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Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 ISSN: 1696-2060

OIL, POLITICS AND CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN : A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AND SOUTH

Kareem Olawale Bestoyin*

*University of , Nigeria. E-mail: [email protected]

Recibido: 3 septiembre 2017 /Revisado: 28 septiembre 2017 /Aceptado: 12 diciembre 2017 /Publicado: 15 junio 2018

Resumen: A lo largo de los años, el Áfica sub- experiencing endemic conflicts whose conse- sahariana se ha convertido en sinónimo de con- quences have been under development and flictos. De todas las causas conocidas de conflic- abject . In both , oil and poli- tos en África, la obtención de abundantes re- tics seem to be the driving force of most of cursos parece ser el más prominente y letal. these conflicts. This paper uses secondary data Nigeria y Sudán del Sur son algunos de los mu- and qualitative methodology to appraise how chos países ricos en recursos en el África sub- the struggle for the hegemony of oil resources sahariana que han experimentado conflictos shapes and reshapes the trajectories of con- endémicos cuyas consecuencias han sido el flicts in both countries. Hence this paper de- subdesarrollo y la miserable pobreza. En ambos ploys structural functionalism as the framework países, el petróleo y las políticas parecen ser el of analysis. It infers that until the structures of hilo conductor de la mayoría de estos conflic- governance are strengthened enough to tackle tos. Este artículo utiliza metodología de análisis the developmental needs of the citizenry, nei- de datos secundarios y cualitativos para evaluar ther the amnesty programme adopted by the cómo la pugna por la hegemonía de los recur- Nigerian government nor peace agreements sos energéticos moldea las trayectorias de los adopted by the government of can conflictos en ambos países. Por tanto, este tex- permanently end the conflicts. to utiliza el estructural-funcionalismo su marco de análisis. De esto se deduce que hasta Keywords: Oil; Politics; Conflict; Nigeria; South que las estructuras de gobierno estén lo sufi- Sudan. cientemente reforzadas para aplacar las necesi- dades de desarrollo de la ciudadanía, ni el pro- grama de amnistía adoptado por el gobierno INTRODUCTION nigeriano ni los acuerdos de paz adoptados por el gobierno de Sudán del Sur podrán acabar or several decades, the Sub-Saharan Afri- definitivamente con los conflictos. ca has remained a theatre of conflicts and wars of different kinds and proportion. Palabras : petróleo; políticas; conflicto; F And at the heart of most of these conflicts and Nigeria; Sudán del Sur. wars is the scramble for resource control and the accruing proceeds. This indicates that wherever there are resources there must be Abstract: Over the years, Sub-Saharan Africa politics, and whenever there is politics, conflict has become synonymous with conflicts. And of must arise because in allocating the resources all the known causes of conflicts in Africa, the (which is politics) there must be a clash of in- gift of abundant resources appears to be the terests. How these interests are assuaged or most prominent and lethal. Nigeria and South met determines whether the conflict will de- Sudan are some of the many resource-rich generate to violence or not. This lends credence countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that have been

© Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 43 Kareem Olawale Bestoyin Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa to the saying that “peace is not the absence of and Nuer. The implication of these conflicts has conflict, but the ability to manage conflict”. been the deepening crisis of development and national cohesion in both countries. This paper Conflict is inevitable in all societies. Any would examine how oil politics is shaping and wonder Karl Marx described conflict as a domi- reshaping the dynamics and trajectory of these nant character in human relations, hence the conflicts. By oil politics I mean the authoritative history of human society is the history of class allocation of oil resources and the struggle that 1 struggle. Supporting this view, Ayokhai argued emanates thereof or the conflicts it generates that social relations in human society are logi- as every participating actor tries to foster their cally antagonistic and conflicting because indi- interest. The paper would also demonstrate vidual interest differs. But conflict only be- how weak institutions and lack of basic infra- comes dangerous if it is allowed to degenerate structure as well as job opportunities cause and into violence and war. With strong institutions deepen these conflicts more than any other and good governance, conflict can be managed factor. and prevented from degenerating to violence and war even in a resource-rich nation. Norway 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK and represent a good example of resource-rich nations where strong institutions The framework of analysis employed for this and good governance have prevented the mani- paper is structural functionalism. There are two festation of the prophecy, or a reasons for chosen this framework. First conflict induced by gift of abundant resources. is that, the resource curse paradigm which over This shows that conflict only thrives in where the years, has dominated academic inquiry on strong institutions of governance are lacking or the causes of conflicts in resource-rich coun- weak. tries appears to be no longer tenable as demonstrated by many years of political tran- In most oil-rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa quillity and economic prosperity in oil-rich for instance, oil politics usually degenerates to countries like Norway and Saudi Arabia for ex- exploitation and violent conflicts because of the ample. Thus, recent studies have not only ques- presence of weak governance structures and tioned, but also criticized the alleged linkage bad . Although conflicts in Africa are between resources and violence.2 also linked to other factors such as ethnic plu- rality, ethnicity, nepotism and religious differ- The experiences of these countries have shown ences, resource curse has been adduced to be that the gift of abundant resources does not the most prominent and lethal factor. Nigeria lead to violent conflict. In fact, resources and South Sudan are two of the many countries could be a blessing rather than a curse to a in Africa that have been ravaged by conflicts . The second reason for employing this and wars. And oil been the major resource in theory is that, violent conflicts and wars in re- both countries has remained at the centre of source-endowed countries in Sub-Saharan Afri- these conflicts. In Nigeria, the oil-rich ca are more often than not a function of struc- Delta Region has been engulfed in conflict be- tural failure. In other words, resource-induced tween the militants (who are fighting against conflict arises and thrives in Africa because its environmental degradation and lack of devel- development structures and institutions of gov- opment in the ) and the Nigerian ernance have failed to function efficiently. In 3 government/international oil companies. Simi- this regard, Fearon & Latin rightly observed larly, in South Sudan, the struggle for political that, “oil producers (for instance) tend to have power and invariably the control of oil re- weaker state apparatuses than one would ex- sources has resulted in a violent conflict and pect given their level of income”. Although the between the various nationalities par- ticularly the two major ethnic groups – Dinka 2 See, Brunnschweiler, C. N. and Bulte, E. H., “The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of para- doxes and red herrings”, Economics Working Paper 1 See, Ayokhai, E. F., “Natural resource, identity Series, 6/61 (2006). politics and violent conflict in post-independence 3 Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D., “Ethnicity, Insurgency, Nigeria”, African Journal of History and Culture, and Civil War”, American Political Science Review, 97 2013. (2003), p. 81.

44 © Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa Kareem Olawale Bestoyin struggle for resource control can lead to con- sa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. Nigeria is divided flict, and the proceeds from resources could into 36 states and its capital is . It is richly serve as a catalyst for violent conflict,4 these endowed with many mineral resources promi- scenarios are possible only if there are weak nent among which is crude oil. Crude oil is institutions of governance, ineffective devel- found in the Niger Delta Region of the country. opment structures and lack of basic amenities. One common denominator in all countries Originally, the Niger Delta Region was the where resources have led to conflicts and wars South-South geo-political zone which is inhabit- has been the presence of weak institutions and ed mainly by the minorities in southern Nigeria inefficient development structures. On the con- and these include; Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross trary, in all countries where resources have River, Delta, Edo and Rivers. However, for polit- created prosperity, strong institutions and de- ical reason and administrative convenience, the velopment structures are found to be present map of the Niger Delta was recently redrawn and efficient. and expanded to include three other states and they include; Abia, Imo and Ondo. Nonetheless, Based on these facts, structural functionalism the concern of this paper is the Niger Delta of theory is very much suitable for the analysis of the South- South geo-political zone. The Niger conflict in oil-rich countries such as Nigeria and Delta has an estimated of over 29 South Sudan. According to Gabriel Almond, one million people, many of whom live in rural fish- of the chief advocates of this approach in politi- ing and farming communities. In spite of its cal science, every political system performs abundant resources, poverty and underdevel- certain input and output functions and these opment remain widespread. 73% of the people include; interest articulation, interest aggrega- lack access to safe drinking water, about 70% of tion, rule making, rule application and rule ad- households lack electricity, and primary school judication.5 The central argument of structural enrolment rate is still very low.6 functionalism is that the degree at which a giv- en political system is able to perform these In Nigeria, crude oil was first discovered in 1956 functions effectively will determine not only the at Oloibiri in the present day . level of its stability, but also its prosperity. A Prior to and few years after Nigeria’s independ- country whose institutions are able to perform ence in 1960, was the mainstay of these roles effectively will achieve political sta- its economy, hence the country produced in bility and development, while a country whose commercial quantities cash crops such as cot- institutions are weak and as a result could not ton, groundnuts, cocoa, , rubber, etc. perform these roles efficiently will experience But that changed in the 70s when oil became conflicts and political instability. The utility of the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy following structural functionalism to this paper is that it the and the consequent neglect of would help us to understand how weak institu- agriculture. Since then oil has remained very tions and inefficient development structures important to Nigeria’s economy which has be- have been shaping and reshaping the interplay come oil dependent. For the past four decades, of oil, politics and conflicts in Nigeria and South oil has been dictating Nigeria’s economic Sudan. growth and development. For instance, oil as- sumed 58.1% of Nigeria’s total export value in 2. GENERAL FEATURES OF NIGERIA AND 1970. It jumped to 96.9% in 1980, 93.6% in SOUTH SUDAN 1990 and 95% in 2001.7 Today, Nigeria faces two major conflicts: militancy in the Niger Del- Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. ta, and in the North. The concern of It is a plural society with over 250 ethnic na- tionalities prominent among which are: Hau- 6 See, Akinwale, A. A., “Curtailing conflicts in the resource-endowed Niger Delta communities of Nige- 4 Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., Greed and grievance in ria”, Journal of the Social Sciences. 1/7 civil war. Washington, DC., Bank, 2001. (2009). 5 See, Enemuo, F. C., “Approaches and Methods to 7 See, Akpabio, E. and Akpan, N. S., “Governance and the Study of Politics”, in Anifowose, Remi and Ene- oil politics in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: The question of muo, Francis Chigbo (eds.), Elements of Politics. distributive equity”, Journal of Human Ecology, 2/30 Lagos, Sam Iroanusi Publications, 1999. (2010), p. 115.

© Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 45 Kareem Olawale Bestoyin Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa this paper is Niger Delta conflict because of its 3. OIL POLITCS, STRUCTURAL FAILURE AND THE link with oil. CONFLICT IN NIGERIA’S NIGER DELTA: THE LINK

Also, South Sudan, like Nigeria, is a multi-ethnic The Niger Delta has been a theatre of agitations society with Dinka and Nuer as the major ethnic and conflict from pre-colonial era. First was the groups. It was formally part of Sudan until 2011 agitation for a separate country which was in- when it got her independence through a United formed by the fear of political domination by Nations backed which, in conjunc- the majority ethnic groups. This fear was al- tion with the 2005 Peace Agreement formally layed by the Willincks Commission which re- ended its over two decades of war with Sudan. jected the demand for a separate country, but It has 10 states and its capital is . Farming is instead granted a special developmental status the major and traditional occupation of South (the Niger Delta Development Board) and con- Sudan. It is rich in mineral resources particularly stitutional guarantees in the form of fundamen- crude oil. Its crude oil deposits are located in tal rights and national police force. However, two key areas - the border with Sudan and the the discovery of oil in 1956 in the region and Upper Region comprising three key states - the commencement of commercial oil produc- , and Jonglei. With oil account- tion in 1958 led to another form of agitation: ing for 98% of the government’s annual operat- the struggle for the control of oil resources by ing budget and 80% of the GDP, South Sudan is the indigenes, Eastern Region Government the most oil dependent country in the world.8 which was dominated and ruled by the Igbo – a major , and the Federal Govern- Despite its huge oil resources, South Sudan is ment which was dominated and ruled by the still one of the poorest countries in the world. Hausa/Fulani – another major ethnic group. The Even though South Sudan’s “ laws struggle for oil resource hegemony later be- are widely considered to reflect many aspects came more intense, hence partly contributed to of good practice and provide a starting point for the of 1967-70, though indi- more extensive reforms, but as with most laws rectly.11 It is on record that part of the reason in South Sudan, they remain almost completely why the Aburi which would have pre- unimplemented”. There is lack of transparency vented the civil war was not implemented was 9 and accountability over the use of oil revenues. because the Federal Government did not want Apart from lack of basic partly to cede the Niger Delta Region to the secession- because of many years of neglect and marginal- ist Eastern Region Government because of its ization by the Government of Sudan (GoS), huge oil resources endowment. South Sudan still suffers from high level of illit- eracy, corruption and bad leadership in post- Meanwhile the civil war did not stop the strug- independence era. It has been engulfed in vio- gle for oil resource control rather it altered the lent conflict that started barely few years after character and the modus oparandi of the strug- independence. Since the outbreak of violent gle. Hence, after the war, one of the actors -the conflict in South Sudan in December 2013, Eastern Region Government was eliminated about 7 out of its 10 states have been affected from the oil hegemony struggle following its by the violence.10 However, the areas affected defeat in the civil war. However, other actors most by the conflict are the oil-rich states and soon emerged and were later compelled by the borders with Sudan which are also rich in circumstances to embrace violence both as a oil. strategy of agitation and as a means of survival. It would be recalled that before the Nigerian civil war, a young police office- Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro recruited and trained about 150 youths under the banner of the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) and declared “the 8 See, , D. K., “Oil and sustainable peace in South Sudan”, A Working Paper. Juba, South Sudan Law Society Access to Justice for All, 2015, p. 2. 9 Ibid., p. 1. 11 Ikelegbe, A., “The Economy of Conflict in the oil 10 For details see, USAID. “South Sudan crisis”, Fact rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria”, Nordic Journal of Sheet, 6 (2013). African Studies, 2/14 (2005), p. 214.

46 © Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa Kareem Olawale Bestoyin

Niger Delta ”.12 He was arrested and neglect of the by the Nigerian State de- imprisoned. But this marked the beginning of spite being the major source of revenue for the militancy in the Region. entire country. For instance, Ijaw - a minority ethnic group that has many oil producing com- It is worthy of note that after the civil war and munities became sensitized and motivated by following the emergence of oil as the mainstay the activities of MOSOP. So, by the time the of Nigeria’s economy from the 70s, there were military government was using force to contain attempts by the Nigerian State to tackle the the activities of MOSOP, the Ijaw and other oil development needs of the Niger Delta, and the producing minorities have become fully aware environmental degradation arising from oil of the economic exploitation and the lack of and production and the consequent development going on in their area. As a result oil spillage and gas flaring. Thus, special devel- of this, they became aggressive and took up opment commissions were established for the arms against the perceived enemies – the oil Region. Examples of such commissions include: companies and the institutions of Nigerian Niger Delta Basin Development Authority state. (NDBA) and Oil Minerals Producing Areas De- velopment Commission (OMPADEC) established The aggression of the Ijaws against the Nigerian in 1978 and 1992, respectively. Unfortunately, state witnessed its crescendo between 1998 these commissions failed to surmount the de- and 1999 when the then Military Governor of velopmental needs of the Region due to corrup- Bayelsa state (a state that consists mainly of tion and bad leadership by the management Ijaw ethnic group) acting on the order of the and political leaders. Military – Gen. , ar- rested and detained an Ijaw youth leader in the The implication was the continuation of agita- Government House for purportedly allowing his tions by the oil producing communities. Ken followers to breach public peace. In a reaction Saro-Wiwa - a human right and environment to that, a group of youth who were said to be activist, had in late formed the Move- members of the Ijaw cult called ‘Egbesu’ ment for the Survival of (MOSOP) stormed the Government House in Yenegoa, and in 1990 made the famous declaration and disarmed the guards and released their incar- presentation of the Ogoni Bill of Rights in which cerated leader. The Egbesu boys were said to the Ogoni people wanted an end to the exploi- have succeeded because they wore charms that tation of their resources by the Multinational made them invincible and bullet-proof. This Oil Companies as well as the economic margin- ugly violent encounter between the apparatus alization of the Ogoni People by the Nigerian of violence of the Nigerian state and the Ijaw State, hence they ordered the oil companies to Youth later became known as the First Egbesu vacate Ogoniland or face the wrath of the peo- War.13 ple. This was followed by a campaign of sabo- tage of oil installations in Ogoniland. In re- The Egbesu war was essential because it pro- sponse to that, Saro-Wiwa – the pioneer found- voked series of activities that aggravated the er of MOSOP and eight other Ogonis were ar- crisis in the Region. The success of Egbesu war rested, tried, convicted and executed for trea- encouraged more youth to join the struggle, son by the then Military Head of State – Gen. hence the formation of the Ijaw Youth Council Sanni Abacha. (IYC) which made the famous ‘ Declara- tion’ in 1998 that ordered the oil companies Fortunately or unfortunately, the emergence of and expatriates operating in all Ijawland to MOSOP and the subsequent public execution of leave or face attacks by the youth. It was the Saro-Wiwa not only triggered more sabotage of refusal of the oil companies to obey the order oil facilities by the Ogoni people, but also creat- that made the youth to start taking them hos- ed more awareness among other oil producing tage and vandalizing oil facilities.14 The Nigerian communities that were suffering same problem of environmental pollution by the oil companies through gas flaring and oil spillage, and the 13 Ibeanu, O., “Our mothers’ Courage silenced all Guns: Women and Conflict in the Niger Delta”, Jour- 12 See, Azaiki, S., Oil, Politics and Blood: The Niger nal of Political Economy, 1/1 (2005). Delta Story. Ibadan, Y-Books, 2006. 14 Ibid.

© Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 47 Kareem Olawale Bestoyin Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa state quickly responded with more military many militant groups prominent among them action. Apart from the provision of 13% deriva- were: Movement for the Emancipation of the tion for the oil producing states in the 1999 Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah and the Constitution, the culture of using military action Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) led by Asari to suppress the agitations for resource control Dukubo which were highly equipped with so- by the Niger Delta continued even after Nigeria phisticated arms and ammunition like AK-47, returned to democracy in 1999. Hence, at vari- Machine guns, gun-boats, Improvised Explosive ous times within the present democratic era, Devices (IEDs) and other types of weaponry the military Joint Task Force (JTF) has carried that are meant for the warfare and out military operations in communities such as which could withstand any security apparatus Odi, Umuchem, Kaima, and numerous like the Nigerian Military. According to security others, resulting in huge civilian casualties.15 experts, these types of weaponry are capital With these experiences, it appears the Nigerian intensive. For instance, 1 AK-47 gun could cost governing class is unaware that, as Nnoli quot- between 300,000 and 500,000 thousand naira, ing , observed: while 1 General Purpose Machine Gun could cost as much as 1 million naira. The militants “democracy and the military are in a dia- who were mainly the unemployed youth could lectical opposition. The military is the an- not have afforded these weapons on their own tithesis of democracy with regard to its without the funding from their sponsors - the 16 forms, values, purpose and structure”. political cabals.

Hence, the use of military aggression as a re- Later attempts by the Federal Government to sponse to the agitations of the Niger Delta assuage the militants through the establish- youth rather than suppress the aggression, ment of the Niger Delta Development Commis- aggravated it and led to more mistrust and cha- sion (NDDC) to tackle the development chal- os. In the midst of this chaos, and in search for lenges facing the Region did not yield the de- funding to enable them buy more weapons in sired result because of corruption and misman- readiness for further battle with the Nigerian agement. The commission like its predecessors military, the Niger Delta youth turned to their failed. Of course, Nigeria in general and the politicians who unfortunately are also part of Niger Delta in particular, has never been in the national conspiracy and structure that has short supply of development agencies. been looting the resources of the oil producing communities for years. While hoping to use the The problem however has been the inability of violent youth to rig elections and perpetuate these agencies to fulfil the objectives for which themselves in power, the politicians quickly they were created. The subsequent excessive capitalized on this crisis and converted the vari- deployment of force by the Nigerian state ous youth movements into militant groups and against the militants enraged the militants this formally marked the birth of organized and more, thus they declared full war against the -funded militancy in the Region. This also companies as well as the Nigerian state and its led to the infiltration, politicization and crimi- instruments of violence – the Joint Task Force nalization of the militancy struggle by the new (JTF). This, coupled with the infiltration of the sponsors or political cabals. Niger Delta Struggle by some politicians and traditional rulers who wanted to make huge The impact was the disintegration of the vari- and quick money, brought a new dimension to ous youth movements into different militant militancy in the Region. factions controlled by different militant leaders. Between 1999 and 2003, there had emerged Apart from engaging in the vandalisation of oil installations, oil bunkering, and hostage taking

of expatriates, the militants began to kidnap 15 Douglas, O., Okonta, I., Kemedi, D. V. and Watts, M., “Oil and Militancy in the Niger Delta: Terrorist local oil workers and top government officials Threat or another Colombia? Niger Delta Economies and wealthy individuals while demanding mil- of Violence”, Working Paper, 4 (2004). lions of naira as ransom. Seeing that militancy 16 See, Nnoli, O., National security in Africa: A Radi- had become a very lucrative business, the large cal New Perspective. , SNAAP Press Ltd., 2006, army of unemployed youth in the Niger Delta p. 185

48 © Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa Kareem Olawale Bestoyin joined in, hence the increased multiplication of ment Ekpemupolo (aka Tompolo) and their militant camps all over the Region. It was then numerous militant fighters embraced the Am- that the crisis in the Region exploded like a vol- nesty programme. From Bayelsa State alone, cano. The militants engaged the JTF in open 520 rifles, 95,970,000 rounds of ammunition confrontations, and consistently attacked oil and 14 gun boats and 200 Ak-47 were turned in platforms and pipelines. As a result of this, oil by the 14 militant camps operating in the area. production decreased dramatically while oil Much bigger quantity of weaponry was turned bunkering increased astronomically and this led in from other states like Rivers, Delta, etc, dur- to a significant reduction in government reve- ing the Amnesty Arms Submission Programme. nues. This threatened the Nigerian Economy President who succeeded which was and is, still dependent on earnings Late President Umar Yar’dua continued with from crude oil. See figure 1 below for the key the Amnesty programme. Today, the Amnesty actors in the Niger Delta conflict. policy has reduced militancy and achieved rela- tive peace in the Niger Delta Region, however, Figure 1. Key actors in the niger delta conflict there are still isolated cases of sabotage of the oil pipelines, hostage taking and oil bunkering. ACTOR NATURE This shows that amnesty policy alone cannot Niger Delta Militants (notable Internal among them are; Henry Okah, solve the Niger Delta conflict permanently. Asari Dokubo, Tom Polo, Atake It is important to note that why oil politics and Tom and Boy-Loaf) Federal Government of Nige- Internal its resultant violent conflicts are thriving in Ni- ria/JTF geria is because fifty years after the discovery Niger Delta Elites (state gover- Internal of crude oil, the country still lacks not only nors, chair- strong institutions, but also basic infrastructure men, traditional rulers) especially in the oil host communities. In the Local oil contractors/oil-well Internal words of Ayokhai, Nigeria is still a country: owners) Multinational Oil Companies External “Where all known social are (Shell, Total, Chevron, Agip, Elf) at the peak of decay. Things like water, electricity, health, education, employment, Source: Adapted from Ibeanu, 2005; , 2012. etc which are taken for granted by most countries of the world are luxuries in Nige- Faced with these disturbing realities and seeing ria. The citizens, who live in one of the that the use of force by the Federal government world’s most naturally endowed regions, over the years has worsened the situation, are among the most wretched of the when the late president – Umar Musa Yar’dua earth’s poor. Its government is also rated came to power in 2007, one of his Seven-Point one of the world’s most corrupt”. 18 Agenda was to resolve the Niger Delta crisis through rapid development of the Region. In Also, the struggle for resource control and the order to achieve this, he created the Ministry of resultant violent conflicts are not only limited the Niger Delta in 2008 and incorporated NDDC to the conduct of relations between the Niger as one of the Departments of the Ministry. In a Delta Region and the Federal Government. major move to end the conflict, the President There are also intra and inter community con- also introduced the Amnesty Programme flicts between some of the various ethnic through which the militants were persuaded to groups within the Niger Delta Region, hence oil shun violence, surrender their arms and em- politics in the Region has been both vertical and brace peace and dialogue in exchange for horizontal. While inter-community conflicts mouth-watering incentives like monthly allow- arise when two or more communities claim ances, education scholarship and lo- ownership of an oil-well, intra-community cal/international skills acquisition training.17 Of clashes usually arise when there is a disagree- course, most of the militant leaders and their ment between the various interests within the groups like Ateke Tom, Boyloaf, Chief Govern- 18 Ayokhai, E. F., “Natural resource, identity politics 17 Gusau, I. U., “Jonathan and Politics of Fresh Mili- and violent conflict in post-independence Nigeria”, tancy in Niger Delta”, Daily Trust, February 10. 2012. African Journal of History and Culture. 2013, p. 38.

© Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 49 Kareem Olawale Bestoyin Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa host community with regards to how to share companies. This sabotage like vandalizing oil oil rent or perks given to the community by the pipelines has even led to further environmental oil companies or government.19 degradation.

Oil politics is still prevalent in Nigerian polity The third dimension is the antagonism between today and it is having a lot of negative conse- the Niger Delta militants and the oil compa- quences on the economy. For instance, it is nies/Federal troops. Militancy emerged in the hindering the effective implementation of the Niger Delta as a response to the environmental Nigerian Local Content Policy that was intro- degradation, the lack of basic necessities of life duced about one and a half decades ago and and the dearth of economic development and which was aimed at increased participation of job opportunities in the Region despite been local indigenous firms in the oil and gas industry the goose that laid the golden egg for Nigeria’s so as to bolster in-country capacity and indige- economy. However, the various militant groups nous manpower development, job creation and that emerged to fight this marginalization and wealth re-distribution. Oil political has also injustice were infiltrated, politicized and crimi- stalled the passage of the nalized by politicians, traditional rulers and Bill (PIB) which has remained in the National other interests. Also, the Nigerian State, mind- Assembly for over a decade now. The bill is ful of the centrality and essential role of oil being delayed by the vested interests such the resources in the national economy usually in- International Oil Companies, local oil contrac- tervenes on behalf of the international oil com- tors, and politicians who think that if the bill is panies using favourable legislations, oil policies, passed into law, it would introduce due process and sometimes, military aggression to suppress and efficiency, and curb corruption and illicit protests by the host communities against the wealth accumulation that have characterized international oil companies that are operating the industry over the years. in the region. From unilateral and statutory transfer of the ownership of oil and all mineral From the foregoing analysis, it could be extrap- resources to the Federal Government to the olated that the Niger Delta conflict has four deployment of military task force to quench major dimensions and they all have link to oil agitations of the Niger Delta people, the Nigeri- politics and lack of development. First is the an state has demonstrated its readiness to re- struggle for resource control between the oil move any barrier that can hinder its access to host communities and the Federal Government. oil resources. The Federal government through constitutional provision has given 13% derivation to the oil The fourth dimension is the struggle between producing states of the Niger Delta, but this is and within the oil host communities arising short of 50% derivation they have been de- from internal disagreements over ownership of manding. oil wells and, or sharing formula of oil rents and, or location of development projects by the Second is the hostility between the oil host government or oil companies. This aspect of the communities and the International Oil Compa- conflict occurs because there are numerous nies as well as the Federal Government over oil needs and interests in the Niger Delta, but the exploration and the resultant environmental resources to meet them are limited. Hence degradation. The international oil companies there is always the scramble for perks and de- operating in the Niger Delta have abused the velopmental projects by the various groups and environment through gas flaring and - interests. This scramble sometimes results in age. These abuses have polluted the lands and inter-group crisis and, or inter- communal con- waters of the Niger Delta people. This is affect- flicts. And at times, two or more communities ing negatively the traditional occupation of the may lay claim to an oil-well so as to enjoy any people which is farming and fishing. This, cou- benefits that may accrue from it. pled with lack of basic amenities and develop- ment in the area, has compelled the people to resort to sabotage of the facilities of the oil

19 Ibid. p. 38.

50 © Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa Kareem Olawale Bestoyin

4. OIL POLITICS, STRUCTURAL FAILURE AND hensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN: THE LINK Sudan’s second civil war (1983-2005) was bro- kered by the regional organization - the Inter- At independence South Sudan inherited not Governmental Authority on Development only crude oil deposit from Sudan, but also a (IGAD) and it was negotiated between the Su- culture of dictatorship, corruption, bad govern- ’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) - the ance, weak institutions and armed rebellion. leading southern movement and armed group, With these as the prevailing features of South and Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party - Sudan, it is not surprising that barely two years NCP.22 after its independence internal conflicts be- tween various armed groups erupted and However, neither the CPA that ended Sudan’s rocked the very foundation of the country by second civil war (1983-2005) nor South Sudan’s degenerating into a full-blown war. Hence, the independence in 2011 brought socio-political crude oil that was supposed and expected to be stability and economic development. Since in- a blessing to the people of South Sudan has dependence, the relationship between the become a curse and a resource that is being Government of Sudan (GoS) and Government of used to fuel conflict and war. Although there South Sudan (GoSS) has been that of a brief were strong indications of the fragile process of cooperation, border conflict and then oil pro- state-building at the point of the country’s in- duction shutdown followed by a new phase of dependence, there was also optimism that the civil war in South Sudan in which Sudan is in- creation of South Sudan would usher in new creasingly an active key player.23 And oil is the opportunities for the citizens of this new state reason for Sudan’s active participation in the to build and rebuild their legitimate homes in a conflict. It is on record that over 70% of Sudan’s place that so many had called “home” while in crude oil is located in Southern Sudan. Howev- exile for decades.20 er, the major refinery, export pipelines and seaport are all located in Sudan. Arguably, the conflict in South Sudan is a func- tion of numerous factors. However, one major The implication of this uneven distribution is factor that has been shaping and reshaping the that even after the South Sudan’s independ- dynamics and trajectories of the South Sudan’s ence, Sudan would still remain its only export conflict is oil politics which has become parasit- route via a pipeline that connects to the sea- ic because of the presence of weak institutions port in at the . This has the and inefficient infrastructure. The history of oil potential of causing another set of conflict and exploration and production in South Sudan is a deepening the already sour relationship be- history of violent conflict. Oil was first discov- tween the two Sudans. However, the Compre- ered by Chevron in Sudan in 1978 at in hensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 had the present day South Sudan’s Unity State. envisaged this scenario playing out and in order Soon after the discovery of oil in the late 70s, to prevent that, it stated that oil revenues from the second Sudanese civil war broke out in South Sudan should be shared 50:50 ratio with 1983 and lasted for over two decades (1983- the Government of Sudan. But this still has neg- 2005). And because of the civil war, Chevron ative implication for the left the country in 1984. Thus, paving the way because the independence of South Sudan for Chinese and Malaysian owned multinational meant that Sudan would henceforth lose 70% oil companies who came in and continued oil of and 50% of oil revenues to the exploration and production. But it was not until newly independent state. Moreover, soon after 1999 that the first Sudanese oil was shipped to the secession, the two countries breached the the international market.21 The 2005 Compre- agreement on oil revenues sharing formula and

20 Hovil, L., “Conflict in South Sudan: Seek Protection in and a Way Home”, Interna- 22 International Crisis Group, “South Sudan: A Civil tional Rights Initiative, 2014. War by any other name”, Africa Report, 217 (10 21 Grawert, E. and Andrä, C., “Oil Investment and April. 2014). Conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan”, : 23 International Crisis Group, “Sudan and South Su- Bonn International Center of Conversion (BICC) Brief, dan’s merging conflicts”. Africa Report, 223 (29 Jan- 48 (2013). uary. 2015).

© Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 51 Kareem Olawale Bestoyin Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa this partly led to the conflict which has been the capital - Juba, and then beyond. The destabilizing oil production.24 fighting was initially between forces loyal to the President and forces loyal to the former Vice In addition to this Sudan-South Sudan struggle President. But when reports from Juba gave for resource control is the internal struggle ethnic coloration to the fighting, armed civilians among the key political actors in South Sudan joined in and engaged in retaliatory attacks for political power as well as the control of oil which further deepened and complicated the resources. The ongoing internal conflict in conflict.26 South Sudan started in December 2013, barely three years after the country gained independ- The struggle for the control of oil resources and ence from Sudan through a referendum sup- the accruing revenues (oil politics) has pitched ported by the international community. Since not only the two Sudans against each other, but then, there have been long-standing tensions also the elites against one another as well as and intrigues within the South Sudan’s ruling the host communities against the oil compa- party - the Sudan People’s Liberation Move- nies. In fact, oil politics is not just a mere cause ment (SPLM) which later degenerated into of the conflict, but the driving force which has armed conflict in the nation’s capital - Juba. continued to escalate and elongate it. There are four dimensions of oil politics in South Sudan’s The conflict started following the purported conflict. attempted coup to overthrow the government of President Salva Kiir in which the president The first is the struggle between the Govern- fingered his vice – to be the spon- ment of Sudan and the Government of South sor. This divided the Sudan People’s Liberation Sudan over the control of oilfields in the border Army (SPLA) between forces loyal to the Gov- between the two countries, and how to share ernment and forces loyal to former Vice- oil revenues emanating from crude oil that are President, and the resultant effect was a violent exported through the pipelines and Red Sea conflict and summary arrest, detention, and Port which are all located in Sudan. In the oil dismissal of senior political figures within the politics that ensued following the secession of SPLA and South Sudan’s political leadership. South Sudan, each country has deployed its Machar, who had been dismissed by President strategic assets to its advantage. While the gov- Kiir escaped from Juba and denied there was an ernment of South Sudan uses its large crude oil attempted coup and his involvement in any reserves, the government of Sudan always de- coup. But he soon declared himself the leader ploys its oil pipelines and seaports which are of an armed opposition movement that later critical to South Sudan’s export. But beyond became known as the Sudan People’s Libera- that, the government of Sudan employs other tion Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A- strategies. It is worthy to note that following IO). The crisis rapidly spread amongst security the discovery of oil and its emergence as the forces in the country’s - Juba and mainstay of Sudan’s economy, the government later engulfed the whole neighbourhoods caus- of Sudan has used oil resources in many ways. ing many civilian deaths, looting and destruc- tion of property within days.25 As with all dictatorships, President Omar al Bashir has been deploying revenues from oil to Although the political intrigues and dispute that curry continuous support with fellow national triggered this crisis was not originally based on elites in order to consolidate his stay in power. ethnic identity, the key players in the crisis ex- He uses the proceeds from oil to buy over ploited the pre-existing ethnic and political fault strong opposition leaders and to sponsor rebel lines and this led to targeted ethnic killings in group in order to counter other rebels groups that threaten his rule. He also uses oil revenues

to provide social services that would make him 24 For details see, Nour, S. S. M., “Assessment of the Impact of Oil: Opportunities and Challenges for - popular and douse the likelihood of popular nomic Development in Sudan”, African Review of Economics and Finance, 2/2 (2011), p. 141. 26 See, Blanchard, L. P., “The crisis in South Sudan”, 25 International Crisis Group, “South Sudan: A Civil Congressional Research Service, 7/5700 (2014). Ava- War by any other name”, Africa Report, 217 (10 laible from [Accessed 2nd April. 2014). June, 2015]

52 © Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa Kareem Olawale Bestoyin revolt against him. It is worthy to note that the And there are indications that the leader of international oil companies involved in Sudan’s SPLM-IO has entered into a secret agreement to oil sector are mainly from Asia and they operate share oil revenues with the Government in under the consortium of the Greater Nile Petro- in exchange of its military support in leum Operating Companies (GNPC) led by the the war. Both the Government of South Sudan National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), (GoSS) and SPLM-IO are trying hard to get the which owns the largest single share of 40%; support of the Government in Khartoum. Alt- followed by ’s which has hough both sides also hate and consider the 30% shares and ’s Oil and Natural Gas Cor- Government in Khartoum as enemy, they have poration which has 25% shares. The Govern- no other option than to seek its support. The ment of Sudan (GoS) through its national oil Government in Khartoum on the other hand is company - Sudanese Petroleum SudaPet, owns exploiting the situation to its advantage. While only 5% shares in GNPC.27 Khartoum is demanding the ceding of disputed border areas like which is rich in oil re- However, when South Sudan seceded with over sources as the condition for its military support 70 percent of the oil reserves, President Al to GoSS, it also secretly demands from SPLM/A- Bashir quickly re-strategized. First, he negotiat- IO the lion’s share of oil revenues as a condition ed 50:50 sharing formula of South Sudan’s oil for its support.28 The GoS has been deploying revenues. But he understood that this agree- every strategy including the use of militia ment might be breached and even if it was not groups in an attempt to elongate the conflict in breached, that alone was not enough since South Sudan. For instance, the GoS has drawn South Sudan could shun Sudan’s oil pipelines the notorious militia into the con- and export terminals and rather chose to export flict. And it is on record that the GoS had used its crude through another country by building this same militia to unleash maximum violence new pipelines (though this option would be on people between 2003 and 2006 capital intensive and time consuming) or decide which prompted the International Criminal to stop production at any slightest provocation Court (ICC) in March 2009, to issue arrest war- by Khartoum. In fact, South Sudan deployed the rants for President Omar Al Bashir on charges of latter strategy in 2012 and halted oil production war crimes, and crimes against hu- but resumed in 2013. This not only affected the manity. The involvement of non-South Suda- Sudanese economy negatively, but also nearly nese fighters, including the Darfur-based militia cost President Al Bashir his political power by - Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) from reducing his financial muscle to curry elite sup- Sudan, has exacerbated the conflict.29 Even port and buy over dissenting voices of the op- China supplies arms and ammunition to the position. The second strategy of the president Region and this affects the dynamics of the was the deployment of the Sudanese Military to conflict too.30 See Figure 2 for the key actors in take over the oil rich border. the South Sudan’s conflicts. Meanwhile by play- ing this double and exploitative oil politics, the Since the outbreak of war in South Sudan, the Government in Khartoum has been benefitting primary aim of the Government of Sudan (GoS) from both sides in the conflict. Hence, as much has been to use all possible means to ensure as it wants an end to the conflict, it equally the continuous production and flow of oil from wants the conflict to continue. The continuation oilfields in South Sudan. Hence, following the of the conflict affords Khartoum the opportuni- violence that resulted in shutdown of some oil installations, it quickly suggested and deployed 28 International Crisis Group, “South Sudan: A Civil joint military force to protect the oilfields. War by any other name”, Africa Report, 217 (10 However, the GoS also wants to elongate the April. 2014). instability in South Sudan, hence it is secretly 29 See, Ottaway, M. and El-Sadany, M., “Sudan: From arming the SPLM-IO. Conflict to Conflict”, Massachusetts: Carnegie En- dowment for International Peace, 2012. Avalaible from: [Ac- 27 Nour, S. S. M., “Assessment of the Impact of Oil: cessed on 2nd June, 2015] Opportunities and Challenges for Economic Devel- 30 See, Attree, L., China and conflict-affected states - opment in Sudan”, African Review of Economics and Between principle and pragmatism: Sudan and South Finance, 2/2 (2011), p. 126. Sudan case study. 2012.

© Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 53 Kareem Olawale Bestoyin Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa ty to commandeer oil resources from both the warring parties including the current UN Peace Government in Juba and SPLM/A-IO. Mission, have failed to end the conflict.

The second dimension is the struggle by the The third dimension is the intervention by one South Sudan’s elites within and outside the of the regional actors – the Ugandan Govern- government as well as the SPLM/A for political ment/Army which was attracted to the conflict power and invariably the control of oil re- by economic interest (oil proceeds) rather than sources. As the elites sought political relevance humanitarian sympathy or the quest to prevent and dominance with access to the oil resources the conflict from destabilizing the entire sub- been their final aim and the ultimate end, they region. Uganda is not a resource rich nation reverted back to their various ethnic groups though it has little quantity of crude oil deposit. where they have strong base and support. It shares border with South Sudan which is very While some formed new ethnic militias, others rich in oil resources. The Ugandan Govern- resuscitated and regrouped the ex-militia ment/Army is playing double game in the con- groups with which they had waged war with flict. While it openly supports the Government Sudan before 2005 Comprehensive Peace of South Sudan which in turn gives it huge fi- Agreement. The elites capitalized on the exist- nancial compensation from the oil earnings, it ing ethnic fault lines and pitched the various secretly supports the SPLM/A-in Opposition. ethnic groups against one another particularly The Government in Juba has used crude oil the two major ethnic groups – Dinka against earnings and oil-backed loans cum agreements Nuer. to arm and rearm its army and allied forces such as the Ugandan troops while spending The oilfields in Upper Nile and Unity states con- relatively little on the welfare of its war- tain 80% and 20%, respectively, of South Su- affected citizens. The heavy spending on the dan’s total crude oil production. Thus, in the war is believed to have mortgaged South Su- current conflict, the forces loyal to Riek Machar dan’s future such that it might lack the re- have severally attempted to take control of sources in future to perform core state func- these states where the oilfields are located tions such as provision of infrastructure and mainly because of their strategic importance payment of salaries to state workers.33 The which could be leveraged upon during negotia- Ugandan Army’s secret support for the Machar- tions. Also, having access to the oilfields would led opposition is intended to make the enable the opposition to raise revenues from SPLM/A–IO look very strong and capable of the sale of oil and use such proceeds to buy capturing Juba, and to instil perpetual fear and 31 weapons and support for the war. Similarly, keep pressure on the government in Juba to the state of Jonglei, which is believed to have continuously appreciate the presence of the significant untapped oil reserves, has been one Ugandan Army as a necessary option. Through of the major flashpoints for inter-ethnic these military conspiracy and political intrigues, fighting. At various times, there have been the Ugandan Army helps in elongating the clashes between Nuer and Murle, Dinka and South Sudanese conflict while reaping part of Murle, as well as between Nuer and Dinka. Any the proceeds from South Sudan’s oil as a result wonder the Jonglei capital: Bor, was among the of its unending participation in the conflict. first areas where fighting quickly spread to in the outset of the current crisis (Blanchard The fourth dimension is the antagonism be- 2014).32 The presence of crude oil in these tween the host communities and international states has made them the theatre of the ongo- oil companies over the former’s forceful evacu- ing war in South Sudan. All attempts by the ation from their land in order to make way for to broker peace between the oil exploration and production, and the result- ant environmental degradation emanating from 31 Patey, L. P., “South Sudan: Fighting could Cripple the activities of the oil companies. It is worthy Oil Industry for Decades”, African Arguments, Janu- of note that following the discovery of oil and ary 10. 2014. 32 Blanchard, L. P., “The crisis in South Sudan”, Con- gressional Research Service, 7/5700 (2014). Avalaible 33 International Crisis Group, “Sudan and South Su- from: [Accessed 2nd June, dan’s merging conflicts”, Africa Report, 223 (29 Jan- 2015] uary. 2015).

54 © Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa Kareem Olawale Bestoyin its subsequent emergence as the mainstay of the other hand, the oil companies which the Sudanese economy, the Government of Sudan host communities believed, conspired with the (GoS) began a violent campaign intended to GoS to abuse, exploit and under-develop their systematically and forcefully wipe-out or drive environment. The result of this was armed re- away the original inhabitants of those South sistance conflicts which have continued to oc- Sudanese areas where International Oil Com- cur in the oil rich areas even after the Compre- panies had discovered oil or expected to find oil hensive Peace Agreement that ended the first in future. war and led to the independence of South Su- dan (Bol, 2012).35 During the 21 years of Sudan’s civil war, crude oil was first explored and then produced by the Figure 2. Key actors in south sudan’s conflict international oil companies in the borders be- tween Southern part and Northern part of Su- ACTORS NATURE dan and also in the Upper Nile areas in South- President Salva Kiir/SPLM/A Internal ern part of Sudan. The GoS also used proceeds Ex Vice President; Riek Internal from oil to fund the war. In reaction to the GoS Machar/SPLM/A-IO campaign to force out the inhabitants of oil-rich Government of Sudan External communities from their lands so as to make Ugandan Army External International Oil Companies External way for oil exploration and exploitation, some (e.g. CNPC, PETRONAS, of the inhabitants fled to escape the violence IONGC) been perpetrated by the GoS, while others de- Chinese Government External cided to stay behind and defend their lands. United Nations External Some of those that stayed behind formed mili- Source: Adapted from Shankleman, 2011;36 UNMISS tant resistance groups or militias and engaged 2014;37 The Institute, 2014.38 the Sudan Armed Forces.34 The outbreak of civil war at a time crude oil was By the time the war ended after over two dec- discovered in Sudan was not a coincidence. ades following the Comprehensive Peace Apart from ethnic and religious differences, the Agreement in 2005 between GoS and SPLM/A, scramble for crude oil and its proceeds was it had created many victims. Many able-bodied among the major factors that fuelled the war. persons before the war had become disabled. Similarly, the eruption of another war in the Many families had broken up or disconnected. newly independent South Sudan points to oil Cultural values and social cohesion were erod- politics too. It would be recalled that even after ed. Homes, farms, , and other unquan- the independence of South Sudan, the oil com- tifiable crucial assets were lost to the war. panies are still operating in lands dispossessed However, when the war ended and the dislo- from the people. Environment degradation is cated population gradually returned to their still going on. But because the new Government areas of origin, they discovered that oil compa- of South Sudan (GoSS) needs the proceeds from nies have taken over not only their lands, but oil, it has not reversed the policy of the old re- also have polluted their environment with oil gime on forceful dispossession of the people’s spillage and production waste. As a result, their land for oil production. It has also failed to stop lands could no longer support agriculture and livestock production which were the traditional 35 occupations of the people. Attempts by the See, Bol, M. B., “Oil Industry’s Impact on Land people to seek redress for the damages were Use. Patterns in Northern Upper Nile State, South Sudan.”, Presentation on the occasion of the Work- suppressed violently by the government of Su- shop “Social Dimensions of Oil Exploitation in South dan (GoS) which was the ultimate beneficiary of Sudan” in Juba, 27-28 , 2012. the proceeds from oil production. 36 Shankleman, J., “Oil and State Building in South Sudan: New country, Old Industry”, This created hostility between the crude oil Institute of Peace Special Report, 2011. host communities and GoS on one hand, and on 37 For details see, UNMISS, Conflict in South Sudan: A Report, May 2014. 34 For details see, Grawert, E, and Andrä, C., Oil In- 38 For details see, The Sudd Institute Special Report. vestment and Conflict in Upper Nile State, South South Sudan’s Crisis: Its drivers, key players, and Sudan. 2013. post-conflict prospects. Juba, South Sudan, 2014.

© Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 55 Kareem Olawale Bestoyin Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa the oil companies from degrading the environ- ties resorted to violence as a strategy of protest ment of the host communities. Although some cum resistance against exploitation, and also as measures have been taken by GoSS to develop a means of survival. the oil producing states and the country at large using proceeds from oil, corruption and bad The political elites in both countries capitalized governance have not allowed these measures on the economic vulnerability and violent dis- to succeed. Examples are: the establishment of position of the youth in the oil rich regions to Future Generation Fund and Oil Revenue Stabi- groom and fractionalize them into militia lization Account; and the allocation of 2% and groups with which they consolidate their politi- 3% of the total revenues from oil to the oil pro- cal power and crass accumulation of the com- ducing states and oil producing communities, monwealth. In the case of Nigeria, for instance, respectively.39 the youth acceptance of financial sponsorship from politicians was mainly aimed at enabling The failure of these measures is reflected in the them buy sophisticated weapons with which inability of GoSS to provide essential infrastruc- they could continue the war against the state ture like good roads, clean water, electricity, and other perceived enemies. But the irony is basic education and health care for its teeming that this sponsorship creates a partnership be- population especially the inhabitants of oil pro- tween the oppressed and the oppressor. In ducing communities. The oil companies have other words, the oppressed - the people ‘repre- also not provided these basic amenities for the sented’ by the militias in the oil producing host communities because providing them communities are sponsored by one of the op- would reduce their profit margin thus affect pressors - the political elites who are the most their quest for profit maximization. The re- parasitic element of the exploitation structure sponse of the oil producing communities to this they are waging war against. continuous neglect and lack of development has been to violently resist the operations of This political and economic partnership that the oil companies. Hence the story of South exists between the oppressed and the oppres- Sudan today is that of an oil-rich country that sor creates unending dialectics that elongate has been impoverished by oil politics and the and make the conflicts to be increasingly inter- attendant violent conflict. minable. In the case of South Sudan, the politi- cians have divided the country and created 5. NIGERIA AND SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICTS: militia groups along ethnic lines. The SPLM/A SIMILARITIES AND IMPACTS controlled by the President Kiir is no longer a national army but has been turned into an eth- From the preceding analysis, it is deducible that nic militia for the Dinka ethnic group and its oil politics plays negative role in the conflicts in allies. In the same vein, the SPLM/A-IO led by Nigeria’s Niger Delta and South Sudan. In both the former Vice-President -Dr. Machar, has conflicts, the quest for the control of oil re- become a militia outfit for the Nuer ethnic sources is the driving factor. And just as the group and its allies. The militias in both sides of Nigerian state and the international oil compa- the conflicts owe allegiance to the politicians nies in conjunction with the political elites have who sponsor them. The sponsorship and the exploited and underdeveloped the oil produc- resultant allegiance are equally a form of part- ing communities in the Niger Delta, the Gov- nership between the oppressor and the op- ernment of Sudan and the Government of pressed because the politicians (sponsors) are South Sudan as well as the international oil the biggest exploiter and enemy of the people companies cum the national elites not only of South Sudan. exploited and underdeveloped the oil-rich are- as, but have also systematically ejected the Eliminating this type of partnership is necessary original inhabitants of these areas in order to for ending the conflicts in both countries. And make way for oil exploration and production. to eliminate this relationship and its resultant Poor and helpless, the oil producing communi- consequences, the fundamentals of the con- flicts must be addressed first. That is to say 39 Deng, D. K., “Oil and sustainable peace in South those challenges that made the oil producing Sudan”. A Working Paper. Juba, South Sudan Law communities and the society at large to be eco- Society Access to Justice for All, 2015, p. 4.

56 © Historia Actual Online, 46 (2), 2018: 43-57 Oil, conflicts and politics in sub-saharian Africa Kareem Olawale Bestoyin nomically vulnerable and violence prone which agents of violence and allied militias. It is also in turn compelled their youth to embrace vio- oil interests that have attracted external players lence and to accept to work for politicians must such as Uganda, oil pirates, etc, to the conflicts. be rectified. Meanwhile, these conflicts are thriving in both countries because they lack strong institutions Moreover, in terms of impact, the conflicts of governance and basic infrastructure especial- have affected both countries negatively. In Ni- ly in the oil host communities. Based on these geria, and before the amnesty, apart from the facts, the paper infers that there is a causal wanton destruction of lives and property, the correlation between oil politics, exploitation, Niger Delta conflict led to incessant attacks on environmental degradation, structural failure, oil facilities which in turn led to a dramatic re- lack of development and the lingering violent duction in oil production, and this nearly crum- conflicts in South Sudan and Nigeria’s oil-rich bled the Nigerian economy. Oil production re- Niger Delta. Therefore, finding a lasting solution duced from its pre-conflict peak of 2 mil- to these conflicts would require factoring in lion/bpd to less than 1 million/bpd. It led to the these fundamental variables. This would entail decrease in foreign investment especially in the strengthening the existing institutions of gov- oil and gas sectors as many foreign investors ernance and providing basic amenities as well ran away from the country at the climax of the as job opportunities especially in the oil produc- conflict. Nigeria is yet to fully recover from the ing communities whose traditional means of damage and economic impact caused by the livelihood – fishing and farming have been al- conflict even many years after the introduction tered by environmental pollution caused by oil of amnesty. In South Sudan, according to Oxfam production. When the institutions of govern- 40 International (2014) and Deng (2015), the ance are strengthened, they would function conflict has also brought humanitarian crises effectively and end the culture of corruption which include: acute shortage of food resulting and exploitation been perpetrated by the na- in hunger, malnutrition and dead; human dis- tional elites and international oil companies placement; disruption of markets; lack of in- operating in these countries. Also, when basic vestment in infrastructure; and destruction of infrastructure and job opportunities are provid- millions of lives and unquantifiable property. ed, the youth would be employed hence they The failure of the GoSS to prioritize much- will not be readily available for recruitment by needed investment in agriculture and infra- the militants and various militia groups. How- structure has led to shortages in basic services. ever, granting amnesty and signing peace The conflict is consuming bulk of the country’s agreement between the warring parties, which annual budget, hence in 2013, about 55% was are the current measures adopted by the Nige- spent on security. The conflict is also affecting rian Government and South Sudanese Govern- oil production. In 2014 for instance, Oil produc- ment, respectively, can only bring relative and tion fell to 50% of pre-conflict level. temporary peace, but cannot permanently end the conflicts because such mechanisms do not CONCLUSION tackle the nitty-gritty of the problem. In the final analysis, this paper submits that the struggle for the hegemony of oil resources is at the centre of the conflicts in South Sudan and Nigeria’s Niger Delta, hence the oil-rich regions in both countries are the major theatres of the conflicts. And that in both countries, oil is being used to fuel the conflicts as the various players deploy its proceeds to curry support from dif- ferent quarters, and to create and arm their

40 For details see, Oxfam International, “From crisis to catastrophe: South Sudan’s man-made crisis – and how the world must act now to prevent catas- trophe in 2015”, Joint Agency Briefing Note, 2014.

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