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Download the PDF File S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 JTF-GTMO-CDR 1 April 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S) JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment 1. (S) Personal Information: JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Lakhdar Boumediene Current/True Name and Aliases: Lakhdar Boumediene, Ahmed, al-Muntasir Place of Birth: Ain Soltgane Saeda, Algeria (AG) Date of Birth: 27 April 1966 Citizenship: Algeria Internment Serial Number (ISN): US4AG-010005DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 28 September 2007. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and al-Qaida who was detained for his involvement with a GIA cell in Bosnia (BK), suspected of plotting an attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo, BK1. Detainee has an 1 Analyst Note: The GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3 target. Priority 3 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats other senior policymakers and IC managers believe must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These include terrorist/extremist groups involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack U.S. persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat than Priority 2 groups, or terrorist/extremist CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20330401 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S) extensive history as an extremist active in jihad and suspected terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, Pakistan (PK), and Afghanistan (AF). Detainee admits extensive travels throughout the Greater Middle East. Detainee has long standing ties with non-governmental organizations (NGO) tied to extremism. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A HIGH threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.) Added a report indicating detainee was an Afghan war veteran and fought as part of the Muslim Brigade in BK. Added reports citing detainee’s admission of being approached to participate in a terrorist plot in Jordan and being asked to join the jihad while working at the Hira Institute. Included a report indicating detainee was a member of al-Qaida and the GIA. 4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee studied at the Techweed al-Meckanie Trade School in Saeda, AG, from 1984 to 1985 to become a mechanic. After completing trade school, detainee served as a border guard in the Algerian Army from 1985 to 1987. Upon completion of his military service, detainee spent 1987 to 1988 living with his parents while seeking employment. From 1988 to 1990, detainee gained employment with the Drywall and Cement Company in Saeda, working as a machinery mechanic. Detainee decided to look for another job when his co-workers informed him the job was bad for his health.2 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In November 1990, detainee learned that a former co-worker and friend named Samahi Abdallah, aka (Saryah), aka (Abu Mustafa Ahmed), was groups that have demonstrated intention to attack U.S. persons and interests and are taking action to develop or acquire WMD capability. 2 IIR 6 034 0204 02 2 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S) working in Pakistan.3 He was told by others that Samahi’s job allowed him to send money home to his family and yet still live comfortably. Detainee called Samahi and asked him about traveling to Pakistan for work. Samahi told detainee to make arrangements, obtain a visa, and travel to Peshawar. Detainee flew via Tunisia (TS), Russia (RS), and Karachi, PK, to Peshawar where he met Samahi.4 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee stayed with Samahi for approximately six months, during which time he obtained a job at a madrassa (Islamic religious school) known as the Islamic Hira Institute in Babi, PK. In approximately December 1993, detainee traveled to Sanaa, Yemen (YM), and became a member of the French Cultural Center. Unable to find favorable employment and after speaking with his old neighbor from Algeria, Akrish Moamer, detainee went to Tirana, Albania (AL), in July 1994. Detainee obtained a job working at the Abu Dhabi Welfare Organization, which later became the United Arab Emirates (AE) Red Crescent Society. Later, in 1995, detainee married an Algerian woman in Albania. In April 1997, detainee asked the Red Crescent Society for a transfer to Sarajevo, BK. Detainee’s close friend, Mohamed Nechle, ISN US4AG-010003DP (AG-10003), had already moved to Bosnia with his wife and children. Detainee left Tirana and traveled to Sarajevo via Istanbul, Turkey (TU), with his wife and daughter, arriving in Sarajevo on 16 April 1997. Detainee purchased Bosnian citizenship credentials in September 1998 through illegal means for 5,000 Deutsche marks.5 On 28 December 1999, detainee returned to Algeria with his daughter and wife, who was about to give birth to their second child. Algerian authorities arrested detainee because his Algerian passport had expired and his passport contained a Pakistani visa. The Algerian police proceeded to question detainee about Afghanistan (AF). Detainee told police he had only been to Pakistan, not Afghanistan, and was subsequently released when the Algerian government issued a blanket pardon to Algerians previously involved with al-Jabha al-Islamyah Lil Inkaz, aka (Islamic Salvation Front), aka (FIS).6 On 16 February 2000, detainee departed Algeria, leaving behind his wife and children, and returned to Bosnia. In March 2000, detainee obtained a visa and traveled to the hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA), via Istanbul and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (SA). Approximately 20 days later, detainee returned to Sarajevo and continued working with the 3 Analyst Note: Detainee identified Abu Mustafa Ahmed and Saryah as aliases for Samahi Abdallah. Samahi advised detainee that it was not a good idea to use his real name in Pakistan. For additional information see IIR 6 034 0203 02, IIR 6 034 0372 02. 4 IIR 6 034 0204 02 5 Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $2,860 US. 6 Analyst Note: FIS was an opposition party that was banned by the Algerian government in 1991, prompting the Algerian Civil War of 1991-2002. FIS supporters factionalized, spawning several armed splinter groups including the GIA and GSPC, and fought a bloody ten-year insurgency. In 1999, the Algerian government issued a blanket amnesty to former FIS members and began a national reconciliation campaign that ultimately contributed to the defeat of the violent insurgency in 2002. 3 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330401 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S) Red Crescent Society as an orphan relief manager. In July 2000, detainee traveled to Istanbul to meet his wife and children, and returned with them to Sarajevo.7 5. (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) In October 2001, a US intelligence source identified a group of men who were reportedly planning to bomb the US Embassy in Sarajevo. After the source’s information was corroborated, Bosnian authorities, at the behest of the US government, captured eight individuals suspected in the plot in a series of mid-October arrests in the Zenica, BK area. Detainee was among the eight and was arrested on or about 15 October 2001.8 The two non- Algerian suspects were deported to their home countries. Bosnian authorities held detainee and the other five Algerian suspects in custody until they could no longer be legally detained. When the Algerian government refused to accept custody of the “Algerian Six,” Bosnian authorities transferred them to US custody on 18 January 2002.9 b. (S) Property Held: Casio Watch Scrap of paper listing three phone numbers attributed to “Ambasade D’Algerie en Italif” (Algerian Embassy in Italy) 10 Money: 170 Deutsche marks 23 Bahraini dinar Though not held at JTF-GTMO, the following items were reported to have been in detainee’s possession at time of capture.11 Identity Documents: Algerian Passport Number 0705513, Bosnian Passport Number 3817760, Bosnian Passport Number 0801081, and a French Identity Document. Arabic language documents with the letterhead for Lajnat al-Dawa al-Islamiah (LDI), aka (Society of Social Reform); Arabic language document with the letterhead for Abu Dhabi Welfare Organization; and an Arabic language document with the letterhead for the AE Red Crescent Society. 7 IIR 6 034 0372 02, IIR 6 034 0203 02 8 IIR 6 034 0205 02, IIR 7 130 1022 02, DCS-G2 Special Assessment-Algerian Six 18-FEB-2004; Analyst Note: Detainee was reportedly arrested on the evening of 20 October 2001 in Bihac, BK.
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