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Home , Operation Barkhane, Sahel

NO. 5 JANUARY 2021 Introduction

Operation Barkhane and the Future of Intervention in the The Shape of Things to Come Denis M. Tull

France is preparing to change its posture in the Sahel. After a “mini surge” of 600 addi- tional soldiers since February 2020, its counterterrorism is likely to revert to the pre-surge level, with more reductions possible in the medium term. Regardless of the details and timetable of the adjustments, French policy toward the Sahel is evolving as Paris seeks to balance a lighter military footprint with counter- terrorism goals, the continued internationalization of intervention, and more local responsibility.

The return to the pre-surge level (4,500 sol- since the Sahel Summit in Pau (13 January diers) or perhaps even more reductions may 2020), when French President Emmanuel come as a surprise, considering that the surge Macron and his five Sahelian counterparts was effective in strictly military terms. Ac- from , , , , cording to Chief of Staff François Lecointre, and sought to reenergize the inter- it increased the volume of French forces vention. Among Barkhane’s notable suc- directly involved in military operations by cesses was the neutralization of Abdel- 70 percent. Two other factors amplified this malek Droukdel, leader of AQMI (Al Qaida impact. The surge went hand in hand with in the Islamic ), and of Bah Ag a strong focus on the three-borders area Moussa, a military commander of the between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musul- which helped to turn quantity into quality. mans (GSIM). Finally, the long-planned armament of The post-Pau year has not fundamentally Barkhane’s three Reaper drones, effective changed the political and security context, since December 2019, has enhanced the but it has given some reprieve to the armies readiness of the force and sharply reduced of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso after a dis- its reaction time when presented with op- astrous 2019, during which they suffered portunities to strike. More than 40 percent possibly more than a thousand casualties at of Barkhane’s air strikes are now conducted the hands of jihadist groups. However, the by drones. These factors have contributed year’s events showed again that more coun- to numerous tactical successes in the year terterrorism does not translate into greater

levels of security. The level of internal dis- If the French government excludes that it placement in Mali has continued to rise – will itself negotiate with “terrorist groups,” from 200,000 in November 2019 to 311,000 it is a different matter whether it will stand in October 2020 – also in the context of in ’s way, should Mali’s authorities military operations during which the armies want to take that route. French discourse of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger allegedly emphasizes Malian sovereignty. This is why committed numerous rights abuses. the analogy with Afghanistan – where the The number of human rights abuses com- negotiated bilaterally with the mitted by community-based armed militias Taliban and excluded the Afghan govern- and jihadist groups has also risen. ment – is not pertinent. However, a litmus test for the French commitment has yet to come. A meaningful French alignment be- An Evolving Political Posture hind a Malian push toward dialogue would ultimately require Barkhane to put its mili- Why would Paris relinquish the additional tary operations on hold, at least temporarily. personnel means that have proved so effec- The evolving French posture is a prag- tive? Military adjustments, whether they matic move of realpolitik, which takes into are made in the short term or medium account that Mali’s new military authorities term, should not be seen in isolation from have repeatedly affirmed their willingness a possibly evolving policy. For example, in to explore this route. Given how often French recent weeks and months, French officials and other officials have bemoaned a lack have frequently engaged in the long-stand- of Malian leadership and ownership in the ing debate in Mali on whether the govern- past, tacitly aligning behind the government ment in Bamako should seek to politically is ultimately in Paris’s best interest. The nu- accommodate jihadist groups in one form merous military strikes of the past 12 months or the other. Despite a well-versed intran- against jihadist targets do not necessarily sigence on the necessity of countering contravene the idea of giving dialogue a terrorism, declarations by officials during chance. They also present a necessary move the past 12 months can be interpreted as to alter the balance of power on the battle- attempts to somehow modify the narrative field, which was dramatically unfavorable and the strategy. Although the French rejec- to the Malian government just one year tion of dialogue with jihadists was always ago. Moreover, can only disengage less clear-cut than is often assumed, recent on a positive note. Everything else would declarations suggest that Paris is now being be a political and strategic failure. careful to not be seen as an obstacle to political pathways that may lead out of the crisis. Indicators are allusions to the porosity Drivers of Change and ill-defined nature of armed groups, and rhetorical distinctions between local and The adjustments to the French posture have international jihadists or between radicals been looming for the past year. In January and recuperable elements. Whatever one 2020, at the occasion of the Sahel Summit may think of the pertinence of these catego- in Pau, Macron had shaken up an untena- ries, the discourse may signal at a minimum ble situation by going public with two un- a more ambiguous and possibly more accom- expected admissions. First, that governments modating stance toward the controversial and parts of the public in the Sahel enter- issue of political dialogue with jihadists, tain, at best, ambiguous attitudes toward even if the determination to fight them the French, and to a lesser extent inter- remains firm. Paris remains skeptical about national intervention. Second, that the po- the prospects of success of political acco- litical and security trends in the Sahel were mmodation, not least because past Bamako- moving in the wrong direction, despite inter- led initiatives have made little headway. national intervention. In other words, Paris

SWP Comment 5 January 2021

2 had recognized the relative ineffectiveness minor issue ahead of the 2022 presidential of intervention as well as its fragile local elections, reducing costs and casualties can legitimacy. only be advantageous. One year onward, the situation has somewhat evolved thanks to the surge, but within the narrow limits of what seems Barkhane: Successful Tactics, to be achievable. Indeed, Macron’s pre-Pau Little Progress analysis is unlikely to have fundamentally changed. This means that the government Decision-makers in Paris know that a more is unwilling to sustain a large, costly, and favorable situation to start disengagement open-ended presence in the Sahel that is will not emerge any time soon. Two such unable to catalyze strategic and political opportunities were missed: after the sweep- progress. At least in military terms, France ing campaign in 2013, and again in may have achieved the best possible out- 2015, when the signing of the Mali peace come. The visible successes of 2020 may accord provided a reasonably appropriate provide an opportunity to start disengaging exit option. The limits of what French (mili- with the head held high. tary) intervention in the Sahel may realis- One factor are the costs. Barkhane is a tically achieve have been evident for some strategic burden. While the operation gen- time, not least to the French military itself. erates valuable experiences and lessons, Indeed, it has become a truism to state that other or newly emerging threats and theaters Barkhane’s tactical successes do not trans- in France’s and ’s strategic environ- late into overall progress. ment are rising on the agenda (the EU’s First, the political objectives that Bar- eastern borders, the Eastern and Southern khane was to support always remained Mediterranean, cyberspace) and will feature vague and excessively optimistic. This is prominently in a revised Strategic Review true for the idea that the military contain- of Defense and National Security that is in ment of the terrorist threat would somehow the making. help create conditions for political progress Barkhane presents significant financial in the guise of the Malian peace accord and costs (€695 million in 2019, and closer to €1 security solutions, thanks to the revamping billion in 2020), which equals 76 percent of of local security and defense forces. In the the country’s expenditure for its military absence of political reform, the capacity- missions and operations at home and ab- building approach pursued by foreign part- road. Amid the economic pressure caused ners (EUTM Mali) has shown modest results, by the Covid-19 pandemic, these costs may while the implementation of the peace be more difficult to defend for an operation accord or other forms of political change that has long been met with public indiffer- has remained intangible. Barkhane labors ence at home, and this despite the fact that in a strategic void. the public considers terrorist attacks to be a Second, no political ambitions were major threat to national security. This sug- attached to Barkhane itself. Barkhane’s gests that the French are not necessarily basic premise is to stay away from Malian convinced that Sahel-based terrorism is a politics. This is evident, for example, in the major threat to France. Conversely, the fact that Barkhane has avoided being drawn French media and members of parliament into the political and violent quagmire in have recently given more scrutiny to Opera- Mali’s central . But Barkhane’s pur- tion Barkhane as the number of French ported claim to be apolitical by virtue of its casualties has grown. Since 2013, 51 French counterterrorism focus is inconsistent on soldiers have lost their lives in the Sahel, several accounts. Barkhane and its inter- but 30 of them have died just over the past national allies have literally constituted a two years. Although nothing suggests that security umbrella under which political Barkhane will be anything more than a elites in Bamako and the north – basically

SWP Comment 5 January 2021

3 the signatories of the Algiers accord – have forces during military operations will remain comfortably pursued their own self-inter- high on the agenda to bring a qualitative ested agendas rather than face the conse- edge to the long-term capacity-building that quences of their own (in)actions. Similarly, is the hallmark of much of the security Barkhane’s claim of being apolitical never force assistance in Mali. In this regard, the had any credibility among Malians, who EU military training mission’s (EUTM Mali) failed to understand why northern towns increasingly decentralized provision of should be liberated from jihadists, but not training and advising the Malian army is from secessionist-leaning rebels. From this welcome. But just as important, there should perspective, Barkhane was decisively involved be a renewed push to negotiate with the © Stiftung Wissenschaft in domestic politics, and any pretense to Bamako military authorities’ security-sector und Politik, 2021 the contrary has only aroused mistrust and reform initiatives. There is no reason to ex- All rights reserved rumors about France’s hidden agendas. pect the emergence of effective and self-sus- Finally, Barkhane’s sheer presence and taining defense and security forces as long This Comment reflects the steady French discourse on counterter- as fundamental reforms (human resources, the author’s views. rorism has not helped the emergence of a logistics, accountability) are frustrated by The online version of more nuanced analysis of the Mali situa- Malian officials. this publication contains tion. Important challenges other than ter- The lighter French military footprint functioning links to other rorism have not received the attention they brings both opportunities and risks. Should SWP texts and other relevant deserve by Malian, French, and internation- Barkhane reduce its presence in the theater, sources. al decision-makers. Nowhere has this been jihadist forces will enjoy more freedom of SWP Comments are subject more evident than in central Mali, where movement. Consequently, this will expose to internal peer review, fact- absent or ineffective institutions, eroding the Malian army as well as foreign troops checking and copy-editing. social capital, and violent socioeconomic with EUTM, MINUSMA, and civilian orga- For further information on competition explain much of the ease with nizations to greater risks of attacks. This our quality control pro- which armed groups, not only jihadists, makes intelligence even more important, cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- have expanded their power and authority. to which Germany’s MINUSMA contingent berlin.org/en/about-swp/ contributes via its drones. But casualties quality-management-for- may still occur and will become a test for swp-publications/ Outlook the European commitment to Mali and the Sahel. In this regard, a fresh debate about SWP France is likely to reduce its military foot- what is and is not at stake for Europe in the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik print in the Sahel in the foreseeable future. Sahel would be useful. German and Euro- German Institute for This is driven by the accurate assessment pean security are not directly threatened International and that the counterterrorism-centered inter- by the Sahel. The challenge is not so much Security Affairs vention framework, in place since 2014, terrorism and migration, but a smart policy has reached its limits. However, the choice that promotes legitimate political orders Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin is not between staying and withdrawing. and may also inhibit the further regional Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 French decision-makers will seek to strike spread of the crisis. Helping neighboring Fax +49 30 880 07-100 a balance between the political goal of countries to become more resilient in a pre- www.swp-berlin.org beginning disengagement and the possible ventive sense should be a priority. [email protected] consequences of such a process. A lighter military footprint, and thus a In the short run, a steep reduction in lesser emphasis on terrorism, is an opportu- ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2021C05 troop numbers would embolden jihadist nity for a more balanced and nuanced con- groups and overwhelm partner armies in versation with Malian partners on political Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Once troop challenges to stabilization and ultimately reductions of some consequence set in, . It will be decisive what local France is expected to make even greater use actors in the Sahel, and particularly in of remote warfare, such as intelligence co- Mali, will make of the space that the pros- operation, armed drones, special forces, and pect of a lighter French military presence security force assistance. Mentoring local may open up.

SWP Comment 5 Dr. Denis M. Tull is a Senior Associate in the and Research Division at SWP. January 2021

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