Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Separatism in Africa The Secession of South Sudan and Its (Un-)likely Consequences Denis M. Tull Co SWP Some members of the international community, particularly in Africa, have mixed feelings about South Sudan’s independence. Though most view the separation from Sudan as politically legitimate, they fear that the successful secession may have a signalling effect on separatist movements elsewhere in Africa. How valid is the assump- tion that the “precedent” of South Sudan will encourage secessionist tendencies which may change the continent’s territorial map over the long run? And how should one consider Somaliland’s claim for international recognition against the background of South Sudan’s independence? Following Eritrea’s independence from movements. Their number is, however, Ethiopia in 1993, South Sudan is only the exceedingly low. Compared with other second case of a successful secession in regions of the world, Africa has suffered postcolonial Africa. Both states, Eritrea the largest number of internal wars, but and South Sudan, gained sovereignty with only a very small number of them involved the consent of their former ‘motherland’, separatist tendencies. Angola, Ethiopia, though after a long and violent struggle. At Senegal and Sudan are the only states in present, there is no evidence to suggest that postcolonial Africa that were relatively other governments in Sub-Saharan Africa, continuously confronted with violent seces- likewise confronted with demands of sepa- sionist movements. Virtually none of the ratist movements, will acquiesce to the insurgent groups that have fought central partitioning of their state in order to end governments in the past 20 years in coun- an irredentist conflict. Likewise, no seces- tries such as Burundi, DR Congo, Liberia, sionist movement currently exists in Africa and Sierra Leone claimed to fight for in- which could muster enough military power dependence; nor did the various rebel to force the central state to agree to separ- groups in Darfur, Sudan. ation. Exceptions are relatively minor seces- Worries about the signalling effect sionist groups in Cabinda (Angola), An- coming from South Sudan’s independence jouan (Comoros), Caprivi (Namibia) and a are based at least partly on the idea that host of groups in Ethiopia. Currently, active Africa is home to numerous separatist secessionist groups are present in Casa- Dr. Denis M. Tull is a researcher at the Middle East and Africa Research Division of SWP SWP Comments 18 August 2011 1 mance (Senegal), Ogaden and Oromia was created in 2000. Since then, the organi- (Ethiopia) and to lesser degree in Cabinda. sation has shown little inclination to recon- The separatist movement in Biafra, which sider this fundamental principle. The fact fought a war with Nigeria’s central govern- that Somaliland has not been recognized ment (1967–1970), has not produced a cred- to date (it applied vainly for AU member- ible successor. The rebellion in Nigeria’s ship status in 2005) is in line with a long- Delta region (since 2005) claims to fight for standing policy established by the AU’s a reform of the state – not its dissolution. predecessor, the Organisation of African Likewise, the insurgency in Ivory Coast, Unity. which started in 2002, at no point in time Closely related to this may be the knowl- advanced a separatist agenda. Against this edge of insurgents that they will attain background, it seems unlikely that South their objectives more easily as long as they Sudan’s independence will stir up more pursue them within existing political separatist tendencies in Africa or reinvigo- entities. Such reasoning may have been rate existing ones. Some insurgents will bolstered by regional and international certainly refer to South Sudan as a point of mediators and diplomats over the past 20 reference in order to put pressure on the years. Almost without exception, they have governments they fight. But this is likely proposed power-sharing arrangements to be a purely tactical move. between incumbents and rebel groups to end violent conflict, often providing in- surgents with significant political and An Apparent Paradox financial incentives to stop the fighting. The relative lack of separatism in Africa seems to be counterintuitive, even para- doxical. After all, conventional wisdom Comparing South Sudan and has it that the socio-cultural heterogeneity Somaliland of many African states, stemming from Even if secessionist movements in Africa arbitrarily drawn borders, poses a formida- are exceptional, South Sudan’s sovereignty ble obstacle to nation-building. From this it raises the question of how the international is only a small step to claim that Africa’s community should respond to secessionist states may be particularly prone to sepa- claims. From the perspective of internation- ratism – a causal argument which has al law, the recognition of a potentially proved incorrect. Other factors have also sovereign entity is solely determined by the failed to stir the flames of secessionism. quality of stateness, based on the existence The marginalisation and discrimination of a population, a defined territory and of minorities and regions, development effective state authority. All other potential failures and authoritarian rule – salient factors of external recognition are based characteristics in a large number of African on the political considerations of outside countries, past and present – have not in- states. Concerning Africa, the explicit creased the likelihood of secessionism. policy of the US and some member states As a matter of fact, existing African of the European Union seems to be that insurgent groups generally do not fight they will consider recognition of a new for the creation of their own independent state only after the AU has recognized the state. Their primary goal is rather the con- new entity. The viability of a new state does quest of political power within a given not appear to be a relevant criterion, much state. One reason for the lack of secessionist less a stumbling block to recognition. This agendas may be the robustness of the inter- is at least suggested by the international national norm that protects the integrity of recognition of South Sudan, where the states. The African Union (AU) explicitly re- government cannot be expected to build affirmed its adherence to this norm when it effective state institutions in the foresee- SWP Comments 18 August 2011 2 able future. Even gloomier are the pros- While important factors speak in favour pects for democracy and rule of law. South of Somaliland’s international recognition, Sudan is an exceedingly heterogeneous the resistance of Somalia’s central govern- entity and its struggle for independence ment has frustrated this aspiration thus far. under the leadership of the Sudan People’s This is another paradox. Not only is Somali- Liberation Army (SPLA) was won against land a far more “successful” state than the the common external enemy in Khartoum. rest of Somalia; the latter’s Transitional This provided a measure of unity that Federal Government (TFG) could not survive may be called into question in the newly without external assistance. Even with independent state. It remains to be seen the help of an AU peacekeeping mission, whether the ruling SPLA will be prepared to the government has little control over its let citizens decide whether the movement’s capital Mogadishu, much less the rest of legitimacy will also be determined by pub- Somalia. Yet, the TFG is widely recognized lic goods other than independence, notably as the legitimate representative of Somalia development and democracy. Doubts may and thus holds a veto over the possible be raised due to earlier experiences in international recognition of Somaliland. Africa with anti-colonial liberation move- ments that sought to hold onto their political monopoly in perpetuity based on Incremental Change is on its Way... their successful struggle against foreign For the time being, it seems utopian to domination. Most of the more recent liber- expect an effective Somali central state to ation movements that turned into national emerge in the coming years. Partly for this governments have shown similar inclina- reason, the debate about the merits of tions. Somaliland’s international recognition will Somaliland presents a sharp contrast continue. Tacit signs of pragmatic thinking to South Sudan. A north-western region of are emerging. Some African and Western Somalia, it became de facto independent governments already maintain informal after the Somali state collapsed in 1991. relations with the de facto state. In late Today, it is widely perceived as the most 2010, the US announced enhanced cooper- promising and credible candidate for inter- ation with Somaliland. This was a prag- national recognition in Africa. This is based matic detour from previous policy, which first on the legal argument, advanced by made closer relations with Somaliland the government of Somaliland, that the dependent on problems in central Somalia area was a British colony in its own right, being solved. However, this policy shift separately administered from the rest of does not seem to signal US intentions to Somalia. recognize Somaliland any time soon. It is The second argument in support of driven rather by the hope that working Somaliland’s international recognition with Somaliland may also help to stabilize is a political one.