ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service Annual Report 2006-2007 PAGE 2 forEWORD

Foreword

In its capacity as the national security authority, However, counter-terrorism efforts require the Danish Security and Intelligence Service ongoing adaptation and adjustments, and for (PET) must prevent, investigate and counter PET it is a dynamic process. This implies, on operations and activities that pose or may pose the one hand, that we must ensure that we a threat to the preservation of Denmark as a integrate and use the new capacities, resources free, democratic and safe country. and competencies efficiently and, on the other hand, that we must have an eye to the fact that In its work, PET addresses various forms of further reinforcement may prove necessary. threats against Denmark and Danish interests abroad, where the most serious threat at the The decisive point for PET is to have easy moment is that of terrorism. and swift access to the information that is necessary for us to identify specific treats According to PET’s ongoing assessments of the and to target our intelligence and investigative terrorist threat, Denmark faces at present the work. It is, however, equally important for us most serious threat picture in many years, and to have modern and up-to-date IT systems to terrorist attacks may take place without any ensure that we can process and analyse the warning. There are persons and groups in this information. country who are planning terrorist activities here or abroad. There is increased focus on Combating terrorism effectively depends on Denmark, also among leading militant extremists the ability of the Security and Intelligence abroad who wish to carry out terrorist activities Service to use the investigative techniques against Denmark or against Danish interests and methods that are necessary. However, it abroad. PET conducts operations and is equally important that we are able to protect investigations on an ongoing basis that are these techniques and methods in such a directed against specific threats, and spends manner that they can be used effectively many resources on identifying and preventing also in future. these threats. The experience gained in relation to the new Effective counter-terrorism efforts are based threats since the terrorist attacks on 11 on comprehensive prevention of radicalisation, September 2001 is that we as a security and robust measures to counter specific terrorist intelligence service must be prepared, to a activities, and effective investigation and much larger extent, to counter threats not only prosecution of terrorists. preventatively, but also to ensure that criminal investigation and prosecution measures are Therefore, it is necessary for the Security and carried through in relation to the perpetrators. Intelligence Service to possess the capacity, resources and competencies that are needed This presents us with the classic dilemma that in order to take effective action in these areas. we in some cases cannot take action until we have a firm and solid foundation for doing PET has experienced great changes since so. At the same time, we must be aware of the terrorist attacks against the USA on the security-related risks when dealing with 11 September 2001, and has been allocated people who are planning an act of terrorism. further resources and tools. It also means that we now, to an even higher

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degree than earlier, have to conduct our are challenges to which we must find sound investigations in a manner that makes it possible solutions. to subsequently initiate criminal proceedings and bring the criminal case to trial. Regarding efforts at both national and international level, we who work for PET also The terrorist threat is not a metropolitan have a clear interest in counter-terrorism problem or a big city phenomenon. It affects being on the one hand effective and on the the entire country. PET has therefore other hand based on a legally sound basis. We reinforced the local and regional presence of must at all times be conscious of maintaining the Security and Intelligence Service. We have this balance. And it is particularly important – done so through the establishment of two also for PET – that the powers we have been regional units covering the eastern and western assigned are subject to effective supervision, as part of Denmark, respectively, and by appointing these powers may often be rather intrusive in local PET agents. Together with the police relation to the individual citizen. The supervision reform and the establishment of new and larger is of importance to our work and especially to police districts, this will hopefully strengthen the confidence in PET which is required. the efforts to combat terrorism through even closer collaboration between PET and the Early prevention efforts are necessary in order police districts. to prevent young people from being attracted to extremism and violent environments. In order PET’s use of sources, informants and, in some to contribute to performing this task, PET has cases, civilian agents is altogether crucial if we established a Centre for Prevention which is are to be able to identify and counter specific responsible for the initiation and implementation terrorist threats. It is a focus area for us to of a number of specific projects that aim at become even better at performing this part of preventing radicalisation and terrorism, and PET’s activities. which through broad dialogue endeavours to involve all relevant actors in Danish society in Another focus area for PET is our wish to the prevention of radicalisation at the earliest strengthen and further develop international stage possible. Similarly, PET considers it an co-operation on combating terrorism. There important task to provide advice and guidance is a need for us to become even better at that contributes to the establishment of an working multilaterally and operationally across effective capability in Denmark for countering borders and with the incorporation of other law the threats facing Danish society. enforcement authorities. At the same time, it is necessary that we develop our collaboration Preventing security threats is not a task PET with a number of countries with which we can perform on its own. It is, therefore, an have not earlier had close co-operation, but important goal for PET to involve Danish society which are of special importance to the fight as such in the protection of the values on which against terrorism. This applies to, among others, our society is based. countries in North Africa and the Middle East. The involvement of citizens requires openness Developing this collaboration implies, naturally, and transparency on the part of PET in relation both practical and legal challenges, but they to the general public. We at PET strive to be

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as open as possible to the outside world, but in order for us as a security and intelligence service to function effectively, it is necessary to keep information secret in order to protect, among other things, current investigations, sources and partners.

As part of our efforts at showing maximum openness and transparency, the Security and Intelligence Service has publicised unclassified assessments of the terror threat against Denmark on an ongoing basis since May 2007. The objective of publicising the assessments is to give the population a greater insight into and understanding of the global threat picture and at the same time accommodate the population’s great interest in this area.

This annual report covers 2006 and 2007. To the extent it is relevant, matters from the beginning of 2008 have been included.

Let me conclude by wishing you pleasant­ ­reading.

Jakob Scharf Director General

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THE DANISH SECURITY AND ­INTELLIGENCE­ SERVICE / ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007 PAGE 6 TOarganisationalble of contents and administrative matters

1. Table of contents

Foreword 2

1. Organisational and administrative matters 8 Adjustment of PET’s organisation 9 Better local and regional coverage 11 Strengthened investigative capacity 11 New IT platform 11 Vision 2009 12 2. Legal matters 14 Legal Department 14 Access to files and records 14 Legislation and supervision 15 Supervision through the Minister of Justice 16 Parliamentary supervision 16 Judicial supervision 16 Records supervision 16 Supervision through Rigsrevisionen (The National Audit Office) 17 The PET Commission and the Committee regarding PET and FE 17 The Government’s Action Plan for the Fight against Terrorism 17 Anti-Terrorism Package III (2006) 18 A criminal offence to recruit and train for terrorism 18 PET’s collection and communication of information 18 Court orders in connection with telephone interception 18 Tele-observation 19 Interference in radio or telecommunications 19 TV surveillance 19 PET’s access to passenger information 20 Logging 20 Co-operation with immigration authorities 21 Expulsion in the interests of national security 21 3. International co-operation 24 Operational co-operation 24 Administrative co-operation 24 Exchange of information with foreign partners 25 4. PET’s operational efforts 28 5. Special Operations 32 Sources and informants 32 Agents 32 Witness protection 33 6. Counter-terrorism 36 General features and trends 36 Danish terrorism cases 39 The bookseller from Brønshøj 39 The Glostrup Case 40

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The Vollsmose Case 41

The Glasvej Case 43 Danish-based support to illegal activities abroad 43 Internet 44 Non-proliferation 45 Terrorist financing 47 Center for Terror Analysis (CTA) 48 Assessment of the Terror Threat against Denmark (VTD) 49 7. Counter-extremism 50 Left-wing extremism 50 Clearance of Ungdomshuset 50 Right-wing extremism 51 Confrontations between right- and left-wing extremists 53 Threats against public figures 54 Racism and xenophobia 54 8. Counter-espionage 56 9. Organised crime 58 10. Security 60 The Special Intervention Unit 60 The Surveillance Unit 61 The Technical Support Centre 62 The Personal Protection Unit 63 The Negotiation Group 65 The Physical Protection Group 65 11. Preventive security and civil protection 66 The Preventive Security Department 66 The Centre for Protective Security 66 Physical security 66 Critical national infrastructure 66 IT security 67 Personnel security 68 The Centre for Prevention 68 Radicalisation 69 Counter-Terrorism Conference 2007 70 Educational initiatives 71 Appendices 72 A. The Danish Criminal Code – special chapters 12 and 13 72 B. Act No. 378 of 6 July 1988 on the establishment of a committee regarding the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE) and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) 80 C. Statutory Provisions regarding the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) of 9 May 1996 81 D. The Wamberg Committee’s Mandate of 1964 84 E. The Government’s Declaration of 30 September 1968 85 F. The Danish Administration of Justice Act, Chapter 66 85

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Organisational and 1. administrative matters

Since 2001, PET has been allocated additional resources to strengthen anti-terrorism Staff by employment category 2007 efforts. In 2005, PET had approx. 480 staff. 8% A total of 140 of these were employed in relation to Anti-Terrorism Packages I and II 14% Police staff in 2002 and 2004, respectively. In 2006, approx. 150 positions were added to PET Administrative from the National Centre of Investigation staff (NEC) of the Danish National Police (Rigspolitiet). Furthermore, in connection Civilian employees 78% with the implementation of ­Anti-Terrorism Package III in 2007, PET was allocated approx. DKK 20 million that was earmarked for special purposes, including a strengthening of the Perso­nal Protection Unit, the Special activities in Region East and Region West, Intervention Unit, and the intelligence and respectively; and 1 per cent in operational investigation field. Today, PET has a staff of development activities. Staff working in the approx. 700 employees. last three areas (Special Operations, local and regional activities as well as operational development activities) carry out tasks in Staff 2005-2007 relation to the efforts against terrorism, espionage, extremism and the most serious 800 form of organised crime. 700 600 A total of 46 per cent of the Security and 500 Intelligence Service staff are linked to PET’s 400 Security Department with 6 per cent involved 300 in co-ordinating staff functions; 14 per cent in 200 personal protection; 9 per cent in the Special 100 Intervention Unit; 13 per cent in surveillance 0 tasks; and 4 per cent in technical support. 2005 2006 2007 Regarding the last three areas (the Special Intervention Unit, surveillance tasks and technical A total of 37 per cent of the Security and support), PET also provides assistance to the Intelligence Service staff are linked to PET’s police districts. In 2007, out of the total number Operational Department with 12 per cent of cases in these areas (770 cases), as many as involved in counter-terrorism, including non- 39 per cent were assistance cases of this kind. proliferation; 7 per cent in counter-espionage and counter-extremism; 5 per cent in the effort A total of 4 per cent of the Security and against the most serious form of organised Intelligence Service staff are linked to PET’s crime; 6 per cent in Special Operations (source Preventive Security Department, while 1 per handling, witness protection and agent activity); cent is linked to the Center for Terror Analysis 6 per cent in local and regional operational (CTA), which also includes staff from the Danish

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Defence Intelligence Service (FE), the Ministry process in 2007, PET consists of six departments of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, and the Danish today: the Administration Department, the Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). Legal Department, the Operational Department, the Security Department, the Preventive A total of 10 per cent of the Security and Security Department and the Center for Terror Intelligence Service staff are linked to Analysis. Together with the Director General of the Administration Department, which is PET, the six Directors make up the senior responsible for PET’s personnel administration management of PET, assisted by a Management and development, internal security, IT and Secretariat in charge of tasks regarding press communication, records and documentation contact, internal communication, as well as the as well as financial management and logistics. co-ordination of the Security and Intelligence Lastly, 1 per cent of the Security and Service’s international co-operation. Intelligence Service staff is linked to the Legal Department and 1 per cent to the Management The individual departments of PET consist of Secretariat. a number of centres, divided up into various sections. The overall organisational chart is Adjustment of PET’s organisation presen­ted at www.pet.dk. PET has adjusted its organisation on an ongoing basis in order to carry out the tasks and The present structure of PET, which dates assignments that are required of the Security back to 2007, reflects a wish to achieve the and Intelligence Service. After a restructuring necessary clarity in terms of distribution of

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The Danish Security and­ ­Intelligence Service

Director General Jakob Scharf

Management Secretariat Head of Secretariat Vibeke Dyssemark

Administration Department Director Vibeke H. Christensen

Legal Department Director Lykke S¿rensen

Operational Department Director Commander Frank Jensen

Security Department Director Chief Superintendent Hans Herluf Pedersen

Preventive Security Department Director Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen

Centre for Terror analysis Director Michael Lund Jeppesen

responsibility, and cohesion regarding the of the resources of the Security and performance of tasks. Intelligence Service.

The organisational change in 2007 implied, It should be noted in this connection that PET among other things, that the source handling, has not been granted any special appropriation witness protection and agent activity tasks from the annual Budget or allocations from of the Security and Intelligence Service were the internal financial management system of brought together in a cross-sectoral unit the National Police. Expenditure for PET is (Special Operations) within PET’s Operational defrayed from within the total police allocation, Department. Furthermore, within PET’s and operating expenses regarding PET are Administration Department, a Centre for estimated to total approx. DKK 400 million, of Finance and Logistics was set up in order to which approx. DKK 310 million is spent on staff ensure efficient management and application costs.

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The Danish Security and­ ­Intelligence Service In order to handle the ever-increasing volume of staff from the Analysis Section and the of information and to make it easier for staff Flying Squad. to gain rapid access to precise information, PET set up an IT and Knowledge Centre in 2007. The The experience of the transfer has been very Centre plays a key role in the implementation positive. The Special Intervention Unit, the of PET’s new IT platform. Surveillance Unit and the Technical Support Centre, as well as the Negotiation Group are Better local and regional coverage today a well-integrated part of PET’s Security With a view to strengthening PET’s local Department. The other staff that have been and regional coverage, the existing liaison transferred are part of PET’s Operational officer scheme in the police districts was Department, where a Centre for Organised restructured in autumn 2007. The restructuring Crime has been set up. The transfer has made implies, among other things, that PET now it possible, among other things, to provide has permanent staff employed in every police greater flexibility with regard to the application district. The employees concerned are attached of personnel, and also the development of to PET’s regional units in Odense (Region core competencies and technical tools in, for East, which covers the police districts east example, IT investigation has been further of Lillebælt) and Århus (Region West, which strengthened. covers the police districts west of Lillebælt), respectively. The regional units, including the In the area of counter-terrorism, PET’s regional staff in the police districts, are part operational efforts have resulted in the of PET’s Operational Department and perform implementation of an increasing number local and regional tasks concerning terrorism, of criminal investigations with a view to espionage, extremism as well as serious prosecution of persons involved in terrorism. organised crime in collaboration with relevant The development has necessitated the police districts. extension and strengthening of PET’s investigative capacity. Therefore, in 2007 an Strengthened investigative capacity actual investigation section was established On 1 August 2006, approx. 150 staff from the within PET’s Centre for Counter-Terrorism as National Centre of Investigation (NEC) of the part of the implementation of Anti-Terrorism National Police were transferred to PET. The Package III. objective was to strengthen the operational efforts in the area of counter-terrorism and New IT platform to ensure that the most serious organised Towards the end of 2006, a total of DKK 70 crime would be handled by a new and larger million was allocated towards the modernisation organisation. of PET’s IT systems, including digitalisation of records, IT support of procedures, the The transfer included the Special Intervention establishment of an overall information Unit, Special Operations (Witness Protection, database, and the development of a basis the Negotiation Group and Under Cover Agent for the use of new IT tools to correlate large Operations), the Surveillance Unit and the volumes of data and carry out cross-sectoral Technical Support Centre as well as a number searches in these.

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In 2007, PET worked at creating the preconditions Against the background of these for the implementation of a new IT platform. A recommendations, PET has formulated a set consultancy company has been selected, and of objectives, which is to ensure that the a contract concluded. Similarly, PET is in the Security and Intelligence Service, also in the process of drawing up a conversion strategy years ahead, will be able to maintain its position for the Security and Intelligence Service’s paper as one of the foremost intelligence services archive, records and databases. In addition, in Europe. bids have been invited regarding the scanning of significant parts of the paper archive, and The six overall aims and objectives are the an analysis has been carried out of whether following: and, if relevant, to which extent it would be advantageous for PET and the Danish Defence • PET must strengthen its capacity to collect Intelligence Service (FE) to use a joint technical and analyse information with a view to, at an platform in connection with the implementation early stage, identifying and drawing up an of new information databases. increasingly comprehensive picture of threats to the security of society. Concurrently with this work, PET has carried • PET must strengthen its capacity to counter out studies both domestically and abroad of and prevent concrete threats to the security IT solutions that might be considered relevant of society. for the Security and Intelligence Service, • PET must strengthen its capacity to provide carried through a market analysis, and finalised targeted guidance and activation of partners this work with performance specifications. and other stakeholders for the purpose of Expectations are that a supplier will be reinforcing overall resilience in society. appointed in the course of 2008. • PET must strengthen its capacity within resource and performance management and Vision 2009 ensure the execution of and follow-up on all In 2006, foreign experts conducted a major initiatives that have been launched. analysis of PET’s activities as part of the • PET must strengthen the correlation between Government’s Action Plan for the Fight against competencies and the performance of tasks Terrorism. The benchmarking review, which is in the short and long term with a view to accessible on www.pet.dk, concludes that PET’s further of the Security and Intelligence capability, effectiveness and reputation have Service. increased considerably since the terrorist­ • PET must develop and maintain an up-to- attacks on 11 September 2001, and that the date IT platform to strengthen and support Security and Intelligence Service must be the work processes and operational overview considered one of the foremost intelligence of the Security and Intelligence Service. services in Europe. The report indicates, however, that PET will face major challenges in its day-to-day work in the years ahead. Against this background, the report sets up 12 recommendations that are included in the unclassified summary of the survey, which the Ministry of Justice published on 17 May 2006.

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MISSION VISION

As the national security authority, the Danish At the end of 2009, the Danish Security and Intelligence Security and Intelligence Service must prevent, Service must be among the foremost intelligence investigate and counter operations and activities services in Europe and function as a source of that pose or may pose a threat to the preservation inspiration to other services. of Denmark as a free, democratic and safe society.

STRATEGIC ACTION AREAS

Tasks Preconditions

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Comprehensive Handling of Preventive Management Competence IT platform threat picture threats security and follow-up optimisation

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2. Legal matters

Legal Department Administration Act and the Access to Public The Legal Department is responsible for legal Administration Files Act, and in relation to issues regarding all parts of PET’s area of researchers’ access to the records of the activity. In this connection, it is the responsibility Security and Intelligence Service. of the Legal Department to implement smooth and effective procedures that ensure and Requests for access to files are subjected supervise legality regarding all parts of the to specific assessment. However, the point Security and Intelligence Service’s activity. The of departure is that no access is granted to Legal Department must, furthermore, ensure any personal data that PET might have. The that the legal processing of all the Security and reason is that PET is not comprised by the Intelligence Service’s cases is effective and Act on Processing of Personal Data and, thus, sound, and that the processing takes place at not by the rules of the Act regarding right of the necessary speed. access (own access). Nor are PET’s activities, as a rule, subject to access under the Public Ensuring and supervising legality comprises Administration Act for citizens wishing to in particular the Security and Intelligence inspect documents of cases in which they Service’s use of coercive measures in criminal are involved as these rules exclusively apply procedure, the Security and Intelligence to cases in which decision has been taken or Service’s national and international co-operation, will be taken by an authority, which is not the as well as the Security and Intelligence Service’s case in the majority of PET’s cases. Lastly, the registration, processing and exchange of Access to Public Administration Files Act does personal data. not apply to cases within the administration of criminal justice, which means that the bulk In order to ensure and supervise legality of PET’s activities are not subject to the rules on an ongoing basis in relation to the other regarding access to files laid down in the departments of the Security and Intelligence Access to Public Administration Files Act. Service, including the aspect of coercive measures in criminal procedure, Legal A few researchers have been granted special Department staff are, on a needs basis, access to the records of PET and the records attached to these departments and are of a number of other authorities. This has, involved in the planning and implementation for example, been the case in connection with of the Security and Intelligence Service’s the report “Danmark under den kolde krig” operations. It is, among other things, the (Denmark during the Cold War) compiled by the responsibility of the Legal Department to Danish Institute for International Studies and ensure that the Security and Intelligence Professor Bent Jensen’s research project “Den Service’s cases are investigated and processed kolde krig i Danmark 1945-1991” (The Cold War in a manner that ensures the collection of in Denmark 1945-1991). the necessary evidence to be used in any subsequent criminal proceedings. In connection with such access, the individual researcher signs a declaration of secrecy. Access to files and records Similarly, a number of terms are laid down for The Legal Department considers all issues the researcher’s specific access to records. in relation to file access under the Public According to the declaration of secrecy, the

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Supervision of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service

Supervision through the Minister of Justice Supervision through the Minister of Justice On behalf of the Government, the Minister of Justice supervises PET, and the Service is subject to the MinisterÕs directions. The Director General of PET is obliged to keep the Minister informed of general and specific matters that are of special importance to the Service.

Parliamentary supervision Records supervision ÒThe Supervisory CommitteeÓ consists of five Members of The so-called Wamberg Committee supervises PETÕs the Folketing who must be informed of the general guidelines records and the communication of personal data. The governing the activities of PET and must be kept informed of Committee must approve new files on Danes and foreign matters of security or foreign policy issues that are of nationals resident in Denmark, and supervise that deadlines importance to PETÕs work. The members of the Committee for deletion are kept. The communication of data to other are bound to secrecy. authorities must be approved by the Committee.

Judicial supervision Supervision through Rigsrevisionen In order to carry out a number of investigative measures PETÕs expenditures,Rigsrevisionens including salaries, kontrol etc., are subject to (e.g. telephone interception), the Security and Intelligence the general audit of police accounts. A minor part of the Service must, in line with the rest of the police, obtain a Security and Intelligence ServiceÕs accounts are subject court order, which also serves to keep the activities of the to special audit procedure carried out by a specially Service under supervision. authorised employee of the National Audit Office as well as an auditor of the Ministry of Justice.

researcher commits himself not to publicising comply with the duty of secrecy may be held classified information and documents unless criminally liable. the consent of the issuer of the document is obtained. Furthermore, the researcher commits Legislation and supervision himself to taking the necessary measures, PET’s work and methods are regulated by the including anonymisation, to protect the same rules laid down in the Administration information in consideration of national security, of Justice Act that apply to the rest of the the defence of the Realm, relations with foreign police. In particular areas, the Administration powers or third parties. Data about third of Justice Act contains, however, some special parties may, for example, be information about rules for investigation of the offences that individuals’ altogether private circumstances. are subject to Chapters 12 and 13 of the The declaration of secrecy is meant to prevent Criminal Code, and with which PET is concerned. any wrongful publication of sensitive Consequently, there is no particular legislation information that may compromise the Security for PET. However, on 9 May 1996, the Minister and Intelligence Service or very sensitive of Justice issued Statutory Provisions which personal data about individuals. The declaration set out in detail the tasks and responsibility of of secrecy states that persons who fail to the Security and Intelligence Service. A reprint

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Parliamentary supervision The Folketing (Danish Parliament) has set up a special committee under Act No. 378 of 6 July 1988 for the purpose of “overseeing the Danish Defence Intelligence Service and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service” (see Appendix B).

The committee consists of five Members of the Folketing (MFs) appointed by the five major parties in the Folketing. In accordance with the Act, the committee must be informed of the general guidelines governing the activities of PET and must be kept informed of important matters of a security policy nature. The MFs are bound by a duty of non-disclosure in respect of what they learn on the committee. of the Statutory Provisions is attached as Appendix C. Judicial supervision In order to carry out a number of investigative PET is subject to numerous types of external measures (e.g. telephone interception), it is supervision . In addition, the Security and necessary for PET, in line with the rest of the Intelligence Service endeavours, through police, to obtain a court order in accordance ongoing internal supervision, to ensure that with the rules of the Administration of Justice work methods and case processing are in full Act governing this area. compliance with the applicable rules. Records supervision The individual supervision measures are briefly The so-called Wamberg Committee supervises presented in the following. PET’s registration and communication of personal data. In this connection, the Committee Supervision through the Minister of Justice must approve new files on Danes and foreign On behalf of the Government, the Minister nationals resident in Denmark. The Committee of Justice supervises PET, and the Security members meet six to ten times a year at PET’s and Intelligence Service is subject to the offices to review cases and decide whether the Minister’s directions. As mentioned in the criteria for filing them have been met. above, the Minister of Justice has issued Furthermore, the Committee also takes random general guidelines for the activities of PET. samples of old files to establish whether the The guidelines stipulate, among other things, guidelines for records are complied with. If PET, that the Director General of PET is obliged to in connection with cases regarding security keep the Minister informed of both general clearance, wishes to communicate data on a and specific matters that are of considerable person to other authorities, the communication importance to the activities of the Security must be approved by the Wamberg Committee and Intelligence Service.

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(for more on the Wamberg Committee, see historical information. Finally, the Committee Appendix D). is to present proposals for a more general regulation of PET’s activities. Supervision through Rigsrevisionen (The National Audit Office) In 1999, a commission of inquiry, the PET PET’s expenditures, including salaries, etc., are Commission, was established for the purpose subject to the general audit of police accounts of examining a large number of aspects as undertaken by the National Audit Office regarding PET’s activities in the period in collaboration with the audit section of the 1945-1989, including the issue of the Security National Commissioner and the auditors of the and Intelligence Service’s activities in relation to Ministry of Justice. the political field. The inquiry will also comprise matters relating to the Blekingegade Case. A minor part of PET’s accounts, for example those regarding coverage of sources’ costs The work of the PET Commission is expected are, however, subject to a special audit to be completed in the course of 2008, which procedure involving a more thorough audit of means that the Wendler-Pedersen Committee the expenses. This audit is carried out by a that has awaited the findings of the PET specially authorised employee of the National Commission will be able to conclude its work. Audit Office, who is assisted by an auditor of the Ministry of Justice. The specially authorised The Government’s Action Plan for the employee reports to the Auditor General Fight against Terrorism regarding the audit carried out. Reports are After the terrorist attacks in London in only submitted to the members of the Public July 2005, the Government set up a cross- Accounts Committee in classified format if ministerial working group charged with exceptional circumstances make this necessary. undertaking a general review and assessment of Danish society’s efforts and preparedness The PET Commission and the Committee with regard to acts of terrorism. regarding PET and FE In 1998, the Ministry of Justice set up a The working group published its report on 3 committee regarding the Danish Security November 2005. The proposals presented by and Intelligence Service (PET) and the Danish the working group included: increased exchange Defence Intelligence Service (FE) – the Wendler- of information between PET and FE, further Pedersen Committee. The principal tasks of the access to obtaining personal data from other Committee is to present proposals for clearer authorities, access to flight passenger lists, rules regarding the two intelligence services’ increased investigative opportunities in the registration and filing of data on persons and telecommunications area, as well as increased organisations in Denmark. Furthermore, the opportunity to set up TV surveillance of central Committee is to consider the question of public squares and major traffic junctions, etc. citizens’ access to obtaining information on whether the persons concerned are registered On 16 November 2005, the Government in the records of PET and FE. The Committee is published its Action Plan for the Fight against also to consider the possibility of establishing Terrorism, which contains a report on the ways an information scheme granting access to in which work, according to the Government,

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should be taken forward to realise the recruited or trained to commit acts of recommendations presented by the cross- terrorism are liable to imprisonment for up ministerial working group. The action plan to six years. describes a number of initiatives in relation to the Security and Intelligence Service’s PET’s collection and communication of organisation, co-operation and resources, information investigation of terrorism, aliens residing in Following the legislative amendment, PET is Denmark, civilian preparedness, dialogue with in a position to communicate information to the Muslim communities, and research. FE without being obliged, in each single case, to carry out a specific assessment and a On the basis of the working group’s balancing of interests in relation to the relevant recommendations, a number of amendments piece of information. Consequently, PET may have been made to the Criminal Code, the communicate information to FE, to the extent Administration of Justice Act and various the communication may be of importance to other legislation (Anti-Terrorism Package III) the ability of the two intelligence services to to strengthen the action against terrorism. perform their tasks. The legislative amendments came into force on 10 June 2006 (Act No. 542 of 8 June 2006). Furthermore, a special statutory framework has been established for PET’s collection In addition to implementing parts of the of information from other administrative Government’s Action Plan for the Fight against authorities, which means that these authorities Terrorism, the objective of the legislative are not obliged, in each single case, to carry amendments was also to enable Denmark to out a specific assessment and a balancing of ratify the Council of Europe Convention on interests in relation to the relevant piece of the Prevention of Terrorism as well as the UN information. Consequently, PET may collect Nuclear Terrorism Convention. information from other administrative authorities to the extent the information may The legislative amendments contain a number be of importance to the ability of the Security of measures that enhance the possibilities of and Intelligence Service to perform its tasks the police to prevent, investigate and combat concerning the prevention and investigation of acts of terrorism. violations of Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code. Anti-Terrorism Package III (2006) A criminal offence to recruit and train Court orders in connection with telephone for terrorism interception New provisions have been inserted in the The procedure for obtaining a court order Criminal Code on recruitment and training for to initiate intrusive measures in the form of terrorism. The maximum penalty is up to six telephone interception and forward-looking or ten years’ imprisonment (in particularly tele-information has been simplified through aggravating circumstances 16 years’ the legislative amendment. Today, PET needs imprisonment) depending on the acts for which only obtain one prior court order, which makes persons are recruited/trained. Furthermore, as it possible to monitor a suspect, irrespective of a new element, persons who let themselves be what means of telecommunications the person

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concerned chooses to use. This is a change compared with the previous arrangement according to which a court order regarding interception and tele-information was required to state the specific telephone numbers that could be intercepted or on which tele- information could be obtained. The change applies only to court orders concerning telephone interception and tele-information in connection with investigations of a violation of Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code. The general rules for when interception may take place have not been amended, and PET may therefore not carry out telephone interception and obtain tele-information to any greater extent than previously. Furthermore, the courts now have the possibility of supervising the a n p ix telephone numbers at which the interception has been directed, and which have not been stated in the court order. S c Photo:

Tele-observation The application of so-called tele-observation Under the provision, the police may on the is now explicitly regulated by the Administration basis of a court order interfere in or cut off of Justice Act, into which provisions have been radio or telecommunications, provided there inserted concerning the conditions, including a are decisive reasons for doing so with a view to court order requirement, that must be fulfilled preventing the commitment of an offence which in order to obtain information from suppliers according to the Criminal Code is punishable of tele-net and tele-services. It concerns, among by six years’ imprisonment or more, or an other things, information regarding which mobile intentional violation of Chapters 12 and 13 of masts a suspect’s mobile phone has ongoing the Criminal Code. A further condition is that contact with, including information on the the offence may pose a danger to human life or mobile cell used and, subject to circumstances, limb or to substantial societal values. information regarding the distance between the mobile phone and the mast. TV surveillance With the legislative amendment, a provision Interference in radio or telecommunications has been inserted in the Act on TV Surveillance For the purpose of preventing specific, according to which the police may request imminent terrorist acts or other serious that public authorities or private enterprises crime, the legislative amendment has inserted establish TV surveillance in accordance a provision in the Administration of Justice with current legislation. A request to set up Act on interference in or cut-off of radio or TV surveillance is expected to be made in telecommunications in altogether special cases. particular where it is found that this type of

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surveillance may be of importance to preventing solution with a view to collecting and processing or investigating potential terrorist attacks. passenger data.

A provision has furthermore been inserted in Logging the Act on TV Surveillance which allows the The so-called logging provision in the police to make demands on public authorities or Administration of Justice Act was introduced private enterprises regarding quality standards through Act No. 378 of 6 June 2002. The for the recordings on videotapes, film or the provision made it obligatory for, among others, like, as well as for the storage of such telecommunications companies and internet recordings. providers to “log” traffic data that are relevant to the police for the purpose of invasion of the PET’s access to passenger information secrecy of communication, etc. Similarly, the In order to give PET swifter and more effective provision opened up for determining specific access to standard information about flight administrative rules regarding providers’ passengers (passenger data), a new provision assistance to the police in connection with has been inserted in the Danish Air Navigation these invasive measures. Act, which gives the Security and Intelligence Service access to this information from the Against the background of this authority, airline companies. the Ministry of Justice issued the so-called Logging Executive Order (Executive Order The provision means that the airline companies on the retention and storage of traffic data are required to register and keep certain by providers of electronic communications passenger data for one year, and to grant PET networks and services) on 28 September 2006, access to this information without a court which entered into force on 15 September order in cases regarding violations of Chapters 2007. The Logging Executive Order contains 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code. Furthermore, detailed rules for the types of data which rules have been laid down regarding PET’s telecommunications companies and internet on-line access to the airline companies’ booking providers, respectively, are required to retain systems. and store for one year, and rules for how the retention is to take place. Under the provision, the Minister for Transport and Energy is, after negotiation with the The information is to be retained and stored Minister of Justice, authorised to determine in such a manner that it can be used as part rules obliging airline companies to register and of the police investigation and prosecution of keep passenger data as well as rules regarding criminal offences. The general rules regarding the practical assistance to PET in connection which conditions must be fulfilled for the police with the surrender of this information. PET to have the relevant information surrendered collaborates with the Ministry of Justice on have not been changed. PET will therefore be the establishment of the necessary basis required, also in future, to obtain a court order for determining specific rules concerning to have the information surrendered, or have passenger data. Similarly, work is in progress the information surrendered immediately, if on the establishment of the necessary IT the purpose would otherwise be wasted, and subsequently present the matter to the court

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with a request that the invasive measure be Number of immigration-related cases submitted approved. to PET by the immigration authorities

Co-operation with the immigration 2006 2007 authorities UN quota refugees 2 0 1 235 Under the Aliens Act, the immigration Asylum cases 115 194 authorities may without consent communicate Visa cases 5 4 6 1 10380 data on aliens to PET and FE, to the extent the Residence cases 955 2032 communication of data may be of importance to the intelligence services’ ability to perform security tasks. It follows from section 25 of the Aliens Act, which rests on a similar provision in the Aliens According to specific criteria, PET receives Act of 1952, that an alien may be expelled if certain immigration-related cases (asylum, the alien must be deemed a danger to national residence and visa cases) in order to carry security. Regard for national security as laid out an assessment of whether an alien must down in section 25 comprises the interests that be considered a threat to public order, to are protected by Chapter 12 of the Criminal relations with foreign powers, or to national Code (Offences against the Independence and security. PET has briefed the immigration Safety of the State) and Chapter 13 of the authorities on the types of information, etc. Criminal Code (Offences against the Constitution which may be of special interest to the Security and the Supreme Authorities of the State, and Intelligence Service. These criteria are Terrorism, etc.). However, the wording does not assessed and adjusted on an ongoing basis rule out that also other interests of great by PET. Furthermore, matters relating to the societal importance may be taken into grant of nationality are submitted to PET. consideration through the application of the provision. Information about an alien may in particular be of relevance to PET if there exists information In 2002, section 45 b was inserted in the indicating that the person concerned is involved Aliens Act. The provision supplements, among in terrorist-related activities, has connections other things, the rule regarding expulsion in with certain foreign intelligence and security the interests of national security laid down in services or criminal organisations, or has been section 25. Under section 45 b (1), the Minister involved in war crimes, arms trafficking or the for Refugee, Immigration and Integration proliferation of arms. Affairs shall, against the background of a recommendation from the Minister of Justice, Expulsion in the interests of national security assess whether an alien must be deemed a The existing provisions on the expulsion of danger to national security. This assessment aliens who must be deemed a danger to national constitutes the basis for a decision by the security are laid down in sections 25 and 45 b of immigration authorities on an immigration the Aliens Act. The provisions were given their matter, including a matter of expulsion under present form through Anti-Terrorism Package I, section 25. which was implemented in 2002.

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If, after recommendation from the Minister of alien concerned must be deemed a danger to Justice, it is the assessment of the Minister for national security, which means that the alien Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs may be expelled under section 25 of the Aliens that an alien must be deemed a danger to Act. national security, the Immigration Service shall decide whether the alien is to be expelled under Since the introduction of section 45 b in 2002, section 25. the provision has not been used more than ten times, and it is generally not possible to provide In connection with the processing of a case further information about the specific cases. In under section 45 b, the Minister for Refugee, connection with the case regarding the planning Immigration and Integration Affairs may of a terrorist-related attempt on the life of one furthermore, on the basis of a recommendation of the cartoonists behind the drawings of the from the Minister of Justice, decide that the Prophet Mohammed, the assessment was that, information resulting in the assessment may without disregarding consideration for foreign not, for security reasons, be transmitted to partners and sources, etc., the information the alien assessed and to the immigration could be released that two Tunisian nationals authority having to make a decision in the case, had been arrested during a police operation on cf. section 45 b (2). The possibility of keeping 12 February 2008; and furthermore that it had information secret is of decisive importance been decided to expel the persons concerned to PET’s collaboration with other nations’ as they must be deemed a danger to national intelligence services and other partners and, security. thus, a fundamental precondition for effective action to prevent terrorist acts and combat Two other cases regarding expulsion in the terrorism. It is, among other things, regard interests of national security have been for these matters that constitutes the basis publicised in the media in connection with a for the possibility under section 45 b to decision made by the Refugee Appeals Board depart from the general administrative law on 1 April 2008 to the effect that two aliens requirements of justification for the decision. expelled under section 25 of the Aliens Act cannot be deported from Denmark. The reason In general, the point of departure regarding a is that it cannot be ruled out with necessary matter of expulsion of an alien who is deemed certainty that they, upon deportation to their a danger to national security is that PET, after native country, will face the risk of the death lengthy investigation, has obtained information penalty or become subjected to torture, etc. that provides the grounds for suspecting the The persons concerned have, consequently, alien of violation with respect to one of the been granted exceptional leave to remain in offences comprised by Chapters 12 or 13 of the this country and will continue to be the subject Criminal Code, for example terrorism. If regard of PET’s interest for as long as they remain in for, among others, foreign partners and sources Denmark. results in PET having to abstain from seeking to bring a criminal case to trial, PET may take On the basis of these cases, the Government the initiative in asking the Minister of Justice has decided to set up a working group to recommend to the Minister for Refugee, concerning the expulsion of aliens who must Immigration and Integration Affairs that the be deemed a danger to national security. PET

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is represented in the working group, which is expected to finalise its work in 2008.

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International 3. co-operation

Operational co-operation The CTG was established by the heads of the The terrorist acts in recent years against security services in the EU Member States the Western world have underlined the following the terrorist attacks on 11 September need for close and intensified international 2001. The group has a rotating presidency, co-operation between authorities and relevant which follows the Presidency of the EU. Work organisations that in various ways are involved conducted in the group focuses on Islamist in the efforts directed against international terrorism and comprises in particular the terrorism. Therefore, PET has close and drawing up of joint threat assessments as ongoing collaboration with foreign partners, well as discussion of initiatives to strengthen both in general to monitor the threat picture, the operational co-operation on combating and operationally in connection with the terrorism. investigation of specific cases. In addition, PET participates in a number of This co-operation takes the form of direct working groups within the framework of the UN, bilateral contact with foreign security and the EU and NATO. intelligence services. It involves, among other things, joint operations and exchange of Administrative co-operation information about persons and groups that PET has had successful operational may constitute a threat to Denmark, Danish co-operation with the intelligence services in interests abroad, foreign interests in this the other Nordic countries for many years. In country, or a threat to our partners. 2006, PET took the initiative to set up similar co-operation in the administrative area (Nordic Furthermore, PET participates in comprehensive Administrative Co-operation Forum), as the multilateral co-operation, which takes place intelligence services also administratively face primarily in the so-called Club of Berne and in the same problems and challenges. In spring the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) of the EU 2007, PET hosted the first meeting of the new member states. Forum in which the intelligence services discuss current strategic and development-related The Club of Berne is a co-operation forum initiatives. Future co-operation areas were between the national security and intelligence identified, and the co-operation will continue in services of most EU Member States as well three sub-groups with focus on, among other as Norway and Switzerland. The heads of the things, strategy development, competence services concerned meet on a regular basis development and IT. to discuss intelligence and security issues. Similarly, a number of working groups have Similarly, international co-operation in the been set up under the auspices of the Club of administrative area has been established Berne. The objective of this forum is to foster between PET and countries outside the Nordic both co-operation and exchange of information region. In 2007, PET visited a number of selected and experience between the security and European intelligence services to discuss, intelligence services of the member countries. among other things, methods and models for Denmark became a member of the Club of competence development, specific training and Berne in 1972. educational activities, management and quality development, and IT system development. In

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2007, the discussions materialised in a new information about health matters, significant common training programme in the area of social problems, and abuse of stimulants and source handling for a number of European the like, must not be communicated to another intelligence services. authority. Information may, however, be communicated where the communication takes Exchange of information with place in order to safeguard private or public foreign partners interests which clearly outweigh consideration The acts of terrorism targeted at the Western for the interests that justify secrecy, including world have underlined the need for close and regard for the person to whom the information intensified international co-operation. The relates. nature of global terrorism has meant that the countries concerned cannot combat the global With a view to ensuring that the communication terrorist threat on their own. of sensitive personal data to foreign partners takes place in accordance with Danish law, Therefore, PET is involved in close and ongoing internal guidelines have been established in co-operation with foreign partners. It takes PET which imply, among other things, that the place both at the general level to monitor Director of the Legal Department or her deputy the threat picture as well as operationally must approve the communication of sensitive in connection with specific investigations. personal data to foreign partners. In order to ensure continued effective counter- terrorism efforts, it is also necessary for PET As a further security precaution regarding the to develop the collaboration with a number exchange of sensitive personal data with foreign of countries that PET has not previously had partners, it is expressly stated in every exchange any close co-operation with, but which are that the information must only be used for of special importance to the action against intelligence purposes, and that the information terrorism. This applies to countries in North must not, without the consent of PET, be Africa and the Middle East, among others. communicated to other authorities, including authorities in third countries. If there are Co-operation between PET and foreign partners grounds for assuming that sensitive personal takes place in accordance with Danish law. With data are to constitute the basis for the use of respect to the communication of sensitive torture or other degrading inhuman treatment personal data to foreign partners, PET complies or punishment, PET will not communicate the with the rules regarding duty of confidentiality information to a foreign partner. laid down in section 152 of the Criminal Code and section 27 of the Public Administration Act, In connection with ongoing collaboration as well as the principles governing the with foreign partners, PET receives much communication of information laid down in information, including in connection with specific section 28 of the Public Administration Act. investigations. In many cases, foreign partners Under section 28 of the Public Administration communicate information to PET on their own Act, information about individuals’ altogether initiative because the information is considered private matters, including information about to be of importance to PET’s work. It may be a race, religion, and colour of skin; about political, matter of information about a specific threat business, sexual and criminal conduct; and to Denmark or Danish interests. In other cases,

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PET asks foreign partners for information in presented as the basis for a court’s decision connection with concrete investigations. on custody, search or invasion of the secrecy of communication, or administrative decisions When PET receives information from a foreign on expulsion. Therefore, PET does not use partner, a detailed investigation will, subject information with a view to, for example, invasion to circumstances, be carried out with a view of the secrecy of communication if it is PET’s to assessing the reliability of the information. assessment that the information must be The information will in this connection be assumed to have been obtained through torture. compared with the knowledge which the Security and Intelligence Service already might be in possession of, or which the Security and Intelligence Service may obtain through other investigations. Similarly, it may prove relevant to endeavour to cast further light on the information by contacting PET’s partners.

In addition, there may often be reason for making a renewed approach to the intelligence service that has communicated the information with a view to having the information further specified. In some cases it will also be relevant to seek clarification as to how the information was obtained. However, intelligence services are usually, out of regard for source protection, very reluctant to comment on how information has been obtained.

Information from foreign partners which may have been obtained through the use of torture will, like other information, be included in PET’s investigations, but PET is very much aware that such information may be lacking in reliability.

Under Danish law, it is not possible to use information obtained under torture as evidence in a case before a Danish court, unless it concerns criminal proceedings initiated against a person who is charged with responsibility for the use of torture.

It may also be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights if information obtained through the use of torture is

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THE DANISH SECURITY AND ­INTELLIGENCE­ SERVICE / ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007 PAGE 28 PET’s operational efforts

PET’s operational 4. efforts

PET is charged with the task of preventing, At the individual centres, intelligence staff investigating and countering operations and collect and process information that is activities that pose or may pose a threat to the subsequently analysed by operational analysts. preservation of Denmark as an independent, The operational analysis work is conducted with democratic and safe society. a view to targeting continued intelligence work and, if necessary, involving actual investigators. Efficient and permanent preservation of internal As part of the implementation of specific national security requires sustained, wide- operations, special operational groups will ranging and co-ordinated efforts by a number normally be set up with the participation of of authorities. It is PET’s responsibility to ensure intelligence officers, analysts, investigators the co-ordination of the overall action. and legal experts.

PET’s field of responsibility comprises first and When collecting and handling information, PET foremost offences set out in Chapters 12 and must make use of all the means and methods 13 of the Criminal Code, including terrorism, the that are at the disposal of the Security and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Intelligence Service. extremism, and espionage. Through its activity, PET must provide the basis for identifying The means and methods at the disposal of and handling such threats as early and as PET in the operational field are among others: effectively as possible. invasion of the secrecy of communication, observation, video and photo surveillance, Consequently, PET performs its tasks through searches, sources (informants and agents), as the collection of intelligence, surveillance and well as data processing and analysis. In addition, investigation, as well as through preventive the means and methods include interviews, measures. interrogations, records checking, the collection and communication, also electronically, of Through balanced application of these means, information to and from authorities or other the Security and Intelligence Service must partners in Denmark or abroad as well as ensure that a comprehensive picture of the the monitoring of open sources, such as current security-related threats to internal newspapers, TV, electronic news bases and national security is maintained at all times. the internet. This picture is to enable relevant and adapted counter-measures against such threats. The activities of the Security and Intelligence Service must be conducted in accordance PET’s operational tasks are embedded in the with Danish law, including the rules of the Operational Department of PET. It consists of Administration of Justice Act regarding the three centres: the Centre for Counter-Terrorism, investigation of criminal offences. the Centre for National Security, as well as the Centre for Organised Crime), a cross-sectoral Especially in connection with the use of sources, unit (Special Operations) and two regional units attention should be drawn to the fact that (Region East and Region West). PET, in addition to covering expenses or losses incurred, may remunerate sources, including

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for the personal risk these sources expose of PET or in his absence by the deputy of themselves to in this connection. the Director General. If the investigative measures in question require a court order, If PET’s efforts lead to a situation where a this approval must be obtained before the person is to be charged, PET will inform the matter can be brought before the court. The Prosecution Service. The investigation will practical implementation regarding telephone subsequently be conducted according to interception or tele-information collection the Prosecution’s specific directions, but in taking place on the basis of a court order understanding and collaboration with PET. regarding the person must, for each single telephone number, be submitted for prior It follows from the Statutory Provisions of approval to the Director General of PET or 9 May 1996 on PET issued by the Ministry his deputy. of Justice that any invasive investigative measures, including invasion of the secrecy Once PET has identified a specific security of communication, must in each single threat, PET will address the threat with the case be approved by the Director General means which, in the specific situation, are

When PET’s Operational Department is to analyse the circles surrounding potential terrorists, among other things, they study their networks.

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found to be the most relevant, appropriate and The trial of cases within PET’s field of effective in order to prevent the specific threat responsibility takes place according to the from being carried out. rules laid down in the Administration of Justice Act. It means, among other things, that the It is PET’s experience regarding new threats information which PET has produced during since the terrorist attacks on 11 September the investigation of the case is included in 2001 that the Security and Intelligence Service the criminal case, so that the counsel for the must be prepared to a much greater extent defence has the possibility to make himself not only to counter the threats, but also, acquainted with the material. among other things for preventive reasons, to ensure that criminal law investigation and However, the Administration of Justice Act prosecution is implemented with respect to the contains rules that are applicable to all perpetrators in situations where the Criminal criminal cases, and which imply that the Code is violated. defence counsel’s access to documents may be departed from through a court order In certain cases, it will, however, not be requested by the police if required by regard possible to implement actual investigation for, for example, foreign powers, national and prosecution in the specific matter. This security, the life and limb of third parties, and applies, for example, to cases where regard the protection of confidential information for the Security and Intelligence Service’s about police investigation methods. The defence work methods, sources and partners renders counsel’s access to documents may, however, it impossible to initiate public criminal not be departed from if it would give rise to proceedings. considerable misgivings with regard to the conduct of the defence of the accused. Furthermore, PET will, for security reasons, In connection with the processing of such a be obliged to take steps to counter certain request, a special attorney is to be appointed specific threats at so early a stage that there to safeguard the interests of the accused. The will not necessarily be sufficient evidence court and the specially appointed attorney will for initiating criminal proceedings and for have the opportunity to familiarise themselves conviction even though it may be necessary to with the material that constitutes part of the arrest and charge individuals in connection with criminal case and the material that is requested PET’s intervention. to be excluded from the criminal case. If it is decided to depart from the defence counsel’s In accordance with the Administration of access to documents, the information to which Justice Act, it is for the Prosecution Service to this decision refers will not be included in the decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings. criminal case. It means that the court which is This applies also to cases within PET’s field to deal with the criminal case, the counsel for of responsibility. In certain cases, including the defence, and the accused will not learn of in cases regarding terrorism, the Minister of this information, nor will the parties concerned Justice decides whether to initiate criminal be informed that a decision has been taken to proceedings subject to recommendation by the exclude certain information from the criminal Director of Public Prosecutions. case.

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As in other criminal cases, the trial of terrorist testimony, and that the identity of the witness cases takes place in the full light of publicity should not be revealed. as a general rule, which means that for example reporters have the opportunity to attend the trial, including the opportunity to listen to the evidence given by the accused and witnesses. However, the Administration of Justice Act contains rules making it possible for police officers with special functions, for example in terrorist cases, to give evidence on special conditions. Under certain conditions, the court may decide that the name and address of a police officer who is to testify shall not be disclosed, or the court may decide that the accused must leave the court room when a police officer with a special function is interviewed, if this is required in consideration of keeping the identity of the police officer secret, and if it must be deemed of no significant consequence to the defence of the accused. In addition, the court may decide that a police officer with special functions may give evidence in camera, i.e. that the general public, including the press, may not be present in the court room while the officer testifies. If the accused has been excluded from being present during a witness statement, the accused must subsequently be informed of the substance of the testimony.

A considerable number of PET staff carry out special functions which imply that it is crucial that the identity and appearance of the persons concerned are kept secret. This applies for example to staff who carry out observation tasks and staff who are in ongoing contact with PET’s sources. If Security and Intelligence Service staff are to give evidence in connection with a terrorist case, it may therefore be necessary to ask the court to decide that the evidence should be given in camera, that the accused should not be present during the

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5. Special Operations

Special Operations are a special unit within PET’s It is the senior management within PET that Operational Department. The unit is responsible decides whether the Security and Intelligence for source handling, undercover police agents Service is to make use of a source, and and witness protection within all parts of PET’s determines the specific guidelines for source activity. The unit also provides assistance to the handling and requires that any contact with the police districts to some extent. source must be documented, which means, among other things, that a report is to be drawn Within PET, the concept of “sources” comprises up for every meeting with an informant both informants and civilian agents as well concerning his or her informant-related activity. as persons who in general provide PET with The report must contain information about the information on, among other things, networks time and venue of the meeting, the reason for and groups of interest to the Security and the meeting, who was present, what kind of Intelligence Service. information the informant provided, and what agreements were made with the informant, if any. Sources and informants The use of sources, including informants and, Agents in some cases, civilian agents is altogether Sections 754 a – 754 d of the Administration of decisive to PET’s opportunities of identifying Justice Act contain rules regarding the police and countering e.g. specific terrorist threats. It use of agents. It follows from the rules that is therefore a particular focus and action area the police must not incite anybody to commit for PET. This is particularly the case because a criminal offence. Thus, the police must not it is difficult for PET in certain situations and as part of an investigation offer assistance in certain environments to collect information or take steps with a view to inciting somebody in any other way. PET’s use of sources, to commit a criminal offence or continue to including recruitment, handling and supervision commit a criminal offence, unless there is a of sources, is embedded in the Security strong suspicion that and Intelligence Service’s unit for Special Operations. • the offence is about to be committed or attempted, The use of sources takes place according to • the investigative measure must be deemed of the principles laid down in Communication decisive importance to the investigation, and No. 2/2005 issued by the Director of Public • the investigation concerns an offence Prosecutions on guidelines regarding informants, punishable by a minimum of six years’ irrespective of the fact that these guidelines imprisonment. do not comprise PET’s use of informants. The Communication establishes the rules It also follows from the rules that the police for the procedures that are to apply to the assistance must not lead to an increase in the contact with informants, for the managerial scope and seriousness of the offence. It follows, responsibility, including the superviser’s role, similarly, that the assistance or measures may as well as rules for documentation concerning exclusively be carried out by police officers. It collaboration with the informant, etc. follows, furthermore, from the rules that the assistance or the measures shall take place subject to a court order.

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It follows, however, from section 754 e of the police agents takes place in accordance with Administration of Justice Act that the rules the rules of the Administration of Justice Act governing agent activity laid down in sections governing agent activities, which implies that a 754 a – 754 d do not apply in connection court order must be obtained. with investigations of, among other things, violations of section 114 of the Criminal Code Witness protection on terrorism. It means that no explicit rules In some cases where a person must give in the Administration of Justice Act apply to evidence in connection with a criminal case, the police use of agents if the investigation including if the person has assisted the police in concerns terrorism according to section 114 of solving a crime, questions will arise with respect the Criminal Code. to the protection of the witness. In the vast majority of cases, it will be sufficient that the It means in particular that PET may use agents accused is not informed of the name, etc. of in connection with the investigation of terrorist the witness. In the vast majority of cases, it will matters without having to obtain a court order be sufficient that the accused is not informed in advance, and the Security and Intelligence of the name, etc. of the witness. Similarly, Service may, in these cases, use civilian agents. the court may decide to impose reporting The extent to which PET otherwise may be restrictions on the identity of the witness, to bound by the rules that arise out of the introduce a reporting ban, and to request a Administration of Justice Act is decided by private hearing. The police and the Prosecution the courts. There is, however, in legal literature may, furthermore, implement a number of a consensus that a ban on incitement also practical measures, such as police escort, applies to the investigation of cases concerning patrolling and guarding. terrorism, i.e. that the Security and Intelligence Service must not incite persons to commit It is the police districts which, if required, in criminal offences which they are not already collaboration with the superior Prosecution committing or attempting to commit. and PET, are to carry out a specific assessment in each individual case of what protective PET’s unit for Special Operations provides measures are required to protect the witness. assistance to investigations where secret In altogether extraordinary cases where the police agents are mobilised to combat, among measures that can be initiated by the police other things, organised crime. A police agent districts are not considered sufficient, PET may is typically used to infiltrate groups or areas initiate witness protection measures within the where the police cannot operate under normal framework of the so-called witness protection circumstances. A police agent is, in contrast programme. In its present form, the programme to a civilian agent, a trained police officer, but has existed since 2001 and is constantly being working under an assumed identity that enables developed in the light of the experience gained. him/her to move in the environments that are In connection with the establishment of the the subject of the investigation. witness protection programme in Denmark, inspiration has been sought in a number of Police agents are typically used in cases where countries in and outside Europe. PET assists in the investigation of serious organised crime. In these cases, the use of

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The special protective measures are introduced on the basis of a careful assessment of the present threat as well as of the witness that needs to be protected.

In the most serious cases, a complete change of identity may take place and the person concerned may also be helped to start a new life in another country. In such a situation, the witness will be informed that the change of identity is only possible if the person concerned refrains from committing any criminal offences and contributes to the process personally, among other things by not contacting his former circle of friends, etc. As part of this process, the witness is informed that the witness protection programme cannot be expected to continue if the witness does not comply with these conditions.

Before a person can enter the witness protection programme, a series of investigations and assessments have to be conducted to ensure that the witness protection programme will prove a success. In this connection, PET provides, for instance, legal, psychological and medical assistance.

PET is not in a position to provide further details on the practical procedure in connection with witness protection or on the number of such cases out of consideration for the persons that are to be protected.

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6. Counter-terrorism

Complex and spectacular attacks presuppose The task of PET is to monitor relevant individuals and considerable resources and solid networks in environments with the aim of preventing the planning relation to logistics and planning. These types and execution of terrorist acts in Denmark or against of attacks will therefore often be difficult to Danish interests as well as preventing Denmark from implement. Simpler attacks using simpler means can be implemented with less preparation and being used as a base for planning terrorist acts abroad. thus need to be paid particular attention by Investigations take their point of departure in Section the authorities. 114 of the Criminal Code, which deals with a number of serious criminal offences (e.g. homicide, arson, kidnapping, Terrorist attacks can take place without the and hijacking of aircraft) that are committed by groups, availability of prior intelligence-based indications, organisations and individuals with the intent to frighten i.e. without warning. The attacks in Madrid in the population, destabilise the order of society or seek 2004 and in London in 2005 are clear examples to coerce Danish and foreign public authorities and of such attacks. international organisations into undertaking or omitting to undertake an act. The attacks also show that terrorists are able, through the use of easily accessible materials, to cause quite serious damage not just directly in the actual attacks, but also indirectly through General features and trends the psychological effect on the general public. In recent years, Denmark and the rest of the Western world have experienced an increasing In Denmark, there are individuals and threat of terrorism, and the assessment is that environments that sympathise with and/or there exists today a general terrorist threat support groups that are engaged in terrorist against Denmark. Similarly, there are indications activities. Similarly, there are individuals and that also leading militant extremists abroad have environments in Denmark that are ready and sharpened their focus on Denmark, and that willing to participate in terrorism-related these circles wish to carry out acts of terrorism activities. against Denmark or Danish interests abroad. This is underlined, for example, by the terrorism The assessment is that the Cartoon Crisis case from Vollsmose, in which three individuals together with Denmark’s participation in the in 2007 were convicted of attempted terrorism. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq in general has contributed to raising awareness Other examples are the so-called Glostrup of Denmark in militant extremist circles. Case, in which one of the accused was sentenced in February 2007 to seven years’ The threat of terrorism against Denmark imprisonment for attempting to commit emanates primarily from networks, groups and terrorism, and the trial in April 2007, in which individuals that subscribe to various forms of a Moroccan-born Danish citizen was sentenced militant Islamist ideologies, including al-Qaida- to three years’ and six months’ imprisonment related groups. These networks may be based for, among other things, offering general both in Denmark and abroad. advice to terrorist groups and for propagating

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materials suitable for recruiting members to such groups.

Even though the threat of terrorism has increased in recent years, it is important to note that, when disregarding certain conflict zones, such as parts of Iraq, the risk of becoming a random victim of a terrorist attack in Denmark or abroad is still very small.

There exists no unequivocal profile of individuals that become radicalised and subsequently recruited for terrorism.

However, experience from Denmark and other European countries in recent years shows that a substantial and increasing proportion of the militant extremists are young or very young men born and raised in the West.

These so-called “home-grown” extremists have often undergone a rapid radicalisation process, in which the internet, established extremist ideologues and charismatic individuals in combination with friends and personal networks have played an important role. These individuals do not necessarily have connections to a certain conflict area, but rather regard themselves as part of a worldwide Muslim community which in their eyes is under attack.

On a small set of shelves in the bathroom belonging to one of those convicted in the Vollsmose Case, the police found triacetone triperoxide – TATP – at the shelf with towels. The small glass bottle with a clear liquid contained approximately 50 grams of the high-explosive. This explosive is also called “Mother of Satan” and is often used by terrorists due to it being relatively easy to fabricate. TATP is extremely unstable and even little bumps or blows can trigger an explosion.

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murder one of the cartoonists from the Danish Cartoon Crisis.

Experience from abroad shows that attacks against public transport systems are often preferred by terrorists. This is not least because means of transportation are easily accessible targets, where many people are congregated. Furthermore, attacks against public transport systems and major traffic junctions have great psychological effect on the general public, because these are places where a very large proportion of the population often comes and where many people therefore can see themselves as potential targets.

In the West, there are relatively few examples where terrorists regard critical national infrastructure, such as the transport sector, as a target in itself. Often, it would appear that the determining factor is the presence of a large number people in a single place. Therefore, attacks directed at other targets where many people congregate, such as shopping centres, bars, public squares and sports events, in principle could just as well be contemplated. A handwritten note with chemical designations from the Vollsmose Case. Terrorists typically use home-made bombs in their attacks (often referred to as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)). The intensified efforts by the authorities to combat terrorism have meant that in recent The type of terrorist attack witnessed in years it has become more difficult for terrorists Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, i.e. IEDs to strike high-profile, protected targets. At the targeted at public transportation, will probably same time, the preferred modus operandi of continue to be a principal method used by terrorists continues to be attacks in unprotected terrorists. At the same time, it is clear that places targeted at crowds of people with the terrorist groups are constantly seeking to aim of causing maximum loss of human life. develop new, surprising and thus unpredictable There are also examples of simple attacks methods for carrying out attacks. carried out against soft targets with a clear symbolic and political objective. This was the The terrorist attacks in recent years in a large case with the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the number of Western and non-Western countries Netherlands in 2004 and with the plans to have underlined that terrorist attacks may take

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Prosecution Service has brought terrorism charges on several occasions. In the three terrorism cases from Glostrup, Vollsmose and Glasvej, charges were brought under the most serious provision on terrorism in section 114 of the Criminal Code, whilst in other cases criminal proceedings were initiated against those suspected of financing terrorism.

The bookseller from Brønshøj In September 2005, after lengthy surveillance, PET arrested an individual (the bookseller from Brønshøj) who was subsequently charged with violation and attempted violation of the former “Silence, do not tell anybody what you want to provision in section 114 b of the Criminal Code do, then you will be prevented from doing it”. concerning the advancement of the criminal activity or common purpose of a terrorist In the terror cases we have seen in Denmark, the organisation. convicted individuals have often used closed chat rooms on the internet to discuss bomb manuals In the Copenhagen City Court’s judgement of 11 and exchange Islamist views. The above advice April 2007, the accused was sentenced to three to keep silent was given to one of the convicted years’ and six months’ imprisonment after being individuals from the terror case in Vollsmose. found guilty as charged. On the principal charge, the Court made the following statement: place without warning and strike individuals “In summary, the Court finds it proven that at random. the defendant’s activities may be described as providing professional general advice to There are indications that the reprinting of the terrorist groups in relation to al-Qaida and Mohammed cartoons has led to an increased groups inspired by al-Qaida whose intention is focus on Denmark today also among leading to commit terrorist acts, and that the militant extremists abroad, and that such defendant was aware of such intention. The circles desire to carry out acts of terrorism defendant is also deemed to have been aware against Danes and Danish interests abroad. that the dissemination of his materials was This applies particularly in regard to Danes suitable for recruiting members to the groups and Danish interests in places where al-Qaida- and suitable for strengthening the resolve of related groups operate, especially in countries the members of the groups to commit terrorist in North Africa and the Middle East as well as in acts. Based on the evidence presented, it Pakistan and Afghanistan. is deemed that the defendant has widely distributed the materials and thus is guilty Danish terrorism cases of having committed a criminal offence under Since the insertion of new anti-terrorism section 114 b of the Criminal Code…” provisions in the Criminal Code in 2002, the

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the length of time the person had lived in Denmark as well as the time that had elapsed since he had last been to Morocco in 1989. Furthermore, the Court felt unable to disregard the possibility that based on the nature of the crimes for which the accused had been convicted, he might be subjected to harm on his return to Morocco.

The Glostrup Case In the terrorism case from Glostrup, it was intelligence received by PET that led Glostrup Police to arrest four individuals on 27 October 2005. The case from Glostrup had connections to arrests in Bosnia, in which two individuals, A Danish-Turkish national and a Swedish-Bosnian including a young Turkish national, who was born national were given lengthy prison sentences and raised in Denmark, were arrested and found in Sarajevo after being caught red-handed in an in possession of, among other things, explosives apartment with 20 kgs of explosives, a suicide and weapons. The individuals arrested in video and a bomb belt. The person who has been Denmark had been kept under surveillance convicted in the Glostrup Case was punished for by PET for a long period of time and were co-operating with the two individuals in Sarajevo. subsequently charged with attempted violation of section 114 on terrorism.

For the first time during the criminal case, a In an Eastern High Court judgement on 15 claim was made that the accused should be February 2007, three of the defendants were deprived of his Danish nationality. The Danish acquitted. The professional judges applied the Nationality Act contains a provision whereby so-called “double guarantee” clause contained a person convicted of violation of one or in the Administration of Justice Act and more provisions of Chapters 12 and 13 of the overturned the jury’s decision, according to Criminal Code may be deprived of his or her which all four accused were found guilty as Danish nationality by judgement unless such charged. deprivation causes the person concerned to become stateless. This provision was applicable The convicted individual who had just turned in the trial of the accused, because the charge 16 years of age was sentenced to seven related to violation of a provision of Chapter 12 years’ imprisonment. As the offence was of the Criminal Code and because the individual committed before he had reached the age concerned had Moroccan nationality in addition of 18, the maximum sentence that could be to his Danish nationality. given under the Criminal Code was eight years’ imprisonment. On 3 October 2007, the Supreme However, the Copenhagen City Court acquitted Court upheld the sentence that had been the accused of the claim for deprivation of pronounced, placing emphasis on the fact that nationality. The Court placed emphasis on the convicted youth had been found guilty of

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attempting to perpetrate the most serious The Glostrup Case shows that it can often be form of terrorism. At the same time, however, difficult to secure the necessary evidence for the Supreme Court did take his young age into use in prosecuting cases of this nature due account. to the necessity of making arrests before the suspects have carried out their plans. In so far as the professional judges overturned the jury’s verdict in regard to three of the The Vollsmose Case accused, it followed from the then provisions In the terrorism case from Vollsmose, PET in the Administration of Justice Act that there initiated surveillance of a group of young men in should be a re-trial in front of a new jury, unless the urban district of Vollsmose in Odense after the Prosecution would drop the charges. In receiving information from an informant. After the Glostrup Case, the Prosecution decided to lengthy surveillance and investigation, several drop the charges against two of the accused, individuals were arrested on 5 September 2006 whereas the Minister of Justice, following a and charged with attempted violation of section recommendation by the Director of Public 114 of the Criminal Code on terrorism. The Prosecutions, decided that the case against the Prosecution Service subsequently decided to third defendant should be re-tried before a new institute criminal proceedings against four of jury. On 10 March 2008, the accused person was the arrested individuals. acquitted after the case had been considered by a new jury. In an Eastern High Court judgement of 23 November 2007, three of the accused were Metal splinters and nails, for instance, are often found guilty, whilst the fourth was acquitted. used in terror bombs to increase the lethal effect The three convicted men were found guilty of of the bomb. This bag containing 5 kgs of metal preparing one or more bomb devices for use in splinters was found in the apartment of one of those a terrorist act that was to be carried out at a convicted in the terror case from Vollsmose. non-specified location in Denmark or abroad.

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Police scenes- The convicted men had, among other things, the most serious form of terrorism, namely of-crime officers procured fertiliser, chemicals, metal fragments terrorism in connection with homicide and carrying out a and laboratory equipment. In addition, in the explosion, cf. section 114 (1) (i) and (vii) of the search at Glasvej apartment of one of the convicted men 50 Criminal Code. In regard to MZ, emphasis is also in Copenhagen. grams of the explosive TATP was found, which placed on his leading role in connection with the the occupier of the apartment had produced. planning process, including in the manufacture of TATP. In regard to AK, emphasis is placed on Two of the convicted were sentenced by the his considerable activity, including downloading High Court to 11 years’ imprisonment, and one bomb-making manuals and procuring fertiliser, of them, an Iraqi national, was also expelled chemicals, equipment, etc. In regard to AA, from Denmark and given a life-time ban from emphasis is placed in a mitigating direction on re-entry. The third of the convicted persons the secondary nature of his involvement and on was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. his attempt to withdraw his involvement, albeit not a matter of voluntary abandonment of an Regarding the sentence, the High Court stated: attempt.” “In determining the sentence, emphasis has been placed on the fact that MZ, AK and AA have The Eastern High Court’s judgement was been found guilty of attempting to perpetrate appealed to the Supreme Court by the three

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accused and also by the Prosecution Service. Two of the arrested were presented before On 10 April 2008, the Supreme Court increased a magistrate the same day and thereafter the sentence for all three convicted persons, remanded in custody. No request was made which meant that two of them were sentenced to remand the other six arrested persons in to 12 years’ imprisonment and the third was custody and the charges against them were sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. At the subsequently dropped. same time, the Supreme Court upheld the expulsion of one of the convicted persons. In March 2008, charges were brought against the two detainees. They have both been charged The Glasvej Case with attempted terrorism under section 114 (1) On the night of 3-4 September 2007, PET (i) and (vii) of the Criminal Code, cf. section 21. carried out a large-scale operation in the The trial is scheduled to take place at the Court Copenhagen area, which saw eight people of Frederiksberg in front of a jury in autumn arrested and charged with preparing an 2008. act of terrorism using explosives. At the same time, searches were carried out in 11 localities. On 11 November 2007, PET also arrested a The arrests were carried out by PET’s Special 22-year-old man with connections to the two Intervention Unit with help from forensics detained men. This youth was suspected of officers and explosives experts from the incitement to kidnap Danes abroad for the military. During the searches, it was necessary purpose of coercing the Danish authorities to evacuate residents on a stairway in to release the two detainees. In March 2008, Copenhagen’s North-West district for security the 22-year-old was charged with attempted reasons, as there was the presence of unstable terrorism under section 114 (1) (iii) of the explosives in the building. Criminal Code, cf. section 21. The trial of this individual is scheduled to take place at the Prior to the arrests, the arrested individuals Court of Frederiksberg during 2008. had been kept under surveillance. The surveillance and PET’s other investigations Danish-based support to illegal showed that persons among the arrested had activities abroad procured materials for use in manufacturing PET’s investigations show that a number of one or more bomb devices. In addition, a test individuals with a Danish residence permit are explosion of the explosive TATP had been involved in, or in other ways provide support prepared and carried out. to, terrorism-related activities in a number of countries, including Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and The arrested were all men aged between 19 Somalia. The tendency can also be observed and 29 years of foreign extraction. Six of in other EU Member States, where individuals the arrested were Danish nationals, while undergo militant Islamist radicalisation. This two were foreign nationals with a permanent radicalisation may entail, for example, that Danish residence permit. They were all charged the individuals in question are willing to travel with attempted violation of section 114 of the to conflict zones in order to receive military Criminal Code on terrorism. training, participate in hostilities or take part in performing various forms of logistic support functions.

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In 2006 and 2007, a number of individuals to take part in hostilities in conflict areas, with connection to Denmark were arrested in primarily Iraq. conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa. A proportion of these individuals were released Investigations in this area are often hampered from prison after shorter or longer periods of by the fact that the activities take place time, whilst others await court trial and can abroad. However, this is a problem of which PET expect to receive long prison sentences in the is extremely aware and which the Security and countries concerned. PET has increased its Intelligence Service through its investigations awareness of this tendency because individuals endeavours to uncover and counter by means who have taken part in hostilities and gained of relevant measures. operational experience from conflict zones abroad may constitute a security risk in Internet Denmark. PET’s investigations in 2006-2007 documented the important role that the internet plays not At the same time, PET’s investigations show only in the environments investigated by the that in Denmark there are also individuals who Security and Intelligence Service, but also in the provide various forms of assistance with the international communication and dissemination aim of facilitating acts of terrorism abroad. of messages that have relevance for the threat The Danish networks collaborate with, for picture in Denmark. example, foreign networks in efforts to recruit and radicalise individuals abroad who are willing

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The internet plays an increasingly important Non-proliferation role for terrorist groups and networks which utilise this medium to spread their messages, to communicate, to provide virtual training and PET’s investigations within the field to provide logistic support and operational of non-proliferation (of weapons planning. of mass destruction) aim at gathering, processing and analysing The terrorism cases from Glostrup and information in order to obtain an Vollsmose as well as other investigations in overview of which countries could Denmark show that individuals in militant be suspected of wanting to develop networks in Denmark regularly visit militant weapons of mass destruction, and websites and access violent material such of which individuals and groups as film clips from conflict zones, execution are involved in the proliferation of videos as well as religious speeches by Islamist weapons of mass destruction. ideologues and al-Qaida leaders.

At the same time, the Danish terrorism cases have shown that using the internet does not A number of countries and certain terrorist require special skills when it comes to obtaining organisations continuously endeavour to information on how to plan and carry out a develop and produce chemical, biological, nuclear terrorist attack. Effective bomb-making recipes and radiological substances that can be used as and manuals are easily accessible for individuals weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, wishing to carry out a terrorist act. there is a strong focus in Denmark and a number of other countries to enforce the international The international challenge that Denmark faced agreements and rules that are designed to at the beginning of 2006, partly as a result of prevent and minimise the export of weapons of the Cartoon Crisis, confirmed not only that the mass destruction and products that can be internet is a well-suited medium for quickly used to manufacture them. raising public awareness of a certain issue, but it also served as an illustrative example of how In particular after the terrorist attacks in the the medium can be used to present threats. USA on 11 September 2001 and due to the increased threat of terrorism that has existed The targeted efforts in connection with since then, considerable attention is paid to the uncovering extremist activities on the internet risk presented by chemical, biological, nuclear are an integral element of PET’s work. and radiological weapons and thus also to the question of what actions can be taken to monitor and control the export of weapons and products that can be used in the development of weapons of mass destruction.

Depending on the circumstances, weapons of mass destruction can be used to carry out a terrorist attack. At the same time, the fear

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which have the capability and capacity to manufacture them. In contrast, the technology needed to make biological and chemical weapons can be used by both governmental and non-governmental actors. Similarly, both governmental and non-governmental actors have the ability to produce primitive radiological weapons.

The high technological level in Denmark means that many of the products and technologies as well as much of the expertise that are necessary in order to develop and build weapons of mass destruction programmes can be acquired in Denmark or through Danish companies.

Therefore, it is important that Danish companies and research institutions are aware of the risk of disseminating products and knowledge that can be used in connection with the manufacturing of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons, particularly when these companies and institutions have contact with partners in countries that are suspected of actively seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. It is important to be aware that attempts will often be made to acquire proliferation-related products by a n p ix indirect means, such as front companies and middle-men, in order to mask the real identity of the end-user of the products. Photo: S c Photo:

As part of PET’s efforts within the field of non- that these weapons might fall into the wrong proliferation, PET has paid a number of visits to hands could in itself give rise to concern and Danish companies and education institutions, insecurity. This fear was evident, for example, some jointly with the Danish Enterprise and in connection with the anthrax letters in the Construction Authority. Similarly, regular studies USA in 2001 and 2002, which caused deaths and investigations have been carried out of and at the same time spread insecurity and various transactions relating to the export of gave cause for concern. Genuine nuclear dual-use equipment to critical countries. weapons are so complicated to develop that it is probably still only a handful of countries

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Terrorist financing because terrorist networks often make use of several intermediate stages in, for example, fund transfers. PET’s efforts within the field of terrorist financing aim at preventing PET’s focus on the field of terrorist financing the transfer or passing on of funds is targeted at financial resources that are to individuals, organisations, groups exported out of Denmark to different conflict or associations that are involved in zones in, for example, the Middle East. Each terrorism. year, therefore, PET in co-operation with other authorities carries out a number of control actions in airports, etc. The combination of PET’s Even though the acts of terrorism carried control actions and other security activities out in Europe in recent years have been that are carried out in Danish airports reveals “inexpensive” actions, transfers of funds can that many travellers export considerable cash be an important indicator in investigations sums to countries in conflict zones. of individuals or networks that are planning to commit a terrorist act. At the same time, If in connection with a control action suspicions investigations of, for example, fund transfers are raised, more detailed investigations will be can yield important information about initiated, and there may also be grounds for individuals affiliated to a group of persons confiscating values, including cash sums. suspected of terrorist activity. The unit co-operates with a number of PET is aware to what extent financing networks institutions, primarily in the state and financial evolve from primarily being a support function sectors, including banks, electronic payment in connection with terrorism to having a more services (PBS), the Public Prosecutor for operational role in relation to the planning and Serious Economic Crime (SØK) and the Danish execution of terrorist acts. With their resolve, tax authorities (SKAT). Similarly, in 2006 and international connections and experience in 2007, the unit paid a number of visits to operating covertly, the financing networks companies in which awareness presentations can play an important role in activities that were given with focus on suspicious money may have direct importance for the threat to transfers – both into and out of Denmark. Denmark and Danish interests abroad.

Both in Denmark and in the rest of Europe, the groups of persons that are suspected of Since 2004, PET has had a special involvement in terrorist activities have, by and unit – the TEFINE (Terror Financial large, been self-financed. This means that the Networks) Unit – which investigates money is often procured by means of personal suspicious financial transactions, income, simple offences against property which may be in violation of Section or credit card fraud, which complicates 114 a of the Criminal Code with investigative possibilities. In addition, it can respect to terrorist financing. be difficult to prove the direct connection of the money transactions to terrorism, partly

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Center for Terror Analysis (CTA) CTA’s analyses can be divided into three categories:

PET’s Center for Terror Analysis • Threat assessments in relation to specific (CTA) was established in October individuals, events and threats, but also more 2006 and became fully operational general national threat assessments. on 1 January 2007. • Analyses of terrorist groups or threats CTA’s task is to conduct analyses abroad of importance for Denmark or, for and assessments of the threat of example, tourist destinations abroad which terrorism in relation to Denmark and Danes travel to. in so doing contribute to improving the ability of Danish authorities • Analyses of tendencies in the terrorism to prevent and investigate acts of field, such as how terrorism is financed and terrorism. how individuals become involved in terrorist activity. CTA comprises staff from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE), CTA’s analyses are used by the Government’s the Danish Security and Intelligence security organisation as a basis for decisions Service (PET), the Ministry of in connection with counter-terrorism. In this Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the respect, principal recipients of the analyses are the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry Danish Emergency Management of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Agency (DEMA), respectively. Staff Ministry of Defence and the Danish Emergency are seconded to CTA on a rotation Management Agency. basis. However, the analyses are used also by, for Affiliated to CTA, a reference group example, the police in connection with tackling has been established, comprising specific tasks relating to terrorism cases and in representatives of the participating connection with street-level efforts to prevent authorities. terrorism. Since its creation, CTA has produced Some CTA analyses are published. This applies, more than 100 analyses on a wide for example, to an analysis on radicalisation range of topics concerning the that describes the different phases that a threat of terrorism to Denmark and person might undergo – e.g. in Islamist circles in Danish interests abroad Denmark – toward steadily increasing acceptance of undemocratic and violent means to achieve political and religious ends. Another analysis deals with Islamist ideologues’ use of a violent interpretation of the jihad concept in their effort to motivate Muslims to participate in violent activities. In addition, CTA’s

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assessment of the nature and scale of the As a point of departure, the VTD is classified. threat of terrorism to Denmark is published However, an unclassified version is published on on PET’s website. PET’s website at www.pet.dk/CTA

Assessment of the Terror Threat The purpose of publishing an assessment of Against Denmark (VTD) the terror threat against Denmark is to provide In May 2007, CTA presented for the first time citizens with a more extensive and better the document, Assessment of the Terror Threat understanding of the threat from terrorism. Against Denmark (VTD), which describes and Furthermore, the purpose is also to meet the assesses the general nature and scale of the increasing interest of the public for this area terrorist threat against Denmark and Danes and at the same time to avoid the formation abroad. The VTD is compiled on the basis of of myths and misunderstandings. Therefore, it information from numerous sources, including has been decided to publish a summary of the CTA’s other analyses, material from the current terrorist threat and a lengthy report participating authorities, reports from partners describing the elements in further detail. The as well as open sources. The assessment is assessment, however, includes no specific presented to relevant authorities, including recommendations for the citizens. In case the the Government’s security organisation, and threat assessments should give rise to specific determines the national threat level. recommendations, these will be given directly by the authorities responsible, e.g. the Ministry The VTD is updated at regular intervals or in the of Foreign Affairs, the Danish Emergency event of sudden and significant changes in the Management Agency and the national police threat picture. districts.

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7. Counter-extremism

in 2002. This is primarily the result of the conflict One of PET’s principal tasks is to prevent groups or surrounding the youth centre, Ungdomshuset, individuals from employing extremist and undemocratic at Jagtvej 69 in Copenhagen. methods – e.g. violence, vandalism or threats – to achieve political, ideological or religious objectives. In the period leading up to the clearance of the house on 1 March 2007, there was massive Characteristic of the steadily increasing polarisation national and international support and backing and radicalisation of the extreme wings of the political to the youth centre environment in the form spectrum is the steadily increasing internationalisation of support actions and demonstrations. In this and collaboration between likeminded individuals connection, 137 incidents involving vandalism, outside Denmark in connection with demonstrations, demonstrations, placard posting, etc. against etc. Within the field of counter-extremism, extensive Danish Missions abroad were observed. efforts are carried out, as in other parts of the Security and Intelligence Service, to prevent right- or left- As a result of the clearance of Ungdomshuset, wing extremists from committing criminal offences or which resulted in several days of massive street disturbing public peace and order. One of PET’s key tasks disturbances in Copenhagen, the environment is to inform the police in Denmark and abroad about around Ungdomshuset launched a new strategy extremist threats, so as to enable the relevant police to acquire a new building, which partly involved authorities to tailor the response to the current threat. holding weekly “Thursday demonstrations”. In addition, on 6 October 2007, activists attempted to occupy a disused pumping station in Copenhagen. Demonstrations, vandalism, violence and other initiatives instigated in Left-wing extremism support of Ungdomshuset resulted in approx. The left-wing extremist environment in Denmark 1,600 arrests, including of foreign nationals, appears today more as a united front, in a way in the period between mid-December 2006 not seen since Denmark held the EU Presidency and the beginning of October 2007. The disturbances required an extremely resource- demanding effort on the part of the police.

In June 2007, individuals from the left- wing­ extremist environment participated in demonstrations in connection with the G8 summit in Heiligendamm in Germany. A number of the tactics that the demonstrators used during the G8 demonstrations were employed in the attempt to occupy a disused pumping station in Copenhagen on 6 October 2007. P HOTO : S c

Clearance of Ungdomshuset

a n p ix The illegal occupation of the youth centre, Ungdomshuset, at Jagtvej 69 in Copenhagen was terminated on 1 March 2007. In the months

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leading up to the clearance, Ungdomshuset demonstrations, primarily in Copenhagen’s had been heavily barricaded by the youth Nørrebro district. In the days and months centre’s users, who had no intention of leaving following the clearance of Ungdomshuset, the building voluntarily. Together with the demonstrations on several occasions resulted Copenhagen Police, PET was involved in, among in violent riots in which, for example, cars other things, the planning and execution of were set alight and Molotov cocktails were the clearance operation. The actual operation thrown at the personnel carriers used by the to clear Ungdomshuset was carried out very police. Similarly, the clearance has been used quickly and without causing serious personal by extremist environments as a pretext for injury. In connection with the clearance, a large further radicalisation. number of chrysanthemum bombs were found, among other things. Right-wing extremism In relation to the right-wing extremist For many years, Ungdomshuset had been a environment in Denmark, PET has in recent popular venue for a number of activities in years observed a continued high level of the Copenhagen activist environment. The activity. Both internationally and nationally loss of the building led to violent protest within the last few years, fronts have been

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sharply drawn up on the extreme wings of the groups in Denmark and abroad, and persons political spectrum. In Europe, terrorist attacks from the right-wing extremist environments have struck, among other places, Madrid and in Denmark have participated in manifestations London, and the rolling up of terrorist cells in a outside the country’s borders. number of European countries has reinforced the perception and belief among certain groups A concrete example of international co-operation on the extreme right wing that the West is in could be seen at the annual Rudolf Hess conflict with the Muslim world. In Denmark, the March in 2007, which took place in Kolding. The Cartoon Crisis and the ongoing terrorism cases demonstration was scheduled to take place in have had a similar effect. the German town of Wunsiedel, but was banned by the German authorities, which is why it was The various groups continue to engage in held in Kolding instead. active efforts to recruit new members and sympathisers. Between the groups there is a Approx. 150 neo-Nazis from several countries, certain degree of mutual co-operation, which including Denmark, Sweden and Germany, is reflected, for example, in the form of frequent took part in the march. A further 50 right- meetings at concerts, demonstrations and wing German extremists were detained at other events. the Danish-German border. In connection with the event, clashes occurred between the Also internationally, there continues to be participants in the march and the police. co-operation between right-wing extremist

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Disseminating and promoting racist and October 2006 after calling for an arson attack derisive messages on the internet, through against the Minister for the Interior and Health. the media, through posters and fliers continue In August 2007, the spokesman was sentenced to be one of the means systematically used by to six months’ imprisonment for this offence. right-wing extremist groups and individuals. Following the dissolution of Dansk Front, the The aim of these messages is to recruit and extreme right-wing’s activities continued in retain supporters as well as create antagonism other similar organisations and networks. between the general public and ethnic minorities. In general, it is PET’s assessment that the right-wing extremist environment contains the It is the assessment that the group of persons potential for further radicalisation and violent responsible for the more general propagation conflicts. of right-wing extremist messages is also involved in acts of intimidation and harassment Confrontations between right- and left-wing of persons of another ethnic origin. extremists In recent years, incidents of confrontation In the efforts to promote polarisation, there between individuals and groups, respectively, is a constant awareness in right-wing extremist from the right- and left-wing extremist circles in relation to how the public agenda can environments have been steadily increasing in best be utilised as a platform for delivering number. The majority of incidents have involved right-wing extremist messages. In this context, actions, including of a violent nature, carried the right-wing extremist environment retains out by the left-wing extremist environment a considerable focus on the Cartoon Crisis. and targeted at the events (demonstrations, However, in connection with the propagation meetings, etc.) held by individuals and groups of right-wing extremist views, there have also from the right-wing extremist environment. been several examples where efforts have However, there have also been examples been made to exploit the publicity surrounding observed where right-wing extremists have arrests and trials concerning planned terrorist been responsible for violent activities against attacks in Denmark and abroad. left-wing extremists. It is PET’s assessment that within the left- and right-wing extremist In recent years, there have been examples environments there is an increased focus on where right-wing extremist networks have such violent activities. publicly announced an end to their activities. The persons behind the network have, however, Whilst the number of violent episodes continues typically continued their activities in new or to be relatively low, it is PET’s assessment that already existing right-wing extremist groups. there is a risk that the confrontations may escalate. In this connection, PET has observed The organisation Dansk Front, which used to increased efforts in right- and left-wing be a strong force in the right-wing extremist extremist circles to obtain weapons as part environment, dissolved itself in July 2007. of the reciprocal violence. The use of these Prior to its dissolution, the organisation weapons in the confrontations will lead to a was characterised by internal discord. The considerable escalation of the violence in such organisation’s spokesman was expelled in confrontations.

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politicians can be regarded as low. PET therefore does not believe that there has been an increase in the number of cases or that the nature of the cases has worsened. Nevertheless, even less serious forms of harassment and threats can place major stress on the politician targeted. At the same time, it is naturally a societal problem if politicians are threatened or harassed by virtue of their political activity. For this reason also, it is important that persons who in the course of their political activities are a n p ix subjected to harassment or threatening behaviour report such behaviour to the police.

Photo: S c Photo: In spring 2006, PET collaborated with Local Government Denmark (LGDK) to produce a Threats against public figures handbook that contains tips and advice for, In recent years, there has been increasing focus among others, local politicians on how to on threats and harassment against politicians prepare themselves to face threats and and other public figures. The extent to which violence and how to respond in such situations. a person risks being subjected to threats and harassment typically depends on the respective Racism and xenophobia person’s visibility in the public arena or arises Criminal offences that are potentially racially in connection with specific issues. There are motivated are an area that PET takesvery examples where politicians on both the right seriously as part of the Security and and left wing are occasionally subjected to Intelligence Service’s efforts to prevent and serious harassment. PET is kept regularly counter extremism which, depending on the informed of this type of matter and assesses, circumstances, can constitute a security threat among other things, whether the threats in Denmark. warrant special security-related measures. Since autumn 1992, PET has received reports It can be difficult to provide a comprehensive from the police districts on criminal offences profile of the kind of person who harasses and and incidents that are suspected of being threatens politicians. It can range from persons racially motivated and are directed against who are angry at “the system”, persons who are foreigners. The arrangement was altered in mentally ill, persons who are under the influence 2001 to include any criminal offence or incident of drugs or alcohol, or resourceful citizens who that is potentially motivated by racism or are used to getting their own way. And then religious hostility, irrespective of whether the there is, naturally, the threat from extremist criminal offence or incident is directed against environments. a person or interest of foreign or Danish origin.

Certain politicians may be extremely vulnerable, PET has produced a set of guidelines for the but in general the level of threat against police districts that describe in which situations

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PET should be notified of criminal offences that factors, including the fact that not all criminal are potentially racially or religiously motivated. offences with a potential racist or religious According to these guidelines, PET should be motive are reported to the police districts, notified when the criminal offence is potentially as well as the fact that it remains uncertain motivated by the perpetrator’s conceptions whether the districts actually notify PET of all about differences between people on the relevant offences. grounds of race, skin colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, or their faith/religion. In the light of the above and because the information received must generally be Thus, PET should be notified when one or more considered relatively limited, it is, according possible indicators point in the direction of to PET’s assessment, very difficult with even racist or religious elements in a criminal a moderate certainty to comment on the offence, unless this is conclusively contradicted causes, correlations, developments and trends by other information. In other words, there is no in regard to this type of cases. requirement that the racist or religious motivation behind the criminal offence must be The number of reports in 2005 and 2006 were clearly demonstrated. quite similar, while there was a decrease in the number of reports in 2007. There was a similar The objective of this reporting scheme is decrease in the number of reports concerning primarily to provide PET with the possibility violations of Sections 266 b and 266 c of the of assessing whether there are signs of Danish Criminal Code. a more organised and systematic criminal activity arising out of racism and xenophobia. Based on these observations, PET wishes to This assessment is made by comparing each reorganise the present reporting system in such reported offence with the rest of the stored a way as to allow PET greater opportunity itself information of PET and by comparing the to collect, process and analyse the relevant various reported offences. information directly in the police’s electronic case-handling system. Such a reorganisation In 2007, PET received reports of 35 cases of a would in PET’s view make it possible in the future potentially racist nature. The previous year 96 to obtain a more adequate and accurate picture cases were reported, while the figure was 87 of developments in an area that is still, for 2005. nevertheless, characterised by the fact that not all criminal offences that are potentially The reported cases from 2007 primarily relate motivated by racism necessarily come to the to various forms of harassment and vandalism, knowledge of the police. whilst only a few cases relate to threats and violence. It has, furthermore, been decided to expand the existing reporting system to include also According to PET’s assessment, it remains criminal acts that may be politically motivated. uncertain to what extent the reports accurately reflect the scope and nature of criminal offences with a potential racist or religious motive. This is due to a number of different

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8. Counter-espionage

Soviet Union and the Communist ideology as Certain foreign intelligence services continue to be very well as obtain technical and scientific products active in Denmark, where attempts are made to obtain and information that, due to the embargo information about foreign and security policy matters. restrictions, could not be legally transferred Also information of a more factual and technical nature to Warsaw Pact countries. Furthermore, as a is sought, such as information about vital lines of result of the security policy situation, there was great interest in Western countries’ communication, utilities and research findings. Countering military strategies, development and mutual and preventing espionage therefore continues to be an co-operation. important field of responsibility for PET. The threat of espionage against Denmark remains present – not least due to increasing The threat of espionage against Denmark globalisation, international competition and the and Danish interests has changed in line with high level of technological know-how. However, the international security policy developments. the threat today has become more multifaceted During the Cold War, intelligence services and manifests itself in other areas than actual from the Warsaw Pact countries in particular subversive activities and the circumvention operated actively in the West. The primary of trade restrictions. Interest is increasingly objectives of this espionage activity were to targeted at unlawfully obtaining information exert political influence for the benefit of the within, for example, research and technology.

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As espionage can be a serious threat to electronic industrial espionage and attacks with Denmark’s security and competitiveness, it is the purpose of disrupting the operation of vital that organisations, companies, public information systems etc. authorities and the general public are aware that there continue to be countries, organisations and companies that attempt to gather confidential information by unlawful means.

The very few cases of espionage that have come to public knowledge in Denmark cannot be taken as evidence that espionage does not occur in Denmark. In a number of instances, PET’s preventive efforts have prevented cases from developing into serious cases of espionage. In these instances, PET has interrupted developments that have been on the brink of developing into genuine espionage, for example by drawing attention to the fact that PET was aware of activities that could constitute a violation of the Criminal Code.

In addition, it is assumed that the official figure for cases of industrial espionage does not reflect the true figure, as a number of companies for various reasons choose not to report suspicions of espionage to the authorities.

In recent years, several countries in Europe have been subjected to electronic industrial espionage (hacking) attacks targeted at the strategic and financial planning of public authorities and private companies. In several instances, there has been suspicion of espionage activity perpetrated by foreign intelligence services. Although no similar tendencies have as yet been observed in Denmark, it is an area of which PET is very much aware. Therefore, in the light of the increasing digitalisation of public institutions and private companies, among other things, PET will implement a number of initiatives to raise awareness of the risk of

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9. Organised crime

Seized narcotics

During 2006, approx. 150 employees were investigation and forwards these matters to the transferred from the National Centre of appropriate police district. The investigation is Investigation (NEC) of the Danish National Police subsequently anchored in the particular police to PET. The transfer comprised, among other district and is conducted under the normal things, a number of staff from NEC’s Flying supervision of the regional public prosecutor in Squad as well as the Monitoring and Analysis question. Officers from PET can participate in Unit. This unit is now attached to PET’s Centre the investigation by specified agreement. for Organised Crime, which comprises an Analysis Section and an Investigation Section. Another task of PET’s Centre for Organised Crime is to contribute to identifying potential The task of the Centre for Organised Crime is relations between the most serious forms to analyse the most serious forms of organised of organised crime and the Security and crime. By the most serious forms of organised Intelligence Service’s other areas of operation, crime is meant gang and network crime, which including the efforts to combat terrorism. is characterised by its international and professional nature and which is committed by The objective of the efforts to combat the most use of violence, threats and weapons in hard- serious forms of organised crime is to secure to-infiltrate environments where the security a basis for proactive and intelligence-based level is high. intervention, early and precisely, in order to prevent a criminal act from taking full effect. To Based on the analyses, PET’s Centre for assist these efforts, the Centre for Organised Organised Crime draws up specific proposals for Crime therefore makes wide use of sources,

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observation and other forms of technical manufacturing laboratories were uncovered. intervention. Similarly, co-operation with the The investigation also uncovered a number of police authorities of other countries is of vital criminal offences across the country related importance and therefore assigned high priority. to extensive trade in narcotics. A total of nine people aged 25 to 50 were arrested, including The co-operation between PET’s Centre for a 27-year-old ringleader. In the same case, a Organised Crime, the Danish National Police, further nine people had been arrested earlier. the police districts and foreign police authorities, etc. has on an ongoing basis Investigators and analysis officers from resulted in the launch of investigations into PET’s Centre for Organised Crime have also criminal gangs and networks with international contributed to strengthening the intelligence- branches that extend beyond Europe. The related efforts within the field of anti-terrorism investigations have dealt with, for example, and have provided considerable assistance in extremely serious drug and weapons violations connection with the investigations regarding as well as serious bodily harm crime. In the the Glostrup Case, the Vollsmose Case and the cases that at the present time have resulted Glasvej Case. in indictments and convictions, the convicted persons have received lengthy prison sentences. Lastly, PET’s Centre for Organised Crime has provided assistance to a number of other In an extensive drugs case with international countries as part of investigations into serious connections, a Danish national was convicted in organised crime against individuals or networks December 2007 of smuggling 15 kg of cocaine that, in connection with their criminal activities, and approx. 550 kg of hash into the country, have had contact to or have resided in Denmark. and also of committing 15 counts of document forgery. The Danish national was arrested and convicted on the basis of investigations conducted with assistance from PET’s Centre for Organised Crime and in collaboration with a number of authorities. The convicted person, who has connections to a European criminal organisation, was sentenced to 11 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment. The convicted person has appealed the judgment, but admitted document forgery and smuggling 550 kg of hash into Denmark

During 2007, PET’s Centre for Organised Crime in collaboration with Funen Police carried out an investigation into a narcotics organisation that, among other things, manufactured “skunk” (an improved form of cannabis). During a large-scale police operation in December 2007 on Funen, in Jutland and on Lolland-Falster, five skunk- Profits from a delivery

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10. Security

As a rule, officers are required to have served The Security Department provides operational support in the police force for five years before being to PET’s other units as well as the police districts eligible to apply to join the Special Intervention from the Special Intervention Unit, the Surveillance Unit, and the admission process itself consists Unit, the Technical Support Centre and the Negotiation of both physical and psychological tests. Besides being in good physical shape, applicants Group, respectively. In addition, the Department’s must possess composure, level-headedness Personal Protection Unit and Physical Protection Group and common sense, and also have good undertake a number of personal protection assignments. collaboration skills in order to join the Special The Security Department participated with considerable Intervention Unit. manpower and equipment in the arrest operations in connection with the terrorism cases from Vollsmose Once admitted into the Special Intervention and Copenhagen as well as in the clearance of the youth Unit, officers undergo a long and intensive centre, Ungdomshuset, at Jagtvej 69 in Copenhagen. training programme. The training encompasses, among other things, gun battles in enclosed spaces, fire-fighting, liberation of hostages on aircrafts, in houses and on buses, advanced The Special Intervention Unit first-aid, assault exercises from rooftops and PET’s Special Intervention Unit is a special unit helicopters, as well as sea-based operations. whose task is to maintain an operational anti- terrorism preparedness and response capability Special Intervention Unit tasks include, among and contribute to combating serious forms of others: crime by providing sound options for performing difficult police assignments where the standard • Hostage rescue police training and equipment is not adequate. • Dangerous arrest operations • Planning, management and execution of The Special Intervention Unit comprises a difficult intervention assignments number of police officers who form part of • Special personal protection a preparedness capability that is able to • Special monitoring assignments respond to sudden unforeseen events. When not engaged in operations, Special Intervention The Special Intervention Unit engages in Unit police officers receive various forms of ongoing collaboration with units from the training, including tactical intervention training, Danish armed forces that provide assistance target practice and other similar activities. in the form of personnel and ordnance as

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well as support in operational assignments If a member of the Special Intervention Unit needs and in connection with training. In addition, to wear all of his equipment, he is carrying around 60 working groups have been established to kg. The above photos show the Special Intervention co-ordinate knowledge, technology and tactics Unit – with support from the armed forces – during that are used in connection with operational an exercise in northern Jutland. The passenger ship assignments and training where the armed “Peter Wessel” has been hijacked by terrorists and forces provide back-up for the police. the exercise is to liberate the ship.

The international collaboration between photo assignments, surveillance and searches. intervention forces in Europe is constantly In addition, the Surveillance Unit assists in the extended in order to develop and utilise the installation of surveillance equipment as well technical and tactical capacities that the as equipment that supports interception of intervention units possess. Therefore, the communication. Special Intervention Unit participates in meeting fora and working groups with the Similarly, the Surveillance Unit provides Nordic countries and the EU Member States. assistance to the police districts in connection with the investigation of other forms of serious In August 2007, Belgium, Germany, Finland, crime, i.e. when the investigation requires Norway and Sweden participated with observers, the use of the Surveillance Unit’s special intervention groups, aircrafts and landing capacities and competencies. Furthermore, crafts in a large-scale maritime exercise at the Surveillance Unit provides training support Frederikshavn, which was conducted by the for the officers in the police districts that Special Intervention Unit with support from the undertake observation assignments. armed forces. The exercise scenario was a hijacking of the passenger ship, Peter Wessel. The Surveillance Unit is primarily composed of police officers who undergo a special training The Surveillance Unit programme in PET, which is supplemented by The Surveillance Unit is a crucial support courses abroad. Similarly in this area, lessons function for the Security and Intelligence learned and experience are shared with Service’s operational activities, in particular corresponding units in other countries. in relation to terrorism, espionage, extremism and serious organised crime. The Surveillance Unit carries out shadow assignments, fixed monitoring assignments of different kinds,

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The royal couple The Technical Support Centre such as electronics or radio technicians. during a visit in PET’s Technical Support Centre performs a However, the Technical Support Centre also has Frederiksværk on 14 number of tasks within the field of technical engineers and civilian IT experts on its staff. June 2007. and IT-based surveillance, tracking and security as support for PET’s operational units. The staff are divided into function-based groups with different competencies, and The centre’s main fields of activity are to they regularly receive individual competence provide technical assistance in regard to the development training, including abroad, that establishment of different types of surveillance takes a point of departure in their current level and interception. In addition, the Technical of technical expertise. The Technical Support Support Centre provides assistance in Centre maintains close dialogue with partners connection with the tracking of individuals or throughout the world in the development of vehicles. Furthermore, the Technical Support technical surveillance equipment, etc. Centre performs security sweeps, for example in connection with uncovering hidden weapons, The Technical Support Centre also provides explosives and communications interception a certain degree of assistance to the police equipment at special localities. The centre also districts in connection with invasion of the supports the operational units in connection secrecy of communication and assists in the with searches, securing of information, etc. technical training of the staff in the districts The Technical Support Centre is typically that undertake duties relating to invasion of composed of police officers who have a the secrecy of communication. supplementary technical training qualification,

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recruited to the unit. Officers wishing to join the Personal Protection Unit undergo physical fitness tests, language tests as well as tests in weapons use and driving ability. A personal protection officer must be in good physical shape, have good co-operation skills and be able to keep a clear head in pressure situations. Each year, personal protection officers are Photo: All required to pass tests in, among other things, driving skills, weapons use and physical training. a n Ha nsen, Ha lsnæs K The Personal Protection Unit has command of a special unit – “Gamma 10” – which has a special mission-oriented training programme and access to special equipment. In close collaboration with the special units and personal ommune protection officers of the armed forces, Gamma 10 undertakes personal protection assignments in connection with, for example, ministerial visits to conflict areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Personal Protection Unit As already mentioned, personal protection As a consequence of developments in the is an increasingly important task for the general threat picture and not least a number Security and Intelligence Service and through of specific threats, PET has in recent years more frequent recruitment of new staff from, been assigned a steadily growing number of among other places, PET’s Special Intervention tasks relating to the protection of individuals Unit, attempts have been made by PET to and institutions. accommodate the steadily increasing need for trained personal protection officers. In PET is responsible for all personal protection connection with the implementation in 2007 of tasks in Denmark in the public sector, and Anti-Terrorism Package III, PET was allocated PET’s Personal Protection Unit today protects approx. a further DKK 20 million, which was members of the Royal Family, members of earmarked for special purposes, including a the Government, certain politicians and strengthening of the Personal Protection Unit. foreign ambassadors, as well as, under certain circumstances, foreign guests and other A special office, Operational Co-ordination, public figures in Denmark. Personal protection provides support for the Personal Protection is offered on the basis of a concrete threat Unit and deals with, among other things, cases assessment. concerning threats against Ministers, Members of the Folketing (MFs) and public figures. In this The Personal Protection Unit comprises police respect, Operational Co-ordination conducts officers that have typically served in the police security briefings and, when necessary, force for six to seven years before being implements relevant security measures.

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“Gamma 10” personal protection officers at work in one of the world hotspots. Gamma 10 is a special unit within PET’s Physical Protection Group that undertakes personal protection assignments in connection with, for example, ministerial visits to conflict areas.

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In addition, Operational Co-ordination performs The Negotiation Group also provides assistance tasks relating to, for instance, the organisation in connection with different types of kidnapping of visits abroad by certain Ministers, and in and hostage situations. This could concern, this regard undertakes responsibility for the for example, family-related kidnappings and contact to Danish embassies abroad and hostage-takings that have financial, political foreign authorities. Operational Co-ordination and religious objectives. The Negotiation also carries out security briefings of staff from Group also provides assistance in connection the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to their with Danes who are taken hostage abroad. In postings in certain countries. this connection, the negotiators assist, for example, with situation analyses, planning of The Negotiation Group solution scenarios and logistics in relation to PET’s Negotiation Group provides assistance the negotiation process, such as getting hold in connection with, for example, kidnapping and of possible ransom money. Providing advice hostage situations. The task of the negotiators and support to the relatives in connection with is to make contact with the perpetrators with a hostage situation is also a key task of the the aim of, if possible, gaining control and an Negotiation Group. In addition, the Negotiation overview of the situation and thus create the Group advises Danish Missions abroad. basis for reaching a peaceful solution. The Negotiation Group was, for instance, The Negotiation Group comprises staff who involved in the efforts to secure a non-violent possess great maturity and considerable life outcome to the hijacking of the ship, the Danica experience and who are carefully selected on White, off Somalia’s coast in June 2007. the basis of their personality as well as their communicative and empathetic skills. After The Physical Protection Group selection, the candidates undergo an intensive The Physical Protection Group undertakes training programme, partly in the UK and the surveillance and personal protection USA. assignments of a more stationary nature in relation to, for example, the Government, the In their daily work, the negotiators are attached Folketing and the Royal Family. In addition, the to other police units, where they perform their Physical Protection Group provides advice and normal duties. However, they can be called in protection in connection with special transport when necessary and are able to travel to any of valuables. The efforts include both threat part of the world at very short notice. assessments and operational activities.

The Negotiation Group provides assistance to In addition, the Physical Protection Group PET’s operational units and the police districts advises the financial sector on matters in connection with incidents that require concerning security in relation to cash- negotiation, etc. in order to avoid use of force, handling firms and depots. In 2007, the Physical avoid damage, collect information or promote Protection Group also initiated training of a surrender. This could be, for instance, when special unit that can deploy explosive detection perpetrators have barricaded themselves, or dogs in connection with security sweeps and in connection with police handling of suicidal or surveillance of special localities. mentally ill individuals.

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Preventive security 11. and civil protection

Preventive Security Department PET advises public authorities and private Developments in the threat picture have actors in areas where protection lies in the emphasised the necessity of supplementing public interest. the traditional investigative approach with more multi-faceted, preventive efforts with the aim Physical security of strengthening society’s overall resilience to In step with developments in the general threat terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass picture and in connection with specific events in destruction, extremism and espionage. Denmark and abroad, an increasing demand has been registered in recent years for advice on In recent years PET has, therefore, established physical security matters. a number of partnerships with public authorities and private actors that possess competencies, PET provides security advice to among others, experience and know-how of relevance to the the Folketing, a number of ministries, agencies efforts in these areas. and organisations, as well as to individuals under particular threat. In addition, PET advises In order to further enhance this co-operation, foreign diplomatic Missions in Denmark and the PET established a Centre for Protective Security Royal Family. and a Centre for Prevention inside PET’s Preventive Security Department in September Denmark’s presence in a number of international 2007. The centres provide holistic and targeted hotspots has led to a further demand for advice advice designed to reduce the vulnerability of within the field of physical security. The advice is potential targets of terrorism and espionage given to, among others, Danish diplomatic in Denmark. In addition, a number of early Missions abroad and focuses on how to secure preventive efforts are carried out targeted at buildings, areas and access routes. preventing radicalisation and violent extremism. Critical national infrastructure The requirements placed on PET to deliver The Centre for Protective Security security advice to a steadily wider circle of PET plays an important role as adviser in relation public authorities and private companies etc. to Denmark’s internal security. have increased in the light of the heightened threat of terrorism in recent years. The Centre for Protective Security provides advisory support within the areas of physical The intention is to systematise the Security security, IT security and personnel security. and Intelligence Service’s advice to the sectors By providing holistic advisory support, the that deliver essential services to society, so as Security and Intelligence Service contributes to enable PET to supply targeted and holistic to promoting a cross-sectoral security culture advice to relevant public authorities, trade among relevant public and private actors, as well organisations or specific critical sectors. as reducing the critical national infrastructure’s vulnerability to terrorism and espionage. By critical national infrastructure is meant the sectors that are necessary for society to function. They include the utility sector, such as electricity, gas, water and heating, as well as

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communication and IT, transport, food products risks in relation to national security. The aim and health care. The maintenance of these of the dialogue has been to help build a cross- sectors’ activities must be secured, also after sectoral security culture among relevant public a possible terrorist attack. Therefore, the and private actors and to ensure a measured Security and Intelligence Service provides advice and balanced response to any changes in the on measures and initiatives that can protect threat picture. against terrorism and ensure a swift restoration of the supply activities in the event of a As regards the maritime and civil aviation terrorist attack. authorities that regulate and supervise parts of the critical national infrastructure, the The advice is provided partly by means of a Security and Intelligence Service provides number of contact groups and partly through advice on securing, for example, ports, ships, direct contact with relevant authorities, shipping companies and airports against organisations and companies. terrorist attack. The advice is based on ongoing assessments of both the maritime threat Since 2004, PET has had a number of contact picture and the threat against civil aviation. groups comprising representatives of public authorities, trade organisations and a number IT security of large Danish companies. The contact groups In conformity with Circular No. 204 of 7 December have served as a framework for dialogue and 2001 issued by the Prime Minister’s Office, PET exchange of information about threats and performs the role of national security authority

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in relation to the handling of NATO and EU police officers and persons performing tasks classified information by civil authorities. This for the police, whereas other public authorities, entails that PET is responsible for the approval on the basis of PET’s personnel security and supervision of IT systems and networks investigations, themselves undertake the final that handle such information. security clearance of their own personnel. Before initiating a security investigation, In line with the increased use of classification, written consent must be obtained from the particularly in relation to the exchange of EU person to be investigated. information, there is an increasing need for the approval of authorities’ networks. The scope of the specific personnel security investigation depends on the classification level PET collaborates with the Danish Defence the particular person is to have access to. Intelligence Service (FE) in order to create up-to-date and flexible solutions in the field of In recent years, there has been an increase in IT security, whilst simultaneously maintaining the number of security investigations. a high level of security. In order to enhance and further develop these efforts, PET The Centre for Prevention participates actively in a number of national and international co-operative fora on IT security. Security investigations

The increasing dependence on internet-based 30000 providers and services has meant that PET 25000 devotes increased attention to these, particularly 20000 with regard to the lines of communication 15000 between the various authorities and also the 10000 communication between authorities and citizens. 5000 In this regard, the Security and Intelligence 0 2006 2007 Service engages in close collaboration with, for example, the National IT and Telecom Agency. With a point of departure in PET’s overall In addition, PET has established co-operation knowledge of terrorism, proliferation of weapons with a number of relevant public authorities of mass destruction, espionage and extremism, and private companies regarding IT security, PET’s Centre for Prevention contributes to in which, for example, experience is shared and ensuring that relevant actors in Danish society trends within the field are discussed. possess adequate knowledge and competence to participate in tackling these threats.

Personnel security The Centre for Prevention targets the Upon request by the employing authority, PET preventive efforts at, among other things, undertakes security investigations into personnel violent radicalisation in particularly vulnerable who are to have access to classified material. groups and areas. The Security and Intelligence Service is responsible for the final security clearance of

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In addition, the Centre for Prevention supports dialogue by widening the circle of dialogue relevant actors’ acquisition of specific partners with additional representatives of knowledge of prevention measures through local Muslim environments in Denmark that training materials on, for example, physical enjoy social status and who are in a position security, IT security and personnel security to exert influence in the relevant local as well as through training programmes and communities. awareness presentations. In so doing, PET wishes to enhance the Target groups and partners in these efforts “disagreement dialogue” by also engaging in include, among others, actors within the dialogue with individuals who represent transport and utility sector, the police districts, controversial views. Often, it is precisely these local authorities as well as representatives of persons who are in the best position to local environments, religious communities and influence, in a non-violent direction, the views interest organisations. of young people who are embarking down a path of radicalisation. Radicalisation The terrorism-related arrests in the Glostrup For a long time, PET has had close co-operation Case, the Vollsmose Case and most recently with the Danish Prison and Probation Service the Glasvej Case underline that also in Denmark with the aim of countering radicalisation in there is a need for an early preventive effort prisons by means of targeted preventive in order to discourage young people from efforts. With a point of departure in the already becoming attracted to radical messages and established co-operation, PET and the Danish embarking down a path of radicalisation that Prison and Probation Service have decided to could ultimately lead to actual terrorist acts. launch a systematic training programme for prison staff. The programme is designed to Effective preventive efforts against enable them to identify signs of radicalisation, radicalisation must be based on not just early implement preventive measures and pass on action but also on a multi-faceted approach. relevant information to PET. Therefore, PET collaborates with a number of authorities with the aim of supporting their ability to identify radicalisation processes as well as independently implement preventive measures.

A key task of PET’s Centre for Prevention is also to handle PET’s dialogue with a number of representatives of ethnic and religious minorities. The focus of the dialogue is the prevention of terrorism and the local environment’s opportunities to contribute in this regard.

Based on own experience as well as experience from abroad, PET will further develop the

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of identifying specific response options across Preventive efforts against the traditional areas of responsibility of the radicalisation: participating groups.

Co-operating with and advising: The conference underlined the importance of – Police districts and municipalities, the problem being viewed from a multi-level e.g. within the framework of SSP and multi-faceted perspective, on the grounds (schools, social services, police) that radicalisation occurs in broad sections of co-operation society and may be visible in different contexts, and because there are many explanatory – Danish Prison and Probation factors, not least of a political, social and Service psychological nature. – Other authorities – Representatives of local The underlying potential in the establishment environments, interest of genuine partnerships with local communities organisations and religious and environments where radicalisation may communities occur was also discussed at the conference. It was emphasised that religion can play a role in countering and preventing radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism Conference 2007 that it may therefore be relevant to collaborate On 26-27 April 2007, as part of the multi- with more controversial religious persons and faceted counter-terrorism efforts, PET hosted environments. a large conference for the third time. The title of the conference was “Radicalisation in At the conference, there was a general Denmark – opportunities for early, co-ordinated acknowledgement that broad-based dialogue efforts.” and inclusion of all citizens in the community of shared values is a prerequisite for a secure and A major aim of the conference was to assemble safe society, in that it is presumed that persons persons from various authorities and public who feel marginalised in various ways will be institutions, representatives of associations more likely to act without respect for and in and local communities, researchers, etc. contradiction to the fundamental values of who each in their own way could contribute society. One of the general observations at the constructively to the preventive efforts conference that arose out of this recognition against radicalisation and thus also ultimately was that the efforts to combat radicalisation against the perpetration of potential acts of and the efforts to promote inclusion through a terrorism in Denmark. PET wished to use the number of initiatives at various levels in society conference to establish a platform for dialogue are closely related and must be co-ordinated. and generation of ideas in relation to common challenges and response options at various On the basis of the conference, an idea levels of society. catalogue was produced that is to serve as a source of inspiration for authorities and public The conference incorporated, among other institutions as well as associations and local things, thematic group discussions with the aim communities in connection with the launch of

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initiatives that can contribute to preventing activate and incorporate the police districts radicalisation in Denmark. even more in the efforts to combat terrorism. The aim was to improve the ability of the Danish The idea catalogue as well as the minutes from police force in general to identify terrorism- the conference can be found at www.pet.dk/ related indications in the day-to-day police work. publikationer/konferencer The project has now been implemented and evaluated positively. However, the police reform Educational initiatives in 2007 has caused the project to be adjusted in In order to strengthen society’s overall order to ensure its further development in the resilience to terrorism and other security- new police district structure. related threats, PET carries out a number of educational initiatives. The initiatives comprise, for instance, targeted awareness presentations aimed at enabling relevant authorities and private actors to identify potential signs of terrorist planning. In addition, written materials are produced in the form of brochures and instructions in support of the awareness- raising initiatives and the advice provided by PET’s Centre for Protective Security.

Awareness presentations per year

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2006 2007

The target groups for the educational initiatives are relevant public and private actors, including the transport sector. The initiatives are devised and tailored to the recipients on an ongoing basis, and action is also taken to ensure that these initiatives reach all relevant recipients in society.

In autumn 2005, as a special educational initiative, PET launched the project, “Police Against Terrorism”, which was designed to

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Appendices

A. Danish Criminal Code brings about an evident danger of such action – Special Chapters shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years. Chapter 12 Offences against the Independence and Safety (2) Any person who by public statements incites of the State intervention by a foreign power in the affairs of the Danish state or who brings about an evident §98 danger of such intervention shall be liable to a (1) Any person who, by foreign assistance, by fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding the use of force, or by the threat of such, one year. commits an act aimed at bringing the Danish state or any part of it under foreign rule or §101 at detaching any part of the state shall be Any person who, in the face of impending war, liable to imprisonment for any period up to life enemy occupation or any other hostilities imprisonment. commits an act by which preparations are made for aiding the enemy shall be liable to (2) The same penalty shall also apply to any imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 ­person who, for the purpose mentioned in years. Subsection (1) above, organises extensive sabotage, suspension of production or traffic, §102 as well as to any person who partakes in such (1) Any person who, in time of war or enemy an act, ­conscious of its purpose. occupation, assists the enemy by word or deed or, for the promotion of enemy interests, impairs §99 the military efficiency of the Danish ­state or (1) Any person who commits an act aimed at any allied power, shall be liable to imprisonment involving the Danish state or any allied power in for any term not exceeding 16 years. war, enemy occupation or other hostilities, such as blockade or any other coercive measure or who (2) The following acts shall be deemed to be otherwise endeavours to bring about, by foreign assistance to the enemy: assistance, a violation of the independence of 1) Recruitment for or service in the armed the Danish state, shall be liable to imprisonment forces of any enemy power at war or in for any term up to life imprisonment. occupation, or in associated military or police forces or in any similar bodies or (2) For the purpose of this Section and other organisations. Sections of Chapters 12 and 13 of this Act, 2) Exercise of functions as a civil employee in enemy occupation shall mean foreign occupation the police or prison administration of any of any territory of the Danish state, if and so enemy power at war or in occupation, where long as it is inflicted on the country by the use such functions include participation in the of force or by the threat of force. examination or custody of prisoners. 3) Informing or similar collaboration with §100 any enemy authority or any associated (1) Any person who by public statements incites organisation or person bringing about the enemy action against the Danish state or who

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arrest or risk of arrest or injury of anybody §104 associated. (1) Any person who, directly or through an 4) Propaganda for the benefit of any intermediary, unduly co-operates for enemy power at war or in occupation, commercial purpose with any enemy power at including activities as publisher, editor or war or in occupation shall be liable to a fine or administrative officer of any daily paper, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding periodical, publishing business or press eight years, bureau working for the promotion of enemy interests. (2) Criminal liability under Subsection (1) above 5) Payment of substantial financial assistance may devolve on any person who has had a position to others with a view to promoting of management in the undertaking concerned. propaganda of the nature referred to in No. Criminal liability may also devolve on other 4) above or to any party or organisation persons employed in the undertaking when their unduly co-operating with the enemy power conduct has been particularly objectionable. at war or in occupation or promoting the interests of such power. (3) In determining whether and, if so, to what extent the co-operation is deemed to be undue (3) Where informing as under No. 3, Subsection in this sense, account shall be taken not only (2) above has taken place under such of the importance of the undertaking to the circumstances that the informer was aware enemy power at war or in occupation, but also that a person thereby incurred the risk of of whether the person concerned imminent danger of losing his life, suffering grievous harm to person or health, of being 1) had himself taken steps to arrange for the deported or being deprived of his liberty for a establishment, continuation or extension of long time, or where Sections 245, 246 or 250 of any business relations; or this Act have been contravened with a view to 2) in the interest of the enemy at his own extorting evidence or a confession or otherwise initiative has reorganised the undertaking, as part of any maltreatment of prisoners, or has achieved, or attempted to achieve, an imprisonment for life may be inflicted. increase or acceleration of production above what was necessary; or §103 3) had called on the assistance of the enemy in (1) Any person who, in time of war or occupation his relations with any Danish authority with or imminent danger of such, fails to fulfil a a view to promoting his own interests; or contract relating to measures taken by the 4) had prevented or tried to prevent any Danish Danish state in this connection, or who otherwise public authority from obtaining full access counteracts such measures, shall be liable to to knowledge of the circumstances of the imprisonment for any term not exceeding three undertaking; years. 5) had obtained or tried to obtain an excessive profit or any other privileges not reasonably (2) If the failing fulfilment is due to gross justified in the undertaking. negligence, the penalty shall be a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding four months.

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§105 imprisonment for any term not exceeding six Any person who, in time of enemy occupation, years. commits an act aimed at inducing the occupying power or any organisation or person associated (2) If the information concerns military affairs with that power to impair the independence of or if the act is committed during war or enemy any Danish public authority, or who takes undue occupation, the penalty may be increased to advantage of any connection with the occupying imprisonment for any term not exceeding 12 years. power or with any organisation or person associated with that power with a view to §109 obtaining for himself or for others a special (1) Any person who discloses or imparts any privilege, shall be liable to imprisonment for any information on secret negotiations, deliberations term not exceeding eight years. or resolutions of the state or its rights in relation to foreign states, or which has §106 reference to substantial economic interests of Any person who acts against the interests of a public nature in relation to foreign countries, the state in carrying out a duty entrusted to shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not him to negotiate or settle, on behalf of the exceeding 12 years. state, any matter with any foreign state, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not (2) If any of these acts has been committed exceeding 16 years. through negligence, the penalty shall be a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding §107 three years. (1) Any person who, being in the service of any foreign power or organisation or for the use of §110 persons engaged in such service, inquires into (1) Any person who forges, destroys or removes or gives information on matters which, having­ any document or any other instrument that regard to Danish state or public interests, is of importance to the safety of the state or should be kept secret, shall, whether or not the to its rights in relation to foreign states shall information is correct, be guilty of espionage be liable to imprisonment for any term not and liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years. exceeding 16 years. (2) If any of these acts has been committed (2) If the information is of the nature indicated in through negligence, the penalty shall be a fine Section 109 of this Act, or if the act is committed­ or imprisonment for any term not exceeding in time of war or enemy occupation, the penalty three years. may be increased to imprisonment for life. §110a §108 (1) Any person who, intentionally or through (1) Any person who, by any act other than those negligence, without being duly authorised to do so, covered by Section 107 of this Act, enables or assists the intelligence service of a foreign state 1) describes, takes photographs or otherwise to operate directly or indirectly within the depicts Danish military works of defence, territory of the Danish state shall be liable to depots, units, arms, material etc., which are

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not accessible to the public, or who copies adopted under the provisions of Articles 60, 301 or publishes such description or depictions; or or 308 of the Treaty on the European Union and 2) publishes provisions relating to the that aims at discontinuing or reducing in whole mobilisation of Danish forces or other war or in part the financial or economic relations preparations, shall be liable to a fine or with one or more countries outside the European imprisonment for any term not exceeding Union or at similar sanctions towards individuals, three years. groups of individuals or legal persons shall be liable to same punishment as stated in (2). (2) Any person who, intentionally or through negligence, without being duly authorised to do (4) If any offence is committed as mentioned in so, takes photographs from aeroplanes over any (1), (2) or (3) through negligence, such offence territory of the Danish state or publishes such shall be punished with a fine or with imprisonment unlawfully taken photographs, shall be liable to for any term not exceeding two years. a fine. §110d §110b If any of the offences dealt with in Chapters Any person who gives his assistance to any 25, 26 or 27 of this Act is committed against a violation of neutrality against the Danish state foreign sovereign or the head of any foreign on the part of any foreign power shall be liable to diplomatic mission, the penalty may exceed the imprisonment for any term not exceeding eight most severe penalty prescribed for any of the years. offences by up to one half, unless where the offence is dealt with in chapter 13. §110c (1) Any person who contravenes any provisions §110e or prohibitions that may have been provided Any person who openly insults any foreign by law for the protection of state defence or nation, foreign state, its flag or any other neutrality shall be liable to a fine or to recog­nised symbol of nationality or the flag of imprisonment for any term not exceeding four the United Nations or the Council of Europe months or, in aggravating circumstances, to shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for imprisonment for any term not exceeding three any term not exceeding two years. years. §110f (2) Any person who contravenes any provisions The offences referred to in this Chapter shall, or prohibitions that may have been provided by in all cases, be dealt with by public prosecution, law for the fulfilment of the state’s obligations to be instituted by the order of the Minister of as a member of the United Nations shall be Justice. liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four months or, in aggravating circumstances, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four years.

(3) Any person who contravenes any provisions provided by or issued pursuant to regulations

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Chapter 13 structures, commits one or more of the Offences against the Constitution and the following acts, when the act due to its nature Supreme Authorities of the State or the context, in which it is committed, can inflict a country or an international organisation §111 serious damage, shall be guilty of terrorism and Any person who commits an act aimed, by foreign liable to imprisonment for any term extending assistance, by the use of force, or by the threat to life imprisonment: of such, at changing the Constitution or making 1) Homicide pursuant to Section 237 of this Act it inoperative shall be liable to imprisonment for 2) Gross violence pursuant to Section 245 any term extending to life imprisonment. or Section 246 of this Act 3) Deprivation of liberty pursuant to Section §112 261 of this Act Any person who commits an act directed 4) Impairment of the traffic safety pursuant against the life of the sovereign or of the to Section 184(1) of this Act; unlawful constitutional regent shall be liable to disturbances in the operation of public imprisonment for not less than six years. means of communication et cetera pursuant to Section 193(1) of this Act; or gross §113 damage to property pursuant to Section (1) Any person who interferes with the safety 291(2) of this Act; if these violations are or independence of the Parliament or otherwise committed in a way which can expose human commits any act aimed, by the use of force or lives to danger or cause considerable the threat of such, at extorting any resolution financial losses. from the Parliament or preventing it from 5) Seizure of transportation means pursuant freely exercising its activities shall be liable to to Section 183a of this Act. imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 6) Gross weapons law violations pursuant years or, in aggravating circumstances, to life to Section 192 a of this Act or Law about imprisonment. Weapons and Explosives Section 10(2). 7) Arson pursuant to Section 180 of this Act; (2) The same penalty shall apply to any person­ explosion, spreading of noxious gasses, who similarly interferes with or exercises flooding, shipwrecking, railway or other coercion against the sovereign or against the traffic-accident pursuant to Section constitutional regent or against the ministers, 183(1)-(2) of this Act; health-endangering the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court. contamination of the water supply pursuant to Section 186(1) of this Act; health- § 114 endangering contamination of products (1) Any person who, by acting with the intent to intended for general use etc. pursuant to frighten a population to a serious degree or to section 187(1) of this Act. unlawfully coerce Danish or foreign public 8) Possession or use et cetera of radioactive authorities or an international organisation to substances pursuant to Section 192 b. carry out or omit to carry out an act or to destabilise or destroy a country’s or an (2) Similar punishment shall apply to any person international organisation’s fundamental who, with the in Subsection (1) mentioned political, constitutional, financial or social intent, transports weapons or explosives.

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(3) Similar punishment shall further apply to 3) Violation of Section 261 Subsections (1) or any person who, with the in Subsection (1) (2) when the act is included in Article (1) of mentioned intent, threatens to commit one of the International Convention against the the acts mentioned in Subsections (1) and (2). Taking of Hostages dated 17 December 1979. 4) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), § 114a 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 186 Subsection If one of the acts mentioned in items 1-6 is (1), 192 a Subsection (2), 192 b, 237, 244, committed without the act being included in 245, 246, 260, 266, 276, 278, 279, 279 a, 281, Section 114, the penalty may exceed the highest 288, or 291 Subsection (2) when the act is statutory penalty for the offence by up to half. included in Article (7) of the Convention on If the highest statutory penalty for the offence Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (the in question is less than four years imprisonment, IAEA Convention) dated 26 October 1979. the penalty may, however, be increased to 5) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection imprisonment for any term not exceeding six (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 183 a, 184 years. Subsection (1), 192 a Subsection (2), 193 Subsection (1), 237, 244, 245, 246, 252 1) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection Subsection (1), 260, 266, 288, or 291 (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 183 a, 184 Subsections (1) or (2) when the act is Subsection (1), 192 a Subsection (2), 193 included in Article (3) of the Convention for Subsection (1), 237, 244, 245, 246, 250, 252 the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Subsection (1), 266, 288, or 291 Subsections the Safety of Maritime Navigation dated 10 (1) or (2) when the act is included in Article March 1988, or Article (2) of the Protocol for (1) of the Convention for the Suppression the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft dated 16 the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the December 1970, Article (1) of the Convention Continental Shelf dated 10 March 1988. for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 6) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection against the Safety of Civil Aviation dated (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 183 a, 184 23 September 1971, or Article (II) of the Subsection (1), 186 Subsection (1), 192 a Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Subsection (2), 193 Subsection (1), 237, 244, Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 245, 246, 250, 252 Subsection (1), 266, or International Civil Aviation dated 24 February 291 Subsection (2) when the act is included 1988. in Article (2) of the International Convention 2) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 184 Subsection dated 15 December 1997. (1), 237, 244, 245, 246, 250, 252 Subsection (1), 260, 261 Subsection (1) or (2), 266 or 291 §114b Subsections (1) or (2) when the act is Any person who included in Article (2) of the Convention on 1) directly or indirectly provides financial the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes support to; against Internationally Protected Persons, 2) directly or indirectly procures or collects including Diplomatic Agents dated 14 means to; or December 1973.

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3) directly or indirectly places money, other liable to imprisonment for any term not assets or financial or other similar means at exceeding ten years. Under particularly the disposal of: aggravating circumstances, the penalty may be a person, a group or an association, which increased to any term not exceeding sixteen commits or intends to commit acts of years. It is considered particularly aggravating terrorism as included under Section 114 circumstances especially in cases involving or 114 a of this Act, shall be liable to violations of a systematic or organised nature. imprisonment for any term not exceeding ten years. (2) Any person who trains, instructs or in any other way teaches another person to commit or §114c advance actions included in Section 114 b of this (1) Any person who recruits another person to Act, knowing that this person intends to use the commit or advance actions included in Sections skills for such a purpose, shall be liable to 114 or 114 a of this Act or to join a group or imprisonment for any term not exceeding six association in order to encourage that the years. group or association commits acts of this nature shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not (3) Any person who lets himself/herself be exceeding ten years. Under particularly trained, instructed or in any other way taught aggravating circumstances, the penalty may be to commit actions included in Sections 114 or increased to any term not exceeding sixteen 114 a of this Act shall be liable to imprisonment years. It is considered particularly aggravating for any term not exceeding six years. circumstances especially in cases involving violations of a systematic or organised nature. §114e Any person who otherwise advances the (2) Any person who recruits another person to activities of another person, group or association, com­mit or advance actions included in Section committing or intending to commit actions 114 b of this Act or to join a group or association included in Sections 114, 114 a, 114 b, 114 c, or in order to encourage the group or association 114 d of this Act, shall be liable to imprisonment to commit acts of this nature shall be liable to for any term not exceeding six years. imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years. §114f (3) Any person who lets himself/herself be Any person who, by any act other than those recruited to commit actions included in Sections included under Sections 114-114e of this Act, 114 or 114 a of this Act shall be liable to participates in or provides significant financial imprisonment for any term not exceeding six support or other significant support to any years. corps, group or association, which intends, by use of force, to exert influence on public affairs §114d or give rise to disturbances of the public order, (1) Any person who trains, instructs or in any shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not other way teaches another person to commit exceeding six years. or advance actions included in Sections 114 and 114 a of this Act, knowing that this person intends to use the skills for such a purpose, shall be

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§114g Parliament, to the Assembly of the Faeroe Any person who, by any act other than those Islands or to the municipal or any other public included under Sections 114-114f of this Act, councils or authorities, or who corrupts participates in an illegal military organisation or the outcome of any election or renders it group, shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment impossible to count the votes, shall be liable to for any term not exceeding two years. imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years. §114h Any person who, under aggravating (2) The same penalty shall apply where such circumstances in contravention of the acts are committed in connection with a legislation on non-proliferation of weapons of referendum in public affairs, as provided by law. mass destruction et cetera, 1) exports products with dual use without §117 permission; Any person who, in the case of the elections or 2) for the use by the authorities in making referendums referred to in Section 116 of this decisions about products with dual use Act, gives incorrect or misleading information or 1) unlawfully obtains authorisation, for himself suppresses information of significance for or for others, to take part in the voting; or the decision in the case; or 2) attempts, by unlawful coercion (as described 3) acts in violation of conditions which are in Section 260 of this Act), by deprivation of stipulated in the authorities’ decisions about liberty or by taking advantage of a position products with dual use; of superiority, to induce some other person shall be liable to imprisonment for any term to vote in a particular way or to abstain not exceeding six years. from voting; or 3) causes, by deceit, some other person, §115 against his intention, to abstain from voting (1) If any of the offences dealt with in Chapters or brings it about that such a person’s vote 25, 26 or 27 of this Act is committed against the is rendered invalid or that it has an effect sovereign or against the constitutional regent, different from that intended; or then, unless the circumstances are covered by 4) grants, promises or offers any pecuniary Sections 112 and 113 of this Act, the penalties advantage with a view to making a person prescribed in the above Chapters for such an vote in a particular way or abstain from offence are increased up to the double. voting; or 5) receives, or demands or accepts the promise (2) If any of the said offences is committed of any pecuniary advantage against voting in against the Queen, the Queen Dowager or the a particular way or against abstaining from heir apparent, the penalty may exceed the voting; most severe penalty prescribed for any of the shall be liable to imprisonment for any term offences by up to one half. not exceeding two years.

§116 §118 (1) Any person who prevents or attempts (1) Any person who, by the use of force or to prevent any holding of elections to the the threat of force or by exploiting a fear of

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intervention on the part of a foreign power, ­B. Act No. 378 of 6 July 1988 on the prevents or attempts to prevent any public establishment of a committee authority from freely exercising its activities regarding the Danish Defence shall, if the act is committed for the purpose Intelligence Service (FE) and the of influencing public affairs or disturbing the Danish Security and Intelligence public order, be liable to imprisonment for Service (PET) any term not exceeding 12 years. Law on the setting up of a committee on the (2) The same penalty shall apply to any person Danish Defence Intelligence Service, FE, and who, for the purpose indicated in Subsection (1) the Danish Security Intelligence Service, PET above and by using the means indicated in that Subsection, gravely impairs freedom of speech BE IT KNOWN that the Folketing has enacted or prevents any society or any other association and We Margrethe the Second, by the Grace from freely exercising its lawful activities. of God, Queen of Denmark, have given Our Royal Assent to the following Act: (3) The same penalty shall again apply to any person who, for the purpose indicated in §1 Subsection (1) above and by using the means (1) With the purpose of supervising the Danish indicated in that Subsection, commits the defence and police intelligence services, a offence dealt with in Section 193 of this Act or committee is set up. any similar act detrimental to the public good. (2) The committee shall consist of five members, §118a MPs, appointed by those parties that are The offences referred to in Sections 111-115 members of the Praesidium of the Danish and 118 of this Act shall in all cases be dealt Parliament (Folketing). The committee itself with by public prosecution, to be instituted by elects its chairman. the order of the Minister of Justice. (3) Each member of the committee may institute convening a meeting. Discussions in the committee may also take place upon the wish of the Government.

(4) A secretary, who is not a Member of the Folketing, shall be attached to the committee. The secretary shall be permanently employed by the Folketing.

§2 The Government will inform the committee of the guidelines established with regard to the activities of the intelligence services. Furthermore, the Government shall keep the committee­ informed of important security

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issues or of foreign policy issues which are of C. Statutory Provisions regarding importance in connection with the activities of the Danish Security and the intelligence­ services. When informing the Intelligence Service (PET) committee, consideration will be given to the of 9 May 1996 special circumstances, which apply to intelligence activities. I. The objective of PET The objective of PET is to monitor, prevent and §3 counter undertakings and acts which are The committee can, orally or in written form, presumed to present a threat to the inform the Government of its opinion of the independence and safety of the lawful order of issues, which are dealt with by the committee. society, including primarily the offences as stated in the Danish Criminal Code Chapter 12 §4 (Offences against the Independence and Safety The financial control of the intelligence services of the State) and Chapter 13 (Offences against is not included in those matters supervised by the Constitution and the Supreme Authorities the committee. However, in connection with the of the State etc.). asking for information from the Government, the committee may be informed of the general II. The organisation of PET guidelines for the finances of the intelligence The management and responsibility for carrying services. out the tasks that the Minister of Justice has assigned to PET rest on the Director of the §5 Service. The committee members and the secretary are bound by confidentiality in respect of the The Director of PET is obliged to at any time information acquired on the committee. keeping the Minister of Justice directly informed of all matters of importance to the national §6 security and in general of all matters of major The law will become effective as of 1 August importance to the activities of the Service, 1988. Signed at Marselisborg Castle, 6 July including all important single issues and contacts 1988. with national as well as international authorities.

III. The tasks of PET Given under Our Royal Hand and Seal The responsibilities of the Service follow from the above specified objective and comprise MARGRETHE R. ­primarily the following tasks:

/Erik Ninn-Hansen 1. Investigation regarding the offences as stipulated in Chapters 12 and 13 of the Danish Criminal Code, including hereunder:

A. Foreign intelligence activities Any action that attacks or threatens the safety of the state, as according to Chapter 12 of the

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Danish Criminal Code, including particularly the F. Proliferation illegal intelligence activities of foreign powers Illegal spread of products and technology to or organisations, in accordance with Sections be used for weapons production etc., including 107 and 108 of the Danish Criminal Code. in particular weapons of mass destruction. Investigations in this respect – like in general G. International embargoes – must be carried out with all due respect for Violation of international embargoes etc., as diplomatic and journalistic activities as well as in accordance with Section 110c of the Danish for legal political enterprise. Criminal Code, particularly where the cases are assumed to be of intelligence interest. B. Extremism The actions of extremist groups that attack 2. Security advice and counselling or threaten the national safety of the state and PET provides advice and counselling to the democratic public order or which obstruct public authorities regarding security issues or undermine the duties of the democracy, as including computer security. Similar advice according to Chapter 13 of the Danish Criminal and counselling can be rendered to private Code, particularly Section 114. individuals if it is of public interest to protect.

C. Terrorism The advice and counselling includes the planning Serious crime or the threat of any such serious and implementation of measures to safeguard crime, which – usually with an allegedly political against espionage, sabotage, infiltration etc., motive – is used as a means of enforcing claims in accordance with particularly the Prime on authorities or private individuals or to bring Minister’s Office Circular of 1 November 19861 about disturbances of the public order. regarding protection of information of common interest to NATO countries or other information D. Organised serious crime of interest in terms of security and protection. Organised crime that in its gravity of the offence, with its international relations or through its Upon request from the specific ministry or purpose threatens the safety of the state agency in question, PET carries out vetting or the public order, or which obstructs or inquiries on individuals who require access undermines the duties of the democracy, as to classified documents (security clearance). according to Chapter 13 of the Danish Criminal ­Classified information must only be passed Code, particularly Sections 114 and 118. upon an actual assessment of the importance of the information to the vetting inquiry. Cases E. International weapons trade etc. regarding passing on of derogatory information Serious cases regarding the violation of the must be presented to the parliamentary offensive weapons act, particularly when it Control Committee regarding the registration is feared that the crime is organised. and passing of information as in accordance with the specific regulations of 8 June 1964 as laid down for this committee.

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3. Personal protection and other V. Registration security tasks A. The object of the registration PET currently assesses the security and safety PET gathers and processes information that of the Royal Family, the members of Government, is, or could be, of importance to the solution of leading Danish public individuals and certain the above-mentioned tasks. foreign visitors (“VIPs”). PET participates in carrying out personal protection tasks as in B. Registration of personal data accordance with specific instructions issued. The registration of personal data shall be limited PET currently assesses the security of the to the absolute minimum. The registration of presence in Denmark of foreign diplomatic Danish nationals cannot be made on grounds of representations and international organisations legal political activity only. All cases regarding and undertakes the contact between these and new files on Danish nationals shall be presented Danish authorities on security issues. to the parliamentary Control Committee regarding the filing and passing of information. 4. Aviation security PET currently assesses the security and safety VI. Co-operation with other authorities of civilian aviation in Denmark and co-operates A. Danish authorities with aviation authorities and airports on the PET shall solve the above-stated tasks in implementation of security measures in respect close co-operation with the relevant national of civilian aviation. authorities, primarily the police force.

IV. The investigations of PET B. Foreign authorities PET shall exercise great caution in applying Where necessary, PET co-operates with foreign information obtained, and the correctness police, security and intelligence services on of the information must, wherever possible, solving the above-stated tasks. be verified. Any investigative steps of vital importance, including interference in the secrecy VII. Entry into force, etc. of communication, shall be approved by the These provisions entering into force immediately Director of PET or in the absence of same by his shall supersede the Instructions for the Director deputy. Where the specific investigative mea­ of PET of 30 November 1953 at the same time sure requires a court order, any such approval repealing the latter instructions. must be given prior to the case being presented­ in court as in accordance with the rules of the 1 As amended by Circular dated 1 September Danish Administration of Justice Act. 1997 and 7 December 2001.

Where investigations lead to charging a person, the Chief Constable of that particular district (in Copenhagen the Commissioner of Police) shall be informed, unless otherwise stipulated by the Minister of Justice. Hereafter, the investigation is carried out under the directions of the local Chief Constable, though in co-operation and with the support of PET.

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D. The Wamberg Committee’s 6. Any question regarding items 3 and 4 above Mandate of 1964 may be submitted to the Minister of Justice by the Committee or by any one of its Quote: ­members. Unquote Rules applying to the Committee that shall supervise the registration and passing of information of the Danish Security Intelligence Footnote: Service (PET). 1. In practice, the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Justice and of the Ministry of Defence as well as the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have not participated in the 1. The Committee is set up by the Government, ordinary meetings of the Committee at which meetings, issues it consists of a chairman and three are discussed of no fundamental importance. other members. In the discussions of the Committee, a representative of PET, the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Justice and of the Ministry of Defence1 participate. Decisions on matters submitted to the Committee shall only be made by its members.

2. The Committee shall supervise the registration and passing of information of PET.

3. The Committee shall be kept informed about the guidelines for the registration applying at any time.

4. When, acting upon a request from a government agency, PET intends to communicate information concerning individuals, the case shall be submitted to the Committee for approval of the communication. Similarly, submission is conducted, if PET intends to communicate to the government agency such information obtained regarding individuals who have already been approved for dealing with classified issues. 5. In case of parity of votes on the Committee, the Chairman’s vote shall be decisive.

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E. The Government Declaration F. The Danish Administration of

of 30 September 1968 Justice Act, Chapter 66

Quote: Chapter 66 “The Government has today decided that reg­­ ­ i­stration of Danish nationals can no longer be The Accused and his Counsel for the defence made solely on grounds of legal political activity. Section729a. The accused has the right to choose his own The fact that such registrations previously Counsel for the defence, cf. Section730. A were made often gave rise to discussions under Public Counsel for the defence will be appointed the present as well as the former Government. according to the regulations Naturally, it is a matter of opinion whether such in Sections 731 to 735. registrations are necessary. In this respect, the security considerations must be balanced Subsect.2. against the individual citizen being able to The Counsel for the defence will receive express himself freely. duplicates of entries in the court record con­ cerning the matter from the Court. The Counsel In principle, it must be recognised that an for the defence may inform the accused of the enterprise which keeps within the limits as laid duplicates unless anything else follows from down by the legislation, should not give rise to Sections 748 and 848. The Court may order the registration with the police. Having balanced Counsel for the defence not to hand over the these opposite considerations, the Government duplicates to the accused or to others, if it is has found it justifiable to abandon registration feared that the duplicates will be used in an solely on the basis of legal political activity. unlawful manner.

Where previously made registered information Subsect. 3. of this type still remain, any such information The Counsel for the defence has access to will be destroyed”. Unquote making himself acquainted with the material obtained by the police for use in the case covered by the charge. To the extent the material­ can be duplicated without inconvenience, copies must be forwarded to the Counsel for the defence. The Counsel for the defence may not without the consent of the police hand over the received material to the accused or to others. The police gives its consent if it is deemed unobjectionable. With regard to material, covered by Section 877, Subsections 1 and 2, No. 5, consent can only be denied because of the reasons mentioned in Subsection 4.

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Subsect. 4. 1 and 2, No. 5, a refusal to hand over the If considerations to foreign powers, the security material can only take place according to the of the State, the solving of the case, a third reasons mentioned in Section 729a, Subsection party, or the investigation of another ongoing 4.Section 729c. case regarding an offence which, according to At the request of the police the Court may the law, may be punished with imprisonment decide to depart from the regulations on the for six years or more, or which constitutes an accused and the Counsel of the defence’s right intentional violation of Chapters 12 or 13 of the of access to documents, according to Sections Danish Criminal Code, render it imperative, the 729a and 729b, if it is imperative in deference to police may order the Counsel for the defence not to hand over the information which he has 1) foreign powers received from the police. The order can be 2) the security of the State extended until the accused has given evidence 3) the solving of the case during the trial. 4) the life and health of a third party 5) the investigation of another ongoing case Section 729b. regarding an offence which, according to the An accused without a Counsel for the defence law, may be punished with imprisonment for shall upon request be granted access through six years or more, or which constitutes an the police to acquaint himself with any entries intentional violation of Chapters 12 or 13 of in the court record concerning the matter the Danish Criminal Code, or unless anything else follows from Sections 748 6) the protection of confidential information and 848. Upon request the police will hand over concerning the investigational methods of duplicates of the entries unless it is feared the police. that the duplicates will be used in an unlawful manner. Subsect. 2. A decision according to Subsection 1 cannot be Subsect. 2. made if it gives rise to considerable misgivings Furthermore, an accused without a Counsel with regard to the conduct of the defence of for the defence shall upon request be granted the accused. access to the material which has been obtained by the police for use in the case covered by Subsect. 3. the charge. However, the police can refuse the If considerations as mentioned in Subsection 1 request according to the reasons ­mentioned apply only to a certain part of the material, the in Section 729a, Subsection 4. Restrictions Counsel for the defence or the accused must on the right of access to documents of the be informed of the remaining contents of the accused lapse prior to the trial at the latest, material. or a hearing concerning the handling of the case pursuant to Section 922, or if the case Subsect. 4. is terminated due to a withdrawal of the The decision is made by court order. In the court charge. Upon request the police will hand over order the concrete circumstances of the case, a duplicate of the material to the accused if which give the grounds for a departure from it is deemed unobjectionable. With regard to Sections 729a and 729b, shall be stated. If the material covered by Section 877, Subsections Court decides that the departure is to be

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temporary, the Court shall carry out a new assessment of the departure before the trial commences. If the Court decides that the departure is to be applied within a specified time frame, the court order may be extended through a later court order. The decision of the Court may be appealed.

Subsect. 5. Before the Court makes its decision, a Counsel­ for the defence must be appointed, and the attorney shall be given the opportunity to make a statement. The attorney is appointed from within the particular circle of attorneys, mentioned in Section 784, Subsection 2. The attorney must be notified of all court hearings, which are held in order to obtain a court order regarding the departure from Sections 729a and 729b, and he is entitled to being present at these and to acquaint himself with the material which has been obtained by the police for use in the case covered by the charge. Section 785, Subsection 1 (item 2-5) and 2 may be applied similarly.

THE DANISH SECURITY AND­ ­INTELLIGENCE SERVICE / ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007 Politiets Efterretningstjeneste Danish Security and Intelligence Service www.pet.dk