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The Hyperspectral and Smartphone Technology in CBRNE Countermeasures and Defence JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES in COMPUTING 256

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The Hyperspectral and Smartphone Technology in CBRNE Countermeasures and Defence JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES in COMPUTING 256 JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN COMPUTING 256 Jaana Kuula The Hyperspectral and Smartphone Technology in CBRNE Countermeasures and Defence JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN COMPUTING 256 Jaana Kuula The Hyperspectral and Smartphone Technology in CBRNE Countermeasures and Defence Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston informaatioteknologian tiedekunnan suostumuksella julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston Agora-rakennuksen auditoriossa 2 joulukuun 17. päivänä 2016 kello 12. Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of the Faculty of Information Technology of the University of Jyväskylä, in building Agora, auditorium 2, on December 17, 2016 at 12 o’clock noon. UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ JYVÄSKYLÄ 2016 The Hyperspectral and Smartphone Technology in CBRNE Countermeasures and Defence JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN COMPUTING 256 Jaana Kuula The Hyperspectral and Smartphone Technology in CBRNE Countermeasures and Defence UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ JYVÄSKYLÄ 2016 Editors Timo Männikkö Department of Mathematical Information Technology, University of Jyväskylä Pekka Olsbo, Ville Korkiakangas Publishing Unit, University Library of Jyväskylä Produced in association with the National Defence University Department of Warfare URN:ISBN:978-951-39-6889-2 ISBN 978-951-39-6889-2 (PDF) ISBN 978-951-39-6888-5 (nid.) ISSN 1456-5390 Copyright © 2016, by University of Jyväskylä Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä 2016 To my Mother Kirsti Kuula, born Huurtola (Haltt) * 23.1.1925 † 1.5.2013 ABSTRACT Kuula, Jaana The Hyperspectral and Smartphone Technology in CBRNE Countermeasures and Defence Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2016, 214 p. (+ included articles) (Jyväskylä Studies in Computing ISSN 1456-5390; 256) ISBN 978-951-39-6888-5 (nid.) ISBN 978-951-39-6889-2 (PDF) Finnish summary Diss. Caused by industrial and military use as well as other sources of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) materials, the global threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) remains in spite of such weapons being internationally prohibited. With these materials, industrial and transportation accidents are likely in all countries and can also be triggered by natural disasters, such as in Fukushima in 2011. In addition, governments cannot fully control the manufacturing and usage of WMDs, as extreme terrorists have access to as well as the knowledge and motivation to use such materials. Due to multiple large-scale risks, the countering of CBRNE threats requires well-practiced joint operations by different authorities and new technical countermeasure methods. This dissertation studies how two novel technologies, hyperspectral technology and smartphone technology, can be used in CBRNE countermeasures and defence, especially by the police, defence forces and rescue services. The research is carried out adaptively via the concept development and experimentation (CD&E) method by forming the research framework with the generic military and civilian capability requirements of the European and North Atlantic operating concepts of CBRNE countermeasures and defence and by testing the capability requirements with related empirical experiments carried out as a part of the study. The experiments with hyperspectral technology focus on the detection of explosives, chemical warfare agents (CWAs), biofluids and other forensic samples, whereas the tests with smartphone technology deal with mobile emergency alerting, command and control, public warning and the information management of CBRNE incidents. The experiments are carried out with the Central Finland Police Department, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and other units of the Police of Finland, the Finnish Defence Forces, the Rescue Department of Central Finland, the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Verifin) and the leading Finnish explosives manufacturer, Forcit. Keywords: CBRNE countermeasures, CBRNE defence, CBRNE detection, joint operation, crisis management, emergency alerting, public warning, hyperspectral technology, smartphone technology Author Jaana Kuula Department of Mathematical Information Technology University of Jyväskylä Finland Supervisors Pekka Neittaanmäki Department of Mathematical Information Technology University of Jyväskylä Finland Mika Hyytiäinen Department of Warfare National Defence University Finland Reviewers Hugo Lavoie Defence Research and Development Canada, Valcartier The Department of National Defence Canada Kirsi Helkala Norwegian Defence Cyber Academy The Norwegian Cyber Defence Competency and Transformation Centre Norway Opponent Sasu Tarkoma Department of Computer Science University of Helsinki Finland ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I thank Professor and dean of the Faculty of Information Technology Pekka Neittaanmäki for inviting me to the university after my previous career and supervising my dissertation process. I also thank my supervisor in the National Defence University, Military Professor Mika Hyytiäinen, for helping me to embed my information technology research in the security sciences field. Thank you also to director of research, Professor Hannu H. Kari, for the additional support from NDU for my research. I am also grateful to the reviewers of my thesis, Professor Kirsi Helkala from the Norwegian Defence Cyber Academy and Hugo Lavoie from the Defence Research and Development Canada, and to my opponent, Professor Sasu Tarkoma from the University of Helsinki. I also thank former Chief Police Officer, PhD Markku Luoma from the Central Finland Police Department for kindly giving the initial permission to conduct the necessary experiments with the police, which then developed into wide multi-authority research and this thesis. Thank you also to the head of laboratory research and development PhD Tapani Reinikainen for the National Bureau of Investigation’s support for our hyperspectral research on crime scene investigation. For their help in carrying out the experiments, special thanks to police officers Tuomo Korhonen, Tuomas Teräväinen, Jukka Saarelainen and Pekka Poutiainen from the Central Finland Police Department, chief of com- munications Marko Luotonen from the National Police Board, captain, pioneer Marko Haukkamäki from the Air Force Command Finland, rescue chief Simo Tarvainen and risk manager Jarkko Jäntti from the Rescue Department of Cen- tral Finland, director, Professor Paula Vanninen and CBRNE specialists Martin Söderström and Matti Kuula from Verifin, and explosives manufacturer Forcit. Thank you to preparedness manager Janne Koivukoski and Taito Vainio from the Ministry of Interior and to the main funders of SpeCSI, SpeCSI Solutions and Sapporo projects, the Finnish funding agency for research and innovation Tekes and the University of Jyväskylä. Thanks also to my co-workers in these projects, especially Ilkka Pölönen, Hannu-Heikki Puupponen and Heikki Rinta. Warm thanks to the director of the Department of Mathematical Information Technology Professor Tuomo Rossi and to my project and travel secretaries Lea Hakala and Tiina Lampinen from the Faculty of Information Technology. My dearest thanks to my sweet daughter Iina Kuula for bearing all the struggle with me, producing videos and other materials for my projects, push- ing through her own degree in this same year and for starting her own career abroad in UK. My deep gratitude also to my mother Kirsti Kuula, who regret- fully passed away during my thesis process and never saw my work finished. Further thanks to my father Pentti Kuula and to my sister Thina Kauppinen and brother Ilkka Kuula with their families. Finally, warm thanks to Raimo Lehtomäki and Marko Lehtomäki with his family for supporting Iina and me. Jyväskylä, November 30, 2016 Jaana Kuula LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 Overview of global CBRN threats and activity in the summer of 2016. ..................................................................................................... 22 FIGURE 2 Overview of global CBRN threats and activity in the summer of 2015. ..................................................................................................... 22 FIGURE 3 The dual research approach of the study ........................................... 40 FIGURE 4 Research agenda for the technology and software development and CBRNE countermeasures experiments ....................................... 56 FIGURE 5 The causes for CBRNE detection at the different stages of the CBRNE incident ..................................................................................... 97 FIGURE 6 Key actors and entities of the military and civilian CBRNE countermeasure models ......................................................... 98 FIGURE 7 The main roles and detection and information management activities of the involved counterparts in a CBRNE incident........ 101 FIGURE 8 Research design for producing explosives’ residue for detection tests ....................................................................................... 123 FIGURE 9 Research design of airborne hyperspectral detection tests ............ 125 FIGURE 10 A photograph and a SWIR type of hyperspectral image of four blood stains .............................................................................. 126 FIGURE 11 Distinguishing different donors’ blood samples ............................. 127 FIGURE 12 The evaluation process of the research questions ........................... 147 LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1 The main level capability requirements of the CBRNE defence concept of the EDA .................................................................................
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