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Terrorism in the Maghreb: the Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism

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Terrorism in the Maghreb: the Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism TTERRORISMERRORISM IINN TTHEHE MMAGHREBAGHREB THE TRANSNATIONALISATION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM ANNELI BOTHA ISS MONOGRAPH SERIES • No 144, JUNE 2008 CONTENTS ABOUT THE AUTHOR iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS v LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND MAPS vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY viii CHAPTER 1 1 Introduction CHAPTER 2 23 Terrorism in Algeria CHAPTER 3 85 Terrorism in Morocco CHAPTER 4 111 Terrorism in Tunisia CHAPTER 5 125 North African involvement in transnational terror networks CHAPTER 6 173 Assessment of counter-terrorism strategies CHAPTER 7 199 Conclusion ANNEX 207 Guantanamo Bay detainees BIBLIOGRAPHY 209 iii ABOUT THE AUTHOR Anneli Botha is a senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria. After completing an honours degree in International Politics (1993) she joined the South African Police Service Crime Intelligence unit, during which time she focused, inter alia, on terrorism and religious extremism. Botha holds an MA (Political Studies) degree from Rand Afrikaans University (1999), which focused on the historical development of terrorism, religious extremism and PAGAD. She has a specific interest in research on the underlying causes of terrorism, radicalisation and counter-terrorism strategies. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank the African Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism in Algiers, Algeria, and in particular the assistance received from Ambassador Diara, General Tartag and Mounir Idriss Lallali. Thanks also go to the staff at the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian embassies who not only made my visits possible but who were crucial in securing interviews with key role-players and institutions in their respective countries. A further word of special gratitude to those at the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian embassies who further enriched this publication with their thoughts and suggestions before publishing this monograph. Disclaimer The author has been researching terrorism in this region for a number of years. The intention is not to be controversial, but rather to stimulate constructive discussion on a topic that can only be described as ‘sensitive’ in the region. The following monograph represents the opinions of the author and not that of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). v ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS In most cases the English versions of the generally French or Arabic names are given ACB Algerian Community in Great Britain AIS Islamic Salvation Army ANP National People’s Army or People’s National Army AQLIM Al-Qa’eda Organisation for the Land of the Islamic Maghreb AS Moroccan Youth Association AU African Union BRC Brown and Root-Condor DGED General Directorate of Studies and Documentation (Moroccan Secret Service) DST Moroccan Territorial Surveillance Directorate FIDA Islamic Front for Armed Jihad FIS Islamic Salvation Front FIT Tunisian Islamic Front FFS Front of Socialist Forces FLN National Liberation Front GIA Armed Islamic Group GICM Moroccan Islamic Combat Group vi Terrorism in the Maghreb: The transnationalisation of domestic terrorism GLD Legitimate Defence Groups GSC Salafist Combat Group GSD Salafish Group for Jihad GSPC Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching Hadith Recollection of the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad Hamas Harakat al-Mujtam’a al-Islam HATM Moroccan Movement for Reform and Renewal HDS Defenders of Salafist Preaching IED Improvised explosive device ILP Islamic Liberation Party LFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group MDA Movement for Democracy in Algeria MDJT Movement for Democracy and Justice MEI Movement of the Islamic State in Algeria MIA Armed Islamic Movement MTI Islamic Tendency Movement NGO Non-governmental organisation PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation Shari’a Islamic law Sunna Traditions (practices) of the Prophet Muhammad UK United Kingdom UN United Nations US United States vii LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND MAPS Table 1: Details of selected GSPC/AQLIM attacks in 2007 (excluding suicide bombings) Table 2: Selected socio-economic indicators for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia Figure 1: Structure of the GSPC Figure 2: Modus operandi of GSPC/AQLIM, 2005–2007 Figure 3: GSPC/AQLIM target selection, 2005–2007 Map 1: GSPC Zones Map 2: Suicide operations in Algeria Map 3: Mobile training camps and areas of concern in Mali Map 4: Areas of concern in Niger viii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Terrorism on the African continent is a complex and emotional topic. One of the primary reasons for this is that a historical introspection for any country, or its people, that has been confronted with a conflicting past can only be described as ‘sensitive’. In addition to international developments and challenges, domestic circumstances predominately fuel domestic terrorism. It will therefore be a mistake to assess the threat of terrorism in any country in historic isolation. This is particularly true when one tries to assess and understand the ‘renewed’ threat of terrorism in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. This monograph will attempt to place the threat and implication of the name change announcement of the Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching (GSPC) to al-Qa’eda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) in context, with the primary focus on events in 2007. The name change in itself implied that the original domestic group had transnational ambitions, but what influenced this development and what would the consequences be? Although this development led to immediate and extensive international interest in the Maghreb, it became clear that most assessments focused on the now, without appreciating the historical complexities that ultimately led to this development. In conducting a historical assessment, one can appreciate that while all three countries under review were confronted with similar challenges after independence, each country reacted in a different manner, which impacted on the manifestation and magnitude of the threat of terrorism and the eventual impact of the transnationalisation of domestic terrorism on transnational terrorism. Even the way independence was gained impacted on the psychological acceptance of violence as an acceptable strategy. The first chapter of the monograph serves as an introduction, providing the scope of analysis, definitions of terrorism as provided by regional organisations, and the legal approaches of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in dealing with the threat of terrorism. This is followed by a brief introduction to Salafism and Wahhabism as a prologue to the philosophical background of the organisations that will be discussed in later chapters. Anneli Botha ix Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the underlying political, socio- economic and cultural factors that influenced the formation of fundamentalist, and later extremist, organisations in Algeria, followed by an overview of the primary organisations that influenced the gradual escalation of violence. The main focus will, however, be on the GSPC – its structure and activities, the influence of al-Qa’eda in the establishment of the GSPC and al-Qa’eda’s ever-increasing influence in the organisation. This is followed by a discussion on the implications that the name change had on the GSPC’s tactics, reach of activities and structure. Although Morocco was faced with similar domestic challenges and international developments, the monarchy was recognised by the majority of the population. This impacted on the ability of fundamentalist and extremist organisations to get a foothold in the country. Chapter 3, similar to the discussion on Algeria, provides an overview of the primary role-players. The suicide bombings in Casablanca in 2003 served as a wake-up call that a number of smaller cells did not recognised the monarchy, further driven by international injustices and poor socio-economic conditions. In contrast to the better structured organisations in Algeria, the suicide bombings in 2007 signified the potential threat of small cells, often involving members of the same family, close friends and individuals formerly incarcerated for their alleged lesser involvement in the 2003 bombings and other offences such as drug trafficking. In addition to poor socio-economic conditions, the state’s reaction to the 2003 bombings demonstrated the negative impact that counter-terrorism strategies have on the radicalisation process. Tunisia was also initially confronted with similar broad challenges as presented in the chapters dealing with Algeria and Morocco. Similar to the Algerian experience in which a religious-based party attempted to gain political power through participating in the political process, the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in Tunisia attempted the same strategy. But the MTI, which changed its name to Harakat an-Nahda, overestimated its strength while underestimating the strength of the new government of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Notwithstanding a number of attacks, the Tunisian government managed to contain the threat through a dual strategy: arrest and convict those involved while at the same time addressing the underlying causes, namely poor socio- economic conditions and education. During a period of calm, extremists from Tunisia had to either leave for Europe or provide assistance to extremists in neighbouring Algeria. Chapter 5 provides insight into the spread, threat and impact of extremists originally from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in emerging networks in x Terrorism in the Maghreb: The transnationalisation of domestic terrorism Europe. Under the protection of political asylum, extremists used freedoms of religion,
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