Dietrich of Freiberg on the Succession of Forms in the Intensification of Qualities
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DIETRICH OF FREIBERG ON THE SUCCESSION OF FORMS IN THE INTENSIFICATION OF QUALITIES Brian Francis CONOLLY Abstract Dietrich of Freiberg defends the succession of forms theory in the intensifica- tion of qualities, first by arguing that unlike substances, qualities do not have the interiority that would permit any variation while remaining numerically the same. He argues further that because degrees of intensity are properties of a quality, and because properties are both relative and privative, they cannot be the terminus of a motion; rather only a new quality can. The most important philosophical objection to the succession of forms with respect to the intensi- fication of qualities is that it seems to entail a passage through an actual infin- ity of degrees of intensity. Dietrich responds to this objection by arguing that intensification is not a continuous motion. Instead, he argues, intensification proceeds through a series of very small, but finite, qualitative leaps, resulting in a motion that is discrete, stepwise and discontinuous. The intensification of qualities — as when, for example, the hotness that characterizes water in a kettle on a stove becomes hotter, or as the yellow of the goldfinch becomes brighter as spring moves into summer — gives rise to a number of problems that were discussed at great length and in detail in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. A particularly fruitful discussion concerned whether an intensified quality remains numerically the same through the course of intensification. The theory that maintains that it does not has become known as the “succession of forms” since it characterizes intensification as a process in which the more intense quality com- pletely replaces the less intense. The underlying subject, e.g., the water or the goldfinch, is thus characterized by a succession of numer- ically distinct qualities. The theory maintains that each new increase Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 81(1), 1-35. doi: 10.2143/RTPM.81.1.3030621 © 2014 by Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. All rights reserved. 2 B.F. CONOLLY or decrease in the intensity of a quality, such as heat or color, requires that a new and numerically distinct quality with the new degree of intensity completely replace the previous quality characterized by the prior degree of intensity. Thus, for example, as the water in a kettle on a stove increases in heat, the quality hotness1 of intensity d1 at time t1 is completely replaced by the new quality, hotness2 of intensity d2 at time t2. The successive qualities are numerically distinct from each other inasmuch as their respective degrees of intensity are dis- tinct; hence, as the quality of hotness intensifies as the water in the kettle remains on the hot stove, the numerical identity of the inten- sifying quality of hotness is not preserved. A variety of theories were developed in opposition to the succession of forms, all of which maintain, on the contrary, that the remitted quality (with respect to the process of intensification) is not replaced, but in some manner remains, for instance, either insofar as it is itself varied or insofar as it is added to, but in any case in such a way that numerical identity between the remitted and intensified quality is preserved.1 The philosophical discussion of the problem can be traced to Aris- totle’s Categories, where Aristotle raises the question of whether qual- ities receive more and less. The late medieval discussion of the problem sometimes, however, takes on a distinctly theological character, espe- cially inasmuch as it involves questions concerning the increase in the 1 See J.-L. SOLÈRE, “Tension et intention. Esquisse de l’histoire d’une notion,” in: L. COULOUBARITSIS – A. MAZZÙ (eds.), Questions sur l’intentionnalité, Brussels 2007, pp. 59-124. In this valuable historical overview of the problem from the ancient through the medieval and early modern periods, Solère distinguishes amongst the late medievals three proposed solutions to the problem: (1) succession, (2) addition, and (3) participation or latitude of forms. In the participation model, the quality itself in effect remains invariant throughout the process of intensification or remission; the degree of intensity is determined by the relation between quality and underlying subject. The addition solution comprises at least two variants, namely, the nutrition model and the perfection model (to be discussed below). These two are distinguished from each inasmuch as the former is more quantitative, the latter more qualitative. That is, in the latter, addition is made not part by part, but in such a way that the intensified quality is related to the remitted quality as more perfect to less perfect. See also ID., “Les variations qualitatives dans les théories post-thomistes,” in: Revue Thomiste 112 (2012), pp. 157-204; and E. JUNG, “Intension and Remission of Forms,” in: H. LAGERLUND (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500, Dordrecht 2011, Vol. 1, pp. 551-555. DIETRICH OF FREIBERG ON INTENSIFICATION 3 theological virtue of charity in the human soul.2 As is typical for late medieval philosophy, such theological concerns inform the philo- sophical discussion, especially inasmuch as the theological concern over the increase in charity gives rise to, and provides considerable support for the theory that qualitative intensification takes place through the addition of more of the quality in question, so that inten- sification becomes understood, in its simplest version, in terms of accumulation, sometimes considered in a manner analogous to nutri- tion, wherein something extrinsically advening is appropriated by the form already in place, whereby it becomes more intense.3 Such a theory of intensification would apply not only to charity or other virtues, but also to the affective qualities, e.g., color, heat, etc. This nutrition model of qualitative intensification is, in some thinkers, amended to what might be called the perfection model, perhaps in response to various objections to the former. In this latter version of the theory the more intense quality in some manner is received by and thus perfects the less intense quality, in a manner analogous to certain theories of generation, in which the prior and inferior form, e.g., the sensitive soul, receives (without being altogether replaced) and is thus perfected by the posterior and superior form, viz., the rational soul. In either case, that is, whether the nutrition model or the perfection model, two features are shared in common: (i) inten- sification occurs through the addition of some extrinsically advening form and (ii) the advening form and the prior form already in place are united in such a manner as to preserve numerical identity. This 2 This can be gleaned simply from the number of quodlibet questions in which it is asked whether charity is increased by the addition of something. See P. GLORIEUX, La Lit- térature Quodlibétique (2 vols.), Paris 1925 and 1935. See also S. PIRON’s database : <http://quodlibase.ehess.fr> (search caritas). 3 See, for instance, JACOBUS DE THERINIS (JACQUES THÉRINES), Quodlibet II, q. 14, “Utrum caritas augmentata sit eadem numero que prius?,” ed. P. GLORIEUX, Paris 1958, pp. 292-294. In addition, Hervaeus Natalis, who argues at some length against the suc- cession theory, is somewhat unclear with respect to the theory he himself subscribes. See HERVAEUS NATALIS, Quodlibet II, q. 13, “Utrum in qualibet alteratione infinitae formae differentes sint sive si remissum et intensum realiter differunt?,” Venice 1513 (reprint, Ridgewood, N.J. 1966), 58vB-61rB. Hervaeus expressly characterizes the addition theory of intensification in terms of the nutrition model, but as he develops his arguments against the succession theory appears to modify it to something much more resembling the perfec- tion theory, and ultimately characterizes the difference between intensified and remitted quality as that between more and less perfect. 4 B.F. CONOLLY latter can be made clear by analogous examples: thus, Socrates remains Socrates regardless of how much bread he eats; alternately, Socrates remains Socrates as he progresses from being a boy to being a man.4 It must be emphasized that the result of the addition of the extrinsi- cally advening form is, on these theories, not a mere conglomeration, a heap, or a pile. Rather the extrinsically advening form is in some manner appropriated by the prior form, again either in a manner analogous to nutrition, or in a manner analogous to perfection. Numerical identity is thus preserved in the sense that what was there previously, namely, the less intense or imperfect form, in some real manner remains upon intensification. It does not depart upon the arrival of the intensifying addition.5 The discussion to follow will focus upon the unusual contribution to this debate made by Dietrich of Freiberg.6 Although Dietrich was by no means the only proponent of the succession of forms theory of intensification and remission,7 his discussion of the problem and 4 See, for example, JEAN QUIDORT, Quodlibet I, q. 8, “Utrum aliquid positivum pos- sit produci a non ente? <Utrum qualitas intensa et remissa sit eadem numero vel diversa?>,” ed. A. J. HEIMAN, in: J.R. O’DONNELL (ed.), Nine Medieval Thinkers, Toronto 1955, pp. 284-286. 5 Although this characterization of the addition theory draws upon Dietrich of Frei- berg’s characterization of the same (discussed below), Thomas de Bailly similarly charac- terizes the theory in terms of the addition of an extrinsically advening form. See THOMAS DE BAILLY, Quodlibet III, q. 15, “Cum caritas intenditur, utrum gradus minus intensus corrumpatur essentialiter?,” ed. P. GLORIEUX, Paris 1950, pp. 208-217. 6 On Dietrich of Freiberg’s life and work, see K. FLASCH, Dietrich von Freiberg: Phi- losophie, Theologie, Naturforschung um 1300, Frankfurt 2007. Dietrich of Freiberg is best known for his careful analysis of the optics of the rainbow (perhaps the most noteworthy achievement of late medieval empirical science), and increasingly, for his distinctive theory of intellect, which draws heavily upon Proclus.