ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK March 2021 Page 2 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK Page 3 PREFACE The assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark is the overall assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad by the Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA)1. It is based on a number of underlying CTA analyses, rang- ing from assessments of the threat against specific individuals, locations and events to broader trend analyses and assessments of phenomena with an im- pact on the terrorist threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad. Compared with previous assessments of the terrorist threat to Denmark, CTA has decided to adjust the term of the lowest level on the scale from “none” to “minimal” so the term corresponds with the definition of the threat level. Addi- tionally, the aim is to be able to reflect a threat potential in areas where there is no identified capability or intent. Due to this precision, the threat levels for Greenland and the Faroe Islands are assessed as “minimal” rather than “limited” without this reflecting a change in the nature of the threat. The preparation of the 2021 assessment of the terrorist threat to Denmark has been overshadowed by an ongoing pandemic, which affects many parts of so- ciety. The pandemic and its derived consequences also affect the assessment of the current threat picture, which remains uncertain in terms of the pandemic’s impact on future trends. The assessment describes the terrorist threat from militant Islamism, right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and other threats which may be characterized as terrorism. Section 6 focuses on the terrorist threat to Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The assessment is based on intelligence processed before 15 March 2021. Sincerely, Michael Hamann Head of CTA Photo: Astrid Maria Rasmussen, Ritzau Scanpix 1. CTA is a fusion centre comprising staff from five Danish authorities (the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, the Danish Defence Intelli- gence Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Emergency Management Agency and the National Centre of Investigation). 3 PREFACE 6 SELECTED TERMS AND SCALES USED IN THE ASSESSMENT 1 8 GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK 8 Militant Islamists 10 Right-wing extremists 10 Left-wing extremists 10 Other factors 11 Impact of covid-19 on the terrorist threat to Denmark 2 14 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM MILITANT ISLAMISTS 15 Impact of perceived insults on the terrorist threat 17 Trends in the global militant Islamist threat picture 20 Militant Islamist terrorist targets and modus operandi in Denmark 22 Focus areas concerning the threat from militant Islamism Content 28 The terrorist threat from militant Islamists to Danes and Danish interests abroad 3 31 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS 31 Trends in relation to the threat and narratives 36 Right-wing extremist terrorist targets and modus operandi in Denmark 4 38 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK FROM LEFT-WING EXTREMISTS 5 40 OTHER THREATS THAT COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS TERRORISM 41 Conspiracy theories 42 Incels 42 Climate extremists 42 Sovereignty movements 43 People suffering from mental disorders 6 44 THE TERRORIST THREAT TO GREENLAND AND THE FAROE ISLANDS 44 Specifically on the terrorist threat to Greenland 44 Specifically on the terrorist threat to the Faroe Islands 45 APPENDIX: MODUS operandi FOR terrorist attacks IN Denmark Page 6 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SELECTED TERMS AND SCALES USED IN THE ASSESSMENT CTA uses the following degrees of probability (written in italics in the text): Unlikely Less likely Possible Likely Highly likely <= 15% 15-40% 40-60% 60-85% >= 85% TERRORIST threat DEFINITION LEVEL Very significant There is a specific threat.T here is capability, intent, planning and possibly initiation. Significant There is a known threat. There is capability, intent and planning. General There is a general threat. There is capability and/or intent and possibly planning. Limited There is a potential threat. There is limited capability and/or intent. Minimal There are no indications of any threat. There is no known capability or intent. TERM DEFINITION Terrorism CTA defines terrorism pursuant to Section 114 of the Danish Criminal Code. North America, Australia, New Zealand and Europe, not including Russia, Belarus, Turkey, Moldo- The West va and the Caucasus. A private person who has travelled to a conflict zone to support one of the parties in the conflict Traveller without necessarily engaging in combat. Intent The will to employ a certain capability against a certain target or target group. Agreement between a person’s accessible means and their ability (training, skills, logistics etc.) to Capability use these in a terrorist attack. Extremism The will to use violence or commit other illegal acts in order to change existing social conditions. A dynamic process in which a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political, Radicalization religious or ideological ends. A person who commits a solo terrorist attack, while planning, training etc. may involve other Lone actor people. The perpetrator is inspired by militant Islamism or political extremism and plans the attack on Inspired attack their own. The perpetrator is in direct contact with one or more people who provide guidance or in other Supported attack ways support the attack plans. An attack is sanctioned by and/or planned under a mandate from the senior leadership of a ter- Directed attack rorist group. Photo: Amager Torv, Strøget i Københvan, Rune Johansen, Scanpix Page 8 DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK Page 9 1. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO DENMARK CTA assesses that the terrorist threat to Denmark re- the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo reprinted mains significant. According to PET’s definitions, this the Muhammad cartoons on September 2, 2020. means that there is a known threat. There is capability, intent and planning2. The most likely militant Islamist terrorist attack in Den- mark is an attack carried out with easily accessible PET regularly launches operations to uncover and pre- means, firearms or improvised explosive devices by a vent potential terrorist threats to targets in Denmark. small group or a lone actor inspired by militant Islamist Since 2019, PET has made arrests in five separate ter- propaganda. CTA assesses that the threat comes from ror-related cases in collaboration with the relevant po- individuals within Danish militant Islamist environ- lice districts. Most recently, PET in co-operation with ments and from other radicalized individuals in Den- relevant police districts arrested 13 people in Denmark mark and abroad. International virtual communities on February 6 and 8, 2021, and another person was ar- in which propaganda is disseminated and extremist rested by German police. The individuals in question views are exchanged across national borders often play are suspected of planning a terrorist attack in Denmark a role in the radicalization process. or another country using firearms and improvised ex- plosive devices. The most likely targets of a militant Islamist terrorist at- tack in Denmark are symbolic targets or unprotected Terrorist attacks may occur with no prior intelligence civilian targets, such as associated with perceived in- indications, even when the perpetrators have previous- sults to Islam. Other potential symbolic targets include ly been known to sympathize with militant Islamism Jewish targets as well as the police and the armed forc- or political extremism. A source of particular concern es – particularly in connection with guarding duties. in this regard are people who go through a relatively Finally, other public officials and certain members of short radicalization process as well people who are ex- political parties may be potential targets. cluded or rejected from extremist environments, for example due to unusually extreme views or behaviour. The leaderships of the militant Islamist groups IS and Photo: Københavns Byret, AQ have been weakened, and the groups’ capability to Ida Guldbæk, Ritzau Scanpix 1.1 Militant Islamists carry out complex, directed attacks in the West is still Militant Islamists remain the primary terrorist threat reduced. However, their intent remains the same, and to Denmark, and CTA assesses this threat to be at the both IS and AQ call on their supporters to carry out at- level of significant. According to PET’s definitions, this ist attack in Denmark or another country using firearms an Peninsula (AQAP) has called for attacks on named tacks against targets in the West. means that there is a known threat. There is capability, and improvised explosive devices. Both cases showed Danish “offenders”. An added focus on cases of insults intent and planning indications that the suspects had been inspired by mil- in general may increase the terrorist threat to Denmark Currently, nearly half of the 160 adults who have left itant Islamist propaganda. and Danish interests abroad. Possible reactions may Denmark for the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq have either There are people in Denmark and abroad with militant occur in the short term, but can also appear at a much returned to Denmark or taken up residence in another Islamist sympathies who pose a terrorist threat to Den- In 2020, incidents in Denmark and abroad which were later stage. country in or outside Europe, while roughly one third mark. CTA assesses that the threat emanates from peo- perceived as insults to Islam showed that cases of in- are presumed to have died in the conflict zone.T he re- ple sympathizing with and inspired by foreign militant sults still have considerable potential as a motivating There were no militant Islamist attacks in Denmark in maining 32 travellers are presumably still in the conflict Islamist terrorist groups, particularly Islamic State (IS) factor for militant Islamists.