Thomas Aquinas on the Separability of Accidents and Dietrich of Freiberg’S Critique
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Thomas Aquinas on the Separability of Accidents and Dietrich of Freiberg’s Critique David Roderick McPike Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctorate in Philosophy degree in Philosophy Department of Philosophy Faculty of Arts University of Ottawa © David Roderick McPike, Ottawa, Canada, 2015 Abstract The opening chapter briefly introduces the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist and the history of its appropriation into the systematic rational discourse of philosophy, as culminating in Thomas Aquinas’ account of transubstantiation with its metaphysical elaboration of the separability of accidents from their subject (a substance), so as to exist (supernaturally) without a subject. Chapter Two expounds St. Thomas’ account of the separability of accidents from their subject. It shows that Thomas presents a consistent rational articulation of his position throughout his works on the subject. Chapter Three expounds Dietrich of Freiberg’s rejection of Thomas’ view, examining in detail his treatise De accidentibus, which is expressly dedicated to demonstrating the utter impossibility of separate accidents. Especially in light of Kurt Flasch’s influential analysis of this work, which praises Dietrich for his superior level of ‘methodological consciousness,’ this chapter aims to be painstaking in its exposition and to comprehensively present Dietrich’s own views just as we find them, before taking up the task of critically assessing Dietrich’s position. Chapter Four critically analyses the competing doctrinal positions expounded in the preceding two chapters. It analyses the various elements of Dietrich’s case against Thomas and attempts to pinpoint wherein Thomas and Dietrich agree and wherein they part ways. It argues that Thomas’ arguments have a strength and consistency which Dietrich’s arguments clearly lack. Chapter Five applies the argumentative findings from Chapter Four to an assessment of the analyses found in recent philosophical literature of the dispute between Thomas and Dietrich. My analysis indicates that there are some serious and persistent deficiencies in these analyses – first, those treating Thomas’ position, and consequently those treating Dietrich’s – and offers some diagnosis of the root causes of these deficiencies. I conclude with remarks addressed to general doubts about the status of the question of the separability of accidents as an actual ‘philosophical’ question. Résumé Le chapitre initial décrit brièvement la doctrine catholique de l’Eucharistie et l’histoire de l’appropriation de cette doctrine dans un cadre de discours systématiquement rationnel (c’est-à-dire, philosophique), terminant avec la doctrine de la transsubstantiation et l’élaboration métaphysique, tel que rendu par Thomas d’Aquin, de la séparabilité des accidents de leur sujet (une substance), c’est-à-dire, de la possibilité (surnaturelle) de l’existence des accidents sans aucun sujet. Le deuxième chapitre élabore l’explication de Thomas d’Aquin de la séparabilité des accidents de leur sujet. Est montré qu’au long de sa carrière Thomas n’a jamais basculé dans son articulation rationnelle de sa position. ii Au troisième chapitre est examiné le refus de la doctrine thomiste par Dietrich de Freiberg, surtout dans son traité De accidentibus, lequel se donne expressément à la démonstration de l’impossibilité absolue d’un accident séparé. En vue de l’analyse influent de Kurt Flasch, selon lequel Dietrich représente admirablement une ‘conscience de la méthode,’ ce chapitre vise à exposer soigneusement le progrès de l’argumentation du traité, tout juste comme le présente Dietrich, avant d’avancer à un analyse critique de sa position. Dans le quatrième chapitre sont soumises à l’analyse les positions rivales, celle de Thomas et celle de Dietrich. Les éléments du critique qu’apporte Dietrich contre Thomas sont examinés et l’analyse différencie les points d’accord et de désaccord entre les deux penseurs. Est démontré que l’argumentation de Thomas a une force et une consistance bien supérieure à celui de Dietrich. Dans le cinquième chapitre, sont appliquées les conclusions du quatrième chapitre à l’analyse de la littérature récente traitante de la dispute entre Thomas et Dietrich. Est montré que cette littérature comporte de graves méconnaissances de la position de Thomas, et aussi, en conséquence, de la critique de celle-ci apporté par Dietrich, et j’essaie d’élucider ce que sont les racines des inconséquences remarquées dans la littérature. Je termine en offrant quelques remarques qui s’addressent à certaines doutes générales concernant le vrai statut ‘philosophique’ de la question de la séparabilité des accidents. iii Abbreviations Thomas Aquinas InBDT Commentary on Boethius’ De trinitate InMet Commentary on the Metaphysics InSent Commentary on the Sentences Quodl. Quodlibetal disputation SCG Summa contra gentiles ST Summa theologiae Dietrich of Freiberg1 an. De animatione caeli cael. De corporibus caelestibus DA De accidentibus De origine De origine rerum praedicamentalium int. De intellectu et intelligibili quid. De quiditatibus entium vis. De visione beatifica 1 With the exception of DA and De origine, I have followed Kurt Flasch’s use of abbreviations in Flasch 2007. iv Table of Contents ABSTRACT II RÉSUMÉ II ABBREVIATIONS IV CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 1 Transubstantiation: A medieval doctrine 1 2 Historical background to the controversy 2 3 Transubstantiation as a ‘philosophical problem’ 6 4 Content and arrangement of thesis 9 CHAPTER 2: AQUINAS’ ACCOUNT OF THE SEPARABILITY OF ACCIDENTS 11 1 Introduction 11 2 Commentary on the Sentences, Book IV (Paris, 1256) 12 2.1 Separation of matter from form 14 2.2 Whether God can make accidents to be without a subject 15 2.2.1 Divine causality 16 2.2.2 The re-definition of accidents 24 2.2.3 The constitution and individuation of accidents 32 3 Quodlibet IX, q. 3 (Paris, 1257) 44 3.1 The causal ordering of the universe 44 3.1.1 Complementary orders 45 3.2 Being and definition of accidents 47 4 Summa contra gentiles IV, 62-65 (Orvieto, 1264-65) 49 4.1 Two orders 49 4.2 Divine conversion of substance and conservation of accidents 51 4.3 The ordering of the accidents 53 5 Summa theologiae III (Naples, 1272-Dec 1273) 55 5.1 The power of God 56 5.2 Definition 58 5.3 The mode of being of separate accidents 59 v 6 Conclusions 61 6.1 Twofold ordering of reality under the divine omnipotence 61 6.2 No contradiction between faith and reason 63 6.3 Divine omnipotence 64 6.4 Redefinition of accident 65 6.5 Quantity in the role of subject 66 CHAPTER 3: DIETRICH’S CRITIQUE OF THE SEPARABILITY OF ACCIDENTS 67 1 Introduction 67 2 Properties 73 2.1 Properties and principles 73 2.2 Natural properties vs. natural accidents 75 2.3 Inseparability of properties 78 2.4 Definition by ‘aptitude’ 80 3 Methodological issues 82 4 Accidents of nature 90 4.1 General characterization of accidents and substances 91 4.1.1 The necessity and finality of accidents of nature 91 4.1.2 Defining the difference between substances and accidents 94 4.1.3 The essential analogy of accidents to substance 98 4.1.4 The relation or inclination of accidents to substance 99 4.1.5 The quiddities and definitions of substances vs. accidents 101 4.2 Confirmation: an accident does not have an absolute essence or quiddity 108 4.2.1 On the essence or being of accidents 109 4.2.2 On the quiddity or form of accidents 111 4.3 The impossibility of separate accidents 116 4.4 Refutation of Thomas’ defense of separability 123 4.4.1. Against the (re)definition of accidents 123 4.4.2. Against any appeal to the special nature of divine causality 128 4.4.3. Against the inherence of the other accidents in quantity 134 5 Conclusions 137 CHAPTER 4: PRIMARY ANALYSIS OF DIETRICH’S CASE AGAINST THOMAS 143 1 The teleological nature of accidents 144 1.1 The fundamental teleological ratio of accidents 144 1.2 Teleology in the distinction between natural properties and natural accidents 145 1.2.1 Separability of properties 148 1.3 Proper operations 149 2 The essential definition of accidents and proof of their inseparability 154 vi 2.1 The Nature of Definitions 154 2.2 Analogy of accidents to substance 158 2.3 Accidental essence and quiddity 163 2.4 Proof of the impossibility of separate accidents 167 2.5 Grounding the truth of definitions 170 2.6 Defining natural accidents vs. defining geometrical figures 175 3 ‘Aptitudinal’ definition of accidents 176 4 Divine causality 182 5 The primacy of quantity 189 6 Dietrich’s methodological complaints 194 7 Conclusion 199 CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF DIETRICH’S CASE AGAINST THOMAS 201 1 Armand Maurer and the relevance of the esse-essentia distinction 202 2 Kurt Flasch 209 2.1 Flasch on Aquinas on Transubstantiation 210 2.1.1 Divine privilege 210 2.1.2 Definition of Accidents 219 2.1.3 Quantity as Subject 226 2.2 Flasch on Dietrich on Thomas on Transubstantiation 230 2.2.1 Methodological issues 230 2.2.2 The operational distinction between substance and accidents 232 2.2.3 On Thomas’ destruction of science 233 3 Other expositions of De accidentibus in relation to Flasch’s 236 3.1 Ruedi Imbach 236 3.2 Catherine König-Pralong 246 3.3 Karl-Hermann Kandler 253 4 Conclusion 261 GENERAL CONCLUSION 270 BIBLIOGRAPHY 275 I. Primary Sources 275 II. Translations 276 vii III. Literature relevant to the separability of accidents 276 IV. Ancillary literature 279 viii Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Transubstantiation: A medieval doctrine The prominent medievalist