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Sub-Saharan Africa 2020

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Sub-Saharan Africa 2020 15 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 5 COUNTRIES WITH MOST NEW DISPLACEMENTS DRC 1,905,000 Ethiopia 1,556,000 Somalia 667,000 Conflict 4,597,000 South Sudan 553,000 Disasters 3,448,000 24.1% of the global total Burkina Faso 513,000 Sub-Saharan Africa was once again the region most Many countries in Central Africa continued to suffer affected by conflict displacement in 2019. Armed the effects of communal conflicts, while the interlinked conflict, communal violence and jihadist attacks triggers of conflict and climate change in East Africa continued in several countries, some of which are forced people to flee their homes in Ethiopia, Somalia struggling to deal with protracted crises. Widespread and South Sudan. poverty, longstanding economic stagnation, lack of development, competition over diminishing resources Figures for displacement associated with disasters in and the effects of climate change are among the factors sub-Saharan Africa are lower than for conflict and that increase the risk of displacement. violence, but they are still cause for concern. The 3.4 million new displacements recorded in 2019 represent The same factors also aggravate its impacts, height- one of the highest figures ever for the region (see Figure ening and prolonging IDPs’ vulnerability. Around 19.2 11). Unusually heavy rains caused widespread flooding million people were living in internal displacement as in several countries, where a chronic accumulation of a result of conflict and violence as of the end of 2019, vulnerabilities and risks aggravated its impacts and the highest figure in the world and the highest ever fuelled displacement. recorded for the region. Countries in the East and Horn of Africa experienced Historical data shows that internal displacement asso- one of the wettest rainy seasons in 40 years.3 Flooding ciated with conflict and violence has increased in sub- along the White Nile basin forced many people already Saharan Africa over the past decade (see Figure 11). displaced by conflict to flee again (see White Nile basin There were 4.6 million new displacements recorded in spotlight, p.27). Mozambique bore the brunt of 2019, accounting for nearly 54 per cent of the global cyclones Idai and Kenneth, which triggered hundreds total. Jihadist groups operating in the Sahel region esca- of thousands of displacements and destroyed homes, lated their attacks and triggered mass displacement in infrastructure and crops. Comoros, Madagascar, Malawi countries including Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (see and Zimbabwe were also hard hit (see Mozambique The Sahel spotlight, p.23). spotlight, p.25). Boko Haram’s insurgency, now in its tenth year, and Nearly two million people were thought to be living operations against the group continued to trigger signif- in internal displacement as a result of disasters in sub- icant new displacement and prolong its duration across Saharan Africa as of the end of the year. the Lake Chad basin, a region that also has to contend with environmental degradation and desertification. GRID 2020 16 and violence as of the end of the year, and around Central Africa PART 1 15.9 million were expected to need humanitarian assis- tance in 2020.6 The country also had to deal with its The region’s most affected second largest Ebola outbreak, a measles outbreak and country in 2019 was the a cholera outbreak, which between them killed thou- Democratic Republic of sands of people. the Congo (DRC), where ethnic tensions, local grievances Heavy rains and flooding affected 12 of DRC’s 26 prov- and chronic poverty are the major drivers of internal inces between October and December.7 The country displacement. Nearly 1.7 million new conflict displace- as a whole recorded 233,000 new disaster displace- ments were reported during the year, compared with ments, the highest ever figure. Floods triggered 137,000 more than 1.8 million in 2018 and 2.2 million in 2017. in Nord-Ubangui and Sud-Ubangui provinces, which border the Central African Republic (CAR), and Tshopo Clashes between the military and armed groups in province was also badly affected. Around 168,000 the eastern province of North Kivu triggered 520,000 people in DRC were thought to be living in displace- new displacements, primarily in Lubero and Rutshuru ment as a result of disasters as of the end of the year. territories, and an upsurge in intercommunal violence between the Hema and Lendu communities triggered The government of CAR signed a peace deal with 453,000 in the north-eastern province of Ituri. There 14 armed groups in early February after more than was also an escalation of conflict between armed two years of negotiations facilitated by the African groups and intercommunal violence in South Kivu, Union.8 Implementation is progressing despite several where 401,000 displacements were recorded, mainly setbacks and disagreements that were resolved with in Mwenga and Fizi territories. Most of the people help from the international community, and the number displaced were women and children. of new conflict displacements fell from 510,000 in 2018 to 96,000 in 2019. The security situation remains fragile, The political situation in DRC remains tense, despite the however, and IDPs’ needs largely unmet. fact that 2019 marked the first peaceful transition of power in the country’s history.4 The new government The most serious violence of the year occurred in Birao inherited a series of challenges, not least the activities of in Vakaga prefecture, where 24,000 new displace- more than 100 armed groups in the east and ongoing ments were recorded in September as a result of clashes conflict in other areas.5 Around 5.5 million people were between the Popular Front for the Renaissance of the living in internal displacement as a result of conflict Central African Republic and the Movement of Central FIGurE 11: New displacements by conflict, violence and disasters in Sub-Saharan Africa (2009-2019) 8 7.4 Conflict and violence Disasters 5.9* 6 5.5* 4.5 4.6 4 3.7 3.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 New displacements in millions 2.2 2.2 1.9 2 1.7 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.7 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 * Updated figures. For further details see methodological annex, available online. 17 African Freedom Fighters for Justice, both signatories Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activi- to the peace deal.9 ties continued in the east of the country following the signing of a peace deal between the Ninja militia and CAR also suffered its worst flooding in 20 years in 2019, the government in December 2017.13 The region has and the capital Bangui was among the places hardest regained stability since, but there were still around hit. About 102,000 new displacements were recorded 134,000 people living in displacement as a result of across the country, and the floods caused extensive the conflict at the end of the year, around 79,000 of damage to infrastructure and livelihoods. More than them in Pool department. 10,000 homes were destroyed, and wells and latrines overflowed.10 About 6,700 hectares of farmland in The security situation in anglophone areas of Came- Ouham prefecture were inundated, aggravating food roon has been deteriorating for the last two years. insecurity. More than a third of CAR’s population of 4.7 Clashes between anglophone separatists and the secu- million were facing acute food insecurity and in need rity forces have increased in Northwest and Southwest of emergency assistance as of the end of the year.11 regions, and they spilled over into West and Littoral regions in 2019.14 Lack of access has impeded an accu- The Republic of Congo was also hit by its worst floods rate assessment of the number of new displacements, in decades, which damaged or destroyed infrastructure, leading to a conservative estimate of 26,000. Boko crops and livelihoods. The Ubangi and Congo rivers Haram also continued its activities in Far North region, burst their banks between October and December, triggering around 40,000 new displacements during inundating hundreds of villages and triggering as many the year. as 163,000 new displacements in the departments of Cuvette, Likouala, Plateaux and Sangha.12 Despite the scale of displacement and the extent of people’s needs, Cameroon’s crisis is among the world’s A displaced family stand by their tents in the Gossi region of Timbuktu, Mali. Photo: NRC/Togo Moise, February 2018 GRID 2020 18 most neglected. Nearly a million people were living in Boko Haram carried out a series of attacks in the north- PART 1 internal displacement as of the end of the year, including eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe during in the relatively peaceful regions of Adamaoua and the year, triggering more than 105,000 new displace- Centre region, which have increasingly become desti- ments.17 More than 473,000 IDPs were living in camps nations for IDPs fleeing conflict in other areas of the without adequate shelter across the three states as of country. October, and another 34,000 were living out in the open.18 Torrential rains also flooded several displace- Lack of access also impeded an accurate assessment ment camps, forcing many IDPs into secondary displace- of disaster displacement in Cameroon, but in common ment. Insecurity has impeded humanitarian access and with other countries in the region it experienced wide- the response has been further stretched by the mass spread flooding and landslides in 2019. Around 24,000 arrival of new IDPs, leaving many camps overwhelmed.19 new displacements were recorded, but the figure should be considered an underestimate.
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