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UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992 Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8z79f48t Author Mantegna, Agostino Publication Date 2014 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992 A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Geography by Agostino Mantegna 2014 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992 by Agostino Mantegna Doctor of Philosophy in Geography University of California, Los Angeles, 2014 Professor John A. Agnew, Chair This research investigate the geographical logic of political clientelism. It show how political clientelism works in a macro-comparative perspective using the contrasting cases of Southern Italy and California as examples of two ideal-types in which clientelistic politics operates. The main finding is that the allocation and flow of financial funds related to public and infrastructural spending is influenced by clientelistic political strategies. This means that variations in the territorial distribution of public and infrastructural spending structure and govern electoral outcomes – e.g. exchange of votes in return for allocation of resources (favors). Decreasing expenditures in Southern Italy lead to increase in preference voting, whereas increasing availability of state and federal resources increase incumbent advantage and push for increasing role of lobbying and special-interests politics in the state of California. This contrasting patterns demonstrate how the different forms in which territorial politics is being constructed plays out in in two macro-regions in a global world dominated by incipient processes of decentralization and state restructuring. ii The dissertation of Agostino Mantegna is approved. David L. Rigby Michael E. Shin Michael C. Storper John A. Agnew, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2014 iii To my parents, Cristina and Mario, for their love and support iv Table of Contents Introduction 1 Outline of Chapters 25 Chapter 1: The territorial logic of political clientelism 29 Chapter 2: Revisiting territorial politics 48 Chapter 3: Constructing a macro-analytical approach 66 Chapter 4: A political history of two sub-state spaces 89 Chapter 5: Institutional transformations 110 Chapter 6: Clientelistic politics regimes at work 130 Chapter 7: Patterns of distributive politics (I): Public spending 154 Chapter 8: Patterns of distributive politics (II): Infrastructural spending 172 Chapter 9: Patterns of distributive politics (III): Voting and lobbying 191 Conclusion: Unbundling territorial politics 214 References 235 v List of Figures and Tables Figure 1. California - Southern Pacific Railroad business patronage system: p. 133. Figure 2. California - Artie Samish political clientelism system: p. 136. Figure 3. California – The lobbying clientelism system: p. 141. Figure 4. Southern Italy - Center-periphery clientelistic circuit system: p. 144. Figure 5. Southern Italy - The infrastructure of the mass clientelistic party: p. 147. Figure 6. Southern Italy - The factionalist-corrupted clientelistic system: p. 150. Table 1. Some of the main explanations of Southern Italy clientelism-prone development: p. 14. Table 2. Main explanations of California political crisis-prone development: p. 18. Table 3. Sample of political clientelism studies by world regions and countries: p. 30. Table 4. Territorial typology of political clientelism: p. 37. Table 5. Multidimensional typology of Southern Italy and California political clientelism: p. 46. Table 6. Territorial politics typology based on particularistic resources and blocs of votes: p. 54. Table 7. Institutional macro-contexts compared: p. 58. Table 8. Effect of decentralization and structure of incentive for politicians: p. 60. Table 9. Institutional linkages compared: p. 62. Table 10. Sub-state as units of analysis: p. 74. Table 11. Encompassing comparisons: p. 78. Table 12. Analytical compass of ideal types: p. 84. Table 13. Southern Italy and California political development ‘paths:’ p. 91. Table 14. The Progressive institutional reforms: p. 112. Table 15. Clientelistic politics regimes: California: p. 132. Table 16. Clientelistic politics regimes: Southern Italy: p. 143. Table 17. Aggregate public spending in the Mezzogiorno as percentage of Italy, 1980- 2006: p. 157. Table 18. Public spending distribution in the Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1972-1988 (%): p. 158. Table 19. Extraordinary expenditure in the Mezzogiorno, 1971-1989 (in millions of lire, 1989): p. 160. vi Table 20. Extraordinary expenditure in the Mezzogiorno, 1971-1998: p. 161. Table 21. Aggregate public spending in California by institutional levels, 1974-1988 (%): p. 164. Table 22. Aggregate revenue for California State Government, 1974-1989 (%): p. 165. Table 23. Aggregate revenue for California County Government, 1974-1989 (%): p. 165. Table 24. Aggregate revenue for California Local Government, 1974 to 1989 (%): p. 167. Table 25. Federal revenue and expenditures in California, 1971-2006 (In millions): p. 168. Table 26. Infrastructural expenditures by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno, 1971-1992 (millions of lire, current): p. 175. Table 27. Territorial distribution of direct investment by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%): p. 177. Table 28. Territorial distribution of transfers to firms by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%): p. 178. Table 29. Territorial distribution of transfers to public agencies by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%): 179. Table 30. Territorial distribution of transfers to regions and local agencies by the Cassa Del Mezzogiorno by Regions, 1985-1993 (%): p. 180. Table 31. State Revenue Sources for Infrastructure Financing in California, 1960-2003 (2003 $ millions): p. 184. Table 32. Per Capita City and County General Revenue by Source, California 1972-1992 (2002 $ millions): p. 185. Table 33. Federal Grants for Major Physical Capital Investment, California 1970-1995 (2002 $ millions): p. 186. Table 34. Federal Funding Expenditures by Character, California 1977-1995 (in millions): p. 187. Tab 35. Index of preference voting for the elections of the Chamber of Deputy, 1972- 1992: p. 195. Table 36. Rate of preference voting by regions - Regional elections, 1970-1990: p. 197. Table 37. Regional elections in Southern Italy by Parties, 1970-1990: p. 199. Table 38. Total campaign expenditure by candidates, California 1976-1996: p. 202. Table 39. Expenditures by candidates for the State Legislature, General Elections - California, 1976-1998: p. 203. Table 40. Average (median) expenditures all major party candidates, General Elections - California 1976-1998: p. 205. vii Table 41. Total campaign expenditure by Assembly and Senate incumbents and challengers, California, 1976-1996: p. 207. Table 42. Total lobbying expenditures legislative sessions, California 1990-2000: p. 210. viii Acknowledgments This research is the result of a three-year project, carried over thanks to the generous assistance of John Agnew and the indispensable financial support of the UCLA Department of Geography, which by providing a three full-cycle Teaching Assistant Fellowship has permitted to complete it. Without the intellectual generosity of John Agnew and the financial support of the Department of Geography, this project would have been very difficult to complete. John Agnew demonstrated that mentoring is a craft in which few academic excel. I feel lucky to have the chance to work with him. Special thanks goes to the other members of my Doctoral Dissertation Committee, Michael Storper, Michael Shin and David Rigby for helping me in the initial stages of my research and for providing the final feedback. A special mention goes to Luca Muscara’ who has provided invaluable helps since this project started and has followed it with generous criticism and humorous attitude. I am particularly grateful to Irene L. Clark for her painstakingly proofreading work, her suggestions on how to improve my English style and for her crucial suggestions in sorting out some key linguistic issues. Many members of my ‘transatlantic family’ in both Italy and United States have been supportive over these years of ‘intellectual isolation.’ In Sicily, Cristina, my mom, Patrizia, my sister and her two wonderful gems, Beatrice and Diego, have made through Skype such isolation a fun one from time to time; in San Francisco, Jeanne and Nancy and the entire Bay Area have been my island of escape and relaxation from the hot pressure of the dry Los Angeles weather. In New York, Giusy, my haunt and her family have been my point of reference since I moved into the United States, and her generous moral support never ix stopped since. Finally, Kasi McMurray, the Chief Manager of the UCLA Department of Geography, has been more than instrumental in my survival of the academic journey, providing both understanding and reprimand when the occasions demanded it. To all of them go my most appreciative thanks. Finally, this research is dedicated to my parents, Cristina and Mario, for their love and supports. Los Angeles and San Francisco, November 20, 2014 x Biographical Sketch After studying Philosophy and Economic History at the