Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015
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Trade Facilitation and Tariff Evasion
Chapman University Chapman University Digital Commons ESI Working Papers Economic Science Institute 6-2020 Trade Facilitation and Tariff Evasion Cosimo Beverelli World Trade Organization, [email protected] Rohit Ticku Chapman University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers Part of the Econometrics Commons, Economic Theory Commons, and the Other Economics Commons Recommended Citation Beverelli, C. & Ticku, R. (2020). Trade facilitation and tariff evasion. ESI Working Paper 20-24. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/319/ This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in ESI Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Trade Facilitation and Tariff Evasion Comments ESI Working Paper 20-24 This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/ esi_working_papers/319 Trade Facilitation and Tariff Evasion∗ Cosimo Beverelli†‡ Rohit Ticku§ This draft: June 2020 Abstract This paper investigates the extent to which trade facilitation measures included in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement affect tariff evasion. In a dataset covering 121 countries and the whole set of HS6 product categories in 2012, 2015, and 2017, the paper shows that trade facilitation measures that improve legal certainty for traders moderate tariff evasion. Holding tariff rate constant at its mean, one standard deviation improvement in trade fa- cilitation measures related to legal certainty reduces tariff evasion, as measured by missing imports in trade statistics, by almost 12%. In a counterfactual with full trade liberalization, countries with higher scores on facilitation measures related to legal certainty experience larger reductions in tariff evasion than countries with lower scores on these measures, even for similar initial tariff rates. -
Trade and the Separation of Powers Timothy Meyer
Vanderbilt University Law School Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2019 Trade and the Separation of Powers Timothy Meyer Ganesh Sitaraman Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons Recommended Citation Timothy Meyer and Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107 California Law Review. 583 (2019) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1093 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. +(,121/,1( Citation: Timothy Meyer; Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107 Calif. L. Rev. 583 (2019) Provided by: Vanderbilt University Law School Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline Wed Jun 5 12:21:18 2019 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: Copyright Information Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device Trade and the Separation of Powers Timothy Meyer* & Ganesh Sitaraman** There are two paradigms through which to view trade law and policy within the American constitutionalsystem. -
Political Questions in International Trade: Judicial Review of Section 301?
Michigan Journal of International Law Volume 10 Issue 3 1989 Political Questions in International Trade: Judicial Review of Section 301? Erwin P. Eichmann Gary N. Horlick Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil Part of the Courts Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons Recommended Citation Erwin P. Eichmann & Gary N. Horlick, Political Questions in International Trade: Judicial Review of Section 301?, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 735 (1989). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol10/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SECTION 301? Erwin P. Eichmann and Gary N. Horlick Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ("Section 301")' has become an increasingly potent and widely-used tool in the U.S. arsenal of trade policy measures. The past few years have seen a proliferation of Sec- tion 301 cases, affecting the trade of goods and services in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Even so, in the debate over the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("Omnibus Trade Act"), Con- gress expressed impatience with the President's discretion in not un- dertaking more Section 301 retaliations. 2 But while much attention has focused on the politics and policy aspects of Section 301, little has been discussed of the legal issues underpinning it. -
Page 429 TITLE 19—CUSTOMS DUTIES Ments Relating to the Return As the Secretary Shall Prescribe
Page 429 TITLE 19—CUSTOMS DUTIES ments relating to the return as the Secretary Sec. shall prescribe; or 2114e. Negotiation of agreements concerning high (2) if not returned to the country of origin, technology industries. be disposed of in the manner prescribed by law 2115. Bilateral trade agreements. 2116. Agreements with developing countries. for articles forfeited for violation of the cus- 2117. International safeguard procedures. toms laws. 2118. Access to supplies. (Pub. L. 92–587, title II, § 203, Oct. 27, 1972, 86 2119. Staging requirements and rounding author- Stat. 1297.) ity. § 2094. Rules and regulations PART 2—OTHER AUTHORITY The Secretary shall prescribe such rules and 2131. Authorization of appropriation for GATT re- vision. regulations as are necessary and appropriate to 2132. Balance-of-payments authority. carry out the provisions of this chapter. 2133. Compensation authority. (Pub. L. 92–587, title II, § 204, Oct. 27, 1972, 86 2134. Two-year residual authority to negotiate du- Stat. 1297.) ties. 2135. Termination and withdrawal authority. § 2095. Definitions 2136. Reciprocal nondiscriminatory treatment. 2137. Reservation of articles for national security For the purposes of this chapter— or other reasons. (1) The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Sec- 2138. Omitted. retary of the Treasury. (2) The term ‘‘United States’’ includes the PART 3—HEARINGS AND ADVICE CONCERNING several States, the District of Columbia, and NEGOTIATIONS the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 2151. Advice from International Trade Commission. (3) The term ‘‘pre-Columbian monumental or 2152. Advice from executive departments and other architectural sculpture or mural’’ means— sources. (A) any stone carving or wall art which— 2153. Public hearings. -
The Trade Facilitation Agreement a Simple Guide
THE TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT A SIMPLE GUIDE The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) will improve trade efficiency worldwide, encouraging economic growth by cutting red tape at borders, increasing transparency and taking advantage of new technologies. The TFA will enter into force once two-thirds (110) WTO member economies ratify the agreement, after which the TFA will be binding on all WTO members. Border inefficiencies, complex customs rules and other trade barriers make it harder for businesses of all sizes to trade internationally, hurting small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) the most. Research by the World Economic Forum suggests TFA implementation could trigger a 60% to 80% increase in cross-border SME sales in some economies. The implementation of the TFA would have a greater impact on international trade than the elimination of all the world’s remaining tariffs. It will reduce average trade costs by up to 15% with developing countries benefiting even more. The business community is widely recognised to have an important role to play in the implementation of the TFA, ensuring that TFA reforms deliver measurable improvements in trading across borders. WHAT WILL THE TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT PROVIDE? PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION RELATING ENSURING INTERNAL COOPERATION TO TRADE RULES AND PROCEDURES AMONG AGENCIES Governments have agreed to publish a All government authorities and agencies wide range of customs-specific information responsible for border controls are required (including on the internet) relating to to coordinate in order to facilitate trade. trade procedures, including on duty rates Coordination includes alignment of working and taxes, forms and documents, rules for hours, alignment of procedures and goods classification and valuation, rules of formalities, sharing of facilities, and one stop origin, transit procedures, and penalties and border post controls. -
The Critical Role of Trade Facilitation in Supporting
CHAPTER 6 THE CRITICAL ROLE OF TRADE FACILITATION IN SUPPORTING ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS Contributed by the World Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Abstract: Two years after the entry into force of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, it is time for an initial stock-taking. The experience of the World Bank Group Trade Facilitation Support Program (TFSP) and the UNCTAD Trade Facilitation Program, both major providers of trade-related assistance, as well as OECD’s analytical work provides relevant insights. In these early years, support has been generally directed to the “foundational” measures of the Agreement, such as National Trade Facilitation Committees. These will oversee implementation; time release studies, providing a baseline to measure progress; and risk management policies and procedures, a precondition for implementation of simplified control and release processes. Progress is being made. TFSP and OECD research find that the level of alignment with the Agreement is increasing, with notable improvements in publication of measures, automation and streamlining of procedures and engagement with the trade community. Positive impacts from these aid-for-trade supported reforms have also been registered. Country reports and periodic time release studies show reduction in customs physical inspections, elimination of unnecessary documents, automation of manual processing steps, and consequent reduction of clearance times. World Bank surveys (the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) and Doing Business) likewise show a positive trend in these aid-supported countries. AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2019: ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND EMPOWERMENT - © OECD, WTO 2019 161 CHAPTER 6. -
Mobilising Trade Policy for Climate Action Under the Paris Agreement Options for the European Union
SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Susanne Dröge, Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das and Michael Mehling Mobilising Trade Policy for Climate Action under the Paris Agreement Options for the European Union RP 1 February 2018 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2018 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They reflect the views of the author(s). SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 34 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 Table of Contents 5 Issues and Conclusions 7 The Climate and Trade Regimes 10 The Climate Regime – from the UN Framework Convention to the Paris Agreement 11 The World Trade Regime and Its Interactions with the Climate Regime 15 Identifying the Upcoming Issues for Trade and Climate Policy 15 NDCs: Policy Measures with Trade Implications 15 “Cooperative Approaches” – a New Setting for International Policy Tools 17 Transfer of Climate-friendly Technologies 18 Global Sectoral Policies: Aviation and Maritime Transport 19 National and Regional Carbon Pricing: Emissions Trading and Carbon Taxes 20 Energy Subsidies 21 WTO Provisions and Disputes That Matter for the Upcoming National Climate Policy Challenges 21 The GATT Rules and Climate Policy 22 Other WTO Agreements and Their Relevance for Climate-and-Trade Policy Interactions 24 Examples of EU and US WTO Disputes with Climate Policy Relevance 26 Climate-related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements 27 Ways forward for the EU to Make the Trade Regime Supportive for Climate Action 27 The Long-term Vision: Improving Legal Guidance 29 A Medium-term Strategy: Promoting Climate Policies through RTAs 30 In the Short-run: Bringing forward Specific Issues under the Paris Agreement 34 Abbreviations Dr. -
Trade Facilitation and the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements
Journal of Economic Integration 23(3), September 2008; 518-546 Trade Facilitation and the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements Maria Persson Lund University Abstract This paper assesses the potential effects from trade facilitation in terms of increased trade flows both on average and specifically for the six regional groups of ACP countries negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU. Data from the World Bank’s Doing Business Database on the time required to export or import are used as indicators of cross-border transaction costs, and a gravity model on two-way bilateral trade between 22 EU countries and 100 developing countries is estimated using a sample selection approach. The results suggest that time delays on the part of the exporter and the importer generally significantly decrease trade flows, but also that this effect is not constant, in the sense that the elasticity of trade with respect to border delays declines at higher levels of time requirements. On average, lowering border delays in the exporting country by one day from the sample mean would yield an export-increasing effect of about 1 percent, while the same reduction in the importing country would increase imports by about 0.5 percent. Significant negative effects are also found of both export and import transaction costs for most EPA groups, and the effects tend to be at least as large as the average or larger. The results are generally robust for a number of alternative estimation methods such as Poisson estimation, IV estimation taking sample selection into account and the sample selection approach suggested by Helpman et al. -
Read the Full Report
The Smoot-Hawley Fixation: Putting the Sino-US Trade War in Contemporary and Historical Perspective Simon J. Evenett1 University of St. Gallen, the St. Gallen Endowment for Prosperity Through Trade2 and CEPR 29 September 2019 This paper was published in the Journal of International Economic Law on 6 December 2019. Unfortunately, the published version excluded many of the pertinent footnotes that lawyers love and that, more importantly, support key elements of the argument. For this reason we make the full version of the paper available here. 1 Professor of International Trade and Economic Development, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Coordinator, the Global Trade Alert, the independent commercial policy monitor. I thank Patrick Buess, Johannes Fritz, Maxime Kantenwein, and Piotr Lukaszuk for help preparing the empirical evidence for this paper. I thank Anne van Aaken, Chad Bown, Andrew Lang, two referees, and Piotr Lukaszuk for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also thank Doug Irwin, Kevin O’Rourke, and Niko Wolf for checking my characterisation of the economic history literature on trade policy developments in the 1930s. All remaining errors are mine. Comments are welcome and should be sent to [email protected]. 2 Founder of the new non-profit Foundation to house the Global Trade Alert and other commercial policy- related initiatives. Abstract The extent to which the Sino-US trade war represents a break from the past is examined. This ongoing trade war is benchmarked empirically against the Smoot-Hawley tariff increase and against the sustained, covert discrimination by governments against foreign commercial interests witnessed since the start of the global economic crisis. -
Smes and the WTO TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT a TRAINING MANUAL
SMES AND THE WTO TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT A TRAINING MANUAL In collaboration with © International Trade Centre 2015 The International Trade Centre (ITC) is the joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the United Nations. Street address: ITC 54-56, rue de Montbrillant 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Postal address: ITC Palais des Nations 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland Telephone: +41-22 730 0111 Fax: +41-22 733 4439 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.intracen.org SMEs AND THE WTO TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT A TRAINING MANUAL SMEs AND THE WTO TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT Abstract for trade information services ID=43167 2015 F-09.07 SME International Trade Centre (ITC) SMEs and the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement: A Training Manual. Geneva: ITC, 2015. xii, 132 pages (Technical paper) Doc. No. TFPB-15-343.E The training manual on the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Facilitation explains each of the measures of the Agreement, including the key elements of the measure, the intended benefits from a business perspective, an outline of the practical steps that businesses might take in order to take advantage of the measure and practical exercises and proposed questions for group discussion. It aims to assist the business community better understand the technical measures of this multilateral Agreement and the opportunities it offers to importers, and exporters in reducing delays and costs in moving goods and services across borders. Descriptors: Trade Facilitation, WTO, SMEs, Developing Countries, Manuals For further information on this technical paper, contact Mohammad Saeed ([email protected]) English The International Trade Centre (ITC) is the joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the United Nations. -
Trade Facilitation
TRADE FACILITATION Brian Rankin Staples October 19, 1998 Draft TRADE FACILITATION SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 1.0 Introduction This paper provides an outline of the concept and reality of trade facilitation primarily from an emerging economy policy-making perspective. This will be achieved by presenting the basic dimensions of trade facilitation in three stages. The first section reviews various issues, definitions and conditions that have led to the necessity of trade facilitation, and a brief history of trade facilitation. The second section profiles current trade facilitation resources and initiatives. The final section examines some of the practical and policy challenges associated with implementing a trade facilitation program. 1.1 Definitions In recent years the term, trade facilitation, has become extremely popular and, therefore, applied to an ever-growing number of activities. Given the very general origins of the word, facilitation, (Latin/facilis: French/facile: make easy, promote, help forward), it is not difficult to understand how the term, trade facilitation, has come to apply to a broad range of undertakings. For the purposes of this study it is useful to define what is not meant by trade facilitation, even though the following endeavors do, in fact, make trade easier or promote trade. · Physical Infrastructure: improving roads, upgrading port facilities, airports and transportation infrastructure in general. · Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs): NTBs and all forms of regulatory asymmetry do prevent the free flow of international trade. NTBs, however, usually imply an alleged World Trade Organization (WTO) violation of some nature. The identification of NTBs in a consistent fashion and their gradual elimination is vital to the equitable treatment of commerce, but for the purposes of this analysis, are not included in the scope of trade facilitation. -
Itc) for the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Lldcs
STATEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE (ITC) FOR THE MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF LLDCS PARTNERING FOR ACCELERATED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIENNA PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR LLDCS AND ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN LLDCS IN THE ERA OF COVID-19 TUESDAY, 23 SEPT 2020 DOROTHY TEMBO ACTING EXECUTIVE DORECTOR Your Excellency Minister Tileuberdi, Chair of the Group of LLDCs, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Excellencies, During this period of continued uncertainty, it is important to recall the most essential ingredients of resilience: partnership, technical collaboration, and the stability of the multilateral system. The Vienna Programme of Action for LLDCs (VPoA) remains a central actionable component of helping LLDCs to meet the SDGs and building back better for the ‘new normal’. As the joint agency of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the International Trade Centre is fully committed to supporting the implementation of the VPoA through enhancing trade in LLDCs and their transit countries. Our approach is focused on assisting micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) to connect to global markets, and for that we work closely with private sector institutions. ITC contributes to two of the six priority areas of the VPoA: 1) International trade and trade facilitation, and 2) Regional integration and cooperation. Since 2014, ITC has implemented more than 40 projects for almost all LLDCs including our global projects such as of public goods on data and intelligence. Still, in this period of COVID-19, we have seen demand for trade related assistance increasing as LLDCs and their MSMEs seek help in coping with the pandemic.