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Dutch Efforts in the Sahel #Investir Pour Prévenir

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Dutch Efforts in the Sahel #Investir Pour Prévenir Diplomatic Presence, Expanding Partnerships and Policy Priorities Dutch efforts in the Sahel #Investir pour prévenir Dutch efforts in the Sahel 2019-2022 | Dutch efforts in the Sahel 2019-2022 | Dutch efforts in the Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel | Table of contents | Dutch efforts in the Sahel Table of contents 1. The Sahel 3 2. Why the Netherlands invests in the Sahel 8 3. Where the Netherlands is represented in the Sahel 11 4. What the Dutch priorities are in the Sahel 12 5. How the Netherlands engages in the Sahel 19 | 2 | The Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel 1. The Sahel Developments across the G5-Sahel region (Burkina Faso, At the same time, several countries along the West and Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) reflect a global trend North African coast are powerful regional economic whereby extreme poverty is becoming ever more engines with considerable potential for the Sahel. concentrated within fragile regions. Clearly, international efforts geared towards promoting As highlighted in the Dutch policy document ‘Investing in stability in G5-Sahel countries should be embedded within Global Prospects’, an estimated 80% of extremely poor a wider geographical approach. people will live in countries affected by fragility and conflict, especially in Africa, by 2030 (see: Figure 1). Expanding terrorist networks, organised crime, governance deficits, profound development needs and The World Bank strategy for fragility, conflict and violence impunity in the Sahel can also have serious repercussions demonstrates that conflicts also drive 80% of all for the EU. Climate change and demographic trends humanitarian needs and reduce gross domestic product further exacerbate these risks. (GDP) growth by two percentage points per year, on average. The Sahel region and the EU have a joint interest in further developing a geopolitical partnership with equal coverage Moreover, violent conflict has led to historically high levels of development, security and governance challenges as of forced displacement with over 70 million refugees, well as opportunities. internally displaced people (IDPs) and asylum-seekers as of end-2018. In light of the many international actors already present in | 3 | the Sahel, the Netherlands seeks to align its resources For the Sahel, the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies notes (upscaling) and expertise (innovation) with existing an increase of almost 50% in fatalities as a result of non- initiatives, rather than duplicating ongoing efforts. state violence between 2016 and 2019. UNHCR reports that the number of IDPs in Burkina Faso alone has risen This brochure briefly summarises why, where and how the ten-fold in 2019, reaching a total of 560,000. Netherlands engages with the Sahel region and what our diplomatic and policy priorities are. There is also a risk of these rapidly increasing levels of instability spreading towards West African coastal states. Figure 1 ising poverty in ragile states could soon end global poverty reduction 1,8 1, 1,4 1,2 1, 8 Numer of poor (millions) 4 2 2 22 24 2 28 21 212 214 21 218 22 222 224 22 228 23 ource World Data ab, Non-fragile Fragile Total The Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel The rapidly deteriorating situation in the Sahel requires Figure 2 Population sie in and urgent interventions in order to restore public services, 218 24 counter security threats and provide humanitarian 5 assistance. In addition, long-term engagement is needed 45 to address the root causes of poverty, fragility, violent 4 extremism and irregular migration. 35 The following trends are particularly influential: 3 25 2 #1. Demographic trends opulation in millions The Sahel is witnessing a phase of unprecedented 15 population growth (see figure 2). By 2030, 50 million 1 youths below the age of 15 will inhabit the region. 5 0 Unlocking the region’s youth potential is one of the key Burkina Chad Mali Mauritania Niger priorities in the Sahel. A large labour-productive Faso population with improved access to skills, schooling, ource nstitute or ecurity tudies Prospects or the ahel justice, employment and (sexual) health services offers countries to orthcoming great development potential in the long term. school attendance remains well below the continental #2. Socio-economic prospects average. According to the World Bank, a mere 29% of girls The socio-economic starting point in the Sahel is in Burkina Faso attend secondary school, while Mali (26%) challenging. Countries in the Sahel rank among the world’s and Chad (12%) score even lower. lowest on the Human Development Index (HDI): more | 4 | than 40% of citizens live on less than $1.90 per day, while Educating girls and ending child marriage is critical to 80% lack access to sanitation and 30% do not have access improve socio-economic prospects (also see: Figure 3). to clean drinking water. Girls who are better educated generate higher future income and choose to have fewer children. Promoting Public services are particularly limited in rural areas and gender equality as an integral part of education policies is increasingly fragile border areas. Primary school therefore crucial. enrolment has improved in recent decades but secondary Figure 3 Percentage o young women years married beore age Mauritania 34 Mali 55 Niger 7 Senegal Chad 33 8 The Gamia 3 Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau 52 Guinea 22 Benin 52 32 Nigeria 43 Sierra eone Togo Ghana 44 Côte Divoire 25 33 21 ieria 38 ource ahel and West Arica lub, 3 3-5 5-75 75 The Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel Photo 1 Working Visit by Minister Kaag in Niger | 5 | Youth ‘underemployment’ is a major concern. The formal sector generates a mere 10% of all jobs in the region. Private sector development “Access to finance is one of the main challenges we face. It is Yet, population growth and urbanisation also generate inadequate for young entrepreneurs, in view of the very high opportunities. Domestic and regional markets for food, interest rates and the types of guarantees requested,” says goods and services are projected to expand considerably Ouma Kaltoume Issoufou, an agricultural products in the future and have the potential to boost employment entrepreneur in Niger. and income opportunities. According to Abdoul-Kader Issoufou, from the ‘Centre Recent studies published by the OECD, the World Bank Agroécologique de Productions Intégrées et de and Chatham House also underline the economic potential Formation en Agrobusiness, “It would help if we could of improving the efficiency of trade corridors that link stimulate the entrepreneurial culture in Niger, especially consumers in West and North African cities with producers among the youth, and set up structures to support them.” in the Sahel. Aligning and adapting the education sector to include the #3. Climate change skills required within the rural economy and in upcoming While demographic trends will lead to ever-growing needs urban economic sectors remains critical to improving in the coming decades, climate change risks diminishing youth employment. the availability of natural resources upon which citizens depend. Scaling up digital innovation initiatives to improve access to finance and public services, and increasing income- Over the past 20 years, water availability per inhabitant generating opportunities will advance economic has declined by more than 40%. Climate shocks are prospects. expected to increase in the future. The region faces unpredictable weather patterns and rising temperatures, There is also considerable economic potential in along with land and soil degradation. developing the renewable energy sector, also in terms of job creation, as stipulated within the UN’s Support Plan for the Sahel. The Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel Photo 2 Woman refilling her bucket from a well in Natriguel, in the drought-stricken South of Mauritania | 6 | Experts predict that a temperature increase of 1.2 to 1.9 At the same time, innovative technologies have proved degrees Celsius (°C) - which is lower than projections for successful in promoting resilience by regenerating severely the region - will be enough to increase the number of degraded land, improving water management and malnourished people in West Africa by 95% in 2050 increasing food security. (Reliefweb, 2016). Food prices are also expected to rise considerably (see: Figure 4). Figure 4 ood prices in ahel 14 13 12 11 1 Food rice Inde, measured against 21 28 21 212 214 21 218 Year Mali Mauritania Niger ource he ague entre or trategic tudies, trategic Monitor, The Sahel | Dutch efforts in the Sahel #4. Governance and justice Due to rising levels of violent incidents, state officials and Yet, improving governance is not limited to restoring state public services are largely absent from many rural areas authority but also entails building trust between citizens across the Sahel region, where the vast majority of citizens and the state. This requires a focus on state legitimacy reside. rather than state capacity per se. In this context, people have come to rely on local militias, Improving the participation of youths and women in criminal groups, terrorist organisations or self-defence decision-making processes is crucial in this regard. Youths groups for their protection and upon non-state actors for and women are disproportionally excluded from decision- a minimal level of services. making processes, further corroding social cohesion and increasing inequalities. For example, in Mali, Niger and The self-defence groups and militias are often organised Burkina Faso, the percentages of women parliamentarians along communal lines and are heavily armed. Hence, inter- are only 8.8%, 17% and 13.4%, respectively (Inter- communal tensions increasingly incite violent clashes Parliamentary Union, February 2019). along inter-communal fault lines. Reports by Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group and others Reinforcing public trust in the security apparatus, human reveal ensuing patterns of impunity.
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