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“I Thought it Was a Narrow Shave”

A Revised Analysis of the Encounter

by Samuel Halpern

At 10:00pm, ship’s time, Sunday night, April 14th 1912, lookouts and took their watch up in the crow’s nest, replacing lookouts and Archie Jewell. Before Symons and Jewell left the nest, they told Fleet and Lee to keep a sharp lookout for ice and growlers in particular, repeating the orders they received from the bridge earlier that night. According to Reginald Lee, it was about “nine or ten minutes” after seven bells were struck that a dark mass was spotted out on the water ahead of the ship.1 When asked how far ahead of the vessel was the iceberg, Lee responded by saying, “It might have been half a mile or more; it might have been less; I could not give you the distance in that peculiar light.” When that dark mass was finally identified, Frederick Fleet was quick to react. He said to Lee, “There is ice ahead,” and immediately reached up and grabbed the lanyard of the lookout bell above his head and struck it three times to signal the officer on the bridge below that an object was sighted ahead. He then left his place on the port side of the nest and went behind Lee on the starboard side of the nest to get to the loud- speaking telephone that connected the crow’s nest with a loud-speaking phone in the wheelhouse. As Fleet would later recall, “I asked them were they there, and they said yes.” They then asked, “What did you see?” to which Fleet replied, “Iceberg right ahead.” They then followed with, “Thank you.” The person that answered the phone in the wheelhouse was Sixth Officer James Moody. According to Quartermaster Hichens, who was at the wheel at the time, after Moody replied “thank you” on the phone, he went and called out to First Officer William Murdoch, the Officer of the Watch at the time, “Iceberg right ahead,” which was followed by Murdoch giving the order “Hard-astarboard” to Hichens who then responded by turning the wheel all the way over to the left. This action caused the steam-driven steering engine in the ship’s to swing the ship’s all the way over to starboard. As a result, ’s rudder was shifted a full 40° to the left causing the ship’s stern to swing out to starboard as the ship’s head veered over to port. When asked how long it was before receiving the helm order did he hear those 3 bells from the crow’s nest, replied, “Well, as near as I can tell you, about half a minute.” Like Hichens, Fredrick Fleet was asked how long did he think he was at the phone calling down to the bridge. Fleet’s response was, “I suppose half a minute.” The two estimates, though highly subjective, were mutually supporting. According to Hichens, Titanic was heading N71°W (289°) by the steering compass before the helm order was received from Murdoch. He also claimed that the vessel had veered about two compass points (22.5°) to port before striking the iceberg, “she went to the southward of west” as seen on the compass. Of course, being in an

1 Bells were struck every 30 minutes during a four-hour watch period. During the 8pm to midnight watch, seven bells were struck at 11:30pm.

2 enclosed and shuttered wheelhouse at night, Hichens could not see the iceberg, but he could see the ship’s heading on the compass directly in front of him. Up in the crow’s nest, lookouts Fleet and Lee both saw the vessel turn to port before striking the iceberg. Fleet estimated that that ship changed her course from a direct line by “a little over a point, or two points.” Before that, he said that they “were making straight for it.” So once again we have mutually supporting evidence that the ship turned a very noticeable amount (between 1 and 2 compass points) to port before it struck the iceberg. According to Fleet, when the ship struck there was no jar or anything that was sufficient to disturb the two lookout men in the crow’s nest. There was just this “slight grinding noise” as he put it. Neither he nor Lee were alarmed. Fleet said, “I thought it was a narrow shave.” According to Lee, the ship “seemed to heel slightly over to port as she struck the berg.” Up in the nest it was hard for them to tell if the ship struck above or below the waterline, but they could hear a rending of metal right away. “It seemed to be running right along the starboard side.” As the berg passed by them, some ice was seen to fall onto the forecastle head and onto the forward well deck that was just behind them. When Fleet struck the lookout bell three times, Quartermaster Alfred Olliver was completing an errand at the standard compass platform amidships, making sure that the lights were burning properly in the compass binnacle. When he heard the three bells from , he instinctively looked up and of course could see nothing ahead but the ship’s second funnel. According to his account, he left the platform and headed straight for the navigating bridge. He arrived there and “was just entering on the bridge” as the ship struck the iceberg, and heard “a long grinding sound” that lasted a few seconds. Olliver, along with others, described the collision as “a glancing blow.” He also was able to get a glimpse of the peak of the iceberg as it quickly passed aft of the starboard bridge wing. He said it was just a little higher than the boat deck. As he entered the bridge he saw First Officer William Murdoch by the control switch that closes the twelve watertight doors down on the tank top in the machinery spaces. Prior to entering the bridge area he did not hear any helm orders, nor did he mention hearing the engine-order telegraphs ring. If such orders were given it was well before he arrived on the bridge. He did however, hear Murdoch issue a hard-aport helm order but only after the iceberg had passed aft of the bridge. The account of Olliver is predominate to unlocking the timing of events that took place that night. Not because of any answers he gave with respect to how long some event took place, which at best would have been very subjective, but because we can use his whereabouts at two key event points to get a fairly good estimate of the duration in time between them. Those two points is his being at the standard compass platform amidships when those three bells were struck, and his entering the navigating bridge as the ship made contact with the iceberg. What does this tell us? From the plans of the ship we know the distance that Olliver had to cover to get from the compass platform to the bridge over the likely path he would have taken. We also have a good idea as to how long in time it would have taken him to cover that distance based on studies of 3 pedestrians crossing busy intersections after allowing for some reaction time as well.2 The likely route that Olliver would have taken that would have allowed him to see the peak of the iceberg pass by as he entered the bridge by simply turning around is shown in Figure 01 below. The distance that he had to cover was close to about 250 feet.

Fig. 01 – Likely path of QM Alfred Olliver.

Assuming a brisk walking pace between 5 and 6 ft/sec, and allowing for some reaction time, it is estimated that somewhere between 45 to a little over 50 seconds would have transpired from the time that 3-bells were struck up in the nest to when the ship struck the iceberg. Now to get the time that the “Hard-astarboard” order was issued, we need to apply the amount of time it would take for the ship’s head to fall off a certain number of degrees before making contact with the iceberg. Figure 02 shows the change in heading versus time for an Olympic-class vessel steaming initially at 22.5 knots with the helm put hard over to starboard (left full rudder) at T = 0.

Fig. 02 – Heading Vs. Time.

2 The 85th percentile of crossing speeds ranged between 1.54 and 1.85 m/s (5.1 to 6.1 ft/sec). Ref.: A. Bansal , T. Goyal, U. Sharma, “Modelling the Pedestrian Speed at Signalised Intersection Crosswalks for Heterogeneous Traffic Conditions,” Promet – Traffic & Transportation, Vol. 31, No. 6., 2019.

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The above was based on a study of the turning characteristics of these Olympic-class vessels from which the turning circle, advance, transfer, drift angle, and tactical diameter were derived for an initial ship’s speed of 22.5 knots.3 These parameters, and the resulting turning circle, are shown in Figure 03 below.

Fig. 03 – Titanic’s turning circle and turning parameters.

As previously stated, according to QM Hichens, Titanic had turned about 2 points (22.5°) to port by the time the ship struck the iceberg. According to Lookout Fleet, she turned between 1 and 2 points (11.25° and 22.5°) before the ship struck. If we accept Hichens’ account and then apply that to the turning data for Titanic we get a picture of the ship striking the iceberg about 37 seconds after the helm order in the area of the peak tank on her starboard side with the iceberg located well over on the port side of the ship’s initial extended centerline. This is shown in condition A in Figure 04 below.4 This

3 Samuel Halpern, “She Turned Two Points in 37 Seconds,” www.titanicology.com/Titanica/Two-Points-in-Thirty-Seven-Seconds.pdf. 4 The shape of the iceberg that we show in these diagrams came about by noting that the peak of the iceberg that Titanic struck was a little higher than the boat deck, which would put it around 70 feet above the water. This puts the iceberg in the medium-size category as defined by the (IIP). A medium size iceberg is defined as having a height from 51 to 150 ft and a waterline length from 201 to 400 ft. What we show in these diagrams is an irregular shape with a waterline length of about 300 ft, consistent with a medium size iceberg. 5 picture is obviously inconsistent with Murdoch calling for the helm to be put hard- astarboard, which would have turned the ship toward the iceberg, not away from it, when first seen. So it seems that we have to reject Hichens’ claim that the ship turned 2 points before striking the iceberg. It was more likely that what he saw on the steering compass in the enclosed wheelhouse came a few seconds after the ship struck, just before a second helm order was issued by Murdoch to put the helm hard over to aport, an order witnessed by QM Alfred Olliver after the ship struck the iceberg, and after the iceberg passed aft of the starboard bridge wing. What would we see with regard to the position of the iceberg if the turn was only about 1 or 1½ compass points at the time the hard-astarboard helm order was issued? We looked at two other conditions that are also shown in Figure 04. Condition B, showing the position of the berg if the ship turned 15° before striking, and condition C, showing the position of the berg if the ship turned only 10° before striking.

Fig. 04 – Position of iceberg for turns of 10°, 15° and 23°.

Both conditions B and C in Figure 04 show the iceberg over toward the starboard side of the ship’s initial extended centerline, with condition B (a 15° turn before striking) having the center of the iceberg ahead but only slightly to starboard, and condition C (a 10° turn) having the center of the iceberg ‘fine on the starboard bow’ with the side of the

6 berg that was struck appearing just over the ship’s extended centerline on the port side.5 In previous works, I had favored condition C mainly because of a very rough sketch drawn by Frederick Fleet that showed the peak of the iceberg when first sighted a little to the right side of the peak of the ship’s bow. However, in his testimony he stated that the ship was making straight for the iceberg when it was sighted, and some people have interpreted that to mean that the iceberg was almost dead ahead. Given the choice taken by Murdoch to turn the ship’s head to port, that decision would make sense with either conditions B or C. Condition B, however, would place the iceberg mostly ahead but just slightly to starboard of the ship’s initial extended centerline. It would be consistent with Fleet’s “we were making straight for it.” So for the purpose of this analysis, we will take condition B as to where the iceberg was when first sighted, which then puts the time that the hard-astarboard order was given, based on the ship’s turning characteristics, at about 28 seconds prior to impact; the time needed for the ship’s head to turn about 15° to port (Figure 02). So what would be the time from 3 bells to when the hard-astarboard helm order was issued? If Olliver, walking at a fairly brisk pace, took 45 seconds to get from the compass platform amidships to the bridge where he could see Murdoch by the watertight door switch, and if we assume that the ship was struck in the forepeak just 2 seconds before he reached that position, then we find that we have 43 seconds from 3 bells to when the ship made contact with the ice. Now if we subtract the 28 seconds for the ship to turn 15° from the time of the helm order, we are left with 15 seconds between 3 bells from the lookouts and when the order was given to put the helm hard-astarboard. So why would there be a delay as much as 15 seconds? Even if Murdoch first saw the iceberg when the lookout bell sounded, why would it take him somewhere around 15 seconds, or perhaps a little more,6 to issue that hard-astarboard helm order? (Remember that Hichens’ said, “Well, as near as I can tell you, [it was] about half a minute.”) If Murdoch had reacted instinctively rather than deliberately, is it not unreasonable to expect that he would have issued those orders no more than 5 or 6 seconds after the 3 bell warning once he had the chance to see for himself what lay ahead in the path of the ship? In fact, this is very much the scenario offered up by Fourth Officer . In the Boxhall scenario, 3 bells were struck in the nest as he came almost abreast of the Captain’s quarters while walking along the starboard side of the boat deck toward the bridge.7 (See Figure 05.) He said:

“I heard the report of three bells...That signifies something has been seen ahead. Almost at the same time [my emphasis] I heard the first officer give the order ‘Hard astarboard,’ and the engine telegraph rang.”

5 One compass point is 11.25°, one and a half compass points is 16.88°, and two compass points is 22.50°. In Figure 04 we are showing heading angles of 10°, 15° and 23° at the time of impact. 6 If Olliver took 50 seconds to get to the bridge, and if the ship struck just 2 seconds before he reached that point, then we would be left with 20 seconds between the 3 bells and when the helm order was issued. This value was used in some of my previous works. 7 At the British inquiry Boxhall said he was first coming out of the officer’s quarters at the time that he heard those three bells. 7 Soon after that Boxhall said he felt “a slight impact” and continued onto the bridge where he said he found “the sixth officer and the first officer and captain” all on the bridge together.8 Then Boxhall went on to say:

“The captain said, ‘What have we struck?’ Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, said, ‘We have struck an iceberg.’ He followed on to say - Mr. Murdoch followed on to say, ‘I put her hard astarboard and run the engines full astern, but it was too close; she hit it.’”

The entire distance that Boxhall had to walk to get to the bridge was less than 60 feet. At a brisk walking speed, it would take a young person about 10 to 12 seconds to cover that distance. So in about 12 seconds or less, according to Boxhall’s version of events, 3 bells were struck up in the nest, followed almost at the same time by Murdoch ordering hard-astarboard helm and putting the engine-order telegraphs to full astern, to the ship striking the iceberg. All of this before he actually stepped onto the bridge.

Fig. 05 – 4/O Boxhall’s path to the bridge.

The implications of this compressed timeframe is that the iceberg was only about 455 feet (38 ft/sec [22.5 knots] for about 12 seconds) ahead of the ship, if not less, when 3 bells were struck by the lookouts. A picture of this situation is shown in Figure 06. It has been noted earlier that Lookout Reginald Lee, when asked about the distance to the berg when first sighted, said: “It might have been half a mile or more; it might have been less; I could not give you the distance in that peculiar light.” A half nautical mile is about 3000 feet. A distance of 455 feet, as we derived in the Boxhall

8 American inquiry, p. 229.

8 scenario, is a distance of only 0.075 of a mile, or about half a ship’s length as shown in Figure 06 below.

Fig. 06 – Iceberg when 3 bells were struck in the Boxhall scenario.

In the scenario whereby the ship struck about 43 seconds after 3 bells sounded, the distance to the iceberg when those 3 bells were struck comes out to about 1520 feet ahead, or ¼ of a nautical mile. That’s almost two ship lengths ahead as shown in Figure 07.

Fig. 07 – Likely distance to iceberg when 3 bells were struck by Fleet.

But this is not all. According to Boxhall, Murdoch told Smith that he ordered the engines full astern in addition to ordering hard-astarboard helm. He even said he saw the engine-order telegraphs call for both engines full astern when he got onto the bridge.9 This claim is not supported by any other eyewitness, on the bridge or down in the engine or rooms.10 According to firemen who were in No. 6 boiler room at the time of the collision,11 the stokehold telegraphs, which are controlled from the engine room, not from the bridge, went to ‘Stop’ at the time the ship collided. As a result, the firemen in

9 British inquiry, 15350. 10 British inquiry, 5523-5538. 11 Leading and Fireman George Beauchamp. 9 the stokeholds were ordered to shut the furnace dampers to cut off the airflow to the fires, something that is done to reduce steam supply when the engines are stopped. If the order from the bridge called for ‘Full Astern,’ as Boxhall claimed, the stokehold telegraphs would not have called for ‘Stop,’ but would have remained at ‘Full,’ which is where they were set beforehand. Furthermore, in the first 10 to 12 seconds from when the helm order was issued, the ship would turn only about 1 to 2 degrees, not 1 to 2 compass points as noted by Fleet, and certainly nothing remotely close to the 2 points mentioned by Hichens. Advocates of Boxhall’s compressed timeline also like to point to the testimony of QM Robert Hichens with regard to how long it took him to get the wheel hard over before the ship struck ice. Unfortunately, on this point, Hichens was very inconsistent. Before the US Senate subcommittee in America, Hichens said that during the time between receiving the helm order from Murdoch, to the time that Moody confirmed that the wheel was hard over, the ship “was crushing the ice, or we could hear the grinding noise along the ship’s bottom.” He also said that the standby quartermaster, which would be Olliver at that time, was standing by his left side when the hard-astarboard order came. However, according to QM Alfred Olliver, he never heard a hard-astarboard order before or after arriving on the bridge that night. He only heard a hard-aport order given by Murdoch (and executed by Hichens and confirmed by Moody) after seeing the peak of the iceberg pass aft of the bridge. In his testimony before the British Wreck Commission, Robert Hichens was all over the place. He first told them:

“Just as she struck I had the order ‘Hard-astarboard’ when she struck.”

Then he told them:

“Not immediately as she struck; the ship was swinging. We had the order, ‘Hard-astarboard,’ and she just swung about two points [22½ degrees] when she struck.”

Then, after being asked if he had time to get the helm hard over before the ship struck, he told them:

“No, she was crashing then.”

Then when pressed further he told them:

“Yes, the helm was barely over when she struck. The ship had swung about two points.”

Then, after being asked again if he had time to get the wheel right over before the ship struck, he told them:

“Oh yes, hard over before she struck.”

Then, after being asked if the ship struck after Sixth Officer Moody acknowledged that the wheel was hard over, he said:

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“She struck almost at the same time.”

So finally Robert Hichens admitted that the ship struck the iceberg after he got the helm fully over, not before, and not while first turning the wheel. However, he also maintained that the ship had turned two compass points before she struck the iceberg, something that would put the iceberg over on the port side of the ship’s initial centerline as we have previously seen. In ships of that period, with telemotor controlled steering engines, it would require about four complete turns of the wheel to get the helm all the way over to one side from its amidships position.12 It would take perhaps 6 to 8 seconds to do with the large wheel that was used back then. However, Robert Hichens maintained that the ship had swung about two points to port when she struck the iceberg. Even deducting the time necessary for him to actually turn the wheel hard over, Hichens’ testimony leaves very little time from when he first received the helm order to the time that he heard the grinding sounds of the iceberg along the ship’s side and bottom. Hichens was also asked if hard-astarboard was the only helm order he received, and if the ship was ever under port helm. His answer was, “She did not come on the port helm, Sir - on the starboard helm.” The reason why Hichens was questioned about the ship being under port helm is that evidence had been presented to the Wreck Commission by Able-Bodied Seaman Joseph Scarrott who said that the ship appeared to be under port helm (right rudder) and appeared to be going around the iceberg turning to starboard when he came up on deck right after the ship struck. In fact, Scarrott was not the only one to say that the ship was put under port helm, a detail that Robert Hichens himself conveyed to passenger Howard Chapin while on board Carpathia. As we have seen, QM Alfred Olliver at the American inquiry said he heard Murdoch give a hard- aport order after he arrived on the bridge, after the ship struck, and that order was carried out by Hichens and confirmed by Sixth Officer Moody. However, at the two inquiries, QM Robert Hichens was very careful to talk only about helm orders received before the ship struck the iceberg, not after. It was only after the impact with the iceberg that the helm was shifted over hard to port to lessen any further damage to the ship’s starboard side. It clearly played no part in any avoidance maneuver that was taken beforehand. In his own mind, it was very likely that Hichens confused the crushing of ice that occurred before he got the hard-aport order with that of the hard-astarboard order. It would also explain the ship then heading 2 points to port of her initial heading as seen on the steering compass when that second helm order was received, as well as his seeing Olliver standing by his side when Moody confirmed that the helm was hard over. So if the compressed timeline of Boxhall is rejected for all the stated reasons, and if we accept that it took Murdoch about 15 seconds from 3 bells to issue his hard- astarboard helm order, then the question that remains is why? Why not sooner? To answer this question one needs to look at some of the possibilities of what would have happened if Murdoch had acted a few seconds earlier or a few seconds later than he apparently did. For this we once again can turn to the turning characteristics of these Olympic class vessels, which also take into account the slowing of the vessel due to hydrodynamic drag as the turn develops.

12 From Nicholl’s Seamanship and Nautical Knowledge. Usually eight turns of a ship’s steering wheel were required to put the rudder from hard over on one side to hard over on the other side. 11 Shown in Figure 08 below are six situations, A through F, where in each situation the hard-astarboard order is given 5 seconds later than the previous.

Fig. 08 – Increasing delays of 5 seconds from 3 bells to hard-astarboard helm order.

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Our starting point, situation A in Figure 08, is for a hard-astarboard order coming at the same moment as the 3-bell warning. Situation B is hard-astarboard coming 5 seconds after the 3-bell warning. Situation C is 10 seconds after 3 bells, and so forth until situation F, where hard-astarboard comes 25 seconds after the 3 bells. Note that situation D, hard-astarboard coming 15 seconds after 3 bells, is the one where the ship strikes the iceberg on her starboard side in the forepeak, the situation where the vessel would turn almost 1½ points before striking. So let’s analyze what the information in Figure 08 tells us. In situation A, a hard- astarboard order is called exactly as 3 bells are struck. This assumes a helm order is issued instinctively based on hearing those 3 bells. What situation A shows is that the ship would likely miss hitting the iceberg, just clearing the stern by only a few feet. (If the order would come just two seconds after 3 bells, the ship would likely have made contact with the berg probably near the aft end of the aft well deck, about where HMS Hawke struck Olympic in September of 1911.) If Murdoch’s order came 5 seconds after 3 bells as shown in situation B, then we see from the turning curve data that the iceberg would have initially made contact with Titanic 55 seconds later in the vicinity opposite the fourth funnel, near the juncture between the reciprocating and turbine engine rooms, and damage would probably have extended further aft of that point into the dynamo room. As we shall see, the ship would have been lost. If Murdoch’s order came 10 seconds after 3 bells as shown in situation C, then we see that the iceberg would have initially made contact with Titanic 40 seconds later in the vicinity opposite the first funnel, near the juncture between No. 5 and No. 6 boiler rooms, and damage would likely have extended further aft of that point into No. 4 boiler room. As we shall again see, the ship would have been lost. Situation D is the one where Murdoch issued the helm order about 15 seconds after the 3 bells. Here we see Titanic initially striking the iceberg 28 seconds later opposite her peak tank and cargo hold No. 1, with damage then extending further aft that included holds No. 2 and No. 3, and No. 6 boiler room.13 If damage had not extended into No. 6 boiler room, but would have extended only as far back as hold No. 3, the ship could have been saved. We shall have more to say about this later on, but for now we note that this is the apparent situation that had occurred on the night of April 14th 1912. Situation E is interesting because it shows what would have happened if Murdoch had issued a hard-astarboard order about 20 seconds after the 3 bells went. It shows that the strike point would have been on the stem post of the ship against the left edge of the iceberg as drawn in our figures. It is difficult to actually say what the full extent of damage would have been, but it is possible that if it would not involve compromising No. 6 boiler room, the ship might have stayed afloat despite the crushing of part of the ship’s bow. Situation F, a delay of 25 seconds in issuing any helm orders, would have resulted essentially in a head-on strike producing severe crushing damage to the bow, including the entire forepeak and holds No. 1 and No. 2. However, despite very severe damage to ship ahead the foremast, she ship would have likely remained afloat. This

13 Small damage was also seen on the after side of watertight bulkhead E separating boiler room No. 5 from boiler room No. 6. The water intake into the empty bunker there was described by Leading Fireman Frederick Barrett as if it came from “an ordinary fire hose.” (BI 2255.) 13 scenario is fully covered in a separate article of mine entitled, “Brace for Collision!”14 From this analysis it seems that William Murdoch may have made a deliberate effort to minimize the extent of damage to the ship if it appeared to him that a collision with this looming object ahead was unavoidable. It appears that Murdoch did not just react out of instinct when those lookout bells were sounded, but tried to assess the quickly unfolding situation before issuing orders. And he almost pulled it off. We know that Titanic took what has been described as a glancing blow along her starboard side. Furthermore, the actual damage to the ship, based on the rate of flooding that had occurred, has been estimated to have been about 12 square feet of non- contiguous openings in the that began just in front of bulkhead A to just abaft of bulkhead E. (See Figure 09.) That’s equivalent to an opening in the hull of only 2/3 of an inch over a length of about 215 feet. Unfortunately, despite the relatively small amount of overall damage to the ship’s hull, the damage extended across too many compartments, and the ship was not able to be saved with the limited pumping capacity that was available. As it was, the ship stayed afloat in a relatively stable condition for 2 hours and 40 minutes before foundering.15

Fig. 09 – Areas of major damage to Titanic.

When one looks at the overall design of Olympic and Titanic to withstand collision damage, we find that the fundamental design configuration formed a sound basis that with just a few detailed modifications, would have complied with modern SOLAS requirements. Curves of floodable length that were produced for these ships (Figure 10) show that they easily met a two-compartment standard for which they were designed, and that all compartments met the permissible length curve for which they

14 Samuel Halpern, “Brace for Collision!” ww.titanicology.com/Titanica/BraceForCollision.pdf. 15 The great loss of life that occurred that night was not caused directly by the collision, but rather because of a lack of adequate capacity, a reluctance of many passengers early on to get into the lifeboats that were available, the prohibiting of male passengers from entering some of the boats that were loaded, a reluctance of some of the officers to fill the boats to capacity before lowering them, and a failure of boats that were launched to return to the ship as ordered to pick up additional people at gangway doors.

14 were designed.16

Fig. 10 – Floodable length curves for Titanic.

16 C. Hackett and J. G. Bedford, “The Sinking of the SS Titanic – Investigated by Modern Techniques,” The Royal Institute of Naval Architects, 1996. Note – Permissible length is some fraction of the floodable length. The fraction is called the factor of subdivision. It is the length between bulkheads on a ship in order to ensure that it will remain afloat if one, or more, compartments are flooded. For Olympic and Titanic it is taken at 37% of the floodable length curve. All compartments met the Permissible length curve for Titanic. 15

These floodable length curves for Titanic not only tell us that Titanic easily met a two- compartment standard, meaning that any two adjacent compartments can be flooded without endangering the ship, but she actually met a four-compartment standard under four flooding conditions, and almost met a three-compartment standard overall with the exception of only three conditions of flooding.17 The four conditions of flooding where a four-compartment standard for Titanic would have been met are shown in Figure 11.

Fig. 11 – Areas where a 4-compartment standard were met.

17 For those not familiar with ship design, the floodable length is the maximum length from a given point along the ship’s length that can be symmetrically flooded without immersing what is called the margin line. The margin line is the highest location on the side of a vessel that water would be allowed to reach for a vessel in a damaged condition of sinkage, heel and trim.

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The three conditions where a three-compartment standard would not have been met are shown in Figure 12. In these three cases, the ship could not stay afloat.

Fig. 12 – Areas where a 3-compartment standard would not be met.

Figure 12 is most revealing as to what would have happened if William Murdoch had called a hard-astarboard helm order 5 or 10 seconds earlier than he actually did. Recall that conditions B and C in Figure 08 show where the iceberg would have struck if Murdoch had called hard-astarboard 5 or 10 seconds after 3 bells, respectively. In condition B of Figure 08 (with hard-astarboard coming 5 seconds after 3 bells) the berg is seen to strike opposite the fourth funnel, near the juncture of watertight bulkhead L separating the room from the turbine engine room. If damage would have continued past bulkhead M into the dynamo room, which is most likely, we would have the situation shown in condition C of Figure 12, where three critical compartments would have been compromised, and the ship would sink. The same appears to be true with condition C of Figure 08 (with hard-astarboard coming 10 seconds after 3 bells) where the berg is seen to strike opposite the first funnel, at the juncture of watertight bulkhead E separating No. 5 boiler room from No.6 boiler room. Again, damage would likely have continued across watertight bulkhead F into No. 4 boiler room thereby compromising the three compartments shown in condition B of Figure 12. Once again the ship would sink. Worse yet is the possibility that the ship 17 would have lost transverse stability and capsized as seen in so many other maritime disasters. By taking the hit in the forepeak (hard-astarboard 15 seconds after 3 bells) it appears that Murdoch may have hoped that no more than the first three or four compartments would have been impacted and therefore, as shown in condition A of Figure 11, the ship would have been saved. Unfortunately, as bad luck would have it, the damage extended across the first five compartments, and the ship was not able to survive. Despite striking a glancing blow, which resulted in what is called an allision event, Murdoch also tried to keep the ship’s hull from making further contact with the iceberg as it glided down the ship’s starboard side. If he would have kept the helm hard astarboard throughout the encounter, further damage along the ship’s aft and mid sections would seem to have been a certainty. After the iceberg passed aft of the bridge wing, Murdoch ordered the helm shifted to hard-aport. Let us be very clear, this was not part of any avoidance maneuver, but a damage mitigation maneuver to pull the ship’s stern away from contact with the berg. This was the order that was overheard by QM Olliver soon after he came onto the bridge and after seeing the peak of the iceberg pass aft of the starboard bridge wing. He also saw Hichens carry out that order, and heard Sixth Officer Moody confirm that the helm was put hard-aport. That it was successfully carried out is indirectly confirmed by QM George Rowe who was stationed out on the poop deck when the iceberg passed aft. He noted that the berg came very close to hitting the docking bridge, but there was no grinding sounds or other indication that the berg was in contact with any part of the vessel at that time. When he was asked if the ship’s stern would have been up against the iceberg had the ship’s helm been kept hard astarboard, Rowe said, “It stands to reason it would, sir, if the helm were hard astarboard.” Figure 13 shows the movements of Titanic after the hard-starboard order was issued based on her turning characteristics and the timing that has been presented here. Condition A is when impact with the iceberg first took place, about 28 seconds after the hard-astarboard order was issued. Condition B is when a hard-aport was likely called, estimated to be about 8 seconds after the initial impact (and 36 seconds after the hard- astarboard order), after the peak of the berg had passed aft of the bridge wing. Condition C is when the iceberg would have passed aft of the ship’s docking bridge at the stern and witnessed by QM Rowe. It would have been about 19 seconds after the hard-aport order was issued (and 55 seconds after the hard-astarboard order), just a few seconds after Moody would have confirmed that the helm was hard over to port. As can be seen in Figure 13, it took just under a minute from the time Murdoch ordered hard-astarboard to when the iceberg would have passed the ship’s stern. Now under port helm (right rudder), the ship started to turn to starboard. “Her stern was slewing off the iceberg,” noted AB-Seaman Joseph Scarrott, “the starboard bow was going as if to make a circle round it.” It should also be noted, that the ship’s engines did not come to a stop until 1½ to 2 minutes following the collision by most eyewitness estimates. That would be about 2 to 2½ minutes after the hard-astarboard helm order was issued. It is estimated that it would have taken Murdoch about 6 seconds to get to the starboard-side engine-order telegraphs and ring down ‘Stop’ after shouting his hard-astarboard order, after running from being out on the starboard-side bridge wing to the starboard-side door of the wheelhouse where Hichens and Moody were. Then it would take him about 7 seconds to get to and ring

18 down ‘Stop’ on the emergency engine-order telegraphs immediately after that. Then it would have taken him about 3 seconds to reach the watertight door (WTD) control switch which was located in front of the navigating bridge wheel. If he then followed printed protocol, he would press the WTD warning bell for about 10 seconds before closing the switch to activate the doors. Those doors took about 25 to 30 seconds to drop shut from the time the switch was closed.18

Fig. 13 – Titanic 28, 36, and 55 seconds after ‘Hard-astarboard’ order.

The movements of William Murdoch from the time of the iceberg sighting to his reaching the WTD control switch are shown in Figure 14. How accurate are these estimated time increments for Murdoch’s movements? As I explained in chapter III of my book, Strangers on the Horizon, with some noted exceptions, some of the footage in ’s 1997 epic film ‘Titanic’ can be utilized to measure the timing of certain specific events such as the movements of William Murdoch from the time he called out hard-astarboard until he reached the WTD control switch. These scenes were created on a full-scale mockup that added a degree of realism to the actions and movements of some of the individuals involved. If we add up all of incremental times, including the 10 seconds to push the button that controlled the warning bells, we find a total of 25-26 seconds from the time the hard- astarboard order is called out until the WTD switch is turned to close the doors. Then from Figure 13 above, we find the ship striking ice in the area of the peak tank about 2 or 3 seconds later, or 28 seconds from the time the helm order was issued.

18 Report of The Wreck Commissioner’s Court, “Report on the Loss of the ‘Titanic’ (SS),” July 30, 1912, p.17. The doors dropped slowly at first, controlled by a cataract until the last 12 to 18 inches. Then they slammed tight shut. 19

Fig. 14 – The movements of First Officer William Murdoch.

About 7 seconds after the ship first struck ice in the area of the peak tank, we find that the underwater part of the iceberg would have reached the vicinity of stokehold No. 10 in No. 6 boiler room where Leading Fireman Frederick Barrett and Junior Second Engineer Jonathan Hesketh were located.19 As it happened, the ice opened up seams in the hull about 2 feet above the stokehold plates. It would have been about the time that QM Alfred Olliver would have noticed the peak of the iceberg pass aft of the starboard- side bridge wing as depicted in Figure 15.20 Within 2 or 3 seconds after that, Leading Fireman Frederick Barrett and Junior Second Engineer Jonathan Hesketh ran through the space between the bunkers to get to the WTD separating No. 6 from No. 5 boiler rooms. They both made it though with little time to spare as the door slammed shut behind them “like a knife” as Frederick Barrett recalled later on. It was about 25 seconds after Murdoch closed the watertight door control switch, or about 50 seconds after Murdoch had called out hard-astarboard.

19 Taking the speed of the vessel after the initial iceberg contact as 34.5 ft/sec for 7 seconds gives a distance traveled of about 240 ft. This is about when the underwater spur from the berg would have reached watertight bulkhead E. 20 This picture was created by taking a darkened photograph of the starboard bridge wing from the navigating bridge of Olympic and adding in the peak from an iceberg photograph. Notice the swung out emergency lifeboat No. 1, which was always swung out at the ready while at sea.

20

Fig. 15 – What QM Olliver saw.

Filling in other details during the minutes immediately following the three-bell lookout signal, we are able to construct a realistic timeline of events that took place around twenty minutes to midnight on the night of April 14th 1912. This is shown in the following table. Time (in seconds) is taken when the listed event was completed. Three related time columns are shown: TL=0 is when 3 bells were struck up in the nest, TH=0 is when the “Hard-astarboard” helm order was given, and TC=0 is when the ship made first contact with the iceberg.

TL TH TC Specific Event (sec) (sec) (sec) Lookout Frederick Fleet strikes 3 bells up in the nest. 0 -15 -43 Fleet gets to the starboard side at the back of the nest and picks up the phone and calls the wheelhouse. QM Alfred Olliver leaves the 3 -12 -40 compass platform amidships and heads for the bridge. Receiving no straightaway reply, Fleet calls out: “Are you there?” 5 -10 -38 1/O William Murdoch sees iceberg ahead through his binoculars. Phone answered by 6/O James Moody: “Yes, what do you see?” 7 -8 -36 Fleet replies: “Iceberg right ahead!” 10 -5 -33 Moody acknowledges: “Thank you” and runs toward the 11 -4 -32 wheelhouse door. Murdoch decides iceberg is too close to avoid. Moody shouts out “Iceberg right ahead!” to 1/O William Murdoch who is already racing toward him. 13 -2 -30 “Hard-astarboard!” shouted by Murdoch. QM Robert Hichens starts turning the wheel hard left (counter-clockwise) to throw the 15 0 -28 ship’s tiller to the right. Murdoch reaches the engine-order telegraphs on the starboard side. 19 4 -24 Engine-order telegraphs double-ring to STOP. 21 6 -22 Hichens gets the wheel full over and Moody reports: “Helm hard- astarboard.” 22 7 -21 21

TL TH TC Specific Event (sec) (sec) (sec) Murdoch now reaches the emergency engine-order telegraphs. 26 11 -17 Emergency engine-order telegraphs double-ring to STOP. 28 13 -15 Engine-order telegraph response bells ring back from the Engine Room as Murdoch reaches the location of the WTD control switch and presses the bell-button to give warning to those below that 31 16 -12 the watertight doors are about to drop. Stokehold telegraphs in all boiler rooms go from FULL to STOP as an engineer in the Main Engine Room sets the 36 21 -7 stokehold transmitting telegraph to STOP. Leading Fireman Barrett calls out, “Shut all dampers!” in BR No. 6. 38 23 -5 While still pressing the warning bell button, Murdoch turns the WTD control switch to CLOSE. 41 26 -2 Allision with the iceberg begins in the area of the peak tank on the starboard side of the bow. 43 28 0 QM Olliver enters the bridge and sees 1/O Murdoch near the WTD control switch as a grinding sound can be heard as the iceberg rips 45 30 2 open several seams in the hull plating along the starboard side. Allision with iceberg ends as Olliver sees the peak of the iceberg pass aft of the starboard bridge wing. Water comes through the side 50 35 7 of the ship about 2 feet above the stokehold plates in BR No. 6. Murdoch calls out: “Hard-aport!” in an attempt to swing the ship’s stern away from the iceberg that was gliding down the starboard 51 36 8 side. Barrett and 2/E Hesketh reach the between the bunkers in an attempt to escape Boiler Room No. 6. before the 53 38 10 WTD shuts. Moody sees and reports: “Helm Hard-aport.” 65 50 22 Barrett sees WTD slam shut behind him “like a knife” after 66 51 23 following Hesketh into BR No. 5. Murdoch orders Olliver to take the time and Moody to make a note of the incident in the ship’s scrap log. 68 53 25 Captain Smith seen by QM Hichens entering the wheelhouse from his quarters. QM Rowe sees the iceberg pass aft of the docking 70 55 27 bridge. Captain Smith steps out onto the bridge from the wheelhouse and asks 1/O Murdoch, “What have we struck?” 73 58 30

Does this timing add up? There are only three people who actually saw the fatal iceberg before the collision. They were Reginald Lee, Frederick Fleet, and William Murdoch. Of course Murdoch did not survive, and Fleet was unwilling to say anything about how far away the iceberg was when he first spotted it. Lee, as we have seen, was a bit more candid and said that he thought the iceberg was about a half-mile ahead, more or less, when it was first seen. (We have it about a quarter-mile ahead.) If Lee is to be believed, Titanic could not have been almost on top of the iceberg when the lookouts first spotted what looked like a dark mass ahead of them; an impression that one gets if we are to believe the scenario given by Fourth Officer Joseph

22 Boxhall. At a speed of about 22½ knots it would take Titanic about 80 seconds to cover a distance of one-half a mile, and 40 seconds to cover a distance of about one-fourth of a mile following a straight path. Under the Boxhall scenario, where he had about 60 feet or less to walk from the officer’s quarters to the bridge, the iceberg would have been about 12 seconds or less ahead of the ship when those 3 bells were struck up in the nest, or about 455 feet ahead of the vessel, about one-half a ship’s length as we have previously seen. We know from standby QM Alfred Olliver that he left the standard compass platform when he heard the three-bell warning, and was just about entering the bridge as the ship struck ice. We have estimated that it would have taken Olliver about 45 to 50 seconds to come onto the bridge after first hearing those warning bells, assuming he went at a fairly brisk pace. This is based on knowing the distance that it would take him to get down from the platform and walk to the bridge using a brisk walking pace for young pedestrians crossing a busy intersection, and allowing a few seconds for reaction time as well. QM Robert Hichens said that about half a minute had gone by from the time of the three-bell warning to when the “Hard-astarboard” order was given by Murdoch, a time interval supported by Fleet’s estimate of spending about half a minute overall at the loud-speaking telephone when he called down to the bridge. In the timeline developed here, assuming it took Olliver 45 seconds to reach the bridge, we allowed 15 seconds from the three-bell warning signal to when Murdoch ordered the helm be put “Hard- astarboard.” We then allowed 28 seconds from the helm order to when the ship makes initial contact with the iceberg in the forepeak. Based on the turning characteristics of Titanic, in those 28 seconds the ship’s heading would have swung about 15 degrees, almost 1½ compass points, into her initial turn to port. This would match the one to two- point swing that Fleet said he saw regarding how far the ship veered to port before striking the iceberg. For the ship to have turned a full two points prior to striking the iceberg on the starboard side of the bow, the iceberg would have had to be over on the port side of the ship’s centerline at the time the helm order was given. This would obviously make it highly unlikely that Murdoch would have called for the helm to be put hard-astarboard. Obviously, you want to turn away from danger, not into it. As we have said before, it is more likely that the two-point swing to port that Hichens saw on the steering compass in front of him took place a few seconds after the ship made contact with the iceberg, as it was passing down the ship’s starboard side, not at the exact moment that the ship made initial contact with the iceberg. When First Officer Murdoch ordered the helm be put “Hard-aport,” the iceberg had passed aft of the starboard bridge wing. That shifting of the helm, from hard- astarboard to hard-aport, is why the iceberg was seen over on the ship’s starboard quarter following the collision by a number of eyewitnesses. It also explains why the ship was facing northward after it finally came to a stop. Considering the time needed to turn the wheel a full 8 turns from one side to the other, the iceberg would have reached the area of the vessel’s stern about the time when Moody acknowledged that the helm was hard over to port, an acknowledgement that was overheard by QM Olliver. It would be just a few seconds afterward that Captain Smith was seen passing through the wheelhouse to get onto the bridge. As QM Hichens testified, “Just about a minute, I suppose, after the collision, the Captain rushed out of his room and asked Mr. Murdoch what was that, and he [Murdoch] said, ‘An iceberg, Sir,’ and he [Smith] said, ‘Close the watertight doors.’” According to the timeline developed here, it would have been more like half a minute 23 from when the ship first struck ice. It has been said that what is missing in many of the discussions surrounding the actions, or inactions, of William Murdoch is exactly how Murdoch saw the unfolding situation before him. We find some people saying that Murdoch was wrong to order the engines full astern before the collision because it would have destroyed the ability of the ship to turn quickly away from the iceberg. They base their conclusions on the unsupported testimony of Joseph Boxhall who, as we have seen, claimed that he heard Murdoch tell Smith that the engines were put full astern when Murdoch ordered the helm hard-astarboard, and even said he saw full-astern for both engines on the engine-order telegraphs when he arrived on the bridge. We find others criticizing Murdoch for not allowing the ship to hit the iceberg head-on, citing studies done after the fact that show that the ship would likely have survived a head-on strike despite being severely damaged in the bow. They somehow assume that Murdoch would have known, or should have known, that the actions he actually took would somehow result in the eventual sinking of the ship. In most of these assessments of Murdoch’s actions, it has been assumed that Murdoch was trying to avoid contact with the iceberg. But what if that was not so? What if it appeared to Murdoch that the iceberg was just too close to avoid contact? What we have looked into here tends to suggest that Murdoch may indeed have realized that the object that loomed ahead was just too close to avoid, and the actions taken were aimed at damage mitigation, not collision avoidance. Based on the time taken from the 3-bell lookout signal to when he ordered hard-astarboard, it seems that William Murdoch did not act out of pure instinct, but rather took deliberate action when the iceberg was first sighted. This also would be in keeping with what we know about him. In 1903, William Murdoch was second officer on board the SS Arabic under the command of Captain Bertram Hayes. The story goes that under one of Arabic’s voyages from to New York, William Murdoch allegedly was able to avoid a collision at night with a sailing vessel by countermanding an order to port the helm that was given by Arabic’s Chief Officer , the man Murdoch was about to relieve as Officer of the Watch. According to the story, Murdoch brushed aside the quartermaster at the helm and held the wheel steady thereby preventing a collision that otherwise would have taken place.21 What we find from this lesson is that William Murdoch did not merely react out of instinct, but took the time to access a situation before taking action. One thing seems clear, the last thing an experienced officer like William Murdoch would have done is to instinctively turn away and at the same time call for full speed astern on both engines as Joseph Boxhall had claimed. In Knight’s Modern Seamanship 1910 it stated:

“The first impulse of many officers in such a situation [where a collision seems dangerously close] is to turn away from danger, and at the same time to reverse the engines with full power. This course is much more likely to cause collisions than prevent them.”

21 See the account: “The Life of William McMaster Murdoch,” www..com/titanic/wmmlifea.htm.

24 So what would have been the appropriate action to take if it appeared that a collision with this looming object ahead was unavoidable? According to Extra Master Mariner A. N. Cockcroft:22

“When collision with another vessel is considered to be inevitable, the foremost concern of the officer must be to maneuver his ship so as to reduce the effect of collision as much as possible. The consequences are likely to be most serious if one vessel strikes the other at a large angle near the mid length. The engines should be stopped, and the helm should be used so as to achieve a glancing blow rather than a direct impact. The damage would probably be the least serious if the impact is taken forward of the collision bulkhead.”

(The collision bulkhead is the forward-most bulkhead in a ship. Its main purpose is to limit damage to the part of the bow that is forward of it. On Titanic, the collision bulkhead was bulkhead A.) Although Captain Cockcroft was talking about an unavoidable collision between two vessels, the same advice would apply if the unavoidable collision would be with some floating object such as a massive iceberg. The key advice, as Cockcroft said, is to maneuver your ship so as to reduce the effect of collision as much as possible, and that means to avoid contact in the more vulnerable parts of the vessel such as to the machinery spaces, the propellers and propeller shaft areas. To repeat what Captain Cockcroft wrote in his “Guide to The Collision Avoidance Rules:”

“The engines should be stopped, and the helm should be used so as to achieve a glancing blow rather than a direct impact. The damage would probably be the least serious if the impact is taken forward of the collision bulkhead.”

It seems that is exactly what William Murdoch did on the night of April 14th 1912; eighteen years before Captain Cockcroft was even born. As we have seen back in Figure 08, timing was critical. Ordering the helm to starboard too early, and the ship would have struck the iceberg in the machinery spaces or in the area of her shaft tunnels and propellers. Ordering the helm to starboard too late, and the ship would have struck the iceberg head-on or almost head-on. Ordering the helm to starboard when he did resulted in the ship striking the iceberg just ahead of watertight bulkhead A, the collision bulkhead, in the area of the forepeak tank. It seems Murdoch’s action was right out of the modern day textbook. In addition to turning the vessel when he did, ordering the engines to ‘Stop’ also appears to be in keeping with modern day practice as noted in Captain Cockcroft’s recommendation above. It appears that the reason for stopping the engines in an inevitable collision situation is to reduce the ship’s overall kinetic energy while retaining some rudder effectiveness. If the engines are put full astern, the rudder will soon become ineffective due to the turbulence that is created. As it so happened, Titanic’s engines did

22 Capt. A. N. Cockcroft and J. N. F. Lameijer, “A Guide To The Collision Avoidance Rules,” International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Sixth edition, (Incorporating the 1981, 1987, 1989, 1993 and 2001 Amendments), p.113. 25 not stop prior to or during the allision event, but ran on for a short time afterward before finally stopping. In addition to the actions taken above prior to the collision, Murdoch ordered Titanic’s helm shifted hard over to port (right full rudder) after the initial contact, after the iceberg had passed aft of the navigating bridge. This seemingly was a move to mitigate further iceberg damage along Titanic’s starboard side, something that was likely to have happened if the helm was maintained hard over to starboard (left full rudder). Considering that only about 12 square feet of aggregate iceberg damage resulted from the allision, William Murdoch almost pulled off a miracle. The unfortunate thing in all of this, is that those 12 square feet of aggregate openings happened to span across five of Titanic’s watertight compartments in an area of the vessel where it only met a four- compartment standard. All in all, however, it was a masterful achievement in ship handling that met up with some bad luck.

26 Appendix–A

Sidestepping an Iceberg

Under the circumstances that were faced that night, was it at all possible to maneuver the ship so that it would not have made contact with the iceberg other than turning away at the very sound of the 3 bell warning? Disregarding the practicality of actually pulling it off under the circumstances that were being faced, it seems that a very carefully timed sidestep maneuver may have prevented the ship from striking the iceberg. Given enough distance and time, the intent of such a maneuver is to first swing the ship’s head away from the iceberg to clear the bow, and then swing the ship’s stern away by shifting the helm to the opposite side at precisely the right time. If exactly executed under the circumstances encountered, the ship would first swing to the left (port) and then swing to the right (starboard) a short time later as it approached the danger. To pull it off, very exact timing on the part of the ship handler would be required under very trying conditions. It would also require that the engines are not touched, but remain at full speed ahead.23 Using the derived turning characteristics of the vessel under various zigzag movements, we were able to determine two conditions under which such a maneuver may have been successful. We already knew from our previous results that the ship would clear the iceberg if the hard-starboard order came at the same moment as the lookout signal, even if no other order was given. So we considered two other possibilities:

A. The first possibility assumes that a hard-astarboard order is called 5 seconds after the 3-bell lookout signal, followed by a hard-aport order when the ship’s head swings 10° to port. B. The second possibility assumes that a hard-astarboard order is called 10 seconds after the 3-bell lookout signal, followed by a hard-aport order when the ship’s head swings 10° to port.

The results for both are shown in Figure 16 below. What we found out is that if a hard-aport order is issued when the ship’s head swung 10° to port, which takes 22 seconds from the initial hard-astarboard order, then the ship would appear to clear the berg in both situations (A and B), although just barely in the second situation (B). Of course, if a hard-aport order is not issued in either situation A or B, then the ship would strike the berg in her machinery spaces (as shown in conditions B and C of Figure 08, respectively), and the ship would likely have sunk with three or more compartments flooded as we previously considered. Although it is interesting to consider these “what if” alternatives with the information that we now have, along with the time available to study them, it still comes

23 This side-step maneuver was referred to as a “port-around” maneuver by Joseph Boxhall at the American inquiry. At the British inquiry he claimed that Murdoch told Captain Smith, “I hard-a- starboarded and reversed the engines, and I was going to hard-a-port round it but she was too close. I could not do any more.” The problem, once again, is the incompatibility of intending to “port-around” and reversing both of her reciprocating engines. However, nobody was willing to question him about that. 27 down to the actual events that took place that fateful night when a dark object was sighted directly ahead at twenty minutes to midnight. It is very easy looking back to suggest that William Murdoch should have acted immediately and ordered the ship to turn away as soon as the 3-bells were sounded, or to take other actions that we can now identify only in hindsight. We can only say this knowing what we know now, not having to face the actual conditions that confronted Murdoch that night; conditions where some dark mass, lit only by reflected starlight and outlined against a pure black sea, was sighted with very little time to assess as the situation quickly unfolded. The actions taken by Murdoch once he realized that there were few options available seems to be one where he hoped to minimize damage to the ship by trying to take a glancing blow in the area of the forepeak along the starboard side. This would have dissipated the energy of collision over a relatively wide area that is generally believed to be less vulnerable than other areas. Unfortunately, the ship’s first five compartments were opened to the sea, and neither Titanic, nor any other passenger- carrying vessel at the time, was designed to remain afloat with five compartments compromised. However, if Murdoch had turned 5 or even 10 seconds sooner than he did, the overall result may have been the ship foundering in a shorter interval of time, or worse yet, capsizing before many of the boats could be loaded and launched.

Fig. 16 – Sidestep maneuvers that may have cleared the iceberg.