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Libya Weekly Political Security Update Bell Whispering Bell October 20, 2020 1. The Big Picture Large LNA operation in south as negotiations proceed The week, starting 12 Oct continues to be marked by cautious Zawiya-based armed groups west Tripoli, although tensions optimism as UN-sponsored negotiations proceed amid were later defused on 15 Oct. The arrest sent a strong message heightened tension between Government of National Accord the MoI under Fathi Bashagha’s command will continue to (GNA) and Libyan National Army (LNA) forces over Sirte. The engage in security-sector reforms, supported by the Special security environment is relatively static, although a large Deterrence Force (SDF). contingent of LNA 128 Reinforced Brigade units deployed across Sabha from the Jufra district, in a show of force ahead Politically, the outlook remains shrouded in uncertainty. LNA of broader law enforcement operations. and GNA military delegations convened in Geneva as part of the fourth round of 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) talks CONTENTS The nationwide combat theatre remains unchanged amid on 19 October. The talks are expected to continue until 24 renewed LNA allegations that GNA forces are plotting attacks October to reach a permanent ceasefire deal. Meanwhile, as 1 on Sirte, Jufra and/or targets in the southern region. LNA spox. official UN-sponsored negotiations proceed, sideline initiatives Ahmed Al-Mesmari reported GNA intent to carry out an are being carved out. In Sirte, a conference was organised on THE BIG PICTURE “aggressive and provocative act” before attacking the Sirte- 17 October under the supervision of the Interim Government Large LNA operation in south Jufra axis and LNA sites. Al-Mesmari reiterated the LNA’s and in the presence of eastern FM, Abdulhadi Al-Hweij, and as negotiations proceed comittment to a ceasefire, calling on the GNA to prevent other civil society members from Libya’s three regions. “militias” from spreading rumours in response to LNA Separately, France is reportedly seeking greater involvement deployments across the central Jufra district. from Libya’s neighbours and is pushing for a meeting involving 2 Algeria, Tunisia, Chad, and Niger. It remains to be seen how all NATIONWIDE SECURITY The politically-charged statements came amid large-scale settlement efforts will converge in the medium term. LNA deployments in Jufra and the south. On 17 Oct, the LNA Events, Analysis and Data 128 Reinforced Brigade, supported by other battalions, While there are grounds for optimism, observers argue the paraded in the Jufra district. Pro-LNA accounts reported at gradual isolation of Turkey from sideline negotiations leading up least 6000 units were mobilised, although more conservative to official UN-sponsored talks, including the Egypt-led military 3 assessments report the number of forces hovered around talks, could backfire in the medium term given Ankara’s on-the- SECURITY BY NUMBERS 2000, including auxiliary battalions. ground presence. Of note, EU Ambassadors recently reiterated their rejection of Turkey’s maritime agreement with the GNA in Charts, Statistics and Analysis Furthermore, the 128 Reinforced Brigade announced on 18 a press communiqué. Oct the beginning of a law enforcement operation in Sabha 4 targeting armed groups, smugglers, and other criminals. The Observers argue Ankara has become less assertive at the operation comes against the backdrop of worsening living negotiating table and its diplomatic ability to steer outcomes in TRIPOLI REPORT conditions in the region and ould exacerbate long-standing Libya is gradually diminishing. Regardless, Turkey continues to News & Neighborhoods ethnic divisions between Tebus and other local Arab tribes. manoeuvre in the western region. The GNA MoD announced Overall, the LNA expanding its foothold in the south could this week Ankara will train 120 GNA forces in Tripoli’s Tajoura. reignite tensions in GNA ranks, especially if LNA forces move Further, Turkey’s Defence Ministry reported a second batch of 5 northwards. The context would be reminiscent of the pre-April Libyan War College graduates received counterterrorism BENGHAZI REPORT 2019 offensive, although another LNA-sanctioned Tripoli training in Isparta, Turkey. Meanwhile, two Turkish Air Force C- operation is unlikely. 130s landed in Al-Wattiyah airbase on 15 October. The cargo News & Neighborhoods aircraft reportedly remained in-country for at least 72hrs, the In the broader operating environment, the week was marked longest recorded ground time for a Turkish military aircraft since 6 by positive signs. On 12 Oct, an eastern tribal delegation the LNA offensive, which according to analysts is a clear visisted Misrata elders to negotiate the exchange of prisoners indicator of Al-Wattiyah airbase’s WHAT’S NEXT and bodies. Reports indicate there was agreement over a Forward Looking Expert number of issues, including the reopening of gates, roads, and In the oil & gas sector, production has remained uninterrupted, airports. Of note, the Sirte-Misrata coastal road was despite uncertainty the LNA will reinstate the closure given the Opinions temporarily reopened to enable the eastern delegation’s visit. expiry on 18 October of the deadline to hold a Libyan-Libyan The local tribal discussions are expected to continue in the dialogue, as part of the deal with GNA Deputy PM Ahmed medium term and are a result of the Egypt-led Hurghada Maiteeg. Oil continues to flow with output hovering around 500k military talks. barrels per day (bpd) as more oil fields resume production. Observers argue LNA commander Khalifa Haftar is unlikely to In an equally positive development, Afriqiyah Airways risk another closure that could spark protests in the eastern operated the first flight between Tripoli’s Mitiga International region. Haftar, however, could close some terminals if UN talks Airport (MJI) and Benghazi’s Benina International are successful in forming a new government, as this outcome Airport (BEN) since the LNA’s Tripoli offensive on 16 October. would threaten the LNA commander’s posture. Meanwhile, The flight was followed by the LNA-sanctioned reopening of observers are of the view Moscow would be in favour of another airspace to domestic and international flights. closure if the outcome of UN-sponsored military talks undermines its interests. Turning to Tripoli, the week was marked by the GNA Interior Ministry’s (MoI) high-profile arrest of Abdalrahman al-Milad, also known as “Al-Beidja”, a notorious Zawiya-based smuggler KEY POINTS under UN Security Council sanctions, on Ghut Shaal’s main • GNA MoI arrests notorious Zawiya smuggler road near Bin Gharsa Gas Station at approximately 1500hrs on 14 October. The arrest resulted in a show of force by • First MJI-BEN flight since LNA offensive • LNA law enforcement op. in Sabha could backfire Libya Weekly Political and Security Update 1 Further distribution without written consent of Whispering Bell is strictly prohibited. The Whispering Bell Libya Weekly Political and Security Update™ does not constitute advice and must not be regarded as a substitute for detailed advice in individual cases. It is provided “as is” and without warranty of any kind. Whispering Bell shall have no liability arising from any use made of this report, or any part of it, to the fullest extent permitted by law. No part of this report may be reproduced in any form. Copyright © 2020. All rights reserved. Whispering Bell October 20, 2020 2. National Security Map Al-Mesmari claims GNA intent to attack LNA; LNA patrols & reinforcements in Jufra & south Legend Impact Indicator 3 A prisoner exchange took place in Sirte between Misrata and the eastern region in the evening on 16 October. The development came as a result of a recent visit by an eastern delegation to Misrata to reach consensus on a 4 prisoner exchange deal between the two sides. Incident Type 6 4 Open-source flight tracking software indicates two 3 Turkish Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft flew from Turkey to Al-Wattiyah airbase on 15 October, and later took off on 18 October. 1 5 2 Pro-LNA accounts reported a large convoy affiliated with the LNA 128 Reinforced Brigade mobilised towards an unidentified area in the The LNA’s Chief of Staff (CoS) and head of the eastern southern region on 14 October. Reports suggest Coronavirus Committee, Abdelrazak Al-Nathouri, issued a the LNA General Command ordered multiple units decision to reopen Libyan airspace to domestic and to mobilise across desert areas in Libya’s international flights according to the precautionary measures southwest. agreed upon with the medical advisory committee and the 6 readiness of national carriers to resume operations. The General Authority for Search and Identification 4 5 7 of Missing Persons reported the remains of five 1 bodies across three mass graves were found in Tarhuna’s Mashro’ Rabat area on 13 October. In an intensified war of words between the two rival sides this week, the LNA spokesman Ahmed Al-Mesmari confirmed intelligence on GNA intent to carry out an “aggressive and GNA Volcano of Rage Operations commanders provocative act” before attacking the Sirte-Jufra axis and LNA rejected the inclusion of LNA commander Khalifa sites. The statements came in response to pro-GNA reports Haftar in any political talks, in a meeting with GNA that LNA -affiliated foreign mercenaries seized public buildings Prime Minister Fayez Al-Serraj. According to pro- and schools in Houn. GNA accounts citing their own sources, Al-Serraj held a six-hour meeting with the GNA commanders 2 .According to reports, the attendees expressed their reservations towards the performance of the The LNA’s 128th Reinforced Brigade paraded in the Jufra Al-Serraj-led Presidential Council (PC), while they district on 16 October. Additional reports from pro-LNA believe the current talks, including the Bouznika accounts indicate approximately 6000 LNA forces are dialogue, set the stage for a power split between mobilised in the Jufra district.
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