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Richard Nixon's Détente and Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik

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Richard Nixon's Détente and Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by ETD - Electronic Theses & Dissertations RICHARD NIXON’S DÉTENTE AND WILLY BRANDT’S OSTPOLITIK: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY OF ENGAGING THE EAST By Werner D. Lippert Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Vanderbilt University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In History August, 2005 Nashville, Tennessee Approved: Thomas A. Schwartz Helmut W. Smith Matthias Schulz Michael D. Bess James M. Goldgeier Copyright © 2005 by Werner Dieter Lippert All Rights Reserved DEDICATION To my beloved wife, Carola, for her infinite support and encouragement. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation is the result of the support from many individuals and institutions. Without the financial support from the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), the Vanderbilt University Graduate Summer Research Fellowship, and the Vanderbilt History Department William C. Binkley Graduate Education Grant, this work would not have been possible. I am grateful to the faculty of the Vanderbilt History Department who provided for me the proper academic environment and support for this project to succeed. In particular, the members of my Dissertation Committee, Dr. Helmut Smith, Dr. Matthias Schulz and Dr. Michael Bess have afforded me extensive personal and professional guidance and influenced my work significantly. I would especially like to thank Dr. Thomas A. Schwartz, the chairman of my committee. He has been my teacher, mentor and friend, and as such taught me more than I could ever give him credit for. In addition, the following people have provided me with inspiration and assistance that I cherished and benefited from during my research: Dr. James Goldgeier, for serving as the “non-history” committee member and his support during my research at the National Archives, Dr. Norbert Frei for his guidance during my research in Germany, as well as Dr. Christian Ostermann and Mircea Munteanu at the Cold War International History Project, Dr. Hope Harrison, Dr. William Gray, Dr. Oliver Bange, Dr. Gottfried Niedhart and David Geyer for many inspiring conversations and ideas. Among my fellow students, I am particularly indebted to three of them. Dr. Barry Robinson for his seemingly endless support and counsel in my academic endeavors, iv Justin Wilson for sharing his insights in and enthusiasm for international relations and Deanna Matheuszik for proofing my work diligently. I would also like to mention the archivists who have proved invaluable in aiding my research: Heinz Hoffmann and Kurt Braband at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Knud Piening at the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Harry Scholz at the Willy Brandt Archiv, Dr. Ulrich Soenius at the Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Dr. Horst Wessel at the Mannesmann Archiv, and Patricia Anderson and Michael Hussey at the National Archives and Records Administration. Most importantly, I wish to thank my loving and supportive wife, Carola, and my two wonderful children, Katharina and Victoria, who provided unending inspiration. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page DEDICATION ...............................................................................................................iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................vi LIST OF FIGURES......................................................................................................viii Chapter INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1 I. THE EMERGENCE OF DETENTE........................................................................19 Bad Godesberg and the pro-American Brandt ....................................................21 The Berlin Crisis of 1961 as the Turning Point...................................................25 Kennedy’s Initiatives: Exploring Alternatives ....................................................30 Johnson’s “Ugly American” policy: Friendship Turns to Frustration ..................36 Nixon’s Détente.................................................................................................46 II. HONEYMOON PERIODS AND INITIAL IDEALISM ..........................................52 Nixon’s Vision of a Responsible Europe............................................................53 Money Speaks Louder than Words: Brandt’s attempt to reach out to the Soviets 58 Brandt’s Osthandel succeeds: The Gas-Pipeline Deal.........................................63 Domestic and International Dissent to a new Osthandel .....................................70 Black or a Different Shade of Red: The German Election Campaign..................79 Initial Ostpolitik: Brandt’s Honeymoon Period...................................................86 The Inter-German Summit Meeting: The Rude Awakening................................97 III. THE HEIGHT OF OSTPOLITIK ...........................................................................102 The German-American Summit on Ostpolitik (4/1970) ....................................103 Advances in Osthandel ....................................................................................110 The Soviet Approach to Trade The Kama River Plant Natural Gas Pipelines Soviet Crude Oil Exports The German Paradigm Shift of the Soviet Union towards a ‘Normal’ State......129 vi III. THE HEIGHT OF OSTPOLITIK- continued Strained Ties with the United States.................................................................132 Soviet Anti-American Rhetoric EU Preferential Tariffs and Agricultural Subsidies COCOM and Export Restrictions U.S. Opposition to Ostpolitik Political Games over Berlin..............................................................................146 Soviet Pinpricks The Four Power Agreement on Berlin The Height of Brandt’s Ostpolitik ....................................................................156 IV. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION .....................................................................171 Efforts at Superpower Détente..........................................................................173 The Soviet-American Summit of 1972 U.S. and German trade policy – same difference? Soviet Pressures on West Berlin Systemic Shifts in the Soviet Union Competing Visions of Détente .........................................................................182 The Opportunity and Failure of Superpower Détente........................................190 The Brezhnev Summits American Strength and Stalling Ostpolitik German disillusionment with Osthandel The Jackson-Vanick Amendment The Arab-Israeli War .......................................................................................210 Crisis European Opposition to American Actions Soviet Hopes for More Transatlantic Dissent Reviving Trade with the East Continued Political Pressure on Berlin Legacy of Ambivalence ...................................................................................236 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................239 Appendix A. TRADE STATISTICS...........................................................................................252 B. OPINION POLLS..................................................................................................253 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................256 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. FRG and U.S. Trade with the Soviet Union in Million US $ ...............................252 2. Survey of West German population with the question “Which country will be more powerful in 50 years?”...........................................................................................253 3. Survey of West German population with the question “Who has the stronger interest in and benefit from German-American cooperation?..................................253 4. Survey of West German population on perceived Russian Threat level. ..............254 5. Survey of West German and British population with the question “Will the next year bring an increase or decrease in power for the following countries?”..............254 6. Survey of West German population with the question “With which countries should we work with most closely? ...................................................................................255 7. Survey of U.S. Americans as to the most important Problems facing the US today (1969-1975) .................................................................................................255 viii INTRODUCTION Western strategies of rapprochement with the Communist bloc during the Cold War, often referred to as détente, permeated diplomatic discourse from the 1960s through the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Thereafter, the United States became the sole remaining superpower amidst multiple, if considerably weaker regional power centers throughout the world. Former Cold War strategies such as détente now bear little significance to the emerging new world order. Yet one often-overlooked side effect of the détente era was the permanent alteration of relationships among allies of the Western Bloc. Probably no European country was more deeply affected by the shift in U.S. policy than the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany). Ever since the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, West German
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