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Algemeen Ambtsbericht Libië (April 2019)

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Algemeen ambtsbericht Libië April 2019 Pagina 1 van 98 Algemeen ambtsbericht Libië april 2019 Colofon Plaats Den Haag Opgesteld door Cluster Ambtsberichten (CAB) Pagina 2 van 98 Algemeen ambtsbericht Libië april 2019 Inhoudsopgave Colofon ..........................................................................................................2 Inhoudsopgave ...............................................................................................3 Inleiding .........................................................................................................5 1 Landeninformatie ........................................................................................ 6 1.1 Achtergrond bij het conflict in Libië ....................................................................6 1.2 Recente politieke ontwikkelingen .......................................................................7 1.2.1 Internationale relaties, bijeenkomsten en vredesbesprekingen ..............................9 1.3 Veiligheidssituatie .......................................................................................... 12 1.3.1 Algemeen ..................................................................................................... 12 1.3.2 Slachtoffers als gevolg van gevechten .............................................................. 14 1.3.3 Controlegebieden .......................................................................................... 16 1.3.4 Veiligheidssituatie per provincie en de belangrijkste steden ................................ 19 1.3.5 Situatie met betrekking tot de vliegvelden, havens en grenscontroleposten .......... 31 1.4 ISIS ............................................................................................................. 32 1.4.1 De slag om Sirte ........................................................................................... 32 1.4.2 Andere ontwikkelingen met betrekking tot ISIS’ aanwezigheid in Libië ................. 32 1.4.3 Leefregels en positie van vrouwen en minderheden ........................................... 33 1.4.4 Allianties, netwerken en tegenstanders van ISIS ............................................... 33 1.4.5 Aanslagen gepleegd door ISIS ........................................................................ 34 1.5 Derna Mujahideen Shura Council ..................................................................... 35 1.6 Documenten en registratie .............................................................................. 36 1.6.1 Identiteitsdocumenten ................................................................................... 36 1.6.2 Reisdocumenten ............................................................................................ 38 1.6.3 Documentfraude, biometrie en centrale database .............................................. 39 1.6.4 National Identity Number System .................................................................... 39 2 Mensenrechten .......................................................................................... 41 2.1 Juridische context .......................................................................................... 41 2.1.1 Verdragen .................................................................................................... 41 2.1.2 Grondwet en Constitution Drafting Assembly..................................................... 41 2.1.3 Overige nationale wetgeving ........................................................................... 42 2.2 Toezicht en rechtsbescherming ....................................................................... 45 2.2.1 Algemeen ..................................................................................................... 45 2.2.2 Aangiftes en de rol van politie ......................................................................... 45 2.2.3 National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights (NCCLHR) .......................... 47 2.2.4 Office of Human Rights Affairs ......................................................................... 48 2.3 Nalevingen en schendingen............................................................................. 48 2.3.1 Vrijheid van meningsuiting ............................................................................. 48 2.3.2 Vrijheid van vereniging en vergadering ............................................................ 50 2.3.3 Vrijheid van godsdienst en levensovertuiging .................................................... 51 2.3.4 Bewegingsvrijheid ......................................................................................... 54 2.3.5 Rechtsgang ................................................................................................... 55 2.3.6 Arrestaties bewaring en detenties .................................................................... 56 2.3.7 Mishandeling en foltering ................................................................................ 58 2.3.8 Verdwijningen en ontvoeringen ....................................................................... 59 2.3.9 Buitengerechtelijke executies en moorden ........................................................ 60 2.3.10 Doodstraf ..................................................................................................... 60 2.3.11 Bloed- en erekwesties .................................................................................... 61 Pagina 3 van 98 2.4 Positie van specifieke groepen ......................................................................... 61 2.4.1 Leden van het justitieel apparaat en werknemers van ngo’s ................................ 61 2.4.2 Leden van oppositiepartijen en politieke activisten ............................................. 62 2.4.3 Etnische minderheden en stammen ................................................................. 64 2.4.4 Palestijnen en Syriërs .................................................................................... 67 2.4.5 Vrouwen ....................................................................................................... 68 2.4.6 Lesbiennes, Homoseksuelen, Biseksuelen, Transgenders en Interseksuelen (LHBTI) ................................................................................................................... 70 2.4.7 Alleenstaande minderjarigen ........................................................................... 71 2.4.8 Dienstplichtweigeraars en deserteurs ............................................................... 72 3 Vluchtelingen en ontheemden ................................................................... 73 3.1 Vluchtelingen- en ontheemdenstroom .............................................................. 73 3.2 Binnenlandse ontheemden .............................................................................. 73 3.3 Vluchtelingen, asielzoekers en migranten ......................................................... 74 3.4 Opvang in de regio ........................................................................................ 77 3.5 Activiteiten van internationale organisaties ....................................................... 78 3.5.1 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) ............................................. 78 3.5.2 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) .............................................. 78 3.5.3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) .................................. 78 3.5.4 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) .......................................................... 79 3.5.5 International Organization for Migration (IOM) .................................................. 79 3.5.6 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) ............. 79 3.5.7 Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) ...................................................................... 79 3.6 Terugkeer ..................................................................................................... 79 4 Bijlagen ..................................................................................................... 81 4.1 Gebruikte openbare bronnen ........................................................................... 81 4.2 Lijst met afkortingen ...................................................................................... 97 4.3 Kaart van Libië .............................................................................................. 98 Pagina 4 van 98 Algemeen ambtsbericht Libië april 2019 Inleiding In dit algemeen ambtsbericht wordt de huidige situatie in Libië beschreven voor zover deze van belang is voor de beoordeling van asielverzoeken van personen die afkomstig zijn uit dit land en voor besluitvorming over de terugkeer van afgewezen Libische asielzoekers. Het ambtsbericht is een actualisering van het in mei 2016 verschenen ambtsbericht over Libië en beslaat de periode van mei 2016 tot en met maart 2019.1 Dit ambtsbericht is gebaseerd op informatie uit openbare en vertrouwelijke bronnen. Bij de opstelling is gebruik gemaakt van informatie van verschillende organisaties zoals de Verenigde Naties (VN) en niet-gouvernementele organisaties (ngo’s), alsmede van vakliteratuur en berichtgeving in de media. Een overzicht van de geraadpleegde openbare bronnen is opgenomen in de literatuurlijst. Daarnaast liggen vertrouwelijke rapportages van de Nederlandse vertegenwoordiging in Tripoli en op vertrouwelijke basis in Tunis en Tripoli ingewonnen informatie aan dit algemeen ambtsbericht ten grondslag.
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