and import sectors Both issues - i.e. excessive documentation and 4. Improved efficiency and security data requirements, plus cumbersome customs 2. Time ·Transparency and simplification limits and border crossing procedures - constitute Faster procedures also lead to: opportunities for criminal activity significant obstacles to the movement of ·Fewer storage problems ·Itenables customs to divertresources goods. They result in additional costs and · Less risk of loss of quality of merchandise and manpower previously used for delays for traders and are damaging to the ·Reduced threatof substantial penalties administration to core crime-fighting economic interests of governments, particu- ·Less risk of theft activities. larly those of developing countries. ·Fewer delayed payments ·Less interestlostdue to capital locked in Various estimations have put the cost of trade goods procedures at about 4-5 per cent of the overall Source: SWERPO (2002), Trade Facilitation - Impact and Potential Gains, cost of trade, about the same as the current www.kommers.se/documents_show.asp?id=44

European Centre for Development Policy Management Centre européen de gestion des politiques de développement Page 2 Comparing EU free trade agreements July 2004 InBrief 6F

Current status in the WTO and Contracting Parties are required to imple- Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area out of the Doha round ment. The trade facilitation demands made by the separate agreements that are currently in the EU would appear to depend on the extent force. To date, bilateral Association Trade facilitation first became part of the work of trade liberalisation already in place in the Agreements (MED agreements) have been programme of the partner country concerned. For instance, the concluded with seven countries: Tunisia (WTO) at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial detailed provisions in the EU FTA with Chile (1995), Israel (1995), Morocco (1996), Jordan Conference, when ministers directed the can be attributed to the liberal economic (1997), the Palestinian Authority (1997), Algeria Council for Trade in Goods to undertake culture in Chile, which means that Chile is (2001) and Lebanon (2002). exploratory and analytical work on the issue. more willing and able to accept and imple- By the end of the Doha Ministerial Conference ment more comprehensive measures than, for All seven MED agreements contain similar in 2001, ministers agreed to negotiations on example, the Mediterranean (MED) countries provisions on trade facilitation or customs trade facilitation provided that the Fifth with their less liberal (if not illiberal) eco- cooperation. As stated above, when consi- Ministerial Conference would reach an explicit nomic policies. Thus, the willingness and the dered in terms of the broad issues affecting consensus on the modalities of such negotia- ability of a particular country to implement trade facilitation and when compared with tions. The ministers further agreed that, before certain trade facilitation measures may be a the EU FTA with Chile, the trade facilitation the Fifth Session, the Council for Trade in factor in determining the relative depth or provisions in the MED agreements are Goods should review and as appropriate, shallowness of the agreement in question. shallow. The aim of customs cooperation, as clarify and improve relevant aspects of Articles stated in the preamble to most of the trade V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994. facilitation sections in the MED agreements, is 'to ensure and compliance with Several proposals were subsequently tabled The Euro-Mediterranean trade rules'. To this end, with respect to all the by WTO members on how to review, clarify Association Agreements countries, the agreements provide for: and improve the GATT articles, as mandated by the paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration. In Since the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference • The simplification of procedures for the its submissions, the EU sought to make GATT held in November 1995, the EU and 12 customs clearance of goods. The agree- Article VIII (the core article on trade facilita- Mediterranean countries have been engaged ment with Israel specifically includes the tion) fully operational, since, as the article in negotiating Association Agreements. The 'computerisation' of customs procedures stands, it imposes no binding obligation.4 A overall objective is to form, by 2010, one (Article 49 (2)), a word missing in other compilation by the WTO Secretariat5 of mem- MED agreements. This particular provision bers' proposals on the issues also shows broad may not be unconnected with Israel's rela- support for strengthening the general com- Box 2 tively advanced technical capacity. mitments in the GATT articles, as well as for Trade facilitation in the WTO • The introduction of a single administra- special and differential treatment, and techni- tive document (SAD) similar to the EU's, cal assistance and capacity-building for deve- Trade facilitation is covered by various WTO though this provision is not included in loping countries. Despite these efforts, agreements: the agreements with Israel and Lebanon. however, WTO members failed to agree to 1. GATT 1994 Articles V (Freedom of transit), • The possibility of interconnection between negotiations on trade facilitation at the Fifth VIII (Fees and Formalities relating to the transit systems of the EU and of the Ministerial Conference in Cancun in import and export) and X (publication and other Contracting Party (this is a provision September 2003, as discussions on the issue administration of trade regulations); included in all the MED agreements except became enmeshed in deeper disagreements 2. Agreement on Customs Valuation; that with Israel). over agriculture, the three other Singapore 3. Agreement on Rules of Origin; • The exchange of information among issues (of investment, and experts and vocational training, as well as ), and other difficul- 4. Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection; technical assistance, 'where appropriate'. ties on the Doha Development Agenda. 5. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; All the MED agreements have a separate 6. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Protocol dealing with the provision of 'mutual (TBT); assistance' by the administrative authorities of the Contracting Parties. These Protocols do Trade facilitation in EU 7. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary not contain specific trade facilitation mea- agreements and Phytosanitary Measures; and sures, but rather describe the nature of assis- Trade facilitation, in the broad sense as 8. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of tance which one Contracting Party could defined above, is not given detailed attention Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), espe- request from the other, as well as the obliga- in a number of the free trade agreements cially the border enforcement provisions tion on the requested authority to give such (FTAs) recently concluded by the European of the is Agreement assistance 'within its competence and Union (EU). In most of these agreements, available resources'.6 There are, however, All articles, as well as summaries and inter- trade facilitation provisions are only in the exceptions to the obligations to provide assis- pretations of these agreements, can be framework of customs cooperation, with a tance, and these include situations where found at http://www.wto.org/english/ view to ensuring 'fair trade and compliance such assistance would: tratop_e/tratop_e.htm with trade rules'. Thus, in terms of depth and specific provisions, the trade facilitation sec- be likely to prejudice the sovereignty of As for the Doha Round, at the Fifth • tions of some of the FTAs may be described as any of the Contracting Parties; or Ministerial Conference in Cancun shallow, although they are often accompanied be likely to prejudice public policy, security (September 2003), members could not arrive • by detailed Protocols dealing with the provi- or other essential interests; or at the 'explicit consensus', as demanded by sion of mutual assistance by the administra- involve currency or regulations other the Doha Declaration, to start negotiations • tive authorities of the Contracting Parties. than regulations concerning customs on trade facilitation duties; or (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ However, there are one or two exceptions, violate an industrial, commercial or profes- minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm). Ongoing • namely the FTAs with Chile and Mexico, which sional secret. work in the WTO on trade facilitation can be include a considerable amount of detail as to followed at http://docsonline.wto.org/ the trade facilitation measures that the

www.ecdpm.org Page 3

The MED agreements considered above have The provisions of the trade facilitation section of • the exchange of information; many similarities. There are, however, differences the TDCA are not very detailed, and are similar in • the development of new training tech- which appear to reflect the bargaining powers or some respects to the agreements between the niques and coordination of activities; influence of the Mediterranean country con- EU and its Mediterranean partners. Yet, unlike • exchanges of officials and senior personnel cerned or, as the case may be, its willingness and these agreements, the TDCA lacks any provision from the customs and tax administrations; ability to accept certain obligations. Thus, Israel that requires the Contracting Parties to imple- • the simplification of customs procedures is not required to introduce a single administra- ment any specific trade facilitation measures, for the clearance of goods; and tive document or to introduce a link-up between such as the introduction of a single administra- • technical assistance, where necessary. its transit system and that of the EU. On the tive document. One possible conclusion is that other hand, the agreement with the Palestinian the agreement implies a whole range of trade Typically, these areas of cooperation are not Authority includes no Protocol on the provision facilitation measures. Another, more probable, exclusive; however, they are the ones specifi- of mutual assistance, presumably because, given conclusion is that the two parties did not attach cally mentioned in the article. The Global its current status, the Authority is not in a posi- great importance to imposing specific contains no Annex or Protocol on tion to provide such assistance. facilitation obligations on each other.7 mutual administrative assistance, but the Parties state 'their interest in considering, in the future, the conclusion of' such a Protocol (Article 19.3). The EU-South Africa TDCA The EU-Mexico Global Agreement It is, however, important to point out that, in The Trade, Development and Cooperation parallel to the general Global Agreement, an Agreement (TDCA) between the EU and The Economic Partnership, Political Interim Agreement on trade and related mat- South Africa was signed on 11 October 1999 Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, ters was also signed in December 1997. The and has been in force, provisionally and also known as the Global Agreement, Interim Agreement contains more detailed pro- partially, since January 2000, and fully since between the EU and Mexico was signed on 8 visions on customs cooperation and trade facil- May 2004. Although the TDCA is, on the December 1997 and came into force in itation than the final agreement. According to whole, a wide-ranging agreement, the provi- October 2000. The liberalisation of the trade Article 17 of the Interim Agreement, the Parties sions on trade facilitation (Article 48) are not in goods and services was established by will seek to achieve the necessary coordination very detailed. Article contains few explicit pro- Decisions 2/2000 and 2/2001 of the EU- of their customs systems to ensure compliance visions on trade facilitation measures. Article Mexico Joint Council, and came into force in with the provisions on the free movement of 48.1 simply states: 'The Parties shall promote July 2000 and March 2001 respectively. goods and the elimination of customs duties, and facilitate cooperation between their as they relate to customs matters. The areas of customs services in order to ensure that the Dealing with trade, Title III of the Global cooperation envisaged in the Interim provisions on trade are observed and to guar- Agreement provides for the establishment of Agreement include, in addition to the above: antee fair trade'. The provisions on trade facili- a Joint Council to decide on the arrangements tation relate largely to customs duties rather and timetable for a bilateral, progressive liber- • the introduction of a single administrative than specific trade facilitation measures. alisation of tariff and non-tariff barriers to document (SAD); Cooperation between the two customs serv- trade in goods and services. This decision is to • the improvement of working methods; ices 'shall give rise, among other things, to the include, among other things, rules of origin and exchange of information and training and administrative cooperation, customs • the respect of transparency, efficiency, schemes'. A comprehensive trade facilitation cooperation and customs valuation (see integrity and accountability of operations. approach may be implied by the inclusive Article 5 of the Agreement). phrase 'among other things', but this can not be taken for granted in such a legal document. Special Committee Cooperation Article 48.2 requires the administrative Article 4 of the Interim Agreement also pro- authorities of the EU and South Africa to pro- Under Title VI (on Cooperation), Article 19 vides for the establishment of a Special vide mutual assistance in accordance with the deals specifically with the issue of customs Committee on Customs Cooperation and provisions of Protocol 2 of the TDCA. The pro- cooperation (or trade facilitation), and, like Rules of Origin. The functions of this visions of this Protocol on 'mutual administra- similar provisions in the other agreements Committee include, among other things: tive assistance in customs matters' are similar considered above, this article provides for in all material respects to those considered cooperation in the following areas: (a) providing a forum to discuss all issues above under the MED agreements. concerning customs, 'including in parti- cular customs procedures, tariff regimes, customs nomenclature, customs coope- Box 3 Where to find articles on trade facilitation in EU trade agreements ration and mutual administrative assis- tance in customs matters'; and MED agreements: (b) enhancing cooperation on the develop- Tunisia (1995) - Article 59; Israel (1995) - Article 49; Morocco (1996) - Article 59; Jordan (1997) - ment, application and enforcement of Article 76; the Palestinian Authority (1997) - Article 52; Algeria (2001) - Article 63; Lebanon (2002) - customs procedures, mutual adminis- Article 56. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/med_ass_agreemnts.htm trative assistance in customs matters, rules of origin and administrative coope- TDCA (South Africa):Article 48.http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/archive/1999/1_31119991204en.html ration.

Global Agreement (Mexico):Article 19 - Title VI - and Article 17 in the Interim Agreement. The amount of detail in the Interim http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/ issues/bilateral/countries/mexico/docs/en2_annex_16.pdf Agreement and the broad remit of the 'Special Committee' can only confirm the Association Agreement (Chile):Article 26. importance the Parties attach to trade http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/chile/docs/euchlagr_xxiii.pdf facilitation measures and their intention of For other agreements, see the Trade Agreements Database and Archive maintained by Dartmouth considering the whole panoply of issues rela- 8 Tuck Business School: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cib/research/trade-agreements.html ting to trade facilitation.

www.ecdpm.org InBrief 6F July 2004 ComparingEU free trade agreements Page 4

In summary, it is clear that the Global Parties will promote and facilitate cooperation These two recommendations have featured Agreement with Mexico contains deeper trade between their respective customs services prominently in several WTO submissions by facilitation provisions than the other agree- with a view to attaining the objectives set out the EU on trade facilitation. The EU has identi- ments reviewed so far. The existence of a in Article 79. fied the lack of cooperation between customs Special Committee on Customs Cooperation, and other government agencies, which result established by the Joint Council, with specific The sheer depth of Article 79 on 'Customs and in cargoes being subjected to multiple checks powers to focus on all issues concerning related trade matters' is partly reflected by at different times and places, as one of the customs and to enhance cooperation on the the fact that the Parties undertake a total of main issues in trade facilitation that should development, application and enforcement of 27 specific obligations in the Agreement. For be addressed. Thus, the inclusion of the provi- customs procedures, etc., can only serve to instance, the Parties agree to ensure compli- sions dealing with these issues in the FTA is a underscore the importance attached to trade ance with the provisions relating to customs clear indication of the depth of the agree- facilitation by the EU and Mexico, and the and trade-related matters, and to facilitate ment. willingness of both Contracting Parties to con- trade. To achieve this objective, the Parties sider trade facilitation in a more comprehen- undertake, among other things, to: Article 79.2 emphasises the need to improve sive manner. Such a relatively high level of working methods and to ensure the trans- political commitment is missing in the other 'simplify requirements and formalities in parency and efficiency of customs operations. agreements so far reviewed. respect of the release and clearance of Here again, the EU positions on trade facilita- goods, including to the extent possible, tion in the WTO are clearly reflected. For collaboration on the development of pro- instance, sub-section 2 (b) of Article 79 cedures enabling the submission of import provides for the reduction, simplification and The EU-Chile Association Agreement or export data to a single agency; and to standardisation of data in the documentation coordinate between customs and other required by customs, and provides that the The FTA with Chile, signed in November 2002, control agencies so as to enable official Parties shall take steps to ensure 'the use of a is the most recent con- controls upon import or export to be single customs entry document or data mes- cluded by the EU. Though the Association carried out, as far as possible, by a single sage and a single customs exit document or Agreement goes beyond trade to cover politi- agency' (Article 79.1 (c)). data message, based on international stan- cal dialogue and cooperation issues, its trade dards…' provisions stand out as the most progressive in EU bilateral agreements to date. Trade faci- Single agency litation forms no exception in this respect. Detailed coordination and Nothing so far considered is comparable, in Two issues stand out in this provision, and cooperation terms of depth and scope, to the Association these are the requirements that Agreement. Most of the positions taken by (a) there should be coordination between cus- Other specific provisions of the EU-Chile FTA, the EU in its various submissions to the WTO toms and other control agencies, and which are conspicuously missing in all the on trade facilitation are reflected by this (b) import or export data should be submitted other agreements considered above, but agreement with Chile. Article 26 on Customs to a single agency, which should also carry out which the EU has variously canvassed include cooperation states that the Contracting official controls on importation or exportation. the following:

Table 1 Trade facilitation in EU FTAs

MED Association EU-South Africa EU-Mexico EU-Chile Agreements TDCA Global Agreement Association Agreement

Technical assistance & exchange of information

Standardisation and simplification

Introduction of single administrative document (SAD) a

Single window approach & use of single border agency

The computerisation and automation of customs procedures b c

Risk management, pre-arrival processing and post-clearance audit c

Customs-related judicial or administrative measures c a Except for Lebanon and Israel. b Only for Israel. c No explicit provisions; however, the Special Committee may propose any provisions to improve working methods and ensure efficiency of operations.

www.ecdpm.org InBrief 6F July 2004 Comparing EU free trade agreements Page 5

• the computerisation of customs proce- authorities under the Protocol of 13 June 2001 As for the EU, it is a key demandeur in the WTO dures and the possible establishment of on Mutual Assistance in Customs matters. on the issue of trade facilitation, and its posi- common standards (Article 79.2 (e)); tion is clear: the exponential growth in world • the application of modern customs tech- The Association Agreement with Chile is trade must be matched by strong and effective niques, including risk assessment, simpli- undoubtedly deep and wide-ranging on trade trade facilitation measures. The EU, however, fied procedures for entry and release of facilitation. It reflects many of the positions recognises the need for special and differential goods, post release controls, and company that the EU has advocated on many occasions treatment for developing countries. In particu- audit methods (Article 79.3(c)). These are on trade facilitation, and includes several of the lar, it has proposed an asymmetrical arrange- some of the substantive elements of the measures recommended or proposed by a ment, which allows for differentiation in revised Kyoto Convention on the number of international organisations, includ- commitments, as well as for longer transitional Simplification and Harmonisation of ing the World Customs Organisation (WCO). It periods. The EU has argued, for instance, that Customs Procedures; and clearly indicates a strong desire by the two certain trade facilitation commitments might • the establishment of common positions Contracting Parties to attach the utmost not apply until such time as some developing in international organisations in the field importance to trade facilitation. countries are in a position to implement them.9 of customs such as the WTO, the World Customs Organisation (WCO), the UN and On the part of Chile, the depth and coverage of However, the EU has also pointed out that UNCTAD (Article 79.2 (g)). the agreement show how far Chile is prepared this notion of variable speed is only a second- to go in further liberalising and reforming its best option, as it risks creating 'a semi perma- With respect to questions of judicial or economy, for the agreement certainly commits nent 'two-tier' (WTO) membership and may administrative measures, the agreement Chile, a developing country, to considerable contain insufficient incentives for the member requires the Parties to provide effective and reform and modernisation. Chile, indeed, is in question to implement what are at the end prompt procedures enabling the right of already a model for trade and investment liber- of the day valuable improvements to its trad- appeal against customs and other agency alisation in the developing world. Its trade ing potential'.10 Nevertheless, the EU appears administrative actions, rulings and decisions institutions are relatively strong and sophisti- to a certain extent willing to accept relation- affecting imports and exports of goods cated and there is a general climate of pro-free ships structured asymmetrically, although the (Article 79. 2 (h)). Further, the Parties agree trade ideas in the country, which is reflected by MED agreements reviewed above would not that their respective trade and customs provi- Chile's positive attitude towards its trade part- appear to contain such asymmetry. Clearly, sions and procedures will be based upon, ners and in trade negotiations. It is thus hardly the developing countries concerned were not among other things, rules that ensure that surprising that Chile has undertaken deep com- allowed to accept every trade facilitation com- any penalties imposed for minor breaches of mitments in its FTA with the EU, which can mitment only on the basis of their individual customs regulations or procedural require- only help to lock in its domestic economic and compliance capacity. There are still some trade ments are proportionate and, in their applica- institutional reforms. facilitation measures in the agreements (such tion, do not give rise to undue delays in as the introduction of a SAD or the possibility customs clearance (Article 79.3 (i)). of interconnection between their transit sys- tems and that of the EU), which, arguably, Cooperation between customs administra- Conclusions may pose implementation problems for some tions and economic operators is often of these Mediterranean countries. strongly emphasised in EU positions on trade The ten EU FTAs with developing countries facilitation. It is therefore not surprising that reviewed above are of various degrees of there are provisions in the Association depth and scope. One discernible trend is that, Agreement dealing with this issue. In Article generally, the developing countries with less 79.4 (a), the Parties agree to establish appro- elaborate trade-related institutions and/or a priate consultation mechanisms between less liberal trade and economic policy frame- their administrations and economic operators work have accepted fewer detailed commit- so as to ensure timely consultation with the ments on trade facilitation, while those Acronyms operators on substantial matters concerning whose trade-related institutions are relatively legislative proposals and general procedures more developed and/or who are already APEC Asia-Pacific Economic relating to customs. They are also supposed to engaged in substantial trade and economic Cooperation 'make publicly available general information reforms at home have accepted far deeper FDI Foreign Direct Investment of interest to economic operators, such as the commitments. Thus, there are questions both EDI Electronic Data Interchange hours of operation for customs offices, inclu- of capacity and willingness. The first relates to EU European Union ding those at ports and border crossing whether a country has the institutional capac- FTA Free Trade Agreement points, and the points of contact for informa- ity to implement measures that may require GATT General Agreement on Tariffs tion enquiries' (Article 79.4 (b)). Furthermore, technical expertise and a huge capital outlay, and Trade new legislation and general procedures while the second is a question of economic MED Mediterranean countries related to customs, as well as any modifica- culture and ideas. It would seem that the NAFTA North American Free Trade tions, are to be published and publicised 'no more vigorously a developing country is com- Agreement later than the entry into force of such legisla- mitted to pursuing liberal economic policy OECD Organisation for Economic tion and procedures' (ibid.). and institutional reforms at home, the more Cooperation and Development willing it should be to accept international SAD Single Administrative The Agreement provides for the establish- obligations that involve even deeper institu- Document ment of a Special Committee on Customs tional and policy reforms. The fact that recent TDCA Trade, Development and Cooperation and Rules of Origin to, among trade facilitation provisions (such as in the Cooperation Agreement other things, monitor the implementation EU-Chile and EU-Mexico agreements) are UN United Nations and administration of Articles 79 and 80 more detailed than those in the earlier EU UNCTAD United Nations Conference on (dealing with customs valuation) and 'any FTAs may also suggest a trend towards deeper other customs matters related to market trade facilitation provisions in light of the USD United States Dollar access' (Article 81. 2). Equally provided for in importance now generally attached to the WCO World Customs Organisation the Agreement is the provision of mutual simplification of trade and customs proce- WTO World Trade Organization assistance between the two administrative dures.

www.ecdpm.org InBrief 6F July 2004 Comparing EU free trade agreements Page 6

Notes Proposals Made by Delegations,Document decisions of the Council are deemed to have been G/C/W/434, 15 November 2002. adopted by the Joint Council established by Article 1 European Commission, Trade Issues, 5 Ibid. 45 of the Global Agreement. The logical conclu- http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/ 6 See, for example, Article 7.1 of Protocol 5 (Israel) sion is thus that the trade facilitation measures sectoral/facilitation/index_en.htm and of Protocol 7 (Algeria). provided for in the Interim Agreement are all as 2 Swedish Trade Procedures Council (SWEPRO) 7 It should be said, however, that South Africa has valid as those in the Global Agreement and form (2002), Trade Facilitation - Impact and Potential been undertaking a unilateral reform of its cus- part of that Final Act. Gains,August2002, www.kommers.se/binaries/ toms operations, with the recent introduction of 9 See European Commission (2002), WTO Trade attachments/1646_Trade_Facilitation_- Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) to facilitate Facilitation - Improvement to GATT Article VIII on _Impact_and_Potential_Gains.pdf cargo clearance. See South African Revenue Fee and Formalities Connected with Importation 3 Wilson, J., Mann, C.,Woo,Y., Assanie, N. and Chio, I Service - Annual report 2003: www.sars.gov.za and Exportation,Submission from the European (2002), Trade Facilitation: A Development 8 Any confusion that might arise as a result of these Communities, 11 July 2002, Perspective in the Asia Pacific Region,Asia Pacific parallel agreements is, perhaps, resolved by Article http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2003 Economic Forum, October 2002. 60 of the Global Agreement, which states that the /june/tradoc_113122.pdf 4 See WTO (2002), Review, Clarification and wide-ranging functions of the Joint Council esta- 10 Ibid, page 10. Improvement of GATT Articles V, VIII and X blished by the Interim Agreement, as well as the

Selected publications and information sources on trade facilitation

Publications Messerlin, P. and Zarrouk, J., (1999), Trade UNECE, (2002), Trade Facilitation in a Global Facilitation: Technical Regulations and Environment,United Nations Commission for Hewitt, A., and Gillson I. (2003), Income Customs Procedures,September 1999 for the Europe (TRADE/2002/21). Distribution Impact of Trade Facilitation in WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Developing Countries,Background Document in a Millennium Round. Information sources for the International Forum on Trade www.sice.oas.org/geograph/trdftn/ Facilitation, 14 and 15 May 2003, (UNECE, messerlin.doc www.acp-eu-trade.org TRADE/2003/21) www.unece.org/trade/forums/forum03/docs OECD, (2001), Business Benefits of Trade Doha Round Briefing Series: update of Doha /trd-03-021e.doc Facilitation, Working Party of Trade Round negotiation (no. 6), Committee, TD/TC/WP (2001)21/FINAL www.iisd.org/trade/wto/doha_briefing.asp Mann, C., T. Otsuki, and J.S. Wilson (2004), www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2001doc.nsf/LinkTo/ Assessing the Potential Benefit of Trade td-tc-wp(2001)21-final WTO Customs Valuation Gateway: Facilitation: A Global Perspective,World Bank www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/cusval_e/cusval_ working paper 3224, February 2004 Staples, B. (2002), 'Trade Facilitation: Improving e.htm http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?id=33231 the Invisible Infrastructure', in: Hoekman, B., Mattoo, A. and English, P. (eds.) Development, Text of the Revised Kyoto Convention (World Trade and the WTO: A Handbook,World Bank. Customs Organisation) www.wcoomd.org

InBrief series on trade for 2004-2005

The InBrief series Comparing EU Free Trade Agreements is aimed at • Trade Facilitation trade negotiators, policy makers, officials and experts in gathering a • WTO Compatibility better technical insight into the evolution of EU trade agreements and the approaches adopted by the EU in negotiating these agreements. The InBriefs are available online at www.acp-eu-trade.org This might be of particular interest to actors involved with or www.ecdpm.org and www.ileapinitiative.com interested in the current and forthcoming negotiations on trading agreements with the EU, such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific This InBrief series on trade is an initiative by the European Centre for (ACP) countries with Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). A Development Policy Management (ECDPM), under the editorial complementary and parallel series on EPAs, called Economic Partnership supervision of Sanoussi Bilal ([email protected]) and Stefan Szepesi. Agreement InBriefs,provides insights into the main issues faced by the ACP,and discuss options for the negotiations with the EU. This InBrief on trade facilitation has been developed in cooperation with International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty (iLEAP). Topics included in the ECDPM InBrief series on trade for 2004-2005 are: • Agriculture international lawyers and • Anti- and • Competition Policy and State Aid economists against poverty • Dispute Settlement • Fisheries iLEAP • Government Procurement • Investment ILEAP • Rules of Origin 180 Bloor Street West • Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) Suite 904,Toronto, ON, Canada, M5S 2V6 • Services • Special and Differential Treatment Tel + 1 (0)416 946 3107 • Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) E-mail [email protected] Website www.ileapinitiative.com

'InBrief' provides summarised background information on the main policy debates and European Centre for Development Policy Management activities in ACP-EC cooperation. These complementary summaries are drawn from consultative Onze Lieve Vrouweplein 21 processes in which the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) engages with NL-6211 HE Maastricht numerous state and non-state actors in the ACP and EU countries. The Centre is a non-partisan organi- sation that seeks to facilitate international cooperation between the ACP and the EC. Information may The Netherlands be reproduced as long as the source is quoted. The ECDPM acknowledges the support it receives for the 'InBrief' from the Department for International Tel +31 (0)43 350 29 00 Fax +31 (0)43 350 29 02 Development in the United Kingdom, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Sweden, Finland and the [email protected] www.ecdpm.org Netherlands, the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation in Belgium, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and the Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento in Portugal. ISSN 1571-7542