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In the United States District Court for the Dist~Ct of Columbia IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DIST~CT OF COLUMBIA BOUDELLAAL HAJJ, et al. Petitioners, Civil Action No. 04-CV-1166(RJL) GEORGEW. BUSH, Presidentof the UnitedStates, et al., Respondents. DECLARATIONOF JAMES R, CRISF1ELD JR. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, CommanderJames R. Crisfield Jr., Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Navy, hereby state that to the best of myknowledge, information and belief, the followingis tree, accurate and correct: 1. I am the Legal Advisor to the CombatantStatus ReviewTribunals. In that capacity I amthe principal legal advisor to the Director, CombatantStatus ReviewTribunals, and provide advice to Tribunals on legal, evidentiary, procedural, and other matters. I also reviewthe record of proceedingsin each Tribunal for legal sufficiency in accordancewith standards prescribed in the CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal establishment order and implementingdirective. 2. I hereby certify that the documentsattached hereto constitute a tree and accurate copy of the portions of the record of proceedings before the CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal related to petitioner BoudellaAI Hajj that are suitable for public release. Theportions of the record that are classified or consideredtaw enforcementsensitive are not attached hereto. I have redacted information that wouldpersonally identify other detainees and the family membersof detainees, as well as certain U.S. Governmentpersonnel in order to protect the personal security of those 5069 individuals. I have also redacted internee serial numbersbecause certain combinationsof internee serial numberswith other information becomeclassified under applicable classification guidance. I declare underpenalty of perjury that the foregoingi.~s true and correct. Dated: ~) (~Mf- z~s R."L~eld Jr. -~-Z)R, JAGC, USN 5070 Department of Defense - Director, CombatantStatus ReviewTribunals OARDEC/Ser: 0304 28 October 2004 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY From: Director, CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal Subj: REVIEW OF COMBATANTSTATUS REV-IEW TRIBUNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN # ~ Ref: (a) DeputySecretary of DefenseOrder of 7 July 2004 CO)Secretary of the NavyOrder of 29 July 2004 1. I concur in the decision of the CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal that Detainee ISN #~ meets the criteria for designation as an EnemyCombatant, in accordancewith references (a) and Co). 2. This case is nowconsidered final and the detainee will be scheduled for an Adminis~afive Review Board. RADM, CEC, USN Distribution: NSC(Mr. Jotm Bellinger) DoS (Ambassador Prosper) DASD-DA JCS (JS) SOUTHCOM(COS) COMJTFGTMO OARDEC(Fwd) CITFFt Belvoir FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5071 UNCLASSIFfED 2"7 Oct 04 From: Legal Advisor To: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Subj: LEGAL SUFFICIENCY ~,~EW OF COMBATANTSTATUS REVIEW TRI]3UNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN # ~ Ref: (a) DeputySecretary of DefenseOrder of 7 July 2004 (b) Secretary of the NavyImplementation Directive of 29 July 2004 Encl: (1) AppointingOrder for Tribunal #12 of 29 September2004 (2) Record of Tribunal Proceedings 1. Legal sufficiency review has been completedon the subject CombatantStatus Review Tribunal in accordancewith references (a) and (b). After reviewingthe record of the Tribunal, find that: a. The detainee was properIy notified of the Tribunal process and madea sworn statement at the Tribunal. b. The Tribunal was properly convenedand constituted by enclosure (1). c. The Tribunal compliedwith all provisions of references (a) and (b). Note that information in exhibits R-32 and R-33 was redacted. The FBI properly certifaed in exhibit R-2 that the redacted information wouldnot support a determinationthat the detainee is not an enemycombatant. d. The detainee requested five wituesses. Three wereproduced and testified at the Tribunal. The U.S. State Departmentsought to locate the other two witnesses but was unable to fred them. Dueto the inab’dity of the State Departmentto locate the Wituesses, the Tribunal President determinedthat they were not reasonably available. In my opinion, the Tribunal President’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. The detainee also requested two documents.The first was a copy of a Bosniancourt document. The other was a copy of"Humanityof the People." The Recorder and the detainee’s Personal Representative attempted to locate the documentsbut were unable to find them. The Tribunal President therefore determinedthat they were not reasonably available. In myopinion, the Tribunal President’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. e. The Tribunal’s decision that detainee #~s properly classified as an enemy combatant was unanimous. UNCLASSIFIED 5072 UNCLASSIFIED Subj: LEGAL SLFFFICIENCY REVIEW OF COMI~ATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBLFNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN #~ f. The detainee’s Personal Representative was given the opportunityto review the record of proceedings and declined to submit commentsto the Tribunal. 2. The proceedingsand decision of the Tribunal are legally sufficient and no corrective action is required. 3. I recommend that the decision of the Trib~~considered final. Jl~:~ R. C~-’IELD JR. CDR~, JAGC, USN 2 UNCLASSIFIED 5073 Departmentof Defense Director, Combatant Stares Review Tribunals 29 Sep 04 From:Dh’e~tor, CombatantS~atus Re’Aew Tribunals Subj: APPOINTMENTOF COMBATANTSTATUS REV~EW’ITUBUNAL#12 Ref: (a) ConveningAuthority AppointmentLetter of 9 July 2004 Bythe authority given to mein reference (~), a CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal established by "Implementationof CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Proceduresfor EnemyCombatants Detained at GumxtanamoBay Naval Base, Cuba"dated 29 July 2004 is herebyeb~V~ned. It shall hear such cases as shall be broughtbefore it withoutfurther action of referral or otherwise. The following commissionedOfficers shall serve as membersof~he Tribunal: i Colonel, U.S. MarineCorps Reserve; President ~Lieatenant Colonel, JAGC, U.S. Army; Member (JAG) ~ Lieutemmt Colonel, U.S. Air Force; Member J. M. MeGARRAH RearAdmiral Civil EngineerCorps United States Navy 5074 HEADQUARTERS, OARDEC FORWARD GUANTANAMOBAY, CUBA APOAE 09360 22 October 2004 MEMORANDUMFOR DIRECTOR, CSRT FROM: OARDEC FORWARDCommander SUBJECT: CSRT Record of Proceedings ICO ISN# ~ 1. Pursuant to Enclosure (1), paragraph (I)(5) of hnplementation of Combatant Stat us Review Tribunal Procedures for EnemyCombatants Detained at GuantunamoBay Naval Base, Cuba dated 29 July 2004, I am forwarding the CombatantStares ReviewTribunal Decision Report for the above mentionedISN for review and action. 2. If there are any questions regarding this package,point of con~s matter is the undersigned at DSN660-3088. 5075 SECRET/fNOFORN//X1 (U) CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Decision Report Cover Sheet (U) This Documentis UNCLASS]/~IEDUpon Removal of Enclosures (2) and (4). (U) TI~IBUNALPANEL: #12 (U) ISN#: Ref: (a) (U) ConveningOrder for Tribunal #12 of 29 September2004 (U) Co)(U) CSRTImplementation Directive of 29 July 2004 Cur) (c) (U) DEPSECDEFMemo of 7 July 2004 (U) Encl: (1) (U) Unclassified Summaryof Basis For Tribunal Decision (U~OUO) (2) (U) Classified Summaryof Basis for Tribunal Decision (S/NF) (3) (U) Summaryof Deta’mee/Witness Testimony (U/FOUO) (4) (U) Copies of DocumentaryEvidence Presented (S/NF) (5) (U) Personal Representative’s Record Review(U) 1. (U) This Tribunal was convenedon 18 October 2004 by references (a) and (b) to a determinationas to whetherthe detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant,as defined in reference (c). 2. (U) On 18 October 2004 the Tribunal determ’med,by a preponderanceof the evidence, that Detainee gs properly designated as an enemy combatant, as defined in reference (c). 3. (U) In particular, the Tribunalfinds that this Detaineeis part of, or supporting,forces associated with Al-Qaeda,which is engagedin hostilities against the United States and its coalition partners, as morefully discussed in the enclosures. 4. (U) Enclosure(1) provides an unclassified account of the basis for the Tfibunal’s decision. A detailed account of the evidence consldered by the Tribunal and its findings of fact are containedin enclosures(1) and (2). U.S.] Tribunal President DERV FM: Multiple Sources SECRET//NOFORN//X1 DECLASS: XI 5076 U~N CLASS]~I]~D/fFOUO UNCLASSIF~D SU’M1VLkRY OF BASIS FOR TRIBUNAL, DECISION (Enclosure (1) to CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Decision Report) TRJ.BUNAL P~,,,,,~ #12 ISN #: ~ 1. Introduction As the CombatantStares ReviewTribunal (CSRT)Decision Report indicates, the Tribunal has determinedthat this Detainee is properly classified as an enemycombatant because he is considered as being part of, or supporting, forces associated with A1-Qaeda, whichis engagedin hostilities against the UnitedStates and its coalition partners. In reaching its conclusions, the Tribunal considered both classified and unclassified information. The following is an account of the unclassified evidence considered by the Tribunal and other pertinent information. Classified evidence considered by the Tribunal is discussed in Enclosure (2) to the CSRTDecision Report. 2. Synopsis of Proceedings The unclassified evidence presented to the Tribunal by the Recorderasserted that the Detaineewas affiliated with associated forces engagedin hostilities against the United States and its coalition partners. The Detaineechose to participate in the Tribunal process. He requested five witnesses (three of which were produced), requested two unclassified documentsbe produced, and madea sworn verbal statement. The Tribunal President found three requested wimessreasonably available and two not reasonably available. For the two not reasonably available,
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