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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, APO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR 1 April 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name:

Current/True Name and Aliases: Lakhdar Boumediene, Ahmed, al-Muntasir

Place of Birth: Ain Soltgane Saeda, (AG)

Date of Birth: 27 April 1966

Citizenship: Algeria

Internment Serial Number (ISN): US4AG-010005DP

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 28 September 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and al-Qaida who was detained for his involvement with a GIA cell in Bosnia (BK), suspected of plotting an attack on the US Embassy in , BK1. Detainee has an

1 Analyst Note: The GIA is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3 target. Priority 3 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats other senior policymakers and IC managers believe must receive attention from the IC that are not already identified as Priorities 1 or 2. These include terrorist/extremist groups involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack U.S. persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat than Priority 2 groups, or terrorist/extremist

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20330401

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)

extensive history as an extremist active in jihad and suspected terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, Pakistan (PK), and (AF). Detainee admits extensive travels throughout the Greater Middle East. Detainee has long standing ties with non-governmental organizations (NGO) tied to extremism. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

A HIGH risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies

A HIGH threat from a detention perspective

Of MEDIUM intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be

annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.)

Added a report indicating detainee was an Afghan war veteran and fought as part of the Muslim Brigade in BK.

Added reports citing detainee’s admission of being approached to participate in a terrorist plot in Jordan and being asked to join the jihad while working at the Hira Institute.

Included a report indicating detainee was a member of al-Qaida and the GIA.

4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee studied at the Techweed al-Meckanie Trade School in Saeda, AG, from 1984 to 1985 to become a mechanic. After completing trade school, detainee served as a border guard in the Algerian Army from 1985 to 1987. Upon completion of his military service, detainee spent 1987 to 1988 living with his parents while seeking employment. From 1988 to 1990, detainee gained employment with the Drywall and Cement Company in Saeda, working as a machinery mechanic. Detainee decided to look for another job when his co-workers informed him the job was bad for his health.2

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In November 1990, detainee learned that a former co-worker and friend named Samahi Abdallah, aka (Saryah), aka (Abu Mustafa Ahmed), was

groups that have demonstrated intention to attack U.S. persons and interests and are taking action to develop or acquire WMD capability. 2 IIR 6 034 0204 02

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)

working in Pakistan.3 He was told by others that Samahi’s job allowed him to send money home to his family and yet still live comfortably. Detainee called Samahi and asked him about traveling to Pakistan for work. Samahi told detainee to make arrangements, obtain a visa, and travel to Peshawar. Detainee flew via Tunisia (TS), Russia (RS), and Karachi, PK, to Peshawar where he met Samahi.4

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee stayed with Samahi for approximately six months, during which time he obtained a job at a madrassa (Islamic religious school) known as the Islamic Hira Institute in Babi, PK. In approximately December 1993, detainee traveled to Sanaa, Yemen (YM), and became a member of the French Cultural Center. Unable to find favorable employment and after speaking with his old neighbor from Algeria, Akrish Moamer, detainee went to Tirana, Albania (AL), in July 1994. Detainee obtained a job working at the Abu Dhabi Welfare Organization, which later became the United Arab Emirates (AE) Red Crescent Society. Later, in 1995, detainee married an Algerian woman in Albania. In April 1997, detainee asked the Red Crescent Society for a transfer to Sarajevo, BK. Detainee’s close friend, Mohamed Nechle, ISN US4AG-010003DP (AG-10003), had already moved to Bosnia with his wife and children. Detainee left Tirana and traveled to Sarajevo via Istanbul, Turkey (TU), with his wife and daughter, arriving in Sarajevo on 16 April 1997. Detainee purchased Bosnian citizenship credentials in September 1998 through illegal means for 5,000 Deutsche marks.5 On 28 December 1999, detainee returned to Algeria with his daughter and wife, who was about to give birth to their second child. Algerian authorities arrested detainee because his Algerian passport had expired and his passport contained a Pakistani visa. The Algerian police proceeded to question detainee about Afghanistan (AF). Detainee told police he had only been to Pakistan, not Afghanistan, and was subsequently released when the Algerian government issued a blanket pardon to Algerians previously involved with al-Jabha al-Islamyah Lil Inkaz, aka (Islamic Salvation Front), aka (FIS).6 On 16 February 2000, detainee departed Algeria, leaving behind his wife and children, and returned to Bosnia. In March 2000, detainee obtained a visa and traveled to the hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA), via Istanbul and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (SA). Approximately 20 days later, detainee returned to Sarajevo and continued working with the

3 Analyst Note: Detainee identified Abu Mustafa Ahmed and Saryah as aliases for Samahi Abdallah. Samahi advised detainee that it was not a good idea to use his real name in Pakistan. For additional information see IIR 6 034 0203 02, IIR 6 034 0372 02. 4 IIR 6 034 0204 02 5 Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $2,860 US. 6 Analyst Note: FIS was an opposition party that was banned by the Algerian government in 1991, prompting the Algerian Civil War of 1991-2002. FIS supporters factionalized, spawning several armed splinter groups including the GIA and GSPC, and fought a bloody ten-year insurgency. In 1999, the Algerian government issued a blanket amnesty to former FIS members and began a national reconciliation campaign that ultimately contributed to the defeat of the violent insurgency in 2002.

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Red Crescent Society as an orphan relief manager. In July 2000, detainee traveled to Istanbul to meet his wife and children, and returned with them to Sarajevo.7

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) In October 2001, a US intelligence source identified a group of men who were reportedly planning to bomb the US Embassy in Sarajevo. After the source’s information was corroborated, Bosnian authorities, at the behest of the US government, captured eight individuals suspected in the plot in a series of mid-October arrests in the Zenica, BK area. Detainee was among the eight and was arrested on or about 15 October 2001.8 The two non- Algerian suspects were deported to their home countries. Bosnian authorities held detainee and the other five Algerian suspects in custody until they could no longer be legally detained. When the Algerian government refused to accept custody of the “Algerian Six,” Bosnian authorities transferred them to US custody on 18 January 2002.9

b. (S) Property Held:

Casio Watch

Scrap of paper listing three phone numbers attributed to “Ambasade D’Algerie en Italif” (Algerian Embassy in Italy) 10

Money: 170 Deutsche marks 23 Bahraini dinar

Though not held at JTF-GTMO, the following items were reported to have been in detainee’s possession at time of capture.11 Identity Documents: Algerian Passport Number 0705513, Bosnian Passport Number 3817760, Bosnian Passport Number 0801081, and a French Identity Document. Arabic language documents with the letterhead for Lajnat al-Dawa al-Islamiah (LDI), aka (Society of Social Reform); Arabic language document with the letterhead for Abu Dhabi Welfare Organization; and an Arabic language document with the letterhead for the AE Red Crescent Society.

7 IIR 6 034 0372 02, IIR 6 034 0203 02 8 IIR 6 034 0205 02, IIR 7 130 1022 02, DCS-G2 Special Assessment-Algerian Six 18-FEB-2004; Analyst Note: Detainee was reportedly arrested on the evening of 20 October 2001 in Bihac, BK. For additional information see TD-314/39634-01. Multiple dates are reported for detainee’s capture, ranging from 15th-20th October 2002. 9 IIR 6 034 0207 02 (Paragraph 12), AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 29-DEC-2006, 010003 PROFILE1 23-AUG-2002 Paragraph 4C 10 Analyst Note: Approximately $183 US based on conversion date of 15 October 2001. 11 TD-314/41396-01

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Photocopies of two articles written in Serbo-Croatian.

A Bosnian newspaper article detailing a youth camp organized by the AE charity.

An article from the Croatian paper Globus, detailing an attack against the United States Information Service office in Pristina, Kosovo, in August 1998.

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 20 January 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

¡ The Red Crescent Society NGO in Bosnia

¡ Employees in the Bosnian NGO office

¡ Banks used by the Red Crescent NGO in Bosnia

¡ Peshawar-based NGOs

¡ LDI NGO in the Babi, PK

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee has provided partially truthful, yet incomplete accounts of his history and timeline. Detainee has consistently denied involvement in terrorist organizations or plots of any kind against the US. He has denied membership in the GIA and affiliation with Bosnian mujahideen despite reports indicating the contrary. Detainee maintains he never met or barely knew the other members of the “Algerian Six,” which has been proven false based on subsequent reports. Detainee has provided dates of travel and places of occupation which have been corroborated; however, he is unable to account for phone numbers captured in his pocket litter tied to extremists. Detainee has been uncooperative with interrogators since approximately 2003 and his story contains multiple gaps requiring further exploitation.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention in DoD Control: Detainee is a member of an Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) cell involved in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee has an extensive history as an extremist, active in jihad and suspected terrorist activities in Bosnia, Algeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and admits extensive travels throughout the Greater Middle East. He worked for more than two years for the Hira Institute, an NGO in Pakistan.

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)

S//NF) Detainee is a member of a GIA cell in Bosnia, assessed to have been involved in an al-Qaida linked plot to attack the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee possibly has additional information regarding other terrorist plots. (S/NF) On 8 October 2001, the Bosnian Federal Ministry of Interior Police (FMUP), in cooperation with US forces in Bosnia, apprehended suspected al-Qaida facilitator , ISN US4AG-010001DP (AG-10001), after an investigation into threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities also directed the investigation toward seven other individuals, including detainee, who were suspected of involvement in the threats, which also led to their subsequent apprehension.12

¡ (S//NF) Over the next two weeks, detainee, along with Saber Mahfouz Lahmar, ISN US4AG-010002DP (AG-10002), AG-10003, Mustapha Ait Idir, ISN US4AG-010004DP (AG-10004), and Al-Haj Omar Boudellaa, ISN US4AG- 010006DP (AG-10006) were arrested for false attestation of information and suspected involvement in the threats against the US Embassy in Sarajevo.13 This group became known as the “Algerian Six.”

¡ (S//NF) The two other individuals arrested were identified as Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) member Khaled al-Arbed and Atif Munassur, aka (Abu Nasar), a suspected facilitator for the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC).14 (S//NF) The Bosnian Federation Supreme Court stated that this group attempted to attack the facility and the employees of the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Documents identified those arrested as an organized terrorist group, whose activities constituted an act of international terrorism. The group is suspected of conducting surveillance of the embassy and its personnel, and coordinating with GZ-10016.15

¡ According to 2004 open source reporting, Bosnian prosecutors and police formally exonerated the six Algerians of any criminal charges. No terrorism charges were levied against them.16

¡ (S//NF) AG-10001 possessed the phone number of a Bosnian locksmith employed at the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Further investigation by embassy authorities revealed the individual was AG-10002’s father-in-law. The employee was detained and subsequently failed a polygraph test given by US authorities.17

12 IIR 6 933 0021 02 13 IIR 6 933 0021 02 14 TD-314/11070-05, IIR 6 933 0021 02, 010001 Mantis ealin26398 21-Nov-2001, Analyst Note: LIFG is an NIPF Priority 1 CT target. 15 TD-314/02606-02, BIH Court Doc BB-014 30-OCT-2001, DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB- 2004 16 Washington Post Foreign Service 21 August 2006 17 IIR 7 130 1022 02,IIR 4 201 2111 06

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(Analyst Note: AG-10002’s father-in-law could have provided physical access to the embassy for the purpose of the attack.) (S//NF) Despite claims that they were not associated with each other, contacts between the members of the group known as the “Algerian Six” demonstrated a close association between them.

(S//NF) Detainee admitted the first apartment he stayed at in Sarajevo was with AG-10006. Detainee stated he met with Muhammad Khalili, an official from the Algerian government, as well as AG-10003, AG-10004, and AG-10006 in December 1998 or January 1999.18

(S//NF) AG-10003 described detainee as his closest friend in Albania and Bosnia. AG-10003 stated detainee used to assist AG-10001 and AG-10002 with various charity activities. Detainee’s wife introduced AG-10003 to his wife while they resided in Albania.19 AG-10003’s phone records indicate he maintained consistent contact with detainee.20

(S//NF) Detainee stated he has known AG-10004 since they met in Bosnia two or three years before their arrest, and AG-10004 worked for the Taibah NGO in the Vogoca area of Bosnia where AG-10004 lived.21

(S//NF) Other reporting confirms the rest of the “Algerian Six” maintained contacts with each other in Bosnia.

¡ (C//REL TO USA, SFOR) Detainee’s phone number is listed among AG- 10001’s phone number contacts. Additionally, another phone number on the list was for “Abu Zubayda,” believed to be a reference to GZ-10016.22

¡ (S//NF) FMUP investigation found items confiscated during AG-10004’s arrest listing detainee’s phone number.23

¡ (S//NF) AG-10002’s mobile phone number and his landline number are listed among AG-10001’s contacts.24 AG-10001 stated that AG-10002, whom he met in January 2001, was his only acquaintance while in Bosnia.25 (S//NF) Detainee admitted knowing, providing aid to, and obtaining a lawyer for AG-10001. Detainee claimed he hired a lawyer without knowing the charges against AG-10001.26 (S//NF) During an Algerian delegation visit in 2006, detainee engaged the delegation with his biography information and his contact with a Jordanian who

18 IIR 6 034 0205 02 19 IIR 6 034 0208 02; IIR 6 034 0372 02(b) 20 TD-314/41670-01 21 IIR 6 034 0205 02(b), Analyst Note: Taibah is a NIPF Priority 2A CT target. 22 010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001 23 TD-314/39904-01 24 010001 SFOR POCKET LITTER 01-OCT-2001, IIR 6 933 0021 02 25 IIR 6 034 0196 02, IIR 6 034 0896 02 26 IIR 6 034 0205 02(b)

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wanted him to bomb a target within Jordan.27 (Analyst Note: The bombing in Jordan may have been referencing one of the millennium plots thwarted by Jordanian security. GZ-10016, who’s phone number was found among the pocket litter of the Algerian Six; has admitted prior involvement in the Jordanian millennium plot.)

(S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of the GIA and a probable member of al-Qaida. (S//NF) In September 2001, detainee, Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari, aka (Abu Maali); AG-10003, and AG-10006, were included on an Algerian government list of Algerians residing in Bosnia who were suspected of having terrorist ties to the GIA and al-Qaida.28

¡ (S//NF) Abd al-Qadr al-Mukhtari was the head of the “al-Mujahid” Brigade during the war in Bosnia (1992 to 1995). In the early 1990s, the Muslim Bosniac government invited foreign mujahedeen to come to Bosnia to fight on its behalf.29 The “al-Mujahid Brigade” later transformed into the Bedr Bosna Corporation, owned and managed by al-Mukhtari. Al-Qaida is reported to have provided financial support to the Bedr Bosna Corporation, which serves as a cover for terrorist activities such as providing financial support for its members, hiding funds transfers, and providing facilities to support operations.30 (S//NF) Detainee’s name was one of 25 names on a Bosnian government list of Algerians suspected of involvement with terrorist organizations abroad or involved with humanitarian organizations suspected of providing logistical support to terrorist groups.31

¡ (S//NF) Detainee was first arrested in Algeria on 28 December 1999 during the Algerian Civil War. Detainee was arrested with an expired Algerian passport which contained a Pakistani visa. Detainee was questioned by the Algerian Military Police, the Algerian Civilian Police, and the Algerian National Police, and taken into custody under suspicion of involvement with Algerian rebel factions training in Afghanistan. Detainee was later released under a blanket pardon for FIS members.32 (Analyst Note: Shortly before detainee’s arrest, FIS claimed responsibility for an airline hijacking that took place in India on 25 December 1999.33)

27

¢VARIOUS ISNS MFR 27-APR-2007, 010005 SIR 17-MAR-2006 28

¢010003 PROFILE 23-AUG-2002, TD-314/42368-01, IIR 2 199 0022 02 29 ACIC INTSUM 04-Apr-2002,Analyst Note: Many of these fighters later traveled to Afghanistan for jihad, as detainee and the rest of the “Algerian Six” attempted to do, and as Ahmad Zayid Salim al-Zuhayri, aka (Handala), US9SA-000669DP (SA-669), who was also a member of the al-Mujahid Brigade, succeeded in doing. SA-669 was also convicted of involvement in a 1997 car bombing in Mostar. 30 ACIC INTSUM 04-Apr-2002 31 TD-314/07724-02 (see item D) 32 IIR 6 034 0372 02 33

¢OSC- FTS19991225000162

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(S//NF) A US State Department report describing background information on the Algerian Six, listed detainee as an Afghan war veteran who also served in the El- Mujahidin Brigade during the Bosnian conflict.34 (Analyst Note: This is the only report directly tying detainee to prior conflicts.)

(S//NF) Detainee stated during the first six months he was in Peshawar during 1990, he lived with Abu Handala. While living with Abu Handala he heard conversations about going to the “House of the Martyrs” and the “House of the Mujahideen.”35 (S//NF) Detainee reportedly planned to travel to Afghanistan along with the other Algerians, at the urging of AG-10001. Detainee and the others planned to travel as soon as AG-10001 arrived in Afghanistan to make receiving arrangements.36

(S//NF) AG-10001 encouraged his Algerian associates to participate in jihad. AG-10001 applied for an Iranian visa in Sarajevo for onward travel to Afghanistan on 1 October 2001. He planned to provide travel assistance to help the other Algerians join jihadist elements in Afghanistan, in anticipation of the US campaign following the 11 September 2001 attacks. AG-10001 received financial support from Shaykh Nasar al-Said, the director of the Saudi High Commission for Relief (SHCR), for his travel to Afghanistan.37 (S//NF) A US intelligence assessment identified AG-10001 as the primary al- Qaida facilitator in Bosnia, with ties to GZ-10016. AG-10001 possessed numerous phone numbers linking him to UBL’s operational network in Afghanistan and the global Sunni extremist network.38 (Analyst Note: Above information indicates AG- 10001’s relationship to al-Qaida and detainee’s subordination to AG-10001.)

(C//REL TO USA, NATO, SFOR) Shortly after detainee’s transfer to JTF- GTMO, he was represented by a Bosnian lawyer Fahrija Karkin. Fahrija Karkin is reported to be closely linked to extremist groups, Algerian groups, and known criminals. (Analyst Note: Detainee was the only one of the six represented by Karkin.)39

¡ (S//NF) Detainee worked at the Hira Institute, a Pakistan-based NGO that had direct ties to al-Qaida’s external operations chief, Khalid Shaykh Muhammed, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024).

34

¢ CIR 316/00277-02; Analyst Note: A variant of El-Mujahidin Brigade is al-Mujahid Brigade. 35 IIR 6 034 0204 02 36 TD-314/35452-01 37 TD-314/35452-01, IIR 6 933 0021 02, TD-314/14059-02, Analyst Note: SHCR is an NIPF Priority 2B TSE, which includes organizations that have available resources and are in a position to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 2B terrorist groups. 38 TD-314/14059-02; IIR 7 130 1022 02, Paragraph 1; IIR 6 933 0021 02; DCS-G2 Special Assessment- Algerian Six 18-FEB-2004 39 Kirikin Receives Security from GAMA 15-OCT-2002

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(S//NF) Detainee claimed he spent two and a half years working for the Hira Institute in the village of Babi, approximately 40 km from Islamabad, PK. Muhamed Hussein Abdallah, ISN US9SO-000704DP (SO-704), reported that the Hira Institute in Peshawar received its funding from the Kuwaiti-based Lajnat al-Dawa al-Islamiya (LDI).40 (S//NF) Detainee stated while working at the Hira Institute he knew a Sudanese man named Abu Tujana, who was the accountant for the school.41 Abu Tujana is assessed to be the alias of long time extremist and LDI employee Adel Hassan Hamid Abdul al-Mutlib, ISN US9SU-000940DP (SU-940, transferred), whom, when asked about detainee, claimed detainee worked with him at the refugee camp and left a good mark in his heart.42

(S//NF) SU-940 worked for LDI in the Jelazee refugee camp for 10 years from 1986 to 1996 as a teacher for the orphans in the refugee camp. SU-940 identified LDI as an organization that promoted Islamic solidarity. There was an education center in the camp sponsored by Khalid Shaykh Muhammed, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024). This camp provided Islamic indoctrination for young men 18-30 years old, including showing jihadist videos. KU-10024 occasionally went to the camp to recruit new fighters for jihad.43

(S) An Afghan national stated LDI vehicles and warehouses were used to store and transfer weapons and supplies to the Taliban front lines and mujahideen from Peshawar during the late 1990s.44

c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 92 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 10 March 2008, when he spat on the guard force. He has 32 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 10 March 2008, when he spat on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 18 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and 15 so far in 2008.

40 IIR 6 034 0372 02, IIR 6 034 0089 04 41

¡IIR 6 034 0204(b) 42

¡000940 SIR 03-NOV-2005; Analyst Note: Mammar Ameur, US9AG-000939DP (AG-939, designated for transfer) also identified detainee, AG-10003, and AG-10006 as individuals who supported NGO’s in Peshawar between 1992 and 1993. For additional information reference IIR 6 034 0903 03. 43 IIR 6 034 1523 03 44 IIR 7 724 0060 02

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US4AG-010005DP (S)

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee’s most recent interrogation session occurred on 12 December 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Since the 1990s, detainee has worked for NGOs known to support terrorist activities. Detainee has visited numerous countries in this capacity. As a result, detainee associated with individuals who held high level positions in various NGOs with ties to extremist activities. Detainee spent over two years working for the Hira Institute and worked for LDI. Detainee was captured with a group suspected of planning attacks against the US Embassy in Sarajevo. Detainee maintained strong personal relationships with these individuals, who are assessed to be members of the GIA and have links with the al-Qaida network.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Given detainee’s extensive involvement and associations to terrorist-linked NGOs, he possesses first-hand information about the organizations and their members. However, detainee has maintained his cover story that he was never associated with the extremist activities or any extremist groups. Detainee gives only cursory information pertaining to his duties with these organizations. Detainee has substantial information about other “Algerian Six” detainees. Detainee continues to deny the full extent of his relationships with these individuals. Detainee’s links and associations indicate a deeper involvement in extremist activity, which have yet to be exposed. Detainee’s travel and his links to extremist individuals and groups require additional exploration.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

Planned attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo

NGO support to extremist groups

GIA

Terrorist travel facilitators

Radicalization factors of terrorism

Terrorist biographical and psychological information

Detainee’s intentions after release from US custody

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JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN US4AG-O10005DP(S)

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemy combatant status was reassessedon I October2004, and he remains an . vllt,t . | .t/) '/z/2.y'//.d.z^/- ,1// /4/ /< MARK H. BUZBY 2 RearAdmiral, US Navy Commanding

. Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessmentcan be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence l|arning Terminologt.

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