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This article was downloaded by: 10.3.98.104 On: 01 Oct 2021 Access details: subscription number Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK

The Routledge Companion to

Lorraine Besser-Jones, Michael Slote

The Stoic Theory of Virtue

Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 Tad Brennan Published online on: 24 Feb 2015

How to cite :- Tad Brennan. 24 Feb 2015, The Stoic Theory of Virtue from: The Routledge Companion to Routledge Accessed on: 01 Oct 2021 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203071755.ch3

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Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 role inthelargerstructure. interest theStoictheoryof virtuehas,canonlybeseenthroughexaminingits acquire somephilosophical motivationandrationale.Whateverphilosophical work, they do not (in my opinion) gain much plausibility, but they do at least in lightoftheStoics’broadercommitmentsandtheoretical frame understood context intheStoicsystemasawhole,theylooklaughably implausible.When Stoics maintainedaboutvirtue.Consideredinisolation fromtheirtheoretical friendly, andonlytheyarewealthy, andlovable. good-looking, Only thevirtuous—whomStoicsrefertoas“Sages”—are sane,free,and you arevicious,alsoinsane,andenslaved,an enemyofallmankind. that doesn’t meanthatyouare moreabletobreatheasyougetcloser. Solongas case. You mightbegettingclosertoaplacewhereyouwillablebreathe,but sea: whetheryouarefivefeetunderwaterormiles, aredrowningineither towards virtue is like a drowning man some distance beneath the surface of the thoroughly vicious and not even partly virtuous. The person making progress progress towardsvirtue,theStoicsinsist,butduringthisyouarestill virtuous thananother:allviciouspeopleareequallyvicious.Itispossibletomake vicious, and entirely wretched and miserable as a result. Noris any of us more Stoic schoolthemselves—aretrulyvirtuous.Notevenclose.We areallentirely of perfection,thatnohumanbeingsknowntous—noteventhefounders no lesshappythanZeushimself. contributor toourhappiness.Whoeverhasvirtueisperfectlyhappy, andindeed happiness, andsufficientforourindeedthesolecomponent ferents, withnotendencytobringushappiness.Virtue isnecessaryforour thing, andallofthethingsthatwemistakenlyvaluepursuearemerelyindif even itself, as much as the sun outshines a candle. Indeed, it is the only good Virtue, saytheStoics,isfinestofallthings,outshining pleasure,wealth,and These aresomeoftheextraordinaryandcounter-intuitive thesesthatthe Alas, thatnoneofushaveit!Forvirtueissodemanding,requiressuchapitch THE STOICTHEORY OF Tad Brennan VIRTUE Introduction 3 1 - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 one commonwayofunderstandingthedefinitionvirtuecannotberight. give ageneralpictureoftherolevirtueinStoicethics,andalsotoarguethat return toadeeperexaminationoftheirtheoryvirtue.Ishallattemptboth in ordertocollectsomepiecesoftheoreticalandanalyticalmachinery, beforewe they imply, make the total figure wholly plausible. logical andethicaloutput;theirrangevariety, aswellthelacunaethat and fifty titles have been preserved in an ancient catalogue, including parts of his Academic SkepticArcesilaus(320?bc–242). bc), andlearnedagreatdealaswellfromthefinestearlycriticofStoics, on .ChrysippusstudiedwithZeno’s successor, (331 was activeinZeno’s time,butthePeripateticschoolleft few discernibletraces Academy andmembersoftheCynicsect.’s successor, Theophrastus, and set a pattern for the Rule of Benedict and later codes ofconduct. and setapatternfortheRuleofBenedictlatercodes and prohibitions,wasadoptedwholesalebyearlyChristianmonasticmovements, Stoics, andEpictetus’“Manual,”withitsnumberedlistofshort,practicalinjunctions few stillidentifiedasStoics.ButStoicethicaltreatisescontinuedtobereadbynon- gent PlatonistswhofollowedPlotinus(205 to itsrejectionbymainstreamChristians,aswellcondemnationtheresur Christian theology, itsrigorousmaterialismandexclusionof incorporealentitiesled between 232and206 height ofitsphilosophicalsophisticationunderthirdleader, ChrysippusofSoli, The Stoic school was founded by around 300 attempts of Tertullian (160 ad–180 “Stoics,” weassumeitstemsfromChrysippus. views as authoritative, and when reports attribute a doctrine to unnamed authors, manyofthemcriticstheStoicschool.Later Stoicsalwaystreatedhis nothing survivesbeyondquotations,paraphrases,and attributionsinlater might suggest to the modern ear.might suggesttothemodern , for instance,included theology, contents ofthesethreedivisions differedtosomeextentfromwhattheirnames indeed, thefirstschoolto structure theirsystemaroundthistrichotomy. The The Stoicsdividedtheirphilosophy intoPhysics,,andEthics,were, when Seneca(1 For that , I want to turn now to a general overview of the Stoic system, issaidtohavewrittenoversevenhundredbooks.Some Prior tofoundingtheschool,ZenohadstudiedwithmembersofPlato’s ) made it the moral of the Roman empire. Despite the ad) madeitthemoralconscienceofRomanempire.Despite Overview ofStoicSystemandRelevantDoctrines ad–65 bc. ad), (55 Itreachedtheheightofitspopularityafewcenturieslater, The HistoricalBackground The DoctrinalBackground HISTORY OFVIRTUE ETHICS ad–225 ) to incorporate Stoic into ad) to incorporate Stoic metaphysics into 32 ad–135 ad –270 ad ), and (121 ad), andMarcusAurelius(121 3 Of this astounding output, ). Bythefourthcentury, very It reached the bc. It reached the 2 bc–232 - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 and ),oritspneuma, sodisposed,orthedisposition ofits ness intherubymaybedescribed equallywellastheruby’s activeelements( sodisposed:thequality ofred dispositions shouldsimplybe identifiedwithbodies nents oftheStoicssometimes presseduponthem.TheStoics,instead,claimedthat sodisposed;andthiswasaconclusionthatoppo property distinctfromthebody therefore thedisposition,meaningbythisanincorporeal elementorstructural A differentschoolmighthaveconcludedthatthecause oftheruby’s rednesswas ference betweenahandheldopenandthesame clenchedintoafist. illustrated bysuchcasesasthedifferencebetweenstanding andsitting,orthedif ently in virtue of its internal disposition, where the of disposition is blue, whenanothermakesthingsred.Herewelearnthat the pneuma as well; so wewill wish to knowwhyoneparcelof bine intoastuffcalled“ elements, whileairandfirewerereferredtoasactiveelements.Firecom of allfourelements.Thefirsttwo,earthandwater, were referredtoaspassive fire. Ordinaryobjects,suchasachair, atree,orhumanbeing, containsamples and areacteduponbyphysicalevents,oursouls,too,mustbecorporeal. andsinceoursoulsbothact interact withthecosmos,theymustallbebodily; areallactiveand said, canactorbeactedupon;sinceZeusandtheothergods realism; theviewthateverythingwhichexists,isbodily. theStoics Onlybodies, Perhaps themoststrikingfeatureofStoicPhysicswasitsthoroughgoingcorpo namesake,butdidalsoincludepoliticaltheory.its modern breaking researchinformallogicandsemantics.StoicEthicsdiffered less from think of as , theory of language, and rhetoric, alongside path- andthestudyofplantsanimals.Logicincludedwhatwewould , ,andthenatureofcausation,aswelltopicssuch qualify itinthisway. Zeus andhasbeendeterminedtooccursincethebeginningofcosmos. the world,includingeverypsychologicaleventinourownminds,wascausedby interactions, ZeuscanalsobecalledFateorDestiny. Every eventthatoccursin ens celestial.Whenconsideredastheuniversalmovingagentincausal or mundane,andisactivelymakingthemudmuddyaswellheav held that Zeus is present in every volume of the , no matter how small although far from clear about howthe details worked out.Accordingly, the Stoics ties, is also in some Zeusthe sources or ; are emphatic about this living thing.Thisactiveprincipleineachthing,whichbestowsonititsproper also makesithard,justasthe properties ofanyobject;itisthe All corporealentitiesarecomposedofthefourelements:earth,water, air, and When weaskwhatmakesarubyred,aretoldfirstthat currentsofpneuma 4 But, of course, sapphires are blue because of currents of But,ofcourse,sapphiresarebluebecausecurrents of pneuma,” whichisresponsibleforallofthecohesionand THE STOICTHEORY OFVIRTUE pneuma inatreemakesitoneand pneuma Physics 33 inastonewhichmakesitoneand makes things pneuma makes things pneuma actsdiffer pneuma. ------5

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 , where they leave an impression ( Perceptual data from the external world are channeled by the sense-organs to the judgment, orimpulse.Humans havethepowertoassentimpressionsor impressions, whetherperceptual orimpulsive,withouttherebyacquiringabelief, act in accordance with them. Not so in humans; adult humans can entertain desirable ordangerous,to-be-pursuedto-be-avoided. sive impressionsthatrepresentobjects,insomenon-conceptual fashion,as impressions arenotcorrelatedwithpropositionalcontent, canstillhaveimpul- toeat.” Butirrational animals, whosedo,” or“that apple certainly looksgood such propositions as “Iwant to eat that apple,” “eating that apple is what I should sub-class ofimpulsiveimpressions.Inanadulthuman,this mightcorrelatewith conative, normative,orevaluative,thentheimpression will belongtothespecial impression (e.g.)thattheappleisred.Ifpartofcontent oftheimpressionis content (anaxiôma),whichmakesitnotonlyanimpressionofapple,but the impression inanadulthumanbeingisalsocorrelated with somepropositional and Aristotle) compared totheimprint left inwaxbya seal-ring. The properties. and “tenor”—wasthoughtofasthesourcelargerbody’s unity, identity, and or were thoughttogaintheircohesionfrombeingheldtogetherbya“tenor,” Finally, coherentnon-livingsubstancessuchasaceramicvaseorbronzebell animated by (not but) “,”usingthe endlessly ambiguous word physis. that alsodeterminestheirotherproperties.Inaddition,plantswereheldtobe animals givethemtheiressenceandunity;theyareaprincipleofcohesion instances includethenon-rationalsouls(psykhai)ofloweranimals.The reason ( to the role of substantial forms in an Aristotelian ontology. The rational soul or be called“natures”;twocanalso“souls.” I amacohesiveunifiedbody. Allfourkindscanbecalled“tenors”;threealso is also the “” by which I am aliving thing, and is also the“tenor”by which less complexkind.SomyrationalsoulisalsoabywhichIamananimal,and and rationalsoul,eachmorecomplexkindofprincipleisalsoamemberthe resulted inanyotherevent.Inthehierarchicalsystemof“tenor,” “nature,”soul, by causesthatstretchbacktothebeginningofcosmos,andcouldnothave body. Heretoo,ZeusandFatepervade:ifthebellrings,thenitwascausedtoring currents of plex vibratorymotionthatpervadesaringingbellcanstandasanimageforthe so itbehavesasaunifiedmassratherthanheapofdiscreteparticles.Thecom When animalshavesuchimpressions theytherebyhaveimpulsestoact,and Now there is a class of pneumatic currents that play a role somewhat analogous Now thereisaclassofpneumaticcurrentsthatplayrolesomewhatanalogous hexis. Eachofthesepneumaticorganizingprinciples—reason,soul,“nature,” ) of an adult human is one instance of this class; other 6 pneuma If we strike a bronze bell, it will produce aringingtone,andindoing Ifwestrikeabronzebell,itwillproduce that the Stoics imagined at work in every macroscopic unified thattheStoicsimaginedatworkineverymacroscopicunified HISTORY OFVIRTUE ETHICS Logic andEpistemology 34 phantasia ) which the Stoics (following 7 - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 other externalfeaturesthatmightnotbeintrospectiblyaccessible.) accessible tointrospection,orwhethertheyalsoincludeditscausalhistoryand between distinct, butitisamatterofscholarlycontroversywhetherthecrucialdifferences times glossedinancientsourcesasamatterofitsbeingevident,clear, and any impression that couldhavecome from what is not thecase. (This is some where thisrequiresittobetrue,madetruebywhatisthecase,andunlike the impressiongoes,itmusthavespecialcharacteristicofbeing“katalêptic,” refutation-mongering, notthelureofpleasure,threattorture.Sofaras sure couldcausemetoreversemyassent:notSocraticelenchus,sophistical assent mustbestrong,ratherthanweak,wherethismeansthatnopossiblepres towards whichitisdirected.Foranactofassentingtocountasknowing,the one intrinsic to the assent involved, and one deriving from the impression between -constitutingassentsandmerebelief-constitutingassents, that thisismyhand,whenIknowhand.Therearetwodifferences idea thatvirtueisknowledge,andviceamatterofdefective . their epistemicperfection.ThisisaStoicspecificationof thetraditionalSocratic ized epistemicagentinthefirstinstance;theirethicalperfections allstemfrom is similartoonethatcouldbefalse.TheStoicSagebestthoughtofasanideal impressions, sothat they would never assent eventothesortof impression that beliefs. Indeed, this is partof why they will give their assentonly tokatalêptic Liar. Andtheycannotbecaughtinanycontradiction,because theyhavenofalse since theyknowhowtosolvealloftheparadoxes,includingSoritesand daunted bytorture,ofcourse.Buttheyalsocannotbedeceivedanysophistry, have assentedtosomething are, sinceonlySagesareentirelyimmunefromchangingtheirmindafterthey perceptibles innormalconditions.Strongassents,however, areasrareSages ple receivethemallthetime,e.g.myperceptualimpressionsofclearanddistinct canhaveknowledgeofthesurroundingworld.There arealso ­species ofassent,andwithoutassentthereisnobeliefimpulse. ­withhold theirassentfromimpressions.Beliefandimpulse(inhumans)are and theinitiationofactions.But theStoicsavoidedthissortofparalysisby them from engaging in ordinary deliberation, the formation of desires and intentions, them fromengaginginordinary deliberation,theformationofdesiresandintentions, impression (evenifitisatrue impression)thatshewillbealivetomorrow. and soshecannotknowthatwillbealivetomorrow, andmustnotassenttothe cient. Shecannotreceivea things are not harmful.” But the Sage virtue” is and not “good omniscient or pres ready store of those, as well as a stock of analytic on the order of “ is a sions ofmathematical and logical axioms and arguments, sothattheSagehas a Katalêptic impressionsarenotterriblyrare,andbothvirtuousviciouspeo Some assentsconstitutecasesofknowledge,e.g.myassenttotheimpression There are The Sages’ refusal to form beliefs about the future looks as though it might prevent The Sages’refusaltoformbeliefs aboutthefuturelooksasthoughitmightprevent katalêptic katalêptic impressions were internal to its content and andnon-katalêpticimpressionswereinternaltoitscontent impressions ofpresent perceptible states ofaffairs, sothe THE STOICTHEORY OFVIRTUE katalêptic impressionofherselfbeingalivetomorrow, katalêptic. Theycannotbeseducedbypleasureor 35 katalêptic constructing constructing ­ impres ------

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 Here arethemosthelpfulpiecesofprimaryevidence: positions toassentimpressionsthroughourearlieractualassentsimpressions. we perform,buttheywillanalyzethisbysayingthatacquireoursettleddis can agree with Aristotle (e.g.) that we acquire our character by the actions that chocolate, andalsobypreviousassentstosimilarimpressions.ThustheStoics toeat,isaffected bothbypreviousimpressionsof this chocolatewouldbegood sition toassent.Theprobabilitythatonewillassenttheimpression,e.g. eating follows directly on the impulse. Third, there are alterations to one’s dispo to animpulsiveimpressionthat,e.g.,weoughteatnow, thentheactionof ories, whicharestored-upimpressions.Second,thereactions;whenweassent being true.AndwhileIcannothavea a beliefaboutpresentstateofaffairs,i.e.thecurrentreasonabilityproposition’s All that I need is the belief that it is reasonable that I shall be alive tomorrow. This is tomorrow (andifIwishtoavoidrashnessandprecipitancy, Ioughtnottobelieveit). future. WhenIdomyshoppingtoday, Idonotneedtobelievethatwillbealive their general theory of action in such way that it does not require beliefs about the 3. 2. 1. shall learnmoreaboutthedefinitionbypressingthree questions: tion” or more literally an “agreeing disposition”: a Our bestaccountofthedefinitionvirtuesaysthatitisa“consistentdisposi of affairs,Icanhavea with thiscontentissufficienttogroundactionandimpulse. her thisevening,butshecanknowthatitisreasonablewill.Andknowledge that itisreasonablethisshouldoccur. Shecannotknow thatbreadwillnourish know thatastonereleasedfromherhandwillfalltotheground,butshecan of nature. From her knowledge of the general workings of the world, the Sage cannot -makers forit,willbealotofparticularperceptiblefacts,plussomegenerallaws its currentlybeingreasonablethatP. Theevidentiarybasisforthisimpression,likethe

The sequelaeofimpressionsandassentarethreesorts.First,theremem virtue, asforinstance,. Another sortisuntheorized, e.g.health.Andathirdsortistheorematic virtue is,generally, theperfection ofanygiventhing,e.g.astatue. They saythatvirtueisanagreeing/consistentdisposition. Onesortof What isavirtueconsistentwith,orinagreementwith? What isavirtuedispositiontodo? What isavirtuedispositionof?(inAristotelianterms) isitssubstratum? impression of a present contingent state of affairs, sc. katalêptic impressionofapresentcontingentstateaffairs,sc. What isaVirtue aDispositionOf? HISTORY OFVIRTUE ETHICS The TheoryofVirtue 9 katalêptic 36 impression of a future contingent state impressionofafuturecontingentstate (SVF 3.197=DL7.89–90) diathesis homologoumenê. We 8 - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 what is perfected is not the right sort of thing. Not just any nature can be perfected what isperfectednottheright sortofthing.Notjustanynaturecanbeperfected their natures, but these perfections do not count as , strictlyspeaking, because and treesorhorsescanbesaid tohavevirtuesbecauseoftheperfectdevelopment A statuecanbesaidtohave statuesque virtuesbecauseofitsperfectionasastatue, counts asavirtueinthestrictestsense:rationalnature, natureofarationalbeing. for theargumenttogothrough.Thereisonlyonekindof naturewhoseperfection nections between virtue and nature are the same, and need to be the same in order which itappliestoallnaturalthingsislooseorcatachrestic. Buttheanalyticalcon indeed, onlyadulthumanbeings.Thisiswhythemore general senseofvirtuein speaking) oftreesandhorsesaregroundedinnature. that humanvirtuemustbegroundedbynature,because thevirtues(loosely sense in whichwespeakofhumanvirtue.Indeed,heusesitasapremise to prove catachrestic sense,butnotasensewhollydistinctfrom or unconnectedwiththe to statuesorpruning-knives.ThissenseisflaggedinCiceroasstillaloose and thingsthathavenatures,socanbeappliedtotreeshorses,butnot instance) ’insistenceinthe This istheloosestandmostgeneralsenseofterm“virtue,”familiartousfrom(for can haveaperfection,virtueinthissense:evenanartifactlikestatue. “virtue” inwhichitmaybeappliedtoanygiventhingthathasaperfection.Whatever Several thingsemergefromthesequotations.Oneisthatthereasenseoftheterm Now, inthestrictestsenseof“virtue,”onlyhumanbeingscanhavevirtues— There isanarrowersenseoftheterm“virtue”inwhichitappliestonatures simply istheperfectionofnatureeachthing,ashehimselfagrees. For each of the things that exist, there is one perfection, and a virtue tues of one capacity, just as there cannot be many perfections of one thing. virtues, butonlyonecapacityofthesoul.Fortherecannotbemanyvir respect) but because he says that there are many and many capacity (forasliplikethatisnotbigdeal,andwedodisagreein Chrysippus madeamassivemistake,notbyhisdenialthatanyvirtueis oped tothehighestextent. Virtue isnothingotherthannature,broughttoperfection anddevel be determinedbynatureaswell. ion, butinnature.Andaccordingly, moralintegrityanddepravitymust of ahorse(aswecallthem,usingthetermloosely)isfoundedinopin in nature, would be insane. For neither the virtue of a tree nor the virtue To suppose that the virtues are projected by opinion, and not grounded THE STOICTHEORY OFVIRTUE (SVF 3.257=GalenPHPV.5.167, 446) (SVF 3.311=CicerodeLegibusI.16,44) (SVF 3.245=CicerodeLegibusI.8.25) 37 (353b)thatapruning-knifehasvirtue. 10 - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 and knives, we do so by a further loosening of our usage of “nature,” so that it can be and knives,wedosobyafurtherlooseningofourusage“nature,”thatitcanbe (and whenweloosenthesenseof“virtue”further, tospeakofthevirtuesstatues it appliestohorsesandtrees,exceptbybeingtheperfectionofthatthing’s nature loosesenseinwhich in whichitappliestohumanbeings,oreventhemoderately into avirtueinthestrictsense.However, nothingcanbeavirtue,inthestrictsense has thevirtue;e.g.reasonofahumanbeing,or‘nature’tree.” answer willbe,“Itisadispositionofthepneumaticprinciplethingthat and “tenor,” respectively. So,whenweask,“Whatisvirtueadispositionof?”the qualities, by pneumaticprinciples which are referred to asreason,soul,“nature,” saw earlierthateachoftheseismadewhatitis,andgivenitscohesion them tobecalledvirtuous,wewillhavetheanswerourfirstquestion.For decent,admirable,etc.,person. this isagood, the terms thatare uniquely applicable to human , e.g.when we saythat andreachedtheir natural end,andbecome praiseworthy in attained theirgood essence ofhumansisreason;soifthehumanperfectstheirreason,thentheyhave worthy (e.g.wesaythatitisafirst-ratepruning-knife,orfinehorse).Butthe andreached itsnaturalendandbecomespraise in, thenithasattaineditsgood be inbetterandworsestates.Whenithasperfectedwhateveritsessenceconsists Here againweseeageneralpattern,applicabletoeachthing( applied virtue simplyisreason( in areportthatvirtueisdispositionoftherationalsoul,which continues,“orrather, thattheyaredispositionsof.Wepositions withthebodies canfindaninstanceofthat sense the answer simply is: to agree. But “agreeing” or “in agreement” here Our secondquestionasked whatthedispositionisatodo.Inone to referthekindofpneumaticprinciplepossessedbyeach livingthing. above), thatthevirtuesimplyisnature,inacertaindisposition, using“nature”here has anatureisthecorrectdispositionofthatnature,orwe cansay(asCicerodoes simply isitssoul,disposedinacertainway. We cansaythatthevirtue ofanythingthat could saythatthehorse’s virtueisadispositionofitssoul,orwecouldsaythat We alsonotedtheStoichabitofmaintainingtheircorporealismbyidentifyingdis If weconsiderhumans,horses,trees,andstatues,whatitisforeachof nature. Thisperfectreasoniscalled“virtue.” being perfectsthis,sheispraiseworthyandhasgraspedtheendofher ofahumanbeing isreason;thenifthehuman nature; andifthegood ispraiseworthyandhasreachedtheendofits when itattainsitsgood, perfect, itconstitutesthehappinessofahumanbeing.Ifeachthing, What is the essence of a human being? Reason. When it is right and ­metaphorically totheessenceorfunctionofartifact). What isaVirtue aDisposition toDo? logos) inagreementandstableincontrovertible.” HISTORY OFVIRTUE ETHICS 38 (SVF 3.200=Senecaep.76.10) omnis res ) that can ) thatcan 12 So we Sowe 11 - -

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 were avirtuousone,thenmy tially, theirprohairesis. allowing Epictetustorepeatedly insistthateachpersonsimplyis,mostessen thing asmyrationalsoul,which insomesenseisthesamethingasme,thus vice. Andinbothcases,my virtueormyviceprohairesis Since mydispositionsarenotvirtuous, dency to assent to“3 shouldbeeaten,aswellmyfairlyreliableten to believethatsweetfoods totality oftheirdispositionstoassentanypossibleimpression. Mytendency disposition toassent:their tarily, wecannotethatEpictetushasaspecialtermforanindividual’s agreeing-ly, orconsistently. Restrictingourfocustothehumancase momen assent, ortohaveimpulses,grow, ortocohere—inanagreeingfashion, of a given substance is a disposition to do what that sort of substance does—to particularassents inawaythatisagreement. tion toassentproduces A virtuous human is one all of whose assents are inagreement, one whose disposi assents andsuspensions(thisiswhatEpictetusreferstoasthe“useofimpressions”). they assent,andthetotalityofahumanlifemayberewrittenashistoryits and self-maintenanceisinagreement.Humansdohaveimpulses,butonlywhen is avirtuousonewillbedecidedbywhetheritsbehavioringrowth,reproduction, all under the guidance of their “natures,” and the question of whether a given plant impulses. Buttheydogrow, themselves, andmaintainthemselves,reproduce level up.Plantscannotact:theydonottakeinimpressions,andhaveno agreement. question of the badger’s virtueis the question of whether itsimpulsesare in that itdoesbythemovementsofitssoulinresponsetoimpressions.And matings, alloftheactivitiesthatitperformsasanimalis,arethings roundings andrespondingtothem.Allofitshuntingsburrowings that theanimallivesbyimpulse:ittakinginimpressionsofitssur first-order activities such as hunting and eating by saying (as the Stoics do say), behavior agreeswith.)We maygiveamoregeneralcharacterization ofthe that itundertakes.(We arepostponingforasectionthe question ofwhatits thefirst-orderactionsit sleepsinagreementandsoon;themodifies row. Whatmakesitavirtuousbadgeristhefactthateatsinagreementand do verylittlefirst-orderagreeing;rather, itwilleatandsleephuntbur or dining;theagreementisapropertyofunderlyingactions. What wearedoing,inthefirstinstance,isnotagreeing,butrathercalculating If weagreeinourmealtimes,thenyoudineandIbothateight. then youarecalculatingandIamwearriveatthesameanswers. functions more like an adverb than a verb. If you and I agree in our calculations, So wehaveansweredoursecondquestion:thedispositionthatisvirtue The samethoughtwillapplytotheplant,oneleveldown,andhuman, The same applies to virtues. The badger that has the virtue of a badger will + 14 4 = THE STOICTHEORY OFVIRTUE 7,” are both part of my prohairesis wouldbethesamethingasmyvirtue. . 13 39 Anindividual’s prohairesis isthesamethingasmy prohairesis. If my disposition prohairesis areallthesame issimplythe ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 these principlesdonotchangeovertime. ior: theSagedecideswhattodobyconsultingalistofethicalprinciples,and is thoughttorestontheirrelianceastablesetofmaximsandrulesbehav consistent becausehewakesat6everymorning.Orsometimestheconsistency cerned aboutinter-temporal regularityofbehavior:theSage’s characteris Sometimes this sort of view is developed into a view that the Stoics were con - agreement, nottheself-consistency. virtue isinagreement.But what thedefinitionofvirtueactuallyreferstois mitted toP&~P)isentailed bythesortofexternalstandardwithwhichtheir rational self-consistency(in thesenseoftheirneverbeingsimultaneouslycom imitation ofaconsistentthingcancontaininconsistencies. Thus,theSage’s contradictory. Zeus’s ownthoughtscontainnocontradictions, andnosuccessful be inagreementwiththatstandardiftheirbeliefsordispositions tobelieveare be thoughtofasthebeliefsandimpulses—theassents—of Zeushimself. is natureingeneral,bothhumanandcosmicnature, wherethiscanalso of agreement,i.e.whata virtuous humandispositionassents in agreementwith, soul oftheSage,wheninfactstandardisexternalto theirsoul.Thestandard it encouragesustolookforthestandardofconsistency oragreementinsidethe in factpossessvariouskindsofself-consistency. Butitisamisreading,insofaras even though,onthereadingIadvocate,itwillturnoutthatSage’s souldoes position, itseemstomebeamisreadingofthedefinition.Itis explicating theirtranslation“virtueisaconsistentcharacter.” disposition agreeorconsist?”is,“itself.”Here,forinstance,areLongandSedley consistent.” Onthisview, therightanswertoquestion, “withwhatdoesthe asashort-handfor“self- disposition,” where“consistent”isunderstood according towhichthedefinitionisreadasclaimingthat“virtueaconsistent of virtue,Ishouldnotethatmyviewisinconflictwithawidelyheldview, plant willbeonethatgrowsinagreementwithnature. animal one that has impulses and acts in agreement with nature; and a virtuous virtuous humanwillbeonethatassentsinagreementwithnature;a sist? Anumberofstrandsevidenceconvergeontheanswer:nature.Soa does thebehaviorofavirtuousaspidistra,antelope,orAthenian,agreecon Finally wecanask:whatisthestandardofagreementorconsistency?With what But howeverwedevelopthethoughtthatvirtueisalogicallyconsistentdis Now itfollowsfromthenatureofthatexternalstandard thattheSagecannot Before presentingtheevidenceinfavorofthisinterpretationdefinition Virtue, then, is rational consistency, a character of the soul’s commanding- faculty analogous tothestraightnessofaperfectlystraightline. sistent or inconsistent; this consistency, or the virtues it promotes, is What isaVirtue ConsistentWith, orInAgreementWith?

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A person’s reasoning faculty is conceived as being either con HISTORY OFVIRTUE ETHICS 40 15 -

- - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 (a action aperfectly befitting action, ora perfect action, or avirtuous action action, theydosofromtheirspecialvirtuousdisposition, whichmakestheir would havedonethesamething.However, whentheSageperformsabefitting motivations wereindoingit.HadaSagebeenthe same circumstances,she rect action,thenIhavedoneabefittingnomatter whatmythoughtsor is virtuousornot.IfI(whoamnotvirtuous)dotheright thing,performthecor They are, speaking very broadly, what one should do in each case, whether one ously translatedas“properfunctions,”“befittingactions,”“duties,”andsoon. virtuous humanbeingbelongtoaclassofactionsknownas“ horses andplants. faculty,” thenitisveryhardtoseehowthiscouldbeapplied, evenloosely, to the definitionsimplysays“virtueislogicalconsistencyofone’s reasoning impulses bytheirknowledgeofnature.However, ifwestart fromtheideathat foremost toassentandsuspendinacertainway, toregulate theirbeliefsand general andtheirnatureashumanbeingsrequiresthemtodo,whichisfirst right specification oftheir virtue: they ought to do excellently what nature in seeing howthispatterncanapplytorationalhumanbeings,andgeneratethe nature ofhorsesinparticular, requireshorsestodo.Andthere isnoproblemin then itsvirtueconsistsindoingexcellentlywhatnaturegeneral,andthe is inagreementwiththenaturalnormsforthatsortoforganism.Ifitahorse, means tosaythatahorseortreeisvirtuousone.Theactivityofthisorganism asacriterion ofagreement,wecanseewhatit If thedefinitionisunderstood definition is clearly intended to apply to more things than rational human beings. importance onmypastbehaviorthanthecurrentcommandsofZeus? essentially vicious, more essentially egotistical and impious, than placing more at 5,whatdoesitmatterthatIhavehabituallywoken6?Whatcouldbemore consistency canbeofnointeresttoagenuineStoic:ifZeusnowwillsmewake rather thaninward,onyourowninternalconsistency. Certainlyinter-temporal ward, ontheworldandwhatyoucanlearnfromitaboutintentionsofZeus, right, meansitsbeinginconformitywiththewillofZeus.Itfocusingout theorists, notcoherencetheorists.Your soul’s perfection,yoursoul’s gettingit about the right reason of a virtuous human being, the Stoics are correspondence i.e. avirtuousaction. action, althoughitdoespreclude mefromperformingaperfectlybefittingaction, to offersuchajustification doesnotprecludemefromperformingabefitting the probablecourseofnature andcommandsofZeus.ThefactthatIamunable shows howaSagecouldhavearrivedatanimpulsetoperform itbyreflectingon given of it (in principle, if not by the agent), a reasonable justification, which ting action:whatmakesitbefittingisthatacertainkind ofjustificationcouldbe katorthôma Here isanotherwayofarrivingatthesameconclusion.Allactionsa One reasontoprefermyparsingofthedefinitioncomesfromfactthat Another waytoputthesamethought:intheirunderstandingofwhatisright ). Havingthisspecialdispositionisnotessentialtoitsbeing abefit THE STOICTHEORY OFVIRTUE 41 kathêkonta,” vari- - - -

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 in themaswell.” actions extendalsotoplantsandanimals;forbefittingcanbeobserved agreement withanexternal standard,notasinward-lookinglogicalconsistency. virtue. Thisisafurtherreason toconcludethatvirtueisdefinedintermsof will ofZeus.Buttolivein thiswayisalso,equivalently, toliveaccording an externalstandardofnature, bothhumannatureandcosmicnature,i.e.the Governor oftheUniverse.” through theagreement(sumphônia)ofherpersonaldaemonwithwill this, hesaid,isthevirtueofhappyperson,whenshe performseveryaction tical law:theyarethesubjectiveandobjectiveaspects of thesamenorm.“And stand tonatureitselfinthiscontextsomewhatasKantian maximstandstoprac thing asZeus,pervadingallthings.One’s knowledgeandexperienceofnature in questionisone’s ownnature,andthenatureofcosmos,whichissame knowledge andexperienceofthethingsthathappenby nature, wherethenature that whenoneattemptstoliveinagreementwithnature, onelivesthroughone’s ment withnature( virtue ( different terms. in somesenseequivalent,andmerelyexpressedthesamedoctrineslightly formulations bydifferentStoics,buttheyallinsistedthatthewere with a certain kind of standard or . This norm is given different verbal well. Mostsubstantively, however, theStoicsdefineditaslivinginaccordance uatively by sayingthat it is the same thing as ,orliving happily and it isnotdoneforthesakeofanythingfurther. Oritcan be characterizedeval ally aswhateverythingelseisrationallyorproperlydoneforthesakeof,while telos orfinalend.Theendforhumanbeingscanbecharacterizedstructur that requirementintheircase. in general,evenifitsspecificapplicationtothecaseofhumanbeingsdoesentail “a reasoningfacultythatmanifestslogicalself-consistency.” Itcannotmeanthat asmeaning down thesamescala.Andifitistodothat,cannotbeunderstood that theyalsodesignedtheirdefinitionofvirtuesoitwouldapplyupand ifications upanddownthescalaofnaturalthings,shouldreinforceourconviction a general theory - of the befitting action, which applies with the appropriate mod are virtuousintheloosersense.SofactthatStoicsstipulatethereis close assuchorganismscancometobeingvirtuousinthestrictsense,andthey their proper functions or befitting actions,and when they doso, they comeas virtuous, when“virtue”isusedstrictly. Butplantsandanimalscanstillperform action. Andlikewise,noplantoranimalcandosomethingthatisgenuinely fication ofwhatmakestheiractionbefittingthataSagecouldofferforown It isafactofthefirstimportancethat,accordingtoStoics,“befitting To liveinsuchawayastoattainone’s end,then,istoliveinaccordancewith One characterization,then,isthatthe final endistoliveinaccordancewith Here isanotherwayofconsideringthematter, fromthe definitionofthe kat’ aretên 16 ). Anothercharacterizationsaysthattheendistoliveinagree Ofcourse,noplantoranimalcouldprovidethesortofjusti homologoumenôs têiphusei).Chrysippusclarifiedthisbysaying HISTORY OFVIRTUE ETHICS 17 42 - - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 absolutely indifferent. by upheavalsofthought.Feelings of thissort,likeallpleasureandpain,are tal conflictarenomoredesirable,foraStoic,thanthefeelingsthatproduced the definition of the nature ofthecosmosingeneral. where thenormisgivenbynatureofthingwhosevirtueitis,and tion,” but rather “virtueisa disposition inagreement,or agreeing disposition,” The correcttranslationofthedefinitionisnot“virtueaconsistentdisposi logical consistency? a fullaccountofanagent’s about end.Whatissoend-like,ultimately good, seemed sotorationaliststhroughtheages),itseemsradicallyimpoverishedas consistency may be a plausible sine qua non for a happy life (at least it has Zeus, which is itself consistent at any given time. But while this sort of internal time, sincetheyaretryingtoconformtheirbeliefsandimpulsesthewillof Sage mustnothaveanycontradictorybeliefsorcommitmentsatgiven consistency cannotbetheissueforStoics.Ihavealreadygrantedthata was theirend. this istoconfuseStoicswithEpicureans.Theneversaidthattranquility quility—the absenceofinternalconflict—isitselfadesirablementalstate.But contradictory beliefsistohave nobeliefsatall. their endmakethemtheeasy preyofSkeptics;forthefastestwaytohaveno absences ofvice.Finally, thosewho givetheStoicsmereinternalconsistencyas perfections ofourrational nature, andpositiveperfectionsratherthanmere in the , and to to act know so what as is to good further it. These, too, are it ispossibleforahumantodoso,thedictatesofnature andofZeus.Itallowsus it putsoneincontactwiththeworld;allowstofollow, totheextentthat nature, physics, theology, andevils,propositionallogic, more—is that goods having anextensivestockofknowledgesuchastheSage has—knowledgeabout pleasure. Butitstillputstheemphasisinwrongplace. Whatisvaluableabout Epicureans of introspection, who shrink from mental and pursue mental This isabetteranswerinsofarasitavoidsthemistakeof makingtheStoicsinto it isaperfectionofone’s reason,andhumanbeingsareessentiallyrationalagents. internal consistency—logicalconsistency—istheendfor humanbeingsbecause itself. isnotthegood while asinequanonofthegood, not becauseofhowtheyfeel.Andtheirreplacementbyasetconsistentbeliefs, assent, andthosearegenuinelybadthings.Buttheyforepistemicreasons, Of course, the agony might be occasioned by false or conflicting beliefs or rash exquisite kindwouldbesimplyanotherinstanceofagony, and thusindifferent. conflict wouldlooklikeanendinitself.FortheStoics,mentalagonyofmost of numbed insouciance as their end, and for them the mere absence of internal When weconsiderthatthelanguageof“agreeing”or“consisting”appearsin One answersometimesgivenbyadvocatesoftheinternalreadingisthattran A different and better answer given by advocates of the internal reading is that A differentandbetteranswergivenbyadvocatesoftheinternalreadingisthat 18 And the feelings that might be produced byanabsenceofmen Andthefeelingsthatmightbeproduced 19 ItwastheEpicureanswhoadvocatedapleasurablestate summum bonum THE STOICTHEORY OFVIRTUE 43 , wecansee more whyself- - - -

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 produce acertain kindofcharacterinagents. produce exactlybecauseandtotheextentthattheystemfromor or outcomesaregood of outcomes by saying, e.g., that ness actions of are actions right or the goodness virtuous peoplethefoundationoftheirsystem,andsodid notgroundtheright if andonlyitisavirtuousaction.Butwhatherefoundational? ous; a life is happy if and only if it is a life of virtue; an action is perfectly correct partakes ofvirtue;anagentisvirtuousifandonlyall theiractionsarevirtu We ifandonlyit aregivenagreatmanybiconditionals:somethingisgood character traitisderivativefromit,ascorrectnessofactions. actions. Here,virtueisapropertyofactionsinthefirstinstance,andas virtuous at discerning person and is producing virtuous if they are especially good its beingavirtuousaction(akindaction,courageousetc.),andthat rightness oftheactions.Anothermayarguethatanaction’s rightnessconsistsin right, andthattheagent’s virtueofcharacterispriortoand independentofthe simply consists in its being the action thatavirtuousperson would judgetobe do, then we may be sure that we will do the right action if and only if we do what cally, asanindicationofrightness inactions:ifwearetryingtodecidewhat behavior. ofvirtuous by sayingthatahappylifeisonecontainssignificantepisodes independent accountsofthevirtues,andthenfleshoutitsaccounthappiness duce tohappinesssodescribed.Againstthis,another theory mayprovide then saythatthevirtuessimplyarethosetraitswhosemanifestationsmostcon stantive accountofhumanhappinessthatmakesnoreferencetothevirtues,and to othertheoriesofvirtueandethicaltheories. to thesequestionswouldhelpusseehowtheStoictheoryofvirtuecompares or justifyothers?AresomeofthemderivedfromdependentonAnswers andhappiness.Dosomeofthesenotionsground actions, rightgoodness, to askaseriesofquestionsabouttherelationsbetweenvirtuouspersons, From thisperspectiveonStoicvirtueanditsroleinethics,wemightwant tues. which actionsarecorrectorobligatorygroundedintheirrelationtothevir forms ofvirtueethicstoclaimthatispriorinsomestrongsense;factsabout or rightness. It ischaracteristic of more ambitiousto the notions of goodness actions thatarerightorobligatory. Inbothcases,thenotion ofvirtueisposterior deontologicaltheoriesasdispositionstoperform duce outcomesthataregood, This isnottodenythatthe actionsofvirtuousagentscanbeused,epistemi To beginwith,itseemstomethattheStoicsdidnotmakecharacterof What, inStoicism,ispriortowhat?Theanswersarenot immediatelyevident. Happiness mayenterinvariouswaysaswell:onetheorydevelopasub For instance,onevirtue-ethicaltheorymayarguethatanaction’s rightness Consequentialist theorieswilltendtotreatthevirtuesasdispositionspro 20 21 Retrospect andComparativeOverview HISTORY OFVIRTUE ETHICS 44 ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 and thewillofZeus. ple, showing that it is reasonable that this action is in accordance with nature action correctisthatacertainkindofjustificationcanbegivenforit,inprinci a Sageherselfwouldattendtoindeliberatingaboutwhatdo:makesthe person wouldperformit.Itscorrectnessisgroundedinthoseconsiderationsthat form anactionofthattype,sinceonlyitiscorrect. perform anactionofthatverysameextensionaltype,andindeedIshouldper Since I donothave the virtues,I cannot performavirtuousaction;butIcanstill observable properties,anddisregardstheagent’s dispositionsandmotivations.) very sametype,whensamenessofaction-typeisrestrictedtoextensionalor the Sage and non-Sage can do are to perform two actions which belong to the performed by a non-Sage. (Talk of “the very same action” is elliptical here. What action whenperformedbyaSage,andonly undermined bythefactthatverysameactionwillbea undercut bytheempiricalabsenceofanyactualSages.) a Sagewoulddo. The Sagecanspendherlife inthedesertneverencounteringanotherhuman virtues. SotheSagemakessandwiches courageously, andfoldshisarmsliberally. action thataSageperforms isavirtuousaction,andperformedwithallofthe ofliberality,episodes orcourage.HerethetroubleisthatStoicssay that every than, e.g.,anAristotelianaccountwhichsaysthatahappy lifeshouldcontain not callthemvirtues.ButtheStoicaccountofhappiness isevenlessdeterminate that makeitmorelikelyone’s lifewillcontainthosethings,theStoicswould family andfriends.Allofthatisindifferenttohappiness, andiftherearetraits prosperity,enjoys health,moderate andwarm intimacywithasmallcircleof things areinessentialtohappiness.Ahappylifeisnot, e.g.,oneinwhich to formulateanaccountofhumanflourishing,theStoics declarethatthose other determinatelife-activities,,aims,or goals thatonecoulduse the happylifehasnofixedcontentotherthanitsbeing alifeofvirtue.Forany in thevirtueofagent. action—and alsothatthecorrectnessofavirtuousactionisinnowaygrounded same action,ifnotperformedbyavirtuousagent,wouldhavebeen of avirtuousactionisposteriortothevirtueagentperformingit—thevery action donefromavirtuousdisposition.Sowecansayboththatthe virtuousness matter of stipulation, in that the perfectly correct action is defined as a correct perfect actionor virtue ethics. that inmakingtheactioncorrect.To thisextent,Stoicethicsisnotakindof standing nature and at discerning the will of Zeus; it plays no deeper role than But thecorrectnessofactionisnotgroundedinfactthatavirtuous That theSage’s actionsareinfallibleindicesofrightnessinactionisnot Happiness, meanwhile, cannot act as a good anchorforthesystem,because Happiness, meanwhile,cannotactasagood Virtue doesplayaroleinmakingcorrectaction“perfectly correct,”i.e.a katorthôma 22 (The heuristic convenience of this method issomewhat (Theheuristicconvenienceofthismethod 23 TheSage’s atunder virtuemakesthemextremelygood THE STOICTHEORY OFVIRTUE ratherthanamere 45 kathêkon orbefittingactionwhen kathêkon katorthôma . Butthisissimplya or virtuous orvirtuous - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 end theirlife. nature (e.g.illhealthortortureservitude),thenthecorrectactionwillbeto able thattheywillcontinuetohave,apreponderanceofthingscontrary to nature; if the Stoic (whether aSage or not) currently has, and thinks it reason some preponderanceofthingsaccordingtonatureoverthatarecontrary and formaltogroundtheirnotionofvirtue. cost ofthisultimateadaptabilityisthattheirnotionahappylifetoothin virtue, andperfecthappiness,nomatterwhattheirsurroundingsmaybe.Butthe requires theirfortuitousexposuretodanger. TheStoiccanlivealifeofperfect ality requirestheagent’s fortuitousaccesstomoney, andAristoteliancourage account: itallowstheirSagetotriumphinanycircumstance.Aristotelianliber by aSage.This,ofcourse,isfeaturethattheStoicsareeagertobuildintotheir all thatweknowisitmustbevirtuous.Andwillvirtuous,iflived thatalifemusthaveinordertobehappylife; concrete, describableepisodes sand fromherfeet.ItisnotclearthattheStoicsplaceanyconstraintson being, and yet manifest the virtues of sociability and philanthropy in brushing Chapter 22,“KantandVirtue Ethics,”AllenWood Chapter 2,“Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics,”DorotheaFrede Chapter 1,“PlatoandtheEthicsofVirtue,” NicholasWhite piness or right action, but nature, both the nature of the agent and of the cosmos. their bestevidence.Hereaselsewhere,whatisfoundationalnotvirtueorhap nature andofZeusthattheyshoulddie,willactinconformitywith and torturearestillabsolutelyindifferent—asevidencethatitis the will of 6 5 4 3 2 1

The onlyconstraintsonthelifeofhappinessarethathastocontain (their reason,rationalsoul,or compose thearmy. Eachhumanmemberofthearmyhas one suchunifyingpneumaticprinciple an army, that forinstance,thereisnopneumaticcurrentthat occupies allandonlythebodies having aunifiedpneumaticcurrent whosevibrationsexactlyoccupythevolumeofbody. In nomatterhowdistant ordiverse,isitselfabody.bodies, areunifiedby Butonlysomebodies suchthatanycollectionof may haveadoptedaprincipleofunrestrictedcompositionforbodies, are assemblagesofparts,whetheradjacentoratagreaterdistance.It looksasthoughtheStoics origins of,interalia,theChristiandoctrineofSevenDeadlySins. always, mydeepestthanksgotoLizKarns. to makemypresentationlessone-sided,andIanHensleyforhelp with metaphysics.Andas posed. Not every macroscopic body has such an organizing principle: ships and choruses are bodies that has suchanorganizingprinciple:shipsandchorusesarebodies Not everymacroscopicbody See Menn(1999)forafulldiscussionofhowqualitiesareidentified with 1053F Laertius( See Boter(1999)onChristianadaptationsofthe“Manual,”andSorabji (2000)ontheStoic I thanktheeditorsforinvitingmetocontributethisvolume,Stephen Mennforpressingme 24 TheStoicwillinterpretthispatternofindifferents—forhealth = LS47M =DL) 7.189. HISTORY OFVIRTUE ETHICS ). And there are currents that occupy all of the bodies inthe logos). Andtherearecurrentsthatoccupy allofthebodies Related Topics Notes 46 pneuma variouslydis- - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 21 9 8 7

uous, seeSVF3.178.10=DL7.85. the indifferentpainand“ 3.136.13 sensations inthemind,theyareutterlyindifferent(e.g.SVF3.70.6 terms refertoanythingphenomenological,whethersmoothsensations inthefleshorharsh (e.g. SVF3.85.6 refer tojudgmentsaboutvalue,theyarefalseandsooutright wrong,notindifferent the end. stateforthosewhoarealreadyvirtuous,butnot sine quanonofprogressorvirtueandasagood occurs. Epictetusdiscussestranquilityoften,treatingitonaparwith lackofpassions,i.e.asa saying thattheconsistencysimplyisvirtue,toitpromotesvirtues. Brennan &Brittain(2002:22–24). ing inAristotletoaverydifferentmeaningEpictetus.Myownspeculationscanbereadat explanationfortheword’sScholarship hasnotyetdiscoveredagood migrationfromonemean deciding onacourseofactionastheresultpriordeliberation,deliberateddecision. perfect isnotthesecondsenseof ratio of a sitions. human When being he is then “ratio,” says this that refers the to good the earlier to referthereasonthatisessenceofahumanbeing,butmaybeinbetterorworsedispo can identifyadisposition,thethingdisposedinthisway, andthethingitself.Hefirstuses“ below, and“untheorized”whenitisnot. the army;itisthusabody, butnotaunifiedone. stuffthatcomposes There isnounifiedcurrentthatextendsthroughoutallandonlythebodily “sympathy,” and makes the cosmos coherent. But this current extends far beyond the army. army; attheveryleast,thereisunityofcosmosasawhole,whichgroundscosmic foundational role. virtue ethicsproper, wherethelatterterm isrestrictedtoethicaltheoriesthatgivevirtuesome The previousparagraphsleanheavily onSlote(2000:327–328). theconvenientdistinctionbetween atheoryofvirtueand Driver (1995)111fn.1introduced The Stoicsdistinguishedtwosensesofbothpleasureandpain;inthe senseinwhichthoseterms Chrysippus hardlymentionstheterm;thereisonlyoneplaceinStobaeus SVF3.111whereit SVF 3.4 SVF 3.493 LS 1.383ItisslightlypuzzlingthatLong and Sedley (1987) move in thespace of afew lines from E.g. Diatribes1.17.27.1;2.23.22.1;3.1.40.1;4.5.12.1. The wordmeanssomethingverydifferentinAristotle’s ethics;notadispositionbutanactof SVF 3.459 Seneca’s phrasing of this argument reflects the tendency noted just below to speak as though one Similarly inSVF3.260 A virtueis“theorematic”whenitconstitutedbytheknowledgeoftheorems,asweshallsee For moredetailsoftherolereasonableimpressionsinaction,seeBrennan(1996)and(2014). cf. SVF2.1013 intend theperfectionofnatureeachthing.” be containedbyonlyone“tenor”isagainassertedatSVF2.368. can soul andbysome“meretenor”thatisdistinctfrommyrationalsoul.Thateachunifiedbody exactly one“tenor.” ThisrulesoutthepossibilitythatImightbeunifiedbothbymyrational that is not also a nature or soul. Finally, is said to be governed note by that each unified body souls or“natures”arecharacterizedasthosecontainedbya“meretenor”( thathaveno blages likechainsanddispersedparticularsarmies.Then,theunifiedbodies arecontrastedwithproximateassem must includeplantsandanimals,sincetheunifiedbodies “tenor,” iscontainedbya“tenor.” notefirstthatwearetoldeveryunifiedbody Thisclass verted reasonisthesourceofmymisery, andsoabadthing. Indeed,sinceitisthesameasmyvice,per or anyotherviciouspersonitisnotmygood. they arehumans,whichcanbeinbetterandworseshape.Thisreasonismyessence,butme already perfected.Whatthehumanneedstoperfectisfirst in a particular disposition, i.e. right reason or perfected reason. What a human needs to = DL7.87,SVF3.12Stobaeus2.76.3. = Stobaeus2.80.22).Sometimesthedifferencewasmarkedlexically, using“ = DL7.107. = Plutarch441C. = = Plutarch1042F, SVF3.113.7 SextusEmpiricusAM9.78.Inordertoseethatarationalsouliskindof = lupê” forthefalsejudgment,but“ Hippocr. dehumoribusIIXVIp.303:“By‘virtue’they[theStoics] THE STOICTHEORY OFVIRTUE ratio in which it is right reason or their good—that inwhichitisrightreasonortheirgood—that 47 = Stobaeus2.77.6).Inthesenseinwhichthose hêdonê” wasrecognizedtobeambig ratio, thereasonthroughwhich = Stobaeus2.57.19,SVF psilê hexis),i.e.atenor ponos” for ratio ratio is is ” - - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 20:58 01 Oct 2021; For: 9780203071755, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203071755.ch3 22 Algra, K.,Barnes,J.,Mansfeld,andSchofield,M.(eds.)(1999) Sorabji, R.(2000)EmotionandPeaceofMind:FromStoicAgitationtoChristianTemptation. Slote, M.(2000)“Virtue Ethics,”inH.LaFollette(ed.)TheBlackwellGuidetoEthicalTheory. 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