1. the Big Picture Political Security

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Libya Weekly Political Security Update Bell Whispering Bell October 13, 2020 1. The Big Picture UN-sponsored talks resume against all odds The week, in Libya was marked by escalating rhetoric The agenda provides some clarity on the UN-led between Government of National Accord (GNA) and Libyan settlement effort after recent uncertainty over the past National Army (LNA) forces over Sirte, the UN’s few months. However, multiple questions remain announcement of the official negotiation roadmap and unanswered and the release of the agenda has equally agenda, and the resumption of production at Libya’s largest raised expectations of a solution to Libya’s political field of Sharara. Overall, uncertainty continues to define the deadlock. security and political landscapes in-country. If reports that the Geneva political talks will formally CONTENTS Tensions escalated between GNA and LNA forces after announce a new government are true, it remains to be GNA Defence Minister Salaheddin Al-Namroush raised the seen whether this outcome will be accepted by all state of alert in anticipation of what he described as stakeholders. If this new government was to assume 1 preparations by Haftar’s forces to attack Bani Walid, power from Sirte as agreed, security incidents could THE BIG PICTURE Tarhuna, and Gharyan. In a decree dated 08 October, Al- ensue. On the military front, Russia and Turkey are UN-sponsored talks resume Namroush ordered field commanders to raise defensive unlikely to accept that a third party enforces the ceasefire against all odds capabilities and stand-by ahead of anticipated military in Sirte-Jufra given they remain the most influential manoeuvres. Both forces exchanged accusations of powerbrokers on the ground. violating the current, albeit fragile, ceasefire. 2 In the oil and gas sector, the National Oil Corporation NATIONWIDE SECURITY In response, the LNA under Khalifa Haftar’s command (NOC) lifted force majeure on Libya’s southern Sharara described Al-Namroush’s statements as “baseless oil field following an agreement with the Petroleum Events, Analysis and Data allegations” to justify combat operations. The LNA added Facilities Guard (PFG) on 11 October. The field is that it remains committed to the ceasefire but will pursue expected to initially hit 40k barrels per day (bpd), 3 combat if necessary. Pro-LNA accounts allege the latest although technical issues remain before reaching peak SECURITY BY NUMBERS accusations by the GNA MoD are part of attempts to provoke capacity of 300k bpd. Sources indicate Russian Wagner an escalation after Salaheddin Al-Namroush’s recent visit to Group private military contractors (PMCs) maintain a Charts, Statistics and Analysis Turkey. presence on the outskirts of the field. The NOC noted that the recent talks hosted by Egypt addressed security 4 It is important to note Al-Namroush’s statement could be arrangements across Libya’s fields and ports and aimed at local audiences, especially hardliners within GNA contributed to overcoming the obstacles facing the TRIPOLI REPORT ranks that remain opposed to negotiations. Regardless, stability of operating Sharara’s field and its stations. News & Neighborhoods there is a risk of miscalculation. While appetite for a major escalation is low, local actors may favour renewed Sources confirmed preparations are underway to engagement given their limited capability to influence resume production from the nearby 70k bpd El-Feel oil 5 outcomes at the negotiating table during UN-sponsored field. The developments would come after the Tripoli- BENGHAZI REPORT talks this month. based Central Bank of Libya (CBL) Governor, Sadiq Al- News & Neighborhoods Kabir, called for an immediate resumption of oil Other observers suggest the latest war of words does not operations to inject cash into the economy amid an signal a renewed escalation, but intent by the GNA Defence unprecedented decline in financial reserves. Al-Kabir 6 Ministry to justify future law enforcement operations, noted that Libya requires to increase its oil production to WHAT’S NEXT possibly sanctioned by Turkey, to “stabilize” Tarhunah, Bani 1.7 million bpd, to cover government expenditure. Forward Looking Expert Walid, and Gharyan. This is a plausible scenario given the GNA’s relatively limited influence in these towns post-Tripoli Meanwhile, the analysis in last week’s report holds true; Opinions offensive. For example, the Warfalla-dominated Bani Walid the LNA continues to shift its focus to the southern maintains its non-aligned stance and has a strong pro- region. The LNA reported reinforcement units from the Gaddafi element. If confirmed, GNA law enforcement 128 Reinforced Brigade, 628 Battalion, 1st Infantry operations in these towns run the risk of exacerbating local Company, and Khalid Ibn Walid Battalion secured El- tensions. Of note, an unidentified military aircraft was Feel and Sharara oil fields on 09 October. Pro-LNA spotted flying over Tarhuna in the early hours of 11 October. accounts reported the LNA general command will soon order the mobilization of additional units to Fezzan. The Politically, the UN-sponsored negotiations formally resumed reports allege the LNA is justifying the mobilization on on 10 October, building on outcomes of the Berlin the basis of the emerging threat posed by the Islamic Conference. The agenda includes 5+5 Joint Military State (IS) in the south. Commission (JMC) talks in Geneva on 10 October, followed by consultations between House of Representatives (HoR) and High Council of State (HCS) on constitutional matters in Cairo between 11-13 October, and finally a Libyan Political KEY POINTS Dialogue Forum (LPDF) starting 26 October and held both • Sharara oil field resumes production virtually and face-to-face in Tunisia. • GNA alert; LNA accused of planned offensive • UN-sponsored talks resume & agenda released Libya Weekly Political and Security Update 1 Further distribution without written consent of Whispering Bell is strictly prohibited. The Whispering Bell Libya Weekly Political and Security Update™ does not constitute advice and must not be regarded as a substitute for detailed advice in individual cases. It is provided “as is” and without warranty of any kind. Whispering Bell shall have no liability arising from any use made of this report, or any part of it, to the fullest extent permitted by law. No part of this report may be reproduced in any form. Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved. Whispering Bell October 13, 2020 2. National Security Map NOC lifts force majeure on Sharara; Kidnapped Indian nationals freed Legend Impact Indicator 5 Reports indicate the LNA Air Force conducted aerial reconnaissance sorties over Sirte, Jufra, 3 and Ash-Shwayrif in the evening on 07 October. 2 6 On 11 October, Brega Security Directorate Incident Type 7 10 announced the release of seven Indian nationals working as technicians and engineers for a local 8 contractor, “Al-Shaala Al-Mathaeya Lel Mokawalat Wa Khadamat Al-Hokool Al-Nafteeya”. The victims 6 were kidnapped in Ash-Shwayrif on 12 September and later held in the suburbs of Bani Walid. No 5 details were provided on the identity of the kidappers and whether a ransom was paid. 7 A GNA unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was 1 reported flying over Al-Rujban and heading The NOC lifted force majeure on Libya’s southern Sharara oil southwards at night on 09 October. No further field following an agreement with the Petroleum Facilities information. Guard (PFG) on 11 October. The field is expected to initially hit 40k barrels per day (bpd), although technical issues 8 remain before reaching peak capacity of 300k bpd. The General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL) LNA accounts reported multiple aerial reported the GNA established a new force to protect reconnaissance sorties between Sirte and As- 1 4 2 GECOL-controlled power infrastructure on 02 August. Saddadah on 09 October.7 According to open- 9 source reports, a MiG-21 aircraft flown by Wagner The Coastal Road of Zliten’s Na'imah area was temporarily Reports indicate the force deployed at sites in Al- Group private military contractors (PMCs) was closed due to a local dispute escalating into sporadic gunfire Ruwais, Shakshuk, Ajaylat, Al-Kreymiya, Al-Zahra, Al- spotted flying over Sirte. Unidentified air activity between 1900hrs-1930hrs on 10 October. Reports indicate Zawiya, Al-Harsha and Beir Al-Ghanam, as well as was also reported in the Jufra district. the dispute was over a plot of land. power stations from the Janzour area extending to Misrata including Al-Khoms, Zliten, and Misrata. 9 3 Mellitah Oil and Gas Company (MOG) announced preparations are underway to resume production at El- In line with a military and security agreement signed between the GNA and Ankara, the Turkish Defence Ministry published Feel oil field. MOG reported its engineers carried out a technical inspection of crude transmission lines from images of a six-week training course of GNA Navy forces in between 05-07 October. Al-Khums. 10 4 Reports indicate a truck driver was shot dead in an The Arabian Gulf Oil Company (AGOCO) announced a full resumption of operations at Tobruk refinery, with unidentified area on the route linking Sabha with Awbari at an estimated quantity of 20,000 barrels, after the night on 05 October. The victim was originally from the Qaser (Map Source: Whispering Bell Platform) tanker ARIN berthed at Tobruk to ship 25,000 metric Al-Akhiyar village and was transporting foodstuff. tons of heavy oil. Libya Weekly Political and Security Update Further distribution without written consent of Whispering Bell is strictly prohibited. The Whispering Bell Libya Weekly Political and Security Update™ does not constitute advice and must not be regarded as a substitute for detailed advice in individual cases. It is provided “as is” and without warranty of any kind. Whispering Bell shall have no liability arising from any use made of this report, or any part of it, to the fullest extent permitted by law.
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