Journal of Issue 32 / Autumn 2001 / £4.00

Liberal DemocratHISTORY

Britain’s new left? Professor John Curtice The 2001 election Implications for the Liberal Democrats Nick Cott Liberal unity frustrated The Asquith–Lloyd George split Ian Hunter The quest for Liberal reunion 1943–46 Liberals and Liberal Nationals Tony Little and Duncan Brack Great Liberal Speeches Liberal Democrat History Group’s new book Jaime Reynolds ‘Jimmy’ Biography of James de Rothschild MP Liberal Democrat History Group Issue 32: Autumn 2001 Journal of Liberal Democrat History The Journal of Liberal Democrat History is published quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group. 3 The 2001 election ISSN 1463-6557 Editor: Duncan Brack Professor John Curtice on the lessons of the 7 June election for Liberal Democrats Assistant Editor: Alison Smith Reviews Editor: Sam Crooks

6 Liberal unity frustrated Patrons Nick Cott examines the Asquith–Lloyd George split in the Liberal Party Professor Eugenio Biagini Professor Michael Freeden Professor Earl Russell 12 The quest for Liberal reunion 1943–46 Professor John Vincent

Ian Hunter on the failed attempts to reunify Liberals and Liberal Nationals Editorial Board Dr Malcolm Baines; Dr Roy Douglas; Dr Barry 17 Impacts of reunification? Doyle; Dr David Dutton; Professor David Gowland; Dr Richard Grayson; Dr Michael Hart; Jaime Reynolds examines the potential electoral impacts of a reunion in the 1940s Peter Hellyer; Ian Hunter; Dr Robert Ingham; Dr J. Graham Jones; Tony Little; Professor Ian Machin; Dr Mark Pack; Dr John Powell; Iain Sharpe 21 Great Liberal Speeches Editorial/Correspondence Tony Little and Duncan Brack introduce the History Group’s latest book Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a refereed publication; all articles submitted will 22 Liberals cheer Mr Churchill be reviewed. Contributions should be sent to:

At the National Liberal Club, 22 July 1943 Duncan Brack (Editor) 38 Salford Road, London SW2 4BQ email: [email protected]

24 ‘Jimmy’ All articles copyright © their authors. The life and career of James de Rothschild MP, by Jaime Reynolds Advertisements 28 Liberal Party membership Adverts are welcome; please contact the Editor for rates. Robert Ingham answers a query on the topic of Liberal membership Subscriptions/Membership 30 Letters to the Editor An annual subscription to the Journal of Liberal Democrat History costs £10.00 (£5.00 unwaged Alan Beith MP; Hugh Pagan rate). This includes membership of the History Group unless you inform us otherwise.

Overseas subscribers should add £5.00; or, a 31 Report: Post-war Liberalism and the special three-year rate is available for politics of race and immigration £40.00 total. Cheques (payable to ‘Liberal Democrat History with Lord Dholakia and Shammit Saggar; report by Sue Simmonds Group’) should be sent to: Patrick Mitchell 6 Palfrey Place, London SW8 1PA; 33 Reviews email: [email protected]

Jo and Laura Grimond: A Selection of Memories and Photographs 1945–1994; reviewed by Geoffrey Sell; Paul Scherer: Lord John Russell; reviewed by Conrad Cover design concept: Lynne Featherstone Russell; Tom Reilly: Cromwell : An Honourable Enemy; reviewed by Tony Little; Published by the Liberal Democrat History Group, Eric Hopkins: Charles Masterman (1873–1927): Politician and Journalist – The c/o 38 Salford Road, London SW2 4BQ Splendid Failure; reviewed by Lawrence Irvine Iles Printed by Kall-Kwik, 426 Chiswick High Road, London W4 5TF September 2001

2 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 Election analysis Professor John Curtice examines the Liberal Democrat performance in the election of 7 June 2001 and draws lessons for the party’s future strategy TheThe 20012001 electionelection Implications for the Liberal Democrats

our years ago, few in the party would have decided to stand down. Where this was the case the Fhoped for such a good result. Not only did party’s vote actually fell – by nearly % on average the Liberal Democrats retain all but two of the – though it had the good fortune not to lose any record haul of seats they won in , but they seats as a result, giving the new incumbents the even managed to emerge with half a dozen more chance to develop a local reputation for themselves MPs. Moreover, in contrast to  the party also over the next four years. stemmed the decline in its overall share of the The party’s success in consolidating its position vote that had been taking place at every election in those seats it gained in  has one very impor- since . tant consequence for its future. So long as the Lib- But political parties can rarely afford to rest on eral Democrats can keep on winning around a fifth their laurels. No sooner is one election over and it or so of the national vote, the days when it could has to think about how it can maximise its chances muster no more than two dozen MPs appear to at the next one. And as well as affirming the success have disappeared for good. The party’s break- of the strategy the party has pursued hitherto, the through in  owed much to the collapse in the  election also poses some key questions about Conservative vote. Because it tends to win more what its strategy should be in the future. votes in Conservative- than in Labour-held seats, Both the basis of the party’s current success and the party could profit from the decline in Con- the questions it faces about its future can be seen servative support in a way that it could not in , from looking at where the party managed to in- when it was Labour’s vote that fell away. But by crease its vote most in the  election. One kind consolidating its vote in those seats it won four of seat where the party typically did relatively well years ago, the party has now begun to insulate itself comprises those marginal constituencies it was de- from the impact of any future Conservative revival. fending, together with some of those that it had Even if, at some point in the future, the Conserva- most hope of gaining. The other kind, however, was tives were to secure a lead over Labour as big as that very different in character, consisting of working- which Labour enjoyed over the Conservatives in class Labour seats where the party has traditionally June, the Liberal Democrats should still be able to found it hardest to secure support. win around three dozen seats. The party’s success in defending and capturing Meanwhile, as well as hanging on to all but two seats appears to be a vindication of a well-estab- of the seats it currently holds, the party also man- lished theme in the party’s strategy – local activity aged to pick up six seats from the Conservatives and targeting. Amongst the seats the party was de- and one from Labour, as well as to retain the by- fending, it easily did best in those which it had won election gain of Romsey, made at the expense of for the first time in , and where the new in- the Conservatives in May . These gains were cumbent MP had had an opportunity over the last made despite the fact that the Conservatives gener- four years to develop a reputation as a good con- ally enjoyed above-average increases in the share of stituency member. On average, the party’s vote rose the vote in those seats they were defending. The by no less than .% in such seats, well above the key to the party’s success here appears to have been .% average increase enjoyed across the country as its targeting efforts. It generally performed about a whole. As if to underline the importance of local four points better in targeted seats where the Con- reputation, the party struggled most to hang on to servatives were being challenged as it did in non- its vote where the local Liberal Democrat MP had targeted seats. This largely appears to have been

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 3 higher than the .% (up from .%) that the party won in Labour-held seats. Moreover, seats where the party is sec- ond to the Conservatives () still out- number those where it is second to La- bour (). New voters for the Liberal Democrats The significance of the party’s relative success in more working-class Labour Britain lies not in any immediate transformation of the geography of Liberal Democrat support but rather as an indication of how New Labour’s continued determination to occupy the ideological centre of British poli- tics may be changing the kind of voter achieved by squeezing the Labour vote typically rose by a percentage point or the Liberal Democrats are able to woo. in seats that for the most part were so more than the national norm. Mean- There is a hint of this in ICM’s sum- ones where the Liberal Democrats had while it was in these kinds of seats that mary of all the polls they conducted not been such strong credible local Labour’s vote fell most heavily. during the election. Compared with challengers before, and where, thus, This relative success in Labour Brit- , the Liberal Democrats’ share of the incentive for Labour supporters to ain is not a wholly new phenomenon; it the vote was no higher than it was in vote tactically had not previously been was also apparent in local elections dur-  amongst the most middle-class so great. ing the – parliament. Equally, AB social group, whereas it rose by Targeting in those seats where La- its impact should not be exaggerated. four points amongst the skilled work- bour was being challenged does appear, The difference between the party’s ing-class Cs as well as by two points though, to have had a more mixed share of the vote in the typical middle- amongst the DEs. Labour, in contrast, record of success. On average the party class Conservative seat and in the typi- gained ground amongst middle-class performed only one and a half points cal more working-class Labour one voters while losing support amongst better in its targeted seats than in the may have narrowed, but the party is still the working class. remainder. Yet more generally, tradi- much stronger in the former than in More dramatic, however, are the re- tionally Labour Britain proved to be the latter. Thus, for example, while the sults of a poll conducted by ICM for relatively fertile territory for the party. party’s average share of the vote in seats the BBC in the final few days of the In safe Labour, typically working-class, won by the Conservatives in  may campaign, a poll that tapped into some seats where the Liberal Democrats have fallen slightly, from .% to of the attitudes of each party’s sup- started off third, their share of the vote .%, that latter figure is still much porters. As the table shows, this found that for the most part Liberal Demo- crat voters were slightly to the left of Who’s on the left now? Labour supporters. Not only were they most in favour of ‘tax and spend’, Supporters of Conservative Labour Lib Dems where the party’s long held stance of an extra penny on income tax for edu- % agree govt should: cation is by now quite well recognised Increase taxes and spend the money on schools 41 71 79 by voters, but they were also most in favour of renationalisation of the rail- Bring railways back into public ownership 56 70 74 ways and most opposed to involving Require employers to give fathers two weeks 44 75 69 private companies in the running of paid leave when they have a baby schools and hospitals and of getting rid Get rid of all taxation on savings 66 57 51 of taxation of savings, a move unlikely to be of much benefit to less well-off Get private companies to run more state schools 42 26 20 voters. On these latter kinds of issues, Get private companies to run NHS hospitals 43 25 13 at least until now, it has usually been Labour voters who have usually given Source: ICM/BBC Analysis Poll the most left-wing response.

4 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 All of this suggests that the Liberal . At the moment at least, the elector- within % of the Conservative win- Democrats may well have been the ate’s dissatisfaction with New La- ner in  seats, and of Labour in , beneficiaries of dissatisfaction with La- bour appears to comprise a disap- those figures have now fallen to  and bour’s continued move to the centre pointment with the government’s  respectively. Moreover, only two or amongst some more traditional and record on improving public services three of these are seats that are newly more left-of-centre Labour voters – al- coupled with a suspicion of its pro- marginal for the party and where there though abstention and voting for far posed greater use of the private sec- is still a sizeable third-party vote that left socialist candidates also appear to tor as a solution. There seems to be might yet be further squeezed. Target- have been options taken by discon- little appetite for a further reduction ing and local campaigning may well be tented Labour voters. If this is so (and in the role of the state. If this dissatis- sufficient to enable the Liberal Demo- further analysis of more extensive sur- faction persists and grows during La- crats to hold on to what they have al- vey data than is so far available will be bour’s second term, then a party that ready got, but seems unlikely to be needed to confirm that this is indeed opposes Labour from the left may sufficient to enable them to make an- what happened), then the party would have more appeal than one that does other leap forward. certainly seem to be facing a new stra- so from the right, a stance where in The debate that has started within tegic landscape. any event the Liberal Democrats the party about how it should posi- Hitherto, New Labour’s switch to would face competition from the tion itself over the next four or five the centre has appeared to be more of a Conservatives. years is a real one. Like it or not, New hindrance than a help to the Liberal Labour’s move to the centre has re- . The party’s existing seats may not be Democrats, especially as it included written some of the rules of British put at as much risk by such a strategy pinching many of the party’s most dis- politics. Deliberately settling for a po- as may first seem to be the case. Be- tinctive clothes on constitutional re- sition somewhat to the left of Labour ing somewhat to the left of Labour form. Certainly, analysis of the British may not be the only viable response could help the party win over tacti- Election Study suggests that over the for the party as it considers how best cal support from Labour voters and – period, Labour won the sup- to make further electoral headway, will do nothing to undermine the port of right-of-centre former Con- but it does at least now seem to be se- party’s efforts at targeting and estab- servative supporters who might previ- rious option, for the first time in lishing a reputation for local activity. ously have been expected to switch to modern British politics. the Liberal Democrats. But now it ap- At the same time, the party may well pears that it may be opening up a new also need to recognise that it could be John Curtice is Deputy Director, ESRC opportunity for the Liberal Democrats hitting the limits of what it can Centre for Research into Elections and to win over left-of-centre Labour vot- achieve through targeting and local Social Trends. ers disillusioned at the performance of activity with around one-fifth of the New Labour. vote. Whereas after the  election 1 See A. Heath, R. Jowell and J. Curtice, The Rise Liberal Democrat candidates were of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices (Oxford University Press, 2001). The new left in British politics? Of course, there are dangers for the party in pitching its tent even just a lit- tle to the left of Labour. In particular, it would seem to run the risk of making the party less attractive to disgruntled Conservative voters, and, as we have seen, many of the party’s seats are held against a Conservative rather than a La- bour challenger. Against this, however, it may well be worth bearing in mind three points: . The party may find it difficult to avoid being left on the left. If New Labour is determined to move to the centre of British politics, the Liberal Democrats may well find themselves to the left of Labour even if all they have done is to stand still.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 5 Liberal divisions Nick Cott examines why the Liberal Party failed to patch up effectively its first major post-war split, between the supporters of Asquith and those of Lloyd George. LiberalLiberal unityunity frustratedfrustrated The impact of intra-party conflict on the reunited Liberal Party, 1923–31

h, for the touch of a vanished hand and the on a joint platform with the Conservatives, intended Osound of a voice that is still! as a means to secure a continuation of the wartime (George Lambert MP,  June ) coalition into peacetime. When the election came, candidates with official backing from Lloyd George The background to Liberal received a ‘coupon’ which entitled them to immu- nity from opposition from candidates of parties sup- divisions and the failure of porting the Coalition. Lloyd George was seen to be reunification indicating a greater preference for Conservatives Between  and , the Liberal Party separated than Liberals, since only around  Liberal candi- into two entities. In part, this was due to an ideologi- dates received the coupon. cal division in the government between The Coalition’s arrangement with the Conserva- compulsionists and voluntarists, who had different tives quickly led to the splitting up of the party’s par- perceptions of the best way to approach the man- liamentary organisation in spring . It also led to agement of the war effort. This manifested itself in a hostile relations between the two elements. Asquith’s struggle between the two sides for pre-eminence, independent – or ‘Wee Free’, as they were known – crudely resulting in the ultimate defeat of the Liberals condemned the Coalition’s policies and tac- voluntarists, represented by Asquith and his allies, tics. Criticism of policy was related chiefly to the and the triumph of the compulsionists, represented Coalition’s brutal tactics in Ireland, its continuing by Lloyd George and his allies. This conflict was military commitments abroad, domestic expenditure highly personal, with many voluntarists believing and state intervention which was attacked as expen- that they were being forced out of the government. sive, inefficient and defying individual freedom. In These Liberals felt that Lloyd George had waged a terms of tactics, a great deal of resentment was gener- campaign against them in order to extend his influ- ated amongst Wee Free candidates by Coalition op- ence and usurp Asquith’s crown. This seemed to be position at election time, most notably during the confirmed by Lloyd George’s alliance with the Con- Spen Valley by-election of , when Sir John Si- servatives, who supported compulsion, and it was mon’s attempt to be re-elected was frustrated by the felt that they conspired together against Asquith, intervention of Coalitionists. A combination of these forcing him out of power, to be replaced by Lloyd elements led to the decision of the  Leamington George in December . party conference formally to reject the Coalition, A rift in the Liberal Party was thus created in splitting the Coalition Liberal minority from the , with Asquith and his supporters relegated to party organisation, except in Wales. Furthermore, the opposition. However, there was no clear-cut separa- hostility between the two camps nurtured a tendency tion of MPs, with whips still canvassing all Liberal to seek to cooperate more extensively with politicians members. In reality, the formal separation of the two outside the two Liberal factions, making it conceiv- elements did not occur until  when Lloyd able that the separation would be permanent. On the George, rather than seeking to reunite the Liberal Coalition side, there was some enthusiasm for the idea Party, decided to continue to foster his relationship of seeking support from Coalition Conservatives for with the Conservatives. This was demonstrated by ‘fusion’ (the establishment of a new party made up of him and his supporters seeking to fight the election Coalitionist Liberals and Conservatives). Some Wee

6 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 Frees pursued their own version of fu- clear purpose, a common identity and a moderate Labour elements into the sion by opening up discussions with sense of belonging, all vital to securing Liberal Party. However, there were anti-Coalitionist Conservatives. The unity and preventing the various defec- opposing voices; Edward Grigg be- aim behind both these attempts was to tions that occurred during the period, lieved that there was a possibility of ‘be- create a new ‘National’ party that in a and the later partitioning of the party ing swallowed up by Labour’, and Sir sense distanced itself from party politics into disparate segments in . John Simon stated that the arrangement by creating a moderate force represent- would see Liberals being culpable in the ing the interests of the nation as a whole, Reaction against the establishment of a ‘socialist state.’ In the rather than sectional or class interests. most extreme case, that of Winston However, the political landscape was positioning of the party Churchill, it appears that he left the party totally altered in October  by the closer to Labour over the issue. He saw Liberalism and fall of the Coalition and the new Con- In one sense, it seems incredible that socialism as opposites; ‘Liberalism’, he servative leader Baldwin’s commitment differences should have emerged after said, aimed to preserve and maintain to protection in  – a move totally reunification over where the party the ‘freedom of the individual and the alien to Liberal free trade instincts. should be positioned in relation to the sanctity of home’, whilst socialism Party political government had re- other two political parties, given the erected ‘the State as a sort of God’ and emerged and Liberals could no longer clear consensus to create a National reduced ‘man to a sort of slave.’ It expect to continue to find political party. However, this consensus was built seems then that there were fundamental comrades within other parties. They on an abstract notion of what a Na- objections in the Liberal Party to even began to realise that it was only by tional party constituted, with little dis- the mildest form of tolerance of oppos- working together that a moderate Na- cussion as to the party’s likely position ing parties since in this instance, Liber- tional political force could be created. in relation to the two other parties. This als had merely voted Labour into office. There was also self-interest to consider. was an error because being now the No formal pact was ever concluded. Now Liberals perceived that they were smallest party in a three-party system, it Fundamental objections to the po- uncertainly placed between the other was vitally important that Liberals were sitioning of the party did not, however, two parties, with the prospect of elec- clear about how they were to position surface strongly until , after Lloyd toral meltdown if they did not work to- themselves. It was also a recipe for con- George, now party leader, sought to gether. Therefore there was an over- flict, since Liberals brought to the reu- forge a political alliance with Labour whelming desire amongst Liberal par- nited party conflicting interpretations arising from his desire to build a left- liamentarians to create a National party of what a National party actually meant leaning National bloc. Whilst this and the imperative forced upon the in practice. Some felt the party should won him the support of the social- party by electoral considerations led to position itself closer to Labour and de- radical element of the party, it led to rapid reunification just in time for the velop left-leaning policies, whilst oth- opposition from some Wee Frees and election of December . ers, by contrast, felt the party should former Coalitionist allies of Lloyd A vague notion of where the party position itself closer to the Conserva- George. This was particularly the case should be positioned and a few tives and develop right-leaning policies. during the General Strike of , electorally focused calculations were, Division over the issue began to sur- when Lloyd George came out in sup- however, hardly enough to ensure Lib- face after the election in December port of the trade unionists, and during eral unity. There were differences be- , which delivered an inconclusive the Parliament of –, when he tween the left and right of the party result. The Conservatives were the gave support to a second minority La- that could not be resolved without largest party, but Asquith and Lloyd bour administration. Reaction was compromise – but Liberals were not George decided to support the acces- sometimes extreme. Two of Lloyd prepared to make the compromises sion of a minority Labour administra- George’s former Coalitionist allies, necessary to ensure that it worked. In- tion in January , as the election had Frederick Guest and Edward Hilton dividualists on the right and been fought on the issue of protection Young, were so aggravated by this that collectivists on the left stubbornly re- versus free trade. The result was a clear they decided to quit the party. fused to contemplate policies and strat- defeat for protectionism, but the La- The policies arising from Lloyd egies which did not totally match their bour Party had more seats than the Lib- George’s strategy also generated opposi- own perspectives. Continuing factional erals and in these circumstances, it tion. This can be seen most distinctly, per- quarrels were also troublesome. Former seemed constitutionally right that the haps, in the controversy surrounding land Wee Frees and Coalitionists continued Liberals should back the accession of a policy that reached its climax in . to refuse to cooperate with each other Labour government. This course of ac- Lloyd George advocated a policy of ‘cul- because of mutual distrust, preferring to tion received general support from Lib- tivating tenure’, which would have seen distance themselves from their rivals erals who saw it as the only possible county council committees taking over rather than seek reconciliation. This course, and from those like Alfred the land and renting it out to farmers. mixture of ideological problems, fac- Mond and Walter Runciman who saw This led to opposition from individualists tional mistrust and sheer stubbornness the arrangement as one which would who were fundamentally opposed to the prevented the party from developing a eventually lead to the integration of abolition of owner-occupation. Hilton

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 7 Young and Mond, another former Coali- to build support to challenge Lloyd tionist, were especially critical. In both George’s strategy. Both formed elec- cases it was a factor influencing their de- toral pacts with the Conservatives in cision to leave the party. Some Wee their constituencies, and Guest fre- Frees also opposed the policy, but since by quently voted with the Conservatives in this stage they had severed ties of loyalty Parliament. However, there were firm to the leadership and sectioned them- advocates of this approach amongst Wee selves off from the party mainstream, it is Frees too. After , for example, Si- little wonder that they did not contem- mon worked very closely with Con- plate resignation. servatives in his constituency, devel- Whilst it is clear that there were oped a strong political friendship with principles at stake, Liberals showed a Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, stubborn inability to make the com- and of course, led the Liberal National promises that might have led to a policy break-away in  in order to pursue that was acceptable to all sides, or to put cooperation more formally. forward alternatives with which to Potentially, then, there was a strong challenge Lloyd George. Both of these body of opinion that might have chal- H. H. Asquith, Liberal leader 1908–26 and positions could have led to greater lenged Lloyd George if the two sides Prime Minister 1908–16 unity and possibly prevented the frag- had desired to cooperate. However, this mentation of the party. Lloyd George was not the case. Former Coalitionists himself can be held partly to blame. His even deliberately sought to exclude The ‘guerrilla war’: Wee resolute determination to plough ahead Wee Frees from their discussions over Free resistance to Lloyd with his policy led to reaction against it, the issue. This is reflected, for example, in particularly since it was believed he a letter written by Grigg to Guest in George bought support through his Political which he stated that he was ‘very anx- Mistrust was undoubtedly the main Fund, a tactic that was hardly likely to ious to discuss the possibility of com- reason for the continuing resistance of endear opponents to his policies. mon action’ with Liberals who were ‘not Wee Frees to Lloyd George and his al- However, even if Lloyd George had in sympathy with the Radical Group’. lies. Much of this was related to recent been more accommodating, it probably Equally, there is no evidence that Simon party history, or perhaps more correctly would have made very little difference sought their support. Wee Frees disliked a mythologised interpretation of it, given the dogmatism displayed by the Coalitionists and could never consider which served to demonise Lloyd objectors. This is particularly true of the formal cooperation. Tr ibal divisions George and his allies. Doubts re- reaction against land policy when a therefore played a major part in pre- mained as to their moral characters (as compromise solution agreed by a spe- venting cooperation between the two witnessed by their activities in under- cial conference to allow cultivating ten- factions. However, this was not the only mining Asquith in the period – ure to coexist with owner-occupation explanation; a further one lies in the and in electoral controversies thereaf- still could do nothing to appease some failure of the party leadership itself to ter) and also as to their competence in of the objectors. Furthermore, evi- produce acceptable policies and strate- policy-making. dence that at least one prominent Wee gies. Whilst a united response to Lloyd The former Wee Frees believed that Free exaggerated his opposition in or- George could have led to a change of Lloyd George and his allies would again der to undermine the leadership sug- direction, the chances of this happening try to usurp the leadership of the party gests that whatever policy Lloyd were hindered because the policy that by underhand tactics. This fear seemed George put forward would have en- Lloyd George was pursuing alienated to be justified by Lloyd George’s tactics countered some opposition. Liberals from the party as a whole, pre- after , when he began his ascent to Moreover, many of the objectors had venting any inclination to cooperate the leadership of the party. Suspicious a clear preference for aligning the party with other Liberals irrespective of their Wee Frees attributed his rise to his Po- closer to the Conservatives and build- personal views about them. litical Fund, which they believed had ing a National party, or bloc, that in- Whatever the reasons, the inability allowed him to lever himself into a volved Liberals and Conservatives, to cooperate caused immense damage dominant position by bribing the party rather than Liberals and Labour. This to the possibility of unity. It encouraged into accepting organisational and was particularly true of former Coali- right-leaning Liberals to look outside policy reforms that were to his ‘own tionists. Churchill, before his defection the party for politicians to cooperate political advantage’. Furthermore, it in , was perhaps the most active of with and led to defections when they seemed that he had somehow con- these Liberals trying to build support came to feel the greater sense of be- trived the humiliating party rout in for the idea amongst members of the longing to the Conservative fold that  in order to remove those who op- Liberal Party. Following his defection, almost inevitably followed the develop- posed him. Secondly, former Wee this mantle was passed to Grigg and ment of fraternal relationships with Frees saw in Lloyd George’s ‘illiberal’ Frederick Guest, who actively sought members of the Conservative Party. socialistic policies the worst excesses of

8 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 the Coalition’s extravagant expenditure grouping. Some of this was luck: many can be seen to be disingenuous given plans. In reaction to this, they became other potential forces of resistance had his earlier support for moderate trade preoccupied with a defence of abstract disappeared because of earlier defections unionists. In Parliament, Runciman notions of individualism to which from the party; but it does at least show led the organisation in trying to coun- some of them in fact did not totally ad- that the resistance had gained enough teract ‘official’ overtures to the Labour here, in order to prove that Lloyd support amongst Liberals to have shat- Party by offering the minority Labour George’s commitment to Liberalism tering consequences for the unity of the government under Macdonald (– had faded, even when it made them ap- party in the longer term. ) general support for moderate Lib- pear inconsistent and hypocritical. Two of the most vocal campaigners eral policies. This was not entirely a po- This form of guerrilla warfare had its against Lloyd George and his allies were litical tactic to weaken Lloyd George, limitations in the immediate period fol- Runciman and Simon. Both had griev- since Runciman was also determined lowing Lloyd George’s effective take- ances against Lloyd George and his al- to encourage Labour not to implement over of the party from . Whilst it is lies and were strong subscribers to the socialist legislation, but it certainly clear that it became powerful in per- ‘demonic’ interpretation of their moti- suited the purposes of tribal warfare petuating divisions which prevented vation. Furthermore, both were sig- since it affected the Lloyd Georgian in- Liberals from developing a sense of be- nificant figures because of their ability fluence over governmental policy and longing to the reunified party, this resist- to lead Wee Free opinion, especially af- the Parliamentary Liberal Party. ance did little to undermine Lloyd ter Asquith’s retirement from the lead- Finally, there were the electoral tac- George’s leadership by solidifying oppo- ership in , when they became tics. Most famously in this respect, sition to him before the – period. identified as his successors. Runciman played a key role in frustrat- This is because it was designed to in- Of the two, Runciman was perhaps ing the chances of the Liberal candidate volve a few disaffected former support- the most active in mobilising resist- at the Tavistock by-election of . ers of Asquith, and therefore excluded ance to Lloyd George. He helped to The controversy he created by refusing other Liberals. Furthermore, there was create and direct the guerrilla warfare to speak on behalf of the candidate, no clear positive conception of what the operation through a separate organisa- who was backed by Lloyd George, was rebels stood for, which might have won tion within the party: the Radical said to have contributed to the narrow support from Liberals who sat between Group, established in , and its later Conservative victory. the former Wee Free and Coalitionist replacement, the Liberal Council, in Simon, by contrast, did not formally factions. Abstract principles were clearly . Because of the key role he become part of the guerrilla resistance not enough. However, from  on- played in establishing these organisa- to Lloyd George by the Wee Frees. This wards, the resistance did start to have a tions, he was able to ensure that they is partly explained by his withdrawal greater impact as it distanced itself from focused efforts on the three-pronged from active Liberal party politics to tribal warfare tactics, eventually unifying attack he favoured to destabilise the pursue his legal career from –, part of the party around the right-lean- leadership of opposing policy, oppos- which left him outside the resistance ing National policy in , when half ing and frustrating strategy and frus- movement. However, in  he re- the parliamentary party deserted the trating electoral success. turned to active politics to mount a Liberals for the new Liberal National In terms of policy, the propaganda challenge to Lloyd George, which he suggested that the rebels adhered to tra- seems to have done in conjunction ditional Liberal values. In most cases, with members of the organised resist- David Lloyd George, Liberal leader 1926– 31 and Prime Minister 1916–22 this appears to have been vaguely the ance, even if he did not become for- case, but on Runciman’s part, there ap- mally part of it. This was particularly pears to have been some disingenuous- the case during the General Strike, ness, since at times he flirted with social- when he joined with five members of istic policies, such as land nationalisation, the resistance in criticising Lloyd and he publicly backed Lloyd George’s George. However, he never played a loan-financed public works programme wider part in the tactical aspects of the in . Clearly, he aimed to create rebel campaign and in the period from controversy over policy to undermine – his position in opposition to the leadership irrespective of whether he Liberal–Labour relations meant that he believed the principles he extolled in or- became distant from its leadership. der to destabilise it. Furthermore, unlike Runciman he In terms of strategy, there was resist- clearly believed in right-leaning tradi- ance to the repositioning of the Liberal tional Liberal individualism and as his Party closer to socialism, as witnessed opposition to Labour showed, he was by opposition to Lloyd George’s sup- an anti-socialist. port for the General Strike of , al- For these reasons, from , Simon though again Runciman’s opposition was able to project a clearer image as a

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 9 as well as an ideological, force strug- 2The divisions were not quite as stark as is often gled to survive, with many of its tradi- implied. Conscription was introduced under Asquith’s Coalition Ministry with only Simon re- tional policies now seen as irrelevant signing over the issue. Other Asquithians such to the post-war period and others hav- as Reginald McKenna and Walter Runciman ing been adopted and adapted by the who theoretically opposed it, did not. 3Two Cabinet supporters of Asquith were Sir other parties. Furthermore, its elec- John Simon and Walter Runciman. For Simon’s toral base was shrinking. This left Lib- attitude see David Dutton, Simon – A Political erals having to redefine their position, Biography of Sir John Simon, (London, 1992), p. 37 and Clementine Spencer-Churchill Trust Pa- not only in isolation but also in rela- pers CSCT 2/9/5-6: 3 January 1916 – Churchill tion to other parties. Undoubtedly this to Clementine Spencer-Churchill. For was one of the main sources of the di- Runciman’s see Jonathan Wallace, ‘The political visions which emerged – but they career of Walter Runciman, 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford, 1870–1949’, Newcastle could to some degree have been over- Ph.D. (1995), pp. 202–06. In Runciman’s case come had Liberals chosen to work to- there is clear evidence that Lloyd George tried gether and reached compromises to to undermine his position at the Board of Trade by establishing a Wheat Commission to circum- ensure greater, if not total, unity. This Sir John Simon, Liberal National leader in vent the Board and by intervening in the Coal 1931 did not happen because of the fac- Dispute of 1915 to force a settlement. Both tional disputes between the Wee Frees these instances affected Runciman’s standing in the government and he was not invited to serve Wee Free rebel leader, which eventually and the former Coalitionists, sheer in the Second Coalition. also won him credibility as a leader dogmatism and, most significantly, the 4The term is a reference to the minority of the amongst former Coalitionists, who failure of the Liberals to develop a Free Church of Scotland who refused to accept shared his views and now saw him as common sense of identity and belong- union with the United Presbyterian Church in 1900 to become the United Free Church; they separate from the mainstream of Wee ing to their party that would have en- carried on (and still do) as the Free Church of Free resistance. The perception of him couraged them to work together. Scotland, or ‘Wee Frees’. (Confusingly, other was critical to the renewed division of Liberals can be blamed, in part, for factions of the Scottish Presbyterian church,  which split more often even than the inter-war Liberalism in , which came about not laying aside their difficulties and Liberal Party, also later became known as the when the mounting financial crisis re- stubbornly refusing to compromise ‘Wee Frees’.) inforced the idea that Liberals should over policy issues that would have ena- 5 See Simon Papers 151/1 – Extract from York- shire Post 1 December 1919, 152/57; Daily seek to make an alliance with the Con- bled them to develop a sense of com- Chronicle, 17 December 1919, Liberal Maga- servatives. Suddenly he realised that a mon identity. However, to some de- zine, January 1920 and Liberal Monthly, Febru- body of disaffected Liberal opinion ex- gree, they could only have developed ary 1920. isted that was ready to work with the this sense if the party had been seen to 6 Liberal Magazine January 1920 and Liberal Monthly February 1920. Conservatives. He exploited this by pursue policies with which they could 7For general commentary see Geoffrey Searle, creating the Liberal National party, es- identify. It had not, and the reunified Country Before Party – Coalition and the Idea of tablished in October, which united Liberal Party from  onwards ‘National Government’ in Modern Britain, 1885–1987 (London, 1995), p. 121. The keen- right-leaning Wee Frees and former therefore contained elements that est advocates of Coalition were Winston Coalitionists around such a policy for never felt any sense of belonging to Churchill and Frederick Guest. For examples of the first time and under his leadership. the party. Because of this lack of unity, Churchill’s position see Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 5/26/11-12 11 March 1922 – Churchill His pre-eminent position reflected the it is perhaps not possible to speak of a to the Honorary Secretary of the Dundee Un- luck that has been alluded to since the single Liberal Party during the period, ionist Association and Paul Addison, Churchill defection of other potential leaders left but rather of a collection of factions on the Home Front (London, 1992), p. 202. For him in a strong position to gain such vying with each other for dominance Guest see Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 2/122/ 18 6 April 1922 Guest to Churchill. Research support. However, it also reflected over the party. In this climate, it was shows that Wee Free enthusiasts for fusion something of the longer-term signifi- hardly surprising that the Liberal Party looked to Sir Edward Grey and the progressive cance of Simon’s style of Wee Free re- fragmented so badly. Liberal-Conservative Robert Cecil for leader- ship. See Michael Bentley, ‘Liberal Politics and sistance. Through distancing himself the Grey Conspiracy of 1921’, Historical Journal from the main rebel group, he was Nick Cott is a PhD researcher at the Uni- 20 2 (1977), pp. 461-478. eventually able to provide an element versity of Newcastle upon Tyne and a Visit- 8 Not all Liberals favoured fusion. Mond favoured reunification. Especially see GM Bayliss, ‘The of the Liberal Party with a common ing Lecturer at Sunderland University. He Outsider: Aspects of the Political Career of Al- sense of purpose again, encouraging also represents Grange ward on Newcastle fred Mond, First Lord Melchett (1868-1930), them to cooperate with each other, but City Council for the Liberal Democrats. Wales Ph.D. (1969), p. 333 and p. 403, unfortunately, this precipitated the col- Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 5/28A/48-49: 29 October 1922 – Mond to Churchill and 1 George Lambert recalls happier days for the lapse of the reunified party. Melchett Papers AP5 Undated Mond to Lloyd Liberal Party under William Gladstone. See George. Gladstone Papers BM Add. MS46, 476 fol. 207: 9For examples of this sentiment see Kenneth O. Lambert to Viscount Gladstone 3 June 1929 cit. Morgan, Lloyd George (London, 1974), pp. Conclusions Michael Dawson, ‘The Liberal Land Policy, 170–73 and Liberal Magazine July 1923. The 1924–1929. Electoral strategy and internal divi- The period from – was one in greatest enthusiasts were understandably Coa- sion,’ Twentieth Century British History (1991) litionists such as Lloyd George and Frederick which Liberalism as a single political, Vol. 113 p. 285.

10 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 Guest, since their section of Liberalism had little Mond’s attitude was complex. See Dawson arti- 33 See Walter Runciman Papers WR 204 – A paper grassroots organisation on which to base suc- cle, p. 276 for his attitude to owner-occupation. by Walter Runciman entitled ‘A Secret Note on cess. See K. O. Morgan, ‘Lloyd George’s Stage On his attitude to land policy see Lloyd George the Plight of the Liberal Party’ dated 1 Novem- Army; The Coalition Liberals, 1918–22’ in A. J. Papers 6/14/5/8 25 September 1924, Melchett ber 1926. P. Taylor, Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (London, Papers AP5/11 Extract from a speech dated 6 34 See Michael Bentley, The Liberal Mind (Cam- 1971), pp. 225–54. January 1926, AP5/12 1 February 1926 – Mond bridge, 1977), especially pp. 44–45. Bentley 10 From October 1931, three Liberal organisations to John Lloyd. On his reasons for defection see shows that part of the reason for this was that the emerged in Parliament: the Samuelite, or ‘offi- AP5 Lloyd George’s Comments undated and Wee Frees wanted to prove greater commitment cial’ Liberals under the leadership of Herbert AP5/13 13 October 1927 Extract from speech to Liberalism than that of Lloyd George and his al- Samuel, the Simonites, or Liberal Nationals un- at Llandovery and Bayliss thesis, p. 586. lies through the identification with the figures, der the leadership of Sir John Simon, and a tiny 19 See Liberal Magazine February 1926 and April policies and philosophies of Liberalism’s past. Lloyd George ‘family’ group. 1926. 35 As has been indicated previously, both believed 11 The 1923 election led to a hung parliament 20 A huge source of revenue built up through the that they had been victimised before the war, with sizeable representation by all three main sale of honours whilst Prime Minister. and Simon had suffered at the hands of the parties. 21 This was particularly true of Mond’s attitude. Lloyd Georgians during the Spen Valley by- 12 See HC Debates Vol. 169 1924 col. 469. In this de- See Lloyd George Papers 6/14/5/8 25 Septem- election of 1919. In addition to these grievances bate George Lambert summed up the constitu- ber 1924, Melchett Papers AP5/11 Extract from should be added Lloyd George’s attempt to tional case for voting in a Labour government. It a speech dated 6 January 1926, AP5/12 1 Feb- frustrate Runciman’s return to Parliament. See was also a feature of election campaigns in 1924 ruary 1926 – Mond to John Lloyd, AP5/13 13 Runciman Papers WR 326 – extract from the when Liberals faced Tory criticism of their actions. October 1927 Extract from speech at Cardiff Western Mail 31 March 1920. For an example refer to Ian Macpherson’s cam- Llandovery and Bayliss thesis, p. 586. 36 Asquith was in himself a barrier to unity because paign in Ross & Cromarty. See The Inverness Citi- 22 Walter Runciman. Refer to discussion in the he was a focus of the wartime splits and showed zen 30 October 1924. For Mond’s attitude see next section. little inclination to try to heal the wounds, de- Reading Papers MSS EUR F118/58/29-32 24 No- 23 See Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 2/133/71-72: spite agreeing to Liberal reunion. 1926 pre- vember 1924 – Mond to Reading. For Runciman’s 18 June 1924 – Churchill to Sir Samuel Hoare. sented an opportunity to put aside some of the see Wallace thesis, p. 259. 24 See Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1002 1 May differences, but his former allies decided to take 13 See Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1001 24 1925 – Grigg to Guest, 1002 6 May 1925 – on his mantle rather than to set a new course. January 1924 – Grigg to A. Bailey, Liberal Maga- Grigg to Lionel Hitchins, 1002 8 May 1925 – 37 The Liberal Council was presided over by Grey zine February 1924 and Dutton, Simon, pp. 64- Guest to Grigg, 1002 30 March 1926 – Grigg to but chaired by Runciman. The other members 68. Simon may not, however, have been speak- Lord Younger, 1003 28 March 1931 – Grigg to were Phillipps, Maclean, Pringle, Collins, ing entirely out of a genuine feeling, given his J.D. Birchall, 1003 28 March 1931 – Grigg to Gladstone, Spender, A.G. Gardiner and Gilbert later acknowledgement that the right decision Neville Chamberlain, 1003 April 23 1931- Murray. had been made. See Viscount Simon, Retro- Neville Chamberlain to Grigg, 1003 June 18 38 For an indication of these see Walter Runciman, spect – The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Viscount 1931 – Neville Chamberlain to Grigg, 1003 26 Liberalism As I See It (1927). Simon (London, 1952), p. 130. June 1931 – Grigg to Neville Chamberlain. 39 For land policy see Hart thesis, p. 261. For pub- 14 Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 2/126/114-117: 25 Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1000 22 Novem- lic works see Walter Runciman Papers WR 331 28 December 1923 – Churchill to Violet ber 1923 – Grigg to A. Chamberlain and Liberal – 18 May 1929 Extract from the Western Morn- Bonham-Carter (unsent), CHAR 2/132/10-13: Magazine August 1927 and January 1929. ing News. Runciman did, however, oppose the 8 January 1924 – Churchill to Violet Bonham- 26 The Cleckheaton Advertiser 4 May 1928 cit. idea in 1928 at the Swansea West by-election. Carter, CHAR 2/132/38-39: 5 February 1924 – MSS. Simon 158/28 See Wallace thesis pp. 294–301. However, his Churchill to HG Tanner, Keith Robbins, Church- 27 Simon became close to Baldwin around the time objections do not seem to have endured, sug- ill (London, 1992), p. 91 and Henry Pelling, of the India Conference in 1927 when Baldwin gesting his 1928 position was merely one of his Winston Churchill (London, 1974), p. 287. appointed him as Chair. See Dutton, Simon, p. tactics to wreck the Lloyd George leadership. 15 Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 2/135/96-97: 23 82. Also see the endorsement of Simon’s candi- 40 See Wallace thesis p. 4. October 1924 – Churchill to Godfrey W. James. dature by Baldwin in 1929 in The Cleckheaton 41 For support for moderate Labour see Wallace 16 See John Campbell, Lloyd George – The Goat in Guardian 10 May 1929 cit. MSS. Simon 159/50. thesis p. 259 and pp. 309–14. It seems that the Wilderness (London, 1977), pp. 33–44 and Furthermore, politically, he had much in common Runciman wanted to encourage Labour to be- p. 54. with Neville Chamberlain. See Dutton, Simon, come a constitutional party by encouraging its 17 For Wee Free resistance especially refer to Si- pp 104–06. Also see MSS (Film) Grigg 1003 23 moderate elements. He felt that Macdonald mon’s opposition. For the General Strike see April 1931 – N. Chamberlain to Grigg for evi- was a better leader than Lloyd George and The Times 15 June 1926 cit. MSS. Simon 110/1, dence of discussion with him over a formal rela- wanted to help to liberalise Labour policy. How- Viscount Simon, Retrospect pp. 136–37, David tionship between him and the Conservatives. ever, the approach also suited his tactic of un- Dutton, Simon: pp. 76–81. For his attitude from 28 Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1002 1 May dermining Lloyd George. This was particularly 1929 see The Cleckheaton Guardian 7 Novem- 1925 – F.E. Guest to Grigg. the case from 1930 when Runciman supported ber 1930 cit. MSS. Simon 161/20, The 29 To understand the position, examine the Wee the Government’s 1930 Budget, despite a Lib- Cleckheaton Guardian 21 November 1930 cit. Free response to Mond’s resignation from the eral amendment. MSS. Simon 160/84-89 and Extract from the party. See Liberal Magazine February 1926 and 42 WR 333 extract from the Morning Advertiser 20 Western Morning News and Mercury 2 Febru- April 1926. Also see Michael Hart, ‘The decline November 1928. ary 1931 in MSS Eur F118101/32-5. For Coali- of the Liberal Party in Parliament and in the con- 43 As a natural leader, he may have chosen not to tionists look at Guest’s view. See Lloyd George stituencies,’ Oxford D.Phil (1982), p. 275. join since he would have probably have had to Papers F/22/3/37 1 June 1926 – Guest to Lloyd 30 See Michael Bentley, The Liberal Mind (Cam- accept a subservient role to Runciman. George. For Hilton Young see Kennet Papers bridge, 1977) and Hart thesis, pp. 85–100. 44 These five were Runciman, Maclean, Phillipps, MSS Kennet 78/12/a-b: 29 May 1926 – 31 Walter Runciman Papers WR 204 – A paper by Pringle and Collins. Baldwin to Hilton Young and MSS Kennet 78/ Walter Runciman entitled ‘ A Secret Note on the 45 For the General Strike see The Times 15 June 14/a-d: 6 June 1926 – Hilton Young to A. J. Plight of the Liberal Party’ dated 1 November 1926 cit. MSS. Simon 110/1, Viscount Simon, Copeman. Also look at Geoffrey Shakespeare 1926. Also see G. R. Searle, The Liberal Party: Retrospect – The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Vis- for 1931. See Hore-Belisha Papers HOBE 1/1/ Triumph and Disintegration, 1886–1929 (Lon- count Simon (London, 1952) pp. 136–37, David 1-2 Diary Entry – 24 March 1931, HOBE 1/1/ don, 1992), pp. 146–47. Dutton, Simon: A Political Biography of Sir John 21: Diary Entry – 29 June 1931 and Liberal 32 In the election of 1924 the Liberals fell from Simon, (London, 1992) pp. 76-81. For his atti- Magazine June 1931. holding 158 seats to only 40. Wee Frees were tude from 1929 see The Cleckheaton Guardian 18 For Hilton Young see Kennet Papers MSS the chief victims of the election and Lloyd 7 November 1930 cit. MSS. Simon 161/20, The Kennet 78/2b-k: 13 February 1926 – Hilton- George was blamed for stoking divisions before Cleckheaton Guardian 21 November 1930 cit. Young to Lloyd George and MSS Kennet 78/6: the election to ensure that they would be de- MSS. Simon 160/84-89 and extract from the Hilton-Young – Speech to the National Liberal feated. See Searle, The Liberal Party: Triumph Western Morning News and Mercury 2 Febru- Federation Conference 18 February 1926. and Disintegration, p. 143. ary 1931 in MSS Eur F118101/32-5.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 11 Liberal divisions Ian Hunter looks at the attempts to reunite the Liberal Nationals with the official Liberal Party in the 1940s TheThe finalfinal questquest forfor LiberalLiberal reunionreunion 1943–461943–46

he decline of the Liberal Party as a party of separate organisation from the Samuel-led Liberals Tgovernment during the first half of the twenti- and remained firm supporters of the Tory-domi- eth century was marked by a series of splits and per- nated National Governments. sonal rivalries. Most famous and most damaging was With the formation of Churchill’s Coalition the split in  between the followers of H. H. Government in May , the Liberal Nationals and Asquith and David Lloyd George, which saw the Liberals again found themselves working alongside Liberal Party divided in allegiance from top to bot- each other in the national cause. The leaders of both tom until the mid s, although personal animosi- the Liberal Party and the Liberal National Party ties lasted much longer. (Sinclair and Simon) entered the government to- A further fault line divided the party again in the gether with the Labour Party leaders. Sir Archibald early s. This schism centred on a divide between Sinclair took over the responsibilities of the Air those Liberals who followed the then Liberal Party Ministry and Sir John Simon accepted a peerage and Leader and National Government Home Secretary became Lord Chancellor. For the Liberals, Sir Percy Herbert Samuel, and those who aligned themselves Harris became Deputy Leader and Ernest Brown with Sir John Simon, a leading Liberal and Foreign became the leader of the Liberal Nationals in the Secretary under MacDonald. The issue that divided Commons. This experience of cooperation and the the party on this occasion was less the personalities approach of the pending general election at the end of the leaders, although there was little love lost be- of the war ignited an outbreak of reunion negotia- tween Samuel and Simon, than their attitudes to the tions that ran from –. National Government. Simonite Liberals had found This interesting period of the Liberal Party’s his- that over the course of the period – they had tory has been mostly overlooked by political histori- become increasingly discontented with the record ans who have tended to focus on the wartime poli- of the Labour Government and more sympathetic tics of the Conservative and Labour parties during to and attracted by the policies of the Conservative the Coalition. Those historians who have covered Party. This preference grew through their involve- the period from a Liberal angle have argued that the ment in the National Government formed in . involvement of the leaders of the Parliamentary Lib- Simon had also abandoned the traditional Lib- eral Party in the Churchill coalition had a detrimen- eral commitment to free trade with his belief that tal effect on the prospects of the party. Malcolm tariff protection was necessary to help British in- Baines, for example, has argued that Sir Archibald dustry weather the storms of economic recession. Sinclair’s involvement as Air Minister ‘removed his This created a rift with the Samuelite Liberals in skilled management, which had helped preserve the National Government which proved unity in the thirties’. More recently, Garry Tregidga unbridgeable. In September , when the three has observed that in the traditional Liberal strong- Samuelite Liberal ministers in the National Gov- hold of South-West England, where by  the ernment resigned over the Ottawa Convention’s Liberals had finally consolidated their position, ‘the tariff reforms, Simon and his followers (who were war years removed the possibility of a recovery. then known as Liberal Nationals) remained on the Sinclair’s effective absence from party politics meant National Government benches. For the rest of the that the Liberals lost the initiative.’ However, less period –, the Liberal Nationals operated as a frequently commented upon is the disastrous impact

12 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 that the Second World War had on the Brown’s offer of discussions. For the be underrated. The Prime Minister fortunes of the Liberal National party. Liberal Party the team included the [Churchill] was popular of course, but The formation of the Coalition Deputy Leader, Sir Percy Harris, Lord the Conservative Party was very un- Government in May  initiated a Gilpin, Wilfred Roberts, Crinks popular. Even in this last year, in the period of formal electoral truce be- Johnstone, Geoffrey Mander and middle of a war, Independent candi- tween the main parties. With normal Dingle Foot. For the Liberal National dates, had got in, and polled big votes competition between the parties sus- Party the negotiators were Lord Teviot, against the Government.’ Foot ob- pended it might have been expected Sir Frederick Hamilton, Geoffrey served that Government candidates that each political party would remain Shakespeare, Alec Beecham, Stanley standing at by-elections were in effect on an even keel. However, while the Holmes and Henderson Stewart. Harris standing under a ‘coupon’ arrangement Sinclair Liberals suffered no desertions was elected as Chairman by both teams. and it was not doing them much good. or resignations from their parliamen- The main terms of the negotiations did The Liberal Nationals were of the view, tary team, the Liberal Nationals showed not focus on the position of leader, as however, that a ‘coupon’ election was significant signs of falling apart. In early Brown had previously indicated that he unavoidable and that those of a Liberal  Clement Davies resigned the Lib- would be satisfied to serve under persuasion should be positioning them- eral National whip and sat as an inde- Sinclair. The key issues surrounding the selves in order to get the best deal pos- pendent Liberal, before rejoining the terms of reunion for the Liberal Na- sible in terms of seats. For the mainstream Liberal Party in early . tionals were highlighted at the start of Sinclairites, Sir Percy Harris stuck to Four more Liberal National MPs fol- the negotiations by Sir Geoffrey Shake- the line that they wanted the Liberal lowed Davies’ route, with Leslie Hore- speare. According to a memo written Party to remain free and independent. Belisha, Sir Henry Morris-Jones, Edgar by Dingle Foot to Archibald Sinclair Although the Liberal Nationals agreed Granville and Sir Murdoch Macdonald the Liberal Nationals were particularly that this was an admirable objective it relinquishing the whip or refusing to concerned with the following issues: was clear, in the words of Foot, that ‘we participate in Liberal National party ac- . The importance of the ‘gospel of understood very different things by the tivities – a loss of over % of the par- free enterprise’; words “independent” and “free”’. liamentary party. This situation was . The need for a ‘sound’ agricultural The pivotal position of Winston compounded in April  by the loss policy; Churchill, himself a former Liberal, in of a further Liberal National seat at the . That the government post-war the strategic thinking of both groups of Eddisbury by-election, to the newly would not be a party government Liberals can be seen in Sir Percy formed Common Wealth party. but a continuance of the National Harris’s comment that ‘Winston was Coalition government of wartime; nearly sixty-nine and not immortal. In . That the Liberal Party could not the event of his breakdown or death The first round: support or put into office a minority they [the Liberal Nationals] should ask negotiations 1943–44 Labour government. themselves whether they were still pre- From this weakened platform in July The Liberal National Party’s willingness pared to commit themselves to close as-  Ernest Brown inaugurated discus- to go into coalition with the Conserva- sociation with the Conservative sions with Sir Archibald Sinclair over tives after the end of the war proved to Party’. Foot’s impression of the Lib- fusion of the two parties. Negotiations be the main source of contention with eral Nationals was that they were continued until the end of November Sir Percy and his team. Crinks strongly in favour of a Conservative– , when they eventually collapsed at Johnstone, himself a minister in Church- Liberal coalition against Labour and Sinclair’s insistence that the Liberal ill’s government at the time, as Secretary that they dreaded and disliked the La- Party would not continue with the Na- for Overseas Trade, declared that it bour Party and its leaders. Foot com- tional or Coalition Government be- would be fatal to declare any willingness mented to Sinclair that the highest yond the end of the war. However, in to enter a coalition government after the hope and aspiration of the Liberal Na- the aftermath of the  general elec- war. This would undermine the Liberals’ tionals, at the election expected at the tion, when both Liberal parties lost position; the only sensible policy was to conclusion of the war, ‘is a coupon their parliamentary leaders and many of continue to build from a platform of in- election with some charitable alloca- their remaining seats, reunion negotia- dependent strength so as to be in a good tion of seats’. The negotiations broke up tions were resumed during mid- to late position to make terms as and when the with the promise that the teams would . Papers that have recently come to time came. meet again and that the Liberal Nation- light during research on the Liberal The Liberal Party representatives als would consider their position over Party and its role in the Churchill coa- were of the opinion that something of a the issue of proportional representation lition have cast light on the reasons for Liberal revival was under way in the and read the resolutions and minutes the final failure to heal the long-stand- country and that many young candi- passed at the last two Liberal Party ing split within Liberal ranks. dates were being selected in seats where Council Meetings (‘poor devils’ as Foot The two teams of negotiators first Liberals previously had been inactive. commented!) to see if there was com- met on  August  at St. Ermins Dingle Foot noted that ‘the strength of mon ground for further exploration. Hotel in London, in response to Ernest Liberal feeling in the country must not Meetings continued on and off into

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 13 entered into renewed debate about into touch with Ernest Brown with a forming a single party. The discussions view to promoting a reunion. I have were led by constituency parties in not hitherto been at all optimistic as to Devon, Cornwall and in London. In- the result of any such efforts for one deed in London the local Liberal Na- simple reason – namely, that the Liberal tionals did rejoin the main party but as National members of the House of neither group by then held any London Commons nearly all hold their seats seats the parliamentary position re- through the support of Conservative mained unchanged. The Liberal Na- Associations in their constituencies.’ tionals were unsure whether to cooper- Samuel was also dubious about the ate with the Conservatives or with the quality of some of the Liberal National Liberals. Lord Simon, the former Lib- MPs, stating candidly that ‘if they were eral National leader, wanted a quick to rejoin us some at least would be a li- union with the Conservatives, while ability rather than an asset’. Samuel was the majority of grassroot activists and a also concerned about the impact on the significant portion of the parliamentary Liberal activists and leftish radicals, such leadership, led by Lord Mabane and as Tom Horabin, in the parliamentary Henderson Stewart, wanted to reunite party if the party too quickly embraced Sir Archibald Sinclair, Liberal leader 1935–45 in an anti-socialist alliance with Clem- a group who had been ‘indistinguish- ent Davies’ party. able from Conservatives, in policy and early  but no real progress was At the Liberal Party’s highest levels in action, throughout the whole of the made. The stumbling block remained there was great enthusiasm for achiev- last fifteen years’. He felt that the most the Liberal Nationals’ insistence on fa- ing some kind of reunion. Any recruit- desirable course would be for the Lib- vouring a coalition-style relationship ment into the small Parliamentary Lib- eral Nationals, who had left the party of with the Conservative Party, which eral Party, especially from erstwhile their own volition in  and , Sinclair’s Liberals feared would under- former alliance partners of the Con- now to declare themselves in agree- mine their existence as an independent servatives, would send a clear message ment with Liberal policies and to re- party. Fundamentally, as Dingle Foot that Liberalism was not dead. In a letter join. Samuel went on to warn that if re- observed, the Liberal Nationals were to Sir Geoffrey Mander, the former union happened then the Liberal Na- totally immersed in one absorbing pre- Liberal MP for Wolverhampton East, tionals would no doubt have to ‘discard occupation – how to get elected again who was defeated in , Sinclair a certain number who are, without if they were opposed by anyone what- wrote: ‘Clem Davies seems to be doing question, essentially Conservatives, and soever. This concern appeared to com- well … if he could only get some of the whose proper place is in the Conserva- pletely dwarf any other political issue Liberal Nationals to join up with the tive Party, and not to serve as a clogging on the Liberal National agenda. Party, people would begin to take the element in Liberalism’. As the general election of June  Liberal Party seriously again’. Sinclair wrote to Samuel on  May demonstrated, this preoccupation with urging that the Liberals ought to make electoral self-preservation was com- every effort to reach agreement with pletely justified. The election results of The second round: 1946 Brown, providing that Liberal inde-  were disastrous for both groups of Ernest Brown reopened the talks on re- pendence was not threatened. Further- Liberals. At the previous election in union which had lain dormant since more, Sinclair observed that the re-  the Liberal Nationals had seen  in the second week of May , moval, by the elimination of the party, thirty-three MPs returned. In  by the peculiar method of a letter to the of the name ‘Liberal National’ from bal- only thirteen scraped back in and two Glasgow Herald saying, on behalf of the lot papers would have a positive effect of those had stood as independent Lib- Liberal Nationals, that he was very anx- on public opinion. Sinclair also noted erals. The Sinclair Liberals saw their ious to bring about a reunion of Liber- that at the  election the Liberals party strength fall from nineteen to als, and he would be willing to work had lost all their Scottish seats (includ- twelve and the leadership of both Lib- with any ‘Sinclairite’ toward that end. ing his own at Caithness) and that the eral parties failed to hold their seats. The Duke of Montrose responded, on Liberal Nationals held three seats in Sinclair lost his seat by a whisker (sixty- Clement Davies’ behalf, with a letter to Scotland which, if they returned to the one votes) and was replaced as leader by Brown suggesting that they meet in Liberal fold, ‘would have a most heart- Clement Davies, who had until  London on  May for unofficial talks. ening effect upon the Party in Scot- been a leading member of the Liberal Montrose also informed Samuel and land’, so consequently the need for re- Nationals. This was, perhaps, a new op- Sinclair of the approach from the Lib- union was much stronger in Scotland portunity for rapprochement between eral Nationals. than in England. the two branches of Liberalism. Lord Samuel wrote to the Duke of When Montrose met Brown on  In the wake of these electoral set- Montrose on  May : ‘I am much May he emphasised the importance of backs Liberals and Liberal Nationals interested to know that you are getting complete independence for the Liberal

14 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 Party. Brown agreed that there should feared that if the Scottish Liberal Party cerned. Fothergill regarded the sugges- not be an alliance but insisted that there merged with the Scottish Liberal Na- tion as ludicrous, providing a potential should be some definite arrangement tionals then it would be impossible to Trojan horse into the Liberal camp from with the Conservatives, in which case it prevent the same situation occurring which the Liberal Nationals could begin should be clearly understood that in in England – which would mean the to form pacts and understandings with certain eventualities the Liberals should end of the Liberal Party as a separate Conservative Associations. Fothergill have their fair share of offices and ap- entity, sucked into an electoral align- wrote to Glen-Coats and urged her to pointments if the Conservatives ment with the Conservatives. This was play for time. He reminded her that the formed an administration. This was a an embrace that he felt would be both Liberal National organisation was show- contradictory position which did not impossible to escape and terminal for ing signs of disintegration, with the Lon- convince Montrose. the Liberal Party’s long term viability don branch of the organisation having In Scotland on  June  the as a distinct party. closed down their offices and come over Scottish Liberal Party and the Scottish Writing to Sinclair in August , to the Liberal Party against the wishes of Liberal National Association issued a Fothergill stated that ‘when I saw Lady its national leaders. Fothergill felt it was draft statement setting out the basis for Glen-Coats [and her colleagues] they perfectly possible that this experience fusion. This included forming a united left me in no doubt that they were in would be repeated in other areas of the front to oppose the Labour Govern- some danger of being outmanoeuvred country and that the process of locally ment, which ‘presents the antithesis of by Henderson Stewart. I do not doubt driven reconciliation would deliver the all that gives Liberalism a meaning’, their genuine desire to act in conform- bulk of the Liberal National Party with- and opposing the nationalisation of ity with the Party south of the border, out the need to do any potentially dam- great industries, the extension of the but I am afraid that Henderson Stewart aging deals. power of the executive and the regi- is a much more skilled negotiator than Fothergill, Sinclair and Clement mentation and restrictions of the lib- anybody on our side’. This view was Davies were united in their determina- erties of the individual. shared by Violet Bonham Carter, who tion that any union with the Liberal The joint statement went on to de- wrote to Sinclair asking him, as Presi- National Party should only come about clare that ‘it is the over-riding duty of dent of the Scottish Liberals, to inter- once clear agreement had been reached all Liberals to secure the overthrow of vene and assist Glen-Coats. Bonham on the need to field candidates in op- the Socialist Government’. However, Carter was particularly concerned that position to both Conservative and So- in order to achieve this, the statement the position of Liberal independence cialist parties. The vital question of in- argued that the party should be ‘pre- be safeguarded and worried that ‘it dependence, which had been the stum- pared to cooperate with all other po- would be disastrous if through incom- bling block during the previous talks in litical forces whose primary objective petence the “pass” were sold and our –, remained the issue on which is the same’. position in Scotland compromised. It this final set of negotiations collapsed. It was this last statement that caused might lead to a breach between the Fothergill and Sinclair suspected that disquiet amongst the Liberal Party Liberal Party and the Scottish Federa- the Liberal National parliamentary leaders when issued to the press by the tion which would be disastrous.’ leaders had been pressured by their ac- Liberal Nationals. The Liberal Party Fothergill’s suspicions about the pos- tivists in certain constituencies to make Chairman, Philip Fothergill, wrote to sible duplicity of the Liberal Nationals moves towards reunion. However, they William Mabane, the Chairman of the were deepened when he discovered that feared that the Liberal Nationals were Liberal Nationals, seeking clarification they had told Lady Glen-Coats that it that the Liberal Nationals agreed that a would be impossible for the three Scot- Edward Clement Davies, Liberal leader reunited and independent Liberal Party tish Liberal National MPs to sit as simple 1945–56 would contest by-elections and at the Liberals. Henderson Stewart had told next general election seek to put for- Lady Glen-Coats that he and his Liberal ward its own positive policy and candi- National colleagues were in a difficult dates in opposition to both Socialists position vis-à-vis their constituencies and Conservatives. and that they would have to sit in the Fothergill was also becoming in- House as Liberal Nationals. Ingeniously, creasingly concerned about the com- he proposed that this need not be a bar- petence of the Scottish Liberal Party’s rier to unity as he suggested that they negotiating team. In particular he was agree to form a new Liberal Party in concerned that the Chairman of the Scotland to be called ‘The Scottish Scottish Liberals, Lady Glen-Coats, United Liberal Party’ to which Liberal was not up to the task because of po- and Liberal National Associations should litical inexperience and would be out- become affiliated. manoeuvred easily by Henderson Fothergill was shocked that Glen- Stewart, the leading negotiator for the Coats felt that this was an acceptable so- Scottish Liberal Nationals. Fothergill lution which would save face for all con-

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 15 not genuine in their dealings and that hamstrung the Scottish negotiations. was to cost the party dear in the short they were only embarking on the ne- Glen-Coats and Henderson Stewart term. An understanding, if not a pact, gotiations to strengthen their position agreed in late October  to submit a with the Conservatives could possibly with their Tory colleagues by bringing draft statement supporting reunion in have helped deliver a sizeable block of the Liberal Party – or some substantial Scotland to the Scottish Liberal and seats for the Liberals at the  and fraction of it – into an anti-Socialist Liberal National organisations for com-  elections. As it was the party won alignment. Fothergill and Sinclair ment and verification. By then it was only nine seats, a net loss of three. feared that the Liberal Nationals would too late and both sides in London re- The attractions of reunion for the engineer some reason to break off ne- acted to the draft with dismay. The Liberal Party were patently clear, but gotiations and leave the Liberal Party Scottish Liberal Party ignored the ad- were less so for the Liberal Nationals. weakened and discouraged. vice from London and approved the Were the negotiations merely an at- Meanwhile, the separate discussions draft on  November. However, the tempt to entrap the Liberals into a posi- in London came to a head. After a fur- Liberal National leaders in London (es- tion whereby the anti-socialist vote ther exchange of increasingly acrimo- pecially Lords Teviot, Hutchinson and could be unified under one Tory- nious letters Mabane wrote to Rosebery) refused to endorse the draft dominated umbrella, or was it a more Fothergill on  October rejecting the document and in effect overthrew their deep-seated unease at the scale of the Liberal Party’s insistence on preserving Scottish negotiating team. On  De- To ry defeat in  and a desire to equidistance between the Labour and cember  the secretary of the Scot- forge a credible alternative to the La- Conservative Parties. ‘Believing that tish Liberal National Association pub- bour Party? Socialism is destructive … we [Na- lished a statement in The Scotsman Either way, for the sake of the long- tional Liberals] took the view that the newspaper that the negotiations for term survival of the Liberal third force first task was to secure the overthrow Liberal reunion in Scotland had irre- in British politics it was critical that the of the present Government … In ef- trievably broken down. Liberal leaders did not ‘sell the pass’ of fect, however, your letters make it clear This proved to be the last time that Liberal independence. The refusal of that before any discussions can take the breach between the two parts of Fothergill and Clement Davies to com- place we must agree to a tactical deci- the old Liberal Party came close to be- promise on the maintenance of Liberal sion (relating to the candidates at the ing healed. The dependence of sitting equidistance from the two main parties next general election). To insist on Liberal National MPs on Conservative was key to the survival of the British such a conclusion before negotiations support in their constituencies and the Liberal Party in the s and ’s. are even started stultifies them in ad- refusal of the national leadership to vance by making freedom of discus- countenance anything but an anti-So- Ian Hunter is a member of the Liberal sion impossible … We are forced with cialist reunion under the protective Democrat History Group executive, and is regret to conclude that no further pur- umbrella of an electoral pact with the completing a part-time doctorate on the Lib- pose would be served by pressing the Conservative Party proved insur- eral Party and the Churchill Coalition. matter further.’ mountable. In May  the Woolton- Fothergill immediately wrote back Te viot agreement was announced, 1 Herbert Samuel, the former leader, had nar- claiming that Mabane was completely confirming the Liberal Nationals’ fu- rowly lost his seat in the 1935 General Election and Sir Archibald Sinclair, with Lloyd George’s misrepresenting the Liberals’ position: ture as a junior partner of the Con- nomination, had replaced him. ‘to our great regret, you have given the servatives rather than part of a 2 Malcolm Baines The survival of the British Lib- impression that what you had in mind reunified Liberal Party. The door to re- eral Party 1932–1959 D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1989, p.66. was not the support of an independent union was finally shut. 3 Garry Tregidga, The Liberal Party in South-West Liberal Party … but to draw us into an Britain, p.115 (University of Exeter Press, alliance with other Parties (including 2000). 4 Confusingly the party changed its name soon the Conservative Party with which Conclusions after the 1945 election to the National Liberal you have closely worked for so long) For the Liberal Party the collapse of Party. For the sake of clarity the term Liberal Na- in creating a purely anti-socialist the talks was the loss of an opportunity tionals has been used throughout the article. bloc’. Fothergill made it clear that potentially to double the size of the 5 Hore-Belisha joined the Conservatives, Morris Jones rejoined the Liberal Nationals in 1943, had the Liberals known that this was parliamentary party and to make peo- and Granville joined the Labour Party in April the crux of the matter for the Liberal ple, in Sinclair’s words, take the party 1945. Nationals they would have never en- seriously again. A united Liberal Party 6The actual results saw 12 Liberal MPs (including    the semi-detached Gwilym Lloyd George) tered into negotiations on such a ‘bar- that was worth more than , , elected on 9% of the popular vote, and 11 Na- ren and negative issue’. Fothergill spelt votes would be in a far better position tional Liberal MPs returned on 2.8% of the vote. out that while the Liberal Party was to bargain with either the Labour or Two further ‘liberals’ were elected in 1945 – Sir M. McDonald and J. MacLeod. Although prepared to fight socialism it was the Conservative Party in any close- elected under the title ‘Independent Liberals’ equally opposed to the Conservative run election, as of course the elections they aligned themselves with the National Liber- Party, which had ‘rightly forfeited the of  and  were to prove. als for the duration of the parliament. confidence of the nation’. Fothergill’s and Clement Davies’ in- The collapse of talks in London sistence on remaining independent concluded on page 27

16 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 Liberal divisions Jaime Reynolds looks at the electoral impact of a potential Liberal–National Liberal reunion ImpactsImpacts ofof reunification?reunification? The electoral prospects of a reunited Liberal Party in the 1940s

an Hunter’s article on the attempts to reunite the • The national impact: that is the general ‘boost’ ILiberal and Liberal National parties in the mid- that might have been given to the Liberal Party in s prompts the question: what electoral assets did other areas as a result of reunification. the Liberal Nationals have to offer a reunited party? Could reunion have sparked the revival in the party’s electoral fortunes that in fact came a decade later? Local impact What wider political impact might it have had? In the seats they fought, a percentage of the actual As the Liberal Nationals never tested their inde- vote given to Liberal National candidates would pendent electoral strength against the Liberal and have gone to a united Liberal candidate if the parties Conservative parties, it is impossible to gauge with had merged. Assuming that the votes for the Liberal much accuracy how many votes they might have candidate, where there was one, would have gone en been able to swing across to a reunited party. Never- bloc to a united candidate, we can calculate the pro- theless we can get some measure of the range of portion of Liberal National votes that had to transfer electoral potential of a merged party: the minimum in order for the united Liberal to win the seat. and maximum impact that adherence of the Liberal We can exclude all seats where even a % trans- Nationals might have had. fer of the Liberal National vote to the Liberal would Table  shows the Liberal Nationals performance have been insufficient to defeat the winning candi- at the elections of the period. However, these figures date. In  there were thirty-six such seats (thirty- greatly overstate the number of committed Liberal five Labour and one Communist). In  there National voters since they include many Conserva- were thirty-two (all Labour). That leaves thirteen tive-inclined voters in constituencies where a Lib- seats in  and twenty-three in  where at least eral National was the standard-bearer for the Na- potentially a merged Liberal Party might have gath- tional coalition. In  the bald figures are even ered up enough votes to win. more misleading, as the totals include numerous es- If the transfer of Liberal National votes had been sentially Conservative candidates running under below %, only one seat would have been vulner- various joint labels. able to Liberal attack: Denbigh, which was a unique There were also some Liberal National support- two-horse race between Liberal National and Lib- ers in constituencies with no Liberal National can- eral at each election between  and . didate, who are thus not included in these figures. Denbigh would have gone to a united Liberal on a However, it is safe to assume that their numbers % shift in  and a shift of only % in . were negligible by the mid-s. The Conserva- If % of Liberal National votes had transferred, tives made great efforts in  to tap Liberal votes, four more seats would have been won in  (St and no doubt they would have run more candidates Ives – %, Huntingdonshire – %, Dumfriesshire under the Liberal National label if there had been – % and Eddisbury – %). Two other seats, South significant concentrations of such voters elsewhere Molton and Fife East, both requiring a % transfer, to target. would have been in the balance. The next most vul- The number of additional MPs a united Liberal nerable seat, Montrose Burghs, would have required Party might have won in  and  would have a massive transfer of more than %. depended on two factors: In , a % transfer would have secured a • The local impact in constituencies where the maximum of seven more seats. However in only Liberal Nationals were organised and ran can- four of these was the  candidate clearly a Lib- didates eral National (Torrington – %, Fife East – %,

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 17 been modest because there were few Table 1: Liberal National performance seats where Liberals were close be- hind the winning party. In  a Election Lib Nat vote % vote Candidates Seats won .% swing - if extended into the 1931 809,302 3.7 41 35 Celtic fringe - would have enabled 1935 866,354 3.7 44 33 the Liberals to hold Caithness & 1945 737,732 2.9 49 11 Sutherland (C majority .%) and 195014 985,343 3.4 55 16 Caernarvonshire Boroughs (C major- Source: F.W.S. Craig, British Electoral Facts 1832–1987 (1989) and British Parliamentary ity .%) and gain Orkney & Shet- Election Results 1918-49 (1977) and 1950-70 (1971). land (C majority .%), Leominster (C majority .%), Aberdeenshire West & Kincardine (C majority .%) Huntingdonshire – % and Harwich a reversal of the years of decline and and Roxburgh & Selkirk (C majority – %). In the other three, the Con- disunity. For the Tories it would have .%). In  they would have won servative was the dominant partner been much more difficult to lay claim only two extra seats: Dorset North (C (St Ives – %, Angus North and to the Liberal inheritance. majority .%) and Caithness & Mearns – % and Angus South – On the other hand, the Liberal Na- Sutherland (C majority .%). %). A transfer of over % would tionals were not an impressive force. have been required in order to win They included few ‘big-hitters’ by any further seats. . Lord Simon was seventy-three Conclusion Even in a seat with a strong Liberal and increasingly detached from the Table  summarises the likely range of tradition and a good candidate, a trans- party. Only Ernest Brown, their leader, electoral impacts of reunion. It is un- fer of % of the votes would have been was of senior ministerial rank. The ca- likely that the direct electoral dividend a considerable achievement. For exam- reers of the few other well-known fig- for the Liberals of merger would have ple, Edgar Granville, elected as a Liberal ures such as Leslie Burgin and Leslie been any greater than this. Only if re- National for the Eye Division of Suf- Hore-Belisha, were clearly past their union had had a mould-breaking im- folk in  and  stood as a Liberal, peak or had a new focus, as in the case pact would they have been able to es- with CnÓ{ervative and Labour oppo- of Clement Davies who had already cape the electoral constraints in which nents, in . Granville retained % joined the Liberals. The party was they found themselves by –. of his  vote and was re-elected. ageing: almost half of its MPs in  There were simply not enough Liberal This probably represents the best-case were in their sixties or seventies. The near-misses to deliver major gains. At scenario: Granville was a popular and Liberal Nationals were also tainted by best the merged party might have re- hard-working constituency MP with a their long association with an un- turned about the same number of in- significant personal vote. In more aver- popular Tory party and the appease- dependent Liberals as in . An im- age constituencies, the level of transfer ment policies of the s. Their ad- probably large swing would have been might well have been much less. What herence to the Liberal Party might needed to start regaining the ground little evidence there is does not suggest even have weakened its appeal to the lost by the split. For the Liberal Na- much inclination by Liberal and Liberal radical mood of . By  the tionals the prospects were decidedly National voters to join hands. Liberal Nationals had even less to offer unfavourable. Without their Con- in terms of front-rank politicians. servative lifeline most faced almost Even if one assumes a substantial, certain defeat. The electoral arithmetic National impact positive and uniform national swing was thus heavily loaded against the re- A reunited Liberal Party would also to the Liberals of, say, .% the gains union project. have expected to make a stronger na- this would have produced would have However, the political impact of re- tional impact and thus gain further seats outside the Liberal National strong- holds. What general ‘boost’ to a united Table 2: Potential impacts of reunion Liberal Party might adherence of the Liberal Nationals given? Actual Lib seats won Potential gains from reunion It seems safe to assume that reunion 1945 1950 1945 1950 would have given some boost to the Limited impact credibility of the Liberals at both gen- (<25% local transfer of Lib Nat votes, 1215 943 eral elections. The size of the Parlia- 1% national swing to Libs) mentary party would have trebled in the run-up to the  election, and Significant impact (50% local transfer of Lib Nat votes, 10–12 6–9 doubled before the  election. 2.5% national swing to Libs) Reunification would also have marked

18 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 union - or indeed any factor increas- ing the Liberal vote slightly - would Table 3: Potential impact in 1950  have been considerable in , and Lib vote Swing Con to Lab Con seats lost Labour Commons majority potentially huge in . It would have allowed Sir Archibald Sinclair to From swing Adding effect hold the seat in Caithness & Suther- of 20% Lib Nat shift to Lib land that he lost very narrowly in  shift to Lib and , and Jo Grimond would have +1.0% 0.10% 6 to Lab,1 to Lib16 17 25 entered the Commons in  instead +2.5% 0.25% 5 to Lab17 27 35 of . Frank Byers would have held his seat in . This would have strengthened the Liberal parliamen- ship and the Bevanite Left would any- technically it would have fallen on a 44% trans- tary party significantly and opened the way have engulfed the Labour govern- fer. In fact the sitting MP was a Tory standing un- der a ‘Conservative and Liberal’ label in a seat possibility of more effective leadership ment and prevented it from surviving with a weak Liberal tradition. under Sinclair and Grimond in the pe- a full term. But even another year or 4 He had been MP since 1929. As Labour candi- riod - than Clement Davies two in office would have brought it date for Eye in 1955 and 1959, he secured much  of the previous Liberal vote. was able to provide. the benefit of the economic upturn 5For example in the double-member constitu- The  election was so evenly and the possibility of prolonging La- ency of Southampton in 1945 single Con- balanced that a few more Liberal votes bour rule. servative, Liberal National and Liberal candi- could have altered the result and po- For the Liberals this scenario would dates stood for the two seats. Only 7% of Lib- eral National voters shared their votes with tentially the course of politics in the have given them vital time to recover the Liberal and under 2% voted only for the s. Labour won the election with a from the  election with a consider- Liberal National, whereas 88% also voted for majority of only five seats and called a ably strengthened leadership and parlia- the Conservative. Amongst Liberal voters,  44% voted only for the Liberal, 19% cast Lib- new election in . The Conserva- mentary party including Sinclair, Byers eral/Liberal National votes, 20% joint votes tives won (despite winning fewer and Megan Lloyd George (who lost her with the Conservative and 17% with Labour. votes), beginning a sequence of gov- seat in ). It is unlikely that they This suggests that the great bulk of the Lib-  eral National vote was Conservative-inclined, ernments that lasted until , ben- would have suffered the near-collapse and that many Liberal voters were disinclined efiting from the world economic of – and they would have had to vote for a Liberal National who in this case boom which took off in the early less lost ground to recover when their had strong Liberal credentials. s. The Liberal band of nine MPs fortunes improved. They were tantalis- 6 Burgin retired in 1945, and Hore-Belisha, who  had left the Liberal Nationals in 1942 to sit as an was caught in the intense Labour– ingly close to this prospect. Independent, was defeated. To ry struggle in the - parlia- The Liberal Nationals chose the 7 In the long years of Tory government that fol- ment that cruelly exposed its political slow death of maintaining their alliance lowed, among the Liberal Nationals only J.S. Maclay made the cabinet as Secretary of State divisions and weak leadership. The with the Tories instead of the suicide for Scotland in 1957-62. Sir David Renton and Liberals were unable to contest the most of them would have faced by Niall Macpherson became Ministers of State. election of  effectively so soon af- joining the Liberals. But in doing so 8 Denbigh is excluded from these figures. 9A swing of 5% would have produced six more ter the great effort they had made in they may have played an important part gains in 1945 (Bodmin, Camborne, Barnstaple, , and lost three more seats as their in securing their principal goal: to en- Mid-Bedfordshire, Gainsborough and Berwick- share of the vote slumped to .%. The sure that Britain in the s was not on-Tweed), and one in 1950 (North Cornwall). party was brought to the brink of ex- governed by the Labour Party. This excludes Middlesbrough West in 1945 and Western Isles in 1950, where Liberals had tinction and only began to recover in straight fights with Labour and so presumably earnest in the late s after Jo Dr Jaime Reynolds studied politics at LSE, already had the full anti-Labour vote. Grimond became leader. and has a long-standing interest in Liberal 10 Sinclair suffered a serious stroke in 1951. Jo Grimond was then aged thirty-eight and might A shift of Liberal National votes to Democrat and electoral history. He works for have been judged too young to assume the the Liberals in  would have ena- the Environment Directorate-General of the leadership. If Grimond had been elected in bled Labour to win a few Conserva- European Commission. 1945, however, he would already have had the  same length of parliamentary experience as he tive seats. In addition, an increase in had when he was actually elected leader in the Liberal vote nationally would have 1 Strictly speaking the label ‘Liberal National’ was 1956. Megan Lloyd George might have been a helped Labour because Liberal votes used only until 1948, after which the label ‘Na- contender for the leadership as well as Clement tional Liberal’ was adopted. For the sake of clar- Davies. were drawn more heavily from the To- ity, and for consistency with other articles, ‘Lib-  11 A shift of 20% of Liberal National votes to Liberal ries than Labour. Table illustrates the eral National’ is used throughout. in 1950 would have given Labour four more probable effect. This would have 2A few Liberal Nationals were opposed by Con- seats, enough to increase its Commons majority servative candidates in 1931, but none by Liber- given Labour a working majority in from five to thirteen. The vulnerable seats were als. After 1931 Liberal Nationals sometimes Luton, Bradford North, Renfrew West and Nor- the Commons at least equal to that faced Liberal opponents, but never Conserva- folk Central. enjoyed by the Conservatives between tives, with the one exception of a by-election in 12 D.E. Butler, The British General Election of 1951 1946 in the wholly untypical constituency of -. It is possible that the devel- (1952), pp. 270-71, concludes that generally Combined Scottish Universities. ex-Liberal voters from 1950 split in favour of the oping divisions between the leader- 3 Sheffield Hallam has been excluded although Conservatives in at least the proportion 60:40 in

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 19 1951. Assuming that an increased Liberal vote 13 The Liberals would have secured 2.5% more 15 Includes Gwilym Lloyd George. in 1950 would have drawn votes from the two votes if they had simply maintained their opin- 16 Spelthorne (C majority 0.0%), Stroud & other parties in the same proportion, it would ion poll rating (12%) at the start of the 1950 elec- Thornbury (0.1%), Pudsey (0.1%), York (0.1%), have produced the swings from Conservative to tion campaign through to polling day. Shipley (0.1%), Dorset North (0.2%) and Labour illustrated in the table. In addition if a re- 14 1950 figures refer to candidates categorised by Woolwich West (0.2%). vived Liberal Party had fought more seats in F. W.S. Craig as National Liberal and Conserva- 17 Bexley (0.3%), Chislehurst (0.3%), Bromsgrove 1950, their intervention might have tipped the tive. These ran under a variety of labels: Na- (0.3%), Peterborough (0.4%) and Glasgow balance in favour of Labour in three more seats tional Liberal, National Liberal and Conserva- Scotstoun (0.5%). where the Conservatives won narrowly in tive, Conservative and National Liberal, Liberal straight fights: Glasgow Craigton (if the Liberal and Conservative, and Conservative and Lib- vote had been above 3%), Eastleigh (above 7%) eral. See Times Guide to the House of Com- and Burton (above 9%). mons, 1945, 1950.

Research in Progress If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see page 2) for inclusion here.

The party agent and English electoral culture, c.1880 – c.1906. The Crouch End or Hornsey Liberal Association or Young Liberals in the development of political agency as a profession, the role of the 1920s and 1930s; especially any details of James Gleeson or Patrick election agent in managing election campaigns during this period, Moir, who are believed to have been Chairmen. Tony Marriott, Flat and the changing nature of elections, as increased use was made of A, 13 Coleridge Road, Crouch End, London N8 8EH. the press and the platform. Kathryn Rix, Christ's College, Liberal foreign policy in the 1930s. Focussing particularly on Liberal Cambridge, CB2 2BU; [email protected]. anti-appeasers. Michael Kelly, 12 Collinbridge Road, Whitewell, Liberal policy towards Austria-Hungary, 1905–16. Andrew Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim BT36 7SN Gardner, 22 Birdbrook House, Popham Road, Islington, London N1 The Liberal Party and the wartime coalition 1940–45. Sources, 8TA; [email protected]. particularly on Sinclair as Air Minister, and on Harcourt Johnstone, The Hon H. G. Beaumont (MP for Eastbourne 1906–10). Any Dingle Foot, Lord Sherwood and Sir Geoffrey Maunder (Sinclair's information welcome, particularly on his political views (he stood as PPS) particularly welcome. Ian Hunter, 9 Defoe Avenue, Kew, a Radical). Tim Beaumont, 40 Elms Road, London SW4 9EX. Richmond TW9 4DL; [email protected].

Edmund Lamb (Liberal MP for Leominster 1906–10). Any Clement Davies – research for the first full biography. Of particular information on his election and period as MP; wanted for biography interest are the activities of government departments where of his daughter, Winfred Lamb. Dr David Gill, Clement Davies worked in the First World War, including Enemy [email protected]. Activities in Neutral Countries, Economic Warfare and Trading with the Enemy; also the period 1939–42, after Davies left the Liberal Joseph King (Liberal MP for North Somerset during the Great War). Nationals but before he rejoined the independent Liberals, and his Any information welcome, particularly on his links with the Union relationships with MacDonald, Boothby, Attlee and Churchill. Alun of Democratic Control and other opponents of the war (including Wyburn-Powell; [email protected]. his friend George Raffalovich). Colin Houlding; [email protected] The Unservile State Group, 1953–1970s. Dr Peter Barberis, 24 Lime Avenue, Flixton, Manchester M41 5DE. The political life and times of Josiah Wedgwood MP. Study of the political life of this radical MP, hoping to shed light on the question The Young Liberal Movement 1959–1985; including in particular of why the Labour Party replaced the Liberals as the primary relations with the leadership, and between NLYL and ULS. Carrie popular representatives of radicalism in the 1920s. Park, 89 Coombe Lane, Bristol BS9 2AR; Paul Mulvey, 112 Richmond Avenue, London N1 0LS; [email protected]. [email protected]. The revival of the Liberal Party in the 1960s and ‘70s; including the Recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative Party, 1906–1935. relationships between local and parliamentary electoral Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and develop performance. Access to party records (constituency- and ward- an understanding of changes in electoral alignment. Sources level) relating to local activity in London and Birmingham, and include personal papers and newspapers; suggestions about how interviews with key activists of particular interest. Paul Lambe, to get hold of the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors University of Plymouth; [email protected]. welcome. Cllr Nick Cott, 1a Henry Street, Gosforth, Newcastle- The political and electoral strategy of the Liberal Party 1970–79. upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; [email protected]. Individual constituency papers, and contact with members of the Liberals and the local government of London 1919–39. Chris Fox, Party’s policy committees and/or the Party Council, particularly 173 Worplesdon Road, Guildford GU2 6XD; welcome. Ruth Fox, 7 Mulberry Court, Bishop’s Stortford, Herts [email protected]. CM23 3JW.

20 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 duction explaining its context and im- pact. Collected and edited by Duncan Brack and Tony Little, editorial effort GreatGreat LiberalLiberal was also contributed by Dr David Dutton, Dr Richard S. Grayson, Ian Hunter, Robert Ingham, Dr J. Graham Jones, Michael McManus, Dr Mark SpeechesSpeeches Pack, Michael Steed and Peter Truesdale. Most of the speeches are reproduced in Tony Little and Duncan Brack introduce the Liberal full; some of the longest nineteenth cen- tury speeches have been edited to help Democrat History Group’s latest publication accessibility for the general reader but, even here, very full extracts have been given to convey the style and substance emember the rights of the sav included alongside such well-known of the orators. The book opens with ‘Rage.’ ‘Methods of barbarism.’ ‘To- orations as Jo Grimond’s ‘Sound of general introductions, by Tony Little and wards the sound of gunfire.’ ‘Go back to gunfire’ and David Steel’s ‘Go back to Duncan Brack, on the evolution of Lib- your constituencies and prepare for your constituencies’. eral thinking and policy, as illustrated by government.’ Most of the speeches are reproduced the speeches, and by Max Atkinson (au- The soundbites have almost become in full, and each is given a concise intro- thor of Our Masters’ Voices), on the art of clichés, but what was the context in which these phrases were first uttered? Newspapers no longer contain full re- ports of major speeches, focusing rather on their interpretations of what the speaker really meant. This style of re- porting and the advent of television have changed the nature of public – and in particular, political – speaking. There is now an ideal opportunity to examine these changes. In Great Liberal Speeches, the Liberal Democrat History Group have brought together forty- seven of the greatest Liberal speeches by the greatest Liberal orators over the past two hundred years. Politico’s are publishing the book in time for the Liberal Democrat conference in Bournemouth in late September. Speeches are included from all party leaders from Palmerston to Charles Kennedy; thinkers and philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill and John Maynard Keynes; leading Whigs, in- cluding Charles James Fox, T. B. Macaulay and Lord John Russell, to- gether with radicals like Orator Hunt, J. A. Roebuck and John Bright; cam- paigners such as Richard Cobden, Violet Bonham Carter and Simon Hughes; and recruits to Liberalism from other parties, including Winston Churchill and Roy Jenkins. Major speeches from Liberal history – Gladstone’s Midlothian campaign, Lloyd George on the People’s Budget, Paddy Ashdown on realignment – are

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 21 political rhetoric. Earl Russell provides a Most importantly, the book demon- The collection also illustrates the way foreword highlighting the continued strates the continuity of Liberal and in which the Liberal Party tried to grap- relevance of the speeches featured. Liberal Democrat thought over  ple with its decline after  – with The collection works at several lev- years. The classical nineteenth-century Asquith, for example, prefiguring the els. For those who were present at the liberal position of maximising the free- Third Way in his reference to a ‘tertium more recent orations it may merely act dom of the individual to act and take quid’ in his  resignation speech. Un- as a souvenir. If you were one of those personal responsibility for their actions expectedly the twentieth century ended who cheered Simon Hughes’ demoli- remains surprisingly relevant in today’s with renewed optimism both for Liber- tion of Alliance defence policy (inci- debates on the role of the state and the alism and the Liberal Democrats, and the dentally, and perhaps surprisingly, the uses of markets. The Liberal foreign final group of speeches shows how the shortest speech in the book); who policy created in the same Victorian party has grappled with its new oppor- heard Roy Jenkins’ thoughtful heyday contained the main ethical tunities. Particularly interesting is the Dimbleby Lecture, the inspiration for principles which informed Paddy way in which, by abandoning ‘equidis- the SDP, or were overcome with emo- Ashdown’s approach to Hong Kong tance’, Paddy Ashdown was able to shift tion at Paddy Ashdown’s farewell ad- and the Balkans, as Ashdown makes the focus away from the difficulties of re- dress to party conference, you may wish clear by his quotation from Gladstone lations with other parties, which fea- for a permanent record of the occasion. in his final speech in the Commons. tured so strongly for Jo Grimond and But there is a deeper purpose. Some Here also is the root of support for self- David Steel, to concentrate on promot- of these speeches have never been government, which informs the Liberal ing Liberal Democrat policy. But even published in book form and others Democrats’ current stance on the de- here history intrudes: Ashdown’s penny have been out of print for very many centralisation of power within the Brit- on income tax to pay for education ech- years. To bring them together will pro- ish state, together with a strong interna- oes Joe Chamberlain’s call – as part of his vide not only a source of reference but tionalist strand which sees the Liberal Radical Programme of  –for an ad- also the materials by which students Democrats as the strongest supporters ditional three farthings on tax to make can compare changes in style of public of the European Union. schools free for poorer families. address over two hundred years. Ex- At the dawn of the twentieth cen- Great Liberal Speeches will be a amples are given of platform oratory tury, the social and economic reform of unique source of reference for anyone to the mass public meeting at a time New Liberalism offered the prospect of interested in the contribution of Liber- when politicians were accorded the the continued pre-eminence of Liber- als to British politics, or in the impor- star status now only given to enter- alism in a mass democracy. While the tance and impact of political speech- tainers, of speeches made to partisan First World War destroyed these hopes, making. For details of availability, see party conferences and of the more in- New Liberal thinking informed the the leaflet enclosed with this Journal. It timate styles favoured by the House of policies of all three British parties will be launched at two meetings, the Commons. It is interesting to note that throughout the century – not least first at party conference on  Septem- the oratorical techniques identified by through the work of the Liberals ber (see back page) and the second in Max Atkinson were well applied by Keynes and Beveridge, also represented Politico’s Bookstore in London in late popular Victorian speakers. in Great Liberal Speeches. October or early November. LiberalsLiberals cheercheer MrMr ChurchillChurchill One speech we did not have room for in Great Liberal Speeches: Winston Churchill at the National Liberal Club, 22 July 1943

r Churchill had one of the of the National Liberal Club today. rels following the last war, but it was re- Mgreatest ovations of his life when The portrait, which shows him as a instated to its place on the wall some he attended the unveiling of his re- young man, was consigned to the cel- years ago. stored portrait in the Smoking Room lars of the club during the Liberal quar- When a bomb hit the club early in

22 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001  the bottom portion of the pic- of labour exchanges, trade board and all Therefore it seems to me that across ture was damaged. It has now been that great field of social legislation in these vicissitudes and storms which we skilfully restored, and it was formally which Liberalism found a most fertile have lived through, through which we unveiled in the presence of Mr and and practical work to do and which has have survived, which a large part of this Mrs. Churchill at a ceremony presided gone steadily forward, altering the entire building has successfully withstood, af- over by Lord Crewe. life of the people of this country, and will ter all these shocks and violences and Members of the Club, some of continue. through them all, there has been a whom had been waiting an hour and a It is not finished yet and has still steady theme of Liberalism which has half in the Smoke Room in order to be greater and finer scope to take. broadened out among other parties and present at the ceremony, stood cheering There was the very remarkable fact which has given to those who have fol- Mr Churchill for several minutes. that Liberal forces in this country, when lowed it all their lives a feeling of con- The Prime Minister said that in for the moment the principles of lib- tinuous fruitful exercise and effort. some ways the occasion seemed to him erty seemed to be well established, And it seems to me that after this like old times. turned to this warmer, more practical war is over there will be other tasks to sphere of social reform, and they un- do. There will be great tasks of rebuild- ‘I am very greatly honoured to have doubtedly gave to the whole legislation ing, there will be great tasks of securing been invited here today and to sit again and life of our land an entirely new and the advance of our ideas and not letting beside my old colleague in several ad- beneficent character. it be swept back by mere tides of lassi- ministrations, Lord Crewe, whose broad, Time passed, and terrible wars swept tude, exhaustion or reaction. consistent outlook has been a help to across the world, wars utterly abhorrent A steady advance of rising ideas, cul- many in the troublous years through to all (the conceptions of Victorian days), tivated and regimented and brought which we have passed and to receive at wars not to be conceived in their horror, forward, must be maintained, and the hands of the National Liberal Club, in their brutality, in their grim ruthless- among them an exact definition of the with apparently the full authority of all ness, inevitable ruthlessness, by the relations of the individual in regard to its members, this very great compliment statesmen of the days of the last century. the state will play a part in which Lib- of seeing unveiled a portrait which has But these wars, as they have moved in eral conceptions must exercise a most survived alike the vicissitudes of politics their course, have thrown the Liberal important sway. and the violence of the enemy. Party back upon its earliest inspiration, In the rebuilding of this country none My mind goes back to the days of namely, human liberty and duty, the in- has a right to stand aside, except on my earlier life and when I first found escapable duty of free men to defend the grounds of intellectual or moral scruple, effective political contact with the Lib- soil on which they live and to govern and content himself with a purely criti- eral Party. In those days they gained, af- themselves in accordance with their de- cal attitude, taking the form of throwing ter a lapse of, many years, political sires, conceptions and traditions. brickbats at the toiling workers, and I power and at that period – I am talking Thus the flame of liberty has look forward in the future to not only of  – it seemed that many of the burned, and thus the Liberal Party has the Liberal theme but Liberal activities causes which had brought Liberalism entered most fully into this struggle playing a great part in the reconstruction into being as a dominant force had al- with that flame burning, with that and consolidation of our country in the ready been achieved. torch which went on ahead, that torch gains which it will have made through The shackles had been struck off the of freedom which we shall never allow this hard and long trial. slaves, career was open to talent, the to be extinguished. I must tell you that I feel a great barriers of class and privilege were be- Not only is the sword drawn in a emotion at your kindness to me, and I ing struck down with great rapidity or generous cause, commanding the efforts feel greatly honoured that my portrait had indeed already been removed. The of all, not only is the liberation of all should be hung on these walls along rights of small nations and the princi- these subjugated and enslaved countries with men I have known and worked ples of tradition which animate nation- a cause for which every man in whose with in formative years of British po- alities were all recognising an ever breast Liberal instincts are implanted litical life. greater measure of respect. burns, not only does that move forward Your welcome to me and the great In many ways when the Liberal Gov- but we see that in days to come, and kindness with which you have treated ernment of – came into power it even at the present time, much more ex- me and my wife will ever be gratefully surveyed a scene in which many of the act definitions will have to be established cherished in my memory.’ great tasks with which Mr Gladstone about the rights of the individual and had been associated had already been about the relations of the individual to When Mr Churchill finished his speech achieved, and then it was that that Gov- the great framework of the state which, members of the Club sang ‘For he’s a ernment came forward and under the as I hold, must have as its highest pur- jolly good fellow’. active inspiration and energy of Mr pose the safeguarding of those individual A luncheon in honour of Mr and Lloyd George brought forward that long rights and the reconciling of the free- Mrs. Churchill, presided over by Lord succession of social laws, of insurance of dom of each with the broad general in- all kinds, of old age pensions, invalidity, terests of the community. concluded on page 27

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 23 Biography Jaime Reynolds recounts the career of one of the Liberal Party’s most colourful MPs ‘Jimmy’‘Jimmy’ The career of James de Rothschild, MP

ames Armand Edmond de Rothschild, known Alphonse and Gustave, Edmond inherited control of Juniversally as ‘Jimmy’, was by any reckoning the the Paris house. James’s mother was another most exotic figure to sit on the Liberal benches in Rothschild, Adelaide of Frankfurt. James’s already the years of the party’s decline. Fabulously rich, as ample inheritance was increased still further in  much French as British, a leading figure in the Zion- by a legacy from his eccentric unmarried Aunt Alice ist movement, a devotee of horseracing and a major of Vienna, of whom he was the principal heir. This art collector, his appearance was striking. In  his included the stupendous, seventy-room Waddesdon left eye had been knocked out by a stray golf ball Manor in Buckinghamshire. struck by the Duc de Gramont. He habitually wore He followed a classic French education at the a monocle in his weak right eye and dressed in top Lycée Louis le Grand by reading English at Trinity hat, frock coat and stiff collar. College, Cambridge where he distinguished himself Rothschild is remembered today chiefly for the by winning the Harkness Prize for an essay on key role he played with his father, Baron Edmond de ‘Shakespeare and His Day’. After  he worked at Rothschild (–) in promoting the Jewish the Rothschild Bank in Paris but found this unsatis- settlement of Israel. There is a biography of father fying. Giving no notice and taking great pains to and son by the well-known historian, Simon evade any attempt by his family to dissuade him, he Schama, celebrating their contribution to the Zion- left for Australia without money or cheque-book. ist movement. Rothschild also appears in the various He lived there incognito for eighteen months, studies of the family as one of its more colourful working on a ranch and experiencing what it was characters. There are also a number of books on his like not to be a Rothschild. In the end he was traced, art collections. About his political career in the Lib- and with some reluctance, returned to France. In eral Party next to nothing has been published.  he married an Anglo-Sephardi, Dorothy Pinto, Rothschild was one of the very small band of sur- seventeen years his junior. He enlisted in the French vivors who managed to hold on to their seats in the Army in  and served on the Western Front. Fol- years of Liberal collapse. He sat as MP for the Isle of lowing an accident early in  he had a prolonged Ely from –, winning three elections before fi- convalescence. He arranged his secondment to nally going under in the  Labour landslide. While Allenby’s Army in Palestine in , serving as a ma- his Zionist activity took front stage and his public jor in the th Fusiliers. He joined the British Mili- profile in the party was low key, Rothschild was nev- tary Mission and helped to organise the Jewish Le- ertheless very much part of the small group of gion. In  he was naturalised as British. wealthy and aristocratic grandees who ran the party at Rothschild’s father, Baron Edmond, had dedi- this time. He also had the distinction of being the last cated himself and his fortune to the cause of the Liberal to be appointed to government office. On  Jewish homeland in Palestine from  and became March  he was appointed as Parliamentary Secre- its leading sponsor, working closely with Chaim tary to the Ministry of Supply in Churchill’s wartime Weizmann. In , convinced, incorrectly as it coalition. His ministerial career was short-lived. On turned out, that he was dying, Baron Edmond began  May  the Liberals and Labour withdrew from to hand over this role to James. In June  James the coalition and Rothschild resigned. became president of a management committee set Rothschild was born on  December . His up to promote Weizmann’s pet project of a Jewish father Edmond was the youngest son of Baron James University. During the First World War he was heav- Rothschild of Paris (–), the most brilliant ily involved in the Zionist work in Britain leading of the great banking dynasty. With his elder brothers, up to the Balfour Declaration of November ,

24 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 working in harness with Weizmann and Herbert Samuel. It was James who led the celebrations of the Declaration held at the Hippodrome in Manchester, cra- dle of British Zionism. He was Presi- dent of the Palestine Jewish Colonisa- tion Association (PICA) from its foun- dation in  until it was dissolved on his death. Rothschild’s Liberal activity began late, towards the end of the s when he was fifty years old. He had family connections to the Liberal Party elite. His second cousin, Hannah (–) had been the wife of the Liberal Prime Minister, Lord Rosebery. Margaret, their daughter, was the wife of the Earl of Crewe, Liberal Leader in the House of Lords from – and again from –. No doubt, as a Jew and a Zi- onist, Rothschild found the Liberals a more congenial home than the Con- at that general election. The Isle of Ely heavily agricultural seats in the s. servative Party. Although several and its pre- predecessor, the There was also a substantial noncon- Rothschilds had sat as Conservative Wisbech division of Cambridgeshire, formist vote, including a concentration MPs and there were a number of was a seat the Liberals could normally of Primitive Methodists amongst the staunch Tory Zionists – notably Balfour expect to win, albeit by smallish majori- smallholders in the Wisbech area. Pre- and Leo Amery – there were also vocal ties. In the s it remained a Liberal– sumably much of this vote went to anti-Semites in the Conservative Party. Conservative marginal with Labour Rothschild despite his being a Jew and The Liberal Party had a long record of making only limited inroads with about his associations with horse-racing. defending the rights of the Jewish com- % of the vote. The seat went Tory in By  rising support for Labour munity and, under the leadership of the Liberal debacle of , but it was no had eclipsed the Liberal tradition even Lloyd George, Herbert Samuel and surprise when Rothschild regained it in the Isle of Ely. The Labour candidate Archibald Sinclair, was decidedly pro- with a majority of , (.%) in a won nearly % of the vote in the gen- Zionist. It seems highly likely that three-cornered fight in , a much eral election and Rothschild trailed in Herbert Samuel, who resumed activity better year for the party. The fact that he third with just %. The Conservatives in the party in  and who had held it at the following two general elec- won, though with considerably less worked with Rothschild in the Zionist tions owed much to the absence of a than their  vote. Thereafter the cause for many years, played a part in To ry candidate in  and of a Labour Liberals largely disappeared from the persuading him to stand for Parliament. candidate in . In , as the only scene until Clement Freud’s by-elec- The association of the Liberal Party ‘National’ candidate, Rothschild tion victory in . with Zionism and the Jewish Commu- romped home with a majority of , In the – parliament Roths- nity, especially marked in the s, is (%) over an independent. In  he child was in the vanguard of critics of an interesting and unexplored area. scraped in by only  votes (.%) in a Lloyd George’s strategy of negotiating Jews were prominent in the leadership straight fight with a Tory. However it is an agreed programme with the minor- of the party. In addition to Samuel some tribute to Jimmy’s wide appeal that ity Labour Government in return for (leader –) and Rothschild, Lord a Rothschild could be elected thanks to continued Liberal support. This ranged Reading (Rufus Isaacs) led the party in the votes of Labour supporters. him alongside the future Liberal Na- the Lords (–). The Liberals also The key to the Liberal predominance tionals. In autumn  he dined retained significant Jewish support in in the constituency was its strongly agri- weekly with two other dissidents, Leslie the East End of London into the s, cultural character. Before  the rural Hore-Belisha and Geoffrey Shake- helping them to win seats in areas had provided the bulk of the Lib- speare, at Quaglino’s restaurant to ar- Whitechapel and Bethnal Green. Harry eral vote in Wisbech, while the towns of range concerted tactics. He spoke Nathan and Barnett Janner, both Jews, Wisbech and Ely were considered to be against Lloyd George at the marathon sat as Liberal MPs in the early s, strongly Conservative. In  % of meeting of the Liberal Parliamentary later defecting to the Labour Party. male workers in the Isle of Ely were Party on  March  when thirty- Rothschild was MP for the Isle of Ely occupied in agriculture, the fourth high- three MPs supported Lloyd George and from  to , when it provided est proportion in the country. The Liber- seventeen voted for withdrawing sup- one of the handful of Conservative gains als were particularly successful in such port from Labour. In May  the

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 25 down, though not before he told me tell you how much I regret the political that I had lived so long among Jews that axe which has removed me from your I was taking a Jewish point of view, and side. It has been for me a wonderful privilege to serve under you, even for could not see things in proportion. such a short time; it was a mighty hon- Surely the oddest remark from him to our and one of the greatest joys of my me … He then half-apologised and life to be a member of your Govern- (though Jimmie is too great a gentleman ment on VE day. May I thank you for ever to be rude) asked what exactly had this in all sincerity. to be done vis-à-vis the Government. Let me add, my dear Winston, that you Then he asked to speak to Lord Moyne will always find me, not only your [Colonial Secretary –], who is grateful admirer, but ever your devoted Waddesdon Manor and affectionate friend. evidently a great friend of his …’  rebel group, now joined by Ernest Rothschild’s finest moment was the Jimmy. Brown, took their case to the National speech he made in December  on His resignation and defeat at the gen- Liberal Federation conference held at the destruction of the Jews in Poland eral election a few weeks later seem to Buxton. Hore-Belisha led the attack. by Nazism. ‘Chips’ Channon recorded have ended his active Liberal career. He Rothschild spoke second, ‘but the audi- the scene: died on  May . ence of two thousand delegates were An extraordinary assembly today in the James de Rothschild was the most getting impatient, and when he ex- august Mother of Parliaments. It was extraordinary of the wealthy aristocrats ceeded his time, they became more res- sublime. Anthony (Eden) read out a who played a key part in keeping the tive still’. The rebels were out-manoeu- statement regarding the extermination Liberal Party going in the s. Schama of the Jews in east Europe, whereupon  describes him as ‘… a complex and fasci- vred and overwhelmingly defeated. Jimmy de Rothschild rose, and with However when the party split later in immense dignity, and his voice vibrat- nating figure, superficially austere, even the year Rothschild declined to join Si- ing with emotion, spoke for five min- forbidding in manner, with something mon’s Liberal National camp. The rea- utes in moving tones on the plight of of the unbending patrician rectitude of sons for his decision to stick with the these peoples. There were tears in his his father … an erect, very proud aristo- Samuelite Liberals are unknown but his eyes, and I feared that he might break cratic persona with a fine sense of hu- down; the House caught his spirit and lack of ambition for ministerial office was deeply moved. Somebody sug- mour … his moods could change with- and personal loyalty to Samuel no gested that we stand in silence to pay out warning from engaging geniality to doubt played a part. our respects to those suffering peoples, a much more dour and unapproachable Rothschild’s parliamentary career and the House as a whole rose, and demeanour’. Although his major po- was conscientious if unspectacular. Al- stood for a few frozen seconds. It was a litical achievements lay elsewhere, in the fine moment, and my back tingled. though a mediocre speaker, he spoke foundation of the state of Israel, he also on a number of issues, especially colo- Rothschild had been in the forefront of made a distinguished contribution to nial affairs and anything affecting the efforts to help Jews persecuted by the the survival of independent Liberalism. Nazis. From  he was a member of farming interests of his constituents –  even on one occasion, government the Council for German Jewry. Dr Jaime Reynolds studied politics at LSE, support for the bacon industry. He also During the leadership of Samuel un- and has a long-standing interest in Liberal  worked hard in  – but without til , and of Sir Archibald Sinclair Democrat and electoral history. He works for   much success – to obtain imperial pref- from – , Rothschild was one of the Environment Directorate-General of the erence tariff rights for Palestine prod- the mainstays of the party and a mem- European Commission. ucts. He was also centrally involved in ber of its inner circle. His substantial fi- nancial contributions helped to keep 1 Rothschild’s health was frail although he lived to the debates on Palestine and Jewish  matters in the later s and during the cash-strapped party afloat. Like the age of 79. He had many abdominal opera- most other Liberal ministers appointed tions. He was also accident-prone. Apart from the war. In her diaries, Blanche the golfing accident, he was regularly thrown (“Baffy”) Dugdale, Balfour’s niece and to the Churchill Coalition, his selection from his horse, was trapped under a lorry on the a fervent Zionist, described the pru- seems to have owed a lot to his moving Western Front in 1915 and had a serious car ac- in the same upper-class social and po- cident in 1941. dence and ease with which he moved 2 Excluding Gwilym Lloyd George, en route to behind the scenes; for example: litical circles as the Prime Minister, a the Conservatives, who remained a minister in :  May – ‘I went to see Jimmie fact which rankled with those party Churchill’s caretaker government.  3This legacy seems to have caused some ill-feel- de Rothschild to ask him to speak (in stalwarts who were passed over. Al- though he loyally accepted the Liberal ing in the Rothschild family, as James’s Aunt debate on setting up Jewish home guard Alice had indicated that Waddesdon would go in Palestine). He looked more than ever decision to withdraw from the Coali- to the British side of the family, but then  like a guttering candle in the shadows of tion in May , his personal friend- changed her will in James’s favour shortly after a ship and admiration for Churchill is visit he paid to her. It was said that he had has- his library … At first Jimmie said that on tened to tell her as soon as he become a British no account would he speak, no Jew clear from his letter of resignation: citizen; E. de Rothschild A Gilt-Edged Life - should speak on such a subject. But I My dear Prime Minister, Memoirs (1998), p. 22. 4 Rothschild maintained his academic interests in persevered and gradually he calmed I hope you will not mind my writing to later life, publishing an important work on Ro-

26 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 mance languages: Mary Williams and James A. Newmarket it was said that wealth and an inter- …though a bad speaker himself, is a good de Rothschild (editors) A Miscellany of Studies est in racing were requirements for a successful judge of others’. in Romance Languages and Literatures pre- Liberal candidate. See Pelling, op cit, p. 96, and 20 Ibid pp. 183–84. sented to Leon E. Kastner Professor of French Journal of Liberal Democrat History 26 (Spring 21 R Rhodes James (ed.), Chips – the Diaries of Sir Language and Literature in the University of 2000), p. 21. Henry Channon (1967), p. 247, entry for 17/ Manchester (Cambridge, Heffer (1932)). 14 Liberals took 20% of the votes in 1950 and 11% 12/42. The remarkable impact of the speech 5 S. Schama, Two Rothschilds and the Land of Is- in 1964, but did not contest the other general was confirmed by Lloyd George’s assistant, A. J. rael (1978), p. 188. elections of the period. Freud held the redrawn Sylvester, in his diary: ‘Disregarding all the rules 6 Ibid. pp. 209 and 252. seat until 1987. of procedure and, in a voice that was full of 7 Ibid. p. 267. 15 The others included Leslie Hore-Belisha, emotion, he made a speech thanking the For- 8 Although it has to be admitted that casual anti- Geoffrey Shakespeare and Ernest Brown. eign Secretary. During the whole of this time, Semitism was to be found in all the parties at this 16 Sir Geoffrey Shakespeare, Let Candles Be the House was as silent as the grave. The atmos- time; see R. Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Brought In (1949), pp. 133–34. Sir Henry Mor- phere was extraordinary. Although every word Right (1980), pp. 59-84. Griffiths points out that ris Jones, Doctor in the Whips’ Room (1955), p. uttered by de Rothschild was out of order, not there was a great deal of ‘parlour anti-Semitism’ 84, describing the March meeting, records that even the Speaker stopped him … Members of between the wars from which none of the par- ‘James Rothschild [was] amusing. He always sat the House then stood in silence. At lunch I ties was immune; ibid p. 65. in a chair within our circle and just in front of the asked LG if he had ever seen anything similar to 9 See H. M. Hyde, Strong for Service – the Life of Chairman. His silk hat well tilted over the back it. “Never in my experience,” he replied … Lord Nathan of Churt (1968); E. Janner, Barnett of his head, he read his contribution to the de- Speaking of de Rothschild’s speech, LG said it Janner - A Personal Portrait (1984), bate with deliberation and weight.’ Perhaps he was really an intonement, such as you get in a 10 There are various anecdotes about Rothschild’s sat where he did because of his poor eyesight. synagogue.’ A. J. Sylvester, Life with Lloyd popularity with Labour MPs, e.g. Aneurin 17 Shakespeare, op cit, p.135. George (ed Colin Cross), p. 308. Bevan; F. Morton, The Rothschilds. 18 However, his loyalty to Samuel took a hard blow 22 E. de Rothschild, op cit, p. 87. 11 H. Pelling, The Social Geography of British Elec- in 1937 when the former High Commissioner 23 Roy Douglas A History of the Liberal Party tions 1885-1910 (1967), p. 96. made a speech in the Lords accepting the need (1970). 12 M. Kinnear, The British Voter - An Atlas and for Jewish immigration controls (which he him- 24 According to Sir Percy Harris, it was due to his Survey Since 1885 (1968), pp. 119-20; C. Cook, self had imposed) and the restriction of land set- membership of the exclusive Tory–Liberal din- The Age of Realignment - Electoral Politics in tlement – a speech which has not done much to ing club; The Other Club, Forty Years In and Britain 1922-1929 (1975), p. 116. endear his memory to Zionist history; Schama, Out of Parliament (1947). 13 On the other hand Rothschild may have picked op cit, p. 377 n9. 25 Churchill Archive at Churchill College, Cambridge up some of the local ‘turf’ vote. In neighbouring 19 N. Smart, The Diaries and Letters of Robert CHAR 20/20741. I am grateful to Ian Hunter for Bernays 1932–1939 (1996), p. 12. Bernays, a drawing my attention to this document. fellow Liberal MP, wrote that ‘Rothschild 26 Ibid p. 197. Liberals cheer Mr Churchill continued from page 23 The final quest for Liberal reunion, 1943–46 Crewe, preceded the unveiling of the continued from page 16 portrait. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Lord Simon 7These papers were originally part of Sir women who did so much to keep the Liberal and Mr Ernest Brown were among Archibald Sinclair’s political papers found at his Party a viable entity during its electoral low old shooting lodge, Dalnawillan, in Caithness. points in the twenty years after 1935. She was those present. The papers have now been deposited with the originally selected to fight the winnable seat of In his speech at the unveiling Lord rest of the Thurso archive at Churchill College, Orkney & Shetland but stood aside to allow Jo Crewe recalled that in the Middle Ages, Cambridge. Grimond his chance to stand in 1945. 8 ‘Liberal Reunion – 1943’ memo to Sinclair from 19 Letter from Fothergill to Sinclair, 8 August, ‘When people believed in magic’, it the Dingle Foot papers (DEFT 1/3) Churchill 1946, Thurso Papers was the custom to fashion a wax image College, Cambridge. 20 Letter from Violet Bonham Carter to Sinclair, 11 of one’s enemy and to stick pins into it 9 ‘Liberal Reunion – 1943’ memo to Sinclair from August 1946, Thurso Papers. There is some evi- in the hope of inflicting some bodily the Dingle Foot papers (DEFT 1/3) Churchill dence in the surviving papers that Fothergill and College, Cambridge. Bonham Carter underestimated Glen-Coats’ ailment upon him. 10 ‘Liberal Reunion – 1943’ memo to Sinclair from skills and that, as she wrote to Sinclair on 8 Au- ‘It seems possible’, said Lord Crewe, the Dingle Foot papers (DEFT 1/3) Churchill gust, ‘I am not under any delusion as to the type ‘that some historically-minded mem- College, Cambridge. of person I am up against in the leaders of the 11 ‘Liberal Reunion – 1943’ memo to Sinclair from opposite camp’. bers of the Luftwaffe may have supposed the Dingle Foot papers (DEFT 1/3) Churchill 21 Letter from Fothergill to Glen-Coats, 23 July that if they could deface the Prime Min- College, Cambridge. 1946, Thurso Papers. ister’s portrait with a bomb he would 12 Sinclair to Sir Geoffrey Mander 6 December 22 Letter from Mabane to Fothergill, 23 October 1945, Thurso Papers 1946, Thurso Papers suffer physically, and would be seen an 13 Letter from Samuel to Montrose, 17 May 1946, 23 Letter from Fothergill to Mabane, 24 October emaciated and hollowed-cheeked figure Thurso Papers. 1946, Thurso Papers addressing a distracted House of Com- 14 Letter from Sinclair to Samuel, 20 May 1946, 24 This was a battle that the leadership were hav- mons in tones of desperation’. Thurso Papers. ing to fight on two fronts: as well as the talks 15 Letter from Samuel to Sinclair 24 May 1946, with the Liberal Nationals a group of Liberal can- ‘If that were their calculation, they Thurso Papers. didates was talking directly to a group of Tory re- failed here as they have failed elsewhere 16 Memo written by Herbert Brechin, Secretary of formers led by Peter Thorneycroft about a possi- and as they are going to fail until the the Scottish Liberal National Association, June ble direct merger with the Conservatives. This 28 1946. went as far as the publication of a joint docu- end of the War.’ 17 Letter from Fothergill to Mabane, 23 July 1946, ment, Design for Freedom, and led to a state- Thurso Papers ment from Liberal headquarters in November The above speech is reprinted with the kind 18 Lady Louise Glen-Coats was an outstanding ex- 1946 denying rumours of any pact with the permission of Curtis Brown. ample of the tough and independent breed of Conservatives.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 27 far as advertising for candidates who could pay their own election expenses. Despite these problems, local asso- LiberalLiberal PartyParty ciations recognised the importance of recruitment and did use canvassing, and the distribution of ‘referendum cards’, to identify potential new members. membershipmembership New members were needed to add to membershipmembership and replenish the body of activists By Robert Ingham which kept Liberal associations going. They could deliver leaflets, canvass and join executive committees. New re- cruits were sometimes immediately of- recent enquiry to the Liberal particular lady as a party member on fered candidacies in local or parliamen- ADemocrat History Group raised the basis of a seedcake she had baked tary elections. Especially in large, rural the question of the Liberal Party’s for a social event. constituencies a large membership was membership and how it fluctuated With such a small subscription rate, necessary to ensure that the party was over the years. This is an interesting is- it was difficult for Liberal organisations represented in every significant town sue, but not one capable of a simple or to make much money from recruit- and village. When election campaigns specific answer. ment. The low recommended rate was were primarily based on a series of The old Liberal Party did not have a a disincentive to active recruitment, nightly meetings, it was essential to national membership. This did not particularly given the effort involved in have a contact in as many villages as come about until the formation of the signing up members. Emphasis tended possible to ensure that halls could be Liberal Democrats, and was part of the to be placed instead on attracting a booked and audiences drummed up. inheritance from the SDP, which was handful of major subscribers, who Even inactive members could generally  itself founded in on a wave of na- could pledge pounds rather than shil- be relied upon to turn up at the annual tional recruitment. lings, and on organising annual money- Liberal fete, and a sizeable Liberal Liberal Party membership recruit- raising events such as bazaars and din- membership on paper was useful for ment was practically all local, although ners. This put the finances of many Lib- propaganda purposes in the local press. some individuals subscribed directly to eral organisations on shaky foundations. After the Second World War, the national or regional organisations such A rainy day could ensure that a jumble Liberal Party did try to estimate its as the Liberal Party Organisation, area sale made a loss rather than a profit, and membership by means of a telephone Liberal federations or the Eighty Club. the death of a couple of rich benefac- survey of local associations undertaken Major donors affiliated themselves to tors could lead to candidates being by party staff in London. Desmond the party in this way. Lord Sherwood, withdrawn from local or even parlia- (later Lord) Banks was one of the staff for example (formerly Liberal MP mentary elections. involved and remembered the chair- Hugh Seely), was recognised by the As with the Conservative Party, par- man of Carmarthenshire Liberal Asso-  Conservative leadership in as liamentary candidates and MPs were a ciation claiming a membership of someone who ‘would fight to his last major source of finance for the Liber- , for his organisation. Banks asked penny to do us down’. On reading this als. There was a long tradition, of excitedly how many paid a subscrip- assessment, Churchill remarked: ‘I hope course, of parliamentary aspirants tion. ‘Only the dozen or so who turn he will soon reach his last penny’; and spreading their financial largesse up to things’, said the Welshman. Woolton commented: ‘with any luck around constituencies, making large A more systematic attempt was his family may be able to have him cer- donations to local charities and volun- made to estimate the total member- tified before then – I know they would tary organisations, treating electors, ship in , when officials toured the  like to’. and propping up party organisations. country and interviewed local office- The fees charged by local associa- The Conservative Party recognised in holders. An estimated membership of  tions were highly variable, dependent , with the Maxwell Fyfe report, , was derived from this process. upon what the member could pay and that the quality of candidates and the Later attempts to calculate member- what the recruiter was willing to ask. In dynamism of local parties could be im- ship resulted from the – ‘Call to  the early s there was no recom- proved if a cap was placed on the con- Action’ campaign, which included a   mended subscription. Later on, s d tribution made by candidates to local postal survey of constituency activity. was suggested as a minimum subscrip- associations. Although the Liberal lead- This came up with a membership esti-  tion and this was raised to s in the ership agreed with this change in prin- mate of around ,. For a time,  s. There was no obligation on Lib- ciple, in practice many Liberal associa- monthly estimates were issued and eral Associations to pay any attention to tions were supported by the deep these showed membership increasing this guidance, and there is a famous pockets of their parliamentary candi- during . This, of course, coincided story that David Penhaligon regarded a dates. Some local associations went as with the surge in Liberal activity and

28 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 leaders also did not want to cede con- Membership of Newbury Liberal Association 1959–644 trol of the party conference and other policy-making institutions to a band of Ward or branch Number of members paying a subscription Liberal Association local activists. A centralised member- ship list could be used to ensure that 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 such bodies were properly representa-  Newbury East 31 52 209 167 164 17 tive of the mass party. Newbury West 35 29 90 118 78 6 The Liberal Democrats inherited this Newbury North 10 19 42 51 14 0 system lock, stock and barrel, putting Tilehurst 4 9 15 76 285 18 paid to the Liberal Party’s locally-run, Norcot 0 0 3 47 12 0 shambolic membership structure. A cen- Thatcham 6 20 24 65 22 0 tralised membership system was one of Theale 0 0 1 12 5 0 the attractions of setting up the new Aldermaston 1 2 23 140 7 0 party, especially to its leaders, but there Boxford 12 5 24 14 2 0 were bitter arguments about the loss of Lambourn 5 2 14 18 0 0 Pangbourne 0 0 1 0 36 1 local autonomy this entailed. Pitchford Hungerford 0 0 1 6 0 0 and Greaves, in their assessment of the None5 35 15 44 36 13 0 merger, wrote that the new system ‘has Total 139 153 491 750 638 42 had a drastic downward effect on local membership’, but it is impossible to judge how many genuine subscribers to success associated with the winning of Liberal associations to the national the Liberal Party, rather than supporters the Orpington by-election. Not sur- party, and therefore their right to send or cake-makers, decided not to join the prisingly estimates were not made, or delegates to the Liberal Assembly, was Liberal Democrats. Few voices have were not published, when the figures based on the declared membership. been heard since for a return to a local started to look worse, and the good Liberal associations usually kept lists of membership system. ones have to be viewed critically. contacts and supporters rather than As well as recruiting new members, paid-up members so it was common Robert Ingham is an historical writer, spe- Liberal associations needed to ensure for people who had never or rarely cialising in the Liberal Party. In  he that existing members kept paying paid a subscription to be regarded as a co-edited the Dictionary of Liberal their subscriptions. The only way of party member, as the Penhaligon story Quotations. organising this was for members to be illustrates. Registration to Assembly visited every year and asked to pay up. was therefore notoriously lax, with 1 Memorandum from J. P. L. Thomas to the Gen- If this was not done then actual mem- people almost able to walk in off the eral Director of the Conservative Party, 9 March 1950, Conservative Party Papers, CCO3/2/112, bership could drop calamitously, as the street and register, had they wished to. Bodleian Library, Oxford. table shows. This helped fuel the irritation felt by 2 Brentford and Chiswick, 1950. Vigorous recruitment in  and Liberal, and perhaps more especially 3A full account of the SDP’s membership and  how it was organised can be found in I. Crewe led to a huge increase in member- Social Democrat, leaders at the con- and A. King, The Birth, Life and Death of the So- ship, but after the party’s fortunes had trary nature of the Assembly. Certainly cial Democratic Party (OUP, 1995), chapter 13. peaked membership fell dramatically. In the Assembly’s swings in policy on free 4 Members’ register, Newbury Liberal Association.  5 Members who joined by subscribing directly to , for example, very little attention trade and agricultural protection in the central Liberal Association, rather than to a was paid to collecting subscriptions in the early s can be attributed in branch. Aldermaston, where paid-up member- part to the differences in the body’s ship collapsed from  to , but there composition as it moved around the was extensive recruitment in Tilehurst country, and to the efforts of the dif- and Pangbourne. These efforts did not ferent wings of the party to ensure extend into , however, when Lib- their supporters attended. The Liberal Democrat History eral activists no doubt concentrated on SDP membership was organised on Group operates an enquiry the general election instead of collect- a totally different footing to that of the system for historical queries ing subscriptions. If Newbury Liberal Liberal Party. It was managed centrally similar to the one that Association was exceptional it was be- and computerised from the start, al- stimulated this article. cause its membership was particularly though not, at first, very successfully. A well organised. Few other Liberal asso- high minimum subscription level of £ Anyone with enquiries relating ciations in the s or s had a was set from the beginning in . to the histories of the Liberal dedicated membership officer. Partly, this reflected the need to process Democrats, SDP or Liberal The chaotic nature of Liberal mem- tens of thousands of applications for Party should email them to bership had an important impact on membership to a party with no local [email protected]. the national party. The affiliation of organisation at the time; but the SDP’s

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 29 Lady Megan’s departure by a diary comment, it is hard to believe that she did not remark in her diary on LettersLetters toto thethe the defections from the party of Dingle Foot and Wilfrid Roberts, both of whom she had previously thought well of; Pottle does indeed record that Lady Violet ‘regarded EditorEditor Dingle Foot as a renegade for having deserted the Liberal cause for La- bour’ (p. , note), and if this Alan Beith MP Journal ), I wonder if Mark Pottle statement is based by Pottle on a As an admirer of Violet Bonham could himself be persuaded to com- contemporary diary entry by her, we Carter’s loyalty to Liberalism in its ment briefly on the extent to which ought perhaps to know. dark years, I am nevertheless obliged the material in the diaries which he In the same general context, it to point out that Malcolm Baines’ has chosen not to publish is enlight- seems quite likely from the fact that enjoyable review of her Diaries ening on the history of the Liberal Churchill’s offer of the post of Lord (Journal ) should not have accepted Party after . Chancellor to Cyril Asquith (Lord unquestioningly her own explana- It is noticeable, for example, that Asquith of Bishopstone) in  is tion of why she was not chosen as although the diaries are said by him sourced by Pottle to DNB (p. ), Liberal candidate for Berwick-upon- to cover the years – ‘in almost rather than to Lady Violet’s diary, that Tweed in . She inferred that it unbroken sequence’ (p. xv), the only neither Churchill nor Cyril Asquith was because of a local prejudice entry relating to the Liberal Party’s told Lady Violet of the offer at the time against women MPs, following their internal affairs selected for printing that it was made. If they did not, that is experience of a Tory woman MP, a by Pottle for the year , a year in probably creditable to Churchill and former actress, who had taken over which Lady Violet was President of Cyril Asquith rather than not, for they the seat when the Liberals got her the Liberal Party Organisation, is a both must have been aware of how husband unseated on an election brief mention of a fund-raising bitterly disappointed Lady Violet had expenses petition. It is more likely interview with Viscount Allendale (p. been at her own political ill-fortune at that the local Liberals preferred ), and it would helpful to know the  general election, which had George Grey because he was local, whether or not it was her normal deprived her of the opportunity to whereas Violet had shown no previ- practice at this time to record inter- become Churchill’s Minister for ous interest in Northumberland. nal Liberal Party business in her Education. It would be interesting if Local party workers who were still diaries. Rather more entries of direct Mark Pottle could tell us if Lady Violet, active when I was elected believed Liberal Party relevance are printed by Clement Davies and Sir Archibald fervently that, had he not been killed Pottle for , but after that entries Sinclair ever knew that the seat for a at the front, George Grey would have of this kind again become somewhat Liberal in Churchill’s cabinet which he been a future party leader. sporadic in the published volume, had offered to each of them prospec- There is also a Berwick connection and it would be interesting to know tively or actually before or after that with C. P. Trevelyan, about whom to what extent this is due to Pottle’s general election might in the end have Duncan Brack writes in the same issue editorial policy and to what extent it been occupied by Lady Violet’s of the Journal. Some years after his may reflect Lady Violet’s own dis- younger brother. death, Wallington became part of the tancing of herself from regular Lastly, Pottle is understandably a Berwick-upon-Tweed constituency, Liberal Party activities before and little unfamiliar with the lesser and I have been very glad to have the after her controversial candidacy for known personalities of the Liberal firm support of one of Trevelyan’s Colne Valley in . Party of that era, and he may like to daughters, the late Pauline Dower, and Nor is it entirely clear to what know that ‘Mrs Gomsky’, who he his grandson, Robin Dower. Liberalism extent Lady Violet may have com- fails to identify on p.  was, as has been well-established in this corner mented in her diary on prominent surviving older Liberals will readily of Northumberland. individual Liberals of the s and recognise, Doreen Gorsky (Doreen s other than Clement Davies Stephens), and that Frances Louise and Frank Byers. It is something of a Josephy (–), although cer- Hugh Pagan surprise that Pottle prints no reaction tainly not liked by Lady Violet, was Further to David Dutton’s review of by her to the defection from the an able speaker who fought six the final volume of Mark Pottle’s party of Lady Megan Lloyd George, general elections as a Liberal at a edition of the diary and letters of and although Lady Violet may indeed period when women candidates were Lady Violet Bonham Carter (Reviews, not have thought it worth dignifying few and far between.

30 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 Kenyan Asian influx in , and in doing so to codify the logic that only restrictive immigration policies – ReportReport particularly in the context of crisis – can be a prerequisite for good race relations? Dr Saggar claimed that realists would say that in many ways Post-war Liberalism and the governments have little room for manoeuvre; they are managing a crisis politics of race and immigration and they operate under extreme pressures and timeframes, including the Evening meeting, July 2001, with Lord Dholakia and need to keep their supporters on-side, Dr Shamit Saggar both in the country and in the House of Commons. Report by Sue Simmonds Pitched against this is the critique of appeasement. The logic was to move towards a position of zero immigration; iberal Democrats regularly con Roy Hattersley, was that good race Britain’s unified cohesive integrated Lgratulate themselves on their relations could only work within the society was not created because of party’s honourable record of opposing framework of a tight immigration society’s belief in tolerance, but or mitigating the worst of the govern- regime, and this, in turn, is indefensible because it closed off options to immi- ment’s policies on race. How far that without good race relations. Dr Saggar gration wherever possible. We now feeling could or should be justified by pointed out that this is not a workable think of this period in history as the a historical view of Liberal policy and scenario; government may become exception to the rule race relations is a fascinating question, constrained by the possibility of Dr Saggar then asked whether one thoroughly explored in this immigration crises and unable to political parties can lead, or have History Group meeting. It is especially deliver the tight regime on immigra- merely to follow, pubic opinion. He interesting in that this period of history tion. We should be asking whether as a cited studies showing that public reflects a lack of Liberal influence society we have been well served by opinion tends to lie to the right of through elected representation – this dualistic approach. Was it the centre, and described the resulting although we have come to claim the responsibility of all parties, including trend to move to where the voters are work of Labour ministers such as Roy the then Liberal Party, to work within as the ‘iron law of rationality’. Dr Jenkins as our own. that framework, or should they have Saggar’s summary of the psephology Interestingly both speakers, Dr tried to challenge it? and party competition were interesting Saggar (Reader in Electoral Politics at The ‘liberal hour’ also saw the and prompted several questions and Queen Mary College, University of attempt to build the architecture of interventions in the discussion. The London and author of Race and Politics long-term tolerance in British society. proportion of ethnic minority indi- in Britain; he spoke in his personal Racial harmony would be pursued and viduals voting Labour (four out of five) capacity) and Lord Dholakia (President people of all shades of political opinion has changed little since  (when of the Liberal Democrats), had arrived would want to move towards it in the figures were first recorded) and hardly in the UK in the s and ’s, and long term. Home Secretary Roy varies between elections. He pointed their historical and political perspec- Jenkins argued that the long-term goal out that there is nothing sinister about tives were clearly shaped by this should be equal opportunity and this; it is probably the outcome of the experience. cultural diversity in an atmosphere of class and socio-economic background Dr Saggar delivered a well-con- mutual tolerance. This is still an issue of the voters and of Labour’s successful structed analysis of the ‘liberal hour’ of for society today, but the developments trumping of the other parties as an the s, in which race relations of the time did succeed in laying the ‘ethnic-minority-friendly party’ policy was formed between the two foundations for the management of (although history shows that this is not Race Relations Acts of  and . tolerance in a mature industrial society. always true). Dr Saggar also suggested He described the first interventions of Particularly interesting was the that the politics of cultural flattery may the Labour government in shaping handling of the Kenyan Asian crisis in play a part, although this could also race relations policy, and the inspira-  – a classical historical dilemma. work for the Conservatives in engag- tion for them to intervene in an area in Dr Saggar asked the question: what ing the Asian vote. which they first established that they should have been the role of govern- Dr Saggar concluded with the could play a role – a fact now accepted ment in that crisis in a normative question: why have Liberal Democrats as a legitimate area for government sense? Is it, was it, or should it have been so poor in attracting the votes of involvement. been possible for government to ethnic minorities? He questioned the The prevailing view, articulated by challenge the premise of restricting the lack of profit in the relationship with

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 31 ethnic minority voters, as Liberals have their families, and therefore more positive outcomes of immigration or been in the forefront of resisting the people entered under the quotas than diversity. Lord Dholakia was clear that anti-immigration logic and rhetoric had before. the discussion needs to be redefined as and in the vanguard of building Racism played a very important part being about needs and skills, rather tolerance and racial inclusivity. in electing British politicians, even than race, in order to maintain present Lord Lubbock, who chaired the before Enoch Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ standards of living. meeting, questioned Dr Saggar’s view speech. Lord Dholakia discussed the In concluding, Lord Lubbock of the s as a ‘liberal hour’ and  by-election in Smethwick, in warned that the s were a time of suggested that the Race Relations Acts which the Conservative candidate cohesion in immigration. Britain’s had masked institutional racism, (who defeated the Foreign Secretary, current influx of migrants originate particularly in the public sector. This Patrick Gordon Walker) took a nega- from disparate countries – the result of question needs to be revisited, to ask tive stance on immigration, claiming asylum-seeking rather than economic whether this veneer of tolerance that a TB camp would be set up in the migration from Commonwealth created a fraud, generating much Midlands. He asked where the Liberal countries – and the record of the s bigger problems as a result. This point Party fitted then, with six MPs, none may not, therefore, have much to teach is worth noting within the debate on representing a seat with a high concen- us. Regrettably this was a point not immigration and asylum taking place tration of ethnic minorities. Even now, really taken forward by the discussion, under this government, especially as Simon Hughes’ seat is the exception especially in the light of Dr Saggar’s the most recent Immigration Act has and the party has never made the observations and his questions about been widely criticised as giving powers impact that it should do in similar the handling of the Kenyan Asian to discriminate on grounds of race. areas. debate and settlement policy. What is Lord Dholakia’s talk covered a great Lord Dholakia recalled his experi- the right to political asylum if not crisis deal of ground, focusing on the various ence working at the National Com- immigration – albeit on a different legislative measures. Prior to the arrival mittee for Commonwealth Immi- scale? of large numbers of people from grants, when they met the Prime Since this meeting took place there Commonwealth countries, the only Minister to complain that the govern- have been riots on the streets of several piece of legislation dealing with ment was bringing in legislation northern towns and race relations have nationality was the British Nationality without consulting, as they had said again had the most cursory of discus- Act of , which conferred the right they would. They were told that the sions in the media. Immigration is of citizenship on all citizens of Com- measures would have gone through constantly discussed in terms of monwealth countries. Lord Dholakia even if they had been consulted. asylum, and parts of the media con- posed the questions: would anyone in Politicians are still unclear about the stantly reflect a sense of unease in  have dreamt that thirty years later process of integration. Roy Jenkins did middle England, arousing racist Britain would have had three pieces of not want Britain to be a melting pot undertones. It would be interesting to race relations legislation, and now a creating stereotypical Englishmen; he reflect how far the seeds of these fourth in the Race Relations (Amend- defined integration not as a process of disturbances were sown in the settle- ment) Act? Has immigration any assimilation, but one of equal opportu- ment policies of the last forty years. relevance to the Hattersley approach, nity accompanied by cultural diversity that controls are needed to establish in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance. Sue Simmonds is a PR consultant working good community relations? Tolerance can, however, produce on issues of human rights and race relations. Lord Dholakia argued that if one friction; it can imply that we do not accepts a multi-racial society then one like you but we will try to tolerate you. must look at the reality of the process That is reflected in a number of of immigration. The first mention of pronouncements made by the govern- The Journal is moving! Britain as a multi-cultural society was ment on immigration and race rela- in the government’s  white paper, tions. Jenkins cleverly brought in the From 17 September 2001, all editorial which admitted that Commonwealth Race Relations Act  at the same and advertising correspondence for immigrants had made ‘a most valuable time as the Sex Discrimination Act the Journal of Liberal Democrat History contribution’. The welfare and integra- , on the grounds that people who should be addressed to: 38 Salford Road tion of newcomers was not even supported the end of discrimination London discussed. Immigration policy was for women would support the end of SW2 4BQ dictated not by the needs of this discrimination on the grounds of race. email: [email protected] country, but based on the colour of the The debate about immigration is immigrant’s skin. A numerical quota now being opened up by the govern- Subscription/membership queries system was introduced by the Com- ment, though only under the pressure remain the same at: monwealth Immigration Act in , of having an unworkable asylum 6 Palfrey Place London SW8 1PA but no controls were applied to the system and economic need, rather than email: [email protected] entry of women and children joining having any great conversion to the

32 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 most at home, and could relax and recharge his intellectual batteries But Orkney & Shetland’s isolation ReviewsReviews may also have contributed to Grimond’s lack of empathy with the industrial voter. He wrote in August  that ‘at the back of our troubles is A perfect balance the disunity between capital and labour, social classes and the shifting Jo and Laura Grimond: A Selection of Memories and conglomerations of our great towns’. Photographs 1945–1994 (Orkney Liberal ‘Every summer,’ he added, ‘when I go back to Orkney I feel the immense Democrats, 2000; 96pp) well-being of people free from the Reviewed by Geoffrey Sell jealousies, stresses and antagonisms of industrial life’. Jim Heppell, a former Liberal parliamentary candidate, felt his booklet, published to mark even today, older Liberals remember it that Grimond ‘was too remote from  Tthe fiftieth anniversary of Jo as the infamous year of ‘the liberal working-class interests’. Peggy Grimond’s election to Westminster, candidate lost his deposit’, as all but Edwards, who fought two elections contains reminiscences from over fifty one hundred of the party’s candidates under Grimond’s leadership, agrees. contributors, accompanied by many suffered this fate. Two and a half She felt that Grimond had ‘an photographs. million votes produced only nine MPs incomprehension of the very people Jo Grimond is best remembered as One of these was, however, Grimond, whom he so wanted to help. His ivory an inspirational leader of the Liberal who had been returned with a major- tower doubled as a sort of social   chastity belt that kept him untouched Party, responsible for the party’s first ity of , , and had seen his share of  revival since . Every successful the vote increase from .% to .%, by social class V.’ politician needs a secure political base, a notable personal achievement. The booklet also rightly celebrates and Orkney & Shetland provided him It would be impossible to exag- the life and work of Laura Grimond. with this for thirty-three years. In the gerate the importance of Orkney & Some wives of leading politicians, such process he clocked up an estimated Shetland to Grimond. The constitu- as Norma Major and Mary Wilson, do two and a half million miles’ worth of ency’s location at the extremity of not regard themselves as political travel, and  letters about seal Britain helped nurture his radicalism animals. The same could not be said of protection (as opposed to three on and gave him an unique vantage Laura Grimond. Grand-daughter of a Scottish devolution). He loved his point from which to view the Prime Minister, daughter of Lady constituents and his constituency. He political scene. Grimond’s skill was as Violet Bonham Carter, one of the best loved his house, the Old Manse of a thinker, not a tactician. As such he speakers, male or female, in the coun- Firth, the pictures by Scottish painters was a considerable publicist for the try and wife of arguably the most that decorated its walls, its garden, his party. From his pen came a constant distinguished and charismatic of post- expeditions to Skara Brae, Scapa and stream of pamphlets, books and Hoy, and St Magnus Cathedral. newspaper articles setting out the Grimond’s association with Orkney Liberal message. His books applied to & Shetland, that was to last until his the problems of the modern age the death in , began in , when traditional Liberal principles of Lady Glen-Coats, the prospective liberty, voluntarism and trust in the Liberal candidate, decided to give up people. They drew heavily on the and suggested him as her successor. On robust values of Orkney & Shetland, paper it was an unlikely empathy. The which remained – for longer than well-connected Eton- and Oxford- most of the United Kingdom – educated son of a Dundee jute manu- immune to the twentieth century facturer had never been to the con- tides of secular materialism and stituency. In the event, he appeared to passive conformity. Grimond’s have landed among soulmates. He constituency helped to shape his narrowly failed to win the seat in , thinking, for he found in its small but after some persuasion agreed to self-sufficient communities para- stand again at the next election. digms against which he measured the Nationally, the  election was a lunacies of central government and severe setback for the Liberal Party; the welfare state. It was where he felt

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 33 war politicians, Laura carved out and Jim Wallace, who succeeded the Blair and Brown of the nine- adorned her own political niche. The Grimond as MP for Orkney & Shet- teenth-century Liberal Party. Times in its obituary described her as land upon his retirement in , That alone would have made Lord ‘one of her party’s strongest hidden describes in the Foreword to the John Russell a key figure in the history assets’. Former party official Sir booklet how Laura’s support for Jo was of Liberalism, yet it was not his main Leonard Smith felt that she not only unswerving. In many ways, he states, contribution to the history of the backed Grimond up, but that intellec- Laura was the dynamo, the force which party. That was made in the field of the tually she was his equal, and had the drove things on. Her single-minded history of ideas, and was done as much independence and spirit of the determination was as inspirational as through writing and speaking as Asquiths. Jo’s leadership and vision. As a team, through his record in office. He was Lord Holme’s portrayal of the they had the perfect balance. Accord- the man who did most to establish that Grimonds is also interesting. When it ing to John Grimond, his mother was the Liberal Party of the nineteenth came to policy formulation Jo more interested in politics than was his century would inherit the ideals, the Grimond was a bit of an agent father. Until her final illness, she would principles, and above all the inherited provocateur, who liked to toss a hand be campaigning in by-elections. electoral loyalties, dating back to the grenade into the room and see what In conclusion, Orkney Liberal first Whigs of the seventeenth century. happened, whilst Laura Grimond was Democrats are to be congratulated for Lord John’s ancestor, William Lord much more realistic, much more publishing this booklet. It is a fitting Russell, had been the first Whig martyr political. It was – he believed – in the tribute to two very special people of . Lord John was steeped in his genes. Grimond’s marriage in a sense who not only made their mark upon life and thinking. gave him his passport into Liberal their community but who enriched The early nineteenth century – politics. His mother-in-law was the national politics. when the succession and religious formidable high priestess of Liberal- toleration were effectively dead as Geoffrey Sell is a college lecturer. He ism. She took a proprietorial interest political disputes, and the key issue completed a PhD thesis on Liberal Revival: in the Liberal Party and the political was becoming the extension of rights British Liberalism and Jo Grimond hopes that she had once entertained to a wider social circle – was one of –. for herself were transferred to those periods when the issues of Grimond. Lord Esher, a contempo- 1 Bulletin, 21/8/59. politics are in a state of flux and party rary and close friend, feels that he 2 Completed questionnaire dated 10/9/94 organisations are correspondingly received by author from J. P. Heppell, Liberal took a pretty relaxed view of politics candidate for Shipley 1964 and 1966. likely to break up. The Tory party until his marriage. ‘Laura not only 3 Completed questionnaire received by author formally split, and was lucky to brought him into the Asquithian from Mrs. P. Edwards MBE, Liberal candidate recover. Lord John succeeded in for Ilkeston 1964 and West Derbyshire 1966. inheritance but also confronted him 4 The Times, 18/2/94 reformulating what E. F. Biagini has with her (and her mother’s) stronger 5 Interview with the late Sir Leonard Smith, 14/2/ called ‘the old Whig cry of equality feelings and more concentrated 89. before the law’ in a way that gave it a  6 Interview with Lord Holme, 17/3/89. ambitions.’ 7Letter from Lord Esher to author, dated 3/9/93. constant daily relevance to the politics of the nineteenth century. Nothing had been more central to the principles of  than the idea of government by consent. This had meant, in , that Parliament Liberal inheritor of the Whigs should be able to determine who should be king. To Lord John, it Paul Scherer: Lord John Russell (Associated meant that a wider circle of people University Press, 1999) should be able to decide who would Conrad Russell be in the House of Commons. He Reviewed by Conrad Russell said in  that of the  English members,  were elected by , persons, and ‘the votes of the House t is not an exaggeration to say that to the short life of most mid-nine- of Commons no longer imply the Ithe event which created the teenth century governments. Their general assent of the realm’. This Liberal Party was the agreement of decision created a party which attack on electoral property would Russell and Palmerston, announced enjoyed unrivalled success as an have horrified his ancestors, yet he  at Willis’s Rooms in , that either election-winning machine for the saw correctly that it followed un- would serve under the other. They next fifty years. Yet this agreement questionably from principles which had long enjoyed a tempestuous did not mark the end of their disa- they had often enunciated. He relationship, resigning with a regular- greements, nor even the beginning of carried this belief in government by ity which contributed very heavily a respect for each other. They were consent through into international

34 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 without which there could not be the supersede Prest’s biography. It is based career open to talent which Victorian on a thorough knowledge of Russell thinking demanded. He never broke papers of many sorts, but is less strong in free of laissez-faire thinking but equally understanding the others with whom he was never a dogmatic adherent of it. he came in daily contact, and therefore It was the pragmatism of the practising in understanding the relationships politician that gave him the freedom of between them. Its real novelty lies in the manoeuvre needed to save the Liberal explanation of the  agreement Party from ever becoming a slave to between Russell and Palmerston, laissez-faire. though here too it would be nice to He was Prime Minister twice, once have an equally acute analysis of as a Whig and once as a Liberal. There Palmerston’s side of the story. is no sign whatever that he saw any The author ascribes Russell’s ideological divide between his two decision to make the peace to his affairs, protesting in  at ‘the administrations. The party’s continuity experience of the Aberdeen Coali- disposal of the Tuscans and through a rapidly changing world was tion. That was an extreme example of Modenese as if they were so many very largely his achievement. the disorganised governments put firkins of butter’. Yet he was often a hopeless politi- together while the Tory party was The struggle for equal civil rights cian. John Prest, his previous biogra- split and the Russell – Palmerston for dissenters was unfinished business. pher, once commented that ‘politics feud prevented a proper Whig Lord John saw (at least sometimes) that was his life-blood, yet he was totally government. The Aberdeen coalition this must entail the same rights for unpolitical’. When he was eighteen he was run from the Lords. It rested on a Roman Catholics, and he was respon- gave Lord Grey a furious scolding for cabinet base drawn mainly from sible, after a long campaign, for secur- his lukewarmness in the cause of thirty Peelite MPs supported by ing the rights of Jews by religion to be reform. It is tempting to imagine that some  Whigs with Lord John as returned to the House of Commons. twenty years later, when Grey told Leader of the Commons, and need- He carried these concerns through him to go and draft the bill, he was ing to pick up votes at random across into a wider concern for equality handing him a coal of fire. On an- the House to win its divisions. before the law. He secured a pardon for other occasion, he leapt up from a seat Decisions were almost impossible, the Tolpuddle Martyrs, arguing that next to one duchess, rushed across the and Lord John was left threatening greater lawbreakers escaped free room and sat down next to another. resignation with such frequency that because of wealth and influence. He The reason was that he was too hot it clearly could not go on. horrified his colleague Lord Mel- beside the fire – which he explained Lord John was not usually a bourne by appointing tradesmen as to the duchess he joined, but not to dedicated political organiser, but he magistrates. When Melbourne pro- the one he had left. In , during seems to have put a great deal of work tested that they could not be impartial the Italian Risorgimento, the Queen in creating the group on which the in disputes between employer and rounded on him and said: ‘am I to Liberal Party was to rest. Reform, his employee, Lord John said that Mel- understand you to say, Lord John, that great life-long issue, drew in radicals bourne should be careful of this under certain circumstances subjects who knew he was the younger man. argument, because unkind people may resist their lawful sovereign?’ He Yet in the short term, the crux of his might say that landlord JPs could not replied roundly: ‘speaking to a sover- union with Palmerston was Italy. It be impartial in disputes between eign of the House of Hanover, Ma’am, drew in Russell’s attachment to landlord and tenant. I think I may say that I do’. His government by consent and It was this generalised concern for relations with the Queen had been Palmerston’s desire to annoy Austria. the underdog that prevented him from bad enough before this. This is one of It created a union in cabinet between being a slave to laissez-faire economics, two points where I can add an oral Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary though he had read and been influ- history contribution to this book. The which even the Queen was unable to enced by Smith and Malthus. He other is the story of an attempted rape upset. It opened up a road which pushed through the Ten Hours Act by Palmerston at Windsor Castle. looked backwards to , and limiting hours of work, because of the What had happened was simply that forward to the United Nations and inequality of power which prevented Palmerston, in the middle of the international human rights. As the equal bargaining, and he exploited the night, had mistaken the bedroom fruit of a short-term political ma- cholera epidemic to put the whole where his long-term mistress was noeuvre, that is something of an weight of Downing Street into over- sleeping. Somehow the story was kept achievement. ruling the Treasury in order to allow away from the Queen, but in the the construction of the London sewers. process Palmerston was prevented Conrad (Earl) Russell is Lord John Above all, he was a consistent cham- from telling the true story. Russell’s great-grandson and Professor of pion of state help for education, In the main, this book does not History at King’s College, London.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 35 ance the defendants of the breach were overwhelmed and the speed of the Those barbarous wretches parliamentary onrush prevented the defenders from making a second line Tom Reilly: Cromwell : An Honourable Enemy of defence. It is here that the contro- versy starts. At the time, and over the (Brandon, 1999) next few days, the whole garrison was Reviewed by Tony Little slaughtered to the extent of about , with fairly superficial Cromwellian losses of around . It is liver Cromwell’s reputation in took with him a ,-strong army, reported that Aston was beaten to OBritain has always been ambiva- later reinforced. His enemy never death with his wooden leg. lent. To some, including many Liberals, fought him in the field but faced up to Cromwell hoped that the example he stood up to the Divine Right of him in a series of town sieges, of which of Drogheda would prevent further Kings and made possible constitutional the best remembered is the first, bloodletting elsewhere. To a large parliamentary government. This is why Drogheda. Cromwell saw himself extent he was right. With Drogheda he has been honoured by his statue at facing an Irish royalist – and more secure, he headed back south and was Westminster. To others he was the importantly Papist – enemy, which had not seriously challenged until he Puritan spoilsport who martyred a been responsible earlier in the decade arrived at Wexford. The key to the misguided but romantic king and for the massacre of innocent English defensive position at Wexford was a supplanted him with a military dicta- Protestants. castle just outside and looking down torship. Each of these is a distortion of In reality the situation was always on the town. Colonel Sinnott, the facts enhanced by myth but not much more complex than Cromwell commander of the town, but with a dangerous. understood. He never at any stage detached force in the castle, stalled for In Ireland, Cromwell’s reputation is faced a united enemy. The nominal time by stipulating unacceptable darker and more dangerous. To nation- leader, the Earl of Ormonde, and conditions for his surrender. While alists he was a war criminal who many subordinate commanders of the negotiations continued, Captain massacred innocent civilians in hot- royalists were Protestants; indeed, Stafford surrendered the castle, which tempered assaults on Irish towns and many of them considered themselves was quickly occupied by parliamentary then drove the remaining Catholic English rather than Irish, including troops who launched an assault on the population into exile in their own some of those born in Ireland. town without waiting for orders. With country. He instigated the sense of Ormonde was never able to muster a little or no resistance, a second massa- grievance which led the native Irish to force strong enough to face Cromwell cre ensued. Many troops and citizens back James II against William of in the field. His strategy, in so far as he who escaped slaughter in the streets Orange and fed that sense of grievance had one, was to draw Cromwell into a drowned fleeing across the river. The through the nineteenth and twentieth siege and allow time, bad hygiene and town was plundered. centuries. History colours the thinking the winter to weaken the Ironsides. Unsurprisingly, Cromwell faced of both sides in Northern Ireland, Cromwell had no choice but to face little further resistance, with the seventeenth century grievances still this tactic head on. The critical test exception of Clonmel, to which we rankle and seventeenth century was Drogheda, to the north of Dublin will return. Cromwell was summoned attitudes to the Christian religion are and the gateway to Ulster. back to England, never again to leave  fervently expressed. Tom Reilly The siege proceeded according to the mainland. Arriving in April , suggests that this view of Cromwell seventeenth century etiquette. he had little rest before he was required still informs the teaching of history in Cromwell requested the surrender of to head off the renewed royalist threat Irish schools and that it is wrong. His the town. The defending commander, from David Leslie and Charles II in work is a useful exercise in challenging Sir Arthur Aston, had the choice of Scotland and reconstruct a constitution stereotypes, the way in which images making terms to hand over the walled to replace the parliamentary govern- are created and the care needed in the and fortified town or of defiance and ment that had failed its civil war use of sources. facing the consequences. It was protagonists. He became a monarch in Cromwell set out for Ireland in the understood that those consequences all but name. summer of . The civil war in were likely to be very bloody. Aston The case against Cromwell in England had been ended by the stood his ground and Cromwell began Ireland is threefold execution of the King in January of pounding the walls with cannon • The slaughter of the troops in that year. But in Ireland there remained superior to anything the defendants Drogheda was unnecessary and substantial bodies of armed men had available. In due course he blasted occurred after they had surrendered proclaiming loyalty to the Prince of a hole in the wall substantial enough to •Civilians of both sexes and un- Wales, the future Charles II. Cromwell allow an assault. After an initial resist- armed Catholic clergy were slain

36 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 tions were accepted and the agreement behaved military leader in Ireland signed. It was only at this stage that either at the time or subsequently. The Cromwell asked whether O’Neill risk of such a book is that it becomes concurred. To his fury, Cromwell was too partisan in favour of the maligned advised that O’Neill had withdrawn hero. It is a danger that Reilly does not from the town under cover of darkness. wholly avoid but his willingness to Despite the immense provocation and provide extensive quotations from the the mayor’s deceit, Cromwell hon- source materials gives the reader the oured the terms he had agreed, and the chance to hear the arguments but town and it inhabitants remained make up his own mind. To a modern unharmed. mind, Reilly fails to exonerate The strength of the book is that Cromwell’s treatment of the soldiers Reilly goes back to the – very limited who had surrendered at Drogheda. – written eyewitness accounts and Today this would be a war crime. The quotes extensively from them. He killing of clergy cannot be condoned, draws attention to the bias of accounts as Reilly appears to, on the basis that written after the restoration in , they might have been armed when he and heavily discounts additions to the quotes no evidence of this. Wisely he legend from the nineteenth century as avoids a detailed discussion of the being manufactured for nationalist or consequences of the plantation of religious propaganda purposes. There is English settlers which followed the no doubt of Cromwell’s hostility to success of the Cromwellian military without mercy; indeed, it is alleged Catholicism or that it was reciprocated campaign. that the population of Drogheda both then and later. His response to the Military affairs of the seventeenth was wiped out. declaration of the Irish hierarchy at century are outside our usual subject • The slaughter of the garrison at Clonmacnoise puts Rev. Ian Paisley’s matter in this journal but the contin- Wexford occurred while negotia- outbursts in the shade. Cromwell ued relevance of these historic events tions were under way. showed no mercy to priests he found to modern Anglo-Irish relations and Tom Reilly’s defence of his hero is in Drogheda or Wexford. But he always the challenge it offers to long accepted similarly threefold: drew a distinction between the priests beliefs make Reilly’s work a worth- • The slaughter at Drogheda was and the – to him – misguided people. while read. It is the continuous chal- within the rules of war at the time. Cromwell’s reputation in Ireland is lenge for historians to work with the • The massacre at Wexford was too damaged to be salvaged by this evidence rather than the propaganda, outside Cromwell’s control. book. Reilly makes a fair case in whether modern or ancient. • There is no evidence of deliberate clearing Cromwell from the extensive civilian deaths (Catholic clergy civilian massacres of legend and shows To ny Little is Chair of the Liberal Demo- excepted and excusable). that he was by no means the worst crat History Group. Clonmel is used to clinch his argu- ment. Here the forces of Hugh O’Neill offered a spirited resistance. The inevitable happened. The cannon were Liberal Democrat History Group website too strong for the walls and a breach was created. However, O’Neill, a From the end of September, the Liberal Democrat History Group website will be professional soldier with extensive completely redesigned, with a new, more professional look and expanded contents. You experience from the Continent, was will be able to find on the site: ready for the assault, trapping and • Latest History Group news, including announcements of meetings, the latest Journal killing significant numbers of and new publications Cromwell’s troops. Despite Cromwell’s • A complete listing of all Journal contents, back to issue 1, and downloadable files (pdf efforts to rally his men they were format) of the oldest issues. beaten off. This was the heaviest defeat • Details of History Group publications and where to buy them. that Cromwell met in Ireland and one • A complete listing of all History Group meetings and speakers. of the heaviest of his career. However • A brief history of the party, together with a suggested reading list. there was a price to be paid. O’Neill’s • Research resources, including guides to archive sources, and a listing of research in men were running short of ammuni- progress. tion and would not survive another And more will come as the site develops; including an email newsletter for assault. During the night the mayor announcements of meetings and other History Group news. and other civilian leaders approached See our website at: www.liberalhistory.org.uk Cromwell to parley terms. The condi-

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 37 insurance reforms (he was the first chair of the newly-established No proper account Insurance Commission), and within the Liberal Party his defeats lent him Eric Hopkins: Charles Masterman (1873–1927): an aura of failure. An opponent of Lloyd George’s coalitions with the Politician and Journalist – The Splendid Failure Conservatives between  and (Lampeter Press, Lewistown, USA, 1999; pp303) , he forged a new – if wary –  Lawrence Irvine Iles alliance with him in , entering Reviewed by Lawrence Irvine Iles Parliament again briefly as the senior MP for Manchester. Prior to this he had flirted with Labour under his book does not do justice to ‘deselected’ in the run-up to the Harold Laski’s urging, but never Tits subject, and indeed is at times election by a group of right-wing actually joined the party. Hopkins offensive in its allegations. C. F. G. shopowner Liberals who regularly suggests a sustained psychological Masterman was the Wimbledon-born made common cause in city politics breakdown, but there is no evidence younger son of a vast Disraelian Tory with local Tories, an episode inad- for this. He also suggests Masterman Evangelical household. Through his equately covered by Hopkins, who was a closet homosexual, citing his own academic endeavour and a misunderstands the social make-up of nude bathing while a visiting school- brilliantly incisive, innovative and the borough. master at Bembridge, and his keen sardonic writing style he won scholar- By  Masterman had entered interest in photography – but in fact ships to Wellington and Cambridge, the government despite middle-class he was a founder of the Society of enabling him to escape Home Coun- and nonconformist opposition. He Progressive Education, which em- ties narrow-mindedness. At Cam- had quickly made influential friends bodied a back-to-nature ethos, as bridge he became President of the with Lloyd George, Winston well as a talented photographer in his Union and a postgraduate writer Churchill and others on the left of own right, one of whose last books Fellow, as well as secretary of the the party. By  he was Lloyd was an acclaimed accompaniment to University Liberal Club, where he led George’s official number two as a German collection of British a team of left-wing ‘progressives’ in Financial Secretary to the Treasury, landscapes. capturing many of the student forums pioneering national health and Hopkins’ agenda negates any value and publications outlets. He and his insurance provisions through the that this biography might have had. team, who included Noel Buxton – Parliament. In  he Better by far is that by Masterman’s (later the first Labour Agriculture entered the Cabinet as Chancellor of wife Lucy, CFG; As I Knew Him, Minister), shocked the usually domi- the Duchy of Lancaster. Closely published in . Reviewing it nant Tory college authorities, not least associated with the more radical then, Richard Crossman described by their hostility to the Unionist clauses of the  budget, he was Masterman as a brilliant intellectual Government’s South African policies, also, by virtue of his personal friend- polyglot to whom history had failed which he characterised, in a book ship with Ramsay Macdonald, Lloyd to give proper account for the entitled The Heart of the Empire, as George’s secret conduit to the services he had rendered to his all- capitalistic Imperialism at its racist and Labour Party’s MPs between  too-conservative country and – jingoistic extreme. and . This was a key role given above all – its poorest and most After Cambridge, and a period the unreliability of the Irish Nation- economically deprived citizens. It is lecturing in literature all over Britain alist vote in perilous Commons both a significantly more measured on London University’s extension divisions. judgement than that of Hopkins, as programmes, Masterman, who was But his very success was to cost well as an epitaph to be proud of. very much a Christian socialist in his him his seat until . Obliged to own eyes (as well as – grudgingly – resign his seat, as was the require- Lawrence Irvine Iles is the US/Canada those of Keir Hardie) considered ment of the time for holding an representative of the British Labour Party Anglican ordination. He rejected this, office of profit under the Crown, he Heritage Group and an adjunct visiting however, unable to stomach the lost by-elections to the Tories at both history instructor at Kirksville Adult literalism of much of the dogma, and Bethnal Green and Ipswich and had Education Technical Center, Missouri, US. the Tory sympathies of many of his to resign from the Cabinet early in potential parishioners. Instead, while . Although not (contrary to This review has been edited for reasons of still a working journalist he was elected Hopkins) an indifferent campaigner, space. in  as Liberal MP for North West his opponents were successfully able Ham, although not without some to ridicule his immersion in the difficulty. He was temporarily administrative minutiae of his

38 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 39 A Liberal Democrat History Group Fringe Meeting Speeches and Speech-makers The official launch of the Liberal Democrat History Group's new book, Great Liberal Speeches, published by Politico's Publishing in September 2001. Speakers: Rt Hon Roy Jenkins (Lord Jenkins of Hillhead), leader of the SDP 1982–83 and biographer of Asquith and Gladstone, on the historical importance of political rhetoric. Max Atkinson, author of Our Masters' Voices, on the techniques of political oratory. Rt Hon Paddy Ashdown (Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon), leader of the Liberal Democrats 1988–99, will chair the meeting. 1.00pm, Tuesday 25 September Ballroom, Tralee Hotel, Bournemouth

Now available from the Liberal Democrat History Group: Great Liberal Speeches

Bringing together in one volume more than forty-five of the greatest Liberal speeches by the greatest Liberal speech-makers, from Charles James Fox to Charles Kennedy.

Great Liberal Speeches includes: • Jo Grimond, ‘The sound of gunfire’ • Roy Jenkins’ Dimbleby Lecture • David Lloyd George, ‘We can conquer unemployment’ • David Steel, ‘Go back to your constituencies’ • W. E. Gladstone, ‘Ireland stands at your bar’ • Paddy Ashdown, Chard speech on realignment • Henry Campbell-Bannerman, ‘Methods of barbarism’ and speeches by Macaulay, Palmerston, J. S. Mill, Bright, Keynes, Beveridge, Asquith, Conrad Russell, and many more. Each speech is given a concise introduction setting it in context and explaining its impact. The book opens with general introductions on the evolution of Liberal thinking and themes (by Tony Little and Duncan BrackBrack) and on the art of political rhetoric (by Max Atkinson, author of Our Masters’ Voices). Great Liberal Speeches will be a unique source of reference for anyone interested in the contribution of Liberals and Liberalism to British politics, and in the importance and impact of political speech-making.

Great Liberal Speeches is published by Politico’s Publishing in September 2001. The book will be available at the Politico’s stand at the Liberal Democrat conference in Bournemouth, and also from:

Politico’s Political Bookstore, 8 Artillery Row, Westminster, London SW1P 1RZ Tel: 020 7828 0010 Fax: 020 7828 8111