Assessment of the Terrorist Threat to Denmark March 2021 Page 2 DANISH SECURITY and INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the Terrorist Threat to Denmark Page 3

Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark March 2021 Page 2 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 3

PREFACE

The assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark is the overall assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad by the Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA)1. It is based on a number of underlying CTA analyses, rang- ing from assessments of the threat against specific individuals, locations and events to broader trend analyses and assessments of phenomena with an impact on the terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad.

Compared with previous assessments of the terrorist threat to Denmark, CTA has decided to adjust the term of the lowest level on the scale from “none” to “minimal” so the term corresponds with the definition of the threat level. Addi- tionally, the aim is to be able to reflect a threat potential in areas where there is no identified capability or intent. Due to this precision, the threat levels for Greenland and the Faroe Islands are assessed as “minimal” rather than “limited” without this reflecting a change in the nature of the threat.

The preparation of the 2021 assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark has been overshadowed by an ongoing pandemic, which affects many parts of society. The pandemic and its derived consequences also affect the assessment of the current threat picture, which remains uncertain in terms of the pandemic’s impact on future trends.

The assessment describes the terrorist threat from militant Islamism, right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and other threats which may be characterized as terrorism. Section 6 focuses on the terrorist threat to Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

The assessment is based on intelligence processed before 15 March 2021.

Sincerely, Michael Hamann Head of CTA

Photo: Astrid Maria Rasmussen, Ritzau Scanpix

1. CTA is a fusion centre comprising staff from five Danish authorities (the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, the Danish Defence Intelli- gence Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Emergency Management Agency and the National Centre of Investigation). 3 PREFACE 6 SELECTED TERMS AND SCALES USED IN THE ASSESSMENT 1 8 GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK 8 Militant Islamists 10 Right-wing extremists 10 Left-wing extremists 10 Other factors 11 Impact of covid-19 on the terrorist threat to Denmark 2 14 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM MILITANT ISLAMISTS 15 Impact of perceived insults on the terrorist threat 17 Trends in the global militant Islamist threat picture 20 Militant Islamist terrorist targets and modus operandi in Denmark 22 Focus areas concerning the threat from militant Islamism Content 28 The terrorist threat from militant Islamists to Danes and Danish interests abroad 3 31 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS 31 Trends in relation to the threat and narratives 36 Right-wing extremist terrorist targets and modus operandi in Denmark 4 38 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM LEFT-WING EXTREMISTS 5 40 OTHER THREATS THAT COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS TERRORISM 41 Conspiracy theories 42 Incels 42 Climate extremists 42 Sovereignty movements 43 People suffering from mental disorders 6 44 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO GREENLAND AND THE FAROE ISLANDS 44 Specifically on the terrorist threat to Greenland 44 Specifically on the terrorist threat to the Faroe Islands

45 Appendix: Modus operandi for terrorist attacks in Denmark Page 6 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

SELECTED TERMS AND SCALES USED IN THE ASSESSMENT

CTA uses the following degrees of probability (written in italics in the text):

Unlikely Less likely Possible Likely Highly likely <= 15% 15-40% 40-60% 60-85% >= 85%

Terrorist threat Definition level Very significant There is a specific threat.T here is capability, intent, planning and possibly initiation.

Significant There is a known threat. There is capability, intent and planning.

General There is a general threat. There is capability and/or intent and possibly planning.

Limited There is a potential threat. There is limited capability and/or intent.

Minimal There are no indications of any threat. There is no known capability or intent.

Term Definition

Terrorism CTA defines terrorism pursuant to Section 114 of the Danish Criminal Code.

North America, Australia, New Zealand and Europe, not including Russia, Belarus, Turkey, Moldo- The West va and the Caucasus. A private person who has travelled to a conflict zone to support one of the parties in the conflict Traveller without necessarily engaging in combat. Intent The will to employ a certain capability against a certain target or target group.

Agreement between a person’s accessible means and their ability (training, skills, logistics etc.) to Capability use these in a terrorist attack. Extremism The will to use violence or commit other illegal acts in order to change existing social conditions.

A dynamic process in which a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political, Radicalization religious or ideological ends. A person who commits a solo terrorist attack, while planning, training etc. may involve other Lone actor people. The perpetrator is inspired by militant Islamism or political extremism and plans the attack on Inspired attack their own. The perpetrator is in direct contact with one or more people who provide guidance or in other Supported attack ways support the attack plans. An attack is sanctioned by and/or planned under a mandate from the senior leadership of a ter- Directed attack rorist group. Photo: Amager Torv, Strøget i Københvan, Rune Johansen, Scanpix Page 8 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 9

1. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK

CTA assesses that the terrorist threat to Denmark re- the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo reprinted mains significant. According to PET’s definitions, this the Muhammad cartoons on September 2, 2020. means that there is a known threat. There is capability, intent and planning2. The most likely militant Islamist terrorist attack in Den- mark is an attack carried out with easily accessible PET regularly launches operations to uncover and pre- means, firearms or improvised explosive devices by a vent potential terrorist threats to targets in Denmark. small group or a lone actor inspired by militant Islamist Since 2019, PET has made arrests in five separate ter- propaganda. CTA assesses that the threat comes from ror-related cases in collaboration with the relevant po- individuals within Danish militant Islamist environ- lice districts. Most recently, PET in co-operation with ments and from other radicalized individuals in Den- relevant police districts arrested 13 people in Denmark mark and abroad. International virtual communities on February 6 and 8, 2021, and another person was ar- in which propaganda is disseminated and extremist rested by German police. The individuals in question views are exchanged across national borders often play are suspected of planning a terrorist attack in Denmark a role in the radicalization process. or another country using firearms and improvised explosive devices. The most likely targets of a militant Islamist terrorist attack in Denmark are symbolic targets or unprotected Terrorist attacks may occur with no prior intelligence civilian targets, such as associated with perceived in- indications, even when the perpetrators have previous- sults to Islam. Other potential symbolic targets include ly been known to sympathize with militant Islamism Jewish targets as well as the police and the armed forc- or political extremism. A source of particular concern es – particularly in connection with guarding duties. in this regard are people who go through a relatively Finally, other public officials and certain members of short radicalization process as well people who are ex- political parties may be potential targets. cluded or rejected from extremist environments, for example due to unusually extreme views or behaviour. The leaderships of the militant Islamist groups IS and Photo: Københavns Byret, AQ have been weakened, and the groups’ capability to Ida Guldbæk, Ritzau Scanpix 1.1 Militant Islamists carry out complex, directed attacks in the West is still Militant Islamists remain the primary terrorist threat reduced. However, their intent remains the same, and to Denmark, and CTA assesses this threat to be at the both IS and AQ call on their supporters to carry out at- level of significant. According to PET’s definitions, this ist attack in Denmark or another country using firearms an Peninsula (AQAP) has called for attacks on named tacks against targets in the West. means that there is a known threat. There is capability, and improvised explosive devices. Both cases showed Danish “offenders”. An added focus on cases of insults intent and planning indications that the suspects had been inspired by mil- in general may increase the terrorist threat to Denmark Currently, nearly half of the 160 adults who have left itant Islamist propaganda. and Danish interests abroad. Possible reactions may Denmark for the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq have either There are people in Denmark and abroad with militant occur in the short term, but can also appear at a much returned to Denmark or taken up residence in another Islamist sympathies who pose a terrorist threat to Den- In 2020, incidents in Denmark and abroad which were later stage. country in or outside Europe, while roughly one third mark. CTA assesses that the threat emanates from peo- perceived as insults to Islam showed that cases of in- are presumed to have died in the conflict zone.T he re- ple sympathizing with and inspired by foreign militant sults still have considerable potential as a motivating There were no militant Islamist attacks in Denmark in maining 32 travellers are presumably still in the conflict Islamist terrorist groups, particularly Islamic State (IS) factor for militant Islamists. Reactions to cases of in- 2020, but 12 militant Islamist attacks were committed zone in Syria/Iraq or in neighbouring countries. and al-Qaida (AQ). This is for instance illustrated by the sults abroad, particularly in France, have added to the in other countries in the West, while eight attacks were arrest on April 30, 2020 of a Danish citizen suspected of increased focus on past and current cases of insults in foiled. The number of terrorist attacks in the West was CTA assesses that the threat to Danish interests abroad planning a solo terrorist attack involving one or more Denmark. In the past year, both AQ and IS have men- significantly lower in 2020 than in the years 2015-2017, generally does not differ from the threat to interests firearms and the arrests onF ebruary 6, 2021 of two Syr- tioned Denmark in their publications, while propagan- although the number of attacks carried out in the West of other Western countries. Danes, like other Western- ian citizens in Denmark suspected of planning a terror- da from the AQ-affiliated group al-Qaida in the Arabi- has been on the rise, and particularly in France, since ers, are at risk of becoming random victims of attacks

2. The threat to Denmark may be kept at “significant” with no planning in progress, as Denmark has previously been the target of attacks, attempted attacks or attack planning. Page 10 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 11

directed at Western interests or if they are near local A left-wing extremist terrorist attack in terrorist targets, such as crowded places, churches and Denmark is most likely to be carried out particular official buildings. with easily accessible means by a small group of people who are members of 1.2 Right-wing extremists or in contact with a Danish left-wing CTA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from right- extremist group. wing extremists to be at the level of general. According to PET’s definitions, this means that there is a general The most likely targets of a left-wing threat. There is capability and/or intent and possibly extremist terrorist attack are right-wing planning. extremist activities and representatives of the authorities, mainly the police. A right-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark Other potential targets include indi- is most likely to be carried out with easily accessible viduals perceived to sympathize with means or firearms by a lone actor or a small group. CTA right-wing extremism and, to a lesser assesses that the right-wing extremist threat primarily degree, certain politicians and public emanates from individuals and small groups who typ- figures perceived as political oppo- ically meet, become radicalized and find inspiration nents, including artists and debaters. in virtual right-wing extremist communities and networks. 1.4 Other factors A number of other factors may affect The most likely targets of a right-wing extremist ter- the terrorist threat to Denmark. For rorist attack in Denmark are Muslim targets, immigrant example, certain conspiracy theories targets, Jewish targets, and people of non-Danish eth- and movements may contain violent nicity as well as locations where these groups are seen threat potential, which may evolve into to gather. Other potential targets include political op- actions that, subject to a legal assess- ponents, especially left-wing extremists and certain ment, may be characterized as terror- politicians with views opposing right-wing extremism. ism. Finally, some authorities and LGBTQ+ figures are also potential targets. In addition, threatening comments on social media and elsewhere may cause

In 2020, two successful and seven foiled right-wing ex- people who are mentally unstable or Photo: Unsplash.com tremist terrorist attacks were seen in the West. This is a easily influenced, to commit violence significant drop compared with 2019, where especially that could constitute acts of terrorism. the March 2019 attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, If a perpetrator suffers from a mental inspired other right-wing extremist attacks. Thus, the disorder, it may be difficult for the authorities to assess number of successful attacks in 2019 was 12, while whether violent actions committed by that person con- reactions, including violent protests, may for instance changed the intent and capability of militant Islamists seven attacks were foiled. stitute acts of terrorism. target politicians, public officials, random citizens or or political extremists to commit terrorist attacks in foreign diplomatic representations in Denmark. Denmark. However, it is likely that the covid-19 pan- 1.3 Left-wing extremists Finally, political, ethnic and religious conflicts abroad demic has contributed to strengthening existing an- CTA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from left- may spark reactions from individuals or groups in 1.5 Impact of covid-19 on the terrorist threat to ti-state narratives among right-wing extremists in Den- wing extremists to be at the level of limited. According Denmark with links to the affected groups, which may Denmark mark. CTA assesses that the increased anti-state focus to PET’s definitions this means that there is a potential develop into acts that could be characterized as terror- CTA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic is not an may impact on the target selection of Danish right- threat. There is limited capability and/or intent. ism. Such acts may involve state actors. The concrete essential driver of terrorism in Denmark and that the wing extremists. CTA further assesses that opposition pandemic, and the way it is handled, has not in itself to the restrictions or vaccination programmes may lead Page 12 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 13

to threats of violence, civil disobedience, arson, vandal- arson, vandalism and acts of violence which, subject to ism and acts of violence which, subject to a legal as- a legal assessment, could be characterized as terrorism. sessment, could be characterized as terrorism. The assessment of the threat posed by covid-19 scep- Virtual activities often play a role in a radicalization pro- tics and opponents of covid-19 restrictions is charac- cess, and it is possible that the lockdown imposed dur- terized by a large degree of uncertainty. The threat em- ing the covid-19 pandemic in some cases has increased anates to a large degree from individuals and groups the use of online propaganda. that do not have a well-known and long-standing his- tory of engaging in violent protests or other actions Restrictions on social activity in response to covid-19 aimed at politicians or authorities, and the available reduce the availability of unprotected targets such as data is therefore limited. large crowds in public places. As a result, perpetrators may adjust their attack plans and target selection. CTA assesses that the amount of threatening or hostile statements in virtual forums and at demonstrations CTA assesses that covid-19 conspiracy theories may ap- which draw major public attention may increase the peal to and radicalize individuals with no, or only insig- risk of inspiring some mentally unstable individuals to nificant, prior extremist views or contact with extremist carry out acts of violence which, subject to a legal as- environments. A number of conspiracy theories that sessment, could be characterized as terrorism. have emerged or been expanded in relation to covid- Militant Islamism 19 are included in an ecosystem of online conspiracy It is possible that, in the long term, terrorist groups theories that may further radicalize individuals who al- abroad may benefit from the pandemic and its con- ready resort to violence and in some cases legitimize sequent effects and that the general terrorist threat to is an Islamist ideology which legitimizes the or encourage acts of violence. This especially regards Western interests in the affected countries and regions conspiracy theories furthering distrust in the authori- therefore will increase. use of violence to achieve political, religious ties, spreading a simplistic black and white view of the world, referring to politicians and public officials as en- or ideological ends. emies and legitimizing acts of violence out of consideration for “the people”.

In general, the covid-19 restrictions and vaccination programmes have met resistance from loosely organized groups of covid-19 sceptics and opponents of covid-19 restrictions. This resistance has led to harsh, anti-state rhetoric on social media, including threats to certain politicians and representatives of the authorities and health service. Vaccine-related matters may also be used by extremists and conspiracy theorists for misinformation and propaganda purposes. In addition, acts of violence have been seen in connection with protests against the covid-19 restrictions, for example during protest marches in Aalborg and Copenhagen in the winter of 2020/2021. CTA further assesses that opposition to the restrictions or vaccination programmes may lead to threats to violence, civil disobedience, Page 14 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 15

2. THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM MILITANT ISLAMISTS

The most likely militant 2.1 Impact of perceived insults on the terrorist Photo: Liselotte Sabroe, Ritzau Scanpix Islamist terrorist attack in threat Denmark is an attack car- Cases of perceived insults to Islam (hereafter “cases of ried out with easily acces- insults”), sometimes relating to the debate on freedom sible means, firearms or im- of speech, have been a factor in the terrorist threat to provised explosive devices Denmark since the cartoon case in 2005. In 2020, inci- by a small group or a lone dents in Denmark and abroad which were perceived as actor inspired by militant insults to Islam showed that cases of insults still have Islamist propaganda. At- considerable potential as a motivating factor for mili- tacks with easily accessible tant Islamists. Response to cases of insults abroad, par- means can be carried out ticularly in France, have added to increased focus on spontaneously or follow- past and current cases of perceived insults in Denmark. ing a very short planning phase. CTA assesses that In 2020, the political party Stram Kurs continued dese- the threat comes from indi- crating the Quran during a number of demonstrations viduals within Danish mili- in Denmark and a few demonstrations abroad. The in- tant Islamist environments ternational media coverage of Stram Kurs and its lead- and from other radicalized er increased after the party burned a Quran in Malmö, individuals in Denmark and Sweden, on August 28, 2020. abroad. International virtual communities in which During a Stram Kurs demonstration near the residen- propaganda is disseminat- tial area Gellerupparken in Aarhus on June 5, 2020, a ed and extremist views are person broke through the police cordon and pulled a exchanged across national knife. There are indications that the person is mental- borders often play a role in ly unstable. In February 2021, the city court found the the radicalization process. perpetrator and a co-defendant guilty of attempted grievous bodily harm, sentencing one to imprisonment CTA assesses that the for one year and three months and the other to indefi- covid-19 pandemic is not nite placement and deportation from Denmark. an obvious motive for militant Islamists in Denmark, On September, 2020, the French satirical magazine who traditionally focus on Charlie Hebdo reprinted its own cartoon of a crying perceived insults to Islam, Muhammad from a 2006 magazine cover and all 12 perceived oppression of Danish Muhammad cartoons from 2005. The cartoons This chapter describes the trends within various key the impact of terrorist financing from Denmark and the Muslims and Western military intervention in Muslim were reprinted to mark the start of a trial in France that areas that CTA assesses will impact the terrorist threat terrorist threat that militant Islamists pose to Danes countries. It is possible that individuals in Denmark who same day against 14 suspected accomplices in the Jan- to Denmark from militant Islamists in the coming year. and Danish interests abroad. sympathize with militant Islamism have spent more uary 2015 terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo. Particular focus is given to the impact of perceived in- time on the internet since the outbreak of the covid-19 sults to Islam, the global threat picture, virtual commu- CTA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from mili- pandemic and the introduction of restrictions on social The reprinting prompted negative reactions in parts nities, militant Islamist environments, connections to tant Islamists to be at the level of significant. According activity. Thus, these individuals may also have been ex- of the Muslim world, and a number of militant Islamist criminal gangs, radicalized ex-prisoners, travellers to to PET’s definitions, this means that there is a known posed to more extremist and pro-violence militant Isla- propaganda media focused primarily on vengeance and returnees from conflict zones, the asylum and mi- threat. There is capability, intent and planning. mist propaganda and may have increased their partic- against France. In the weeks following the reprinting, gration area as well as people who may travel to Den- ipation in militant Islamist virtual online communities. Denmark or Danes were mentioned explicitly four times mark to commit acts of terrorism. Finally, CTA assesses in the official propaganda of militant Islamist groups. Page 16 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 17

The reprinting and especially the killing of the 2.2 Trends in the global militant Islamist threat spans several years. In 2020, AQ continued to encour- French school teacher also sparked a debate in picture3 age its sympathizers to carry out solo attacks in their Denmark on the limits of freedom of speech. The leaderships of the militant Islamist groups IS and home countries, including in the West. As in many other countries, the number of inci- AQ have been weakened, and their capability to carry dents during this period also caused deep con- out complex, directed attacks in the West has been Regional AQ sub-groups play a central role in the cern in Danish society. reduced in recent years. However, the intent of these group’s organization and global presence. The sub- groups remains the same, and both IS and AQ encour- groups are currently present in large parts of Africa, The extent of negative reactions to cases of in- age their supporters to carry out attacks against West- the Middle East and Asia. Their primary focus is on sults in the West varies from case to case. Some ern targets. This is especially emphasized by the efforts their own, local interests, but they often follow instruc- cases never receive any attention, while others of IS to build attack structures outside Syria/Iraq which tions from the senior leadership. CTA assesses that IS – as was the case in France in the autumn of can act locally and also strike against targets in the and AQ sympathizers may become inspired by the 2020 – lead to considerable negative attention, West. In 2020, both IS and AQ highlighted perceived in- groups’ propaganda to carry out attacks in Denmark or including planning and execution of militant Is- sults to Islam and the covid-19 pandemic in their prop- against Danish targets abroad. The quantity as well as lamist terrorist attacks. aganda. the quality of the official IS and AQ propaganda remain highly reduced compared with a few years ago, when CTA assesses that, since the cartoon case in Since March 2019, when IS lost control of its last terri- especially IS had a large-scale propaganda production. 2005, Denmark has had a reputation for of- tories in Syria/Iraq, the group has established itself as a However, a large amount of propaganda still exists on- fending Islam among militant Islamists. When local terrorist and rebel group in the two countries. It is line, including extremely violent IS propaganda, which Denmark or Danes are mentioned or singled likely that IS in Syria/Iraq is mainly focused on attacking may have an effect in terms of radicalization and target out in militant Islamist propaganda, Denmark’s local targets. selection and may offer specific guidance in connec- reputation as a “nation of offenders” may regain tion with attack planning. momentum. IS regards the West as its enemy and, along with IS-affiliated groups and sympathizers, the group still poses IS, AQ and their affiliated groups and sympathizers It is CTA’s overall assessment that considerable a terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests have mentioned covid-19 in their propaganda a num- militant Islamist attention to circumstances and abroad. It is likely that the overall strategy of IS remains ber of times. IS has, for instance, focused on how the Photo: Hizb-ut-Tahrir demo, Liselotte Sabroe, Ritzau Scanpix events in Denmark may affect the terrorist threat the same and that the long-term goal is still to create a pandemic is weakening the economies of Western to individuals in Denmark, Denmark in general so-called caliphate. In 2020, IS continued to encourage countries and making Western societies more vulner- and Danish interests abroad. CTA assesses that its sympathizers to carry out solo attacks in their home able to militant Islamist attacks. However, the focus Denmark was mainly used as historical reference to the the impact on the terrorist threat is highly dependent countries, including in the West. on covid-19 was most notable at the beginning of the punishment and sanctions that had previously been on the exposure of the individual cases in national and pandemic and has decreased with the global spread of imposed on countries perceived as offensive to Islam. international editorial media, social media and militant AQ believes that Islam is under attack from the West, the virus. Islamist propaganda as well as on the response to these militarily, financially, socially and culturally. AQ and In the months following the reprinting, militant Is- cases in militant Islamist environments in Denmark and AQ-affiliated groups pose a threat, although the Since September 2020, IS has started focusing on per- lamists in France carried out three separate terrorist abroad. Possible reactions may occur in the short term, group’s capability to direct complex attacks in the West ceived insults to Islam in its official propaganda. Sever- attacks against random people at Charlie Hebdo’s for- but can also appear at a much later stage. remains limited. A number of leading members of AQ al times during the autumn and winter of 2020, IS, AQ mer premises (September 25 in Paris), against a French died in 2020, and it is likely that these losses will delay, and their affiliated groups and sympathizers called for school teacher (October 16 in Paris) and against ran- Finally, CTA notes that militant Islamist terrorist attacks but not directly prevent, the group’s plans to carry out revenge on perceived insults to Islam and the boycott dom people in a church (October 29 in Nice). A total of motivated by cases of perceived insults to Islam may terrorist attacks against Western targets. of goods. four people were killed in the attacks, while two were also trigger violent counter-reactions from individuals seriously injured. It is highly likely that all three attacks and groups motivated by a right-wing extremist, an- It is likely that the main AQ threat to the West comes were motivated by the reprinting of the cartoons in the ti-Muslim agenda. from small AQ networks operating independently. The French satirical magazine. CTA notes that militant Isla- networks are typically connected with the AQ senior mists already focused on France before Charlie Hebdo leadership or regional sub-groups. The networks aim to reprinted the cartoons. attack symbolic targets, and the planning phase often

3. For further details, see the 2020 Intelligence Risk Assessment by the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. Page 18 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 19

Figure 1: Foiled and successful militant Islamist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 20204

100 Definitions of types of militant Islamist

90 It is CTA’s assessment that militant Islamist targets can be divided into symbolic targets and civilian targets. 80

70 60 Symbolic targets 50

40 Public authority targets: Authorities, including certain ministries, police, military, emergency response services, other public institutions as well 30 as representatives of such authorities. Public authority targets may also 20 include diplomatic representations. 10 Political representatives: Elected politicians, ministers and other people, 0 events and locations affiliated with political parties and movements. 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Targets related to perceived insults: Groups, individuals, locations and Foiled attacks events which have been selected on the basis of statements, actions or Successful attacks themes which the perpetrator perceives as offensive to Islam. Total Jewish targets: Synagogues, Jewish meeting places and institutions, such as schools, and other targets whose association with Judaism is identifi- Figure 2: People wounded or killed in militant Islamist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 able. Jewish targets also include Israeli interests in Denmark, including 800 diplomatic representations, companies and tourists. 700 Other religious targets: Christian symbolic targets, such as churches and 600 Christian schools, Muslim symbolic targets, such as Shia mosques, and other religions. 500

400

300 Civilian targets People who do not constitute symbolic targets. For example random 200 people gathered in public squares, at events or in other crowded places. 100

0 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

People killed People wounded

4. Data on the number of foiled and successful militant Islamist terrorist attacks in the West may vary depending on the method used for assessing the data and the available information. Page 20 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 21

2.3 Militant Islamist terrorist targets and mo- threat against symbolic targets is primarily aimed at Jewish people, events and locations continue to play cure weapons. In a Danish context, easily accessible dus operandi in Denmark individuals, institutions and events that may be seen an important role in militant Islamist propaganda, and means are mainly knives, bludgeons/assault weapons, as offensive toI slam. Other potential symbolic targets militant Islamists regard such targets as legitimate ter- incendiary devices or vehicles. 2.3.1 Targets include Jewish targets as well as the police and mili- rorist targets. The most recent militant Islamist attack Militant Islamist target selection does not follow a con- tary – particularly in connection with guarding duties. on a Jewish target in Europe was committed in January The arrests in Denmark on December 11, 2019, April 30, sistent and predictable pattern and may change during There may also be a threat to other public authorities 2016 in France. 2020 and February 6, 2021 underline the continued in- the course of the planning phase. Target selection may and certain political representatives5. Militant Islamists terest in carrying out attacks with firearms in Denmark. be influenced by militant Islamist propaganda, current still wish to attack transport infrastructure. 2.3.2 Modus operandi6 The suspects were allegedly all planning to carry out agendas, personal networks and preferences as well as CTA assesses that the most likely militant Islamist at- a terrorist attack on their own using one or more fire- the capability of the attack planner. Furthermore, suc- In general, other religious targets are rarely selected tack form in Denmark to be a terrorist attack with use arms, among other means. cessful terrorist attacks in the West may serve as inspi- as militant Islamist targets. However, IS propaganda of easily accessible means, firearms or improvised ex- ration for others – a so-called copycat effect. has called for attacks on religious targets a number of plosive devices. Attacks with easily accessible means The types of weapons most often used in militant Isla- times. In October 2020, a militant Islamist terrorist at- can be carried out spontaneously or following a very mist attacks in the West since 2014 are bludgeons/as- The most likely targets of a militant Islamist terrorist tack targeted visitors to a church in France. short planning phase, whereas attacks with firearms sault weapons and bladed weapons, which have been attack in Denmark are symbolic targets or unprotect- are mainly reserved for people with legal access to used in 50 per cent of the attacks and caused 11 per ed civilian targets, such as public crowded places. The weapons or criminal contacts who can help them pro- cent of all deaths in terrorist attacks since 2014.

Figure 3: Types of targets of successful militant Islamist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may have multiple targets) Figure 4: Weapons used in successful militan Islamist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may involve multiple weapon types)

40 40

35 35

30 30

25 25

20 20

15 15

10 10

5 5

0 0 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Targets related to perceived insults Improvised explosive devices or arson Other religious targets Firearms Jewish targets Vehicle Public authority targets Bludgeons/assault weapons Civilian targets Other easily accessible means

5. The target type “political representatives” was previously included under “public authority targets”. The category has now been listed as a 6. For further elaboration of the capability for terrorism in Denmark, see appendix. separate target type. This allows a more detailed description of the target and does not in itself indicate any changes to the threat. Page 22 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Terrorist attacks with improvised explosive devices quick and relatively easy way to disseminate militant are regularly emphasized in militant Islamist prop- Islamist messages and propaganda to a large interna- aganda. The most recent attack was carried out in tional audience. 2019 in Lyon, France. In December 2019 and Feb- ruary 2021 respectively, a number of people were 2.4.2 Militant Islamist environments in Denmark arrested by PET, in cooperation with relevant police Many militant Islamists move in and out of various en- districts, and charged with making preparations for vironments and group constellations, where extremist manufacturing one or more explosive devices to be material and propaganda is shared and where poten- used in an act of terrorism. tially radicalizing activities of a social and religious nature take place. Closed or semi-closed groups may Attacks using drones or chemical, biological and ra- serve particularly well as echo chambers for partici- diological agents are regularly mentioned in militant pants to build up and reaffirm one another in a mili- Islamist propaganda, and the risk of such attacks tant Islamist view of the world without being contra- is also occasionally mentioned in open media. It is dicted. Aside from religious matters, militant Islamists CTA’s assessment that attacks using such means are especially focus on Danish cases which they perceive less likely. as offensive.

2.4 Focus areas concerning the threat from The level of security awareness is quite high in Danish militant Islamism militant Islamist groups. Statements expressing ap- proval of acts of violence or terrorism or support for 2.4.1 Militant Islamist virtual communities and groups such as IS and AQ are usually made in more use of the internet closed groups or indirectly by means of inside refer- Militant Islamists in Denmark and abroad use var- ences. ious virtual communities for communication with like-minded people, dissemination of propaganda, The physical militant Islamist environments are main- radicalization, recruitment and exchange of infor- ly found in and around Copenhagen, Aarhus, Aalborg mation about weapons and the like, including bomb and on Funen. They are typically multi-ethnic Sunni en- and attack manuals, which may serve as mutual in- vironments consisting of small groups of men in their spiration and contribute to building capability. twenties, most of them with roots in Arabic-speaking countries. The level of security awareness is quite high in Dan- ish militant Islamist virtual communities. CTA is 2.4.3 Connections between militant Islamists and aware that militant Islamist propaganda produced organized criminal environments by IS and AQ is still being shared in Danish online CTA assesses that persons in Danish gang environments networks on social media. On the major social media are primarily motivated by money and personal status. platforms, this propaganda is often shared in a more However, there are several examples of links between subtle form, where logos and other features associ- militant Islamists and individuals from criminal environ- ated with the terrorist groups have been removed, ments. These links are in most cases the result of geo- allowing only those familiar with the groups’ sym- graphical and social overlap within the environments bols and figures of importance to know the source of that gang members and militant Islamist sympathizers the propaganda and to understand its true meaning. move in. There are also examples of people from militant Islamist environments carrying out Islamic missionary It is likely that, over the next year, militant Islamists activities (dawa) in criminal environments, just as imams in Denmark and abroad will continue, and increase, and prominent figures in Islamist circles have often been their use of virtual communities, as these offer a used to negotiate peace between rival gangs. Page 24 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 25

CTA assesses that there are individuals within Danish primarily, but not exclusively, from individuals located gang environments who sympathize with militant Is- Photo: Storstrøm Fængsel, in countries bordering Denmark. Asger Ladefogde, Ritzau Scanpix lamism, including individuals who have been to Syria/ Iraq. CTA assesses that individuals who are influenced However, the fact that a person travels to a conflict by militant Islamist propaganda and also linked to crim- zone to support a militant Islamist agenda does not inal environments prone to use violence and access to necessarily mean that this person poses a terrorist weapons may pose a terrorist threat to Denmark. In threat to Denmark or Danish interests abroad. The ter- addition, ongoing relations between people from the rorist threat is determined on the basis of a specific as- gang environments and militant Islamist environments sessment of the intent and capability of the individual may increase the capability of militant Islamists to carry to attack Danish targets. Relevant factors to consider out terrorist attacks in Denmark with firearms and ex- include the person’s continued sympathy for militant plosives. Islamism and affiliation with militant Islamist groups along with weapons training and combat experience. 2.4.4 Radicalized ex-prisoners According to CTA’s information, seven per cent of all CTA assesses that radicalized prison inmates may pose successful and foiled attacks in the West since 2014 a terrorist threat during their incarceration and upon have involved perpetrators who have been to Syria/ their release. This threat may come from people con- Iraq. victed or suspected of terror-related offences and from others prone to use violence who start or continue a CTA assesses that at least 160 people have travelled radicalization process while remanded in custody or from Denmark to Syria/Iraq to join militant Islamist serving a sentence. Prison radicalization also manifests groups since the summer of 2012. Currently, almost itself as the spread of extremist networks and the exer- half of them have returned to Denmark or taken up res- tion of ideological influence on others. idence in mainly other European countries.

CTA is aware of seven perpetrators who have commit- According to PET’s information, nearly one third of ted terrorist attacks in Europe since 2015 while on leave the total number of travellers have died in the conflict from prison or within the first six months of their re- zone. 32 adult travellers from Denmark remain in Syria/ lease. One of them was the Danish citizen Omar Abdel Iraq or in neighbouring countries. Slightly less than half Hamid El-Hussein, who committed a terrorist attack are women. Of the 32 adults who remain in the conflict in Copenhagen in February 2015 approximately three zone, 11 have only held Danish residence permits, and weeks after his release. Most recently, a twenty-year- CTA is aware of a few cases where individuals convicted been to the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq may pose a threat these have all been revoked. In addition, ten have had old male with asylum status committed a terrorist of militant Islamist terror-related offences have inter- to Denmark or Danish interests abroad. This applies to their Danish citizenship revoked by an administrative attack in Dresden, Germany, on October 4, 2020, less acted during their incarceration and have attempted both men and women and regardless of whether they order. The remaining 11 adults are Danish citizens. Ac- than two weeks after his release. This is one of three at- to influence other inmates. are still located in the conflict zone, have returned to cording to PET’s information, five of these 11 citizens tacks in 2020 that took place within two weeks of the Denmark or are located in another country in or out- are currently imprisoned or detained, mainly in camps perpetrator’s release. CTA assesses that radicalized inmates may pose a ter- side Europe. The potential threat is not limited to attack under Kurdish control in north-eastern Syria, while the rorist threat to prison staff. CTA has knowledge of three planning, but may also take the form of radicalization remaining six citizens are presumably not detained and CTA regularly receives reports about concern over radi- terrorist attacks motivated by militant Islamism that or propaganda activities, logistical support, terrorist fi- located in or near the conflict zone or in neighbouring calization and potential threats among inmates in Dan- have been committed against prison staff in otherE u- nancing and other terror-related activities. countries. ish prisons. CTA assesses that the threat from radicali- ropean countries since 2014. zation among inmates in Danish prisons may increase Travellers from countries other than Denmark, includ- According to PET’s information, no one has succeeded if more travellers to Syria/Iraq return to Denmark and 2.4.5 The threat posed by travellers to and return- ing other European countries, may also pose a terrorist in travelling from Denmark to the conflict zone in Syria/ face prosecution. This applies to both male and female ees from the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad. The Iraq to join militant Islamist groups since 2016. Three travellers. CTA assesses that individuals from Denmark who have threat posed by travellers from other countries comes adult travellers have been ex-tradited to Denmark Page 26 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 27

Children of travellers Europe or from people who start or continue a radical- Photo: Unsplash.com Several of the travellers from Denmark have brought ization process after they arrive in Denmark. Howev- their children with them to the conflict zone, while er, CTA assesses that only a very small percentage of some have had their children during their stay in the those arriving in Europe and Denmark as refugees and conflict zone. According to PET’s information, approxi- migrants sympathize with militant Islamism and may mately 45 children whose parents were Danish citizens pose a terrorist threat. at the time of the child’s birth are located in or near the conflict zone. In addition, PET has information that ap- It is still possible that militant Islamist groups will try to proximately ten children of former Danish residents are exploit refugee and migrant routes to commit terrorist also located in the conflict zone. Of the approximately attacks in Europe, including Denmark. CTA is not aware 60 children of travellers from Denmark, at least 25 are of any terrorist attacks in Europe committed by individ- located in north-eastern Syria, mainly in the al-Roj and uals sent by a militant Islamist terrorist group through al-Hawl camps. According to PET’s information, the the flow of refugees within the last year. remaining children are located in north-western Syria and Turkey, among other places. CTA assesses that asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers and migrants may be particularly susceptible CTA assesses that it is unlikely that children of travel- to radicalization and influence from militant Islamist lers from Denmark to the conflict zone currently pose agendas. This is particularly younger persons travel- a terrorist threat. This is primarily due to the current ling alone. High susceptibility may be ascribed to such young age of the children. It is the general assessment factors as frustration over one’s situation, a sense of of CTA that older children who travel to Denmark from exclusion, the absence of family members and mental the conflict zone or from camps may pose a terrorist instability. threat due to indoctrination or other types of influence asserted in the conflict zone. Further to this, CTA Since November 2015, asylum seekers, rejected asylum also assesses that the risk of indoctrination and other seekers, accepted refugees and/or migrants have been types of influence increases the longer the children involved in several successful and foiled attacks in Eu- stay in a radicalized environment such as the camps in rope. Four of the successful attacks were committed since 2016, two of them in 2020. All three are currently In 2020, a growing number of women, especially from north-eastern Syria. within the past year, with the most recent example on imprisoned. CTA has no knowledge of other travellers European countries, managed to escape from camps in October 29, 2020 in France. The attack was committed having returned to Denmark since 2016. All of the 32 north-eastern Syria – some of them accompanied by The threat from travellers, including children of travel- by a 21-year-old Tunisian citizen, who had applied for adult travellers from Denmark who remain in the con- children. CTA assesses that there may also in the future lers, who come to Denmark, may be affected by how asylum in Italy less than a month before the attack. In flict zone have been there for over four years. be women, with or without children, who manage to they are received by the Danish authorities, including addition, CTA notes that the arrests made in Denmark escape from camps in north-eastern Syria, potentially whether they are offered any support for the purpose in February 2021 include individuals with an asylum CTA assesses that only a few of those who have left also women with links to Denmark. of potential de-radicalization and reintegration. background. Denmark for Syria/Iraq and remain in the conflict zone will be able to return to Denmark in the short term There have been several reports of prison riots in the 2.4.6 The threat from asylum seekers, refugees, CTA assesses that foreigners with militant Islamist sym- without assistance from Danish or foreign authorities. overcrowded Kurdish-controlled prisons in north-east- migrants and people on exceptional leave to pathies on exceptional leave to remain in Denmark The majority of the adult travellers from Denmark who ern Syria, where around 2,000 male travellers with af- remain may pose a terrorist threat. It is likely that some terror remain in the conflict zone will face prosecution if they filiation toIS are being detained, and the past year has CTA assesses that asylum seekers, rejected asylum convicts on exceptional leave to remain will estab- return to Denmark. seen examples of IS-affiliated inmates who have man- seekers, accepted refugees and migrants who live or lish new networks or strengthen existing networks of aged to escape. It is likely that there will also be men arrive in Denmark may pose a terrorist threat if they like-minded people with militant Islamist sympathies. CTA assesses that the conditions in the camps and who manage to escape from prisons in north-eastern have been radicalized. This threat may come from prisons in north-eastern Syria may add to the radical- Syria during the next year. However, CTA assesses that people who have entered the country with the flow of ization of the detainees, including detained travellers it will remain more difficult to escape from prisons than refugees with the intent to commit acts of terrorism in from Denmark. from camps. Page 28 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 29

2.4.7 Militant Islamists based in other countries in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pal- The terrorist threat is aimed at protected targets such tionally, in which case the threat to Danes and Danish Denmark also faces a terrorist threat from radicalized estine. as diplomatic representations as well as unprotected interests abroad may increase. In the autumn of 2020, individuals and small groups based in other countries, targets such as companies, NGOs and tourists. Danes, the Quran burnings carried out by the Danish political mainly those neighbouring Denmark. Attacks planned CTA assesses that the intent of individuals in Denmark like other Westerners, are at risk of becoming random party Stram Kurs in Sweden and other countries at- by individuals in one country against targets in another to provide funds for militant Islamist groups has not di- victims to attacks directed at Western interests. In ad- tracted some international attention. The international country may be particularly difficult for the authorities minished. Furthermore, knowledge on how to acquire dition, Danes located abroad risk becoming victims of focus on perceived insults to Islam rose sharply when to uncover and prevent. money by way of financial crime and how to transfer an attack if they are in near vicinity of local terrorist tar- Charlie Hebdo reprinted its own and Danish Muham- money or other assets to terrorist groups remains wide- gets, including crowded places, churches and certain mad cartoons in September 2020. The majority of the CTA assesses that people with or without links to Den- spread among certain Islamist networks in Denmark. official buildings. attention was directed at France. mark who have travelled to the conflict zone in Syria/ The ramified nature of these networks will most likely Iraq and returned to countries other than Denmark increase the degree of terrorist financing in the future. CTA generally assesses that Danish diplomatic rep- The events in Sweden and particularly France also re- may pose a threat, as may radicalized ex-prisoners from resentations and other Danish presence abroad, in- sulted in some mention of Denmark in militant Islamist other countries. In the coming years, a large number In 2020, the Danish High Court sentenced in the so- cluding employees of Danish companies, may be per- propaganda. CTA assesses that the reference to Den- of terrorist convicts will be released in other European called drone case the three defendants to imprison- ceived as symbolic targets providing an opportunity mark in militant Islamist propaganda may cause local countries, and these will be able to travel to Denmark ment for eight years, four years and six months, and to target Denmark without carrying out an attack in militant Islamist groups to intensify their focus on Den- after their release. CTA assesses that the most impor- three years, respectively. In the case of one of the de- Denmark. Danish diplomatic representations may be- mark as a legitimate target, which in turn may increase tant factor for attack planning against targets in Den- fendants, the High Court found that purchasing and come targets of terrorist attacks if they are perceived as the threat to Danes and Danish interests in certain mark by persons based in other countries is the ex- facilitating thermal cameras to IS constituted accessory less secure than the representations of other Western countries and regions. posure of current and past Danish cases of perceived to terrorism. The case is not a typical terrorist financing countries. insults to Islam, and especially when such cases are case, but it illustrates the fact that not only money but CTA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic has had no given major attention in militant Islamist propaganda also procurement, facilitation and transfer of other as- CTA assesses that the general terrorist threat level is effect on the intent and capability of militant Islamists and in militant Islamist virtual communities. sets may be used by sympathizers to support terrorist most high in countries and regions where AQ and IS to commit terrorist attacks against Danish interests groups abroad. have branches and networks and are able to train and abroad. CTA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic most CTA has knowledge of five cases within the last ten plan attacks. This is especially the case in Syria, Iraq and likely has made it more difficult for militant Islamist years – most recently in 2016 – where individuals based 2.5 The terrorist threat from militant Islamists to Afghanistan, but also in West and East African coun- groups to attack Danes and Danish interests abroad. in the West have travelled to Denmark to prepare and Danes and Danish interests abroad tries, where militant Islamist groups have attacked the commit terrorist attacks. In four of these cases, the per- CTA generally assesses that it is still the intent of mili- local population and authorities frequently through- CTA assesses that, in the long term, some terrorist petrators intended to hit targets connected with the tant Islamist groups in a number of countries to attack out 2020. In 2020, there have also been indications that groups abroad may benefit from the pandemic and its Danish cartoon case, while the target of the so-called Westerners and Western targets in non-Western loca- support for militant Islamism in South and Southeast financial and social effects and that the general terrorist Matchstick case in 2016 remains unknown. These types tions. Asia continues to rise. CTA assesses that increased sup- threat to Western interests may therefore increase. The of cases are more frequent in Denmark than in other port to IS in South and Southeast Asia could extend the covid-19 pandemic may for example lead to a weaken- European countries, which, according to CTA’s assess- CTA has no knowledge of successful or attempted focus of local militant Islamist groups in the region to ing and destabilization of countries in the Middle East, ment, is mainly due to the cartoon case and the fact terrorist attacks against Danes or Danish interests in include attacks on Westerners and Western interests. Africa and Asia, which may then lead to a less priority to that Denmark is home to targets that have played a non-Western countries in 2020. CTA has knowledge of counter-terrorism efforts. central role in the case. at least four successful militant Islamist terrorist attacks CTA assesses that the threat of militant Islamist kid- on Western civilians or interests in non-Western coun- napping is most significant in conflict zones and their 2.4.8 Financing from Denmark to militant Islamist tries in 2020. neighbouring areas. CTA also assesses that Danes are terrorist groups abroad generally no more exposed to kidnapping than other Terrorist financing maintains terrorist groups and pro- Westerners and Western targets are generally well pro- Westerners7. mote their activities. Funding improves the ability of tected and therefore hard to reach in countries with a terrorist groups to carry out operations and to recruit high terrorist threat level. Also, the relatively low num- The cartoon case is not forgotten within militant Isla- and retain members. ber of attacks against Westerners in 2020 may be relat- mist environments, and Denmark’s reputation as a na- ed to the reduced global travel activity and thus West- tion of offenders can quickly become an issue interna- CTA assesses that funding from persons in Denmark to ern presence in non-Western countries as a result of the militant Islamist terrorist groups mainly goes to groups covid-19 pandemic. 7. Information on country-specific risks is provided via the travel advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark on www.um.dk. Page 30 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 31

3. THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS

CTA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from right- number of major right-wing extremist attacks in 2019, wing extremists to be at the level of general. According including an attack on two mosques in Christchurch, to PET’s definitions, this means that there is a general New Zealand, in March 2019. In 2020, CTA recorded threat. There is capability and/or intent and possibly a downward trend in the number of successful and planning foiled right-wing extremist attacks in the West compared to 2019. CTA recorded 12 successful and seven CTA assesses that the most likely right-wing extremist foiled right-wing extremist attacks in the West in 2019, terrorist attack to be carried out in Denmark is an attack while the equivalent figures for 2020 were two success- by a lone actor or a small group from within or outside ful and seven foiled attacks9. It is likely that the declin- the periphery of a right-wing extremist environment. In ing number of attacks in the West in 2020 is due to the addition, CTA assesses that a threat may emanate from added focus of the authorities on right-wing extrem- vulnerable individuals and others who may find identi- ism, but the general covid-19 lockdown may also have ty, inspiration and a sense of community in right-wing had a moderating effect on the physical right-wing extremist virtual environments. The organized, physical extremist activity level in 2020, including the planning groups and organizations are less likely to pose a direct and execution of attacks. CTA assesses that the 2019 threat of right-wing extremist terrorism in Denmark. attack in Christchurch became a catalyst for a number However, CTA notes that non-terrorist actions carried of subsequent copycat attacks that year. 2020 saw no out by Danish right-wing extremist groups may create right-wing extremist attacks which in any comparable Right-wing extremism a sense of insecurity. Over the past years, for example, way incited right-wing extremists to carry out similar, a number of anti-Semitic actions have been carried out inspired attacks. is a generic term covering various political views in Denmark, including a case of gross vandalism and desecration of Jewish graves and symbols committed The threat from right-wing extremists in the West is on the extreme right of the political spectrum by right-wing extremists in November 20198. posed by a broad spectrum of organizations, groups and individuals inspired by various political and ide- characterized by combinations of nationalist, CTA assesses that the covid-19 lockdown and the con- ological agendas, including conspiracy theories. The sequent isolation in some cases may have boosted the ideological platform for right-wing extremism may authoritarian, anarchist, anti-parliamentary, consumption of right-wing extremist online propagan- include Nazism, fascism or national conservatism, but da and possibly strengthened existing conspiracy the- various conspiracy theories are increasingly becoming racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic viewpoints. ories and anti-state narratives. CTA assesses that covid- the driving force among right-wing extremists in the The ideological foundation of right-wing ex- 19 in general has had no impact on the threat level in West. relation to right-wing extremists in Denmark. It is pos- tremism may derive from Nazism, fascism or sible that covid-19 will affect the right-wing extremist While militant Islamists are often inspired by interna- threat picture within the coming year. tional organizations such as AQ and IS, there are no national conservatism. Right-wing extremists physical right-wing extremist organizations which in 3.1 Trends in relation to the threat and narra- any similar way are capable of gathering and inspiring question or reject democracy and consider the tives internationally across national and cultural boundaries. use of violence a legitimate means to achieve 3.1.1 Trends in the global right-wing extremist CTA assesses that the primary threat from right-wing political goals. threat picture extremists is not posed by the established, physical or- Over the past years, a number of Western authorities ganizations, but rather by lone actors and small groups. have assessed that the threat from right-wing ex- According to CTA’s record of right-wing extremist tremists has increased. Contributing factors include a attacks in the West, 12 of the 14 successful attacks in

8. Two Danish right-wing extremists were convicted of this offence. 9. It should be noted that data on the number of foiled and successful right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in the West may vary depending on the method used for assessing the data and the available information. Page 32 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 33

2019 and 2020 were carried out by lone actors. None of population by means of urged massive immigration. 3.1.3 Right-wing extremists’ the attacks were directed by a terrorist group, and no The Great Replacement is both the title and the core use of virtual communities Photo: Patrick Hertzog, AFP, Ritzau Scanpix perpetrators were associated with physical right-wing message of the manifesto which the perpetrator of the and the internet extremist organizations or groups at the time of the attack in Christchurch published shortly before his at- Danish right-wing extremists attack. tack in 2019. CTA assesses that The Great Replacement and international right-wing is one of the most predominant narratives among extremist groups use various CTA assesses that, over the next year, the threat from right-wing extremists globally and that it is common virtual communities for com- right-wing extremists in the West will mainly be posed among both Danish right-wing radicals and right-wing munication with like-mind- by individuals and small groups whose primary venue extremists. ed persons, dissemination for gathering, engaging in radicalization and finding of propaganda, capability inspiration will be virtual communities and networks A narrative very similar to The Great Replacement is building, radicalization and with a right-wing extremist agenda. In Western coun- the “White Genocide” conspiracy theory, according to recruitment. Although major tries, there is an increasing trend towards international- which white populations in the West will diminish and commercial platforms such ization of right-wing extremist narratives, driven by the die out as a consequence of immigration, low birth as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube sharing and consumption of propaganda and facilitat- rates as well as violence and murder committed by im- and Reddit along with ded- ed by transatlantic and European virtual communities. migrants. However, this narrative distinguishes itself by icated right-wing extremist CTA assesses that this growing international exchange being mostly anti-Semitic claiming that a Jewish con- websites and forums are still of propaganda and extremist views may increase the spiracy lies behind and controls developments with used for such activities, the threat from right-wing extremism in Denmark. an aim of exterminating the white race. This narrative added focus on extremist finds its primary supporters among anti-Semitic right- content by providers and au- 3.1.2 Supranational narratives wing extremists and is explicitly promoted by, among thorities has made it increas- Among right-wing extremists, internationally and in others, the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) in Den- ingly difficult. Denmark, supranational narratives are commonly used mark. to support, maintain and sometimes constitute the As a result of this attention, many right-wing extremists extremists has gradually been extended to include entire underlying basis for their right-wing extremist ZOG, the abbreviation for “Zionist Occupied Govern- are shifting to platforms which they consider more se- a number of new platforms. It is highly likely that, es- ideology and world view. Some narratives are mainly ment”, is an anti-Semitic conspiracy theory like White cure, including imageboards such as 4chan and 8kun, pecially the young and technology savvy right-wing structured around right-wing extremist interpretations Genocide, claiming that Jews control Western govern- which are favoured by right-wing extremists for their extremists, will continue to look for and use such new of verifiable information, for example on immigration ments, for example through their alleged ownership limited moderation and high degree of anonymity. platforms and that this trend will continue, also among and Islam, while others are founded on highly ques- and total control of banks and the financial sector. Social media with limited moderation are also used, right-wing extremists in Denmark. tionable or non-verifiable information, thereby taking among them the Russian VK, the video service BitChute the form of a conspiracy theory. CTA assesses that right-wing extremist narratives may and the US Twitter clones GAB and Parler, Encrypted, 3.1.4 International contacts of Danish right-wing help to reinforce existing enemy perceptions and lead internet-based communication platforms have also extremists One of the most prevailing and essential right-wing to the creation of new ones and that they may there- gained popularity, including Telegram, which has be- CTA assesses that international contacts of Danish extremist narratives is the theory of “The Great Re- fore have a determining effect in terms of which targets come highly popular among right-wing extremists, right-wing extremists may create and maintain net- placement”. According to this narrative, the original are most at risk of becoming victim of right-wing ex- while gaming platforms such as the digital distribution works which may lead to added radicalization and mo- population of Europe is being replaced by immigrants tremist terrorism. In addition, the narratives may have and chat services Discord and Steam and the lives- bilize followers to engage in right-wing extremist activ- from non-Western countries, mainly due to perceived a both mobilizing and uniting effect within right-wing tream service Twitch are also used. ities. Such foreign contacts may influence and expand lenient asylum and immigration policies, higher birth extremist environments, also in Denmark. Furthermore, enemy perceptions and narratives and build capability rate of immigrants and low reproduction rate of the Eu- CTA assesses that right-wing extremist narratives re- It is likely that the use of virtual communities among among Danish right-wing extremists. ropean populations. There is also a conspiratorial vari- main widespread and currently reach a large audience right-wing extremists internationally and in Denmark ant of this narrative, according to which a political and through their distribution in virtual communities and will continue and increase, as they ensure a very quick CTA assesses that the covid-19 pandemic has reduced financial elite, comprising immigration-friendly politi- on social media. and low-cost sharing of right-wing extremist messag- cross-border meeting activities among right-wing ex- cal parties, the EU, the UN and major companies, are es and propaganda with a very large audience across tremists, but that the international contacts have been making intentional and targeted efforts to replace the borders. The use of virtual communities by right-wing maintained and strengthened virtually. Page 34 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 35

Figure 5: : Foiled and successful right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 Definitions of right-wing extremist target types 20 CTA assesses that right-wing extremist targets can be divided into symbolic tar- 18 gets and civilian targets. 16 14 Symbolic targets 12 Muslim targets: Mosques and other Muslim meeting places as well as events 10 on Muslim days of celebration and holidays, Muslim schools, clubs and shops 8 frequented by Muslims. 6 Immigrant targets: Asylum seekers, asylum centres, accepted refugees, immi- 4 grants and others who may be perceived as immigrants on account of ethnic and cultural markers such as skin colour or language. 2 Jewish targets: Synagogues, Jewish meeting places and institutions, including 0 schools, and other targets whose association with Judaism is identifiable as well 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 as events on Jewish days of celebration and holidays. Jewish targets also include

Foiled attacks individuals who are perceived as being Jewish as well as Israeli interests in Den- Successful attacks mark, including diplomatic representations, companies and tourists. Total Racist targets: Individuals identified as terrorist targets on the basis of ethnic markers such as skin colour. Figure 6: People wounded or killed in right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 Authority targets: Authorities, including certain ministries, police, military, 90 emergency response services, other public institutions as well as representatives 80 of such authorities. Authority targets may also include diplomatic representations. 70 Political representatives: Elected politicians, ministers and other individuals, 60 events and locations affiliated with certain political parties and movements. 50 Other perceived political opponents: Individuals, events and locations which are 40 perceived as or represent political opponents and which are not authority targets or political representatives. 30 LGBTQ+ targets: People who, for example, are openly homosexual, queer, bi- 20 sexual or transgender or who may be perceived as such. 10

0 Civilian targets 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 People who do not constitute symbolic targets. For example random people gathered in public squares, at events or in other crowded places. People killed People wounded Page 36 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 37

3.2 Right-wing extremist terrorist targets and CTA assesses that the use of anti-state rhetoric has CTA assesses that conspiratorial ideas are gaining foot- 3.2.2 Modus operandi10 modus operandi in Denmark become more widespread among right-wing extrem- hold in right-wing extremist environments in Denmark. A right-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark is ists in 2020. It is likely that the covid-19 pandemic has The conspiratorial narratives of right-wing extremists most likely to be carried out by means of bludgeons/ 3.2.1 Targets strengthened existing anti-state narratives among often include anti-Semitic messages, which may be assault weapons or small firearms, especially hunting The most likely targets of a right-wing extremist ter- right-wing extremists in Denmark, and it is possible that due to the fact that the leading and most active right- rifles, shotguns, pistols and homemade firearms. Other rorist attack in Denmark are Muslim targets, immigrant Danish right-wing extremists have been inspired by wing extremists in Denmark hold a National Socialist possible weapons include arson, improvised explo- targets, Jewish targets, persons of non-Danish ethnici- American or German right-wing extremists, who often ideology. CTA assesses that conspiratorial narratives sive devices and vehicles. CTA further assesses that ty and locations where these groups are seen to gather. display and share strong anti-state views. Also, CTA as- among Danish right-wing extremists may reinforce ex- right-wing extremists can build the capability to use Other possible targets include certain perceived politi- sesses that the increased anti-state focus may impact isting enemy perceptions. weapons, including firearms and explosives, by shar- cal opponents. Authorities and LGBTQ+ figures are also on the target selection of Danish right-wing extremists. ing knowledge in virtual communities and following among the potential targets. instructions available online, especially videos on You- Tube.

Figure 7: Types of targets of successful right-wing extremist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may have multiple targets) Figure 8. : Weapons used in successful right-wing attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack may involve multiple weapon types)

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0 0 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Immigrant targets Improvised explosive devices Muslim targets Firearms Political representatives Vehicle Other perceived political opponents Bludgeons/assault weapons Public authority targets Other easily accessible means Jewish targets LGBTQ+ targets Racist targets Civilian targets

10. For further elaboration of the capability for terrorism in Denmark, see appendix. Page 38 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 39

4. THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM LEFT-WING EXTREMISTS

CTA assesses the terrorist threat to Denmark from left- Arson is another possible weapon in connection with wing extremists to be at the level of limited. According demonstrations and actions. CTA assesses that it is less to PET’s definitions this means that there is a potential likely that Danish left-wing extremists will make use of threat. There is limited capability and/or intent. CTA improvised explosive devices and unlikely that they will assesses that Danish left-wing extremists are ready to use firearms11. commit acts of violence and have some, but limited capability to commit acts of terrorism. At the same time There are a number of virtual communities used by their intent to commit politically motivated violence, Danish left-wing extremists to communicate and share characterized as terrorism has declined and is currently information. By using these virtual communities, they very low. are able to relatively quickly mobilize supporters, for example to engage in left-wing extremist events, in- The primary aim of Danish left-wing extremists is to cluding individuals with an otherwise limited contact expose, counter and combat perceived racism and fas- to the left-wing extremist environments. cism, especially as expressed by right-wing radical and extremist groups. CTA assesses that the most likely tar- Danish left-wing extremist groups collaborate with gets of a left-wing extremist terrorist attack are right- like-minded international organizations and groups. It wing extremist activities and representatives of the au- is likely that collaboration with international left-wing thorities, mainly the police. However, CTA assesses that extremist organizations and groups may increase the the threat to the police highly depends on the given capability of Danish left-wing extremists, for example situation and that it primarily exists in relation to clash- in relation to gaining specific tactical know-how on es with left-wing extremists during actions, protests or the execution of violent acts. CTA further assesses that squatting. Other potential targets include individuals collaboration with international left-wing extremist perceived to sympathize with right-wing extremism environments with a significant readiness for violence and, to a lesser degree, certain politicians and public may increase the level of radicalization and readiness figures perceived as political opponents, including art- for violence among Danish left-wing extremists. Fur- ists and debaters. thermore, such collaboration may lead to contact with foreign left-wing extremists who are prone to violence CTA assesses that right-wing extremist attacks in Den- and who may become mobilized to engage in left- mark may inspire a violent backlash from Danish left- wing extremist events in Denmark, which may increase wing extremists. the terrorist threat.

The most likely left-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark is an attack carried out by a small group of members or associates of a Danish left-wing extremist group.

A left-wing extremist terrorist attack in Denmark is most likely to be carried out by means of bludgeons/ assault weapons, incendiary devices, such as Molotov cocktails, or fireworks, including powerful bangers, chrysanthemum bombs, mortar tubes and rockets.

Photo: Unsplash.com

11. For further elaboration of the capability for terrorism in Denmark, see appendix. Page 40 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 41

5. OTHER THREATS THAT COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS TERRORISM

This chapter deals with current trends in areas that fall Furthermore, political, ethnic and religious conflicts 5.1 Conspiracy theories cy theory, but often a whole group of overlapping or outside the scope of militant Islamism and political abroad may spark reactions from individuals or groups Conspiracy theories are attempts to explain events and sometimes outright contradicting conspiracy theo- extremism and which, in CTA’s assessment, may affect in Denmark affiliated with the various affected groups, circumstances using unfounded claims of underlying ries, alternative thoughts and ideologies. the terrorist threat to Denmark. The chapter addresses which may develop into acts that could be character- secret conspiracies between powerful actors. Those certain conspiracy theories, incels, climate extremism, ized as terrorism. Such acts may involve state actors. who believe in conspiracy theories will often dispute Conspiracy theorists are generally characterized by sovereignty movements and mental illness, which in The reactions, including violent protests, may target this term as it has a derogatory tone to it. distrust in politicians, media and science along with different ways may inspire acts which, subject to a legal politicians, public officials, random citizens or foreign a fear of losing fundamental rights of freedom. Some assessment, could be characterized as terrorism. diplomatic representations in Denmark. CTA assesses that a further spread of certain conspira- conspiracy theories, including QAnon12, have a core cy theories could lead to threats against politicians and message that there is a corrupt and morally flawed po- public officials. litical elite that must be fought, which, in CTA’s assessment, may strike a chord with individuals who pro- Conspiracy theories appeal to a rel- foundly distrust the state and who have or have had atively modest group in Denmark, disagreements with Danish authorities. In addition, partly due to the Danish populations’ several conspiracy theories have a clear anti-Semitic generally high degree of confidence and/or Islamophobic element. in the authorities. However, the covid- 19 pandemic has sharpened interest in In some European countries, including the UK and the conspiracy theories, in particular those Netherlands, 5G opponents inspired by 5G conspiracy based on the pandemic, such as the au- theories have seriously vandalized 5G masts, or masts thorities’ handling of the pandemic and and plants considered to be 5G. The United States has their covid-19 guidelines, or the per- seen a number of cases where individuals inspired by ceived harmful effect of the 5G mobile QAnon have acted violently or planned violent ac- network. tions, for example against authorities, private companies and private individuals who have been impugned People known to the Danish author- in connection with the conspiracy theory. ities for engaging in activities within the Islamist environments, the political CTA assesses that further dissemination of certain con- extremist environments or the Danish spiracy theories that add to the perception that politi- sovereignty movements may also be cians and public officials are traitors and enemies, may conspiracy theorists. increase the number of threats and may sharpen the rhetoric of the threats. The majority of threats have Conspiracy theorists primarily meet vir- no implications of violence or other physical manifes- tually in internet forums, including on tations. However, CTA assesses that, in case of such Facebook, Instagram and other social physical manifestations, conspiracy theories may have media. Some influencers (i.e. individ- impacted the motivation and target selection. uals with many social media followers) take the lead in interpreting and CTA assesses that the potential impact of conspiracy spreading the messages. theories on the terrorist threat is primarily related to individuals affiliated with political extremist environ- The current trend indicates that people ments, particularly within the extreme right. Photo: Anthon Unger, Ritzau Scanpix are interested in not just one conspira-

12. QAnon is a conspiracy theory with the core narrative that the former US President Donald Trump is secretly fighting against an international conspiracy, which includes prominent politicians and is controlled by a Jewish elite. Page 42 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 43

CTA assesses that, if conspiracy theories are further em- within the sphere of climate extremism, including the 5.5 People suffering from mental disorders CTA’s knowledge indicates that perpetrators with a bedded in extremist environments, this development so-called eco fascists. It is also possible that there are If a perpetrator suffers from a mental disorder, it may psychiatric diagnosis or symptoms of a non-diagnosed may cause additional radicalization of people within individuals sympathetic with left-wing extremism who be difficult for the authorities to assess whether vio- mental disorder are more likely to commit terrorist at- these environments. This especially regards conspiracy will act violently for example when participating in cli- lent actions committed by that person constitute acts tacks on their own, rather than in a group. theories promoting distrust in the authorities, spread- mate demonstrations. of terrorism. In some situations, it may be necessary ing a simplistic black and white view of the world, re- to give special attention to individuals suffering from Social media are increasingly used for making threaten- ferring to politicians and public officials as enemies CTA assesses that there are currently no climate extrem- mental disorders who show signs of radicalization and ing comments, for example against public figures, and and legitimizing acts of violence out of consideration ist groups in Denmark that are willing to use violence in who have previously displayed violent or impulsive be- for disseminating rumours and fake news. While the for “the people”. Such acts of violence may for example their fight to protect the climate and the environment. haviour. A mental disorder is not necessarily decisive in vast majority of these comments do not lead to actual take the form of assault which, subject to a legal assess- respect of a person’s ability and intent to commit acts attack planning, CTA assesses that such commentary ment, could be characterized as terrorism. It is less likely that individuals who are actively engaged of terrorism, but only one of several factors to consid- may lead people who are mentally unstable or easily in climate activist groups and who are dissatisfied with er when assessing the terrorist threat which may be influenced to commit acts of ideologically motivated 5.2 Incels the non-violent activist line will choose to break away posed by the person in question. It should be noted violence that could be characterized as terrorism. The word incel is short for “involuntary celibate”. The from the groups to engage in climate extremism. that mental disorders typically appear in conjunction term covers individuals, predominantly men, who are with other risk factors, including social isolation, mar- frustrated with their inability to engage in romantic or 5.4 Sovereignty movements ginalization, unemployment and life-altering events. sexual relations with women. They join up with people Sovereignty movements are movements formed by in- CTA assesses that a person’s mental state, including who feel the same way in subcultures online, using a dividuals and loosely affiliated groups of varying sizes, any mental disorders, may be of great importance to variety of virtual platforms, including 4chan and 8kun, sharing the common fundamental ideology that they their behaviour and motivation for acting, also in con- as well as a number of dedicated websites and social do not recognize the legitimacy and authority of the nection with terrorism. media subgroups. Some radicalized incels use the plat- state. Sovereignty movement supporters also share forms to express a strong hatred towards women and the conviction that, by declaring sovereignty, individ- men who are thought to have success with women. uals can resign from the existing society, setting them- selves free from the obligation to abide by its laws and Many incels are engaged in international virtual com- regulations. munities offering a high degree of user anonymity, which makes it extremely difficult to assess the total Because of their anti-state ideology, sovereignty move- number of radicalized users. ments pose a potential threat to the authorities, especially the police. The threat is particularly likely to ma- Misogyny in particular has been a motivating factor be- terialize if supporters of a sovereignty movement were hind several multicasualty attacks committed by incels to violently resist police arrest. in the United States and Canada from 2014 to 2020. CTA assesses that, it can be very difficult for authorities The ideology of sovereignty movements may for ex- to predict whom and where incels are going to attack, ample seem appealing to criminals or others who have as they have a wideranging target selection, including been in conflict with the authorities, especially the po- both women and men. lice. Such individuals may be more prone to violence and have easier access to weapons, which may increase 5.3 Climate extremists the threat, especially in connection with police con- Climate extremists are individuals or groups who are frontation. willing to use violence in the fight for one or multiple causes with environmental protection or global climate CTA assesses that, if sovereignty movement ideologies as a key element. Climate extremists are unlike climate become more rooted among people in Denmark, it activists, who only use non-violent means, including may increase the risk of sovereignty movements pos- civil disobedience. There are also right-wing extremists ing a terrorist threat. Page 44 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 45

6. THE TERRORIST THREAT TO GREENLAND AND THE FAROE ISLANDS Appendix: Modus operandi for terrorist attacks in Denmark

CTA has adjusted the term of the lowest level on the terrorist threat scale from “none” to The choice of modus operandi in a terrorist attack often carry out terrorist attacks in the West with the main ob- “minimal”. Against this adjustment, the terrorist threat to both Greenland and the Faroe Is- reflects the capability of the perpetrator. It may also af- jective of attacking large crowds. fect the number of casualties and the propaganda ef- lands is assessed to be “minimal” rather than “limited” without this reflecting changes in the fect of the attack. Below follows an assessment of the CTA assesses that there are individuals in Denmark with nature of the threat. overall capability of potential perpetrators in Denmark. the capability to carry out a terrorist attack using fire- Within the individual categories of potential perpetra- arms. However, acquisition of such weapons typically tors, there may be some difference in terms of capabil- requires legal access to weapons or criminal contacts ity, focus and preferences, which affects the choice of who can help facilitate the acquisition. vulnerable young peo- modus operandi13. ple may be particularly CTA assesses that there are individuals in Denmark with susceptible to radicali- CTA assesses that the choice of modus operandi is af- the capability to make small improvised explosive de- zation. fected by a number of factors, including the adopted vices and carry out attacks by means of these. Instruc- focus in propaganda and on virtual platforms, the abil- tions and manuals on how to make various explosives CTA assesses that the ities and access to resources of the individual perpetra- and improvised explosive devices, which could be used easier access to weap- tor, access to the intended target and inspiration from by people with no prior training, are available online. ons and explosives in other attacks. However, the effect of such improvised explosive de- Greenland, compared vices may vary considerably. to other parts of the The terrorist threat in the West is increasingly posed Danish Realm, might by people with no physical links to established groups. A number of barriers exist in relation to producing increase the chances of This regards both militant Islamists and right-wing ex- homemade explosives, including the general restric- carrying out an attack tremists. In Denmark, the capability of potential perpe- tions surrounding the sale of substances such as hy- with great damage. trators may for example be enhanced through the use drogen peroxide. However, despite national and in- of virtual networks where resource persons share international efforts, it remains fairly easy to procure 6.2. Specifically on structions and give advice on specific modus operandi. ingredients for making simple improvised explosive the terrorist threat to devices, for example by gathering gunpowder from the Faroe Islands The capability may also be enhanced through recruit- fireworks or pyrotechnics. The terrorist threat to ment or radicalization of key figures with legitimate ac- Photo: Faroe Islands, Unsplash.com the Faroe Islands is cess to facilities, resources or information. Such insid- There are some criminal environments in Denmark with minimal. According to ers may have various functions and access rights which contacts that enable procurement of factory-made ex- PET’s definitions this may enable them to aid in carrying out a terrorist at- plosives, especially dynamite. Increased availability of 6.1. Specifically on the terrorist threat to Greenland means that there are no indications of any threat. There tack or in other ways cause harm. such explosives may ease the production of impro- The terrorist threat to Greenland is minimal. According is no known capability or intent. vised explosive devices for potential terrorist use. to PET’s definitions this means that there are no indi- Attacks with easily accessible means, firearms and cations of any threat. There is no known capability or As in Greenland, militant Islamism is less widespread in IEDs CTA assesses that radicalized people who have received intent. the Faroe Islands than in Denmark. Terrorist attacks with easily accessible means can be weapons training in a conflict zone, such as Syria/Iraq, carried out spontaneously or following a very short or who have knowledge of weapons from the military, CTA assesses that militant Islamism is less widespread Militant Islamist or political extremist propaganda may planning phase. Attacks with easily accessible means shooting clubs, criminal environments or elsewhere in Greenland than in Denmark. influence individuals in the Faroe Islands or individuals may cause major harm, as particularly illustrated by will be able to carry out high-impact attacks. This in- travelling there to commit acts of violence. This may be vehicle attacks. Multiple knife attacks in France during cludes serial attacks, where individuals or groups carry However, militant Islamist or political extremist prop- triggered by political single issues such as animal wel- 2020 have also illustrated how such attacks can have out multiple consecutive attacks. aganda may also influence individuals in Greenland fare. Socially marginalized or vulnerable young people a high propaganda effect. Vehicles have been used to to commit acts of violence. Socially marginalized or may be particularly susceptible to radicalization.

13. Such specific circumstances are described in more detail under militantI slamism (chapter 2), right-wing extremism (chapter 3) and left-wing extremism (chapter 4). Page 46 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark Page 47

Figure 9: Weapons used in successful militan Islamist and right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in the West from 2014 to 2020 (one attack Attacks with biological agents CTA assesses that there are no individuals in Denmark may involve multiple weapon types) 60 CTA assesses that the capability to weaponize biologi- with the capability to commit acts of terrorism by cal agents, such as anthrax, is very limited in Denmark, means of nuclear agents. the reason being that handling of viruses and bacteria 50 requires very special conditions, including access to Attacks with cyber-related means14 laboratory facilities. CTA assesses that there is a limited capability in Den- mark to carry out a terrorist cyberattack that causes 40 CTA assesses that there are individuals in Denmark who physical harm to humans or serious disruption of criti- would be able to produce some toxins of a quality and cal national infrastructure or similar targets15. quantity suitable for use in a simple biological attack. 30 However, the execution of an attack would also require Attacks by means of new technologies knowledge of efficient means of distribution or disper- CTA follows the technological development closely in sion of the agent. CTA has no information about attacks order to assess the effect of new technologies on the 20 with biological agents in the West in 2020. terrorist threat to Denmark. CTA assesses that, despite their potential, none of the new technologies, such as 10 Attacks with powder letters artificial intelligence, 3D printing and synthetic biol- There are only very few examples of terrorist attacks ogy16, are currently suited or sufficiently available to with powder letters in the West, and CTA is aware of no have any independent effect on the terrorist threat. 0 powder letter attacks in the West in 2020. 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Attacks with radiological and nuclear agents CTA assesses that the capability to carry out terrorist at- Improvised explosive devices or arson tacks using radiological agents is very low in Denmark. Firearms CTA is aware of no attack planning involving such Vehicle agents in the West. Bludgeons/assault weapons Other easily accessible means

Attacks with drones out chemical attacks using means other than unpro- There is capability in Denmark to use drones for recon- cessed substances is limited. naissance, for simple attacks and for intimidation purposes, while the capability to use drones for more com- Various propaganda publications have occasionally fo- plex attacks is limited. Militant groups have displayed cused on the use of chemical agents. Despite calls for considerable ability to use drones, for example to carry using corrosive liquids and chemical agents to poison out attacks in and around conflict zones in Syria/Iraq food, for example, such means have not yet been used and Ukraine, but this capability has yet to be seen in for terrorist attacks in the West, according to CTA’s in- the West. According to CTA’s assessment, the challeng- formation. es involved in using drones as an attack weapon in Denmark remain substantial compared to the potential Toxic industrial chemicals and actual warfare agents harmful effect of such a weapon. (primarily mustard gas) have been used by armed groups in conflict zones, but CTA assesses that the abil- Attacks with chemical agents ity to transfer this capability to individuals or groups in 14. In this context, the word “attack” refers to an activity aimed at causing a harmful effect. It does therefore not include any terrorist use of CTA assesses that the capability in Denmark to carry the West is very low. computers for the purpose of funding, propaganda or similar activities. 15. See the assessment entitled The Cyber Threat to Denmark by the Centre for Cyber Security (CFCS). 16. Synthetic biology concerns the engineering of new, man-made biological systems. POLITIETS EFTERRETNINGSTJENESTE CENTER FOR TERRORANALYSE Klausdalsbrovej 1 2860 Søborg 45 15 90 07 • [email protected] • www.pet.dk