S3570 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 We will have the ability to decide known—has been seen as a singular ers, or proto-nuclear powers, has grown any information that we will exchange evil giving rise to a singular cause for somewhat. But only somewhat: around with other countries. That has been a international sanctions. 10 in a world with some 185 members of confusion about this treaty, Mr. Presi- In May 1899, Czar Nicholas II of Rus- the United Nations. And never since dent, that needs to be cleared up. sia convened a peace conference at The 1945 has a single atomic weapon been When all the debate is concluded at Hague in Holland. Twenty-six coun- used in warfare. the end of the day today, I believe it tries attended and agreed upon three The Chemical Weapons Convention serves our national interest to go conventions and three declarations incorporates the advances in inter- ahead and ratify the treaty. I believe it concerning the laws of war. Declara- national law and cooperation of which will contribute to a more peaceful tion II, On Asphyxiating or Deleterious I have spoken; it extends them. Its in- world. Like all treaties, it lacks perfec- Gases stated: spections can be more effective than tion. But the acid test is: Will this gen- The Contracting Parties agree to abstain the IAEA because of the ability to con- eration of Americans and future gen- from the use of projectiles the sole object of duct challenge inspections when viola- erations of Americans be less likely to which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or del- tions of the CWC are suspected. confront chemical weapons on the bat- eterious gases. If the Senate should fail—and it will tlefield or in a civilian context if this Article 23 of the Annex to the Con- not fail—to adopt the resolution of treaty is ratified? In my view, it is vention added: ratification, it would be the first rejec- clear that they will be less likely to In addition to the prohibitions provided by tion of such a treaty since the Senate confront chemical weapons if we go special Conventions, it is especially forbid- in 1919 rejected the Treaty of Ver- ahead today. I hope very much my col- den: sailles, with its provision for the estab- leagues will join in supporting the (a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons lishment of the League of Nations. It treaty. *** would be only the 18th treaty rejected Mr. President, I yield the floor and Our own Theodore Roosevelt called by the Senate in the history of the Re- suggest the absence of a quorum. for a second peace conference which public. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time convened in 1907. This time, 45 coun- Every living Chairman of the Joint of the Senator has expired. tries were in attendance at The Hague, Chiefs of Staff over the past 20 years Will the Senator withhold the and reiterated the Declaration on As- has called for ratification of the Chem- quorum request? phyxiating Gases and the article 23 ical Weapons Convention. Mr. BINGAMAN. I withhold. prohibition on poisoned weapons. Our beloved former colleague, Sen- f The Hague Conventions notwith- ator Bob Dole, has given his support standing, poison gas was used in World and asked us to do what I think we can RECESS UNTIL 10:30 A.M. FOR A War I. Of all the events of the First only describe as our duty. The Presi- CLOSED SESSION IN THE OLD World War, a war from which this cen- dent pleads. SENATE CHAMBER tury has not yet fully recovered, none Here I would note a distinction. In The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under so horrified mankind as gas warfare. 1919, Woodrow Wilson could have had the previous order, the Senate will re- No resolve ever was as firm as that of the Versailles Treaty, we could have cess and reconvene at the hour of 10:30 the nations of the world, after that joined the League of Nations, if only he a.m., in the Old Senate Chamber. war, to prevent gas warfare from ever had been willing to make a modicum of Thereupon, the Senate, at 10:22 a.m., happening again. concessions to then-chairman of the recessed under the previous order and Declaring something to be violation Foreign Relations Committee and ma- reconvened in closed session at 10:32 of international law does not solve a jority leader, Henry Cabot Lodge of a.m., in the Old Senate Chamber; problem, but it does provide those of us Massachusetts. Wilson was too stub- whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the Senate re- who adhere to laws mechanisms by born; in truth, and it pains an old Wil- cessed the closed session, and the Sen- which to address violations of them. In sonian to say so, too blind. Nothing ate reassembled in open session, under June 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibi- such can be said of President Clinton. the previous order, at 1 p.m., when tion of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, In a month of negotiations with the called to order by the Presiding Officer Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bac- current chairman of the Foreign Rela- (Mr. ENZI). teriological Methods of Warfare was tions Committee and the current Re- f signed in Geneva. This reaffirmed the publican leader, the administration has CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION Hague prohibition and added biological reached agreement on 28 of 33 condi- weapons to the declaration. tions. Only five proved unacceptable. The Senate continued with the con- In the Second World War that fol- And, indeed, sir, they are. The Presi- sideration of the convention. lowed, such was the power of that com- dent could not in turn ratify a treaty The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mitment that gas was not used in Eu- with those conditions. pending business before the Senate is rope. It was expected, but it did not Again to draw a parallel with 1919. ratification of the Chemical Weapons happen. During consideration of the Treaty of Convention. Then came the atom bomb and a new, Versailles, the Senate was divided into The Senator from North Carolina has even more important development in three primary camps: those who sup- 1 hour and 20 minutes. The Senator warfare. In time it, too, would be the ported the treaty; those who opposed from Delaware has 46 minutes. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 7 subject of international conventions. the treaty, no matter what shape or minutes to my friend from New York. As part of the peace settlement that form it might take—known as The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- followed World War II, President Roo- ‘‘irreconcilables’’ or ‘‘bitter enders’’— ator from New York. sevelt, with the British, Chinese, and and those who wanted some changes to Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. French, set up the United Nations. In the treaty, most importantly led by May I ask my good friend if he didn’t 1957, within the U.N. system, the Inter- Senator Lodge. wish that the time be charged to the national Atomic Energy Agency was There are some modern day Senator from Delaware? established. The new agency fielded an irreconcilables who oppose this Treaty The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time extraordinary new device, inter- for the same reason they eschew inter- will be charged to the Senator from national inspectors, who began inspect- national law: viewing it as an assertion Delaware. ing weapons facilities around the world of what nice people do. Such a view re- Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. I to ensure compliance. This was en- duces a magisterial concept that there thank my dear friend, the chairman. hanced by the Nuclear Non-Prolifera- will be enforced standards to a form of Mr. President, I rise in support of the tion Treaty (NPT), which came into wishful thinking. A position which resolution of ratification. I will take force in 1970, allowing inspectors to runs counter to a century of effort. just a moment of the Senate’s time to monitor declared nuclear sites. This Today I would appeal to those Repub- put this matter in a historical context. was an unheard of compromise of tradi- licans who might compare themselves Since its development by 19th cen- tional sovereignty. It has not worked with Senator Lodge. Unlike 1919, this tury chemists, poison gas—as it was perfectly. The number of nuclear pow- President has heard your concerns and April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3571 worked carefully to address them in is still unknown about chemical weap- only superpower and leader in the fight the form the resolution of ratification ons use in the gulf and there is great for world peace, we must be out front containing 28 conditions which is now concern throughout the Minnesota vet- on this convention. before the Senate. erans community. I’ve seen the tragic This treaty itself has a very interest- To fail to ratify the CWC would put effects of this when I’ve met with gulf ing and solid bipartisan history as well us on the side of the rogue states and war veterans who went to the gulf in as strong popular support, and I am relieve them of any pressure to ratify perfect health but became seriously ill mystified as to why some of my col- the convention themselves. As Mat- after they returned. While many are leagues want to reject a treaty for thew Nimitz has argued, the United uncertain about the causes of their ill- which we are largely responsible. The States has a unique interest in inter- nesses, they suspect that exposure to CWC was conceived during the Reagan national law because it cannot ‘‘match toxic chemical agents was a factor. administration, crafted and signed dur- the Russians in deviousness or the Mr. President, I want to tell my col- ing the Bush administration and fur- Libyans in irresponsibility or the Ira- leagues about a story I recently heard ther negotiated during the Clinton ad- nians in brutality ** *. [It is the Unit- concerning veterans who were part of ministration. Former President Bush ed States] which stands to lose the the 477th Ambulance Company who has continued to proclaim strong sup- most in a state of world anarchy.’’ may have been exposed to toxic chemi- port for ratification. Its bipartisan The Chemical Weapons Convention cals. After the war, a couple of com- creditials are thus impeccable. Legisla- builds on the laws of The Hague: a cen- pany members went exploring the area tors and national security experts from tury of arms control agreements. It nearby and noticed a spill on the floor both parties firmly support it. Former bans chemical weapons—hideous and of a warehouse. There’s no way of Secretary of State James Baker argues barbaric devices—completely. Inter- knowing now exactly what the sub- that it is outrageous to suggest that ei- national law can never offer perfect stance was, but they are concerned ther Presidents Bush or Reagan would protection, but we are primary bene- about possible exposure to a nerve negotiate a treaty that would harm na- ficiaries of the protection that it does agent. They were alarmed because even tional security. President Clinton sees provide. I urge my colleagues to sup- this kind of low-level exposure can be a the accord as building on the treaty port this important treaty. serious threat to our soldiers’ safety than bans nuclear tests in the atmos- I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. and health. The plea from the Minneso- phere that President Kennedy signed Might I ask? Does time run consecu- tan who told this story is, ‘‘Please! Get more than three decades ago. The Sen- tively and is it divided equally? everyone to stop using this junk!’’ ate now needs to complete the weap- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. It Well, that is exactly what we are try- ons-control work to which Presidents will be divided equally. ing to do, and ratifying the CWC is a Kennedy, Reagan and Bush and Clinton Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. vital step in that direction. If we don’t were and have been committed. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest sign up, America’s soldiers—and in- By at least restricting the manufac- the absence of a quorum. deed, all Americans—will be the worse ture, sale, and possession of toxic The PRESIDING OFFICER. The for it. chemicals capable of being used as clerk will call the roll. Another Minnesotan who was a nu- weapons, the United States makes it The assistant legislative clerk pro- clear-biological-chemical warfare spe- more difficult for rogue nations or ter- ceeded to call the roll. cialist during the war talked about the rorist organizations to obtain the raw Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask panic and incorrect use of protective material for weapons. Ultimately, we unanimous consent that the order for equipment that occurred when there then better protect our soldiers and ci- the quorum call be rescinded. were scud alerts accompanied by CBW vilians. We should help lead the world The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without alerts. There were soldiers who just away from these graveyard gases, and objection, it is so ordered. couldn’t handle the threat of possible not pretend they are essential to a Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 chemical attacks. And why should we solid defense. Do we plan to use chemi- minutes to my friend from Minnesota. be surprised? The use of chemical cal weapons? No. Then do we lack the The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- weapons is inhuman and even the per- courage to lead? I certainly hope not. ator from Minnesota. ceived threat has to be psychologically Mr. President, according to Sec- Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. damaging. These stories just strength- retary of State Madeleine Albright, the Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- en my resolve to do all I can to push United States is the only nation with sent that a congressional fellow from for ratification of this treaty. the power, influence, and respect to my office, Ashley Tessmer, be allowed Mr. President, we face a decision be- forge a strong global consensus against in the Chamber during the Chemical tween taking a lead role in this effort the spread of weapons of mass destruc- Weapons Convention debate. or standing on the sidelines—this deci- tion. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without sion should not be difficult for the There is also support for this treaty objection, it is so ordered. United States which historically has from the armed services. I have the Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the taken the lead in arms control, seeking unique perspective of serving on both Chemical Weapons Convention goes agreements that are in the national in- the Foreign Relations Committee and into force April 29 with or without U.S. terest, verifiable, and contribute to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. I participation. This, after more than 100 world peace. I repeat in the national know that many veterans organiza- years of international efforts to ban interest, verifiable, and contribute to tions support this treaty—VFW, VVA, chemical weapons, including the Hague world peace. And there is no question Reserve Officers Association of U.S., Convention of 1889 and the Geneva Pro- in my mind that the CWC fully meets American Ex-prisoners of War, tocol of 1925 which placed restrictions these standards. AMVETS, Jewish War Vets to name a on the use of chemical weapons. The To me, it is a great mystery why this few. What better testimony to its history of chemical weapons use is a treaty is not already ratified. After all, value? The treaty will reduce world long one—from 1915 with the German Congress directed in 1985 that all U.S. stockpiles of weapons and will hope- use of chlorine gas in Belgium during chemical munitions be destroyed by fully prevent our troops from being ex- World War I, to the Iraqi use of poison 1999—since amended to 2004. Subse- posed to poison gases. And, for my col- gas to kill an estimated 4,000 people in quently in 1993, the United States be- leagues who are still not convinced on the Kurdish village of Halabja in 1988, came one of the original signatories of the merits of the treaty—over three and the very recent threat of chemical the CWC, now awaiting ratification by quarters of the American public—as weapons use in the Persian Gulf war. this body. It would seem that there’s much as 84 percent in a recent poll, fa- These chemical weapons are dan- nothing so dramatic as waiting until vors this treaty. gerous—not only because of inten- the last minute to make an obvious But why then are there opponents to tional, but also accidental use. In Min- and sensible decision. This inter- this treaty? I cannot answer that. I can nesota, I’ve listened to many gulf war national treaty takes a major step for- only say that it is always easier to tear veterans who’ve told me about their ward in the elimination of the scourge something down than it is to build it. experiences during the conflict. Much of chemical weapons. As the world’s Ask ethnic minorities in Iraq—who S3572 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 were the victims of Saddam’s chemical Senate with more than 1,500 pages of leagues join me in striking this amend- attacks—why there are opponents. Ask information on the CWC, including ment, we’ll be permitting Russian Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell why over 300 pages of testimony and over hardliners to decide our foreign policy, there are opponents. According to Gen- 400 pages of answers to questions for while dimming prospects that Russia— eral Powell, this treaty serves our na- the record. It is important to recall which has the world’s largest stockpile tional interest—to quote his comments that in April 1996 the Senate Commit- of chemical weapons—will ratify the at last week’s Veterans’ Affairs Com- tee on Foreign Relations voted the CWC. How can this be in our national mittee hearing: ‘‘For us to reject that treaty out of committee by a strong bi- interest? treaty now because there are rogue na- partisan majority, 13 to 5. Why then, CWC condition No. 30 on rogue states tions outside the treaty is the equiva- only 1 year later, are we confronting bars the United States from ratifying lent of saying we shouldn’t have joined four conditions, any of which will pre- the CWC until all states determined to NATO because Russia wasn’t a part of vent us from ratifying the treaty by possess offensive chemical weapons NATO.’’ If we don’t sign this treaty, April 29 when it will automatically go programs, including China, North their will still be rogue nations. Ask into effect, and a fifth condition that is Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and the State Department, the intelligence unacceptable and would undermine the other states deemed to be state spon- community, the chemical manufactur- treaty? sors of terrorism, have ratified. This is ers who stand to lose as much as $600 Mr. President, I hope that all of my a killer condition likely to prevent the million in sales, why there are oppo- colleagues realize that the United United States from ever joining the nents to this treaty. And ask our own States will incur serious costs if we CWC. If this condition is not struck we gulf war veterans who lived with the don’t submit instruments of ratifica- would be using the lowest common de- fear of chemical attack and may now tion by April 29. Unless we join the nominator as a principle for determin- be suffering the effects of exposure to convention now, the United States will ing our foreign policy. The United chemicals why there are opponents. be barred from having a seat on the ex- States would be placed in the bizarre They and I will never understand it. ecutive council, the key decisionmak- and embarrassing position of allowing Mr. President, ratification of the ing body of the convention, for at least the world’s most recalcitrant regimes Chemical Weapons Convention is cru- a year and, perhaps, longer. We would to determine when we join the CWC, if cial to all nonproliferation efforts. If thus be precluded from influencing ever. As former Secretary of State America’s message to the world is that vital decisions to be made by the exec- James Baker has said: ‘‘It makes no the United States is not deeply con- utive council regarding the detailed sense to argue that because a few pa- cerned about the production of weap- procedures that will be followed under riah states refuse to join the conven- ons of mass destruction, then it will the convention. Moreover, sanctions tion the United States should line up encourage rogue states to either con- against U.S. companies—the require- with them rather than the rest of the tinue clandestine projects or to begin ment that they obtain end-user certifi- world.’’ Makes no sense at all, which is producing these weapons that could cates to export certain chemicals—will precisely why I strongly support strik- imperil U.S. troops in future conflicts. commence on April 29 if we are not a ing this condition. CWC condition No. 31 on barring CWC Lack of U.S. resolve on the CWC and convention party. If we still haven’t inspectors from a number of countries the unraveling effect it would have on joined in 3 years, U.S. firms would be such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North other arms control treaties, would subject to a ban on trade in certain Korea, from ever entering the United make it easier for rogue states in two chemicals. In addition, U.S. citizens States as part of CWC inspection ways: they could more easily acquire won’t be hired as officials or inspectors teams. This is an unnecessary condi- chemical weapons materials and more by the body that will implement the tion that has the potential to seriously effectively hide their production pro- convention until the United States be- hamstring CWC implementation. To grams. How can we best protect the fu- comes a party to the CWC. And, even begin with, the United States already ture of our children, our soldiers, our more important than these costs to the has the right under the CWC to bar in- trade, our country’s position in the United States, is the fact that failure spectors on an individual basis each world? By ratifying this treaty. to ratify the treaty, which was pro- year when the CWC proposes its list of I’m deeply puzzled as to why, when at duced because of U.S. leadership, will inspectors. If this condition is not long last the Senate is on the verge of have a negative impact on American struck, it is likely to provoke reciproc- giving its advice and consent to CWC leadership around the world. ity, resulting in other nations black- ratification, we are being asked to con- While I will never understand why we balling all American inspectors. This sider treaty-killer conditions. Again, I have come to such a pass, it is crystal would have the perverse effect of un- remind my colleague, this treaty has clear to me why we have to move to dermining one of our main objectives been more than 15 years in the making strike all five of these conditions. Mr. in joining the treaty: to ensure Amer- with two Republican Presidents and President, permit me to briefly sum- ican inspectors take the lead in finding one Democratic President involved in marize each of the five conditions and violations. In addition, condition No. 31 negotiating and crafting the final prod- to spell out the key reasons why I’m would bar inspectors from a country uct. It is the result of years of biparti- unalterably opposed to them: like China even if United States na- san efforts. The CWC has been strongly CWC condition No. 29 on Russia pre- tional security might be better served endorsed by former Secretary of State cludes the United States from joining by letting them confirm directly that James Baker and former National Se- the convention until Russia ratifies the United States is not violating the curity Adviser Brent Scowcroft—both and satisfies other specified conditions. CWC, but fails to require rejection of of whom served Republican Presidents. This is a killer condition that would inspectors from other countries who It also enjoys the support of our top hold hostage our ability to join the might be known spies or have a record commanders during the Persian Gulf CWC to hardliners in the Russian of improper handling of confidential war, including General Schwarzkopf, Duma. As the President put it, ‘‘this is data. Because of these serious flaws, I who clearly recognize that it is in our precisely backwards [since] the best urge my colleagues to join me in vot- national interest to ratify the treaty. way to secure Russian ratification is to ing to strike this condition. While I do not question the motives ratify the treaty ourselves.’’ I couldn’t CWC condition No. 32 which prohibits and integrity of my colleagues who agree more with the President, whose the United States from joining the support these four killer conditions, it position parallels that of Vil CWC until the President certifies that is clear that they are not a result of in- Myrzyanov, a Russian scientist who the parties to the convention have sufficient Senate scrutiny and debate. blew the whistle on the Soviet Union’s agreed to strike article X and amend In fact, the CWC has been before the CW program and strongly backs the article XI. This provision is an out- Senate since November 1993, when it treaty. In a recent letter to my distin- right killer that will prevent the Unit- was submitted by President Clinton. guished colleague, Senator LUGAR, he ed States from joining the Convention. During the past 31⁄2 years, the Senate said ‘‘Senate ratification of the con- Clearly the President can’t make such has held 17 hearings on the treaty and vention is crucial to securing action on a certification prior to April, and like- the administration has provided the the treaty in Moscow.’’ Unless, my col- ly won’t ever be able to do so since the April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3573 Convention permits a single State licit production or storage of one met- whom are ill, many of whom are strug- party to veto such amendments. Pro- ric ton of chemical agent. Since this is gling with illness, who were fine before ponents of condition No. 32 wrongly an unachievable standard for monitor- they served in the war and are not now contend that the Convention requires ing the treaty, this is a killer condition and want to know what has happened the United States and other parties to that would permanently bar U.S. par- to them, there are two different issues. share sensitive technology that will as- ticipation in the CWC. I have the honor of being on both the sist such countries as Iran to develop Mr. President, no one can deny that Veterans’ Committee and the Senate offensive CW capabilities. some aspects of the CWC will be dif- Foreign Relations Committee. One, on In fact, Mr. President, neither article ficult to verify, nor can anyone affirm the Veterans’ Committee, is to get to X nor article XI have such require- that any arms control agreement is 100 the bottom of this and make sure vet- ments. Article X, which focuses mainly percent verifiable. And, as Gen. Edward erans get the care they deserve. But on assisting or protecting convention Rowny, who was special adviser to the other is when we have such an im- member countries attacked, or facing Presidents Reagan and Bush, pointed portant treaty, such a historically im- attack, by chemical weapons, provides out in the Washington Post any chemi- portant agreement which is in the na- complete flexibility for states to deter- cal weapons treaty is inherently more tional interest, which is verifiable and mine what type of assistance to pro- difficult to verify than a strategic arms which contributes to world peace and vide and how to provide it. One option treaty, under which missiles and bomb- helps us get rid of this junk and is so would be to provide solely medical ers can be observed by national tech- important not only to our soldiers-to- antidotes and treatments to the nical means. For one thing, chemical be but also to children and grand- threatened state. This is precisely the weapons can literally be produced in children, Mr. President, I do not think option the President has chosen under thousands of large and small labora- there is any more important vote that agreed condition No. 15 which specifies tories around the world. But the bot- we can make than one of majority sup- that the United States will give only tom line is one made succinctly and port for the Chemical Weapons Conven- medical help to such countries as Iran clearly by General Rowny: ‘‘If we are tion. or Cuba under article X. Moreover, be- within the CWC, well-trained and expe- In my State of Minnesota, I know yond medical assistance, the President rienced American inspectors, employ- that people are overwhelmingly for has made clear the United States will ing an agreed set of procedures, inten- this agreement. People are under no il- be careful in deciding what assistance sive procedures, will have an oppor- lusion. They do not think it is perfect, to provide on a case-by-case basis. In tunity to catch violaters. Outside the but they think it is an enormous step sum, there is no valid justification for CWC, no such opportunity will exist.’’ I forward for all of humankind, an enor- scrapping article X. couldn’t agree more. As in many other mous step forward for people in our Opponents of the CWC contend that matters, the perfect is not only unat- country, an enormous step forward for article XI, which addresses the ex- tainable but is also the enemy of the people in other countries as well. Since change of scientific and technical in- good. I hope than many of my col- the United States of America has formation, requires the sharing of tech- leagues will see this issue in the same taken a leadership position in the nology and will result in the erosion of light and will join me in voting to international community, in the inter- export controls now imposed by the strike condition No. 33. national arena, it would be, I think, Australia Group of chemical exporting In conclusion, I want to stress that nothing short of tragic if we now were countries, which includes the United America has always been a leader in on the sidelines, if we were not in- States. While this is plainly not the international arms negotiations. Amer- volved in the implementation of this case, the President under agreed condi- ica should continue this proud tradi- agreement, if we were not involved in tion No. 7 is committed to obtain as- tion of leading the way. We as a nation exerting our leadership in behalf of this surances from our Australia Group have the opportunity to be one of the agreement. partners that article XI is fully con- world’s leading guardians of the peace I urge full support for this agree- sistent with maintaining export curbs through the application of this treaty; ment, and I really do think I speak for on dangerous chemicals. Condition No. we can participate in safeguarding our a large, engaged majority in Min- 7 also requires the President to certify armed forces, our citizens, our children nesota. that the CWC doesn’t obligate the from the horrors of chemical weapons; I thank the Chair. United States to modify its national we can lessen the likelihood of chemi- Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest export controls, as well as to certify cal weapons being used again in war- the absence of a quorum. annually that the Australia Group is fare. The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there maintaining controls that are equal to, But to make all this possible, we is no objection, time will be deducted or exceed, current export controls. must have the perspicacity and fore- equally. Mr. President, one final point regard- sight to grab this fleeting opportunity, Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I withhold ing the Condition’s proponents concern this historic moment where we decide my suggestion of the absence of a that articles X and XI will require to join with other nations to improve quorum. I yield 7 minutes to my friend technology that will assist other coun- the quality of life worldwide and assure from North Dakota. tries to develop offensive chemical a safer, saner world. We have just cele- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- weapons programs. Exchanges of sen- brated Earth Day—and I ask what bet- ator from North Dakota. sitive technology and information pro- ter way to honor our planet is there Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today vided under terms of both articles than by now ratifying a treaty that the Senate will vote on the Chemical would be legally bound by the fun- will protect and safeguard her people? Weapons Convention. President Reagan damental obligation of treaty article I, Mr. President, there is not a lot of began the negotiations on this treaty. which obligates parties never to ‘‘* * * time to go through such an important President Bush signed it. And Presi- assist encourage, or induce, in any, issue, but I thought I would just draw dent Clinton sent it to the Senate for anyone to engage in any activity pro- from some very poignant and personal our advice and consent. hibited to a State party under this con- discussion back in Minnesota that we We do a lot of things in this Cham- vention.’’ This would ban assisting have had with gulf war veterans. ber. Some of them are small and rather anyone in acquiring a chemical weap- To quote one of the veterans who insignificant. But we also do some very ons capability. himself is really struggling with illness big and important things and make I strongly urge my colleagues from which he thinks is based upon some ex- some big and important decisions. The both sides of the aisle to join me in posure to chemicals during his service vote this evening on this treaty is a voting to strike this condition. in the war, he said, ‘‘This is my plea. very significant decision for the people CWC condition No. 33 would prohibit Please get everyone to stop using this of America and also people around the the United States from ratifying the junk.’’ world. CWC until the President can certify I really do think that the more I talk There are some who have opposed high confidence U.S. capabilities to de- to veterans with their service in the virtually all efforts in all cases to limit tect within 1 year of a violation, the il- gulf war fresh in their mind, many of arms. They vote against all of the arms S3574 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 control treaties, believing that they That is what this debate is about. free to ratify the convention. If we do are not in our country’s best interests. This is not a small or an insignificant not, of course, he does not have that I think they were wrong, and I think issue. This is an attempt by our coun- power to do so. they have been proven wrong in a num- try and others to join together to ban Last week I did not object to the ber of areas. an entire class of weapons of mass de- unanimous-consent agreement by In previous arms control agreements, struction. which the Senate is now finally able to we have achieved significant success in Mr. President, I have spoken several consider the Chemical Weapons Con- reducing the nuclear threat against times in this Chamber about the vote vention. I did comment at that time on this country. I held up in this Cham- that we are to take today. This vote is the manner in which we are proceed- ber—in fact, somewhere right near this late. This debate should have taken ing. We have been forced to take the spot—not too many months ago a large place long ago, but it did not. We unusual step of discharging this impor- piece of metal that I held up from that pushed and agitated and pushed and tant treaty from the Foreign Relations missile is metal that comes from the pushed some more to get it to the floor Committee without the benefit of com- scrap heap because the missile does not of the Senate because we face a critical mittee consideration or a committee exist any longer. end date of April 29. report. And, what is most extraor- In the missile silo that existed, in the I commend those who finally decided dinary, is that it is the Republican hole in the ground in the Ukraine, that to join with us and bring this to the leadership for the Republican majority hole in the ground which contained a floor for a debate, but now as we pro- that has insisted on this extraordinary missile with a warhead ensconced in ceed through several amendments and procedure. Last week we were required to dis- that silo, there is now simply dirt. And then final passage, it is important for charge the Judiciary Committee from in that dirt are planted sunflowers—no the future of this country, for my chil- any consideration of S. 495, a bill that missile, no silo—sunflowers. dren and the children of the world, that was taken up last Thursday with no Now, why are sunflowers planted this Senate cast a favorable vote to committee consideration, no commit- where a missile was once planted, a ratify the treaty that comes from this tee report, and an absolute minimum missile with a nuclear warhead aimed convention. It will be a better world of debate. In fact, the Senate was asked at the United States of America? Be- and a safer world if we do that. to consider a revised, unamendable cause of an arms control agreement I want to commend those who have substitute version of the bill that was which required that that missile be de- worked on this in Republican and not made available to us until that stroyed. So sunflowers exist where a Democratic administrations, those very afternoon. I raised concerns that missile once stood poised, aimed at our whose view of foreign policy is that it it might, in fact, serve to weaken country. is a safer world if we together, jointly, Arms control agreements have criminal laws against terrorism. I dare- reduce the threats that exist in our say at least 90 out of the 100 Senators worked. This particular convention world. Yes, the threat from nuclear which we will vote to ratify today who voted on S. 495 last week had not weapons. We have done that in arms read it and probably did not have much would eliminate an entire class of control treaties. Those treaties are not idea of what was in it. weapons of mass destruction. perfect, but we have made huge I mention this because we have taken One could come to the floor of the progress. And now, also, the threat of a lot of time for recesses this year but Senate today and hold up a vial of chemical weapons and poison gas. we did not come up with a budget on sarin gas, and if one should drop that I am proud today to cast a vote for a April 15, even though the law requires vial of gas on this desk and it would treaty that is very significant, and I us to do so. The leadership decided not break, those in this room might not be hope sufficient numbers of my col- to bring one before the Senate to vote leaving the room; they might not sur- leagues will do the same. I hope that on. Each one of us had to file our taxes vive. If someone came here with a vial the news tomorrow in our country will on April 15, or the IRS would have and a gas mask and wore the mask and be that the United States of America come knocking on the door, but even appropriate protective clothing, then has joined 74 other countries in ratify- though the law requires the leadership they would suffer no consequences. ing this critically important treaty for to bring up a budget bill, none was. I My point is, who are the most vulner- our future. am not suggesting we not bring up the able in our world when there is a poi- Mr. President, I yield the floor and I Chemical Weapons Convention now. It son gas or chemical weapon attack? make a point of order that a quorum is should have been brought up last Sep- The population of ordinary citizens is not present. tember. But I worry that the Senate is the most vulnerable. There are armies, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time suddenly doing this, launching into if forewarned, that can defend them- will be divided equally. issue after issue, not following the kind selves against it, but the mass popu- The clerk will call the roll. of procedures that would enable us to lation of citizens in our countries is ex- The assistant legislative clerk pro- really know what we are talking about. traordinarily vulnerable to the most ceeded to call the roll. I suggest that we should be looking at aggressive poison gas and chemical Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask the way we have done this. weapons known to mankind. unanimous consent that the order for In 1988 I chaired hearings on the There are a lot of arguments that the quorum call be rescinded. threat of high-tech terrorism. I con- have been raised against this conven- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without tinue to be concerned about terrorist tion, but none of them make much objection, it is so ordered. access to plastique explosives, sophisti- sense. Our country has already decided The Chair recognizes the Senator cated information systems, electronic to destroy our stockpile of poison gas from Vermont, who has an hour under surveillance equipment, and ever more and chemical weapons. We have al- the agreement. powerful, dangerous weapons. With the ready made that decision. President Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo Reagan made that decision. We are in myself such time as I may need under subway system 2 years ago, we saw the the process of finishing that job. The the hour reserved to the Senator from use of harmful chemicals to commit question before the Senate is whether Vermont. terrorist acts. we will join in a treaty ratified already Mr. President, today the Senate will In our Judiciary hearings in 1988, 1991 by over 70 other countries, whether we exercise its advice and consent author- and 1995, we heard testimony on easily will decide to work to eliminate chemi- ity under article II, section 2, clause 2 acquired, difficult to detect chemical cal weapons and poison gas from the of the United States Constitution. We and biological weapons and explosions. rest of the world, to decide that if ever have to decide whether we will advise On April 17, 1995, the date of the bomb- American men and women who wear a and consent to the Chemical Weapons ing of the Murrah Federal Building in uniform in service of our country go Convention that has been the product Oklahoma City, we all learned how abroad or go somewhere to defend our of negotiations conducted by the easy it is for somebody, intent on ter- country, they will not be facing an at- Reagan, the Bush and the Clinton ad- rorism, to concoct a lethal compound tack by chemical weapons or poison ministrations. If we advise and consent out of materials as easily available as gas. to it, then President Clinton will be fertilizer. April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3575 So, for more than a decade I have warfare. This treaty prohibits a full resolution of ratification that provide raised issues about the threats of nu- spectrum of activities associated with even greater protections to U.S. busi- clear, biological and chemical terror- the offensive use of chemical weapons, ness, and our soldiers, and those who ism. I have worked with Members on including the development, production, are concerned about constitutional vio- both sides of the aisle to minimize acquisition, stockpiling and assistance lations. those threats. We have cooperated on to anyone engaging in these activities. Shortly, we are going to vote to measures included in the Violent The convention creates a comprehen- strike five other conditions that oppo- Crime Control and Law Enforcement sive verification regime which makes nents of the treaty say are necessary to Act of 1994, and the Antiterrorism Act, it easier to detect and monitor emerg- address their concerns. I hope that, passed in April of last year. We have ing chemical weapons threats. The vig- rather than addressing their concerns, concurred on those. Assuming we ad- orous verification procedures estab- we address the concerns of the United vise and consent today, and I think lished in this treaty will help deter States. Those five conditions should be now that we will—I think some who countries from developing chemical seen for what they are, treaty killers, wanted to hold it up realize that this is weapons, and will make it more likely designed by those who have no desire not the kind of posture they want to be that cheaters are detected. Those na- to see us participate in this treaty, no in, especially as a party going into tions that do not ratify it, and we matter how many modifications we elections next year—but, assuming could be among them, will be subject make. that we advise and consent and the to trade sanctions. Nonparticipating I want to speak briefly about two of President can ratify it, I look forward nations will also face increasing inter- the amendments. The distinguished to working with Senator HATCH to national pressure to comply, as their chairman of the Foreign Relations promptly consider and report imple- number dwindles to an unsavory few. I Committee, Senator HELMS, has been menting legislation that will continue hope the United States will not be one very insistent on them. They are im- the progress we are making today. of those unsavory few. portant with respect to this treaty, and I look forward to hearings in the Ju- In the last day, I have heard prepos- also with respect to the issue of anti- diciary Committee on S. 610, having terous statements from the Senate personnel landmines. That is a matter that committee consider that measure floor about what damage this treaty of special importance to me. and report it to the Senate before the will do to our national security, about Proposed condition 29 would, among Memorial Day recess. what a burden it will be on American other things, prohibit the United I do not expect the distinguished sen- business—the same businesses that are States from ratifying the treaty until ior Senator from Utah, chairman of the hoping that we will advise and consent Russia has done so. Proposed condition Judiciary Committee, to bottle up this to it; about how rogue states will sud- 30 would prohibit the United States measure or to deny the Senate the ben- denly produce unconstrained amounts from ratifying the treaty until all efit of our committee’s views. I am of chemical weapons to use on our sol- States having chemical weapons pro- going to try to get something ap- diers. Others eloquently exposed these grams, including China, North Korea, proaching regular order. We have not charges for what they are: flat-out and Iraq, have ratified the treaty. In on anything else yet this year, but false. other words, we would say that China, maybe on this issue we could. What this debate is really about is North Korea, and Iraq would determine We have had the Chemical Weapons how we monitor the rest of the world the timetable for the United States. Convention before us since November to ensure the use of these weapons is Can you imagine that in any other con- 1993. As the April 28, 1997, deadline ap- deterred and minimized. For we all text? We would be screaming on this proaches—after which our lack of rati- know, the United States by law is com- floor. Of course we would not allow fication risks economic sanctions mitted to destroying our own chemical that to happen. These conditions would against our chemical industry that stockpiles by 2004. We are doing this effectively prevent the United States would actually cost U.S. chemical com- because we know that these weapons from ratifying the Chemical Weapons panies hundreds of millions of dollars— have limited military utility and be- Convention and allow the world’s most I hope the Republican majority will cause civilized people around the world recalcitrant regimes to decide the rules join with the President and ratify it, agree their use is morally wrong. And of international conduct. and allow him to sign this treaty. I un- the United States is not going to use To its credit, the administration derstand all Democrats will vote for it. them. strongly opposed these amendments. It I hope enough Republicans will, too. So, how do we encourage other states argues, and I agree, that we should rat- In fact, our good friend and former to do what we are going to do anyway? ify the treaty even before Russia does, colleague, Senator Bob Dole, endorsed Should we go at it unilaterally or mul- and even assuming that rogue States ratification yesterday. I hope others tilaterally? Do we want American in- like Iraq and Libya and North Korea do are now going to follow him, because, spection teams to mount short notice not. In other words, even if these other really, we are deciding whether the inspections of potential violators or nations which could easily produce United States will be a member of a not? Do we want international pen- chemical weapons do not join the trea- treaty that goes into effect on April 29, alties to apply to those who flout this ty, the United States should still do so. with or without us. No matter what we treaty or not? Are we safer if the Rus- Why? Because, by ratifying the treaty do on the floor of the Senate, this trea- sians destroy their 40,000 tons of chemi- we isolate the rogue nations, we make ty goes into effect on April 29. If we do cal weapons, or not? Do we join with it harder for them to produce and use not advise and consent, the United the 74 nations who have ratified this chemical weapons. And, were they then States will be left on the outside of the treaty, and the 162 countries that have to do so, if all of us had joined in this world community, with states like Iraq signed it, or not? Or, does the United convention and they moved outside the and Libya, which have refused to be- States, the most powerful nation in the convention, they would suffer inter- come parties to this important arms history of the world, choose, somehow, national condemnation and sanctions. control measure. It is a fascinating sit- to go it alone, with all the problems In support of this argument the ad- uation, Mr. President. If we do not ad- that would entail? ministration has turned to some of our vise and consent, we can say we are Let us not forget that the United most distinguished military and na- standing shoulder to shoulder with Iraq States had a primary role in designing tional security leaders. Let me quote and Libya because we did not join the and shaping this treaty, from the time what they are saying about linking our chemical weapons treaty. This is one of it was first proposed by President ratification to Russia’s or to the ac- the most ambitious treaties in the his- Reagan. In recent weeks, the ranking tions of such nations as China and Iraq. tory of arms control. It bans an entire member of the Foreign Relations Com- Gen. Brent Scowcroft and former CIA class of weapons, which have been one mittee, working in concert with the Director John Deutch say: of the great scourges of the 20th cen- Clinton administration, has worked [U.S. failure to ratify] gives Russia—which tury. In fact, this, along with anti- very hard to address the concerns that has the world’s largest stock of chemical personnel landmines, have been among some Members of this body have. Yes- weapons—an easy excuse to further delay its the greatest scourges of 20th century terday we passed 28 declarations to the own accession to the CWC. S3576 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 Former Secretary of State James of ratification. The President has made should line up with them rather than Baker says: the case very, very well, and members the rest of the world. And they would [S]ome have argued that we should not of his administration have too. say that a treaty banning anti- contribute to the treaty because states like I would say with some irony though, personnel landmines would reduce the Libya, Iraq and North Korea, which have not this is precisely the argument that I landmine problem to a few notorious signed it, will still be able to continue their have been using on antipersonnel land- outlaws and make the world safer for efforts to acquire chemical weapons. This is mines. I could repeat verbatim what all its people. These are the arguments obviously true. But the convention . . . will the President, the White House staff, make it more difficult for these states to do they made on the Chemical Weapons so. . . . It makes no sense to argue that be- the Secretary of Defense, General Convention. They are right. They also cause a few pariah states refuse to join the Schwarzkopf, and former Secretary would be right in making these same convention, the United States should line up Baker have said. These arguments arguments in support of a treaty ban- with them, rather than the rest of the world. apply lock, stock, and barrel to the ning antipersonnel landmines. Secretary of Defense William Cohen problem of antipersonnel landmines. In fact, Mr. President, in a letter to says: We all want Russia and China to be the New York Times today by Robert [T]he CWC will reduce the chemical weap- part of a treaty banning antipersonnel Bell, the Senior Director for Defense ons problem to a few notorious rogues. ... landmines. But that is not going to Policy and Arms Control, National Se- And last, but certainly not least, happen any sooner than Iraq is going to curity Council, Mr. Bell wrote: Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf has said: sign the chemical weapons treaty. We will be in a much stronger position to We don’t need chemical weapons to fight Their failure should not be used as an make sure other parties to the Chemical our future wars. And frankly, by not ratify- excuse for the United States not to Weapons Convention do the same if we are ing that treaty, we align ourselves with na- sign a treaty banning antipersonnel inside, not outside a treaty. tions like Libya and North Korea, and I’d mines when 100 other nations, includ- Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- just as soon not be associated with those ing many that have produced and used sent that that letter be printed in the thugs in that particular battle. landmines or have been devastated by RECORD. I agree with General Schwarzkopf. I their effects, are ready to sign such a There being no objection, the mate- do not want to have the United States treaty. rial was ordered to be printed in the lumped in with Libya and North Korea When the administration on the one RECORD, as follows: on the CWC. hand says we have to go forward with [From the New York Times, Apr. 24, 1997] By ratifying the treaty, we and the the Chemical Weapons Convention— U.S. WOULD BENEFIT FROM CHEMICAL TREATY overwhelming majority of nations es- and I agree—even though some coun- (By Robert G. Bell) tablish the rules by which the conduct tries, the worst ones have not yet of nations is measured. joined, it is unfortunate that the ad- To the Editor: Re A.M. Rosenthal’s ‘‘Matter for Char- Will some nations violate the treaty? ministration then turns around and Perhaps. But that is no more reason to acter’’ (column, April 22), on the Chemical says we cannot do the same thing with Weapons Convention, which the Senate will oppose ratification than it would be to antipersonnel landmines until every- vote on April 24: oppose passage of other laws outlawing body joins in. Mr. Rosenthal says that Article 10 of the illegal conduct. We pass laws all the No treaty is universal. In fact some treaty should be a ‘‘deal breaker’’ because it time, criminal laws in this country, treaties have taken effect with only 20 allegedly would give ‘‘terrorist nations’’ ac- and treaties, that say what shall be a signatories. But by establishing the cess to defensive technology that would help crime or a violation of the treaty. We international norm, the rogue nations them evade the defenses of responsible do not withhold passing them because are isolated and pressure builds on states. somebody might break that law. It is Only countries that have joined the Chemi- them to sign. And that is the only way. cal Weapons Convention, renounced chemi- one of the main reasons we do pass a So I ask, Mr. President, why does the cal weapons and destroyed their stockpiles law, to try to deter unacceptable con- administration argue one way on can request defensive assistance—and then duct. chemical weapons but not follow only if they are threatened with or under And by isolating the rogue nations, through on its argument when it comes chemical attack. Further, President Clinton we pressure them to refrain from pro- to antipersonnel landmines? Land- has committed to the Senate in a binding ducing or using chemical weapons. mines are just as indiscriminate. condition that the United States will limit When they tire of being branded out- Why, when many more American sol- our assistance to countries of concern, like laws, they may even join in ratifying diers and many more innocent civil- Iran or Cuba—should they ratify and comply with the treaty—to emergency medical sup- the treaty and complying with it them- ians, Americans and others, have been plies. selves. killed and horribly maimed by land- And we will be in a much stronger position The arguments we hear on the floor mines than by chemical weapons? to make sure other parties to the Chemical from some today in opposition to this The reason, of course, is we pushed Weapons Convention do the same if we are also apply to the Nuclear Test Ban for the Chemical Weapons Treaty be- inside, not outside a treaty that will compel Treaty. Not all nuclear powers are sig- cause we have already renounced our other nations to do what we decided to do natories to that treaty. But the effect own use of chemical weapons, just as years ago: get rid of chemical weapons. of the treaty is a powerful disincentive we pushed for the Test Ban Treaty be- Mr. LEAHY. I agree with Mr. Bell, on any state, signatory or not, from cause we had renounced our own nu- and I know he worked tirelessly on the testing nuclear weapons. We know clear tests. But we have not yet re- CWC. But unfortunately, Mr. Bell, who there are some countries today that nounced our use of antipersonnel land- I am sure is well motivated, has not have nuclear weapons. They have not mines. been willing to apply that same argu- signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, If we did do so, if the United States ment to antipersonnel landmines. The but because the major countries have, were to renounce its use of anti- Vice President will not apply that ar- it limits their own scope of activity. personnel mines, as so many other na- gument. Many of the same people who These treaties were the subject of tions have done, including many of our are up here arguing for the Chemical many, many years of negotiations, ne- NATO allies, I guarantee that the ad- Weapons Convention make one argu- gotiations that went nowhere until the ministration would make exactly the ment for the Chemical Weapons Con- United States said that it would re- same arguments in support of a treaty vention and turn that argument com- nounce the use of chemical weapons, banning those weapons as it is making pletely around when it comes to anti- and stop nuclear testing. And once the in support of the CWC. personnel landmines even though we United States said that, then negotia- They would say that we should not face a grave danger, every day, from tions were pursued vigorously. The allow Russia, China, and others to de- antipersonnel landmines. treaties were signed within a few years cide what the rules of international There are 100 million of anti- time. conduct should be. They would say it personnel landmines in the ground in I commend the administration and makes absolutely no sense that be- 68 countries, where every few minutes other proponents of the CWC for argu- cause a few pariah nations refuse to somebody is maimed or killed by them. ing so strongly and effectively in favor join a landmine ban the United States This is, in many ways, a greater danger April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3577 to innocent people than chemical I quote further: stantly, chemical weapons invade the weapons. And I wish the administra- The rationale for opposing antipersonnel respiratory system making it unbear- tion, I wish Mr. Bell, I wish the Vice landmines is that they are in a category ably painful to breathe. When chemical President, I wish others who have not similar to poison gas. .. . they are insidious weapons were used in Iraq by Saddam made their same arguments on anti- in that their indiscriminate effects . . . Hussein, against the Kurds, eye- personnel landmines that they do on cause casualties among innocent people. ... witnesses reported that the pain was so chemical weapons will reconsider. Be- They said further: great that many victims submerged cause, like chemical weapons, anti- Given the wide range of weaponry avail- themselves in nearby rivers to escape personnel landmines are weapons we do able to military forces today, antipersonnel the spreading gas. not need. landmines are not essential. Thus, banning Mr. President, we are a civilized Na- What we do need are defenses against them would not undermine the military ef- tion here. We must do all we can to them, because, like chemical weapons, fectiveness or safety of our forces, nor those prevent this torture. And approving of other nations. they are easy and cheap to produce. the CWC is a major step. I know many They pose a grave threat to our troops. Mr. President, every single argument of my colleagues had questions. I know They are the Saturday night specials of the administration has made in favor that Senator BIDEN and others have civil wars. They kill or maim a man, of us joining the Chemical Weapons worked tirelessly to address those woman or child every 22 minutes every Convention could be made to ask us to problems. And I feel what we will have day of the year. They are aptly called go to Ottawa to sign a treaty banning before us, if we defeat the killer weapons of mass destruction in slow antipersonnel landmines. Because by amendments, the five killer amend- motion. In fact, they are the only doing that, we would have 90 percent of ments, will lead us to a far more civ- weapon where the victim pulls the trig- the nations of this world pressuring the ilized world. ger. They are a weapon where one Cam- remaining 10 percent, and that pressure All signatory nations of the CWC bodian told me, in their country they would be enormous. agree never again to manufacture cleared their landmines with an arm I reserve the balance— chemical weapons, nor to use them in and a leg at a time. Mr. President, how much time is re- war. They agree to destroy all existing I am proud to support the President, maining to the Senator from Vermont? stockpiles of chemical weapons. They the Vice President, and the rest of the The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty- agree to allow inspections of chemical administration on the Chemical Weap- seven minutes. plants to verify that no weapons are ons Convention. But I hope that they Mr. DODD. May I inquire, Mr. Presi- being manufactured illegally. will soon take the same position on dent, from the Senator from Vermont, To those who say there are some na- antipersonnel landmines and say, let us there are a couple of us here who have tions who may not sign on, we know bring together the like-minded states— requested some time. In fact, I know that is so. I will say this: If we sign and there are many who are ready to my colleague from California has made this treaty and we are a party to it, it join in a treaty to ban them, join with a similar request. My colleague from will be far more difficult for nonsigna- them, and then put the pressure on the Maryland also has. I ask if our col- tory nations to develop chemical weap- other countries like Russia and China league from Vermont would be willing ons. This is the case because rogue and so on who will take longer to do it. to yield us some time off his time. We states will find it far more difficult to If American children were being torn could make some remarks and maybe import the raw materials and manufac- to pieces every day on their way to expedite this process. turing equipment they need to develop school, or while playing in their back- Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I intend chemical weapons. yards, we would have made it a crime to be speaking again further on this. I Another reason, the second reason: If long ago. It is an outrage that should have 27 minutes remaining. the United States fails to ratify the shock the conscience of every one of The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is convention, it will still go into effect, us. a correction of the time. You actually but it will be weaker. It will be weaker So I am going to vote to advise and have 32 minutes left. because many nations will stay off this consent to the Chemical Weapons Con- Mr. DODD. I needed 10 minutes. treaty and, therefore, there will be vention so the President can ratify it Mrs. BOXER. If I could have 7 min- fewer who are actually bound by it. and to exert the leadership necessary utes, I would ask the Senator. Also, our inspectors will not be on the to help rid the world of the scourge of Mr. LEAHY. I will yield 10 minutes team to go and search for possible CWC chemical weapons. I look forward to to the Senator from Connecticut, 7 ratification and to the implementation violations. Our inspectors are among minutes to the Senator from Califor- the best in the world, and they will legislation to make the treaty a re- nia, and withhold the balance of my ality. give us confidence as to the true state time. And I will also continue to work to of chemical weapons production. Why The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- convince the administration this is the would we want to stay off a treaty that kind of leadership we need if we are to ator from California. will go forward that will not have our rid the world of antipersonnel land- Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much. inspectors on those teams? mines—a scourge every bit as horrify- I appreciate my friend from Con- Third, failure to ratify will hurt ing as chemical weapons, frankly, Mr. necticut allowing me to proceed. I may American business. The CWC imposes President, a scourge that is killing not use the full 7 minutes. I will try to trade sanctions against nonsignatory more people today and tomorrow and be very concise. nations that limit the ability of their last year and next year, and on and on, Mr. President, I rise in strong sup- chemical industries to export many of than chemical weapons. We should be port for ratification of the Chemical their products overseas. It could cost leading the world’s nations to end the Weapons Convention. And I base my our companies hundreds of millions of destruction and death caused each day support on four main facts. dollars every year. Now, opponents say by landmines, not sitting on the side- First, the Chemical Weapons Conven- that the CWC would impose additional lines. tion is in the national security inter- regulations on an already heavily regu- I will conclude, Mr. President, by ests of the United States of America lated industry, our chemical industry. quoting from a letter to President Clin- because it reduces the likelihood that They argue the convention will result ton signed by 15 of this country’s most American soldiers or civilians will ever in vast new compliance costs. But distinguished military officers, includ- face a chemical weapons attack. when you take the compliance costs of ing Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf; former We should not lose sight of why this $250,000 to $2 million for the entire in- Supreme Allied Commander John is so important. The effects of chemi- dustry, that is a small price to pay Galvin; former Chairman, Joint Chiefs cal weapons are so barbaric, so dev- compared to the hundreds of millions of Staff, David Jones, and others. They astating, that we must do all we can to of dollars that would be lost if sanc- said: ensure that they are never used again. tions were imposed. We view such a ban [on antipersonnel land- Chemical weapons are among the The vast majority of the chemical in- mines] as not only humane, but also mili- most horrible devices ever conceived. If dustries strongly supports the CWC. tarily responsible. they do not kill their victims in- U.S. chemical companies advised the S3578 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 Reagan and Bush administrations majorities to commit this Nation to nations do, we have decided to take throughout the original CWC negotia- international arrangements, and the ourselves out of the chemical weapons tions. Leading U.S. chemical trade as- fact that we require supermajorities business unilaterally, and yet the as- sociations support the CWC. They for treaties, I think, is worthwhile. sumption under this faulty condition is know the costs of compliance are small Mr. President, I want to focus my at- that we must not disarm until other and the risks to industry are great if tention, if I can, on the first amend- nations with chemical weapons or we fail to ratify. ment that will be raised here. The chemical weapons capability disarm as Fourth, failure to ratify will under- amendment will strike a condition in well. mine our credibility, America’s credi- the treaty that has been included by We must be clear, Mr. President, that bility, in the world. Imagine a treaty Senator HELMS. I am going to oppose having agreed, ourselves, to destroy that was brought forward by Ronald condition 30, which I believe will be the our chemical weapons, this treaty Reagan, continued toward the goal line first vote we will cast. This is the deals with whether or not we can act by George Bush, and now a Democrat rogue states condition. I will explain with the backing of the world to bring President, following a legacy of those what that means and express why I other nations to do the same. As Sec- two Republican Presidents, wanting to think it ought to be struck from this retary Albright has said very simply, take this over the goal line, and sud- treaty in the brief time I have avail- ‘‘This treaty is about other nations’ denly we are going to back off. It seems able to me. chemical weapons, not our own.’’ We to me our credibility is absolutely at Mr. President, we must ask only one will destroy, Mr. President, our weap- stake here. I believe we should not question today. We must ask: Is this ons because they are no longer needed. back away from this treaty. We should treaty in the best interests of our So this idea that we must wait for pass it and defeat the killer amend- country? That is our obligation as other nations to ratify this treaty, I believe, is fatally flawed. ments. Members of the U.S. Senate. That is This convention would establish an Mr. President, to those who raise all the question which we must address. international norm that will allow us sorts of flags about this treaty, we This condition 30, the rogue states con- to pressure rogue states who decide should understand this: We could al- dition, I think, is not in the best inter- they would rather keep and enhance ways exercise our right to withdraw ests of the United States. I think it their chemical weapons stockpile. On from the convention on 90 days’ notice. would prohibit the United States from the basis of what we now know about This right to withdraw is guaranteed ratifying the Chemical Weapons Con- the Persian Gulf war, that many thou- vention. It would prohibit us, of course, to all signatory nations by article XVI sands of this Nation’s troops may have from ratifying the convention until na- of the CWC. been exposed to chemical agents, we Mr. President, in closing, I thank the tions such as North Korea, Libya, must not pass up the chance, in my Senator from Vermont for his generos- Syria and Iraq ratify the treaty. view, to establish a norm that would ity, and my friend from Connecticut. I More than any of the other condi- have made it far more difficult for Iraq tions we will vote on, Mr. President, join with them. The CWC is in our na- to have the weapons in the first place. later today, this condition would delay tional interests. It will enhance na- Remember, Mr. President, there is no indefinitely, in my view, the ratifica- tional security, protect American jobs; law that bars a nation from building, tion of this treaty. The so-called rogue it will help maintain our position of stockpiling, upgrading, or transferring states condition would force the United global leadership; and, my friends, their chemical weapons. In fact, when States of America to wait until all of most important of all, it really will Iraq used chemical weapons against the protect the world from the most hor- the pariah states of the world ratify be- Kurds, as heinous an act as it was, the rible, horrible weapons of our time. fore we, ourselves, would accept the Iraqis did not even violate the Geneva The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- treaty that we, ourselves negotiated. Protocol because they did not use the There is a reason, Mr. President, that ator from Connecticut. agents in an international conflict. Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Presi- we use the words rogue and pariah to What we need today, Mr. President, dent. I thank my colleague from Ver- describe these countries such as North is a new agreement. This convention mont for his generosity in yielding Korea, Libya, Iran. These are the na- goes much farther in establishing a time. tions that are the loners in the inter- basis for international action against Mr. President, yesterday I included national arena and who routinely dis- chemical weapons themselves. some extensive remarks in the RECORD regard international opinion in pursu- I further object, Mr. President, to regarding the overall treaty. I let those ing their own interests. These rogue this rogue states condition because we remarks speak for themselves today. nations, these renegade nations, have should not allow our foreign policy de- First, I begin by commending our never given weight to world opinion. cisions to be dictated by rogue states— colleagues, the chairman of the For- There is no reason to expect that they by a Libya, a North Korea, and an Iraq. eign Relations Committee, Senator will have a change of heart any time Let us remember that the negotiating HELMS; the ranking Democrat on the soon. Waiting for these rogue states to teams of President Reagan and Presi- committee, Senator BIDEN; the major- accept this treaty is literally like wait- dent Bush anticipated the likelihood ity leader, Senator LOTT; and the mi- ing for Godot. that rogue nations would not accept nority leader, Senator DASCHLE, for Let it be known, then, that a vote this treaty. That is why President Rea- working out the arrangements of this against striking this condition is, in gan’s and President Bush’s teams in- treaty so we can come up for a vote my view, without any question what- cluded sanctions, when they wrote this prior to the April 29 deadline. ever, a vote to prohibit U.S. participa- treaty, against nations that remained Let me also say, Mr. President, while tion in the Chemical Weapons Conven- outside of this treaty. This condition there are disagreements—and there tion. If we include, Mr. President, this 30, the rogue states condition, insults will be over the ultimate decision of condition 30, the rogue states condi- those negotiating teams that worked whether or not to support the treaty— tion, we might as well include a condi- so hard and with such great foresight I think the debate and the process we tion that requires ratification by every on this very treaty. It assumes that have gone through has been healthy. I single nation on Earth before we ratify, they were so shortsighted that they did suspect those who are deeply involved for these are, indeed, the very last na- not anticipate that rogue nations in the workings of this treaty have im- tions that would ever accept this trea- would oppose it. That is not the case. proved it. So I commend all of our col- ty. That is because these nations, these The truth, again, is that the nego- leagues for the work they have done on rogue nations, fear this treaty and the tiators knew very well that these rogue this particular effort. I think it is how international determination that it nations would look upon this treaty as the Senate of the United States ought demonstrates. something that they would have to op- to conduct its business when it comes Our country, Mr. President, has de- pose, so we and other nations de- to matters dealing with obligations to cided unilaterally to destroy its aging manded that these renegade nations be commit our country for many years to chemical weapons stockpile by the penalized. come. It was no mistake that our year 2004. That is a decision we have al- How ironic it is, Mr. President, that Founding Fathers required super- ready made. Regardless of what other unless the United States strikes this April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3579 rogue states condition, we now will be Mr. President, I urge the adoption of ty, and the overreaching question is: penalized ourselves. Germany, I point the amendment to strike, and I urge Will we be better off or worse off if we out, has already indicated its intent to the adoption of the treaty itself. commit to its terms? impose the sanctions against non- I yield the floor. Now, this is not a treaty that is participants that this treaty mandates. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The going to prevent terrorists from using Let us be aware, Mr. President, we chair recognizes the Senator from New chemicals as weapons if they see fit. live in a new world. Scholars use the Mexico and asks, who yields time? This is more of a treaty that addresses words ‘‘multipolar’’ and ‘‘post-nation- Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 7 itself to the military use of these kinds alist’’ to describe today’s world. Other minutes to my friend from New Mex- of drastic weapons. Now, it is not per- nations are increasingly capable of ico. fect, but let me suggest the second taking action without our leadership, Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, first principle that everybody should know, regretfully I might add. Those who let me say that I believe the Senate including those Americans who worry think this treaty will not go into effect has done itself proud with reference to about this treaty: America has already without our ratification are thinking the debate and participation of our committed to totally destroying all of of an older world, of the days when the Members in this series of debates and its chemical weapons. President Ron- United States declined to participate discussions regarding this treaty. When ald Reagan, many years ago, said, let’s in the League of Nations and it failed you add to it the closed session we had get rid of one kind of weapon, leaving as a result. Mr. President, that was today, I think every Senator has had only one left over. President Bush also over three-quarters of a century ago. an ample opportunity to thoroughly agreed to get rid of them. America is Let me assure my colleagues that to understand this situation. I believe now on a path to get rid of them in 10 the extent we isolate ourselves today, when the day ends and you have heard years. All of this discussion has not our country will pay a price tomorrow. all of that, the overwhelming majority changed that. So when we talk about The question before us this hour with of the U.S. Senators are going to vote the dangers to America, it should be this condition that will come up short- to ratify this treaty. I believe they are understood that we have already de- ly, is, will we allow a group of rogue, going to do that not because it is per- cided that on our own. We want to get renegade nations to disengage the fect, but because the world is better off rid of them either because we think United States from the international and we are better off if we have this that is in our best interest—I would as- community on this issue of chemical treaty than if we don’t. sume that is the case—and/or we think weapons? Having said that, while the world has it is better for the world that we not Mr. President, when this Nation al- set about to perfect chemical weapons, have any because we think the world lows itself to be held back by the short- there is nothing new about this. In may follow our example. sightedness, the evil of other nations, fact, I can remember, as a very small Having said that, it seems to me we make a huge mistake indeed. Presi- boy, a great uncle who was a totally that, with the United States having dent Reagan did not wait for other na- disabled American veteran. He was an agreed to destroy all of their weapons tions when he took the first step for- Italian immigrant taken into the First of this type, we ought to look at the ward on the matter of chemical weap- World War. He served in the U.S. treaty and ask, is it apt to work its ons by declaring that the United States Army, and he was the victim of mus- will on the rest of the world quicker would unilaterally destroy its chemical tard gas. In that war, the Germans and better than if we didn’t have it? In weapons stockpile. President Reagan used mustard gas, a chemical weapon everything I hear, everything I have did not wait for other nations when he on the front, on the lines. Many Ameri- read, in discussions with scientists initiated negotiations to ban chemical cans received toxic doses. In fact, this that worked on it, including some of weapons from this Earth. President great uncle of mine, as I indicated, col- the top scientists who negotiated this Bush did not wait for other nations to lected veteran benefits for his entire agreement, they have all said that, sign this treaty. Presidents Reagan and life for a total disability because of the even with its defects, the CWC is more Bush did not follow others in making mustard gas being used in World War I. apt than not to bring the rest of the those critical decisions. We led, as Science has perfected weapons be- world to the same conclusion that great nations must, and others have yond mustard gas, and the world lives America has come to. They support fallen in behind us. Our Nation set the under three scourges today. One is the that we might get to a point where example. Now it is time for us to set possible proliferation of nuclear weap- there are none of these weapons around the example once again. ons; another is the proliferation of Finally, Mr. President, we must keep sooner rather than later if we have this chemical weapons, and the third is the in mind that opponents of this treaty treaty, as compared with no treaty. proliferation of biological weapons. argue both sides of the issue. On the There are all kinds of nuances that Now, we have attempted in the past, one hand, they argue that rogue states one can talk about as you look at will reap great benefits from the tech- starting with President Eisenhower, to something as complicated as this. But nology and intelligence available to do something about the proliferation of I think, fundamentally, the issue is: them as participants in this treaty. nuclear weapons. While we haven’t suc- what is best for the United States after That argument assumes that these ceeded in totality, we have clearly suc- we have committed to destroy our nations can’t wait to participate in ceeded beyond anything men of that chemical weapons, is it better that we this treaty. Yet, on the other hand, day thought. It was not perfect. There have the treaty or not? From every- this condition that we will vote on as- were those who wanted to argue about thing I can tell, the 28 conditions that sumes that rogue states will avoid par- it because it was not perfect, but we have been agreed upon are good clarify- ticipating in this treaty. could not have ended an entire era ing language and many contain protec- If parties to this treaty pick up such without Atoms for Peace and every- tions to our private property rights a technological advantage, why aren’t thing that came with it. Having said that we may have assumed early on these rogue nations crawling over that, let me suggest that we probably would not be violated. But then we got themselves to ratify the treaty? They won’t find a way to enter into an inter- concerned with the CWC and properly should be the first in line if that is the national treaty on biological weapons. so. Now, there is going to be some judi- case. Why then do we need this condi- They are principally weapons of terror- cial process to be required before in- tion? ists. spections can occur. I believe we now The truth is, Mr. President, that Let me talk about this treaty and will protect private facilities as well as rogue nations fear this convention and tell the Senate in my own way why I public facilities like our national lab- this treaty. Waiting for them to ratify am for it. First of all, I think it is an oratories through requirements for is absurd. No one expects them to rat- imperative. Even though it was said be- search warrants as part of the language ify, so we should at least become a fore, I say this one more time. Frank- that Senator HELMS agreed on with our party to a treaty that will severely re- ly, the reason this treaty exists is be- staff. strict the flow of chemicals to those cause we are trying—the United States In summary, it seems to this Senator nations, rather than assisting them by of America—to set in motion in the that if we join with other countries and a reluctance to move forward. world a security and arms control trea- begin moving to implement this treaty, S3580 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 that we are better off with it than duction, transfer, and storage by pro- Moreover, once we ratify the treaty without it. Will it be difficult to get viding incentives for participation, ver- we will be in a better position to do everyone in the world to agree with our ification of compliance, and penalties something about noncompliance. The position—the civil position of moral, for violation. The United States is the CWC throws the force of world public decent leaders? I am not sure. But the only major industrialized country not opinion behind the identification and question is, will it be any easier, or are to have ratified it yet. Our participa- exposure of violators. Any violations we apt to succeed better, without the tion is critical to its ultimate success. that are discovered will be made widely treaty? I am convinced that such is not This convention will not make the known and receive universal con- the case. threat of chemical weapons automati- demnation. We will be able to punish Now, Mr. President, there are so cally disappear from the face of the violators through multilateral action, many Senators to thank, but I say to Earth. But it will constrain their pro- rather than going it alone, or trying to JON KYL, whose position I don’t agree liferation and make it harder for rogue convince the world that our suspicions with, that I don’t believe anybody has regimes and terrorists to gain access to are correct without revealing our intel- done a better job on something as com- them. By increasing the legal, moral, ligence sources. As former Secretary of plicated as this since I have been in the and financial costs of acquiring chemi- State Christopher explained, ‘‘By rati- Senate, which is now 25 years. I com- cal weapons, it will deter covert chemi- fying the Convention, we will add the pliment him for that. cal weapons programs and increase the force and weight of the entire inter- I yield the floor. likelihood they will be discovered. national community to our efforts.’’ Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 There are three major reasons why The third reason we must ratify this minutes to the distinguished Senator this treaty will serve American inter- treaty is that a failure to do so will put from Maryland. ests and why a failure to ratify it could U.S. chemical manufacturers at a seri- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- have severe repercussions. ous competitive disadvantage. Once the ator from Maryland. First, the convention requires other CWC enters into force—which will hap- Mr. SARBANES. I thank the able nations to do something we already pen next Tuesday, with or without U.S. Senator from Delaware, and I commend plan to do—destroy chemical arsenals. participation—chemical manufacturers him for his extraordinary leadership Under a law first signed by President in countries that have not ratified will with respect to the Chemical Weapons Reagan, the United States will elimi- find themselves faced with inter- Convention. I know personally of the nate our current stockpile of chemical national economic sanctions. These time and effort he has devoted to this weapons by the year 2004, independent companies will be required to obtain end-user certificates for the sale of cer- cause. We are all in his debt. of what happens in this treaty. Our tain chemicals abroad, and after 3 Mr. President, it is now less than a own military thinks that is a wise years, they will not be able to export week before a landmark treaty—one thing to do, even on a unilateral basis. those chemicals at all. The United which the United States led the world The convention will simply ensure that States will be treated on a par with in negotiating—goes into effect inter- others do the same. rogue states, who will no longer be nationally. The Chemical Weapons In other words, this is not a debate trusted to conduct normal, commercial Convention, signed by President Bush over eliminating our own chemical weapons. We are already programmed trade in chemicals. on January 13, 1993, has now been rati- These dismal scenarios were cer- to do so. This is a question of whether fied by 74 countries. The eyes of the tainly on the minds of the chief execu- we can establish a regime that will re- world are upon the United States as we tives of 53 of the Nation’s largest chem- decide whether or not to join them. quire other countries to destroy their ical firms last August, when they ex- It would be a major mistake if this chemical weapons and stop building pressed their concern in a joint state- treaty were to go into effect without new ones. That is why Admiral ment, warning: ‘‘Our industry’s status us. Worse yet, if we fail to ratify, we Zumwalt had stated, militarily, this as the world’s preferred supplier of could be jeopardizing our best chance treaty will make us stronger. chemical products may be jeopardized It is not enough, however, to ask to eliminate the chemical weapons if the United States does not ratify the that some day would be used against other nations to ratify the treaty. We Convention. If the Senate does not vote us. must do so ourselves. Today, we have in favor of the CWC, we stand to lose This is a treaty that was advanced, an opportunity to lead the world in hundreds of millions of dollars in over- negotiated, and signed by Republican abolishing these terrible weapons, seas sales, putting at risk thousands of Presidents, with the encouragement, in rather than providing others with an good-paying American jobs.’’ American 1989, of some 75 U.S. Senators. What a excuse not to do so. If we do not adopt chemical companies have indicated a mistake it would be if the Senate were this treaty, or if we add crippling willingness to comply with inspections to forfeit this opportunity to protect amendments, we will have single- under the treaty because they are not American security, promote American handedly undermined the hope of rid- conducting illegal activity, and be- interests and preserve American lead- ding the world of this deadly scourge cause they helped to design the trea- ership. and of reducing the threat to our own ty’s inspection regime so that it would If we fail to ratify the CWC, we will citizens. not threaten legitimate business se- have done just that. If the Senate does The second major reason to ratify crets or compromise proprietary infor- not approve this historic treaty, our this treaty is that it will provide us mation. economic and security interests will with better information about what Earlier this year, President Bush re- suffer. Despite widespread and continu- other countries are doing in the realm affirmed his support for ratification, ing bipartisan support for this treaty, of chemical weapons. We know the ver- telling reporters the treaty should despite support from some of our Na- ification regime is not perfect. The ver- transcend partisanship. ‘‘I think it is tion’s outstanding military leaders— ification regime is never perfect in any vitally important for the United States such as General Shalikashvili and treaty. There may be states that try to to be out front, not to be dragged, former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of cheat on this agreement and others kicking, and screaming to the finish Staff Colin Powell, Admiral Crowe, that refuse to sign it. But if we are line on that question. We do not need General Vessey, and General Jones— party to the treaty, we will have an op- chemical weapons, and we ought to get some of my colleagues argue that this portunity to investigate and sanction out front and make clear that we are convention does not serve our security potential violations. We will take part opposed to others having them.’’ interests. in the organization established to mon- The CWC has been before the Senate The Chemical Weapons Convention is itor implementation, and we will help for consideration for nearly 4 years an unprecedented international agree- enforce its rules and procedures. As now, providing ample opportunity for ment designed to eliminate an entire former CIA Director James Woolsey examination. Last year, after exhaus- class of weapons of mass destruction. noted, ‘‘We will know more about the tive hearings and review, it was re- Unlike earlier protocols that prohibit state of chemical warfare preparations ported favorably by the Senate Foreign only the use of chemical weapons, this in the world with the treaty than we Relations Committee, but not brought convention aims at stopping their pro- would know without it.’’ to a vote on the floor of the Senate. April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3581 Over the past few weeks a new series ried out in the Tokyo subway system where, and how than we would without of hearings has been held, in open and by the Aum Shunrikio cult was testi- the treaty. That is why the intel- in closed session, and all perspectives mony to the power of even a relatively ligence community has consistently have been thoroughly aired. The ad- small amount of chemical weapons. testified that, while the treaty is not ministration has worked in good faith Chemical weapons are among the completely verifiable, they regard it as to negotiate a new resolution of ratifi- most barbaric of mankind’s inventions. a highly desirable tool that will en- cation that addresses the earlier con- They are so awful, that the United hance our knowledge of chemical weap- cerns and more, including 28 agreed States, by act of Congress, has decided ons programs and our ability to stop conditions, declarations, statements, to eliminate our own stocks of these them. and understandings. The remaining weapons by 2004. They are designed to The CWC’s verification regime re- five conditions that have been proposed kill and incapacitate by causing such quires routine inspections of all de- will undercut and place in jeopardy the effects as skin blistering, blindness, clared facilities working with signifi- effectiveness of this treaty, and I urge lung damage, choking, nervous system cant amounts of chemicals listed by my colleagues to reject them. disruption, paralysis, or oxygen starva- the treaty. In addition, any site, de- The conditions to which the adminis- tion. Because of the ease of their dis- clared or not, may be subject to short- tration has already agreed will resolve persal over a wide area, chemical weap- notice challenge inspections if there every legitimate concern that has been ons are especially useful for targeting are suspicions that it is being used to raised. I would urge my colleagues not civilian populations. produce or store banned chemicals. to vote for pending amendments that The Chemical Weapons Convention is The CWC also establishes significant would require renegotiation, delay, or the most far-reaching attempt ever by trade restrictions on precursor chemi- abrogation of the CWC. If we don’t take the international community to con- cals. These restrictions will make it this opportunity to begin abolishing trol the spread of chemical weapons. It more difficult for nations who are not these terrible weapons, we will rue the bans for the first time the develop- parties to the treaty to acquire these day and have only ourselves to blame. ment, production, and possession of chemicals, and will provide us with Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I chemical weapons and reinforces the much more information than we cur- rise today to express my strong support international norm against their use. rently have about who is seeking to for the Chemical Weapons Convention. Since we are destroying our own chem- import such chemicals, and in what I believe it is very much in our na- ical weapons, it only makes sense that amounts. tional interests to ratify this treaty, we should want other nations to do so So the concern about verification, after we strike five conditions in the as well. while valid, I believe has been more resolution of ratification. The convention requires all signatory than adequately addressed. We must go Let me first express my respect and states to declare and destroy any into this treaty with our eyes open, appreciation for the distinguished chemical weapons and the facilities aware that it will not detect every vio- ranking member of the Foreign Rela- used to produce them. It requires mem- lation. But why would we deprive our- tions Committee, Senator BIDEN. He ber states to submit annual reports on selves of the extremely useful tools and and his staff have really done the the production and use of certain sen- information this treaty would provide heavy lifting in getting this treaty to sitive chemicals. This information, on the grounds that they are not fool- the floor, including many long hours of combined with our own intelligence re- proof? It would be incredibly short- negotiations on the package of 28 sources, will significantly improve our sighted to do so. agreed conditions. I also want to express my respect for ability to monitor and prevent illegal Sharing Defense Technologies: Dur- the opponents of this treaty, including transfers and uses of such chemicals. ing one of the hearings in the Senate the distinguished chairman of the For- Once the CWC takes effect, it will Foreign Relations Committee earlier eign Relations Committee and the Sen- make it much harder and more costly this month, the concern was raised for proliferators and terrorists to ac- that Article X of the CWC would re- ator from Arizona, Senator KYL. I have quire chemical weapons. An intrusive worked well with Senator KYL on many quire the United States to share ad- issues, including, at the moment, our verification system will be set up to de- vanced chemical defense technologies strong effort to pass a Victims’ Rights tect violations. Sanctions will be im- with rogue nations like Iran, who may Amendment to the Constitution. posed against nations that refuse to sign and ratify the treaty. If indeed the I know that in this debate these Sen- participate, making it more difficult treaty required that, there would be ators are motivated by their genuine for them to acquire precursor chemi- significant grounds for concern. But I and deeply felt concern for America’s cals for poison gas and easier to mon- believe the concern is overstated. national security. However, I must dis- itor their efforts to do so. In an April 22 letter to me, National agree with the view that we would be The intelligence-sharing and global Security Adviser Sandy Berger makes better off without this treaty, or by verification network that will result it very clear that Article X of the CWC passing a resolution of ratification from this treaty will increase the would impose no obligation on the that essentially renders the treaty chances that terrorist attacks involv- United States to assist Iran with its meaningless. ing chemical weapons can be prevented chemical weapons defense capabilities. Mr. President, the threat of chemical before they ever occur—a net gain in I ask unanimous consent that Mr. weapons falling into the hands of ter- the security of our troops and our citi- Berger’s letter be printed in the rorists, or being used as a weapon of zens. RECORD at the conclusion of my re- war by a rogue state, has increased Now, a number of very serious con- marks. dramatically in recent years. cerns have been raised about the CWC. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without One need only reflect on the dangers I myself have shared some of these con- objection, it is so ordered. faced by our military by Iraq’s incip- cerns. I will not speak to every criti- (See exhibit 1.) ient chemical weapons program during cism of the treaty, but I want to ad- Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. Berger makes the gulf war, or the tragedies our Na- dress some of these concerns now, be- clear that paragraph 7 of Article X, tion has suffered with the bombing of cause I believe very solid answers have which spells out the obligations of the World Trade Center, the Federal been provided to virtually all of them. States Parties to assist others threat- building in Oklahoma City, and the Verification: Critics of the CWC have ened by chemical weapons, would re- Olympic Park in Atlanta, to fully ap- complained that it is not verifiable, quire the United States to provide preciate the dangers posed by the pro- and that it will be easy for nations who nothing more than medical antidotes liferation of chemical weapons. In each sign up to the treaty to cheat without and treatments to any state we deemed of these cases, the tragedy and loss of getting caught. unreliable. We have the option to pro- life could have been magnified signifi- We must start with the proposition vide more advanced assistance to those cantly had chemical weapons been that no arms control agreement is 100- nations we trust, but no obligation. used. percent verifiable. But with the CWC, The administration is so comfortable The people of Japan know this first- we will know far more about who is with this reading of the treaty, that, in hand. The deadly sarin gas attack car- trying to develop chemical weapons, their negotiations with Senator HELMS S3582 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 and with the Majority Leader’s task effect are fully consistent with the the treaty, or set up unachievable force on the CWC, they have agreed to CWC. In addition, our allies in the Aus- goals that must be met for us to de- a binding condition (number 15) that tralia Group, all 28 of them, have posit our instruments of ratification. would ensure that the United States pledged to maintain all existing multi- They should all be defeated. will not provide any assistance other lateral export controls, which they Let me briefly address each of these than medical assistance to any rogue agree are fully consistent with the killer conditions: nation that becomes a party to the CWC. Condition 29 would prohibit the Unit- treaty. Here again, the problem identified by ed States from ratifying the CWC until Another concern about Article X is critics of the CWC would actually be Russia ratifies it and takes a series of that paragraph 3, which calls for par- worse without the treaty. The CWC other actions to comply with past ties to ‘‘facilitate . . . the fullest pos- will allow us to better monitor chemi- agreements. sible exchange’’ of information and cal commerce that occurs today with- Besides holding United States foreign technology on protection against out our knowledge. It will also provide policy hostage to a group of hardliners chemical weapons, would require the the basis for further multilateral ef- in the Russian Duma, this condition ig- United States to share such equipment forts to control exports, above and be- nores the fact that the CWC provides with rogue nations who sign and ratify yond our own existing export controls precisely the tools that would be help- the treaty. and those of the Australia Group. ful in detecting Russian violations of The administration has made clear To address the concerns raised about this and past treaties. It also gives that the use of the words ‘‘facilitate’’ Article XI, the Administration has Russia an easy excuse to delay ratifica- and ‘‘possible’’ in this paragraph mean agreed to a binding condition (number tion itself. On the grounds of self-inter- that we will determine whether any 7) that the President must certify now est, this condition shoots ourselves in specific exchange is appropriate, and and on an annual basis that the Aus- the foot. Condition 30 would prohibit the Unit- we will not pursue those we deem inap- tralia Group is continuing to effec- ed States from ratifying the CWC until propriate. In making these decisions, tively control chemical exports and re- rogue states such as North Korea, we will do nothing to undermine our mains a viable mechanism for doing so. Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq have rati- national export controls. According to this condition, the With these assertions in hand, I am President must also certify that noth- fied it. By accepting this treaty, we allow these rogue regimes to set the satisfied that the United States will in ing in the CWC obligates the United standards of international conduct. It no way be obligated to provide chemi- States to weaken our own export con- is the equivalent of saying that we cal weapons technology to any nation trols, and that each member of the should not outlaw drug smuggling be- we deem to be untrustworthy. Australia Group remains committed to cause some people will still smuggle Some have also raised the concern maintaining current export controls. drugs. that Article X might induce other, less With this condition added to the res- By ratifying the CWC, the United conscientious nations, to supply rogue olution of ratification, I believe con- States will make it easier to forge states with defense technologies. But cerns about Article XI can be laid international coalitions aimed at there is nothing that prevents those aside. eliminating the chemical weapons pro- In fact, the negotiations between the sales from taking place today, with no grams of these regimes, even through Administration and Senator BIDEN on CWC in effect. military force when necessary. It will With the CWC, the countries who the one hand, and Senator HELMS and also set a standard for those nations to make exchanges allowed in Article X the Lott task force on the other, have meet if and when their current regimes are legally bound by the treaty’s over- been remarkably successful in address- are replaced by more responsible ones. riding principle, stated in Article I, ing the concerns that have been raised Condition 31 requires the United that they can do nothing to ‘‘assist, en- about the treaty. States to reject all CWC inspectors courage, or induce, in any way, anyone In all, 28 conditions have been agreed from countries like Iran and China. to engage in any activity prohibited to to in these negotiations, on subjects This condition is unnecessarily rigid. It a State Party under this Convention.’’ ranging from verification and Articles would prevent us from allowing suspect In addition, the CWC would provide X and XI, to Congressional preroga- states from seeing for themselves that us with far more ability to scrutinize tives in providing funding for the we are not violating the treaty. It any exchanges than we have today. The OPCW; the establishment of an inspec- would also certainly result in Amer- result is a net increase, not decrease, tor general at the OPCW; safeguards on ican inspectors being excluded from in- in our knowledge of defense exchanges intelligence sharing; the Senate’s role spections in these countries. with rogue nations, and our ability to in reviewing future treaty amend- A better approach would be to strike address any compliance concerns that ments; constitutional protections in this language and enact implementing may arise from these exchanges. the inspection of U.S. facilities; our legislation that would allow Congress a Cooperation on Chemical Tech- armed forces’ continued ability to use role in determining which inspectors nology: Another concern that has been non-lethal riot control agents, such as should be barred, which the CWC al- raised involves Article XI. Some have tear gas; and maintaining robust U.S. lows the United States to do on a case- suggested that Article XI, which deals chemical defense capabilities. by-case basis. with cooperation in chemical activities With all of these conditions agreed Condition 32 would prohibit the Unit- not prohibited by the treaty, would re- to, there are only five areas remaining ed States from ratifying the CWC until quire the United States to provide in dispute. One would think we were Article X is eliminated and Article XI other nations with access to our dual- near the point of a virtually unani- is amended. This is completely unreal- use technologies and manufacturing se- mous vote to ratify the CWC. istic and completely unnecessary. Arti- crets. Here again, the concern is un- And yet, we still hear charges that cles X and XI were included to reassure warranted. the administration is ‘‘stonewalling.’’ countries who signed the treaty that Article XI does aim to ensure that That is simply not the case. Far from they would not be prevented from de- parties to the treaty can conduct le- stonewalling, the administration has veloping chemical weapons defenses or gitimate chemical commerce, which is worked very hard to address the Sen- engaging in legitimate chemical com- reasonable. But in his April 22 letter, ate’s concerns. But it appears that merce. Mr. Berger explains that this article some people simply do not to want to None of the 160 nations who have does not require the United States, or take yes for an answer. signed or 74 nations that have ratified any U.S. company, to provide any con- And so, we have five conditions in the treaty will agree to renegotiate fidential business information to any this resolution of ratification which these provisions at the eleventh hour. foreign party. the Administration has identified as It will simply result in our exclusion As to the concern that Article XI will ‘‘killer’’ conditions. These conditions from the CWC—which is clearly the in- undercut export controls, indeed, the would make our ratification of this tent. reverse is true. Mr. Berger makes clear treaty meaningless, because they As Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National that the all U.S. export controls now in would either gut central provisions of Security Adviser to President Bush, April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3583 testified before the Foreign Relations Our failure to ratify this treaty crets with other countries. Such an interpre- Committee on April 9, 1997: ‘‘Starting would be a grave mistake. The treaty tation is totally at odds with the plain lan- over. . .is pure fantasy. If we reject will enter into force on April 29, with guage of the treaty. It also defies logic to suggest that a treaty expressly devoted to this treaty, we will incur the bitterness or without us. This is the only treaty eliminating chemical weapons somehow re- of all our friends and allies who fol- that there is, and it requires U.S. lead- quires its parties to facilitate the spread of lowed us for 10 years in putting this ership to make it work. Only by being chemical weapons. thing together. . . The idea that we a party to this convention can we First, Article XI is explicitly subject to the can lead out again down a different make it function to its fullest possible fundamental ban in Article I on assisting path I think is just not in the cards. We extent. anyone in acquiring chemical weapons. have got to deal with the situation we I believe every Member on this side Moreover, in order to reinforce the treaty’s constraints against the transfer of dangerous face now, not an ideal one out in the of the aisle supports this treaty. I urge technology, the President has committed in future.’’ my Republican colleagues to vote for agreed condition #7 in the Resolution of The concerns raised about Articles X ratification, after voting to strike the Ratification to obtain official assurances and XI—which I shared—have been five killer amendments. from our Australia Group partners at the more than adequately addressed by the EXHIBIT 1 highest diplomatic levels that Article XI is fully consistent with maintaining strict ex- agreed conditions. This is what I mean THE WHITE HOUSE, port controls on dangerous chemicals and about not wanting to take yes for an Washington, April 22, 1997. answer. that they are committed to ensuring the Hon. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, Group remains an effective mechanism for Condition 33 would prevent the U.S. U.S. Senate, dealing with CW proliferation. I would note from ratifying the treaty unless the Washington, DC. that this condition also requires annual cer- President can certify with ‘‘high con- DEAR SENATOR FEINSTEIN: I am pleased tification. fidence’’ that we would be able to de- that we were able to talk last week about Second, with the CWC the countries under- tect the production or storage of a sin- ratification of the Chemical Weapons Con- taking exchanges are legally bound by the vention, including the concerns which have fundamental obligations in Article I. As Ron gle metric ton of chemical agent. been raised about Articles X and XI of the This is an absurdly high standard. Lehman, former Arms Control Director treaty. I would like to take the opportunity under President Bush, recently stated in tes- The intelligence community has con- to elaborate further on these issues and set timony before the Senate Foreign Relations sistently said it could detect ‘‘mili- the record straight. Committee: ‘‘We made it very clear through- tarily significant’’ cheating, but the Regarding Article X, concern has been ex- out the negotiations that all of this was sub- production of one ton of agent does not pressed that this provision might force us or ject to Article I, which is the fundamental qualify. other treaty parties to share advanced chem- obligation not to assist. . . . But the most But the tools created by the CWC ical defense technologies and equipment important, I think, telling fact in support of will only enhance our abilities to de- with rogue nations like Iran and to assist in the U.S. interpretation is the fact that after the development of CW defense capabilities. tect these violations. It would be fool- the Convention was done so many of the This simply is not the case. usual list of suspects were so unhappy that ish to kill the treaty with a condition First, only countries that have joined the they did not get what they wanted in these like this that makes the perfect the CWC and renounced CW can request assist- provisions.’’ enemy of the good. This condition is ance and only then if they are threatened or I would note, in conclusion, that renegoti- not about verification—it is about kill- attacked with CW. Indeed, the very purpose ation of Articles X and XI of the CWC, as the ing the treaty. of Article X is to encourage countries to join Helms condition (#32) in the Resolution of Tomorrow, each of these five amend- the CWC and eliminate their CW programs Ratification would require, is not a realistic ments will be subject to a motion to by providing an assurance of international option. This treaty was intensively nego- assistance in the event that they are threat- tiated for more than 10 years. It has been strike. Failing to strike them would be ened or attacked with CW by a non-party. signed by 162 countries and ratified by 74. As tantamount to killing the treaty. I For states in good standing under the CWC Brent Scowcroft recently testified, ‘‘Starting urge my colleagues to vote for each that do qualify for Article X aid, there is no over . . . is pure fantasy. If we reject this motion to strike. Those who do not are requirement to provide high tech defenses or treaty, we will incur the bitterness of all of essentially voting against ratification even gas masks. The obligation to assist can our friends and allies who followed us for 10 of the entire CWC. be satisfied with medical or humanitarian years in putting this together . . . the idea Mr. President, I think this debate aid. Indeed, the President has committed in that we can lead out again down a different really comes down to whether or not an agreed condition on the Resolution of path I think is just not in the cards. We have one supports international arms con- Ratification (Condition #15) that the United got to deal with the situation we face now, States will only give medical help to certain not an ideal one out in the future.’’ This is trol agreements. Many of the criti- countries of concern, such as Iran or Cuba, why the Senate must vote to strike this cisms of the CWC—such as that it under Article X. Helms Condition. would lull us to sleep, or that it is not Second, with regard to the actions of other I hope this information facilitates the Sen- verifiable—were levied against all pre- states, let me point out that countries con- ate’s consideration of the CWC and look for- vious successful arms control treaties, templating any exchanges under Article X ward to a successful vote in the coming days. such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation are legally bound by the fundamental obliga- Sincerely, Treaty, and the START treaty. tion in Article I of the treaty never ‘‘to as- SAMUEL R. BERGER, Assistant to the President for Those who worry that the United sist, encourage or induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity prohibited’’ under National Security Affairs. States will weaken its vigilance in our the Convention. This means that all relevant The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who efforts to guard against the threat of transfers must be subject to very close scru- yields time? chemical weapons have actually done tiny, especially with countries whose com- Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest us a service. I believe the intensity of pliance may be in doubt. We will use every the absence of a quorum. this debate has helped to ensure that instrument of U.S. diplomacy and leverage The PRESIDING OFFICER. The we will never allow ourselves to believe at our disposal to ensure that transfers do not occur which could undermine U.S. na- clerk will call the roll. The time will that the treaty by itself is enough. We be equally divided. will follow the course that President tional security interests, including the ex- tensive verification and compliance provi- The legislative clerk proceeded to Reagan did—a strong national defense sions in the Convention. As Secretary Cohen call the roll. and arms control agreements with ver- said on ‘‘Meet the Press’’ on Sunday, we will Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask ification. be in a much better position to do this if we unanimous consent that the order for The CWC is not a panacea, and none are inside the treaty rather than outside. the quorum call be rescinded. of its proponents believes it is. It will Frankly, other countries will have little in- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without not by itself banish chemical weapons centive to work with us to ensure that inap- objection, it is so ordered. propriate transfers do not occur if we have from the earth, but it would result in AMENDMENT NO. 47 not ratified ourselves. the destruction of much of the world’s (Purpose: To strike condition no. 30, relating chemical weapons stocks, and provide Article XI encourages free trade in non- prohibited chemicals among States that join to chemical weapons in other states) us with a valuable set of tools that the CWC and renounce any CW capability. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an would significantly strengthen our Some have charged that this provision might amendment to the desk. ability to monitor and defend against force us or our chemical industry to share The PRESIDING OFFICER. The the threat of chemical weapons. dual-use technologies and manufacturing se- clerk will report. S3584 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 The legislative clerk read as follows: will be people out there who will con- The truth of the matter is that they The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN] tinue to produce chemical weapons, or will not do a thing in the world to help proposes an amendment numbered 47. who will cheat, is a little bit like say- the situation because the Chemical On page 63, strike lines 8 through 20. ing we should not have laws because Weapons treaty—Convention, as it has Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this is people will break them. We should not been called—is not a comprehensive condition No. 30. As was indicated at have laws against murder because we ban. This treaty contributes to the na- the outset of the unanimous-consent know people are going to murder peo- tional security of the United States agreement, the Senate has now agreed ple. So have no laws against murder. and the American people, and that is to 28 of the 33 conditions that were at- The point is that today there is noth- what I am primarily interested in. tached to the treaty that is before us ing illegal—let’s get this straight— This treaty, it seems to me, must at today. under international law about produc- a minimum affect those countries pos- As I indicated at that time that I ing chemical weapons, developing sessing chemical weapons which pose a would be moving to strike five of the chemical weapons, or stockpiling threat to the United States. Accord- conditions, any one of which—at least chemical weapons. The purported Liby- ingly, the United States should not be- four of which—if adopted, would essen- an chemical weapons program is com- come a party to this treaty—many tially vitiate the treaty; would make pletely legal today. The Iraqi chemical Senators feel—until those countries our ratification useless. stockpile is completely legal today. In are also participants. And no effort has They are killer amendments. This is fact, there is nothing in international been made to encourage them to come one of those amendments. Mr. Presi- law that prohibits the use of chemical in. We are standing alone, and they are dent, condition No. 30 would hold hos- weapons internally. Like Saddam Hus- going to go about their little deviltry tage our joining the Chemical Weapons sein’s poison gas attack against the unmolested. Rogue states—like Iran, Convention to the condition that rogue Kurds within Iraq, there is nothing il- Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea— states—several rogue states, such as legal about having or using these weap- clearly represent a threat to United Iraq, Libya and North Korea—would ons in your own country. That will States security and the security of key have to sign and ratify the treaty be- change once the CWC is in force. United States allies. And not one of fore we became party to the treaty. To quote Gen. Colin Powell, ‘‘For us these countries has ratified the CWC, This has a very perverse impact. The to reject this treaty now because there and not one of them is likely to ratify. first impact is we wouldn’t be in the are rogue states outside that treaty is First, the intelligence people in our treaty. We would not have ratified the the equivalent of saying that we should own country—we call it the intel- treaty, if we ratified this condition. not have joined NATO because Russia ligence community—reported that all Second, it has a perverse impact. It wasn’t part of NATO.’’ That is former of these governments have active ag- would prevent the United States from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin gressive programs to develop and participating in the convention until a Powell—not me. produce chemical weapons. band of 2-bit regimes that specialize in This treaty will establish standards In March 1995, I believe it was, re- flaunting norms of civilized behavior by which to judge others. If it is vio- garding the nonproliferation treaty, decide for us when we should be a mem- lated—that is, if the treaty is violated the Central Intelligence Agency re- ber of this treaty. Seventy-four nations —it will provide the basis for harsh ac- leased an unclassified estimate that have already signed onto it. tion to punish and bring violators into gave a troubling assessment of the This condition turns the present compliance. The opponents will say likely impact that the CWC would have global arrangement on its head. In- that norms are meaningless unless upon the proliferation of chemical stead of the civilized nations of the there is a will to enforce those norms. weapons. world setting the rules, this condition They are right. But on that point, I This report said: effectively let’s the villains determine would point out that without a norm A number of states continue to pursue the the rules of the road and American pol- there is nothing to enforce. development or enhancement of a chemical icy. This condition ignores the critical The bottom line is this: With the weapons capability. Some states have chosen fact that regardless of what the rogue treaty we will have more tools and to pursue a chemical weapons capability be- states do, regardless of whether we join cause of relatively low cost, and the low greater flexibility to act against those technology required for chemical weapons the CWC, or not, we have decided uni- countries that threaten us and their production. Moreover, they believe that a laterally to destroy our chemical weap- neighbors. Should we choose military CWC ability can serve as both a deterrent to ons stockpile. action we would be able to justify it as enemy attack and as an enhancement of We will not use chemical weapons to a measure taken to enforce the terms their offensive military capability. respond to a chemical weapons attack. of a treaty to which we and 160 other I am quoting. The report says: That is a judgment our military and nations who are signatories—only 74 Currently, at least 15 countries have an of- our last Commander in Chief and this ratified—are parties. North Korea is fensive CWC program in some level of devel- one has made. Instead, we will rely on not. Libya is not. But 160 other nations opment, and the most aggressive chemical what General Schwarzkof said, and have signed, and we are going to say weapons programs are in Iran, Libya, and General Powell, General Shalikashvili, that we will not join unless North Syria. The CWC will continue to be a serious and others will rely upon our over- Korea joins. As Gen. Colin Powell said, threat for at least the remainder of this dec- whelming nonchemical military capa- ade despite a number of armaments control I am glad these folks weren’t around efforts, such as the Chemical Weapons Con- bilities to deter and retaliate against when NATO was starting up to say we vention. Several countries have expressed the use of chemical weapons. are not going to have NATO because concern, excluding Libya, Syria and Iraq, The best way to affect the behavior Russia can’t be a part. which have so far refused to sign the CWC, of these rogue states is to bring to bear Mr. President, I reserve the remain- and some CW-capable countries that have the combined weight of the civilized der of my time. I yield the floor. signed the treaty show no signs of ending nations of the world to isolate, sanc- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who their programs. tion, and target those nations who yields time? That was our intelligence commu- would continue to produce chemical Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair. nity’s assessment of the situation as of weapons in defiance of the creation of The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 1995. this international norm. But, Mr. Chair recognizes the Senator from Mr. President, while the intent of the President, first we have to establish North Carolina. CWC is good, what it proposes is to cre- the norm. If the United States of Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. ate a global chemical weapons ban, and America says we will not join unless Mr. President, there is a lot of mis- it will not do any such thing. It simply the bad guys join, then there is no rea- understanding about this treaty. It has will not achieve any other of the goals. sonable prospect that such a norm will been advertised implicitly—not explic- Thirty percent of the countries with be established. itly, of course—as a cure-all; as an end chemical weapons programs, including As Secretary of State Madeleine to the perils of chemical warfare. And all of those with what is called aggres- Albright has noted, to say that we a lot of people think it will all be over, sive programs, have not yet signed the should not have a CWC because there and we will not have any more danger. treaty, let alone ratified it. Yet, these April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3585 countries have been and will continue perior conventional forces of the Unit- The text is very short, and I just want to be the paramount chemical weapons ed States and its allies. These coun- to quote it verbatim. It says: threat to the United States. tries continue to develop plans to use Prior to the deposit of the United States About 6 years ago, during Operation chemical weapons in the event of war, instrument of ratification, the President, in Desert Storm, the United States was so and we must remember I think, Mr. consultation with the Director of Central In- concerned about Iraq’s chemical weap- President, that each of these countries telligence, shall certify to the Congress that ons program that we focused a huge countries which have been determined to are state sponsors, Government spon- have offensive chemical weapons programs, percentage of long allied air attacks sors, of terrorism and may supply including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, the Demo- upon Saddam Hussein’s chemical weap- chemical weapons to terrorist groups. cratic People’s Republic of Korea, China, and onry. A facility 65 miles north of Bagh- So when the CWC enters into force, all other countries determined to be state dad was the nucleus of Iraq’s chemical our troops will be no safer from chemi- sponsors of international terrorism have weapons program, and a priority target cal attacks than they are today be- ratified or otherwise acceded to the conven- during the early days of the gulf war. I cause the countries of greatest concern tion. was amazed then that no one seemed to have not acceded to this treaty. For Let me translate that into simple pay much attention. And I am amazed the CWC to offer any improvement, English. Under the terms of that condi- now that no one seems to remember however modest, to the national secu- tion, we will hold ourselves hostage to General Schwarzkopf’s remarks during rity of the United States, it must at a the very outlaw, rogue states that we a press briefing at that time in Saudi minimum, I think, affect those coun- seek to control by passing this conven- Arabia. It was on February 27, 1991. tries with aggressive chemical weapons tion. Under the terms of that condi- Here is what he said: programs, those countries which have tion, we would in fact do nothing to The nightmare scenario for all of us would hostile intentions toward the United change the status quo. have been to go through the Iraqi tank bar- States and the American people. The distinguished chairman of the rier, get hung up in this breach right here I urge Senators, please, to oppose committee said we have to hold on to and then have the enemy artillery rain this motion to strike this key provi- this amendment and defeat the treaty chemical weapons on the troops that were in sion. essentially because Iraq, Iran, Libya, the gaggle, in the breach right here. Have the yeas and nays been ordered these countries have chemical weapons Pointing to specific points. on the motion? today. Well, if we do not pass this trea- Well, the point is this. That night- The PRESIDING OFFICER. They ty, nothing whatsoever will change mare scenario exists today since Iraq have not. with respect to the threat versus the has neither signed nor ratified this Mr. HELMS. I ask for the yeas and United States. Each and every one of treaty. nays. those countries will continue to Let us look at another rogue regime, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there produce and we will continue on the path that we have been on for some North Korea. On March 18, 1996, the Di- is a sufficient second? rector of the Defense Intelligence Is there a sufficient second? years which is destroy our chemical Agency, Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, for- There is a sufficient second. weapons stocks. Why? Because we have warded to me a DIA assessment of Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. decided, and appropriately I believe, North Korea’s military capabilities The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who that we do not need and do not intend to fight a war with chemical weapons. which underscored United States con- yields time? Now, this particular reservation has cern with the war-fighting uses to Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield the a noble objective. I do not think any of which chemical weapons can be put. distinguished Senator from Massachu- us would argue, the real objective is to Now, according to that study, and I setts up to 10 minutes. get those rogue states to get rid of am quoting, ‘‘In any attack on the The PRESIDING OFFICER. The their chemical weapons. We are all in South, P’yongyang could use chemical Chair recognizes the Senator from Mas- favor of that, if that is the real objec- weapons to attack forces deployed near sachusetts for 10 minutes. tive. But I respectfully suggest the real the DMZ, suppress allied air power and Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair. I objective is to come around through isolate the peninsula from strategic re- thank the distinguished minority man- the back door and do through the back inforcements.’’ ager. door what they may not be able to do Now, in boasting that this treaty will We have now finally arrived at the through the front door. There is no make American soldiers free from the first of a series of real confrontations Senator in this Chamber who does not threat of chemical weapons, the admin- on this treaty, and we will vote shortly hope that Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, istration either has forgotten or delib- on this striking of the first reserva- North Korea, China, Cuba, and Sudan, erately ignored the fact that North tion. It really is not possible to over- in fact, every nation on Earth, is going Korea has neither signed nor ratified emphasize the importance of each of to someday ratify the CWC. If that was the CWC and the threat posed by North these votes. There are four votes, each the case or it was about to happen or Korea and Iraq and others here. Now of which would cripple this treaty. If had happened, there would be a lot less over 30,000 United States troops face there are 100 Members of the Senate concern about how we are going to go North Korean troops armed and exten- prepared to vote for this treaty—and about clarifying, inspecting, or chal- sively trained with chemical weapons. we know there are not—but if there lenging during the course of this trea- Key airfields and ports are within were and we subsequently were to ty. But that is not the case. There is striking distance of North Korean mis- adopt one of these reservations, those not one of those Senators who has siles, and with just a handful of chemi- 100 votes would be absolutely meaning- drafted this resolution who can look cal weapons North Korea could force less because we would have denied our- any other Senator in the eye in this United States aircraft to withdraw selves the capacity for this treaty to go Chamber and say today that they be- from the Korean Peninsula to Japan, into effect if we do not strike these res- lieve that any of those rogue states are and in fact in the near future North ervations. about to ratify tomorrow, the next Korea may be even able to strike air The fact is that the United States day, or the next day. That is not going bases in Japan with chemical muni- would be simply unable to ratify now to come as any surprise to anybody tions. Without air support and rein- or at any time in the immediate fu- here in the Chamber, Mr. President. forcement, our ground forces and our ture, and quite possibly never, if the ef- There is not one who would do that. South Korean allies would be over- fort to strike any one of these four In fact, during most of the 10 years whelmed within days. fails. That is the gravity of what we during which the Reagan administra- The threat to the United States are going to be doing in this Chamber tion and the Bush administration nego- forces in the Persian Gulf being rotated in the course of this afternoon. tiated over exhausting amounts of time from Iran and Iraq is no less troubling, The first of these conditions, condi- and developed this treaty, they devel- Mr. President. The bottom line, I tion 30, which the Senator from Dela- oped it to structure sanctions that guess, is that rogue states—if you will ware has ably discussed, has been would apply to trade in chemicals con- look at the chart—see chemical weap- called, somewhat antiseptically, ducted by nations that do not ratify ons as the best means to offset the su- ‘‘Chemical Weapons in Other States.’’ the treaty. S3586 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 Let me be clear about that. The pri- are we better off with this treaty in [From the Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1997] mary purpose of the strict require- terms of protecting our security inter- NO TO THE CHEMICAL ARMS TREATY ments for challenge inspection and the ests by being part of the convention, (By James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, process of tracking precursor chemi- within its organization able to change and Donald Rumsfeld) cals is not necessarily to keep track of it, which has already been ratified by The phrase ‘‘damning with faint praise’’ is the people that we know are going to 74 nations and signed by over 160? If we given new meaning by the op-ed by Brent live up to this treaty. It is precisely to fail to ratify, or if we fail to ratify by Scowcroft and John Deutch on the Chemical keep track of the people that are most not taking out this reservation, then Weapons Convention [‘‘End the Chemical likely to break the treaty, and every where are we? We have joined the out- Weapons Business,’’ Feb. 11]. In it, the au- thors concede virtually every criticism made one of the experts has suggested that law nations. We will have joined the by those who oppose this controversial trea- with respect to the rogue states you very nations that we want most to af- ty in its present form. are better off having that tracking fect the behavior of. They acknowledge the legitimacy of key process, the declarations of sales, the I think it is important to note that concerns about the Convention: its essential ability to be able to track the finger- some of our most respected voices in unverifiability; its lack of global coverage; print of chemicals through the globe in this country with respect to military the prospect that it will inhibit non-lethal order to be able to hold those countries use of chemicals, including tear gas; and its affairs and national security affairs mandating the transfer of militarily rel- accountable. have all agreed that it is significant for evant chemical offensive and defensive tech- That is the purpose of this treaty. So the United States to be able to not nology to untrustworthy countries that be- we have sort of a double negative here. align itself with those nations. General come parties. It is our view that these prob- If we allowed this particular reserva- Schwarzkopf said: lems are inherent in the present treaty. Take, for example, Scowcroft and Deutch’s tion to stand, not only would we hold I am very, very much in favor of the ratifi- warning against cutting investment in chem- ourselves hostage to the very countries cation of the treaty. that we want to have eliminate the ical defensive measures. Unfortunately, trea- weapons, but we also would eliminate And he said: ties such as the Chemical Weapons Conven- the means that we have created to be We don’t need chemical weapons to fight tion (CWC)—which promise to reduce the our future wars. And frankly, by not ratify- menace posed by weapons of mass destruc- able to get them to eliminate those tion but which cannot do so—inevitably tend weapons. ing that treaty, we align ourselves with na- tions like Libya and North Korea and I to diminish the perceived need and therefore So, Mr. President, I respectfully sug- would just as soon not be associated with the support for defenses against such gest this treaty was negotiated and those thugs in this particular measure. threats. crafted precisely to apply the pressure In fact, in December 1995, the then-vice of world opinion, the diplomatic pres- I think that is a pretty strong state- chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rec- sure, the economic pressure on the re- ment about precisely what this res- ommended a reduction of more than $800 mil- calcitrant nations whose leadership ervation would have the effect of doing. lion in investment on chemical defenses in General Powell, who has already been anticipation of the Convention’s coming into flaunts the civilized norm. force. If past experience is a guide, there The Senator from North Carolina is quoted by my colleague, made it very clear that we should not do this and might also be a reduction in the priority ac- absolutely correct. These nations do corded to monitoring emerging chemical have these materials. These nations made the analogy to NATO, to our not weapons threats, notwithstanding Scowcroft will, I am convinced, in a number of joining NATO simply because Russia and Deutch’s call for improvements in our cases continue to produce them. But was not a member. ability to track chemical weapons develop- the issue is how you best try to pres- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ments. sure them to reform their behavior. ator’s time has expired. Scowcroft and Deutch correctly warn that Mr. BIDEN. I yield my colleague an- the ‘‘CWC [must] not [be] exploited to facili- How do you make it as difficult as pos- tate the diffusion of CWC-specific tech- sible for those nations to do that? How other 30 seconds. nology, equipment and material—even to do you isolate them in the greatest Mr. KERRY. Former Assistant to signatory states.’’ The trouble is that the manner possible? Plainly speaking, the President Reagan and Secretary of Chemical Weapons Convention explicitly ob- authors of this amendment have to State Jim Baker said: ligates member states to facilitate such transfers, even though these items are read- know the distinction between having Some have argued that we shouldn’t com- ily exploitable for military purposes. What is those mechanisms in place, which the mit to the treaty because states like Libya, more, the treaty commits member states not Defense Department and others have Iraq and North Korea, which have not signed to observe any agreements, whether multi- it, will still be able to continue their efforts all said will help them more to be able lateral or unilateral, that would restrict to acquire chemical weapons. This is obvi- to do the tracking, than not to have these transfers. ously true, but the convention, which will go them. In short, we believe that the problems with into effect in April whether or not we ratify I want to emphasize also that there the Chemical Weapons Convention in these it, will make it more difficult for those and other areas that have been identified by is an irony in this because some of the states to do so by prohibiting the sale of ma- Brent Scowcroft and John Deutch clearly people who are advocating that we wait terials to nonmembers that can be used to demonstrate that this treaty would be con- until the rogue nations turn around make chemical weapons. and change their mind are, frankly, the trary to U.S. security interests. Moreover, in He said: our view these serious problems undercut the very same people who usually say It makes no sense to argue that because of argument that the CWC’s ‘‘imperfect con- never give up any sovereignty of the straints’’ are better than no constraints at United States to another nation. Here a few pariah states refusing to join the con- vention, the United States should line up all. we are turning over the entire sov- with them rather than the rest of the world. The CWC would likely have the effect of ereignty of the United States to make leaving the United States and its allies a decision in our best interests to the This is a bipartisan sentiment, Mr. more, not less, vulnerable to chemical at- very rogue states that have indicated President, and I hope the Senate will tack. It could well serve to increase, not re- already no willingness to try to adhere recognize the gravity of the vote we duce, the spread of chemical weapons manu- facturing capabilities. Thus we would be bet- to these standards. are about to take. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ter off not to be party to it. Second, the condition either fails to Notably, if the United States is not a CWC recognize or ignores purposefully the KEMPTHORNE). Who yields time? The member state, the danger is lessened that reality that at midnight of next Tues- Senator from North Carolina. American intelligence about ongoing foreign day, April 29, no matter what the Sen- Mr. HELMS. I have here, Mr. Presi- chemical weapons programs will be dumbed ate does today, the Chemical Weapons dent, a group of editorial comments, down or otherwise compromised. This has Convention takes effect with or with- making, as Sam Ervin used to say, un- happened in the past when enforcement of a out U.S. participation. common good sense, in opposition to violated agreement was held to be a greater So the question of whether or not this treaty. I ask unanimous consent threat to an arms control regime than was noncompliance by another party. The United they be printed in the RECORD. this convention is foolproof, is abso- States and the international community lutely the best convention in the There being no objection, the edi- have been unwilling to enforce the far more world, really begs the issue. The real torials were ordered to be printed in easily verified 1925 Geneva Convention ban- question before the United States is the RECORD, as follows: ning the use of chemical weapons—even in April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3587 the face of repeated and well-documented perience. It is an attempt to reform the One of the important things separating violations by Saddam Hussein. What likeli- world by collecting signatures. Some of the Reaganite internationalism from the more hood is there that we would be any more in- most dangerous nations—Iraq, Syria, Libya, starry-eyed Wilsonian version is the under- sistent when it comes to far less verifiable and North Korea—have not ratified the con- standing that treaties must reflect reality, bans on production and stockpiling of such vention and, for all we know, never will. not hope. The Chemical Weapons Convention weapons? Some of the nations that are signatories, turns the clock back to the kind of Wil- As a non-party, the United States would like Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba, are mani- sonian thinking characteristic of the Carter also remain free to oppose dangerous ideas festly unreliable and are already looking for administration. It is unfortunate that among such as providing state-of-the-art chemical ways to circumvent the convention’s provi- its strongest backers are some prominent manufacturing facilities and defensive equip- sions. Republicans who have served in key foreign- ment to international pariahs such as Iran The convention’s most prominent Amer- policy positions. It is true that the origins of and Cuba. And the United States would be ican defenders admit that the agreement is the Chemical Weapons Convention date back less likely to reduce investment in chemical probably not verifiable. And it isn’t. Chemi- to the Reagan years, and the convention was protective capabilities, out of a false sense of cal weapons can be produced in small but carried to fruition by the Bush administra- security arising from participation in the deadly amounts in tiny makeshift labora- tion. But let’s be candid. In the Reagan CWC. tories. The nerve gas used by terrorists to years, the treaty was mostly a sop to liberals In addition, if the United States is not a poison subway riders in Japan in 1995, for in- in Congress, an attempt to pick up some CWC party, American taxpayers will not be stance, was produced in a 14 ft.-by-8 ft. room. points for an arms control measure at a time asked to bear the substantial annual costs of No one in the American intelligence commu- when Reagan was trying to win on more im- our participating in a multilateral regime nity believes we would be able to monitor portant issues like the defense buildup and that will not ‘‘end the chemical weapons compliance with an international chemical the Strategic Defense Initiative. And Presi- weapons regime with any reasonable degree business’’ in countries of concern. (By some dent Bush pushed the treaty in no small part of confidence. estimates, these costs would be over $200 because he had disliked having to cast a tie- The Washington Post opines that these million per year.) Similarly, U.S. citizens failings in the convention—the very fact breaking vote in the Senate as vice president and companies will be spared the burdens as- ‘‘that the coverage of this treaty falls short in favor of building chemical weapons. Re- sociated with reporting and inspection ar- and that enforcement is uncertain’’—are ac- publicans today are under no obligation to rangements that might involve unreasonable tually arguments for ratifying it. Presum- carry out the mistakes of their predecessors. searches and seizures, could jeopardize con- ably, signature of a flawed treaty will make In one respect, the debate over the Chemi- fidential business information and yet could all of us work harder to perfect it. cal Weapons Convention calls to mind the not ensure that other nations—and espe- Great. struggle for the party’s soul waged in the cially rogue states—no longer have chemical At the end of the day, the strongest argu- 1970s between Kissingerian de´tente-niks on weapons programs. ment proponents of ratification can offer is one side and the insurgent forces led by Ron- Against these advantages of nonparticipa- that, whatever a treaty’s manifest flaws, it ald Reagan on the other. Back then, conserv- tion, the purported down-sides seem rel- is better to have one than not to have one. ative Republicans like Senate majority lead- atively inconsequential. First, whether Rus- How could it be bad to have a treaty outlaw- er Trent Lott knew without hesitation where sia actually eliminates its immense chemi- ing production of chemical weapons, no mat- they stood. They should stand where they cal arsenal is unlikely to hinge upon our par- ter how full of holes it may be? stood before, foursquare with the ideas that ticipating in the CWC. Indeed, Moscow is Well, actually, such a treaty could be helped win the Cold War, and against the now actively creating new chemical agents worse than no treaty at all. We have pretty Chemical Weapons Convention. that would circumvent and effectively defeat good evidence from the bloody history of this the treaty’s constraints. century that treaties like the Chemical [From the Arizona Republic, Mar. 9, 1997] Second, the preponderance of trade in Weapons Convention—treaties that are more CHEMICAL PACT chemicals would be unaffected by the CWC’s hortatory than mandatory, that express good SAY NO TO THIS TREATY limitations, making the impact of remaining intentions more than they require any ac- Make no mistake about it. outside the treaty regime, if any, fairly mod- tions to back up those intentions—can do Those were the words of President Bill est on American manufacturers. more harm than good. They are part of a Clinton, referring to the Chemical Weapons Finally, if the United States declines to psychological process of evasion and avoid- Convention in his State of the Union ad- join the present Chemical Weapons Conven- ance of tough choices. The truth is, the best dress. tion, it is academic whether implementing way of controlling chemical weapons pro- He said ratification of the CWC ‘‘will make arrangements are drawn up by others or not. liferation could be for the United States to our troops safer from chemical attack . . . In the event the United States does decide to bomb a Libyan chemical weapons factory. we have no more important obligations, es- become a party at a later date—perhaps after But that is the kind of difficult decision pecially in the wake of what we now know improvements are made to enhance the trea- for an American president that the Chemical about the Gulf War.’’ ty’s effectiveness—it is hard to believe that Weapons Convention does nothing to facili- Although all civilized nations can embrace its preferences regarding implementing ar- tate. Indeed, the existence of a chemical the notion of eliminating chemical weapons, rangements would not be given considerable weapons treaty would make it less likely it would, nevertheless, be a mistake to ratify weight. This is particularly true since the that a president would order such strong uni- the CWC, signed by more than 160 nations— United States would then be asked to bear 25 lateral action, since he would be bound to including the United States during the Bush percent of the implementing organization’s turn over evidence of a violation to the administration. budget. international lawyers and diplomats and The treaty requires the destruction of There is no way to ‘‘end the chemical wait for their investigation and concurrence. chemical weapons that signatories to the weapons business’’ by fiat. The price of at- And as Richard Perle has recently noted, treaty own or possess, or weapons anywhere tempting to do so with the present treaty is even after Saddam Hussein used chemical under their jurisdiction; the destruction of unacceptably high, and the cost of the illu- weapons in flagrant violation of an existing chemical weapons abandoned on the terri- sion it creates might be higher still. prohibition against their use, the inter- national bureaucrats responsible for mon- tory of another state; the destruction of chemical-weapons production facilities; the [From the Weekly Standard, Mar. 24, 1997] itoring these matters could not bring them- selves to denounce Iraq by name. In the end, prohibition of riot-control agents as a meth- JUST SAY NO TO A BAD TREATY it would be easier for a president to order an od of warfare—all reasonable and worthy The United States Senate must decide by air strike than to get scores of nations to goals. April 28 whether to ratify the Chemical agree on naming one of their own an outlaw. Ever since 1675, when a French-German Weapons Convention. The press, the pundits, The Chemical Weapons Convention is what agreement not to use poison bullets was con- and the Clinton administration have treated Peter Rodman calls ‘‘junk arms control,’’ cluded in Strasbourg, nations have struggled the debate over the treaty as another in a se- and not the least of its many drawbacks is with how to limit the terribly destructive ries of battles between ‘‘internationalists’’ that it gives effective arms control a bad nature of chemical weapons, though none of and ‘‘isolationists’’ in the new, post-Cold name. Effective treaties codify decisions na- the subsequent international agreements War era. tions have already made: to end a war on prevented the use of chemical weapons by It isn’t. What we really have here is the certain terms, for instance, or to define fish- warring factions. continuation of one of this century’s most ing rights. Because they reflect the will of In the 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons, enduring disputes. In the first camp are the the parties, moreover, the parties themselves including nerve gas, against Iran, clearly high priests of arms control theology, who don’t raise obstacles to verification. violating the 1925 Geneva Protocol. But an have never met an international agreement But treaties whose purpose is to rope in international conference in Paris failed to they didn’t like. In the second camp are rogue nations that have not consented, or enforce or fortify the Geneva Protocol, prov- those who take a more skeptical view of re- whose consent is widely understood to be ing the difficulty is not a lack of law, but the lying on a piece of watermarked, signed cynical and disingenuous, are something else failure to enforce it. parchment for safety in a dangerous world. again. They are based on a worldview that is Under terms of the CWC, for the first time The case for ratifying the Chemical Weap- at best foolishly optimistic and at worst pa- in U.S. history, private industry will be sub- ons Convention is a triumph of hope over ex- tronizing and deluded. ject to foreign inspection, with inspectors S3588 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 being dispatched from an agency based in the goes into effect with or without U.S. ratifi- [From the Washington Times, Mar. 4, 1997] Netherlands. In addition, businesses must cation. Despite Chicken Little warnings DON’T RUSH THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY prove to the U.S. government and inter- from the White House, there is no deadline George Bush, James Baker, Brent Scow- national inspectors that they are not produc- for ratification; the U.S. can join as a full croft—this is not exactly a lineup one would ing or stockpiling chemical weapons, with member at any time. expect to find on the side of the Clinton non-compliance fines reaching as high as Before a ratification vote, there is plenty White House. However, in the past few $50,000 per incident. of time for a vigorous, public examination. weeks, the administration has drawn upon Tucson’s Sundt Corp. estimates that ‘‘with The best place to start is with hearings, all available resources in the hope of prevail- five major offices/warehouses/shops in two which Foreign Relations Committee Chair- ing upon Congress to ratify the Chemical states, up to 35 job-site offices utilizing sub- man Helms has scheduled to begin on April 9. Weapons Convention—and to do it at once. A contractors and suppliers in eight states, the Senators, especially the 15 new ones who deadline of April 29 looms ominously on the complete and final determination of what we missed last year’s hearings, deserve a chance horizon, so we are told, by which time the have in the way of compounds and their de- to understand exactly what they are being treaty goes into effect, having already been rivative, the interactive relationships (with asked to vote on. At the moment the focus is ratified by the necessary 65 countries. If the the list of chemicals) could involve the cost on political maneuverings instead of where United States does not ratify by then, we of a chemist’s or consultant’s time amount- it should be: the content of the treaty. will be left out in the cold with other non- ing to $50,000–$100,000 per annum, not includ- For starters, Senator Helms could call the signing ne’er-do-wells, and the world will ing Sundt Corp.’s administrative time.’’ four former Defense Secretaries who ada- laugh at this failure of American leadership. Under the terms of the treaty, inspections mantly oppose the CWC: James Schlesinger, For heavens’ sake, this is a treaty the United may be conducted at any facility within a Donald Rumsfeld, Casper Weinberger and States itself negotiated! How can we possibly state party without probable cause, without Dick Cheney. Ask them about the treaty’s not ratify it? a warrant. Inspectors will be authorized verifiability, and they’ll tell you it’s impos- Hold the horses here. As critics of the trea- under the treaty to collect data and analyze sible. (So, for that matter, will the treaty’s ty including four past secretaries of defense samples. This could result in the loss of pro- supporters, whose best argument is that the have pointed out, it’s not at all clear that it prietary information, or ‘‘based upon the treaty is flawed, but we ought to sign it any- is in the interest of the United States to rat- depth of inspection, e.g. interviews with cor- way.) Douglas Feith, a Reagan Administra- ify the CWC, at least not until a number of porate personnel, employees, vendors, sub- tion chemical weapons negotiator, likens en- problems associated with it have been re- contractors; review of drawings, purchase or- forcement to a drunk searching for his keys solved. The famous deadline of April 29 is ba- ders, subcontracts; inspection and review of under a lamppost because that’s where the sically of the administration’s own making internal and external correspondence; we light is. Under the CWC, members could look and ought not intimidate anyone. Of the 65 feel that it could be difficult to safeguard for chemical weapons in New Zealand or the countries needed to trigger the treaty to confidential business information during Netherlands, but not in North Korea or take effect, the last one, Hungary, did so in this inspection,’’ says the Sundt Corp. Libya or Iraq, which have no intention of November, and only after consultation with The obligation to open on-site inspections joining. the White House, which told Budapest to go raises clear Fourth and Fifth Amendment The former Defense Secretaries could also ahead. concerns, inasmuch as no probable cause talk about Articles X and XI, which would In point of fact, as Michael Waller notes on need be shown while a foreign state will have require American chemical manufacturers to today’s Op-ed page, Russian Prime Minister the right to a challenge inspection of a U.S. share their latest technology with fellow sig- Victor Chernomyrdin specifically warned facility without the grounds that are essen- natories—including the likes of Iran and Vice President Gore in a letter against rush- tial for a search warrant. Cuba. Legal scholars could offer some ing the process with other countries before As Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., has pointed out, thoughts on the treaty’s requirement that ratification by the two most important sig- the CWC may actually contribute to the pro- American companies open their doors to sur- natories, Russia and the United States. Dis- liferation of chemical technology because of prise inspections as to whether that squares regarding Mr. Chernomyrdin’s warning, the its requirement that the United States share with the Constitution’s protection of prop- Clinton administration pressed ahead in information with rogue nations, once they erty rights and its ban on search and seizure. order to try to force the Senate’s hand. sign onto the CWC. CEOs could testify on the treaty’s regulatory President Clinton and Secretary of State Further, American technology that might burdens, not to mention the threat of indus- Madeleine Albright argue that non-ratifica- actually enhance the safety of U.S. troops— trial espionage as inspector-spies snoop tion by the United States by April 29 will such as non-lethal immobilizing agents— around their factories and troll through mean that we will be shut out from the re- could be prohibited if the Senate ratifies the their files. Intelligence experts could discuss gime’s executive board. This is highly un- convention in its present form. the impact on national security. likely to happen, especially given that the The forces on both sides of this issue in United States is being asked to pony up a Washington are men and women of good will. All this and more should emerge in hear- full 25 percent of the budget for enforcement. But the CWC is not a good deal for the Unit- ings. In recent days, Republicans and Demo- That’s $52 million this year. ed States. That is the message the Senate crats have come to agreement on 21 of 30 The fact of the matter is that the CWC should continue to send to Bill Clinton, in points of contention over the treaty. That may be in just as much trouble in the Senate unmistakable terms. progress (which comes after weeks of Admin- istration stonewalling, by the way) is on rel- now as it was back in the fall, when then- secretary of State Warren Christopher de- [From the Wall Street Journal, Apr. 1, 1997] atively minor issues and doesn’t extend to the key concerns on verifiability, constitu- cided to postpone the debate for lack of sup- THE BUM’S RUSH tionality or national security. The Adminis- port. For one thing, this Senate is more con- The debate over the Chemical Weapons tration would like nothing better than a per- servative than the previous one, and for an- Convention looks like it’s about to turn into functory day or two of hearings on these cru- other, numerous concerns have not been ad- a slugfest, notwithstanding last week’s spec- cial matters followed by a quick transfer to dressed. It redounds to the credit of Repub- tacle of Jesse Helms and Madeleine Albright the Senate floor for a vote billed as ‘‘for’’ or licans that they have declared themselves holding hands. Intimations of the battle to ‘‘against’’ poison gas. It should come as no willing to work with the administration to come were heard the week before last, when surprise if it doesn’t want Senators to take iron out these difficulties, but there is a very Democrats threatened to stall all Senate ac- too close a look: if they do, there’s a good long way to go. Sen. John Kyl of Arizona tions unless a ratification vote is scheduled. chance they might not like what they see. tells The Washington Times’ editorial page, The Administration, meanwhile, is hyping ‘‘I believe we have an obligation to try to get April 29 as the drop-dead date for ratification Mr. HELMS. I yield to the distin- as close as possible to making the treaty in the hope of getting the Senate to short- guished Senator from Arizona [Mr. workable. And we’ll see how far we can get.’’ change the ‘‘advise’’ part of its advise-and- KYL], such time as he may require. Mr. Kyl, however, points to some serious consent responsibilities and rush to a vote Does he have an estimate? problems. For one thing, it is not global. before it has a chance to review it properly. Mr. KYL. Mr. President, 10 minutes. Iran and Libya, for instance, have not Majority Leader Trent Lott, who hasn’t let Mr. HELMS. Take a shot at it. I want signed, and China and Russia have not rati- on how he will vote, is the point man here. fied it. Should we be concerned about chemi- How he handles the treaty’s passage through to be through along about 3:30, so we cal weapons in Belgium and Holland? Of the Senate will be an important test of his can vote. course not. They are not the problem. For leadership. While he has pleased Democrats The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- another, the treaty is not adequately verifi- by promising to bring the treaty up when the ator from Arizona. able. Even the Clinton administration ad- Senate returns from recess in a few days, Mr. KYL. I also ask unanimous con- mits as much. And third, much like the that doesn’t mean that he’s going to ram a sent to have printed in the RECORD a Atoms for Peace program, it will spread the vote down the Senate’s throat, as the Ad- number of op-ed pieces. knowledge of a potentially lethal technology ministration hopes. Senator Lott is perfectly to countries that could make dangerous use capable of spotting a bum’s rush when he There being not objection, the mate- of it. Add to these concerns the huge regu- sees one, and he expressly made no promise rial was ordered to be printed in the latory burden the treaty will impose on for a vote before April 29, the date the treaty RECORD, as follows: American chemical companies, in effect an April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3589 unfunded mandate, as well as the constitu- ulations and would be compelled to open weapons scientists, Vladimir Ugiev, revealed tional problems with spot checks by inter- their records to foreign inspectors. Firms the existence of A–232—which he personally national inspectors. having nothing to do with chemical weap- developed—in an interview with the maga- There may be ways out of these problems ons—wineries, breweries, distilleries, food- zine Novoye Vremya in early 1994. And in without sending the treaty back to the draw- processing companies and manufacturers of May 1994 Mr. Mirzayanov wrote about A–232 ing board. One would be for the Senate ratifi- electronics and soaps—could be forced to re- and other substances in an article for this cation resolution (a document that accom- veal trade secrets to the inspectors, to the page. Along with these first-person accounts panies all international treaties ratified by benefit of foreign competitors. came additional revelations of both pro- the Senate) to posit a set of conditions that In its zeal to ratify the CWC, the adminis- grams in the Baltimore Sun and other publi- must be fulfilled before the United States tration has been distorting and even conceal- cations. formally joins the CWC regime. A creative ing vital information about the treaty. Writ- Backed by letters from Sens. Bill Bradley solution might be, for instance, to say that ten exchanges between key senators and the (D., N.J.) and Jesse Helms (R. N.C.), U.S. the CWC regulatory burden should not be im- executive branch show grave inconsistencies Ambassador Thomas Pickering held a Mos- posed on American companies at least until and worse in the selling of the CWC: cow news conference in January 1994 defend- such a time as the treaty has been ratified Verification questions ing Mr. Mirzayanov for ‘‘telling the truth by countries that are key to its effective- Many senators are worried that the U.S. about an activity which is contrary to treaty ness—say, Russia, China and Iran. lacks the capability to verify other coun- obligations.’’ Yet in Washington, officials On Friday, Senate Majority Leader Trent tries’ compliance with the CWC. This dis- kept silent. Only the embarrassment of last Lott informed administration negotiators quiet is fueled in part by the rather vague week’s Washington Times report has spurred that they will have to deal directly with the assessments by Arms Control and Disar- the administration to ask Russia to stop. staff of Sen. Jesse Helms’ Foreign Relations mament Agency Director John Holum and Weapons destruction Committee, which is indeed where the re- other officials, who repeatedly have reas- The U.S. and other nations have repeatedly sponsibility belongs. Mr. Helms has some sured the Senate that the CWC is ‘‘effec- offered to help Moscow destroy the tens of other issues outstanding with the adminis- tively verifiable.’’ Indeed, proponents say thousands of tons of declared chemical tration, including State Department reorga- CWC will provide an added tool for intel- agents in its arsenals. A legal base toward nization. If the CWC is truly as important as ligence collection. this goal in the 1990 Bilateral Destruction the White House claims it is, there’s little But intelligence reports demonstrate it is Agreement. Visiting Bonn last spring, Mr. time to be lost in getting the White House to insufficient, even though intelligence chiefs Holum of the Arms Control and Disar- work on the legitimate problems of this trea- have given the CWC their obligatory en- mament Agency learned that Moscow was ty. dorsement. In 1994, then-CIA Director R. planning to withdraw from the BDA, and James Woolsey told senators that ‘‘the wrote a May 21 cable to Washington with the [From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 13, 1997 chemical-weapons problem is so difficult news. Lawmakers who asked to see the cable THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS COVERUP from an intelligence perspective that I can- were told for weeks that it did not exist. (By J. Michael Walker) not state that we have high confidence in Senate sources say. Sen. Jon Kyl (R., Ariz.), our ability to detect noncompliance, espe- a member of the Select Committee on Intel- President Clinton had hardly completed cially on a small scale.’’ And a May 1995 Na- ligence, wasn’t allowed to read the cable his first year in office when Sen. William tional Intelligence Estimate stated that pro- until the eve of the expected September rati- Cohen (R., Maine) suspected that the admin- duction of new classes of chemical weapons fication vote, when he was shown only a re- istration was covering up ominous Russian ‘‘would be difficult to detect and confirm as dacted version. military developments. Mr. Cohen intro- a CWC-sponsored activity.’’ duced legislation requiring the president ‘‘to Chernomyrdin letter to Gore tell us and the American people what the Clandestine production Russian Prime Minister Viktor Russian military was doing and what the im- Several countries—notably including Rus- Chernomyrdin sent a letter to Vice President plications were for American and Allied se- sia—maintain clandestine chemical weapon Al Gore on July 8, 1996, warning that if the curity.’’ The Pentagon made the information programs designed to elude detection. The CWC went into effect before Russia’s ratifi- available to Congress—but withheld it from administration virtually ignored reports of cation, Moscow probably wouldn’t ratify it. the public. Mr. Cohen complained that the Moscow’s continuing covert development The letter was faxed all around Washington, report ‘‘was classified from cover to cover, and production of binary nerve agents, and but when Sen. Helms, chairman of the For- even though much of the report did not war- made no visible attempt to induce Moscow to eign Relations Committee, asked the admin- rant being restricted by a security classifica- terminate the programs—until last week, istration for a copy, the administration clas- tion.’’ when the Washington Times made public a sified it. ‘‘Perhaps,’’ Mr. Cohen surmised in a speech classified Pentagon report. The report de- STRATEGY BACKFIRED scribed Foliant, the code name of a super- on the Senate floor, ‘‘the administration was The Clinton administration had hoped to secret program begun under the Soviets to worried about being embarrassed given its present the Senate with a fait accompli: develop nerve agents so lethal that micro- acquiescence to Russian military adven- that’s why it encouraged Hungary and other scopic amounts can kill. One of those sub- tures.’’ Whatever the reason, he said, ‘‘the nations to ratify the treaty and automati- stances is A–232 of the Novichok class of bi- decision to classify the report from the cover cally trigger its implementation. Yet the nary weapons, which were designed to cir- to cover has prevented Congress from con- White House strategy seems to have back- ducting a complete public debate about Rus- cumvent future bans on such agents. The Pentagon report says the chemical for- fired. After Hungary set the CWC in motion, sian actions and the administration’s policy the upper house of the Russian Parliament toward Russia, and it has prevented the mulas are not defined in the CWC lists. Therefore, Novichok weapons technically are voted down a long-awaited law that would American people from becoming fully in- establish the legal basis for chemical-weap- formed on these matters.’’ not banned under the treaty. The adminis- tration counters that they are banned ‘‘in ons destruction. Just as the administration EERILY RESONANT spirit,’’ but as with all its arms control began its new CWC sales pitch, the Pentagon Mr. Cohen’s criticisms of the administra- agreements, Moscow has been banking on was forced to explain why it had done noth- tion to which he now belongs seem eerily the technicality and the camouflage. ing for four years to convince Moscow to ter- resonant. The issue today is the administra- Russian military scientists and journalists minate its clandestine binary weapons pro- tion’s campaign to win Senate ratification of revealed the program, but Russian officials gram. And with former Sen. Cohen settling the Chemical Weapons Convention. Intended were not alone in trying to cover it up. The in at the Pentagon, others in the administra- to abolish all chemical weapons world-wide, leaked Pentagon report’s low level of classi- tion still hide behind their paper shield of se- the CWC contains many loopholes, legal dis- fication—secret as opposed to top secret— crecy. crepancies and weak enforcement mecha- suggests that protecting intelligence sources [From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 19, 1997] nisms that render it ineffective. In particu- and methods was not the objective of the se- lar, there is every reason to believe that crecy. Rather, it appears the facts were sim- A DANGEROUS TREATY Russia has continued work to develop deadly ply too inconvenient for the administration’s Among the many good reasons why the new chemical weapons that would skirt the purposes. Senate should not ratify the Chemical Weap- treaty’s requirements. Nearly all the leaked information had ap- ons Convention is a substance known as A– Hungary recently became the 65th country peared in the press long before. In September 232. This highly lethal nerve agent was con- to ratify the CWC, tripping a mechanism 1992, Vil Mirzayanov, a dissident Russian sci- cocted by a Russian scientific team precisely that puts the treaty into effect April 29 with entist who worked for 26 years on the clan- for the purpose of circumventing the terms or without the ratification of Russia, China destine programs, wrote an article in Mos- of the CWC, which both the U.S. and Russia and the U.S. Thus the administration is cow News describing the existence and na- have signed but not yet ratified. A–232 would pushing hard for ratification by that date, ture of Novichok, and the specific intent to escape scrutiny under the treaty because it though it had put the CWC on hold last Sep- circumvent the CWC. More details emerged is made from agricultural and industrial tember over concerns that the CWC might over the next two years as authorities per- chemicals that aren’t deadly until they are unnecessarily burden U.S. industry. Amer- secuted—but never disputed—Mr. mixed and therefore don’t appear on the ican companies would be subject to new reg- Mirzayanov. One of Russia’s top binary CWC’s schedule of banned chemicals. S3590 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 The world has known about A–232 since the weapons by 2004. That doesn’t mean the rest interests of the United States, I think May 1994 publication on this page of an arti- of the world shares any such commitment; at a minimum it must affect those cle by a Russian scientist, who warned how what possible peaceful purpose does Russia countries with aggressive chemical his colleagues were attempting to camou- have in the clandestine production of A–232? weapons programs and which have hos- flage their true mission. It is now the subject Instead of pushing a treaty that can’t ac- of a classified Pentagon paper, reported in complish its impossible goals, the Adminis- tile intentions toward the United the Washington Times earlier this month, on tration would be better advised to use its States. Let me just outline briefly who the eve of what is shaping up to be an esca- clout, rather than that of some planned U.N.- these—who some of these countries lation of the battle joined in September over style bureaucracy, in getting the Russians to are. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Con- stop making nerve gas. North Korea—North Korea’s program vention. It’s hard to find a wholehearted advocate involves the stockpiling of a large The Administration was forced to sound of the treaty. The gist of the messages from amount of nerve gas, blood agents, and the retreat then, pulling the treaty from most of its so-called champions is that it’s a mustard gas. And it is capable of pro- consideration when it became clear that the poor deal, but it’s the best on offer. But their Senate was preparing to vote it down. Now cases have acknowledged so many caveats ducing much more, according to our in- it’s trying again, this time in full cry about that it’s hard to see how they’ve reached telligence sources. Its armed forces the urgency for U.S. ratification before April such optimistic conclusions. The biggest have the ability to launch large-scale 29, the date it goes into effect. For now, Sen- danger of ratification is that it would simi- chemical attacks using mortars, artil- ator Jesse Helms has kept the treaty tied up larly lull the U.S. and other responsible na- lery, multiple rocket launchers, and in the Foreign Relations Committee, making tions into the false belief that they are tak- Scud missiles. And it is presently de- the sensible argument that the new Senate ing effective action against the threat of veloping a new generation of medium- ought first to focus on matters of higher pri- chemical weapons. The case for this treaty range ballistic missiles that will be ority than ramrodding through a controver- strains belief too far. sial treaty that merits careful deliberation. able to carry chemical warheads. North The Administration, meanwhile, is mount- Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the condi- Korea has neither signed nor ratified ing a full-court press, with the president of- tion we have before us right now is the Chemical Weapons Convention. fering a plea for ratification in his State of whether or not the United States will Iraq—despite the most intrusive in- the Union address ‘‘so that at last we can be a party to a meaningful treaty, that spection and monitoring regime in the begin to outlaw poison gas from the earth.’’ is to say a treaty that covers nations history of the world, Iraq has retained This is an admirable sentiment—who isn’t that it needs to cover. It will not do us a chemical weapons production capa- against making the world safe from the hor- any good if we are a party to a treaty, bility and continues to hide details and rors of poison gas?—but it’s far from the re- paying 25 percent of the costs, to in- ality. In fact, ratification would more likely documents related to its chemical bring the opposite result. spect ourselves. Right now, the coun- weapons program. The U.N. Special Article XI is one of the key danger areas. tries that have ratified this treaty are Commission believes that Iraq contin- It would obligate U.S. companies to provide not the countries that are of concern ues to hide chemical agents, precur- fellow signatories with full access to their to us. They do not have weapons. As a sors, and weapons. Iraq admitted in latest chemical technologies, notwithstand- matter of fact, right now the countries 1995 that it had produced over 500 tons ing American trade or foreign policy. One that are parties have nothing to in- of a lethal nerve gas agent before the country delighted at the prospect of upgrad- spect. The United States, if it believes ing its chemical industry is China, which, Gulf war. The U.N. inspectors had pre- upon signing the CWC, issued a declaration this treaty is ultimately going to have viously been unable to uncover evi- saying, ‘‘All export controls inconsistent any positive effect, that is to say if it dence of this, despite a more rigorous with the Convention should be abolished.’’ has significant verification features, inspection regime than even those No doubt Cuba and Iran, to name two other and if it is global in the sense that mandated by the Chemical Weapons signatories, share the same sentiment. The most of the countries of the world that Convention verification regime. As Russian team that came up with A–232 no have chemical weapons are parties to noted, Iraq has neither signed nor rati- doubt could accomplish much more with the it, and if it is enforceable—at that fied the Chemical Weapons Convention. help of the most up-to-date technology from point in time the United States pre- the U.S. Iran—Iran has been producing chemi- Verification is an insurmountable problem, sumably could get something out of cal weapons at a steadily increasing and no one—not even the treaty’s most ar- this treaty. In the meantime, the only rate since 1984 and now has a stockpile dent supporters—will promise that the trea- thing we get out of it is the oppor- of choking, blister and blood agents of ty can be enforced. In the administration’s tunity to pay a lot of money, as I say, over 2,000 tons. It also may have a obfuscating phrase, the CWC can be ‘‘effec- to inspect ourselves. Because the coun- small stockpile of nerve agent. It has tively verified.’’ Yet if chemical weapons are tries that need to be inspected are not the ability to produce an additional easy to hide, as A–232 proves, they are also yet in it. 1,000 tons of chemical agents per year. easy to make. The sarin used in the poison- Specifically, 74 countries have rati- gas attack on the Tokyo subway was created It has signed but not ratified the not in a fancy lab but in a small, ordinary fied the treaty and they are the coun- CWC. Even so, and this is critical, room used by Aum Shinri Kyo’s amateur tries of least concern to the United Iran’s chemical weapons program is chemists. The treaty provides for snap in- States. The three countries that have among the largest in the Third World. spections of companies that make chemicals, the largest amount of chemical weap- It has continued to expand, even since not of religious cults that decide to cook up ons in the world—Russia and China and Tehran signed the CWC. And the some sarin in the back office. The CWC the United States—are not parties, nor Central Intelligence Agency believes wouldn’t make a whit of difference. are any of the so-called rogue countries Those snap inspections, by the way, could that Iran has no intention of abiding turn into a huge burden on American busi- of the world. by the terms of the CWC. nesses, which would have to fork out mil- Many of these countries have no in- Iran is making improvements to its lions of dollars in compliance costs (though tention of signing onto the treaty. chemical capabilities that suggest it the biggest companies no doubt would watch North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and has made a long-term commitment to the heaviest burden fall on their smaller Sudan have all refused to sign the trea- its chemical program. I repeat, the CIA competitors). ty. Others, such as Cuba and Iran, have believes that Iran has no intention of More than 65 countries have already rati- signed the treaty but have not yet rati- abiding by the terms of the CWC. It is fied the CWC, including most U.S. allies. But somehow we don’t think the world is more fied it. In the meantime, some of these the most active state sponsor of inter- secure with Australia and Hungary commit- countries, such as Iraq, continue to national terrorism. It is directly in- ted to ridding the world of chemical weapons stockpile and develop chemical weap- volved in planning and directing ter- when such real threats as Libya, Iraq, Syria ons. rorist attacks. And it could supply and North Korea won’t have anything to do So, the question is, will the United chemical weapons to a number of ter- with the CWC. How can a treaty that pro- States enter this treaty at a time when rorist groups. Iran has not ratified the fesses to address the problem of chemical it is meaningless, or will we, instead, Chemical Weapons Convention. weapons be credible unless it addresses the use our entry as a prod to cause other Syria has produced chemical weapons threat from the very countries, such as Syria countries of the world that need to be since the mid-1980’s. The CIA believes and Iraq, that have actually deployed these weapons? parties to be parties. For the treaty to that it is likely that Syria’s chemical With or without the CWC, the U.S. is al- offer any potential improvement, how- weapons program will continue to ex- ready committed to destroying its chemical ever modest, to the national security pand. Syria can indigenously produce April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3591 nerve agents and mustard gas, and is mention the expense to the U.S. tax- cued 71 of the 72 hostages being held by stockpiling both agents. It may have payer, let us be involved in this when it a terrorist group for 4 months. As part produced chemical warheads for its means something; that is to say, when of the operation, the Peruvian Army Frog and Scud missiles for use against the countries we really care about are used riot control agents to stun the Israeli cities. Syria has not signed nor involved in it. terrorists and rescue the hostages. ratified the Chemical Weapons Conven- Finally, to the point that we are I would caution my colleagues, re- tion. somehow associating ourselves with gardless of where they come out on Libya—Libya has produced at least thugs by not joining, I find that really this treaty, that the actions of the Pe- 100 tons of chemical agents, including an argument that is, really— ruvian Armed Forces that resulted in mustard and nerve gas. Libya is capa- Mr. HELMS. Insulting? minimal loss of life among the hos- ble of delivering its chemical weapons Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I don’t want tages were quite possibly a violation of with aerial bombs, and may be working to use the word insulting, but it has no the Chemical Weapons Convention, to develop a chemical warhead for bal- persuasive force, let’s put it that way. which expressly forbids the use of riot listic missiles. It also possesses cruise Does this mean if a country like Iran control agents as a method of warfare. missiles. Libya has neither signed nor or Cuba, for example, signs up, that we I make this point because this treaty ratified the Chemical Weapons Conven- would be associating with lesser thugs? has many things in it that we must tion. Actually, don’t the proponents of the think about very carefully. I believe Mr. President, the point is, unless treaty want us to associate with thug the proposals the distinguished Sen- these countries are party to this trea- nations, if this is going to mean any- ator from North Carolina has offered in ty, whatever benefits the treaty has thing? Don’t we want all of those coun- the resolution before us will turn a are essentially meaningless. This is one tries in the treaty with us? flawed treaty into an effective, verifi- of the reasons why former Defense Sec- Somehow, under their logic, we don’t able tool of American foreign policy. retary Dick Cheney said this, in a let- want to associate with these thugs. We are talking about safeguards that ter he wrote about a week ago. He said: Yet, they want to pass a treaty that, ensure the treaty will be something Those nations most likely to comply with presumably, if it is going to mean any- that America can support, knowing the Chemical Weapons Convention are not thing, has these thugs in it, in which that we are protected, both in our con- likely to ever constitute a military threat to case we are associating with them. stitutional rights and in the security of the United States. The governments we Obviously, the point is not whether our country. should be concerned about are likely to we are associating with thugs. I don’t One of the amendments before us cheat on the CWC, even if they do partici- think that any of us can fail to make today would take away one of the very pate. appropriate distinctions here. The fact important elements of protection In effect, [he wrote] the Senate is being of the matter is, those thug nations, if about which I speak. The amendment I asked to ratify the CWC even though it is likely to be ineffective, unverifiable, and un- this treaty is to mean anything, ought am referring to does not require that enforceable. Having ratified the convention, to be part of the organization and, at the Director of the CIA certify that the we will then be told we have ‘‘dealt with the that time, the United States then countries which have been determined problem of chemical weapons’’ when in fact could participate in a meaningful way. to have offensive chemical weapons, we will have not. But, ratification of the Until those thugs are a part of this like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North CWC will lead to a sense of complacency, to- treaty, we are just wasting our time Korea, China—have ratified the con- tally unjustified given the flaws in the con- and money and putting a lot of our vention. We want to make sure that vention. citizens to an awful lot of unnecessary those countries are going to come Finally, to the point. The Senator hassle. under the auspices of this convention. I from Massachusetts said that we are The point of this condition is to think it is important that we have somehow holding ourselves hostage to make a point, to make the point that those safeguards. the rogue states. Precisely the opposite the countries that really matter are So, I hope my colleagues will support is the case. We decide when to join this not even going to be governed by this the resolution, the underlying resolu- convention, not because the adminis- treaty. It is one of the reasons why this tion, rather than the amendments that tration says there is an automatic treaty, in the end, cannot be supported. are being put forward. deadline under which we have to do so, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who I am glad the Senate is taking the but when we say it will matter. When yields time? The Senator from North opportunity to improve this treaty. we are not having to pay 25 percent of Carolina. Our constitutional responsibility to ad- the costs of a meaningless convention, Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, allow me vise and consent on treaties is one of in effect 25 percent of the costs to in- to inquire of the distinguished col- the most important that we have. Un- spect ourselves. Mr. President, $200 league, does he have somebody ready to fortunately, we have gotten into the million a year to help this U.N.-style go now? I do, if he does not. bad habit of all consent and no advice. bureaucracy, in addition to putting the Mr. BIDEN. Why don’t you go ahead? When it comes to that, we cannot let businesses of the United States Mr. HELMS. I believe I have an hour that happen. That is why we are here. through all the hoops they are going to and 6 minutes that I saved a while ago. That is why the Constitution requires have to go through in order to comply I yield 10 minutes of that to the distin- two-thirds of our body to ratify any with this convention. guished Senator from Texas. treaty that America would participate I have written to my constituents The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- in. the names of companies on the list sup- ator from Texas is recognized. Mr. President, international treaties plied to us by the Government as po- Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I extend the full faith and credit of the tentially required to comply with the thank the distinguished chairman of United States, and they become the reporting requirements of the conven- the Foreign Relations Committee for law of our land when they are ratified. tion. They write back to me saying it his leadership on this issue, for talking So the United States cedes a little sov- would cost them $50,000, $70,000, or about this treaty so that all of Amer- ereignty with every treaty the Senate more than $100,000 a year, just to fill ica is beginning to see what the issues ratifies. That is why the framers of our out the forms. are. Constitution wanted to be very careful What we are saying is, instead of put- I hope to be able to support the that two-thirds of the Senate would be ting our businesses through the ex- Chemical Weapons Convention as needed to ratify any treaty that would pense and hassle of having to comply strengthened by the resolution of rati- become the law of our land. with this when nobody in the United fication introduced by the chairman of Like no other treaty before it, the States has any intention of violating the Foreign Relations Committee. Chemical Weapons Convention will this treaty—these companies back in Before I address this resolution, I make this loss of sovereignty apparent Arizona have no intention of producing want to draw our attention to the re- to thousands of Americans at thou- chemical weapons—instead of submit- markable events in Lima, Peru. The sands of companies who will be faced ting ourselves to that intrusive bureau- Peruvian Armed Forces and police con- with new Government regulations or be cratic regulation and expense, not to ducted a bold, daytime raid and res- subject to searches and seizures of S3592 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 their property by teams of inter- Mr. President, I think we have to ad- are rogue nations, that are terrorist national inspectors. These are the dress three key questions when we are states, right now as we speak. Ger- practical effects this treaty will have talking about not only destroying our many is. Russia is. China is. on ordinary Americans. chemical weapons but sharing the tech- What are we doing about it? What are As many as 670 companies in my nology that we have for defending we doing? We are not standing up and home State of Texas will be directly af- against them. saying, there are consequences to that fected by this treaty. Only a handful of My first question: Will this treaty action, because we do not want to rock these companies are actually in the achieve the desired objective, an objec- the boat in some other area of foreign chemical industry. Many others use tive we all want, and that is to rid the policy. small amounts of chemicals for legal, world of chemical weapons? Mr. President, if we are not going to nonmilitary purposes. But according to I do not think so. Even the most ar- stand up when countries with whom we this treaty, they will be required to dent supporter of the treaty knows are trading and with whom we have submit business information to a new that this is not going to rid the world friendly relations are this very day United Nations-style international or- of chemical weapons. We know that selling nuclear weapons or nuclear ca- ganization that will monitor this trea- there are outlaw regimes producing pabilities to rogue nations, like Iran ty, or they will have to open their chemical weapons as we speak that and Iraq, how could we ever say that property to inspections by teams of have no intention of signing or ratify- this treaty would be verifiable and that international inspectors. ing this treaty. all of the signatories would comply Because of the way this treaty will Iraq is one example. Iraq makes a affect ordinary Americans, it is a pro- with this treaty and that we would in mockery of international agreements. fact do anything if they were not? found departure from previous arms The Government of Iraq has used Mr. President, my third question is: control treaties which were really lim- chemical weapons against its own peo- Can we protect the constitutional ited to military contractors and instal- ple, for Heaven’s sake. Who among us rights of ordinary Americans affected lations. That is why we must look so believes that a government that would by the treaty who are engaged in ac- carefully at this treaty. If we are going do this would honor an agreement tivities that have nothing to do with to impose this burden on ordinary when it has already used these weapons the production of chemical weapons? I Americans, then we must make sure on its own people? think this is one of the most important that the benefits outweigh the costs. Even worse, this treaty as written ac- issues—the constitutional right First, let me say, without qualifica- tually encourages the spread of chemi- against an unreasonable search or sei- tion, that chemical warfare is rep- cal weapons technology among the zure. rehensible and it deserves uniform con- countries that are parties to it because demnation. I am proud that the United articles X and XI require treaty par- The protections offered by the chair- States has already decided to destroy ticipants to share their chemical weap- man of the Foreign Relations Commit- any chemical weapons that we might ons defense technologies and prohibits tee, Mr. HELMS, is a first step. But we have with or without this treaty. But, countries from placing restrictions on are going to have to hold on to the pro- Mr. President, it is also our respon- commerce in chemicals that can be tections that have been put in the bill sibility to make sure that we have de- used for weapons purposes. by the committee because the fourth fenses against any country that might Mr. President, I think what we see amendment to the Constitution is a use chemical weapons in order to be here is good-intentioned, but we are pillar of the Bill of Rights. It protects sure that we are not unilaterally dis- talking about restricting ourselves the rights of our people against unrea- arming ourselves. from producing chemical weapons, sonable searches and seizures. Yet this I support the 1989 and 1990 agree- which we want to do, and we are talk- agreement, the chemical weapons trea- ments between the United States and ing about sharing our defenses against ty, would allow people to come in, Russia that ban the production of chemical weapons with countries that international groups, to inspect our chemical weapons and require both may be represented in international in- companies, not companies that are countries to destroy their stockpiles. making chemical weapons—we do not Those two agreements were backed up spection groups that would come into our businesses and could easily give do that—but companies that use by tough onsite inspections in which chemicals for any other myriad of pur- each side can watch the other destroy this information back to the countries who are not signatories. poses, to get their trade secrets or our the weapons. defense mechanisms against the chemi- Unfortunately, neither the Geneva That is why these amendments are so important, so that every one of these cal weapons that we may have to face Protocol against chemical weapons use one day. nor the two agreements that we have countries that has chemical weapons will be a party to this agreement, so Mr. President, I am just very worried signed with Russia are actually being that we would disarm ourselves and enforced. that at least we would know that we lose the ability to protect ourselves When the Government of Iraq used have some ability to sanction these against a rogue nation that will not chemical weapons against its own citi- countries when they are not able to zens in the 1980’s, the United Nations show us that they are complying. sign and ratify this treaty. could not even agree upon a resolution Mr. President, my second question is: The amendments offered today would condemning Iraq. Can we determine with reasonable ac- take away the protections that are now The two Russian agreements are curacy that the other countries that in the resolution against that happen- dead, too. The Russian Prime Minister have signed the treaty will honor it, as ing because the resolution says all of told Vice President Gore in July 1996 we certainly will? We all remember these rogue nations must be a party to that both agreements have outlived President Reagan’s words, ‘‘trust but the agreement so that at least we their usefulness. It appears that the verify.’’ We need the ability to verify. would have the mechanisms to go in Russians do not intend to honor these This is a treaty that I am afraid and try to find these chemical weap- agreements. I remind my colleagues there is no way we could really verify. ons. Yet, you know even the best effort that Russia has the world’s largest In fact, even the supporters admit that that we have been able to make in find- stockpile of chemical weapons, and you cannot really verify it. We are try- ing chemical weapons in Iraq have this is not a trivial matter. ing to strengthen it so that we will failed. Right now our international So, Mr. President, we have three have at least some ability. But then it agreements allow us to look in Iraq for good, tough, supposedly enforceable comes into question, are we going to chemical weapons. We have not found international agreements to restrict exercise those abilities? any. And yet all of the inspectors in the use of and destroy chemical weap- I think one of the concerns that I the international group that are trying ons. But those agreements have failed. have is that we know that countries to find those weapons have not been So now we are here today to consider with whom we trade, countries with able to do it, but they say they know another agreement, even tougher, that whom we have good relations, are actu- they are there. They are sure that they involves more countries, and we hope it ally selling the equipment to make nu- are there. So the verifiability becomes will work where others have failed. clear weapons to these countries that a real issue. April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3593 Mr. President, I think that the com- a variety of other nations, purportedly difference that there is a law against mittee has done an excellent job of pro- have these weapons. Our problem is to this, and that the United States acts tecting the interests of Americans in convince other nations in the world with other nations and with their this treaty. I hope that we can keep that we all ought to be about the task backing to enforce that, and that we the safeguards so that all of us can of ending production of these weapons, shall have to do. vote for this treaty. I would like to be- ending possession, storage, ending any Much has been said about lack of cause I respect the people who are for vestige of them. military will or lack of political will, the treaty. Now, in order to do that, we have to but, Mr. President, I have seen very lit- I have the greatest regard for Presi- bring other nations into this with us. tle of that in this Chamber during this dent Bush. I think he is a wonderful Therefore, we have offered leadership debate. We are serious about this. man. He would never leave the United now for many years. We have con- Mr. President, let me add just as a States of America defenseless. But you vinced 74 other nations that have al- topical matter, because the Members of know, if Senator KYL and Senator ready ratified the Chemical Weapons the Senate who have been watching HELMS had not stood up, one of the Convention that they ought to be with local television at least in the last safeguards that President Bush put in us in this quest. I make that point at half-hour appreciate that in northwest the treaty would have been taken out, the outset, Mr. President, because the Washington, in the downtown area and that is the use of tear gas by our motion before the Senate is to strike a near the B’nai B’rith headquarters, a forces in wartime, because President condition added, at least to this treaty, vial of chemical material or biological Bush made sure that we said right up that would say we ought to forgo our material is present that authorities of front, yes, we will use tear gas because leadership, we ought to really forget the police and fire department and spe- we would rather use tear gas than bul- what our objective has been for years. cial persons in the Washington, DC, lets. I presume we ought to forget we are in area have now picked up this material, President Clinton disagreed with the process of destroying all of our own and people in the B’nai B’rith head- that. He said, no, we would not use tear chemical weapons and simply hope quarters are being decontaminated. A gas. But because of the efforts of Sen- that others might proceed. suggestion is that it may be anthrax, a ator HELMS and Senator KYL, we have As a matter of fact, if we do not rat- very deadly biological weapon. been able to agree on that issue. ify this convention this evening, others It was not long ago on this floor, Mr. So, Mr. President, I hope to be able will proceed, but they will proceed President, that the Nunn-Lugar-Do- to support this treaty. I thank the dis- without us. Our diplomacy with Russia menici Act was debated and we talked tinguished chairman of the committee will be severely impaired. As a result, then in terms of attempting to bring for allowing me to speak and for his even though we are working with Rus- Department of Defense resources into leadership. I would like to be able to sia now—as a matter of fact, to help play with the cities of this country— support it, but I will not support this them destroy chemical weapons— Washington, DC, being prominent treaty without the safeguards to the through reasons the world will find among them, Atlanta, GA, Denver, CO, security of America. That is my first hard to understand, we will have de- and 23 other cities have been named— responsibility. nied the very treaty we have asked so that in the event there should be an- Thank you, Mr. President. others to join us in. It makes no sense. thrax, which was specifically men- Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator. Let me say with all due respect to tioned in the debate, we were prepared The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who those who formulated the idea that we to move. That is leadership, Mr. Presi- yields time? should not ratify the Chemical Weap- dent. We saw the threat and we pre- Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair. ons Convention unless the so-called pared to move upon it. We have done The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- rogue states—named as North Korea, so. ator from Delaware. Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq—join, Now, we will do so with regard to the Mr. BIDEN. I yield 10 minutes to my must have really stayed up nights try- international scene. But the treaty colleague from Indiana. ing to think of some way to throw us gives us the basis of international law. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- off course. I presume they felt that our To suggest for a moment, Mr. Presi- ator from Indiana is recognized for 10 antipathy to some of these states dent, we ought to be deterred from our minutes. would be such that we would say if leadership by whether Iraq joins, Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. they are not going to be a part of it, we whether Iran is involved, whether I thank the distinguished Senator ought not to be a part of it, we ought North Korea should ever be involved, is from Delaware. to simply go after them in a unilateral to stretch credibility really to the Mr. President, the objective of the way. Let me examine that for a mo- breaking point. These nations are irrel- Chemical Weapons Convention, the de- ment, Mr. President. evant to our membership and our lead- bate that we are involved in now, is The Senator from Delaware and the ership. They are irrelevant to our leadership, a question of leadership by Senator from Massachusetts have standing for international law and our our country. talked about law, about legitimacy. As ability to act, and to act decisively. We can take a look at all the excep- a matter of fact, our Nation does have That must be our standard, Mr. Presi- tions and the negative views, but the the mobility to be an enforcer. In the dent. With imagination, one will think very positive force I think we want to event we feel our security is threat- of all sorts of hobgoblins that can be stress in framing this issue is, the ened, our President might, in fact, con- thrown up to make an interesting de- United States of America, our states- sider a military action against a nation bate, but debate is leadership, and de- men, President Ronald Reagan, George that offered a security threat to us. bate is decisive political will, and the Bush, now President Bill Clinton, and But let us examine the implications if debate is our ability to convince other many who have worked with them in our President decides to do this. If he nations of the world they should come the Armed Forces and in statecraft, is going to act unilaterally without with us, that we are reliable, that we recognize that our country has a very benefit of international law—and inter- stay the course, that our word is good, substantial problem in the world; national law does count because other administration after administration. namely, that of chemical weapons. nations understand the implications of Mr. President, this is the reason we We came to a determination on our that cooperation and the binding that should vote to strike this amendment, part that these weapons were unreli- brings—if we are going to contemplate this condition, from the convention im- able, unstable, dangerous, and so dan- solo strikes without benefit of inter- mediately, decisively. It has been a gerous, as a matter of fact, that we did national law, then we will have to point, clearly, a parliamentary proce- not wish to employ them—we wished to think about overflight rights, about dure, and that our failure to do so, as destroy them. We have been doing that the problems of our pilots if our air- a matter of fact, jeopardizes the entire as a nation. craft are down, about a number of im- treaty. It is improbable, if not impos- Our dilemma is that other nations, plications in which we count upon co- sible, our Nation would ever join, primarily Russia, with substantial operation of nation-states. Inter- would ever follow through on our lead- stores much greater than our own, but national law does count. It makes a ership, if we were to wait upon states S3594 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 that are irrelevant to the whole propo- dered the cult from procuring the needed General Hughes said: sition. chemical compounds used in the production I conclude, Mr. President, by saying of sarin. Further, the Aum Shinrikyo would In any attack in the south, Pyongyang have escaped CWC requirement for an end could use chemical weapons to attack forces obviously, threats in those states are deployed near the DMZ, suppress allied air not relevant. We must be decisive. We use certification because it purchased the chemicals within Japan. power, and isolate the peninsula from strate- need going for us international law, en- There are some additional things we gic reinforcement. hancement of our intelligence that the can quote. The point I am making is intrusive inspections and all of the Four days ago in a Seoul, North that reasonable people can differ about trade accounts will give to us, so that Korea, newspaper there was an article the pros and cons of this treaty. That when we strike, we will strike accu- quoting very high North Korean offi- will be reflected in the vote on the rately and completely and bring the se- cials as saying they now have adequate treaty here. I hope that Americans do curity to the world that this treaty at- chemical weapons to annihilate South not get the idea that we will be safe tempts to promote. Korea. This is going on as we speak. So from terrorist attack or even signifi- Mr. HELMS. I yield such time as the we are talking about nations that are cantly safer by the adoption of this Senator from Arizona may consume. not going to be our friends. These are Chemical Weapons Convention. Terror- Mr. KYL. I will be very brief to a the ones that, whether they are sig- ist attacks are not what it was de- matter of news interest here in the natories, or whether they ratify or not, signed to deal with. I hope that point is Washington, DC, area. People might be it doesn’t make too much difference. It watching this on a different channel of crystal clear. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- tickles me when they talk about, ‘‘Rus- their television, viewing the ambu- sia is going to do that.’’ Last night, I lances and people attempting to assist, ator from North Carolina. Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator for was on a talk show and we finally and at least two people who appear to that explanation. I think it was very agreed that on the 1990 Bilateral De- have been exposed to some kind of timely. struction Agreement, they have been chemical agent. My understanding is I yield 12 minutes to the distin- found in noncompliance of that, and of that Senator LUGAR has just discussed guished Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. the START I, of the Conventional this matter briefly, as well. This oc- INHOFE], following which I suggest we Forces in Europe. Even though my op- curred at or near a B’nai B’rith facility vote. ponent denied it was the INF, in fact, here in Washington, DC. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- they were. In the 1995 Arms Control I think that while neither side in this ator from Oklahoma is recognized. debate would want to use an unfortu- Disarmament Agency report, it says The Senator from North Carolina has they were not in compliance with that; nate incident to bolster their case, and 41⁄2 minutes remaining on the amend- while our first concern ought to be for the ABM Treaty, they have not been in ment. compliance with that. the people who may have been exposed Does the Senator wish to yield from to some agent here—and we all cer- your resolution time? But let’s assume if a country like tainly hope there is no harm done and Mr. HELMS. In that case, I mis- Russia doesn’t comply when they rat- that if, in fact, it was not accidental understood the statement of the Par- ify, what about these rogue nations? I that the perpetrators are dealt with in liamentarian. can tell you for sure that those pro- the appropriate fashion—I think it is The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ponents of the ratification have gone also an inappropriate place to make ator from North Carolina, do you yield to every extent possible to make it the point that contrary to those who the remaining time of the amendment look like—or to make us believe that assert that the Chemical Weapons Con- or from the resolution time? the Reagan administration, if they vention deals with this problem, it does The Senator from Oklahoma is recog- were here today, would be in support of not. We should be very, very clear nized for 12 minutes. Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Presi- this Chemical Weapons Convention. I about that. can assure you that they would not. There are reasons for proponents to dent. I will probably not take the 12 Coincidentally, I happened to be on a suggest that this Chemical Weapons minutes. Convention should be supported. There The Senator from Arizona is exactly talk show—‘‘Crossfire’’—with a very are arguments of opponents as to why right. I think even the strongest oppo- fine gentlemen, Ken Adelman. He had that should not be the case. But I hope nents of the ratification of the Chemi- been in the Reagan administration. We that we do not have people arguing on cal Weapons Convention have said this found out, after he gave his testimonial the floor of the Senate here that the is not going to affect terrorist activi- as to why we should ratify—and he ad- Chemical Weapons Convention will ties. Obviously, by the very title ‘‘ter- mitted it was not verifiable nor is it deter terrorists, that somehow this will rorists’’ they are not going to be com- global, but he still thought we should make us safer from terrorist attack, plying with this. do it—that Mr. Adelman might be prej- because it cannot fulfill that noble I have to say I feel the same way udiced by his membership on two goal. We will literally be buying on to about these countries that we are dis- boards of directors, the International something that cannot come to pass if cussing right now. The condition which Planning and Analysis Center and on the treaty proponents try to sell it on is under debate at this time is whether Newmeyer and Associates. These com- that basis. or not to strike that portion with re- panies, which he directs, have clients As a matter of fact, there is specific gard to Iran, Syria, Libya, North in many foreign countries, including declassified intelligence information Korea, and China. It would be, if we China and Japan, and they represent were only concerned about those coun- directly on this point. I will quote that companies that deal in chemicals such tries that have signed or have ratified before the chairman resumes his time. as those from the UpJohn Co. People A declassified section of the Defense or have an expressed intention to rat- ify, that would be very nice, because say this is just chemicals. It is not just Intelligence Agency document of Feb- chemical companies we are talking ruary 1996, with specific reference to we would be talking about Canada, the Fiji Islands, Costa Rica, and Singapore, about. In this chemical association the Tokyo subway attack by terrorists that gets so much attention, it rep- at that time said: Iceland. That is not where the threat is. The threat is the rogue nations. resents 192 chemical companies. These Irrespective of whether the Chemical are the large ones, the giants. There Weapons Convention enters into force, ter- That is what we are talking about rorists will likely look upon CW as a means right now. are some 4,000 other companies, and to gain greater publicity and instill wide- I will for a moment bring this up to you can expand it beyond purely chem- spread fear. The March 1995 Tokyo subway date by quoting a couple of things. ical companies to some 8,000 other attack by Aum Shinrikyo would not have General Schwarzkopf, during a press companies, most of whom are opposed been prevented by the Chemical Weapons conference in Riyadh said: to this, because they would be shut out Convention. The nightmare scenario for all of us would in the competition. In May of 1996, another CIA report, a have been to go through this [the Iraqi tank I think the whole thing on this par- portion of which has been declassified, barrier], get hung up in this breach right contains this statement: here, and then have the enemy artillery rain ticular amendment is whether or not In the case of Aum Shinrikyo the Chemical chemical weapons down on the troops that this would have any positive effect on Weapons Convention would not have hin- were in the gaggle in the breach right here. the rogue nations if we should ratify April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3595 the Chemical Weapons Convention. I they would have to ratify before we Delaware would have 2 minutes 37 sec- don’t think there is anybody here who will. Well, we had that requirement 2 onds. is so naive to think that, voluntarily, years ago when I voted against the Who yields time? if they are a part of it, they would re- START II treaty. They said we have to Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much duce their chemical behavior. I think do it before Russia because they won’t time remains for me? those of us in this room can argue and ratify unless we do. Guess what, Mr. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- debate that. President, they still haven’t ratified. ator controls 2 minutes 37 seconds. So I go back to the people who are Lastly, to kind of express the ur- Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself the re- the real authorities. You have heard gency of this, former Secretary of De- maining time. I will speak to a couple Dick Cheney quoted several times on fense, James Schlesinger, said, ‘‘To the of points. With regard to Ken Adelman, the floor, in his letter that we have extent that others learn from inter- I am sure our colleague from Okla- quoted several times. He said, ‘‘Indeed national sharing of information on homa didn’t mean to impugn his moti- some aspects of the present conven- chemical warfare defenses, our vulner- vation by suggesting for whom he tion—notably, its obligation to share ability is enhanced rather than dimin- worked. I would not suggest that of Mr. with potential adversaries, like Iran, ished. Finally, this treaty in no way Rumsfeld because of where he works chemical manufacturing technology helps shield our soldiers from one of now, that it caused him to have that that can be used for military purposes battlefield’s deadliest killers. As indi- view. Ken Adelman—although I dis- in chemical defense equipment— cated earlier, only the threat of effec- agree with him most of the time, he threaten to make this accord worse tive retaliation provides such protec- was an able member of the administra- than having no treaty at all.’’ That is tion.’’ tion. He was viewed as a hawk at the Dick Cheney, not some guy that read a What he is saying there is not that time he was here. For the record, I am couple of articles and determined it we would use chemical weapons, but by sure there was no intention to do that? was wrong. What is he talking about? the fact that we are not a party to this Mr. INHOFE. If the Senator will He is talking about something that treaty is one that would at least offer yield, I made it very clear before my will be debated here shortly, and we some type of a deterrent. So I think, remarks that I hold him in the highest will get into that in more detail. Part Mr. President, when you look and read of esteem. However, the fact remains of article X says, ‘‘The technical sec- of the hostility that is over there— that he does work for those companies retariat shall establish not later than James Woolsey said, in 1993: that have an interest, and that could 180 days after entry into force of this More than two dozen countries have pro- be a conflict of interest. I think that contract, and maintain for the use of grams to research or develop chemical weap- could be drawn by anyone. any requesting state party, a data ons, and a number have stockpiled such Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator for bank containing freely available infor- weapons, including Libya, Iran, and Iraq— making clear what he meant. I didn’t mation concerning various means of Three of the countries we are talking think that’s what he meant. I was hop- protection against chemical weapons, about: ing that is not what he meant, but it is as well as such information as may be The military competition in the always what he meant. That could be said provided by states’ parties.’’ volatile Middle East has spurred others in about almost everybody who testified Well, I can remember in the Armed the region to develop chemical weapons. We before our committee, for and against Services Committee when Schwarzkopf have also noted a disturbing pattern of bio- this treaty, and I really, quite frankly, was here. I said: logical weapons development following close- think that the leaders for and against ly on the heels of the development of chemi- this treaty in the last two administra- General, you are in support of the Chemi- cal weapons. cal Weapons Convention. tions are men and women of integrity Mr. President, the threat is there, who would have no conflict. They are I read that, and then I will read a and we know that other countries can consistent with what they did within transcript, because I think everybody sell their technology, as well as their those administrations. who might be basing their vote on systems, to rogue nations. We know Let me point out a few things. It what General Schwarzkopf said, here is Russia has done this, to specifically seems interesting to me that here we a transcript from that meeting: Iran and other nations, not when they are, the very people—our very col- Senator INHOFE. Do you think it wise to sold their technology, but also their leagues who want to have a provision share with countries like Iran our most ad- equipment. So it is a very scary thing saying that we want all these rogue na- vanced chemical defensive equipment and technology? to think that we might be putting our- tions in the treaty before we get into General SCHWARZKOPF. Our defensive capa- selves in a position that would increase the treaty, argue in the alternative, bilities? our exposure to the threat of chemical that these nations in the treaty mean Senator INHOFE. Yes. warfare and would increase the pro- the treaty is worthless. Translated, General SCHWARZKOPF. Absolutely not. liferation of chemical weapons in the very simply, they are not for this trea- Senator INHOFE. Well, I’m talking about Middle East. ty under any circumstance, whether or sharing our advanced chemical defensive I yield the floor. not these nations are in the treaty or equipment and technologies, which I believe The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who out of the treaty. I also point out under article X (they) would be allowed to yields time? (get). Do you disagree? that—in the interest of time, I will not General SCHWARZKOPF. As I said, Senator, Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I believe be able to point it out in detail—every I’m not familiar with all the details—you time has expired. Parliamentary in- argument against this treaty made know—you know, a country, particularly quiry. thus far on the floor today, I respect- like Iran, I think we should share as little as The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- fully suggest, is made worse by not possible with them in the way of our mili- ator will state it. being in the treaty, by not having the tary capabilities. Mr. HELMS. If the Chair will refresh treaty. I find it, quite frankly, inter- I am not critical of General my memory, a motion to table is not in esting. Schwarzkopf. It is a very complicated order, is that correct? My time is up. I hope my colleague thing. I don’t know how many people The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time will not move to table. We agree not to read the whole thing. I haven’t, but I would have to be yielded back on the attempt to amend any of these condi- read enough to know, as far as our amendment in order for a motion to tions. I hope we will have a vote up or treatment with rogue nations, I would table to be in order. The unanimous- down. Apparently, it is not in the not want to be ratifying this contract consent agreement does not appear to agreement. If he chooses to do it, I unless they ratified it. Then I would preclude a motion to table. guess he has the right. not trust them any more than we Mr. HELMS. How much time re- Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I shall would trust Russia, and if they do rat- mains, Mr. President? not move to table. I will yield back ify, I question if they will honor it. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Cur- such time as I may have. One of the other conditions we are rently, the Senator from North Caro- The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time going to talk about is, should we do it, lina would have 4 minutes 27 seconds having been yielded back, the question should we put in a requirement that on the amendment. The Senator from is on agreeing to amendment No. 47. S3596 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 The yeas and nays have been ordered. some of the so-called rogue countries, dent Clinton sent the convention to the The clerk will call the roll. but I think it is important we go ahead Senate. In his transmittal letter, dated The assistant legislative clerk called and state our positions at this point. November 23, 1993, President Clinton the roll. Everybody has made their case. It is wrote: The result was announced—yeas 71, time to make decisions and to move I urge the Senate to give early and favor- nays 29, as follows: on. I want to start by thanking Sen- able consideration to the convention and to [Rollcall Vote No. 46 Ex.] ator HELMS for his cooperation. With- give advice and consent to its ratification as soon as possible in 1994. YEAS—71 out his cooperation, we would not be Let me remind my colleagues that Abraham Feingold Lugar here today. His cooperation guaranteed Akaka Feinstein McCain that we were able to develop a process for the next 11 months, until the 103d Baucus Ford Mikulski that was fair, that allowed us to get S. Congress adjourned on December 1, Biden Frist Moseley-Braun 495 up and voted on last week, that all 1994, the Senate majority leader was Bingaman Glenn Moynihan George Mitchell and the chairman of Bond Gorton Murray of the remaining issues in disagree- Boxer Graham Nickles ment would have an opportunity to be the Foreign Relations Committee was Breaux Gregg Reed debated, considered and voted upon. Claiborne Pell. Bryan Hagel Reid He really has done an excellent job. Despite Democratic control of the Bumpers Harkin Robb White House and the Senate, the Sen- Byrd Hatch Roberts There is no question that he continues Chafee Hollings Rockefeller to have great reservations about this ate did not consider the Chemical Cleland Inouye Roth legislation. But his efforts and the ef- Weapons Convention in 1994. Coats Jeffords Santorum In late 1995, Senate Democrats began forts of Senator KYL from Arizona have Cochran Johnson Sarbanes a filibuster on the State Department Collins Kennedy Smith Gordon H been nothing short of heroic. They authorization bill to force action on Conrad Kerrey Snowe have been tenacious. They have done D’Amato Kerry Specter the CWC. On December 7, 1995, an their homework. They have made ex- Daschle Kohl Stevens agreement was reached providing for cellent statements both here and in our DeWine Landrieu Torricelli the convention to be reported out of Dodd Lautenberg Warner closed session earlier today. I think the Foreign Relations Committee by Domenici Leahy Wellstone they should be commended for what Dorgan Levin Wyden April 30, 1996. The committee honored they have done. In fact, their work and Durbin Lieberman that agreement, and the convention their success has contributed greatly NAYS—29 was placed on the Executive Calendar. to the likelihood that this treaty actu- That is where matters stood when I Allard Gramm Mack ally will pass. That had not necessarily Ashcroft Grams McConnell became majority leader on June 12, Bennett Grassley Murkowski been their intent, but they wanted to 1996. Only 6 days later, before I had a Brownback Helms Sessions make sure, if it did pass, they wanted chance to get my sea legs at all, there Burns Hutchinson Shelby it to pass in the best possible form. began a filibuster once again by the Campbell Hutchison Smith Bob I also thank the Democratic leader Coverdell Inhofe Thomas Senate Democrats to force Senate ac- Craig Kempthorne Thompson for his courtesies as we worked tion on the convention. Enzi Kyl Thurmond through a very complicated unani- To allow critical national defense Faircloth Lott mous-consent agreement. We were legislation to proceed, we worked with The amendment (No. 47) was agreed watched over very carefully by the Senators on both sides of the aisle, and to. Senator from West Virginia. I thank again we reached an agreement guaran- Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to the Senator from Delaware, [Mr. teeing a vote by September 13, 1996. reconsider the vote. BIDEN] for his cooperation and his pa- In the weeks preceding the vote, op- Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that mo- tience, and I think the fact that we ponents and proponents of the conven- tion on the table. have all sort of kept cool heads and tion made their case to Senators. On The motion to lay on the table was been careful how we proceeded has September 6, 1996, I requested the de- agreed to. served us well. classification of certain key judgments Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair. Mr. President, our Constitution is of the intelligence community relating The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. unique in the power it grants the Sen- to key aspects of the convention. On BROWNBACK). The Senator from Dela- ate in treaty making. Article II, sec- September 10, the administration par- ware. tion 2 states the President ‘‘shall have tially complied with that request, and Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry. the power, by and with the advice and certain intelligence judgments were The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we consent of the Senate, provided two- made public. I ask unanimous consent please have order. thirds of the Senators present concur.’’ that the exchange of letters on the in- Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I with- The Senate’s coequal treaty making telligence judgments be printed in the draw my inquiry I did not make. power is one of our most important RECORD. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- constitutional duties. All 100 Senators Mr. President, I understand the Gov- ator from Delaware withdraws his in- have approached this duty very seri- ernment Printing Office estimates it quiry. Who seeks time? ously in examining the Chemical Weap- will cost $1,288 to print these letters in Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair. ons Convention, as we should. We have the RECORD. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- participated in and we have listened to There being no objection, the mate- ator from Mississippi, the majority hearings laying out the arguments for rial was ordered to be printed in the leader. and against the convention. We have RECORD, as follows: Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, can I get looked closely at many provisions of U.S. SENATE, time off the manager’s time from the the convention and have sought the ad- OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER, bill? vice and counsel of experts and former Washington, DC, September 6, 1996. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without policymakers. We read many articles President WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, objection, it is so ordered. and we have heard the arguments mak- The White House, Mr. LOTT. I do still have my leader Washington, DC. ing the case for and against it. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am writing to ask time. If I need that, we can use that Before addressing my views on the your cooperation and support for Senate ef- also. convention itself, I should like to share forts to obtain information and documents Mr. President, I had planned on and with my colleagues a brief history of directly relevant to our consideration of the had hoped to be able to speak after all the Senate’s action on this convention, Chemical Weapons Convention. of the votes on the motions to strike how we got to where we are today. As you know, the Senate is currently because I did not in any way want to The Chemical Weapons Convention scheduled to consider the Convention on or distract from those motions to strike. I was signed by the United States as an before September 14, 1996 under a unanimous consent agreement reached on June 28, 1996. have hopes that at least some of them original signatory on January 13, 1993, Immediately prior to the Senate agreement might actually be defeated, particu- in the last days of President Bush’s ad- on the Convention, I stated, ‘‘With respect to larly the one with regard to inspectors ministration. For reasons that remain the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ma- coming into the United States from unclear, it was 10 months before Presi- jority Leader and the Democratic Leader April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3597 will make every effort to obtain from the ad- vention to acts of terrorism committed with ate letters and reports, over 400 pages of an- ministration such facts and documents as re- chemical weapons. swers to Senate questions for the treaty quested by the Chairman and ranking mem- I make these requests to enable the Senate record and over 300 pages of other docu- ber of the Foreign Relations Committee, in to fully prepare for its consideration of the mentation. order to pursue its work and hearings needed Chemical Weapons Convention. I am certain to develop a complete record for the Senate you would agree it is necessary for the Sen- With regard to Senator Helms’ most recent . . .’’ ate to have complete and usable information letters, the President and I both personally I regret to inform you that your adminis- in order fulfill our constitutional obligations responded to Senator Helms, first on July 31 tration has not been fully cooperative in and to responsibly meet the terms of the cur- and then again on August 13; these responses Senate efforts to obtain critical information. rent unanimous consent agreement. Because included detailed attachments that answered Chairman Helms wrote to you on June 21, the unanimous consent agreement calls for a series of specific questions asked by Sen- 1996—prior to the Senate setting a date for a the Senate to vote on the Chemical Weapons ator Helms. vote on the Convention—and asked eight Convention by September 14, 1996, I respect- The Administration has repeatedly offered specific questions. Chairman Helms also re- fully request that you respond to my declas- to make relevant classified information quested the provision and declassification of sification requests no later than the close of available to the Senate through classified documents and a cable relating to critical is- business on Tuesday, September 10, 1996. briefings and reports. I explained to Senator sues of Russian compliance with existing With best wishes, I am Helms in my response to his most recent let- chemical weapons arms control agreements Sincerely, ters that, while I regretted we could not de- and with the Chemical Weapons Convention. TRENT LOTT. On July 26, 1996, having received no re- classify the documents he requested, we re- sponse to his earlier letter, Chairman Helms THE WHITE HOUSE, mained eager to brief the Senator and any of reiterated his earlier request and asked addi- Washington, September 10, 1996. his colleagues, as well as cleared staff, at the tional questions concerning the apparent Hon. TRENT LOTT, earliest possible time, both on those docu- Russian decision to unilaterally end imple- Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, ments as well as on other concerns. Such a mentation of the 1990 U.S.-Russian Bilateral Washington, DC. briefing was provided to Senator Kyl but, to Destruction Agreement on chemical weap- DEAR MR. LEADER: The President has date, Senator Helms has not responded to ons. Chairman Helms also asked for specific asked that I respond to your letter regarding these offers. information and documents concerning Rus- Senate consideration of the Chemical Weap- We have carefully reviewed your request sian conditions for ratification of the Chemi- ons Convention (CWC). for declassification of the May 21, 1996 cable cal Weapons Convention, as well as other in- On behalf of the President, I would like to written by ACDA Director Holum, the July formation important to our consideration of thank you for your cooperation and leader- the Convention. While Chairman Helms did ship in scheduling a Senate vote on this vital 8, 1996 letter from Russian Prime Minister receive responses to his letters on July 31 treaty which, as you know, has been before Chernomyrdin and selected paragraphs from and on August 13, his request for declas- the Senate since November 1993. The CWC, various intelligence community documents. sification of documents was refused and the which was negotiated under President I regret that we cannot declassify the May answers to many of his questions were in- Reagan and concluded and signed under 21, 1996 Holum Cable or the letter from Rus- complete. President Bush, is an important element of sian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice During a Senate Select Committee on In- our bipartisan efforts over the years to ad- President Gore because these documents telligence hearing on June 17, 1996, Senator dress two of the most important threats fac- have been properly classified pursuant to Kyl asked for a specific document—a cable ing us in the post Cold War era: the pro- E.O. 12958; they contain sensitive diplomatic written in Bonn, Germany by Arms Control liferation of weapons of mass destruction information regarding high-level, ongoing and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director and terrorism. negotiations, the disclosure of which may af- Holum concerning current Russian govern- I was concerned by your letter and regret fect our ability to negotiate in confidence. In ment positions on the Bilateral Destruction that you believe that the Administration has addition, the correspondence you requested Agreement, ratification of the Chemical not been fully cooperative with Senate ef- is between the highest levels of the United Weapons Convention and on U.S. assistance forts to obtain critical information. I want States and Russian governments, and was for the destruction of Russian chemical to assure you that the Administration re- exchanged with the expectation that it weapons. On numerous occasions, Senator mains eager and committed to continuing to would be kept in the strictest confidence. As Kyl was told the document did not exist. Fi- assist the Senate in developing a complete you know, an essential element of the Execu- nally, on July 26, Senator Kyl was able to see record for its consideration prior to floor ac- tive Branch’s conduct of foreign relations is a redacted version of the document under tion on the CWC, as stated in the June 28, the protection of the confidentiality of high 1996, unanimous consent agreement. tightly controlled circumstances but the level, sensitive diplomatic discussions and document has not been made available to During the almost three years the Conven- correspondence. Chairman Helms or other Senators. tion has been before the Senate, the Admin- Mr. President, the unanimous consent istration has worked very hard to ensure After a careful review of the paragraphs of agreement of June 28, 1996, was entered into that the Senate has been fully informed on the intelligence documents that you re- in good faith, and based on our understand- the Convention and that all its questions quested be declassified, we have determined ing that the administration could and would have been answered. Our efforts to inform they were properly classified. However, we be fully forthcoming in the provision of in- the Senate have included testimony at 13 have been able to declassify a portion of the formation and documents to enable the Sen- hearings, including testimony by many Cabi- material without risk to sources and meth- ate to fulfill its constitutional responsibil- net officials. We have conducted dozens of ods and it is attached. The sentences and ities. Numerous judgements of the United briefings for members and staff by represent- paragraphs that are still classified remain so States intelligence community deserve as atives of key agencies, including yesterday’s because they contain information which wide a circulation as possible—particularly productive session with the Arms Control could place sources and methods at risk. In since they are distinctly different than some Observer Group. The President has appointed several cases, declassification of requested public statements made by officials of your two Special Advisors on the CWC, to address materials also would reveal information Administration concerning the Convention. Senate questions and concerns as part of the about U.S. force vulnerabilities. The para- Accordingly, I respectfully request that ratification process. Former Representative graphs from which most of the judgments you reconsider your refusal to declassify Martin Lancaster served in this capacity in were extracted remain classified because it critical documents and consider the declas- 1995 and Dr. Lori Esposito Murray currently is difficult to identify clearly the source sification of important intelligence commu- holds this position. On behalf of the Presi- paragraphs. Therefore, granting paragraph nity judgements—consistent with the need dent, they have personally briefed every Sen- release authority could inadvertently permit to protect intelligence sources and methods. ate office, offered individual briefings to release of intelligence which would be dam- Specifically, I request that you act imme- every member of the Senate and personally aging to declassify. diately to declassify the May 21, 1996, cable briefed over 40 Senators. written by ACDA Director Holum and the In addition, we have answered over 300 I would like to reaffirm personally the Ad- July 8, 1996, letter from Russian Prime Min- questions for the record. Senator Helms has ministration’s commitment to brief you or ister Chernomyrdin to Vice-President Gore, asked many of these questions and we have any other Senator and cleared staff on the and consider immediately declassification of always responded to his concerns. For exam- documents discussed above under appro- the paragraphs from which the attached ple, we have not only provided Senator priate classification at any time before the statements are excerpted—all drawn from Helms our database of companies likely to Senate debate on the CWC. As you know, a documents produced by the Central Intel- be affected by the CWC, but we have also high-level Administration team briefed Sen- ligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence provided him a list of chemical companies ators and staff on the CWC, including many Agency on the Russian chemical weapons we have determined unlikely to be affected of the issues raised in your letter, on Mon- program, the verifiability of the Chemical by the CWC. Overall, the Administration has day, September 9, 1996. We remain commit- Weapons Convention, the effect of the Con- provided the Senate with over 1500 pages of ted to continuing to assist the Senate as it vention on the chemical weapons arsenals of information on the CWC—over 300 pages of prepares to vote on advice and consent to rogue states, and the relevance of the Con- testimony, over 500 pages of answers to Sen- ratification on this vital Convention. S3598 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 As part of this continuing effort, I have at- environment in which chemical weapons The CWC’s declaration provisions will im- tached a detailed response which includes may be used or threatened to be used. prove the U.S. ability to obtain information the declassified material. Though U.S. chemical equipment is second about other countries’ CW efforts. These pro- Sincerely, to none, we understand the need to contin- visions will facilitate detection and monitor- ANTHONY LAKE, ually improve our capabilities. Through the ing of prohibited activities by providing the Assistant to the President for National Defense Acquisition Board process, the mili- U.S. access to certain information about dec- Security Affairs. tary is taking steps to ensure these improve- larations of CW production facilities and RESPONSES TO ISSUES RAISED BY MAJORITY ments continue. The Administration’s budg- storage sites as well as relevant chemical in- LEADER LOTT et request for FY 97 for our chemical defense dustry facilities and activities. The CWC’s inspection provisions permit The issues addressed in the attachment to programs is $505 million. access to both declared and undeclared fa- your letter concern chemical weapons pro- In this context, the following paragraph cilities and locations, thus making clandes- liferation challenges we must address, with from NIE 95–9/I of May 1995 is hereby declas- sified: ‘‘Production of new binary agents tine CW production and stockpiling more dif- or without the CWC. The CWC provides con- ficult, risky and expensive. Routine inspec- crete measures that will raise the costs and would be difficult to detect and confirm as a CWC-prohibited activity.’’ tions will enhance deterrence and detection risks of engaging in CW-related activities. of clandestine product by monitoring activi- 2. RUSSIAN INTENTIONS REGARDING CHEMICAL The CWC also will improve our knowledge ties and relevant chemical industry facili- WEAPONS about CW activities worldwide. This is why ties. These inspections will increase the cost the CWC has been strongly supported by It is important to keep in mind, when dis- and the risk of carrying out illicit chemical both President Bush and President Clinton. cussing Russian intentions regarding chemi- weapons activities. Since the CWC was submitted to the Sen- cal weapons, that there is not yet in force a Challenge inspections will further enhance ate in 1993, the Intelligence Community has treaty obligation prohibiting the possession deterrence and detection of prohibited ac- kept the Senate fully informed of its judg- of chemical weapons against which we can tivities by providing States Parties with the ments regarding the Convention. During the measure compliance. The CWC will establish right to request an international inspection past three years, the Intelligence Commu- such a prohibition and, most importantly, at any facility or location in another State nity has produced two NIEs and numerous the new tools to pursue any concerns we may Party in order to clarify and resolve a poten- other reports, testified in numerous public have about suspected CW activities, whether tial compliance concern. As the scope and and executive session hearings, answered in Russia or any other State Party. As the size of a program increases, it is more likely dozens of intelligence questions for the Intelligence Community has testified, the that illicit activities will be detected. Chal- record and provided a number of briefings on CWC will provide us with access to informa- lenge inspections are but one part of the precisely the issues you raise in the attach- tion not otherwise available which will help CWC’s comprehensive verification regime ment to your letter, as well as many others. us in our efforts to detect, deter and, if nec- which, in its totality, complements our on- Intelligence Community judgments on the essary, punish violations of the CWC. going intelligence monitoring effort in this CWC are not at odds with Administration Regarding the views of the Russian leader- area. As former DCI Woolsey testified before policy. In fact, Intelligence Community ship, President Yeltsin and other senior gov- the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on judgments play an integral role in the for- ernment officials have repeatedly expressed June 23, 1994: mation of policy regarding the Chemical support for the CWC. We will expect Russia ‘‘The CWC will, however, strengthen our Weapons Convention. The following re- and all other Parties to adhere to all the ability to deal with the problem that we sponses regarding the issues raised in the at- Convention’s provisions including those con- confront with or without the Convention: tachment to your letter may help clarify cerning CW development and production. the requirement to discover what states are this. The Russian Government has recently re- developing and producing chemical weapons 1. NOVEL AGENTS affirmed its commitment to become an origi- when these activities are difficult to distin- New chemicals of concern and novel agents nal Party to the CWC and announced it is guish from legitimate commercial endeav- are covered under the CWC; it is incorrect to seeking speedy submission of the Convention ors. The isolation and adverse attention that assert that because an agent is not on the to the Parliament for ratification. nonsignatories will draw upon themselves Schedules it is not subject to the CWC. The In this context, the following paragraph may spur greater multinational cooperation CWC captures new chemicals of concern and from NIE 95–9/I of May 1995 is hereby declas- in attempting to halt offensive CW pro- novel agents under the definition of a sified: grams. ‘‘chemical weapon’’ and prohibits the devel- ‘‘President Yeltsin has publicly endorsed ‘‘In sum, what the Chemical Weapons Con- opment, production, acquisition, stockpiling, CW disarmament and supported ratification vention provides the Intelligence Commu- retention, use and direct or indirect transfer and implementation of CW arms control nity is a new tool to add to our collection to anyone of chemical weapons. Concerns agreements to which Russia is a signatory. tool kit. It is an instrument with broad ap- that new chemicals of concern and novel The extent to which Yeltsin has attempted plicability, which can help resolve a wide va- agents were being used to violate the CWC to enforce his will on the bureaucracy is not riety of problems. Moreover, it is an univer- would provide a basis for bilateral consulta- clear. He may not be aware of the scope of sal tool which can be used by diplomats and tion and challenge inspection under Article ongoing CW activities, or if he is aware, he politicians, as well as intelligence special- X of the Convention. It would not be nec- may be unable to control them. We cannot ists, to further a common goal: elimination essary to show that such chemicals are listed exclude the possibility that Yeltsin approves of the threat of chemical weapons.’’ in the Schedules of the Convention to exer- of an offensive CW capability and will sup- In this context, the following paragraphs cise this option. port a covert program once the CWC enters from NIE 93–32J/I of August 1993 are hereby Furthermore, the CWC explicitly provides into force. He may accept the military’s ar- declassified: for expanding the lists of chemicals subject gument about the need to retain a CW capa- ‘‘The capability of the Intelligence Com- to declaration and verification as new CW bility. Moreover, being subjected to far more munity to monitor compliance with the agents are identified and to improve verifica- bureaucratic pressure to sustain the program Chemical Weapons Convention is severely tion procedures and equipment as new tech- than to do away with it, he may find it easi- limited and likely to remain so for the rest nology emerges and experience is gained. er to give way to military arguments.’’ of the decade.’’ As regards our chemical defense capabili- It should be noted, however, that detailed ‘‘The key provisions of the monitoring re- ties, the Department of Defense information on the views of key individuals gime—challenge inspections at undeclared Counterproliferation Program is, with Con- is limited and insufficient to document with sites—can be thwarted by a nation deter- gress’ support, already aggressively pursuing confidence their current personal and profes- mined to preserve a small, secret program an effective response to ensure that our sional positions for maintaining CW pro- using the delays and managed access rules troops are the best protected and best grams. allowed by the convention.’’ equipped fighting force for operations in a 3. VERIFICATION 4. TERRORISM nuclear, biological, or chemical environ- No treaty is 100 percent verifiable. While The CWC will increase the difficulty for ment. The National Defense Authorization the Intelligence Community has indicated terrorists and proliferators of acquiring Act for FY 94 led to the formation of the that CW development and production is and chemical weapons and significantly improve Joint Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) will remain difficult to distinguish from le- our law enforcement ability to investigate Defense Board, the Joint Services Integra- gitimate commercial activities, they have si- and prosecute chemical terrorists even be- tion Group and the Joint Services Material multaneously noted the importance of ac- fore chemical weapons are used. Japan serves Group. These boards, which have representa- quiring the CWC as a new collection tool to as an example of the importance of this trea- tives from the Services, Joint Staff and OSD, aid their efforts to monitor CW proliferation, ty and its implementing legislation in com- are working to identify the needs of the mili- which we must do, with or without the CWC. bating the terrorist threat. Within 10 days of tary for chemical/biological defense and are The CWC’s verification provisions con- the poison gas attacks in the Tokyo sub- providing input to the Defense Acquisition stitute the most comprehensive and intru- ways, the Japanese enacted the CWC imple- Board process through the Secretary of De- sive verification regime every negotiated, menting legislation. The Japanese completed fense. covering virtually every aspect of a CW pro- ratification of the CWC a month later. The U.S. military is well aware that it gram, from development through production No treaty is foolproof. However, the CWC may be called upon to operate in a hostile and stockpiling. and its implementing legislation will provide April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3599 significant benefits in dealing with the likely to report any suspected chemical 5. ROGUE STATES threat of chemical terrorism. Implementing weapons-related activities. The Administration recognizes the possi- legislation will strengthen our legal author- The nonproliferation provisions of the CWC bility that not all States Parties may com- ity to investigate and prosecute persons who will deny terrorists easy access to chemical ply with their CWC obligations immediately commit acts prohibited by the treaty. It will weapons by requiring Parties to eliminate upon the Convention’s entry into force. How- also make the public more aware of the national stockpiles and by controlling inter- ever, information acquired through the threat of chemical weapons and of the fact national transfers of certain chemicals than CWC’s declaration and inspection provisions that the acquisition of such weapons is ille- can be used to make chemical weapons. In will supplement our national intelligence re- gal . particular, the CWC requires Parties to cease sources and place us in a better position The following are among it significant ben- transfers of certain CW agents and CW pre- than we are now to deter and detect clandes- efits: cursor chemicals to non-Parties and restrict tine chemical weapons programs. Moreover, Investigation. The proposed U.S. imple- such transfers to Parties. In addition, report- unlike any previous arms control agreement, menting legislation contains the clearest, ing is required on anticipated production the CWC provides a range of punitive meas- most comprehensive and internationally rec- levels of Schedule 1, 2 and 3 chemicals and ures including trade sanctions that can be ognized definition of a chemical weapon anticipated imports and exports of Schedule imposed against a Party to the treaty who available. The definition contained in the 1 and 2 chemicals. These measures will help fails to meet its treaty obligations. implementing legislation will enable an in- restrict access to key chemicals, while also In short, as former DCI Woolsey and other vestigator to request a search warrant on the helping to alert law enforcement and other intelligence officials have pointed out, the basis of reasonable suspicion of illegal chem- government officials to suspicious activities. CWC will provide a useful tool in our inven- ical weapons activity (such as production of Finally, one of the key tools in combating tory of means to stem the worldwide expan- chemical weapons agent), rather than sus- terrorism is early intelligence. The CWC will sion of chemical weapons capabilities and to picion of an attempt or conspiracy to use a provide access to international declaration assist in monitoring CW programs world- weapon of mass destruction, as under cur- and inspection information and will wide, whether inside or outside the CWC. rent U.S. law. By providing law enforcement strengthen the intelligence links between officials and prosecutors an actionable legal the United States and the international com- U.S. SENATE, basis for investigating the development, pro- munity that will help us detect and prevent OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER, duction, transfer of acquisition of chemical chemical attacks. By tying the United Washington, DC, January 8, 1997. weapons, CWC implementing legislation im- States into a global verification network and Hon. WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, proves prospects for detection, early prosecu- strengthening our intelligence sharing with President of the United States, tion and possibly even prevention of chemi- the international community this treaty can The White House, Washington, DC. cal terrorism in the United States. be an early warning that is essential for DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Following our phone Prosecution. The proposed U.S. implement- combating terrorism. conversation, I arranged a meeting later ing legislation will also aid prosecution. Be- In this context, the following paragraph today with your Acting National Security cause possession of a chemical weapon from DIA PC–1563–4–96 of February 1996 is Adviser, Sandy Berger, to discuss the Chemi- (whether or not it is intended to be used) hereby declassified: cal Weapons Convention. Before that meet- would be prohibited under the Convention, it ‘‘Irrespective of whether the CWC enters ing however, I wanted to inform you person- into force, terrorists will likely look upon would also be illegal under the CWC imple- ally of how your Administration’s actions on CW as a means to gain greater publicity and menting legislation and thus would provide a critical arms control issues have com- instill widespread fear. The March 1995 sufficient basis for prosecution. Currently, plicated efforts to work cooperatively. Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo As you know, many Members of the 104th prosecutors must rely on legislation in- would not have been prevented by the CWC.’’ Congress have expressed concern over the se- tended for other purposes, such as a law I would also invite your attention to the curity implications of certain arms control against conspiracy to use a weapon of mass following conclusions concerning the impact positions taken by your Administration. The destruction. of the CWC contained in the May 1996 report security concerns are aggravated by your Penalties. Under the proposed U.S. imple- issued by the Director of Central Intelligence Administration’s unwillingness to seriously menting legislation, any person who know- Interagency Committee on Terrorism enti- consider our views on the appropriate Con- ingly engages in prohibited CW-related ac- tled ‘‘Aum Shinrikyo: Insights to the Chemi- stitutional role of the Senate in providing tivities far short of actual use of a chemical cal and Biological Terrorist Threat’’: advice and consent on treaties. I would point weapon could be subject to the maximum ‘‘The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to three important issues: demarcation lim- punishment of life in prison or any term of is designed to regulate and monitor the pro- its to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of years. In contrast, under existing U.S. legis- curement, production, and use of some 1972 (ABM Treaty); multilateralization of the lation, equivalent penalties require proof of chemicals used in CW production with vary- ABM Treaty; and flank limits to the Conven- use or an attempt or conspiracy to use a ing degrees of intrusiveness, depending on tional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty of 1990 weapon of mass destruction. Thus, it would which of the three Schedules of Chemicals a (CFE Treaty). In each of these cases, your be difficult under current law for prosecutors compound is listed. Within five years of the Administration has negotiated substantive to prove that a violation of the law has oc- CWC’s entry into force, transfer of all Sched- modifications of the treaties, and then taken curred unless a scheme to use chemical ule 1 and 2 chemicals to non-States Party questionable legal positions that render Sen- weapons is well advanced. will be banned, and transfer of Schedule 3 ate advice and consent an option that can be Trade Controls. The proposed U.S. imple- chemicals to non-States Party will require ignored rather than a constitutional obliga- menting legislation would also supplement end-use certificates. In addition, all sites tion that must be fulfilled. existing export/import control laws and reg- within a State Party are subject to challenge Congress has legislated on the proposed de- ulations by strictly controlling the import inspections initiated by another State Party marcation limits and the proposed and export of those chemicals posing the with substantive information that illegal ac- multilaterization of the ABM Treaty. Sec- greatest risk (listed in Schedule 1 of the tivities are taking place by the government tion 232 of the National Defense Authoriza- CWC) and also regulating the production, ac- or any other group. The Convention’s provi- tion Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (P.L. 103–337) quisition, retention, transfer or use of such sions probably would make it more difficult addresses both issues. It states ‘‘the United chemicals within the U.S. Fines of up to and costly for terrorists to acquire CW by in- States shall not be bound by any inter- $50,000 could be imposed for unlawful produc- creasing the risk of detection, but a deter- national agreement entered into by the tion, acquisition, transfer, etc. of such mined group could circumvent the provi- President of the United States that would chemicals. sions. substantively modify the ABM Treaty unless Emergency Authority. The proposed U.S. ‘‘The CWC mandates that each State Party the agreement is entered into pursaunt to implementing legislation contains authority establish national laws to prohibit anyone the treaty making power of the President to seize, forfeit and destroy chemical weap- on its territory or any citizen abroad from under the Constitution.’’ ons. This important provision protects the developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring Section 235 of the National Defense Au- constitutional rights of property owners or using CW. Each State Party must develop thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. while allowing law enforcement officials to and pass national legislation to ensure the 104–106) addresses demarcation and states seize and destroy a chemical weapon under implementation of all CWC obligations and ‘‘any international agreement that would exigent circumstances (i.e. where harm is provisions. Depending on the quality of the limit the research, testing, or deployment of imminent or likely). This provides addi- legislation and its enforcement, the institu- missile defense systems, system upgrades, or tional authority to prevent a potential ca- tion of these laws would help establish a po- system components that are designed to tastrophe and save lives. litical and legal basis for the prosecution of counter modern theater ballistic missiles in Public Awareness. Tips by concerned pri- a terrorist group. a manner that would be more restrictive vate citizens are the lifeblood of successful ‘‘In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, the CWC than the compliance criteria specified in police investigations. Ratification of the would not have hindered the cult from pro- paragraph 1 should be entered into only pur- CWC and enactment of its implementing leg- curing the needed chemical compounds used suant to the treaty making powers of the islation will ensure, due to reporting and in- in its production of sarin. Further, the Aum President under the constitution.’’ spection requirements and penalties for vio- would have escaped the CWC requirement for The position of Congress concerning the lations, that private companies and con- an end-use certification because it purchased substantive modifications your Administra- cerned citizens are more alert to and more the chemical within Japan.’’ tion has sought to the ABM Treaty is clear: S3600 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 Senate advice and consent is needed for their vice and consent of the United States Sen- States party to the CFE Treaty agreed to ex- entry into force. Despite this clear position, ate. tend the deadline for confirmation of ap- your Administration continues to argue that Second, I have repeatedly pointed out that proval to May 15, 1997. In recent months, it Senate advice and consent is not necessary the CWC is currently under consideration by has become evident that the flank agree- in the case of multilateralization, and is but the Committee on Foreign Relations. Ac- ment underpins the new negotiations in Vi- one among several options you might choose cordingly, it is essential that you and your enna on ‘‘CFE adaptation,’’ which in turn in the case of demarcation. This is unaccept- administration honor the publicly-stated underpins NATO’s efforts to define the new able. commitments to work closely and expedi- security environment in Europe as NATO en- With specific reference to the Agreed tiously with Chairman Helms on issues be- larges. In addition, both adaptation of the Statement on Demarcation reached last fore the Committee, including the presen- CFE Treaty and the admission of new states summer, section 406 of the Department of tation of a plan to reorganize U.S. foreign af- to NATO will be effected through agreements State and Related Agencies Appropriations fairs agencies. Until that occurs, Chairman that will be submitted for the advice and Act, 1997 (P.L. 104–208) prohibits expending Helms has made it clear to me that he is un- consent of the Senate. The situation and funds on the Standing Consultative Commis- likely to consider next steps in the CWC timing is therefore different from when the sion ‘‘unless the President provides to the process. Administration submitted the CFE flank Congress a report containing a detailed anal- As I have said privately and publicly, bi- agreement for legislative approval last Au- ysis of whether * * * the Agreed Statement partisanship must be a two-way street. I gust. Accordingly, the Administration is pre- regarding Demarcation agreed to by the look forward to hearing from you soon on pared, without prejudice to its legal position Standing Consultative Commission on June these important issues. With best wishes, I vis-a-vis the approval options we believe are 24, 1996 * * * will require the advice and con- am, available to us, to seek Senate advice and sent of the Senate of the United States.’’ The Sincerely, consent to the flank Document provided the report submitted on your behalf did not an- TRENT LOTT. Senate will act on this crucial matter before swer this question. May 15. Finally, the May 31, 1996 Conventional THE WHITE HOUSE, MOU ON ABM SUCCESSION Forces in Europe flank agreement contains Washington, March 25, 1997. As noted in the President’s November 25, negotiated amendments and significant Hon. TRENT LOTT, 1996 report to Congress submitted in accord- changes to the 1990 CFE Treaty. Yet, again Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, ance with Section 406 of the FY 1997 State your Administration has taken the legal po- Washington, DC. Appropriations Act (the ‘‘Livingston Re- sition that Senate advice and consent is not DEAR MR. LEADER: The President has port’’—hereafter referred to as ‘‘the Re- necessary. asked me to reply to your letter concerning port’’), executive agreements recognizing the Mr. President, I have pledged to work with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) succession of new States to the treaty rights you in a bipartisan fashion on a wide range and the role of the Senate under the Con- and obligations of their predecessors have of challenges facing our country. Nowhere is stitution in giving its advice and consent to traditionally not been treated as treaty such cooperation more important than in treaties. Our staffs have held some discus- amendments or new treaties requiring Sen- foreign policy and national security. But bi- sions on this matter, but I want to address in ate advice and consent. Rather, they have partisanship must be a two-way street. Your more detail each of the three treaty issues been treated as the implementation of exist- Administration has now re-started a public you raise in the letter: the CFE flank agree- ing treaties, which is recognized as an exclu- campaign to gain Senate advice and consent ment, ABM multilateralization and ABM/ sively Presidential function under the Con- for the Chemical Weapons Convention. As TMD demarcation. stitution. The Report elaborates the specific you seek bipartisan cooperation, you must CFE FLANK AGREEMENT reasons why this conclusion applies in the understand our expectation for such coopera- case of the June 24, 1996 Memorandum of Un- On May 31, 1996, the United States, our tion on ABM multilateralization, ABM de- derstanding (MOU) on ABM Succession NATO allies, Russia and the 13 other States marcation, and CFE flank limits. reached ad ref between the United States, Party to the CFE Treaty approved a docu- Senate advice and consent arms control Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kasakstan in ment in Vienna culminating more than two treaties after their negotiation and after the Standing Consultative Commission years of intensive negotiations on the CFE their substantive modification is not an op- (SCC). It also explains why the MOU does not tion—it is a requirement of our Constitution. flank issue. The centerpiece of this agree- constitute a substantive modification of the I am sure you understand that it will be very ment was a realignment of the CFE map (de- ABM Treaty. difficult to explore the possibility of Senate picting the territory of the former USSR in In dealing with matters of succession, a action on the Chemical Weapons Convention the CFE area), which has the effect of reduc- key U.S. objective has been to reconstitute without first addressing legitimate security ing the size of the flank zone. The CFE par- the original treaty arrangement as closely as and Constitutional concerns on other impor- ties had deliberately not included this map possible. This was true with respect to the tant arms control issues. I stand ready to as part of the Treaty when it was signed in elaboration of the ad ref MOU as well and, work with you and your national security 1990, and the Bush Administration did not accordingly, the MOU works to preserve the team in a comprehensive manner to address submit the map to the Senate in 1991 as part original object and purpose of the ABM Trea- arms control issues in the 105th Congress. of the formal documents for advice and con- ty. We hope that the breakthrough on ABM/ With best wishes, I am, sent. Accordingly, legal counsels in the Clin- TMD demarcation achieved at the Helsinki Sincerely, ton Administration’s national security agen- Summit will set the stage for a meeting at TRENT LOTT. cies determined last year that a change to which all parties would sign this MOU. The the map does not constitute a formal amend- Administration continues to believe that the U.S. SENATE, ment to the Treaty. agreement does not require the advice and OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER, At the same time, we determined that a re- consent of the Senate, or any other form of Washington, DC, March 18, 1997. alignment of the map did constitute a congressional approval, to enter it into Hon. WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, change in a ‘‘shared understanding’’ formed force. President of the United States, The White with the Senate at the time the Senate gave House, Washington, DC. its advice and consent to the Treaty. That THE WHITE HOUSE, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As you know, we ‘‘shared understanding’’ established that the Washington, April 24, 1997. have been working in good faith to try to es- Treaty would be applied and interpreted on Hon. TRENT LOTT, tablish a process under which the Senate the basis of the original map. According to Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, might consider a resolution of ratification the 1988 ‘‘Biden Condition’’ on treaty inter- Washington, DC. for the Chemical Weapons Convention pretation (which was attached by the Senate DEAR MR. LEADER: During Senate ratifica- (CWC). to its resolution of ratification for the INF tion proceedings on the Chemical Weapons As we consider the next steps in this proc- Treaty), Senate consent or congressional ap- Convention (CWC), concerns have been raised ess, I want to remind you of two problems proval is required to change a shared under- over Article X, which provides for certain that remain unresolved. First, on January 8, standing. types of defensive assistance in the event 1997, I wrote to you expressing concerns When the Administration submitted the that a State that has joined the treaty and about your administration’s approach to a CFE flank document for legislative approval renounced any chemical weapons (CW) capa- number of critical arms control issues, in- last August, we were faced with a time-ur- bility is threatened with or suffers a chemi- cluding demarcation limits and gent situation: by its own terms, the docu- cal weapons attack, and Article XI, which multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic Mis- ment required all States parties to confirm encourages free trade in non-prohibited sile Treaty of 1972 (ABM Treaty) and about their approval by December 15; yet very lit- chemicals among states that adhere to the the flank limits to the Conventional Armed tle time remained before the adjournment CWC. Some have suggested that these Arti- Forces in Europe Treaty of 1990 (CFE Trea- sine die of the 104th Congress. In this cir- cles could result in the CWC promoting, ty). To date, I have not received a response. cumstance we chose to seek statutory ap- rather than stemming, CW proliferation de- Each of these significant treaty modifica- proval by both houses, as is explicitly per- spite States Parties’ general obligation tions are subject to the constitution’s shared mitted under the Biden Condition. under Article I ‘‘never under any cir- treaty making power and, accordingly, can- We now face a complex situation. At the cumstances . . . to assist, encourage or in- not enter into force until receiving the ad- Lisbon OSCE Summit in December, the 30 duce, in any way, anyone to engage in any April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3601 activity prohibited to a State Party under to the Foreign Relations Committee summit, will provide the Senate an op- this Convention.’’ calendar at the end of the 104th Con- portunity to consider the administra- To respond to these concerns, the Adminis- gress. tion’s approach toward negotiating tration has worked closely with the Senate to develop conditions relating to both Arti- In January of this year, the Presi- constraints on our defensive systems cles that have now been incorporated in the dent and his national security advisers pursuant to the administration’s inter- resolution of ratification (Agreed Conditions made it clear that the Chemical Weap- pretation of the ABM Treaty. I am sure #7 and 15). These two conditions would sub- ons Convention remained a top prior- we will have quite an interesting and stantially reinforce and strengthen the trea- ity. On January 8, 1997, I wrote to the lively debate on that, but certainly we ty by: prohibiting the United States under President explaining some of our arms should take advantage of our respon- Article X from (a) providing the CWC organi- control priorities, including the sub- sibilities to do just that. Along with zation with funds that could be used for chemical weapons defense assistance to mission of three significant treaty many of my colleagues, I have ex- other States Parties; and (b) giving certain modifications for advice and consent: pressed grave doubts about the wisdom states that might join the treaty any assist- The ABM Demarcation Agreement, the of this administration’s approach in ance other than medical antidotes and treat- ABM Multilateralization Agreement that area. Now, however, we have a full ment; and requiring the President to (a) cer- and the flank agreement to the Con- opportunity to debate the policy and tify that the CWC will not weaken the export ventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The this treaty in the ratification process. controls established by the Australia Group administration had previously refused The President still does not agree and that each member of the Group intends that they should send forward the trea- to maintain such controls; (b) block any at- to submit these treaties for Senate tempt within the Group to adopt a contrary ratification. ty dealing with multilateralization. We position; and (c) report annually as to I wrote at that time. think the Constitution requires it; his whether Australia Group controls remain ef- Bipartisanship is a two-way street. Your lawyers disagree. We will continue to fective. administration has now restarted a public press the administration to accept our With respect to the latter condition, I am campaign to gain Senate advice and consent position in this area, and they under- pleased to inform you that we have now re- for the Chemical Weapons Convention. As stand we should keep talking about it. ceived official confirmations from the high- you seek bipartisan cooperation, you must If this provision is contained in the est diplomatic levels in each of the 30 Aus- understand our expectation for such coopera- tralia Group nations that they agree that final agreement that is submitted to tion on ABM multilateralization, ABM de- the Senate for advice and consent in the Group’s export control and nonprolifera- marcation and CFE flank limits. tion measures are compatible with the CWC connection with demarcation, it will and that they are committed to maintain On March 18, I again wrote the Presi- give us an opportunity to debate it. such controls in the future. dent reminding him that I had not re- On U.N. reform, our now Secretary of While supporting these guarantees and ceived a response to that January 8 let- State Madeleine Albright asked that safeguards, you expressed the concern on ter. I also pointed out that ‘‘it is essen- we begin to actually meet and talk Sunday that nations might still try to use tial that you and your administration about U.N. reform; that we meet with a Article X or XI to take proscribed actions honor the publicly stated commit- that could undercut U.S. national security U.N. presiding officer; that he come interests, notwithstanding the best efforts of ments to work closely and expedi- and visit with us. He did. We have U.S. diplomacy to prevent such actions. I tiously with Chairman HELMS on issues started a process between the House am, therefore, prepared to provide the fol- before the committee, including the and Senate, Republicans and Demo- lowing specific assurance related to these presentation of a plan to reorganize the crats, our chairmen and ranking mem- two Articles: U.S. foreign affairs agencies. bers, to take a look at what should be In the event that a State Party or States From the beginning of the 105th Con- Parties to the Convention act contrary to done with regard to the arrearages we the obligations under Article I by: gress, I made clear as best I could to all may or may not owe, how can we deal (A) using Article X to justify providing de- who would listen in the administration with the U.S. assessment at the United fensive CW equipment, material or informa- that bipartisanship could not mean Nations that could be fairer, and we tion to another State Party that could result forcing the Senate into acting on ad- are working from a comprehensive Re- in U.S. chemical protective equipment being ministration-chosen priorities if we did publican document as a basis for the compromised so that U.S. warfighting capa- not likewise have an opportunity to discussions. I think we see some action bilities in a CW environment are signifi- consider issues that are important to cantly degraded; already occurring. The Secretary Gen- (B) using Article XI to justify chemical the Senate, in fact, issues we think eral has been working at it, and I think transfers that would make it impossible for have long since been sent to us for ac- he understands we are very serious me to make the annual certification that the tion with regard to arms control trea- about U.N. reform. Australia Group remains a viable and effec- ties. On State Department reorganization, tive mechanism for controlling CW prolifera- We stated that we thought it was I am very pleased that the administra- tion; or vital that we get State Department re- (C) carrying out transfers or exchanges tion has proposed, I think, some major under either Article X or XI which jeopardize organization and real reform at the changes. Chairman HELMS, and many U.S. national security by promoting CW pro- United Nations. This was not a quid others, have worked to streamline our liferation: pro quo but a simple statement of re- foreign policy bureaucracy, and now it I would, consistent with Article XVI of the ality. Working in a cooperative fash- looks like we are going to have a CWC, regard such actions as extraordinary ion, as we must, means that both sides chance to do that. events that have jeopardized the supreme in- have to be forthcoming on issues in The Agency for International Devel- terests of the United States and therefore, in consultation with the Congress, be prepared these foreign policy very important, opment, the Arms Control and Disar- to withdraw from the treaty. critical areas. mament Agency and the U.S. Informa- Sincerely, Let me briefly review the status of tion Agency were started and organized BILL CLINTON. each of these three related issues. On during the cold war. Barely more than Mr. LOTT. On September 12, the day the arms control treaties, the adminis- a year ago, President Clinton vetoed a the Senate was scheduled to begin de- tration did reconsider their positions bill which would have mandated the bate on the convention, Secretary of very carefully and they came back and dismantling of only one foreign affairs State Christopher called me and asked agreed to send the Conventional Forces agency. Last week, however, thanks to that the vote be canceled. I quizzed in Europe Flank Agreement to the Sen- the efforts of Secretary of State Mad- him. I wanted to make sure that was ate for advice and consent. Hearings eleine Albright and the involvement of what the administration was asking have already been scheduled on this the President, the President agreed to and that I would be able to come out to treaty, and I expect a resolution of abolish both the USIA and ACDA and the floor of the Senate and explain that ratification to be before the full Senate to fold many of AID’s functions into is why it was being done. It was can- in the near future. President Clinton the State Department. This will make celed because it was clear, in my opin- agreed to submit the agreed statement our scarce resources go farther, in- ion, the convention was likely to be re- on demarcation to the Senate for ad- crease coordination and help ensure jected at that time by the Senate. vice and consent. This treaty, agreed American interests, not bureaucratic I acceded to the Secretary’s request. to in principle between Presidents interests, are behind our foreign policy We canceled the vote, and it went back Clinton and Yeltsin at the Helsinki decisionmaking. S3602 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 On each of these parallel issues—and intelligence shared with the inter- these changes addresses concerns I call them parallel, that is the way national organization established raised by treaty opponents last year they have always been discussed—we under the CWC. and addresses my own concerns. In ad- have made progress. I think it is im- Fourth, on maintaining robust chem- dition, the Senate is considering this portant that we realize that. Thanks to ical defenses, condition 11 mandates a convention in a manner agreed to by the persistence of the chairman and series of steps including negotiations all 100 Senators. We first considered, thanks to a Secretary of State that is with our allies, planning for chemical and passed, as I said earlier, S. 495, the working with us now, we have made weapons in war game scenarios and Chemical and Biological Weapons progress with U.N. reform, with State high-level leadership of the U.S. Threat Reduction Act of 1997 sponsored Department reorganization, and the Army’s Chemical School. by Senator KYL. We are considering the fact we will be able to consider these Fifth, on information sharing, an resolution of ratification drafted by treaties. No serious observer can claim area that has worried me the most and Senator HELMS. Think about that. We that we have not moved forward in right up until this very moment, are considering that resolution that he these areas. progress has been made in two ways. drafted and that he had in the commit- There have been important changes First, with regard to these articles X tee. That is what we brought to the in the Chemical Weapons Convention and XI, condition 7 makes crystal clear floor, and the process requires that mo- over the past few months. Last Sep- that nothing in the CWC undermines tions to strike be offered to take provi- tember, I worked closely with Senators U.S. export control laws, and that the sions out. Much progress has been HELMS, KYL and others in opposition to informal Australia Group export con- made, and many Senators have been the treaty. Had we not canceled the trols will continue. Condition 15 helps cooperative. vote, I would have voted against it, and to ensure that defensive assistance But there should be no mistake, seri- I believe that it would have failed. under the convention will be strictly ous problems remain with this conven- In the aftermath of that debate, some limited. So I invite my colleagues who tion. Unfortunately, key protections in in the White House blamed political may still have some doubts to look at the resolution of ratification may be motivations. The President said it was these conditions—conditions 7 and 15— stricken out in our debate today, and partisan politics involving America’s dealing with information sharing and we will have some more votes in a few security. But, fortunately, calmer how we have restrictions on the defen- minutes. Condition 33 on verification requires heads have prevailed this year. The ad- sive assistance. ministration did come to the table and Sixth, on financing Russian imple- the President to certify the same standard of verification developed they have negotiated with us. They mentation, which I think is a ridicu- under the Reagan-Bush administra- recognize the legitimate concerns that lous idea personally on its face, but tions—high confidence in detecting were ignored last year. So we have en- condition 14 precludes the United militarily significant violations in a gaged in a process of member-and-staff- States from making any commitment timely manner. Detecting the produc- level discussions that have had a major to finance Russia’s chemical weapons tion and stockpiling of chemical weap- impact on this convention. destruction program in an effort to se- There are 28 agreed items in this res- ons may be more difficult than detect- cure Russian ratification of CWC. olution of ratification that were not ing the existence, obviously, of nu- Seventh, conditions 1, 17, 6, and 20 there last September. Senator KYL, clear-armed warheads. preserve Senate prerogatives in this Senator HELMS, and Senator BIDEN But I will vote to retain the verifica- and in future treaties. They preserve have been working together on this. tion standard that has served our coun- our right to pass reservations to trea- They reached agreements. Some of try well in previous arms control ties, to ratify future amendments to them Senator BIDEN said, ‘‘Yes, we agreements. I understand why my col- the CWC and to make clear the execu- should do this,’’ and the administra- leagues might not agree with that and tive branch cannot commit to appro- tion didn’t particularly agree. Others they might vote in a way that would priations in advance of congressional in the administration said, ‘‘Yes, we lower this verification standard, but it action. should do it,’’ and some of our col- is a serious problem. Eighth, on noncompliance, condition leagues did not agree with it. There has Condition 30, which we just voted on, 13 requires a series of steps to be taken been a give and take, but real progress I think should have been kept in the by the United States in the event of has been made. document. Many of these items have addressed noncompliance by a party to the con- Condition 29 conditions U.S. partici- the concerns that have been cited by vention. Condition 13 mandates unilat- pation in the convention upon dem- opponents as reasons to oppose the eral actions and requires the United onstrated actions by the country with CWC last year. I have gone over some States to seek a series of multilateral the largest chemical weapons arsenal of the letters, some of the memos I actions to deal with CWC violations. on Earth—Russia. Russia has not im- have received—and I have received a Ninth, conditions 3 and 22 address fi- plemented the Bilateral Destruction lot of them—and point by point has nancial concerns about the Organiza- Agreement signed in 1990. Russia has been addressed, maybe not 100 percent, tion for the Prohibition of Chemical not submitted accurate data on chemi- maybe not to their total satisfaction, Weapons set up under this convention. cal weapons. That is a real concern, but progress has been made. I will not One sets a binding limit on the U.S. as- and we have reason to believe they are go down the whole list of 28, but I want sessment to ensure we are not creating devoting resources now to develop new to list some of the more critical ones another international entitlement pro- chemical agents which are outside the where real progress has been made. gram, and the other requires an inde- scope of CWC. I support retaining this First, on search and seizure, condi- pendent inspector general be created to condition because I believe it makes tion 28 requires search warrants for all increase accountability of the OPCW. sense to expect Russia to live up to involuntary searches of American fa- Finally, condition 10 requires an an- past agreements before entering into cilities. We were worried about a con- nual report of condition that, for the new ones. stitutional problem here. Now it has first time in arms control, shifts the I strongly support condition 31 which been addressed. burden of proof to making the adminis- would require the President to exercise Second, on our ability to use riot tration certify compliance. As previous the power given in the verification control agents, condition 26 ensures experience has demonstrated, the arms annex to the convention to bar inspec- that the U.S. policy since 1975 remains control bureaucracy has refused to find tors from terrorist states and from in effect. Our military can use non- clear evidence of noncompliance. This states which have violated U.S. pro- lethal agents, such as tear gas, to res- condition will change and will ensure liferation law, particularly, I hope and cue downed pilots. Certainly, that our vigilance on monitoring issues. think that we can defeat the motion to should have been in there all along. I Each of these conditions makes the strike here. It is not a killer amend- don’t know why there was resistance to resolution before us today a better doc- ment and we ought to retain the right it, but it has been addressed. ument, there is no doubt about it, cer- to bar those inspectors. Third, on intelligence sharing, condi- tainly better than the document we Finally, there is the most serious tion 5 places strict limits on all U.S. were considering last fall. Each of question of articles X and XI, whether April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3603 these provisions on information shar- formed about the treaty’s flaws. I I believe this convention will in- ing will increase the likelihood of, in talked with President Clinton, Sec- crease the cost of covert chemical fact, chemical weapons proliferation. retary Albright, and Joint Chiefs of weapons programs, and it will increase Over the past few weeks, I made it Staff Chairman Shalikashvili. our chances of detecting such pro- clear to the administration as best I Republican Senators, with long expe- grams. could the legitimate concerns about rience in national security matters, are I think there is a long list of good the impact of articles X and XI had to divided. On this issue, reasonable peo- reasons why we should do this today. I be addressed more than what was in ple can and do disagree, and reasonable have struggled with it. I would like to the condition. I support delaying our people will vote on opposite sides. take just a minute, if I can, to talk on ratification until the CWC is renegoti- After our negotiations, hearings, and a personal note. ated to deal with these articles. For ob- discussions, it is time to make deci- Many people in the media have tend- vious reasons, the administration does sions—decisions that will be important ed to say, well, you know, this is going not want to do that, and probably the to the future of our men and women in to determine the fate of various and majority of the Senate would not want uniform, and the future security of our sundry Senators and tell a lot about to do that. country. leadership. It has been exaggerated. But this very morning, I received a I have decided to vote in support of I have talked to a lot of Senators one letter from President Clinton which I the Senate giving its advice and con- on one. Not one of them—not one of think is significant. The President sent to the Chemical Weapons Conven- them—has said that they would vote on made specific assurances that the Unit- tion. I will do so not because I believe it on any basis other than what is best ed States would exercise its right to it will end the threat posed by chemi- for our country. withdraw from the convention if any cal weapons or rid the world of poison The way the Senate works, we debate one of three things occurred: If coun- gas. I will do so not because I believe these issues—we read, we study, we tries used ‘‘article X to justify provid- this treaty is verifiable enough or even argue, we go back and forth. We set up ing defensive chemical weapons equip- enforceable enough. And I will not do a fair process, and then we come to a ment, material, or information to an- so because I believe there are no addi- conclusion. We make a decision. We other state party that could result in tional proliferations concerns related vote on it. And I do not think it is fair U.S. chemical protective equipment to articles X and XI. to exaggerate any one Senator’s role in being compromised. . .’’; I will vote for the convention because this whole effort. If countries use article XI to justify I believe there will be real and lasting I think the Senate should be com- chemical transfers which undermine consequences to the United States if plimented today for the way it has the Australia Group. we do not ratify the convention. In a handled this. I think that Madison, and If countries carried ‘‘out transfers or very real sense, the credibility of com- others, placed their faith in this insti- exchanges under either article X and mitments made by two Presidents of tution. And I think it has worked well. XI which jeopardize U.S. national secu- our country—one Republican and one The efforts of Senator HELMS and rity by promoting chemical weapons Democrat—is at stake. Senator KYL have been heroic. They proliferation; I will vote for the convention because have done a magnificent job. Others These are specific and probably un- the judgment of the most senior former that have supported the convention precedented. Yes, it is a letter. It is not and current military commanders be- have done their part, too. in the document, but it is signed by the lieve it will make our soldiers, sailors, I think that this process has helped President of the United States in very airmen, and marines more safe in po- the Senate as an institution to exercise strong language that, frankly, I was tential battlefields and less likely to the leadership assigned to it by the pleased but somewhat surprised that he face the horrible prospect of chemical Constitution. And that, I submit, is the agreed to say, I will withdraw after weapons. only real test of leadership that truly consultation with the Senate. If any I will vote for the convention because matters. one of these things happen, he is the I believe the United States is margin- I urge the adoption and ratification President and his assurances in foreign ally better off with it than without it. of this treaty. policy must make a difference. They It will provide new tools to press sig- Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair. address countries even justifying trans- natories for compliance. It will enable The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- fers where there is concern. They ad- us to gain access to sites and informa- ator from North Carolina. dress transfers which promote chemi- tion we are currently unable to exam- Mr. HELMS. I suggest the absence of cal weapons proliferation. ine. a quorum. Mr. President, I think this is a very Through the important and enlight- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The important document. I have made that ening debate we have had over the past clerk will call the roll. letter available to our colleagues. I few months, I am convinced the con- The bill clerk proceeded to call the have more copies. vention will bring new focus and en- roll. Every Member has struggled with ergy to this administration’s non- Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask one fundamental question: Are we bet- proliferation efforts. We have certainly unanimous consent that the order for ter off with or without this conven- heightened the awareness and knowl- the quorum call be rescinded. tion? In my mind, there is no easy an- edge of the concerns we have. One year The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without swer. I want to know that my children ago, few of us even knew about the objection, it is so ordered. and our country will be better off, and Australia Group. Now we have commit- Mr. HELMS. We have a small dif- that we will be better able to deal with ted ourselves and the administration to ficulty which can be remedied in short chemical weapons with it, but I have keeping the Australia Group as a via- order. Without going into a great deal my doubts. ble tool to limit access to chemicals of detail, we are trying to adjust the Experts, whose opinions I respect and technology. time back to have accommodated the deeply, are divided on the question. Yes, the CWC may give legal cover to majority leader and his remarks. Over the last 2 weeks, I have had many proliferators in Teheran or in Beijing. So I ask unanimous consent that— conversations to discuss this conven- But they have undertaken such efforts how much time did we agree to? tion. I spoke with Presidents Bush and in the past and no doubt will do it Mr. BIDEN. That the remaining time Ford. I talked with my good friend, again in the future. that the chairman have be 35 minutes, former Secretary of Defense Dick Che- I believe our allies in Europe are the remaining time under the control ney, former Secretary of Defense Cap more likely to join with us in isolating for the Senator from Delaware be 15 Weinberger, Steve Forbes, former Sec- Iran if we are a party to this conven- minutes, and I believe Senator LEAHY retary of State James Baker, Jim tion than if we reject it tonight. They has 14 minutes anyway, and that be the Schlesinger, Colin Powell, uniformed have made it clear that they hope we remaining time on the bill. military officers—a great variety of will ratify it, whether it is Canada or The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without people. I met with leaders of groups whether it is Britain or our European objection, it is so ordered. that are deeply opposed and well in- allies or Japan. Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. S3604 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who opment and the application of chemistry for Mr. HELMS. I yield to the Senator seeks time? [peaceful] purposes . . . from Oklahoma. Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair. Have we not had enough experience PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- over nuclear problems of this world, Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask ator from North Carolina. just with one country that is on this unanimous consent that Jeff Severs be Mr. HELMS. How many minutes? planet? permitted privileges of the floor for the Mr. BURNS. Ten or less. Third, transferring chemical-related duration of the debate. Mr. HELMS. Ten minutes. technologies and material to members The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Mr. BURNS. Or less. of the CWC such as Cuba, Iran, India, objection, it is so ordered. Mr. HELMS. I yield 10 minutes to the Pakistan, and China will help them es- AMENDMENT NO. 48 Senator from Montana. tablish and/or improve their chemical (Purpose: To strike condition no. 29, relating The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- weapons programs. This is because to Russian elimination of chemical weapons) ator from Montana is recognized for 10 there is very little difference between Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an minutes. the legitimate commercial chemical amendment to the desk and ask for its Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I thank processes and those processes used to immediate consideration. Senator HELMS, the chairman of the make chemical weapons. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Article XI also legitimizes trade in clerk will report. History has to be recorded that this dangerous dual-use chemicals. The The bill clerk read as follows: has probably been the most ever-chang- treaty right will be used by countries The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN] ing and cloudy situation that we have such as China, India, and Russia to proposes an amendment numbered 48. faced here in the U.S. Senate. Some in override Western objections to their Beginning on page 61, strike line 21 and all this body have changed their minds as provision of sensitive chemicals and that follows through line 7 of page 63. they have tried to read the public opin- production technologies to countries Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this ion polls, and even some of those who such as Iran. China and India already amendment strikes condition 29. I will have served in the administration have supply Iran with such chemicals, but speak to this in a moment, but I yield done the same—the history, as it was the CWC will legitimize this trade and as much time of the half-hour that I articulated here by the majority lead- allow these countries to expand the control as my friend from Indiana de- er, of getting caught up in Presidential volume of commerce conducted in sires to discuss this. politics in 1996. dual-use chemicals. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- But basically what it was, it was Mr. President, I take a moment to ator from Indiana is recognized. most of us sitting down and reading focus on the fact that by ratifying this Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the words and trying to make a deci- treaty, Iran will be permitted to have the Chair and I thank the distinguished sion based on what we think is best for access to our chemical secrets, to have Senator from Delaware. The condition our country. No matter the winds that the ability to obtain chemical informa- that we move to strike, condition 29, blow in politics or in public opinion, tion from other rogue nations. If rati- would prohibit the United States from this issue must be considered and de- fied, we are allowing a nation that we ratifying the Chemical Weapons Con- cided on its merits. There is just too have confirmed, we have confirmed as vention until the President certifies much at stake. The President has writ- a terrorist nation, one that is the pri- that Russia has done the following: ten a letter to the majority leader. If mary suspect in numerous terrorist at- Ratified the CWC, complied with the 1990 you will read the words real carefully, tacks against the United States, and bilateral destruction agreement, fulfilled its you could even say you could argue one that calls for the destruction of obligations under the 1989 Wyoming memo- both sides of the issue on that letter this country to get more information, randum of understanding, and ceased all alone. not less, on deadly chemicals. chemical weapons activities. But I rise today to express my oppo- How many in this body think that if Mr. President, two arguments sition to this Chemical Weapons Con- allowed this information, Iran will, of against this condition prevailed, at vention treaty. its own accord, destroy these poten- least on the last vote that we had. I There are several reasons why I have tially deadly weapons and not use them cite the first important argument is chosen to oppose the treaty. Some against United States citizens around simply that this is a killer amendment. would say that it is verifiable. I am not the world? I think that is a legitimate Senators need to know that a vote to fully convinced of that, yet. Some question. How many in this body really leave this in the convention effectively would say that it does not hinder or think that the United States will be in terminates the convention. Senators break the Constitution. I think I would a more secure position? Finally, how cannot have it both ways. question that. When it comes to sov- can we in clear conscience give them I simply indicate, in his very impor- ereignty of the United States, I would this information when American men tant statement, the majority leader, say that very much was in jeopardy. and women have been murdered by Senator LOTT, referencing a particular However, I will focus my concerns with their actions? condition that he found appealing, in- article XI and my fears that this arti- Mr. President, for this reason, I can- dicated it was not a killer amendment. cle will compromise both the United not vote for the passage of this treaty. But, in fact, this one is a killer amend- States and the citizens that live here. I have heard all the reasons why we ment. Therefore, there is a crucial rea- Article XI of the Chemical Weapons would be just a tiny bit better off being son to vote to strike it. Convention treaty prohibits countries part of the convention. Well, this Sen- Second, Mr. President, once again we from denying others access to dual-use ator thinks you have to be a bigger are talking about American leadership. chemicals—that means chemicals that part. It falsely promises security to our It is in our interest, clearly, to get can be used in any manner—processes, Nation, and would betray those U.S. Russia’s attention to the chemical and technology. In effect, mandating citizens who have died by the hand of weapons problem. We have decided uni- access to and sharing of materials and terrorists. I urge my fellow colleagues laterally in this country that chemical the methods of making chemical weap- to contemplate what I have stated weapons are not useful to us in our de- ons. By legitimizing commerce in dan- here. I urge a ‘‘no’’ vote on ratification fense, largely because we cannot nec- gerous, dual-use chemicals and proc- of this treaty. This is not an easy deci- essarily guard our own troops against esses the CWC will increase, not re- sion but is a decision where the major- the fallout and against the problems duce, the ability of countries to ac- ity of people who serve in this body they create. So we are destroying quire chemical weapons. have read and have made their decision them. Second, Mr. President, article XI on what is actually in it and not the Russia always had greater stocks gives states the treaty right to: emotion of the times. I urge them to than we have. They still do. It has been Facilitate and have the right to partici- read it and vote accordingly. in our interest to work with the Rus- pate in, the fullest possible exchange of I yield the floor. sians. In the Cooperative Threat Re- chemicals, equipment, and scientific and The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- duction Act, so-called Nunn-Lugar-Do- technical information relating to the devel- ator from North Carolina. menici Act, we have worked with the April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3605

Russians in a first instance to assist the world. We are the country that is Senator KYL has three remarkable them in the techniques of destroying leading Chemical Weapons Convention young people: David Stephens, John chemical weapons in Russia. There are matters. Our citizens of the United Rood, and Jeanine Esperne. Senator seven very large sites that need to be States take that seriously. Mr. Presi- CRAIG has Yvonne Bartoli and Jim dealt with. We are dealing now with dent, a large majority of Americans Jatras. the Russians at the first. want us to act. They believe the U.S. I want to thank, in particular, some Mr. President, I speak today from a Government ought to do everything people from the outside who helped personal experience of last October possible, and they recognize, as do enormously in our trying to build a when it was my privilege to accompany most Senators, that this convention is case to protect the American people the then Secretary of Defense, William unlikely to get that job done very from the extravagances of this treaty. Perry, and my colleagues Senator Sam swiftly but they do recognize it is an But that is neither here nor there, but Nunn and Senator JOE LIEBERMAN, in a advance, it is a constructive step. To I want to thank those four great visit to Russia, specifically to the De- offer as a reason why we would not pro- former Secretaries of Defense who fense Department of Russia and to ceed that we are waiting for Russia, or came up—Dick Cheney; Cap Wein- military persons involved in weapons hoping that two agreements that are berger; Don Rumsfeld; James Schles- of mass destruction. Perhaps equally specified in the condition might some- inger; the marvelous Jeane Kirk- importantly, Mr. President, it was my how come to fulfillment is to miss the patrick; Steve Forbes, who came down privilege to go with my colleagues entire point of the leadership that is from New York; Richard Perle; Frank from America to the Russian Duma. On involved and the persuasion we must Gaffney; Doug Feith, and Fred Clay. I that particular day, our first attempt have. also want to include the retired flag was to attempt to gain some under- Mr. President, I believe it is impor- and general officers. standing by members of the Duma tant, as soon as we ratify this conven- I know that when I am driving home about the importance of the START II tion, for the President of the United in a few hours from now, I will think of treaty and its ratification. While we States to press on President Yeltsin his others. Just speaking for all of us, I were there, we visited with the rel- responsibility to gain ratification. At want to thank them all. I know Sen- the Helsinki summit meeting recently, evant committees comparable to our ator BIDEN wants to do the same thing Foreign Relations and our Armed Serv- President Yeltsin assured our Presi- on his side. ices Committee about the Chemical dent he would offer that leadership. He I yield the floor. Weapons Convention. assured our President he understood Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank The Russians—in what we character- the responsibility of the Russians. He the chairman. I apologize because I ize as the Russian administration, the also asked our President to do his duty may have to augment this. Although it executive branch, and the legislative to help get the job done here. In fair- is a very good idea to do it now, I was branch, the Duma—made identical ness, our President has been fulfilling preparing to do it later, so I may leave points to us, that the START II treaty that responsibility, as did Senator Dole somebody out, and I may amend this. was coupled in consideration with the yesterday, as have President Bush and Let me begin by thanking a young expansion of NATO. They said this is a President Ford, as they have come for- man, who came over from my personal political issue. These two are joined to- ward as Presidents who understand, staff to the Foreign Relations Commit- gether. and as the majority leader under- tee and I think maybe Mr. Billingslea With regard to the Chemical Weapons stands. In his statement today, he may have thought he was his cousin, Convention, they made the clear dis- mentioned one reason for voting for they spent so much time together in tinction that it was not political, it this treaty is the fact that two Repub- the last couple of months, and that is was not involved with either NATO or lican administrations have made a Puneet Talwar. He has done a great START II or other arrangements. As a commitment. An American word deal of the heavy lifting for me on this, matter of fact, they perceived it was in means something. Our leadership has along with Ed Levine, from the Intel- the interests of Russia to ratify the continuity and staying power. It does ligence Committee, who is now work- treaty. They also pointed out that Rus- not flip one way or another, depending ing with me. Ed Hall, the minority upon Iraq or Russia. sia has very little money, that at this staff director; John Lis; the young Mr. President, I simply say, once particular point in history Russian man—well, he has been with me so long again, American leadership is at stake. taxes are not being paid with regular- We are looking at a killer amendment. that he is getting old—Brian McKeon, ity. The soldiers are not being paid, or This condition must be struck. I ask who is counsel for the minority; Frank at least their paychecks are often de- Senators to vote aye when the roll is Januzzi; Dawn Ratliff; Kathi Taylor; layed. As a result, they pointed out called. Ursula McManus, who we kept up late that arms control expenses were a very I thank the Chair. at night writing memos and other great problem for them. I think we un- Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before I things on our behalf; Casey Adams; Bill derstand that. That is not a sufficient plead on this amendment, I have been Ashworth, a former long-time staff reason for Russia to dodge its respon- around this place for quite a while. Be- member of the Foreign Relations Com- sibilities. But it was a reason offered as fore I came to the Senate as a Senator, mittee and Senator Pell’s staff; David to why they had postponed consider- I had the honor of serving with two Schanzer, who worked with me on the ation. Senators as administrative assistant. Judiciary Committee; Mary Santos; In addition, Mr. President, they have Time after time, at the conclusion of Kimberly Burns; Jennette Murphy; postponed consideration because de- long arduous debate and votes on var- Larry Stein; Randy DeValk; Sheila spite our leadership from the very be- ious issues, a parting ‘‘thank you’’ is Murphy, all leadership staff persons ginning, our leadership to destroy our made to the staff people who did most who have worked with me. own chemical weapons, then to try to of the work. I talked to Senator BIDEN I have left out some, but I will aug- sign up all the nations of the world to and told him I want to do it now before ment this with the staff members of destroy theirs, and to make this an we begin to sign off. He suggested that the Intelligence Committee, the Appro- international law project, the Russians I go first. priations Committee, the Judiciary read our press and they understood Admiral Nance, sitting back there, Committee, and the Armed Services that we had had difficulty last Decem- with the white hair, that young man, Committee. They all played major ber in ratifying this convention. So he and I were boyhood friends back in rolls. they simply were curious as to whether Monroe. Adm. James W. Nance, the The hearings that the distinguished we were serious now. Well, we are, Mr. chief of staff of the Foreign Relations chairman had on this treaty this time President. I simply say that the ques- Committee; Tom Klein; Mark Theissen; around were, I think, among the best tion that is before the Senate should Steve Biegun; Marshall Billingslea— hearings—even though I didn’t always not be delay or perhaps failure to rat- particularly Marshall Billingslea—Col- agree with the witnesses—that I have ify the treaty, because we are waiting leen Noonan; Beth Wilson, and the rest participated in in my 25 years. The cast on Russia. Our leadership is impera- of the Foreign Relations Committee of characters were the luminaries of tive. We are the country that is leading staff. previous administrations, as well as S3606 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 this administration. We had the who’s because he gets to work with his son, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The who of the foreign policy establish- Kenny Myers, every day. The only amendment offered by the Senator ment, literally. These people were par- thing I found, Mr. Chairman, in my from Delaware. ticularly helpful to me, which is going meetings with them is that, like with Mr. HELMS. Which is? to sound strange. He was up in the gal- my sons, I occasionally observe that The PRESIDING OFFICER. No. 48. lery, but I am referring to General and the son knew more than the father. So Mr. HELMS. I yield to the distin- former Ambassador Rowny, a close my compliments to both of them. guished Senator from Arizona [Mr. friend and, I think, neighbor of the The bottom line of all this—and I as- KYL] for whatever time he may require. chairman. I know he is much more sume this was one of the intentions of The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- philosophically compatible with the the Senator from North Carolina, the ator from Arizona. chairman than with me, but we found chairman—is that regardless of the Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will, at a ourselves on the same side of this final outcome of each of these remain- later time, join in thanking the various issue. Everybody wondered why Bob ing amendments and the treaty, this staff and other people who have been so Dole changed his mind—not changed has been done fairly and honorably. Ev- useful in ensuring a good debate. I his mind, but why Bob Dole concluded eryone has kept their word. We said we think the Senate has gotten very seri- that the conditions that were added to would negotiate in good faith; we both ous about this matter. As the majority the treaty sufficiently corrected its de- did. All of the staff members involved leader said earlier, as a result of the fects. It is my understanding that Gen- acted in the same way. application of various Members of the eral Rowny bumped into Bob Dole in a Lastly—and I hope this doesn’t come Senate, a great deal of progress has coffee shop at the Watergate Hotel. I out the wrong way—I want to thank been made in trying to bring the sides can see the distinguished Senator from the chairman of the full committee for closer together in getting a treaty Arizona wishing he had been at that the honorable way in which he has that, if it is entered into, will be more coffee shop. But there was Gen. Brent dealt with this entire matter. I mean in the interest of the United States Scowcroft, one of the most respected that sincerely. than as originally submitted. There are a couple of conditions, people in this town, Adm. Elmo I yield the floor. however, in the resolution of ratifica- Zumwalt; John Deutch; Fred Webber Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator. I and his staff at the Chemical Manufac- tion which we believe ought to be a will add two things. One, I hope Bob part of this treaty before the President turers Association; Gen. Colin Powell; Dole stays out of those coffee shops Amy Smithson of the Stimson Center; submits those articles for ratification, from now on. I am going to see if the signifying the U.S. entry into the trea- John Isaacs; Brad Roberts, Institute distinguished ranking member would for Defense Analysis; Barry Kellman, ty. One of the most important is the mention probably the most prominent one before us at this moment. There is DePaul Law School; Ron Lehman of player in this game. He didn’t, but I the Reagan and Bush administrations. a motion to strike this condition from will, because I had the honor of escort- the resolution of ratification. We be- I am leaving a number of people out ing her to North Carolina—the new who I will add later. lieve that this condition should re- Secretary of State, Madeleine main. As the majority leader earlier I thank them all for contributing to Albright. I don’t always agree with her, this debate. I want to make a personal said, he believes this condition should nor she with me. But she is a great remain. Here is what it provides: Prior thanks, if I may, Mr. Chairman and Mr. lady and she is doing a good job for this President, to one of the most com- to depositing the U.S. instrument of country. I thank her. ratification, the President must certify petent staff people I have ever dealt Mr. President, one of the many fine with in the administration, Bob Bell, four things: First, that Russia is mak- people who contributed to the Chemi- ing reasonable progress on implement- who works for Sandy Berger and who cal Weapons Convention is no longer also, I think, did an incredibly good job ing the 1990 bilateral destruction agree- among us. Mrs. Sherry Stetson ment entered into between the United here, and Lori Murray, also of that Mannix, a retired U.S. Air Force lieu- staff. Bob Bell is a walking encyclo- States and Russia. Second, that out- tenant colonel, joined the U.S. Arms standing compliance related to the 1989 pedia, who negotiated with the Lott Control and Disarmament Agency in committee. He is a man who has the Wyoming memorandum of understand- 1984 and became its top expert on ing have been resolved to U.S. satisfac- ability to understand very complex no- chemical weapons. She helped nego- tions and put them into language ev- tion. Third, that Russia has deposited tiate the treaty, and then she became a its articles of ratification of the con- erybody can understand. He has done resource person for Members and staff an admirable job. There are other peo- ventional weapons agreement. Fourth, of the Senate as we began to consider that it is committed to foregoing any ple to thank. whether to give our advice and consent Mr. LUGAR. Will the Senator yield? weapons development. Mr. BIDEN. Yes. to ratification. Those are four important conditions, Mr. LUGAR. I would like to ask if he Lieutenant Colonel Mannix was if our partner, Russia, and the United would include Kenneth Myers and dying of cancer in 1994, when the For- States are to effectively utilize the Kenny Myers, on my staff and the staff eign Relations and Intelligence Com- Chemical Weapons Convention. The of the Intelligence Committee, who mittees first held hearings on the CWC. reason is, first of all, because Russia is have been invaluable. Despite being in terrible pain, Lieuten- the world’s largest possessor of chemi- Mr. BIDEN. The answer is I would ab- ant Colonel Mannix faithfully and ef- cal weapons. It has anywhere from 60 solutely like to do that. The statement fectively managed the process of re- to 70 percent of the world’s chemical I was going to introduce has a para- sponding to our committees’ questions stocks. For the Chemical Weapons Con- graph about that. for the Record. vention to be global, in the sense that I express my deep appreciation to Sherry Mannix was only 44 years old it covers the weapons, and to be effec- Senator LUGAR, with whom I have when she died in early 1995. She had tive, it should involve the country with talked every day for the past few hoped to live long enough to see this the largest inventory of chemical months as we have tried to move the convention ratified. We were unable, weapons. ball forward in this treaty. He was very Mr. President, to grant that last wish. Now, Russia has signed the Chemical committed. He is truly the Senate’s But Sherry Mannix kept faith with us, Weapons Convention, but has indicated leading expert on the treaty and, I with her comrades in the U.S. Armed that it will not ratify, at least at this think, one of the leading experts in Forces, and with her country. Now we time and, as a matter of fact, in a com- this country on foreign policy. We have the opportunity to keep faith munication to the Vice President of would not have gotten this far without with her, and with all our military per- the United States, one of the Russian his efforts. Perhaps the reason he is as sonnel who long for ratification of this leaders, Chernomyrdin, said, in effect, good as he is that he has a father and convention as a step toward curbing that Russia would prefer that the two son team working for him, Kenneth the menace of chemical weapons. parties, if they are going to come into and Kenny Myers. I envy Ken Myers, Mr. HELMS. What is the pending the treaty, come in at the same time Senator LUGAR’s long-time staff aide, business, Mr. President? rather than one preceding the other, - April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3607 and, therefore, said that it would be in- will simply note that this memoran- inspectors will neither be prepared nor tegral to Russian entry that the United dum of understanding was essentially allowed to look for them, nor will Rus- States entered first, which is what we an agreement between the two states sia be precluded from importing these are about to do. that we would exchange data on how components. A declassified portion of a I think these four commitments by much chemical weapons we had and to May 1995 national intelligence esti- Russia are integral to the success of provide the information on the status mate states ‘‘Production of new binary the Chemical Weapons Convention if for binary weapons programs. agents would be difficult to detect and we are to have a truly global ban. That To comply with this declaration, the confirm as a CWC-prohibited activity.’’ is why this condition 29 should remain United States has given information to In conclusion, in light of these ongo- a part of the resolution of ratification. the Russians. Russia declared a 40,000 ing activities and related United States Quickly, to the four points: First, metric ton agent stockpile. However, intelligence estimates, it is reasonable reasonable progress in implementing present reports and other information to condition United States ratification the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agree- allege that the Defense Intelligence of the CWC to the President certifying ment. Reasonable progress simply Agency estimates that the former So- that Russia is committed to foregoing means that we are continuing to work viet—now Russian—stockpile could be chemical weapons capability or other on complying with it. That is what the as large as 75,000 tons. Russia has re- activity contrary to the purpose of the Russians agreed to do when they en- fused to provide information on the convention weapons treaty. tered into this agreement in June 1990. status of its binary weapons program. For those reasons, Mr. President, I This is an agreement between Presi- And, according to the former Director join the distinguished majority leader dent Bush and President Gorbachev. of Central Intelligence Jim Woolsey, and the chairman of the Foreign Rela- By the way, when proponents of this ‘‘The data we have received from Rus- tions Committee in urging that we not treaty speak of it as a Reagan-Bush- sia makes no reference to binary chem- strike this condition from the resolu- Clinton treaty, I point out the fact ical weapons or agents. That is con- tion of ratification. that the treaty was different in the trary to our understanding of the pro- Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair. Reagan and early Bush years than it is gram that was initiated in the former The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- now. One of the underpinnings of the Soviet Union.’’ ator from Delaware. treaty was that this bilateral destruc- There are additional indications of tion agreement between Russia and the activity on the part of the Russians, all Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, par- United States would be in place and of which suggest that they are not in liamentary inquiry: How much time is would be enforced and would be com- compliance with this 1989 memoran- under the control of the Senator from plied with by the two parties. This dum of understanding. Delaware? agreement was designed specifically to Our second point in this condition is The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seven- ban the production of chemical weap- getting compliance with that. teen minutes. ons, their agents, the destruction of Third, we want the Russians to ratify Mr. BIDEN. I yield 5 minutes to the chemical weapons agents, to provide this treaty at the same time that we distinguished Senator from Michigan. for onsite inspections of CW facilities, do. That is what they want to do. We Next, I will let people know that I un- and require data declarations. believe that will be a preferable course derstand Senator INHOFE is going to The Bilateral Destruction Agreement of action to the United States entering speak in opposition to this motion to is central to the CWC before us today. into the treaty causing the Russians to strike. Then I would like to yield, just Without it the Chemical Weapons Con- be concerned that we would set up the to let people know, 5 minutes to the vention is a much weaker treaty than rules of the treaty, in effect, in a way distinguished Senator from Virginia. it would otherwise be. The CWC was that would be amicable to their inter- That is for informational purposes. I negotiated with the assumption that ests, thus perhaps causing them never am not asking UC. the United States and Russia would to enter into the treaty. I now yield 5 minutes to the Senator both destroy and verify destruction of A CWC without Russia, furthermore, from Michigan. their stockpiles under the Bilateral De- means that over 50 percent of the Mr. HELMS. I ask for the yeas and struction Agreement. But Russia has world’s known chemical weapons nays. not implemented the Bilateral De- stockpile will be outside of the treaty The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a struction Agreement, and it appears regime. Should the United States rat- sufficient second? that it has no intention of doing so. ify the CWC absent Russian participa- There is a sufficient second. Russian Prime Minister tion or the involvement of other states The yeas and nays were ordered. Chernomyrdin, in this letter to Vice that have weapons, the treaty’s intru- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- President GORE that I mentioned be- sive verification schemes would, for all ator from Michigan is recognized. fore, essentially stated that the Bilat- intents and purposes, be focused solely eral Destruction Agreement and the on the United States, the only nation Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, it isn’t al- 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Under- likely to declare integral weapons in- ways that our top military officials so standing have outlived their usefulness ventory. In effect, we would be paying strongly and jointly agree that an insofar as Russia is concerned. 25 percent of the cost of the treaty to arms control treaty is in our national The Chemical Weapons Convention verify our own compliance. security interest. But in the case of the before us today is no substitute for the Finally, Russian commitment to chemical weapons treaty before the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. forego a chemical weapons capability. Senate today, that strong support has Under the Bilateral Destruction Agree- This is central to the meaning of the been expressed over and over and over ment, the inspectors of Russian facili- CWC. If Russia is not willing to do this, again. ties would not be international inspec- obviously their intentions are not to The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, tors. They would be U.S. professional comply with CWC. General Shalikashvili, speaking on be- inspectors, and there would be more We have evidence of the so-called half of the Chiefs of each of the serv- frequent inspections. The United Novichok class of nerve agents that is ices and the combatant commanders, States would have guaranteed access to more lethal than any other known urged the Senate to ratify this treaty data declarations, none of which would chemical agent in the world. because it would make it less likely be the case under the CWC. According to Jane’s Land-Based Air that our troops will face chemical So it is important that Russia at Defense 1997–98, Russia is developing weapons. Their position is not based on least indicate to us that it is making three new nerve agents, two of which politics or public opinion polls; it is reasonable progress to implement the are eight times as deadly as the VX based on their military judgment. BDA before we enter into force CWC. nerve agent stockpiled by Iraq. The acting head of Central Intel- Second, the resolution says there Mr. President, Russia’s new chemical ligence, George Tenet, has said that should be compliance with the 1989 Wy- agents do not depend on stockpiles this treaty will give us additional tools oming Memorandum of Understanding. that are on the CWC list of scheduled to inspect for chemical weapons that Without getting into a lot of detail, I chemicals, according to sources. Thus, we otherwise would not have. S3608 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 The United States, under former What does our ratification have to do get out a little bit earlier, including President Bush, led the way to the ne- with Russian ratification? I would sug- the distinguished occupant of the gotiation of this treaty. It would rep- gest here that we listen to a number of Chair. resent a tragic blow to American lead- voices. But one of them is a Russian Mr. President, this condition is very ership were the Senate to reject a trea- voice—a Russian scientist who blew important. It forbids the deposit of the ty negotiated and supported by three the whistle actually on the Soviet United States instrument of ratifica- Presidents. If we don’t lead the way, if Union chemical weapons program. His tion until Russia has made significant and when the day comes that we must name is Vil Myrzyanov. He is a high- progress in implementing the 1990 Bi- act militarily to eliminate a country’s level Russian scientist. This is what he lateral Destruction Agreement and has chemical weapons, the credibility of said about the relationship in a letter resolved concerns over its incomplete and support for, that effort will be un- that he wrote to Senator LUGAR. ‘‘Sen- data declarations under the Wyoming dermined by our lack of clean hands ate ratification of the convention is memorandum of understanding, rati- and our refusal to ratify a treaty that crucial to securing action on the treaty fied the convention and has committed makes it less likely those weapons will in Moscow.’’ to forgo the clandestine maintenance be created to begin with. Our ratification, he is telling us—this of chemical weapons production capa- The CWC destroys stockpiles that is an inside voice—is critical to getting bility. could threaten our troops; it signifi- the Duma to ratify this treaty. And That sounds like a lot but more than cantly improves our intelligence capa- getting the Duma to ratify this treaty anything else it is a measurement of bilities, and it creates new inter- is, in the eyes of General Shalikashvili, how Russia is playing games in terms national sanctions to punish those the single most important advantage of of not doing things to live up to its states that remain outside of the trea- the treaty because then 40,000 declared agreement. ty. If we fail to ratify the convention, tons of chemical agents, the largest I have the highest hope that Russia we will imperil our leadership in the stockpile in the world, will be de- one day will have a free enterprise entire area of nonproliferation, perhaps stroyed and less available for leakage, economy and all the rest of it, but such commitments by Russia are absolutely the most vital security issue of the less available to any potential sale or imperative and essential to the success post-cold-war era. disposition to others adversely or inad- of this CWC, this treaty, in securing a Relative to condition 29 that is be- vertently. truly global ban on possession and use fore us, there is a motion to strike this So our leadership is important to a of chemical weapons. If Russia contin- condition that has been made by the safer world. This is a treaty that we ues to drag its feet, this convention Senator from Indiana. It is based on helped to draft, negotiated, and now it will be worth almost nothing. And for many grounds. But the first ground is before us to ratify. But our leader- my part, as one Senator, I am ex- that he points out, which seems to me ship is also important to ratification of tremely concerned that Russia, the is the foremost ground even before we this treaty inside of Russia. country that possesses the largest and get to the details of this condition, is The decision of whether the United the most sophisticated chemical weap- that this condition is a killer condi- States ratifies this convention is for ons arsenal in the world, has refused tion. If this condition stays in this res- this body, the United States Senate to consistently to agree to implement its olution, it kills this ratification reso- decide—not the Russian Duma. We commitments to eliminate its chemi- lution because it makes it conditional should strike this killer condition. cal weapons stockpile despite the 1990 on somebody else ratifying. The purpose of both the Bilateral De- United States-Russian Bilateral De- Do we want to make our ratification struction Agreement and the Wyoming conditional upon these other events? struction Agreement. MOU was to help make progress to- Now, put any face on it you want, but Do we want to give Russia the power to wards achieving a CWC. if Russia fails to do that, then Russia decide our participation in the leader- Now that we have the CWC complete, is telling this Senate, this Govern- ship of this crucial treaty? The Presi- the BDA and the Wyoming MOU are ment, the American people, we don’t dent has said—I am here quoting him— less relevant. We can enter the CWC care what you want; we are going our ‘‘This is precisely backwards. The best without the BDA being implemented. way. And that is a pretty dangerous po- way to secure Russian ratification is to The BDA does not go as far as the sition for Russia to take in terms of ratify the treaty ourselves. Failure to CWC. BDA would permit both sides to world peace. do so will not only give hard-liners in keep 5,000 tons of chemical agent. The This coupled with the Russian with- Russia an excuse to hold out but also BDA does not permit challenge inspec- drawal from the BDA and the Russian to hold onto their chemical weapons.’’ tions. Parliament rejection of the chemical Do we want Russia to ratify? Clearly The CWC requires complete destruc- weapons destruction plan portend omi- we do. General Shalikashvili, who has tion of all chemical weapons, and pro- nous things to come in terms of Rus- so strongly supported the ratification vides for challenge inspections to any sia’s ratification of this treaty. of this treaty, has testified before us in facility suspected of a violating sus- Now, I hope Senators are aware, and the Armed Services Committee as fol- pected of violating the CWC. if they are not aware, that they will lows: ‘‘The most significant advantage If the CWC is ratified by the United become aware, that Russia is by far derived from the convention is the po- States—which this killer condition and away the world’s largest possessor tential elimination of chemical weap- would prohibit—and by Russia—it is of chemical weapons. If the United ons by state parties.’’ He went on to entirely possible that the United States in eliminating its own chemical say, ‘‘Eventual destruction of approxi- States and Russia can finish negotia- stockpile could assure that Russia also mately 40,000 tons of declared Russian tions on the BDA and let it enter into destroyed its stockpile through the Bi- chemical weapons will significantly re- force. lateral Destruction Agreement, 99 per- duce the global chemical threat.’’ If the United States does not ratify cent of the world’s chemical arsenal That is why General Shalikashvili this convention, there is little chance would be eliminated independently of has said, among other reasons, that the Russia will ratify it and there is no this treaty. So that gives you some ratification of this treaty will make it chance for this BDA ever entering into idea of the enormity of this situation less likely that our troops would ever force. which has been passed over and over face chemical weapons because the If we want Russia to ratify the and over. I think enough is enough. largest declared stockpile by Russia CWC—and surely we must—then we Now, of course, Russia has signed the must be destroyed under this treaty. should ratify the CWC—which, in turn CWC but it has not ratified this treaty. General Shalikashvili, Chairman of our requires us to strike this condition. Evidence has come to light recently, by Joint Chiefs, speaking for each of the The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- the way, suggesting that Russia may chiefs and our combatant commanders, ator from North Carolina is recognized. not pursue ratification of this treaty in says that destruction of 40,000 tons of Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. the near term and does not intend to declared chemical weapons by Russia is Mr. President, I am going to abbre- abide by the CWC even if it ratifies it. the most significant advantage to this viate my statement in the interest of I just want Senators to understand treaty. time, hoping that we can help Senators what they are doing. It is all very well April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3609 and good to succumb to the imagina- ask unanimous consent that these let- holes in the agreements with the obvious in- tive suggestion that we are doing ters be printed in the RECORD. tent of enabling him and others to engage in something about chemical weapons There being no objection, the mate- chemical trafficking with impunity—and when we pass this treaty. We are not. rial was ordered to be printed in the possibly to permit Russia to evade its obliga- tions. It is not going to do one bit of good RECORD, as follows: I respectfully request a thorough analysis until the United States is able to per- U.S. SENATE, of the negotiating record of the CWC and the COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, suade some other people to do things Bilateral Destruction Agreement in order to that they have already agreed to do. So Washington, DC, October 25, 1995. The PRESIDENT, review the role of General Kuntsevich in se- the danger is how the American people The White House curing various provisions and concessions. I are being misled by those who have en- Washington, D.C. regard this analysis to be essential to any dorsed this treaty into believing that DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I take no offense at credible review. something is being done about chemi- your declaration to the effect that I am irre- Furthermore, I need to know General cal weaponry. sponsibly delaying consideration of the Kuntsevich’s role in the provision of ques- I hope, if we do nothing else in our Chemical Weapons Convention. Both of us tionable data declarations under the Wyo- opposition to this treaty, we can make know that this is not so. Moreover, the CWC ming Memorandum. Has he been allowed to the American people aware that noth- is a treaty which in my view must not be se- retain contacts with the Yeltsin government riously considered by Congress unless and since his removal? ing is being done for their safety by until the issue of verification can be re- There are three other questions, Mr. Presi- this treaty. I wish it were different. I solved. dent, that simply must be answered: wish I did not have to stand here and There is no disagreement that the produc- (1) When did the U.S. government learn of say this. But those are the facts. This tion stockpiling and use of chemical and bio- General Kuntsevich’s role in trafficking logical weapons is inherently abhorrent, and treaty is absolutely useless in terms of chemical weapons and other corrupt prac- especially by rogue regimes. Yours is the giving the American people any secu- tices? second Administration with which I have rity at all. (2) Were you aware of his activities, and According to a May 6, 1996, letter raised compelling questions about verifica- tion, Russian compliance, Russian binary his arrest, while you were urging the Con- from the DIA, the Defense Intelligence weapons programs—and the cost of the gress to move forward on the ratification of Agency, to the chairman of the Senate Chemical Weapons Convention. the CWC? Select Committee on Intelligence: If and when we receive satisfactory an- (3) If General Kuntsevich has been under There are several factors affecting Russia’s swers to these concerns, there would be a house arrest since April 1994, what could ex- actions regarding its CW programs and arms substantial increase in the probability of plain the timing of the Russian govern- control commitments. Russian officials this treaty’s being reported out of the For- ment’s revelations regarding his activities? probably believe they need a CW capability eign Relations Committee for formal consid- The Russian government should be urged to deter other nations from chemical war- eration by the Senate. to accelerate and complete its investigation fare. They cite a potential threat from pur- I was astounded to learn, as surely you of General Kuntsevich. I do hope you will ob- ported CW programs in the United States, were, that the former Chairman of the [Rus- tain from the Russian government a full ac- other Western nations, and several countries sian] President’s Committee on Conven- counting of precisely what was sold and to on or near Russia’s borders. tional Problems of Chemical and Biological whom, and how Russian export controls were Now, the DIA continued: Weapons, Lieutenant General Anatoliy circumvented. Additionally, what pre- Kuntsevich, is now under the house arrest cautions, if any, have been taken to prevent In addition, Russian officials believe that for his having delivered 1,800 pounds of mili- such future incidents from occurring? dismantling the CW program would waste re- tary chemicals to terrorists in the Middle Obviously, unless and until these concerns sources and rob them of valuable production East in 1993. What’s more, the Russian intel- assets. They maintain that the CW produc- and those raised previously have been ad- ligence service asserts that General dressed, it would not be fair to the security tion facilities should not be destroyed but be Kuntsevich attempted to sell 5 tons of mili- used to produce commercial products. and safety of the American people even to tary chemicals to the same buyers a year consider moving the Chemical Weapons Con- Well, la-de-da. Every nation that has later, in 1994. He was caught in the act. vention out of Committee. some ulterior motives with chemical Needless to say, the arrest of this key Rus- Respectfully, weapons can say the same thing. sian negotiator of the Chemical Weapons JESSE HELMS. Convention on trafficking charges—for deal- Moreover, these officials do not want to ing in the very same chemical agents he was U.S. SENATE, see their life’s work destroyed, their jobs supposedly trying to control—calls into eliminated, and their influence diminished. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, question the integrity of every provision of Washington, DC, October 30, 1995. And here we are probably going to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It cer- DEAR COLLEAGUE: I am confident that you ratify this treaty in spite of the great tainly lends credibility to concerns about he were astonished, as I was, that Russia’s trustworthiness of Russian declarations re- concern about the views of Russia’s former chief negotiator for the Chemical garding its own current chemical and bio- senior military leadership on the Weapons Convention is now under house ar- logical programs, its stockpiles, and the sin- Chemical Weapons Convention and on rest for trafficking in the very military cerity of the Russians’ willingness, and abil- the elimination of Russia’s chemical chemicals he purportedly was seeking to ity, to abide by the CWC and other agree- control. Apparently, General Kuntsevich in warfare capability in general. ments. 1993 sold 1,800 pounds of chemical agents to On numerous instances, the United General Kuntsevich’s role in chemical terrorists in the Middle East. He was caught States has received indications that weapons dates to the 1980s. As Deputy Com- attempting to sell another 5 tons a year key elements within the Russian Gov- mander of Soviet Chemical Forces, he was later. ernment staunchly oppose the CWC. honored as a hero of Socialist Labor in 1981. Many of us have consistently raised con- Back in 1994, October 25, Dr. Lev In 1988, he became a member of the Soviet cerns regarding the verifiability and enforce- Fyodorov—I never met him, do not delegation to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, which negotiated the CWC. ability of the Chemical Weapons Convention. know how to pronounce his name— In 1991, he received the Lenin Prize for his This most recent incident makes it demon- head of the Union for Chemical Secu- work on binary chemical weapons. Through strable that the CWC, even had it been in ef- rity, told Interfax news service that his many years as a negotiator for the So- fect, would have been helpless to interdict il- key officers from the Russian Ministry viet/Russian governments, Kuntsevich won a licit trade in chemicals. (General Kuntsevich of Defense had spoken against the trea- number of concessions on the Chemical is alleged to have transferred chemicals not ty during the Russian Duma defense Weapons Convention and follow-on provi- listed in the chemicals annex of the CWC, committee’s closed hearings on Octo- sions to the Bilateral Destruction Agree- and those chemicals went to a country that ment. Moreover, he was responsible for Rus- was not even a signatory to the Convention. ber 11 1994. He was caught red-handed by traditional, na- Now, my concerns about the two Rus- sia’s dubious declarations under the Wyo- ming Memorandum of Understanding. tional law enforcement means, not by some sian generals responsible for Russia’s While General Kuntsevich is said to have global policing mechanism.) chemical warfare elimination program been removed by President Yeltsin in April Furthermore, had General Kuntsevich not have been well documented in a series 1994, concern remains that the General may been caught, it is conceivable that he and/or of letters to President Clinton, and I have conspired to negotiate significant loop- his cronies may have worked their way into S3610 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 the administrative body of the CWC, and indefinitely—or risk the possibility that ment the six-year old U.S.-Russian Bilateral would then have access to a plethora of in- Russia will never ratify the CWC. Destruction Agreement (BDA) or pursue formation regarding the chemical programs I am concerned that nearly a month has ratification of the CWC in the near future. of all signatories, and forewarning of all elapsed and the Senate Foreign Relations Mr. President, since writing to you, my short-notice inspections to be conducted Committee has yet to be notified of such an concerns as to whether Russia intends to im- under the Convention. ominous change in Russian policy towards plement the BDA and ratify the CWC have The attached letter that I sent to Presi- the destruction of its chemical arsenal. been confirmed beyond peradventure. To be dent Clinton underscores my concerns aris- Accordingly, I respectfully request imme- specific: Russian Prime Minister ing from the arrest of General Kuntsevich. diate declassification of any documents or Chernomyrdin wrote to Vice President Gore Given Kuntsevich’s influence over the nego- cables pertaining to the aforementioned is- on July 8, stating officially that both the tiating process of the CWC, and his respon- sues, including cable number 607329 dis- BDA and the Wyoming Memorandum of Un- sibility for overseeing the destruction of his patched from Bonn on May 21, 1996, and their derstanding (MOU) have outlived their use- own personal empire under the U.S.-Russian being provided to the Committee. I also re- fulness to Russia. Moreover, it has been es- Bilateral Destruction Agreement, I have re- spectfully request detailed, and unclassified tablished that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin quested a thorough review of the negotiating responses to the following questions: (1) linked Russian ratification of the CWC to record of both agreements. (1) Has the intelligence community con- U.S. agreement to a Joint Statement linking I bring this new incident to your attention ducted any assessment identifying Russian ratification by the United States to Russian as the Senate continues its discussion of is- officials believed to oppose dismantlement of ratification, (2) stated that the American sues surrounding the Chemical Weapons Con- Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile, or who taxpayers must pay the cost of the Russian vention. General Kuntsevich’s activities and oppose Russian ratification of the CWC? destruction program, and (3) linked ratifica- arrest highlight the many legitimate con- Please declassify these reports provide them tion to U.S. acquiescence to Russia’s posi- cerns we all share regarding how best to to the Committee. tion on conversion of its chemical weapons guard against the threat that chemical (2) The Central Intelligence Agency stated facilities. weapons pose to our nation’s security. in a report in March, 1995, that ‘‘some CW- Even more disturbing is the report that Respectfully, capable countries that have signed the CWC the Prime Minister declared that if the CWC JESSE HELMS. show no signs of ending their programs.’’ enters into force without Russia, it will be Does the intelligence community believe impossible for Russia ever to ratify the trea- U.S. SENATE, that Russia intends to forgo all aspects of its ty. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, chemical weapons program? Mr. President, the Russian Federation ap- Washington, DC, June 21, 1996. (3) Is it the case that Russia has not yet pears to anticipate that due to intense U.S. The PRESIDENT, constructed even a pilot chemical weapons diplomatic lobbying the CWC may enter into The White House, destruction facility? Is it also true that the force this summer. I am concerned that U.S. Washington, DC. Shchuch’ye Implementation Plan exists only efforts at inducing nations to ratify the trea- DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I was gratified to on paper, and that the plan does not yet even ty, and bring it into force before the views of note your Administration’s decision to im- include such rudimentary components as the United States Senate have been ex- pose sanctions against Lieutenant General baseline data, engineering survey data, or a pressed on the CWC, have virtually ensured Anatoliy Kuntsevich, former Chairman of site feasibility study? How many years will that neither the United States nor Russia the [Russian] President’s Committee on Con- finalization of these critical elements of the will have a hand in finalizing the 37 ventional Problems of Chemical and Biologi- Russian destruction program take? uncompleted implementation procedures of cal Weapons. (I had written to you on Octo- (4) On June 23, 1994, the then-Director of the treaty. Once 65 countries have ratified, ber 25, 1995 regarding his having been ar- Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, all manner of detailed guidelines affecting rested on charges of selling military chemi- stated that the U.S. had ‘‘serious concerns the CWC’s verification regime, ranging from cals to Middle East terrorists.) over apparent incompleteness, inconsistency the conduct of inspections to the safeguard- Disturbing information about General and contradictory aspects of the data’’ pro- ing of samples transferred for analysis off- Kuntsevich’s activities prompted my con- vided to the United States by Russia regard- site, will be finalized rapidly. cerns about whether the U.S. can believe ing its chemical weapons program. How will Prime Minister Chernomyrdin’s letter was Russian declarations regarding: (1) its cur- Russian withdrawal from the BDA affect clear: ‘‘Speaking candidly,’’ he wrote ‘‘I shall rent chemical and biological programs and U.S. efforts to resolve questions regarding say that the Convention’s entry into force stockpiles; (2) its willingness to abide by the ‘‘contradictions’’ in Russia’s declarations without Russia would hamper its ratification 1990 U.S.-Russian Bilateral Destruction about its chemical weapons stockpile? Is the with us.’’ On July 22, 1996, the Russian dele- Agreement (BDA); and (3) its intent to ratify Administration prepared to challenge imme- gation in The Hague repeated this position, the Chemical Weapons Convention. diately the veracity of Russian reporting stating that ‘‘the entry into force of the Con- General Kuntsevich was, after all, one of under the CWC if Russia provides data which vention without Russia, to be perfectly can- the most senior officers in Russia’s chemical mirrors that provided to the United States did, would hamper its ratification in our weapons program. Indeed, in 1994 it was he under the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Un- country.’’ who signed, in conjunction with Colonel Gen- derstanding? Since Russia is bound to know that the eral S.V. Petrov, the U.S.-Russian work plan (5) Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former chief of treaty will enter into force without Russia’s for the destruction of Russia’s chemical counterintelligence at the State Union Sci- participation, is it not evident that Russia is weapons. entific Research Institute for Organic Chem- preparing a diplomatic exit strategy from At that time, your National Security Advi- istry and Technology, has alleged that Rus- the CWC? sor assured me that General Kuntsevich was sia has produced a new class of binary nerve The Senate needs to be informed by the acting independently of the Russian govern- agents five to eight times more lethal than Administration precisely how Russian with- ment. I was also told that his actions in no any other known chemical agent, and that drawal from the BDA and the Wyoming MOU way called into question the willingness of work may be continuing on these chemical will affect U.S. efforts to resolve questions Russia to abide by its commitments to weapons. Is the Administration satisfied concerning Russia’s various declarations eliminate its stockpile of chemical weapons. that the Russian Federation has indeed about its chemical weapons stockpile. However, it subsequently came to my atten- ceased the development and/or production of The Director of Central Intelligence, tion that yet another high-ranking Russian all offensive chemical weapons agents? James Woolsey, testified on June 23, 1994, general, General Petrov, has openly alluded I will appreciate your assistance in resolv- that the U.S. had ‘‘serious concerns over ap- to the desirability of maintaining a chemical ing these questions which concern issues parent incompleteness, inconsistency and weapons capability. General Petrov, the which so directly impact on the national se- contradictory aspects of the data’’ submitted other signatory to the 1994 Work Plan, ex- curity of the United States. by Russia under the Wyoming MOU. pressed his views in the November-December Respectfully, So, Mr. President, if Russia is now refusing 1994 edition of the official Russian Military JESSE HELMS. to answer any more questions about the size Journal, Military Thought. Such a belief, of its chemical weapons stockpile or its bi- stated publicly by a key Russian officer, U.S. SENATE, nary weapons program (which it has failed to prompts concern that key elements within COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, mention at all), does this not cast doubt as the Russian government may not even in- Washington, DC, July 26, 1996. to whether Russia will ever fully disclose its tend to implement the BDA, ratify the The PRESIDENT, chemical weapons activities? Is the Adminis- CWC—or abide by either agreement. The White House tration prepared to challenge immediately Most troubling to me, however, are rumors Washington, DC. the veracity of Russian reporting under the that have begun to circulate that Russia no DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: When I wrote to you CWC if Russia provides data which mirrors longer favors implementation of the six-year on June 21 regarding perhaps the most sig- that provided to the United States under the old Bilateral Destruction Agreement. I fur- nificant, ominous shift in Russian arms con- Wyoming MOU? ther understand that Russia will not seek to trol policy since the end of the Cold War, I Additionally, given that the bilateral in- ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention in respectfully requested, among other things, spection regime (under the BDA) was to have the near future, and that the United States information from the Administration con- substituted for multilateral inspections has been told to delay its own ratification cerning reports that Russia will not imple- under the CWC, does Russian withdrawal April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3611 from the BDA lower the intelligence commu- weapons facilities. The shift in Russian cial products. The plant receives a license nity’s already poor level of confidence in its arms control policy, you see, will have for production and goes into operation. Nei- ability to monitor Russian treaty compli- important ramifications. ther the firm’s leaders, its staff, nor inter- ance? First, the minimalist approaches national inspectors know that the chemicals Mr. President, I respectfully reiterate my are a component of a new binary weapon. request for detailed, and unclassified re- taken by Russia in its data declaration As the public talks toward banning chemi- sponses to the questions I asked of you on on the Wyoming memorandum of un- cal weapons progressed, the more intense be- June 21, 1996. I also will appreciate your pro- derstanding will go unresolved. Russia came Russia’s secret development and test- viding to the Committee: has stated that the total size of its ing of binary weapons... our laboratories cre- (1) the Chernomyrdin letter of July 8, 1996, stockpiled chemical weapons is equiva- ated Substance A–230, a weapon about which which I understand must be unclassified lent to 40,000 tons of agent. This dec- I can only say that its killing efficiency sur- since it was transmitted by facsimile around laration is absolutely untrue. The Di- passed any known military toxin by a factor Washington on unsecured lines; rector of Central Intelligence, James of five to eight. (2) all assessments by the intelligence com- ...Two more major achievements took munity discussing the views of Prime Min- Woolsey, testified before the Foreign place in 1990 and 1991. First, a binary weapon ister Chernomyrdin towards the BDA, the Relations Committee on June 23, 1994, based on a compound code-named Substance CWC, and any assessments as to whether he that the United States had ‘‘serious 33 passed site tests and was put into produc- favors complete elimination of Russia’s concerns over apparent incomplete- tion for the Soviet army. chemical weapons arsenal; ness, inconsistency and contradictory ...The second development was the syn- (3) the draft Joint Statement and all rel- aspects of the data’’ submitted by Rus- thesis of a binary weapon based on Sub- evant documents supplied by Russia to Vice sia under the Wyoming MOU. On Au- stance A–232, a toxin similar to A–230. This President Gore prior to the President’s Mos- gust 27, 1993, Adm. William Studeman, new weapon, part of the ultra-lethal cow Summit; ‘‘Novichok’’ class, provides an opportunity (4) a detailed assessment of discrepancies Acting Director of Central Intel- for the military establishment to disguise in Russia’s Wyoming MOU data and the re- ligence, wrote to Senator GLENN stat- production of components of binary weapons sults of any bilateral discussions regarding ing: as common agricultural chemicals; because those discrepancies; We cannot confirm that the Russian dec- the West does not know the formula, and its (5) a detailed assessment by the intel- laration of 40,000 mt is accurate. In addition, inspectors cannot identify the compounds. ligence community of the impact that non- we cannot confirm that the total stockpile is ...Fifteen thousand tons of Substance 33 implementation of the BDA and Wyoming stored only at the seven sites declared by the have been produced in the city of MOU will have upon the U.S. ability to mon- Soviets... Novocheborksarsk... But our generals have itor Russian compliance with the CWC; Articles in both the Washington Post told the U.S. that Novocheborksarsk is turn- (6) a detailed estimate of the additional ing out another substance known as VX. cost to the United States of implementing and the Washington Times alleged that the CWC without the BDA in place; the Defense Intelligence Agency has es- Dr. Mirzayanov and other dissident (7) an estimate of the total cost of destroy- timated the Soviet stockpile could be Russian scientists have claimed that ing Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile; and as large as 75,000 metric tons. Russia’s binary weapons program has (8) all documents relating to any discus- Omissions in Russia’s MOU data dec- been specifically crafted to evade de- sions with or assurances made to Russia by larations have clear implications for tection under the verification regime the Administration regarding U.S. assistance of the CWC. They allege that compo- to the Russian destruction program. how Russia will interpret the various provisions of the CWC. Because the nents for the binary agents have been In closing, Mr. President, I should note for given legitimate commercial applica- the record that the unanimous consent BDA mandates annual updates to the agreement in the Senate (to proceed to con- Wyoming MOU, Russian withdrawal tions, that they are not covered under sideration of the CWC on or before Septem- from the BDA may also signal that the CWC’s schedules, and that OPCW ber 14, 1996) is predicated entirely upon the Russia will henceforth refuse to enter- inspectors will not know what they are administration’s providing ‘‘such facts and tain any additional United States ques- examining when they come across such documents as requested by the Chairman and tions about the size of its chemical chemicals. The United States should ranking minority member of the Foreign Re- not ratify the CWC until Russia agrees lations Committee.’’ weapons stockpile or its binary weap- ons program. Senators should be con- to forgo this abhorrent program. I hope we can work together on this mat- Third, the BDA provides for United ter. I will appreciate your assistance in re- cerned that Russia may intend to pro- solving these questions concerning issues vide to the OPCW data which mirrors States on-site inspections of Russian which so directly impact on the national se- that provided under the Wyoming storage, destruction and production fa- curity of the United States and the Amer- MOU. This would, in this Senator’s cilities, combined with data declara- ican people. view, serve as a clear indicator that tions. The United States can expect to Respectfully, Russia intends to violate the CWC. gain real monitoring benefits from the JESSE HELMS. Second, Russia has consistently re- CWC only if the Bilateral Destruction Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we are fused to provide information on the Agreement [BDA] is implemented. This all aware of how the administration status of its binary chemical weapons agreement provides for United States has refused, refused to provide the Sen- program. On June 23, 1994, then-Direc- on-site inspections of Russian storage, ate, despite my repeated requests, my tor of Central Intelligence James Wool- destruction and production facilities. repeated entreaties to them, to give us sey declared that ‘‘the data we have re- Without the BDA, the United States an updated assessment of the Russian ceived from Russia makes no reference will be forced to verify Russian CWC position regarding the BDA and the to binary chemical weapons or agents. compliance based upon a smaller num- CWC. That is contrary to our understanding ber of inspections than anticipated Russian Prime Minister of the program that was initiated by under the bilateral arrangement, with Chernomyrdin wrote to Vice President the former Soviet Union.’’ inspections of Russian sites by the GORE on July 8, 1996 stating that both Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former chief of OPCW rather than by United States the BDA and the 1989 Wyoming memo- counterintelligence at the State Union personnel, and with no guaranteed randum of understanding have outlived Scientific Research Institute for Or- United States access to detailed in- their usefulness to Russia, don’t you ganic Chemistry and Technology, has spection data. In other words, the in- see. Moreover, the Prime Minister, one, stated that the Russian Federation telligence community’s already poor tied Russian ratification of this treaty, may continue work on novel nerve confidence level in its ability to mon- the CWC, to United States agreement agents far more lethal than any other itor Russian treaty compliance will to a joint statement linking ratifica- known chemical agents—substance A– fall even lower. tion by the United States to Russian 230, substance 33, and substance A–232. Fourth, Russian insistence on exclud- ratification; two, stated that the In an article in the Wall Street Journal ing several of its chemical weapons-re- American taxpayers—get this—the on May 25, 1994, Dr. Mirzayanov wrote: lated facilities from the BDA’s defini- American taxpayers must pay the cost tion of ‘‘chemical weapons production It is very easy to produce binary weapons of the Russian destruction program; without detection under the guise of agricul- facility,’’ and hence from the CWC’s and three, he linked ratification to tural petrochemicals. The products easily definition, relates directly to its desire United States acquiescence to Russia’s pass all safety tests and become registered to maintain a clandestine chemical position on conversion of its chemical with the government as legitimate commer- weapons production capability. The S3612 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 United States refusal to accede to the tougher the issue, the closer the divi- look upon this treaty—as we should Russian position, which would have—in sion within the ranks of the Senate and look upon all treaties—as a living doc- turn—strengthened the Russian case most particularly within our party, the ument, a document that must be for facility conversions under the CWC, tougher the leadership challenge. I am changed by the conscientious efforts of may be a primary reason that Russia proud to join others in saying our lead- the signatories to this treaty. It must has refused to implement the BDA. We er has met that challenge. be changed to meet the advancements should not, under any circumstance, Likewise, my distinguished colleague of technology in the area of chemical allow Russia to exclude its chemical and friend from day one in the Senate, weapons; it must be changed to address weapons facilities from inspection. the senior Senator from North Caro- the concerns that have been raised dur- Moreover, without the bilateral lina, together with Senators KYL and ing this debate. agreement the OPCW will increase the SMITH and INHOFE, have met the chal- Like our Constitution—a document size of its international inspectorate lenge. They have ensured that the Sen- that has lived and survived so that we, and purchase of additional equipment. ate has conducted a full and thorough the United States, are the oldest con- This will drive up vastly the expected debate on this treaty, and they have tinuously functioning form of demo- costs of the regime. Further, the CWC been instrumental in achieving the 28 cratic republic on Earth—this conven- requires States Parties to pay for mon- conditions which have been adopted by tion must be a living document. Our itoring of their chemical weapons pro- the Senate. Those conditions have im- Constitution has been amended. It duction, storage, and disposal facili- proved the document which the Presi- shall be amended, perhaps, in the fu- ties. dent submitted to the Senate in 1993. ture. Because it is a living document. Mr. President, I guess we ought to re- There is a clear division within the It has adapted to the many changes we spond once more—it is an exercise in ranks of Republicans on this issue, and have witnessed as a nation. futility, but we ought to keep respond- it has been a conscientious and This treaty must be regarded as a liv- ing to that old litany that we have thoughtful process by which each has ing document and it is incumbent upon heard this day about making the Unit- reached his or her position. this President and his successors there- ed States ratification of the CWC con- Now, Mr. President, to go to the sub- after to work conscientiously, within tingent upon Russia’s acting first. ject itself. I will not go into the details the arena, to see that it is strength- Let us look at a little bit of history. of this treaty. I would like to speak to ened. This Senate approved the START II the broader issue. The work in this debate has gone far treaty amidst a clamor of claims by I first learned of chemical weapons at to show that it is a living document. the administration that a failure to act the knee of my father who was a sur- Under the leadership of Senator HELMS was preventing Russian approval of geon in the trenches in World War I. He and Senator LOTT we have already that treaty. Does anybody hear any- described to me in vivid detail how he brought about a number of changes. thing familiar about that? More than cared for the helpless victims of that The Senate may effect further changes 15 months have passed and the Russian weapon. as the evening progresses. But the im- Duma still has not approved START II. On through my years on the Armed portant thing we must keep in mind is Instead, the Russian leadership ren- Services Committee, where I was the that this document must be regarded dered ratification of the START II point man in the 1980’s to drive as one that has to be improved. And it treaty contingent upon United States through the legislation for binary is the leadership of the United States acquiescence to Russian interpretation chemical weapons because I wanted that must step forward to achieve that of, get this, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Mis- this country to be prepared to deter goal. sile Treaty and now the Chemical the use of those weapons. And, then, I yield the floor. through the Reagan-Bush era, our Na- Weapons Convention is being tied to The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BEN- tion has come full circle, and decided NATO enlargement and other issues. NETT). The Senator from North Caro- Mr. President, surely, surely, Sen- to lead in the effort to eliminate these lina. weapons. Whether that can be done I ators will not fail to refuse such link- Mr. HELMS. May I ask the distin- know not, nor does anyone. But we ages, and the best way to do it is to re- guished Senator from Oklahoma how cannot turn back now from that lead- quire, to stipulate unmistakably that much time he believes he will need? Russia must act in good faith and rat- ership role. This treaty does not meet my full ex- Mr. INHOFE. May I have 6 minutes? ify the Chemical Weapons Convention Mr. HELMS. I yield 7 minutes to the first. Indeed, in his letter to Vice Presi- pectations. But I think we can fight better in the arena, in the ring, to im- Senator. dent Gore, the Prime Minister of Rus- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- sia stated that the United States prove this treaty than were we to stay outside and peer over the ropes. It is ator from North Carolina has 5 minutes should wait for Russia. remaining on the amendment. I urge Senators to reject that motion for that reason that I shall cast my The Senator is recognized for the re- to strike. final vote in support of this conven- mainder of the time. I yield the floor. I do not know who tion. has been waiting the longest. I recall the ABM Treaty. I was in Mr. INHOFE. I inquire of the Senator Mr. WARNER. I think the Senator Moscow as a part of President Nixon’s from North Carolina if he has other from Oklahoma, Mr. President, has team, as Secretary of the Navy. The Senators requesting time? been waiting longer than I. I will fol- drafters of that treaty put their minds The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- low him. to dealing with the threat at that pe- ator from North Carolina has 5 minutes Mr. HELMS. I did not see anybody riod of time. They never envisioned, remaining. over here. nor could they envision, a decade or Mr. HELMS. Yes. I think I have some Mr. LEVIN. Senator WARNER is going two decades hence, what the scientific time over in one corner. to get part of our time. community might produce. Therein we The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Mr. INHOFE. I think Senator WAR- have made a mistake as a nation by ator has time on the resolution, if he NER should go ahead since we are going not adapting that treaty over time to wishes. There are 5 minutes remaining back and forth across the aisle. deal with technological developments. on the motion. Mr. LEVIN. I yield 5 minutes to Sen- I shall continue to fight very vigor- Mr. HELMS. I understand that. I ator WARNER. ously to see that that treaty does not have 5 minutes. Then he would like 2 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- become written in stone so as to block minutes. So take it out of the other ator from Michigan yields to the Sen- the efforts of our Nation to properly pot. ator from Virginia. defend itself against attack from short- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I was range missiles. ator from Oklahoma is recognized for asked by a reporter my view of the dis- I cite that as an example, because up to 2—up to 7 minutes. tinguished majority leader’s role in technology is outpacing what the best Mr. INHOFE. Are you sure that’s this very important debate, and I re- minds in this Nation can draft—wheth- right? plied, without hesitation, that the er it is a treaty or a law. We have to The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3613 Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator But, one of the statements that was over again right now that we heard 2 from North Carolina. I do want to ad- made by the distinguished Senator years ago. Mr. President, 2 years ago dress this particular amendment. Be- from Michigan I thought was interest- we stood in this Chamber and they fore I do, I have three articles, and I ing. He said, if I got it right, and cor- said: If we don’t ratify this, Russia ask unanimous consent to have them rect me if I am wrong: ‘‘The single won’t ratify it. Here it is 2 years later printed in the RECORD after my re- most important reason to ratify the and Russia has not ratified it. marks. treaty is to encourage Russia to ratify So I think this is a very significant The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without it.’’ Again, if they do, it really does not requirement, the fact that Ronald objection, it is so ordered. seem to make that much difference be- Reagan said—and this is a direct quote, (See exhibit 1.) cause of their past history on what coming out of his committee at the Mr. INHOFE. The first one is a Wall they have done. time—for ratification, ‘‘All Soviet obli- Street Journal editorial of September I would like to clear up something gations of previous arms control agree- 9, 1996. I will just read the last para- because I think we have gone through ments would have to be corrected.’’ graph. a lot of debate on this issue. It has And we have five such agreements that Ultimately the treaty’s most pernicious ef- been clearly implied by both Repub- have not been corrected to date. fect is that it would lull most responsible na- licans who are supporting the ratifica- So, I hope no one stands on the floor tions into the false belief that they’d ‘‘done tion of the Chemical Weapons Conven- the rest of the evening and talks about something’’ about the chemical weapons problem and that it now was behind them. tion as well as Democrats who are sup- how Ronald Reagan would have ratified Yes, the world would be a better place with- porting it that this was started in the this Chemical Weapons Convention. out chemical weapons. But this treaty’s at- Reagan administration and that Ron- EXHIBIT 7 tempt to wave them away isn’t going to ald Reagan was in support of a chemi- [From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1996] make that happen. cal weapons treaty. POISONS FOR PEACE I happened to run across something The other two, one by Frank Gaffney, The greatest misperception about the Jr. and the other by Douglas Feith, ad- here that I am going to read. These are Chemical Weapons Convention, which comes dress the regulation problems that the conditions—I am going to save the before the Senate this week for ratification, would come from this to literally thou- best one until last—the conditions is that it can’t do any harm and might do sands of companies throughout Amer- under which Ronald Reagan said he some good. Former Reagan defense official ica. In fact, the Commerce Department would agree to the ratification of a Fred Ekle aptly calls this mind-set ‘‘poisons guidance on recordkeeping for affected chemical weapons convention. for peace.’’ Who could possibly be against businesses runs more than 50 pages. First, the condition was that strate- making the world safe from the horrors of Mr. President, you have run compa- gic defense initiative and theater mis- poison gas? In fact, this treaty would make sile defense systems would be deployed the horrors of poison gas an even greater nies. You know one of the major rea- possibility. sons we are not globally competitive and operational as one safeguard The first problem is that many of the na- here in the United States is that we are against cheating. tions we have cause to worry about most overregulated. There is a tremendous As we know, currently we do not aren’t about to sign. What good is a treaty cost to these regulations. If the re- have those in place. that doesn’t include Iraq or Libya or Syria quirements exceed 50 pages, imagine No. 2, that the Chemical Weapon or North Korea? Somehow knowing that New what the companies would have to do. Convention’s international executive Zealand and the Netherlands have both rati- Mr. President, in a way I think the council would consist of 15 members, fied it doesn’t help us sleep more soundly. other side of this has perhaps used the including the United States as one of Worse, the treaty would give all signato- the five permanent members, just like ries access to our latest chemical tech- wrong argument. There is an argument nology, since Article XI enjoins signatories they are overlooking, and that is it the U.N. Security Council. The current from keeping chemicals, information or does not seem to make a lot of dif- treaty gives us a 41-member executive equipment from one another. This means not ference whether Russia ratifies this or council, each with 2-year terms, and no only countries such as China and Russia, but not because, as we have said several permanent members; hence, no veto. also Cuba and Iran, which have both signed. times during the course of this debate, Third, that the United States would In other words, forget about the trade em- they ratified a lot of treaties, including have absolute veto power over all CWC bargoes and forget about foreign policy. The the 1990 Biological Weapons Destruc- decisions. Obviously, in this one there treaty would require the U.S. to facilitate is no veto power. Obviously, the Presi- the modernization of the chemical-weapons tion treaty, the ABM Treaty—that industry in a host of countries that just goes all the way back to the 1970’s—the dent would not have supported this. might use them. START I, CFE, INF. And while they President Reagan also, even though The second problem is verification. No one, have ratified these, they have not com- it is not on my list, verbally indicated not even its most ardent supporters in the plied. on more than one occasion that one of Administration, is naive enough to claim There are three steps you go through. his conditions would be that we would that the treaty is verifiable. Chemical weap- One is you have to sign them. Second, not have to incur the financial respon- ons are easy to make and easy to hide. The you ratify them. But, third, you have sibility, in the United States, of other sarin that was used in the attack in the countries complying with it. In fact, Tokyo subway last year was concocted in an to comply. And they have been found 812 room. Instituting snap inspections of out of compliance. I cannot imagine right now our compliance costs on this companies that make or use chemicals isn’t why we would expect that they would convention appear to be, according to going to stop a future Aum Shinri Kyo. Nor comply with this one if they ratified it the Foreign Relations Committee re- is it going to stop a determined government. if they have not complied with the pre- port, $13.6 billion and the cost of Rus- In addition, the inspection and reporting vious ones. sia complying with this would exceed procedures required under the treaty would The distinguished Senator from that. be a huge burden on American business, Michigan quoted, somewhat exten- It has been stated on this floor many which of course would become even more sively, Gen. John Shalikashvili, the times that Russia has somewhere be- nervous about industrial espionage. Senator tween 60 and 70 percent of all the chem- Jon Kyl estimates that up to 10,000 American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, companies would be affected at a cost ap- as saying that this would have the ef- ical weapons in the world, so, obviously proaching $1 billion a year. Every company fect of reducing the proliferation of it would be more than that. What is that uses or produces chemicals would fall chemical weapons. Russia going to do? Are they going to under the long arm of the treaty—companies I would only say, trying not to be re- comply? Let us say they go ahead and like Pfizer and Quaker Oats and Strohs dundant, if that is the case, then you ratify. If they ratify it, you know, ev- Brewery and Maxwell House Coffee and are taking his word over four previous eryone in this Chamber knows, that Goodyear Tire. Dial Corp., which uses 5,000 Secretaries of Defense: Dick Cheney, they are going to look to the United different chemicals to produce an array of James Schlesinger, Don Rumsfeld, and States to pay for their obligation under household products, estimates that it will have to spend $70,000 a year to meet the trea- Cap Weinberger, all four of whom said the treaty. That is what they are doing ty’s reporting requirements. this would have the effect of increasing on START II. In fact, I have to go back The small number of chemical companies the proliferation of chemical weapons and make that statement also, that we that make the lethal stuff would of course be and their use in the Middle East. are hearing this same argument all covered, too, and much has been made of the S3614 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 treaty’s endorsement by the Chemical Manu- For example, the administration convened [From the San Diego Union-Tribune, Sept. 8, facturers Association, which represents just a series of briefings for Senate staffers over 1996] 190 member companies and had a hand in for- the August recess. In these lopsided sessions, ‘‘OPEN UP IN THE NAME OF THE .. . ORGANIZA- mulating the treaty’s verification proce- a gaggle of 15 or more executive branch offi- TION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL dures. The industry is already very heavily cials harangued three of four folks from Cap- WEAPONS?’’ regulated, and the treaty’s inspection and re- itol Hill, in some cases for hours on end. Un- (By Douglas J. Feith) porting requirements wouldn’t be much of an fortunately, the briefers repeatedly misled The Chemical Weapons Convention would additional burden. It also can’t hurt that the the staffers—notably with respect to the be the first arms control agreement to reach treaty would increase its members’ trading costs of the CWC to American taxpayers and into the lives of non-military U.S. businesses and sales opportunities thanks to Article XI. to thousands of American companies. Among and impose costs and regulatory burdens. The list of problems with the treaty goes other things, the administration is signifi- It would oblige the government to adopt on and on. Constitutional scholar Robert cantly low-balling the U.S. portion of the ex- implementing legislation to compel a wide Bork raises the possibility that the verifica- penses associated the new U.N.-style inter- range of American businesses—including tion requirements might violate the Con- national bureaucracy created to gather data tire, paint, pharmaceutical, fertilizer and stitution’s ban on search and seizure, and its and conduct inspections. Clinton officials electronics manufacturers, distillers, food property rights guarantees. The Pentagon have also minimized the likely loss of propri- processors and oil refiners—to keep special isn’t happy with it since, under the Clinton etary data when a company’s sensitive facil- records. (The Commerce Department guid- Administration’s interpretation, it would ity is gone over for up to 84 hours by inspec- ance on record-keeping for affected busi- prohibit the military from using non-lethal tors who will be, likely as not, detailed from chemical agents. It’s not hard to imagine a nesses runs more than 50 pages.) foreign commercial espionage organizations. Affected businesses would be forced to sub- scenario in which the Army is forced to Incredibly, even some of the companies at shoot people because it’s not permitted to mit to routine and possibly ‘‘challenge’’ in- greatest risk appear to be susceptible to the spections by officials of an international or- use tear gas. administration’s disinformation on this Ultimately the treaty’s most pernicious ef- ganization—the Organization for the Prohi- score. Take, for example, an Aug. 7 letter to fect is that it would lull responsible nations bition of Chemical Weapons. The warrantless Sen. Richard Lugar from the Pharmaceutical into a false belief that they’d ‘‘done some- inspections, which may run afoul of U.S. thing’’ about the chemical weapons problem Research and Manufacturers of America constitutional rights under the Fourth and and that it now was behind them. Yes, the (PhARMA), a trade association for some of Fifth Amendments, could jeopardize impor- world would be a better place without chemi- the nation’s most cutting-edge biotech firms. tant private proprietary information. cal weapons. But this treaty’s attempt to Clinton officials reportedly induced The regulatory cost is just one of a number wave them away isn’t going to make that PhARMA’s president to tell the treaty’s top of flaws. In the final analysis, what the CWC happen. Senate cheerleader that it supported the amounts to is a general declaration, a state- CWC with the promise that the administra- ment of disapproval of chemical weapons [From the Washington Times, Sept. 4, 1996] tion would not allow the CWC’s verification that would be made sincerely only by the protocol to be extended to the existing (and IMPENDING CWC DEBATE world’s law-abiding nations. The treaty similarly unmonitorable) Biological Weap- (By Frank Gaffney, Jr.) would accomplish little more than the typi- ons Convention. There is a certain irony to the timing of cal United Nations General Assembly resolu- PhARMA’s members clearly understand an tion. Such rhetorical exercises are not nec- the looming Senate debate on the Chemical important reality: If, under the biological Weapons Convention. After all, in a sense essarily bad or useless, but they do not weapons treaty, America’s pharmaceutical amount to a whole lot. this treaty was the direct result of one of manufacturers were subjected to a reporting Saddam Hussein’s earlier genocidal oper- We would favor paying a substantial price and inspection regime similar to that of the ations against the Kurds of Northern Iraq. It for a ban on chemical weapon possession if CWC, they could lose their shirts. After all, came about after the abysmal 1989 con- such a ban covered the relevant countries on average these companies invest 12 years ference in Paris where scores of nations and it could be made effective through reli- and some $350 million to produce a new could not being themselves even to cite—let able detection of illegal production and breakthrough drug. Trial inspections suggest along condemn or sanction—the Iraqi gov- stockpiling. But such results hardly seem that a single on-site, inspection by a trained ernment for its use of chemical weapons likely. We tend to think of the Chemical intelligence operative could greatly reduce, against its own people, let alone the Iranian Weapons Convention this way: Even a price if not wipe out, the competitive advantage military. Such attacks directly violated the you may be willing to pay for a new car will acquired at such a high price. existing ‘‘international norm’’ on chemical appear ridiculously high if you learn that warfare: the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning The only problem with PhARMA’s stance the car cannot be made to drive. the use of chemical weapons. is, that many of its member companies will Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 2 find themselves subjected to precisely that In a bid to deflect criticism for the inter- minutes to the Senator from Massa- national community’s failure to enforce one danger under the terms of CWC. So might a great many other companies having nothing chusetts. relatively verifiable arms control treaty, the The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- politicians and diplomats decided to nego- to do with chemical weapons and in indus- tiate a new, utterly unverifiable agreement. tries as diverse as automotive, food process- ator from Massachusetts. After four years of further negotiations in ing, electronics, alcohol distilling and brew- Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I Geneva, a brand new ‘‘international norm’’ ing, oil refining, soap and detergents, cos- strongly support this treaty, and I against chemical warfare was minted: the metics, textiles and paint and tire manufac- strongly urge the Senate to ratify it. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). turers. Among the companies listed on a re- In a sense, this debate is as old as Now, readers of this column learned last cent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency America. Two centuries ago, with our week that, quite apart from the problems list of businesses ‘‘likely’’ to be affected by independence newly won, the Founding the CWC’s various requirements are: Eli with this treaty from the standpoint of its Fathers urged us to beware of ‘‘entan- verifiability and enforceability, there are a Lilly, Sherwin-Williams, Nutrasweet, Jim number of questions that have been posed Beam, Archer Daniels Midland, Lever Broth- gling foreign alliances.’’ They wrote about how the CWC has been affected by ers, Kaiser Aluminum, Goodyear Tire and into the Constitution a requirement Russian bad faith and other changed cir- Rubber, Xerox Raythoen and Conoco. If the that any treaty with foreign nations cumstances since the United States signed trade associations representing these major must be confirmed by a two-thirds vote up in 1993. Such questions were supposed to American businesses are operating under il- of the Senate. have been answered before the Senate con- lusions similar to PhARMA’s their member By any rational standard, this treaty sidered this accord on or before Sept. 14. As companies may wish to join the call for a meets that test. the answers are inconvenient (for instance, ‘‘time-out’’ on Senate action on the CWC. Nevertheless, the treaty is being op- Some senators may be tempted to ignore confirmation that Moscow is welching on a posed by an entrenched band of foreign 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement and de- the administration’s stonewalling of legiti- manding that the West pay the estimated mate and troubling questions relevant to the policy ideologues and isolationists who $3.3 billion it will take Russia to dismantle CWC that have been posed by their own lead- think the United Nations is the enemy its vast chemical arsenal), it has employed ership. Some may consider the administra- and who say the arms race should be its favorite tactic with regard to congres- tion’s understanding of the treaty’s associ- escalated, not restricted. History sional information requests: Stonewall. ated costs and its inflating of the claims ben- proved their ilk wrong once before, Since that column was written, however, efits to be business as usual for the Clinton when they sank the League of Nations the administration’s machinations on behalf team. It is, however, very much to be hoped in the 1920’s. And it will prove them of the Chemical Weapons Convention have, that at least 34 members of the U.S. Senate as Alice said of Wonderland, become will refuse to tolerate such behavior and, in- wrong again with far more drastic con- ‘‘curiouser and curiouser.’’ This is particu- sist that consideration of the Chemical sequences than World War II, if they larly evident in the Clinton teams’s efforts Weapons Convention be postponed until cor- prevail today. to dissemble about what the CWC won’t do— rective action can be taken and, failing that, We cannot let that happen. The Sen- and what it will. that the convention be defeated outright. ate should reject the remaining killer April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3615 amendments, and give this treaty the tle differences of opinion the wrong The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- two-thirds vote it needs and deserves. way. They are killer amendments. I ator from Pennsylvania is recognized. The 29-year-old pursuit of a chemical hope the Senate will note ‘‘no’’ on all Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would weapons treaty has finally reached its of them. If any of them passes, it will like to reserve 30 seconds of whatever moment of truth in the U.S. Senate. doom our participation in the treaty, my time is. Few votes cast in this Congress or any and relegate us to the company of out- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Congress are likely to be more impor- law regimes like North Korea and ator from Pennsylvania is recognized tant. Libya, who also reject the treaty. for 5 minutes. The effort to achieve this treaty was Two of the killer amendments condi- Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleague launched in 1968, and its history is tion our participation on whether from Delaware for yielding the time. Mr. President, on the pending issue, genuinely bipartisan. It has moved for- other nations—Russia, Iran, Iraq, having studied the conditions as to ward under Republican and Democratic Syria, and China—have already become what is sought here by way of prelimi- Presidents alike. In 1968, the final year participants. Essentially, they would nary action by Russia before ratifica- of the Johnson administration, inter- hand over U.S. security decisions to tion should occur by the United States, national negotiations began in Geneva those nations. it is my strong view that we really to build on the 1925 Geneva Protocol A third killer amendment arbitrarily ought not to play Gaston and Alphonse and try to reduce the production of excludes all representatives from cer- with the Russians to require them, as chemical weapons. tain other countries from participating article C does, for Russia to deposit In the 1970’s, President Gerald Ford in verification inspections. This their ratification before the United had the vision to take that initiative a amendment ignores the ability that States ratifies. major step forward during intense the treaty already gives us to reject I think that that sets up a condition international negotiations. any inspectors we believe are not trust- which is just not reasonable. If they President Ronald Reagan advanced it worthy. took the same position, as Alphonse to the next stage with his efforts on A fourth killer amendment omits and and Gaston, no one would ever enter arms control in the 1980’s. And Presi- alters other key parts of the treaty the door. dent Bush deserves high praise for em- that deal with the export of certain With respect to the other conditions bracing the ideal of eliminating chemi- materials. Its proponents fear that which are set forth here, all of the sub- cal weapons, for making it a serious rogue nations may gain valuable tech- stantive matters would be superseded worldwide effort, and at long last nology from us. by the Chemical Weapons Convention, bringing it to the stage where it was Nothing in the convention requires that the requirements set forth in this ready to be signed. In one of his last the United States to weaken its export treaty would impose more obligations acts in office, George Bush signed the controls. Experts in the chemical in- on Russia than are contained in these treaty, on January 13, 1993. dustry, trade organizations, and gov- instruments. President Clinton formally submit- ernment officials have worked to en- And under instrument A, where it is ted the Chemical Weapons Convention sure that nothing in the treaty threat- talked about, an agreement between to the Senate for its advice and con- ens our technology and industrial the United States and Russia, that was sent later that year. Now, it’s our turn. power. never formalized into an agreement be- Today, the Senate can and should join The fifth killer amendment places an cause all terms were never agreed to by in this historic endeavor to rid the unrealistically high standard of ver- the parties, so that this is not a condi- world of chemical weapons. We can be- ification on the treaty. It requires the tion which adds any measure of safety stow a precious gift on generations to treaty verification procedures to ac- to the United States since all of the re- come by freeing the world of an entire complish the impossible, by being able quirements imposed on Russia in these class of weapons of mass destruction. to detect small, not militarily signifi- collateral arrangements would be su- The chemical weapons treaty bans cant, amounts of dangerous chemical perseded and more stringent require- the development, production, stock- meterials. ments would be added by the Chemical piling, and use of toxic chemicals as No international agreement can ef- Weapons Convention. weapons. Previous agreements have fectively police small amounts of raw Mr. President, I compliment my col- merely limited weapons of mass de- materials that might possibly be used leagues on both sides for what I believe struction. But the Chemical Weapons in chemical weapons production. Every has been a very, very constructive de- Convention sets out to eliminate them effort is being made and will be made bate in the highest tradition of the from the face of the earth. to make the detection procedures as ef- U.S. Senate. I compliment the distin- The United States has already taken fective as possible. It is hypocritical guished chairman of this committee, Senator HELMS, for his determination. many steps unilaterally to implement for opponents to attempt to scuttle And it is noted that some 28 of the 33 a ban of our own. As long ago as 1968, this treaty because they feel it does conditions have been agreed to. Even this country ordered a moratorium on not go far enough. beyond those conditions, the President chemical weapons production. The overwhelming majority of past today, in writing to the distinguished When President Bush signed the trea- and present foreign policy officials, majority leader, has articulated fur- ty on behalf of the United States, he military leaders, large and small busi- ther safeguards which would be present also ordered the unilateral destruction nesses, Fortune 500 companies, Nobel so that in sum total we have an agree- of the U.S. stockpile of these weapons. laureates, veterans organizations, reli- ment which, while not perfect, ad- Regardless of the treaty, the United gious groups, environmentalists and vances the interest of arms control. States is destroying its chemical weap- public interest groups are united in In my capacity as the chairman of on stockpile. their strong support of the convention. the Senate Veterans Committee, I have Today culminates many years of It is a practical international agree- chaired hearings on the issue of the work and compromise. The Senate has ment with practical benefits for the gulf war syndrome where there is evi- held 17 hearings on the convention. United States, and the United States dence that our veterans in the gulf Every issue has been exhaustively ana- should be a part of it. were damaged by chemical substances, lyzed. The result is the shoot-out that Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much not conclusively, but that is the indi- the leadership has arranged today on time do I have on this amendment? cation, and that had such a treaty been this series of killer amendments. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- in effect, again, not conclusive, but a Bipartisan negotiations have ator from Delaware has 5 minutes 45 strong indication, that our troops achieved agreement on 28 amendments seconds. might have been saved to some extent. to the treaty, none of which go to the Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, unless And certainly if we intend to take a heart of the treaty and many of which there is someone in opposition, I yield firm stand on a moral plane, the Unit- help to clarify it. as much time of the remaining time ed States has to be a part of this cov- But five major issues have not yet that my colleague from Pennsylvania enant to try to reduce chemical weap- been settled. The five amendments, on would like to the Senator from Penn- ons. And this treaty goes a substantial which we are voting today, seek to set- sylvania, Senator SPECTER. way. S3616 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 And the search and seizure provisions In the event that a State Party or States Johnson Lugar Rockefeller are adequate to protect constitutional Parties to the Convention act contrary to Kennedy McCain Roth the obligations under Article I by: Kerrey Mikulski Sarbanes rights, a field I have had substantial Kerry Moseley-Braun Smith Gordon H experience with as a district attorney, (A) using Article X to justify providing de- Kohl Moynihan Snowe fensive CW equipment, material or informa- so that there will have to be a criminal Landrieu Murray Specter tion to another State Party that could result Lautenberg Reed Stevens standard of probable cause. in U.S. chemical protective equipment being Leahy Reid Torricelli Taken as a whole, with the additions compromised so that U.S. warfighting capa- Levin Robb Wellstone by the President today—even though it bilities in a CW environment are signifi- Lieberman Roberts Wyden had been made a part of the RECORD, I cantly degraded; NAYS—34 ask unanimous consent that, following (B) using Article XI to justify chemical Abraham Gramm Murkowski my comments, the President’s letter to transfers that would make it impossible for Allard Grams Nickles Senator LOTT be printed in the RECORD. me to make the annual certification that the Ashcroft Grassley Santorum The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Australia Group remains a viable and effec- Bennett Helms Sessions tive mechanism for controlling CW prolifera- Bond Hutchinson Shelby objection, it is so ordered. tion; or Brownback Hutchison Smith Bob (See exhibit 1.) (C) carrying out transfers or exchanges Burns Inhofe Thomas Mr. SPECTER. All factors consid- Campbell Kempthorne Thompson under either Article X or XI which jeopardize Coverdell Kyl Thurmond ered, this is a treaty which ought to re- U.S. national security by promoting CW pro- Craig Lott Warner ceive Senate ratification. liferation: Enzi Mack EXHIBIT 1 I would, consistent with Article XVI of the Faircloth McConnell THE WHITE HOUSE, CWC, regard such actions as extraordinary The amendment (No. 48) was agreed Washington, April 24, 1997. events that have jeopardized the supreme in- to. terests of the United States and therefore, in Hon. TRENT LOTT, Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. consultation with the Congress, be prepared to withdraw from the treaty. vote. DEAR MR. LEADER: During Senate ratifica- Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay it on the tion proceedings on the Chemical Weapons Sincerely, Convention (CWC), concerns have been raised BILL CLINTON. table. over Article X, which provides for certain The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- The motion to lay on the table was types of defensive assistance in the event ator from Delaware has 1 minute re- agreed to. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, how that a State that has joined the treaty and maining. renounced any chemical weapons (CW) capa- much time is reserved for the Senator Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me bility is threatened with or suffers a chemi- from Vermont? just take the minute to say the follow- cal weapons attack, and Article XI, which The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ing: If you do not like this treaty and encourages free trade in non-prohibited ator has 14 minutes remaining on the you are not for it, vote against it. If chemicals among states that adhere to the resolution. CWC. Some have suggested that these Arti- you think this treaty makes sense, Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, for the cles could result in the CWC promoting, vote for my amendment, because if this rather than stemming, CW proliferation de- benefit of my colleagues, I will be very treaty contains this provision, it is brief. Mr. President, I appreciate ef- spite States Parties’ general obligation dead. This is a so-called killer amend- under Article I ‘‘never under any cir- forts of the Senator from Utah to get ment. cumstances . . . to assist, encourage or in- order, and that is no more than I could duce, in any way, anyone to engage in any So those of you who have concluded expect for somebody that bears certain activity prohibited to a State Party under you are not going to vote in the final similarities to the Senator from Ver- this Convention.’’ analysis for this treaty, vote no. Those mont. To respond to these concerns, the Adminis- of you who have decided you want to Earlier, the distinguished Senator tration has worked closely with the Senate vote for this treaty—to cut through it to develop conditions relating to both Arti- from Delaware read a long list of staff all—vote yes. I mean, it really is that and Senators and others who deserve cles that have now been incorporated in the basic, because if my motion fails to resolution of ratification (Agreed Conditions praise for getting us as far as we are. #7 and 15). These two conditions would sub- strike, this treaty is dead. The name of the distinguished Senator stantially reinforce and strengthen the trea- I yield back the remainder of my from Delaware is notably absent, and I ty by: time, if my colleague from North Caro- think that those who support the CWC Prohibiting the United States under Arti- lina is prepared to yield back his time. owe a debt of gratitude to the Senator cle X from (a) providing the CWC organiza- I am prepared to vote. from Delaware. In the customary prac- tion with funds that could be used for chemi- Mr. HELMS. The yeas and nays have tice, he left his own name off, but if I cal weapons defense assistance to other been ordered? States Parties; and (b) giving certain states might add his name to the record and that might join the treaty any assistance The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas put it in. other than medical antidotes and treatment. and nays have been ordered. All time Mr. President, I am, as you know, a Requiring the President to (a) certify that has expired. supporter of the CWC. Again, I com- the CWC will not weaken the export controls The question occurs on agreeing to pliment what we have done. As in the established by the Australia Group and that amendment No. 48 offered by the Sen- test ban treaty, when countries were each member of the Group intends to main- ator from Delaware. The yeas and nays not coming forward, the United States tain such controls; (b) block any attempt have been ordered. The clerk will call within the Group to adopt a contrary posi- unilaterally banned their own tests and tion; and (c) report annually as to whether the roll. then other countries joined us—not Australia Group controls remain effective. The legislative clerk called the roll. every country that has nuclear capabil- With respect to the latter condition, I am The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there ity, but other countries did join us— pleased to inform you that we have now re- any other Senators in the Chamber de- and we brought the pressure forward ceived official confirmations from the high- siring to vote? for a test ban treaty. est diplomatic levels in each of the 30 Aus- The result was announced—yeas 66, The United States took an initiative tralia Group nations that they agree that nays 34, as follows: with chemical weapons. We banned our the Group’s export control and nonprolifera- tion measures are compatible with the CWC [Rollcall Vote No. 47 Ex.] own use, unilaterally. When we did and that they are committed to maintain YEAS—66 that, other countries joined us. Not all countries, but other countries, most such controls in the future. Akaka Cochran Ford While supporting these guarantees and Baucus Collins Frist countries, joined us. safeguards, you expressed the concern on Biden Conrad Glenn Now if we vote to advise and consent Sunday that nations might still try to use Bingaman D’Amato Gorton on this treaty we will have pressure, Article X or XI to take proscribed actions Boxer Daschle Graham Breaux DeWine Gregg the pressure of the most powerful Na- that could undercut U.S. national security tion on Earth, joined by all these other interests, notwithstanding the best efforts of Bryan Dodd Hagel Bumpers Domenici Harkin U.S. diplomacy to prevent such actions. I countries, pressure on the few rogue Byrd Dorgan Hatch countries who have not done that. I say am, therefore, prepared to provide the fol- Chafee Durbin Hollings lowing specific assurance related to these Cleland Feingold Inouye that, Mr. President, because there is two Articles: Coats Feinstein Jeffords one other weapon, a weapon that kills April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3617 and maims far more people than chem- This yardstick of ‘‘effective verifica- chemical agent. For example, accord- ical weapons. That is the weapon of tion’’ has been the standard against ing to today’s Washington Times, Rus- antipersonnel landmines. There are 100 which every arms control treaty for sia may produce its new nerve agents million landmines in over 65 countries the last decade has been measured. It at a pilot plant in quantities of only 55 today. As one person told me, in their should be the standard against which to 110 tons annually. country, they clear these landmines an the CWC is measured as well. In other words, the intelligence com- arm and a leg at a time. Every 22 min- For any arms control treaty to be ef- munity has low confidence in its abil- utes an innocent civilian—almost al- fective it must be verifiable. When Vice ity to detect in a timely fashion the ways a civilian—is killed or injured by President George Bush put forward the covert production of chemical weapons an antipersonnel landmine. The United first U.S.-sponsored text for the CWC, which could produce militarily signifi- States should now do the same thing he told negotiators in Geneva on April cant quantities. We should not cheapen they did. 18, 1984, that: the norm of effective verifiability by The United States should do the For a chemical weapons ban to work, each claiming that the CWC meets this same thing we did with chemical weap- party must have confidence that the other standard—for it patently does not. ons. We should move unilaterally, ban parties are abiding by it. . . . No sensible In conclusion, verification of the our own use, ban our own export, ban government enters into those international CWC is plagued by the fact that too our own production of antipersonnel contracts known as treaties unless it can as- many chemicals are dual-use in nature. landmines, expand on the Leahy legis- certain—or verify—that it is getting what it Chemicals used to make pen ink can be lation already passed by the House and contracted for. used to make deadly agent. It is impos- Senate. Do that and then join with I could not agree more. sible to monitor every soap, detergent, like-minded nations. There are tens of In my view, this standard cannot be cosmetic, electronics, varnish, paint, like-minded nations that have already met by the CWC. On March 1, 1989, pharmaceutical, and chemical plant done that. then-Director of Central Intelligence around the world to ensure that they Join with them, agree, together, that [DCI] William Webster stated that are not producing chemical weapons, or this is what we will do. It will not be monitoring the CWC ‘‘is going to be that toxic chemicals are not being di- every nation. It will not be some of the costly and difficult, and, presently, the verted to the production of weapons nations most needing to do this like level of confidence is quite low.’’ On elsewhere. Countries such as Russia are Russia and China, but we will have the January 24, 1989, Director Burns noted well aware that if they ratify the CWC, same moral suasion that we have with that ‘‘verification of any chemical ban they can cheat with impunity. Indeed, the chemical weapons convention. We is going to be extremely difficult.’’ on May 6, 1996 the Defense Intelligence can do it with chemical weapons and ACDA’s section 37 report on the CWC, Agency informed the chairman of the should. Now let us follow exactly the submitted on March 18, 1994, states Senate Select Committee on Intel- same step, join with the Canadians and that the CWC’s verification provisions, ligence that Russia intends to main- others and do it with antipersonnel together with National Technical tain the capability to produce chemical landmines. This country is capable of Means [NTM], ‘‘are insufficient to de- weapons, regardless of whether or not it. It would be a moral step. It would be tect, with a high degree of confidence, it ratifies the CWC. a dramatic step that would help the in- all activities prohibited under the Con- The Senate, therefore, should not nocent civilians who die from that. vention.’’ Then-DCI Woolsey testified I withhold the balance of my time agree to this treaty until U.S. intel- on June 23, 1994 that ‘‘I cannot state ligence capabilities have caught up and yield the floor. that we have high confidence in our The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- with President Clinton’s Wilsonian ability to detect noncompliance, espe- ator from North Carolina. idealism. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we all cially on a small scale.’’ Finally, I will say a word or two know full well that this administration Most significantly, declassified por- about the counter-arguments we have has already testified that the CWC is tions from the August 1993 NIE note: heard on this condition. Patently ig- ‘‘effectively verifiable.’’ The Director The capability of the intelligence commu- noring the conclusions of the Joint of the Arms Control and Disarmament nity to monitor compliance with the Chemi- Chiefs, the administration has claimed cal Weapons Convention is severely limited that the right standard for detecting Agency, John Holum, testified on and likely to remain so for the rest of the March 22, 1994, that ‘‘the treaty is ef- violations is not 1 metric ton, but a decade. They key provision of the monitor- ‘‘large-scale, systematic effort by a po- fectively verifiable’’ and that the Dep- ing regime—challenge inspections at uty Under Secretary of Defense for Pol- undeclared sites—can be thwarted by a na- tential adversary to equip its armed icy, Walter Slocombe, made similar tion determined to preserve a small, secret forces with a militarily significant claims on May 13, 1994. However, just program using the delays and managed ac- chemical warfare capability * * *’’ It is because administration officials have cess rules allowed by the Convention. absurd to say that if the intelligence declared the CWC to be ‘‘effectively With respect to military significance, community has high confidence in its verifiable’’ does not make it so. General Shalikashvilli testified on Au- ability to detect ‘‘any large-scale, sys- Indeed, by making such claims the gust 11, 1994 that: tematic effort by a potential adversary Clinton administration has done great In certain limited circumstances, even one to equip its armed forces with a mili- violence to the standard of ‘‘effective ton of chemical agent may have a military tary significant chemical warfare capa- verification’’ developed and refined by impact . . . With such variables in scale of bility * * *’’ the CWC is effectively veri- the Reagan and Bush administrations target and impact of chemical weapons, the fiable. as a key criteria for arms control trea- United States should be resolute that the 1 I have no doubt that it would be dif- ties. The definition of ‘‘effective ver- ton limit set by the Convention will be our ficult to conceal the existence of a pro- ification’’ was first offered to the For- guide. gram the scope and size of the former eign Relations Committee by Ambas- The bottom line is that a stockpile of Soviet Union’s for example. But not sador Paul Nitze during hearings on 1 ton of chemical agent can prove of one of the countries that currently en- the INF Treaty in 1988 and subse- military significance. Unclassified por- visions a need for chemical weapons in- quently further refined on January 24, tions of the NIE on U.S. monitoring ca- tends to wage World War III and con- 1989, by ACDA’s Director, Maj. Gen. pabilities indicate that it is unlikely quer Western Europe. Not one. William Burns, and again in January that the United States will be able to Again, let me reiterate just how ri- 1992 by Secretary of State James detect or address violations in a timely diculous this argument is. Nobody—not Baker. The components of effective fashion, if at all, when they occur on a Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, verification, as defined during testi- small scale. And yet, even small-scale India, Pakistan, Egypt, or North mony, are: (1) a ‘‘high level of assur- diversions of chemicals to chemical Korea—is engaged in a large scale ef- ance’’ in the intelligence community’s weapons production are capable, over fort. ability to detect (2) a ‘‘militarily sig- time, of yielding a stockpile far in ex- Indeed, such a certification is inher- nificant’’ violation in (3) a ‘‘timely cess of a single ton. Moreover, few ently contradictory since a country de- fashion.’’ That definition is the one countries, if any, are engaging in much sirous of developing a militarily sig- used in this condition. more than small-scale production of nificant stockpile of chemical agent S3618 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 need not engage in a large-scale, sys- AMENDMENT NO. 49 munism, and on the defeat of Iraqi ag- tematic effort. The Chairman of the (Purpose: To strike condition No. 33, relating gression in the Persian Gulf. This Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John to effective verification) evening, we can again assert our irre- Shalikashvilli, testified before the Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an placeable leadership by participating Armed Services Committee on August amendment to the desk and ask for its in an effort to ban chemical weapons 11, 1994, that: immediate consideration. around the world. Even one ton of chemical agent may have The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Mr. President, condition No. 33, a military impact . . . With such variables in clerk will report. which we are now debating, must be scale of target and impact of chemical weap- The legislative clerk read as follows: stricken in order for the United States ons, the United States should be resolute The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN] to participate in the CWC. Condition that the 1 ton limit set by the Convention proposes an amendment numbered 49. No. 33 requires that the President— will be our guide. Beginning on page 65, strike line 25 and all these are the conditions of condition that follows through line 3 of page 67. In other words, the production of 1 No. 33—the President of the United militarily significant ton of agent does Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask States must certify with ‘‘a high de- not require a large-scale program. To unanimous consent that the time gree of confidence’’ that our intel- knock-out every key logistical node in consumed by the Senator from North ligence community can detect ‘‘mili- Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein needs Carolina in his previous speech be de- tarily significant’’ violations of the only a handful of SCUD’s with chemi- ducted from the 10 minutes of time al- convention. cal warheads. He does not need an elite lotted to his side, and that 10 minutes Now, Mr. President, what does ‘‘mili- force of infantry trained in chemical- remain on the side of the Senator from tarily significant’’ mean? It is defined environment combat. Delaware on this amendment. as 1 metric ton or more of these chemi- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there cal weapons. Accordingly, the intelligence com- objection? Mr. President, this condition is sim- munity’s confidence in its ability to Mr. HELMS. Reserving the right to ply impossible to achieve. This condi- detect the annual production of 1 met- object. tion would bar the U.S. participation ric ton in a timely fashion is the Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent in the CWC forever. We must under- benchmark question by which the Sen- that there be a total of 20 minutes on stand that the convention seeks to ban ate should assess the verifiability of this amendment equally divided. chemical weapons. These weapons, by the CWC. I urge the Senate to reject The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without their very inherent composition, are this motion to strike and to uphold objection, it is so ordered. extremely difficult to detect in rel- President Reagan’s standard of effec- Who yields time? atively small quantities, such as a ton. tive verifiability. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on this This truth has been known from the Mr. President, I ask that Senator amendment, of my 10 minutes, I will beginning, and no one, Mr. President, SHELBY of Alabama be recognized next yield 7 minutes to the Senator from has alleged that the CWC will elimi- for 10 minutes. Does the Senator have Rhode Island. But prior to doing that, nate chemical weapons from the face of somebody? let me say briefly what this amend- the Earth. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I could ment does. If an individual wants to build a ask a parliamentary inquiry. A lot of This amendment strikes a condition chemical weapon somewhere in a small our colleagues are looking to deter- in the treaty that sets a verification shack or a cave in some remote area of mine when the final vote will take standard that, if it were in the treaty, the world, he or she will always be able place. It is my understanding that the would not be able to be met; therefore, to do so, regardless of the outcome of Senator from Delaware has the option it would kill the treaty. I will not this vote. No treaty, no matter how it to move to strike three more condi- speak more at this time. is written, will ever be able to stop tions—one relating to intelligence ver- I yield to the Senator from Rhode Is- such an occurrence. Our inability to ification, one relating to inspectors, land. verify fully the CWC is not a result of and one relating to articles X and XI. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- any flaws in the convention. It is due On each of those motions of the Sen- ator from Rhode Island is recognized. to the innate difficulty in monitoring ator from Delaware, there is an hour Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, just a chemical weapons and their compo- reserved, equally divided, is that cor- moment. I must leave the Chamber for nents. rect? a few minutes. After the Senator from Mr. President, I also question the The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is Rhode Island has concluded, I ask definition of ‘‘militarily significant correct. unanimous consent that the Senator quantity,’’ as being 1 metric ton or from Alabama be recognized to more of chemical weapons agent. Al- Mr. BIDEN. The attempt is being consume our 10 minutes. though 1 metric ton can certainly do a made, as we speak, to reduce the time The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without lot of damage, particularly in a terror- on those amendments. I respectfully objection, it is so ordered. ist attack, I will defer to military ex- suggest that on the next amendment The Senator from Rhode Island. perts to consider what is military sig- that I am going to move—my intention Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I nificant. In testimony to the Senate, was to move to strike the intelligence strongly support the Chemical Weap- Gen. John Shalikashvili stated that provision—or verification, I should say, ons Convention, a treaty which serves tonnage is not the only factor to con- No. 33, and that instead of an hour our national security interests in a sider in assessing the military capacity equally divided on that amendment, I number of ways. U.S. ratification of these weapons. To transform an il- respectfully suggest we have 20 min- would help set an international stand- licit chemical stockpile into something utes equally divided on that amend- ard that would put political pressure militarily useful, an adversary must ment. Is that all right with the Sen- on outlaw nations to rid themselves of have vast supplies of these weapons, ator? chemical arsenals. This treaty will also and he must have an infrastructure for Mr. HELMS. That will be fine, from give our intelligence community valu- handling them and must have troops this point. I will consume a few min- able new tools to combat illicit produc- trained in the use of these weapons. utes. tion of deadly chemicals, even among It is these more complex activities— Mr. BIDEN. In other words, the Sen- nations that do not ratify the conven- the training of the troops, for exam- ator has already spoken on the intel- tion. ple—that the Chemical Weapons Con- ligence issue. The time he has spoken Mr. President, ratification of the vention, together with our intelligence on it would be taken out of the 10 min- Chemical Weapons Convention by the resources, will be able to verify. As utes that we are about to agree to on Senate this evening would continue our Gen. Brent Scowcroft has testified to the amendment I have not yet sent to Nation’s proud tradition of leadership the Foreign Relations Committee, the desk. The Senator was under the in the field of international security. under the CWC, it will no longer be impression I already sent the amend- We took the lead in the formation of possible for a country to buy a few ment to strike. NATO, on the containment of com- pounds of these chemicals from April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3619 various sources around the world to In its efforts to obtain ratification, For example, the creation of the Or- amass an abnormal supply of chemi- the administration has—if I may bor- ganization for the Prohibition of Chem- cals. Our intelligence community has, row a phrase from a former vice-chair- ical Weapons [OPCW], and the ability in fact, indicated on a number of occa- man of the committee, Senator MOY- of OPCW inspectors to carry out chal- sions that this convention will provide NIHAN—‘‘defined verification down.’’ lenge inspections of suspected viola- another tool to the U.S. inventory of Condition No. 33 to the resolution of tions, are cited as evidence for a mech- ways to stem worldwide expansion of ratification seeks to correct that prob- anism of effective verification. chemical weapons capabilities. In brief, lem. Yet in an unclassified excerpt from the Chemical Weapons Convention will It conditions deposit of the U.S. in- the 1993 NIE on verification, the intel- supplement—it will not replace, but it strument of ratification on a Presi- ligence community states that: will add to—ongoing efforts to monitor dential certification to Congress that The key provision of the monitoring re- chemical weapons production world- the treaty is effectively verifiable. gime—challenge inspections at undeclared wide. This term, as used in the resolution, sites—can be thwarted by a nation deter- Now, critics of this treaty claim it is contains the following elements, based mined to preserve a small, secret program by unverifiable, that we will not be able to on the traditional definition of ‘‘effec- using the delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention. catch adversaries abroad who cheat. tive verification’’: But they also allege that the CWC’s A ‘‘high degree of confidence’’ in our Those, Mr. President, are not my verification regime, while too weak to ability to detect, words. Those are the words of the intel- catch those cheaters abroad, is too in- ‘‘Militarily significant violations’’— ligence community describing its abil- trusive for American industry. In other meaning one metric ton or more of ity to monitor compliance with the words, it won’t let us find anything chemical agent— treaty before us. I should point out to my colleagues, abroad, but it is too intrusive for other ‘‘In a timely fashion,’’—meaning de- in light of the fact that the National nations as far as inspection in the tection within 1 year—and Detection of ‘‘patterns of marginal Intelligence Estimate from which I United States. They can’t have it both violation over time.’’ have quoted is dated August 1993, that ways. Effective verification is ultimately a the Acting Director of Central Intel- The fact is that the Chemical Weap- political judgment that must be made ligence, George Tenet, and other intel- ons Convention’s verification tools—in by the President and his national secu- ligence officials have confirmed on nu- other words, how to determine whether rity advisors. However, a key input to merous occasions that the key judg- there are weapons in other countries— this decision is the judgement of the ments cited above are unchanged. go beyond those of other arms control intelligence community. In an open hearing on February 5 of treaties that we have approved in the It is currently impossible to rec- this year, I asked George Tenet, the Senate in the past. No treaty will ever oncile the above definition of ‘‘effec- acting Director of Central Intelligence, be able to verify totally a ban on chem- tive verification’’ with the intelligence about the verifiability of the CWC. Our ical weapons. Condition No. 33 is im- community’s own statements over the discussion went, in part, as follows: possible to meet. The condition that is past 4 years, which is why condition 33 Acting Director Tenet said: ‘‘We can in this, which we are seeking to strike, calls for a new Presidential certifi- never guarantee that a power that is an impossible condition to meet. It cation., signs up to this agreement won’t cheat. serves no purpose other than to pre- I would like to briefly restate the in- These . . . chemical and biological de- vent U.S. participation in the Chemical telligence community’s key conclu- velopments are small, they are easily Weapons Convention treaty. So I urge sions as to the verifiability of the CWC, hidden. They are not like big nuclear my colleagues to support the motion to as set forth in recently declassified ma- developments that have big signatures strike this amendment. terial from the National Intelligence that everybody understands.’’ I thank the Chair. Estimate of August 1993: I replied: ‘‘In other words, it will be The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- The capability of the Intelligence Commu- fairly easy to cheat some, wouldn’t ator from Alabama is recognized. nity to monitor compliance with the Chemi- it?’’ Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise to cal Weapons Convention (CWC) is severely Acting Director Tenet responded: ‘‘It address the issue of verification, and in limited and is likely to remain so for the will be easy to cheat, Mr. Chairman.’’ opposition to the motion to strike con- rest of the decade. Mr. President, the treaty before us dition No. 33 contained in the resolu- Our intelligence community is the today is deficient in many respects: tion of ratification, relating to effec- most capable in the world today. It en- both in what it does, and in what it tive verification. joys extensive resources, and employs fails to do. I have a number of serious concerns an impressive variety of assets to col- As chairman of the Senate Intel- with respect to the Chemical Weapons lect information affecting our national ligence Committee, I must therefore Convention. security. conclude that the greatest flaw with As chairman of the Senate Intel- Yet with all of the sophisticated as- the CWC is that, absent a certification ligence Committee, however, I have a sets at our disposal, we cannot be con- of effective verification, we cannot particular responsibility to ensure that fident of verifying this treaty. even know if it is doing what it is sup- any treaty ratified by this body can be And some of the most promising new posed to be doing, and we cannot know effectively verified by the intelligence intelligence methods which might have the extent to which it is failing to do community. improved this score over the last 4 what it should do: This treaty is un- If it cannot be verified, the CWC years, have been significantly under- verifiable. could become the means by which CWC funded by this administration. Therefore, I support condition No. 33, member states, such as China and Iran, We should look to the certification and oppose the motion to strike. expand and enhance—rather than re- required by condition 33 as an oppor- If I have any time left, I yield it to nounce—their CW capabilities. tunity for the President to tell us of the distinguished Senator from Colo- In negotiating the INF Treaty, rati- his plans to invest in improvements to rado. fied in 1988, President Reagan set forth our technical collection capabilities to The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- an eminently reasonable standard to enable effective verification. ator from Colorado. guide the negotiation and implementa- Therefore I strongly support condi- Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I thank tion of arms control agreements. tion 33 of the resolution of ratification, the chairman for yielding to me. ‘‘Trust,’’ he said, ‘‘but verify.’’ and oppose the motion to strike. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to But I am afraid that the critical, sec- While most will acknowledge that we the motion to strike condition 33, re- ond part of President Reagan’s formula do not have the technical intelligence lating to effective verification. seems to have been forgotten with re- capabilities currently in place to pro- As a member of the Senate Select spect to this treaty. The CWC, and es- vide effective verification, the pro- Committee on Intelligence, I believe I pecially the verification regime, is ponents of the treaty place great stock have a responsibility to ensure that based on the triumph of hope and trust in the contribution of the verification this treaty can be effectively verified over experience and history. mechanisms contained in the treaty. by the intelligence community. S3620 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 If the CWC cannot be verified to en- Yet the intelligence community con- our experience with Iraq, and we will sure that it will, in fact, eliminate the cludes, in an unclassified excerpt from do better next time.’’ I cannot join scourge of chemical weapons, then the 1993 NIE, that: them in that optimistic conclusion. what is the point of ratifying it? The key provision of the monitoring re- If the President of the United States In fact, the CWC may well make gime—challenge inspections at undeclared cannot certify that this treaty can be things worse, not better, Some signa- sites—can be thwarted by a nation deter- effectively verified, as defined in condi- tory countries like China and Iran will mined to preserve a small, secret program by tion 33, then the Senate should not rat- use the technology-sharing provisions using the delays and managed access rules ify this treaty. of titles X and XI, combined with the allowed by the convention. I oppose the motion to strike condi- cloak of international respectability Acting CIA Director Tenet reiterated tion 33. they gain by joining the CWC, to ad- that judgment in a letter to Senator Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield the vance their CW programs and exports. KYL, dated March 26, 1997. remainder of the time to the Senator Condition 33 of the resolution of rati- In the 6 years since the end of the from Nebraska. fication seeks to address the verifi- Persian Gulf war, weapons inspectors Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise ability problem, by requiring the Presi- from the U.N. Special Commission today in support of striking condition dent to certify to the Congress that the [UNSCOM] have combed Iraq in search 33 from the resolution of ratification of CWC is effectively verifiable before of nuclear, chemical, biological, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. submitting the U.S. instrument of rati- missile production and storage sites— Condition 33 would bar the United fication. inspectors armed with powers far States from ratifying the convention Mr. President, we have all heard greater than those of OPCW inspectors, until the President can certify with what the intelligence community said I might add. high confidence that we have the capa- about the verifiability of the CWC in Despite this extraordinary level of bility to detect, within 1 year of a vio- its National Intelligence Estimate of scrutiny, Iraq is believed to retain: lation, the illicit production or storage August 1993, but I think this judgment chemical weapon precursors and pro- of a single metric ton of chemical is worth repeating: duction equipment, and possibly large agent. As the authors of this condition The capability of the Intelligence Commu- quantities of deadly VX agent and mu- fully realize, this standard is unattain- nity to monitor compliance with the Chemi- nitions; BW cultures, production equip- able and would effectively bar the cal Weapons Convention (CWC) is severely ment, agent and weapons. These stocks limited and likely to remain so for the rest United States from participation in the of this decade. can be used to create a large stockpile CWC forever. in a matter of days; and an operational If that judgment has changed, the Mr. President, I do not come to the SCUD missile capability, including President should be able to provide the floor as the vice chairman of the Intel- support vehicles, launchers, fuel, oper- necessary certification. But as we well ligence Committee to say to my col- know, and as the Acting Director of ational missiles, and, most alarming of leagues that this treaty is absolutely the CIA George Tenet has confirmed on all, possible chemical or biological verifiable. The distinguished chairman several occasions, that judgment has warheads. of the committee indicated that Mr. not changed. With all the assets at our Last, Iraq retains nuclear weapons Tenet, Acting Director of Central In- disposal, the intelligence community blueprints, machine-tools, and know- telligence, said it will be difficult to still cannot verify compliance with how; is believed to be continuing its verify and quoted him as saying it this treaty. nuclear weapons design work; and would be easy to cheat. What he did The Senate has already discussed the probably has the ability to create a nu- not do, regrettably, is go on with the classified aspects of our intelligence clear weapon—if it obtains fissile ma- follow-on quote. The next sentence in and verification capabilities in consid- terials—with very little warning. his answer was, ‘‘But, in the absence of erable detail in closed session, and I Mr. President, I am not reciting this the tools the convention gives us, it cannot add anything to that debate information in order to criticize will be much harder for us to apprise now. UNSCOM. I commend Ambassador Rolf you’’—meaning the committee—‘‘and What I would like to do, is provide an Ekeus, and the dedicated UNSCOM in- apprise the military and policymakers example of the way in which a deter- spectors, for their persistence in the of where we think we are in the world mined proliferator can evade, and de- face of determined Iraqi resistance and with regard to these developments.’’ flect, what is perhaps the most exten- intimidation. Let me be clear. The United States sive scrutiny ever imposed on an unoc- But if these are the results of 6 years has made a decision that we are going cupied nation in peacetime. I am refer- of international monitoring of Iraq—a to destroy our chemical weapons and ring, of course, to Iraq. pariah country, defeated in war, and try to lead the world in the elimination Iraq is exhibit A for a number of subjected to massive invasions of its of chemical weapons. That is what this propositions. First, Iraq is the very national sovereignty—then I wonder policy is all about. We didn’t have this model of a rogue state. It is a country what the OPCW inspectors, with their treaty presented to us. We made a con- that has not only developed chemical far more limited powers, can realisti- scious decision to eliminate our own and biological weapons [CBW], and cally hope to accomplish in other coun- chemical weapons and then try to de- come within a hair’s breadth of produc- tries? velop a regimen that enables us to ing a nuclear device, but has actually As a final note, I should remind my identify and detect as much as pos- used chemical weapons against Iran, colleagues that before the gulf war, sible. Our Director of Central Intel- and against its own citizens. Iraq was a member in good standing of ligence, as well as our military, has in- Second, as a nonsignatory to the the International Atomic Energy Com- dicated to us that this treaty will in- CWC, Iraq is an example of those coun- mission, or IAEA, subject to all the crease the identification that we are tries that will not be constrained by usual IAEA inspections and safeguards. able to do and increase the likelihood the CWC, and will proceed apace with Yet Saddam Hussein was within that we will be able to end up with the the production of chemical weapons. months of having a nuclear weapons result being that we have no chemical Third, and this is the point I wish to capability on August 2, 1990, when he weapons in any military arsenal on focus on, Iraq is the most current ex- invaded Kuwait. Had Saddam waited this planet. ample of the effectiveness—or the lack until he had a nuclear device, Kuwait No treaty is absolutely verifiable. thereof—of even the most intrusive might yet be the 19th province of Condition 33 make verification more international monitoring. Iraq—and tens of thousands of people, difficult by setting a level of identifica- Treaty supporters point to the Orga- including thousands of American sol- tion, we do not need to benefit from nization for the Prohibition of Chemi- diers, might have died. the convention. Far more important to cal Weapons [OPCW]—and especially Mr. President, I believe that our ex- our security are the improvements to the ability of OPCW inspectors to carry perience with Iraq demonstrates the in- our identification efforts we stand to out challenger inspections of suspected tractable problems posed by the ver- gain under the CWC. violations—as a means of effective ver- ification of the CWC. Supporters of the Verification is a political decision ification. treaty say, ‘‘But we have learned from made by policymakers. To make this April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3621 decision, our intelligence agencies will Without the CWC, chemical weapons The PRESIDING OFFICER. The need to provide evidence to support a production and stockpile on a small or clerk will report. conclusion made by policymakers. The grant scale will still be an acceptable The bill clerk read as follows: benefits we will receive under the CWC practice. Under the CWC, not only will The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN] come from our increased ability to this no longer be acceptable, but we proposes an amendment numbered 50. identify whether a nation is develop- will have additional tools in our arse- Beginning on page 63, strike line 21 and all ing, producing, and storing chemical nal to identify chemical weapons pro- that follows through line 4 of page 65. weapons. Under the CWC’s routine and grams. Since we will have to monitor Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me challenge inspections, we will be better this threat whether or not we join the also say for the benefit of my col- able to identify the storage and de- CWC, our security interests are im- leagues that we are trying to accom- struction of declared chemical weapon proved under the treaty rather than modate schedules. I thank the Senators stocks. We will also be better able to without it. from Arizona and Georgia, who were identify a nation’s attempt to develop This condition must be removed from running around trying to get their the infrastructure to handle chemical the resolution if the United States is to agreement. At the completion of the weapons and any military training in participate in the Chemical Weapons two rollcall votes—we are trying to get the use of these weapons. Convention. Therefore, Mr. President, I additional time on one amendment re- U.S. intelligence officials have stated support striking condition 33 from Ex- lating to articles X and XI, and we that the CWC will add to their mon- ecutive Resolution 75. have an hour set aside for it now and itoring tools to counter the chemical Mr. President, and colleagues, I be- we hope to reduce that time. At the weapons threat. Data declarations will lieve strongly that this particular con- conclusion of that vote we would then provide evidence of compliance or non- dition, regardless of how you feel about go to final passage, although there compliance, routine inspections make the treaty, sets an unrealistic level of probably may be a few minutes inter- it more difficult and costly to use le- requirement for verification, and under vening because each has some time gitimate facilities to produce chemical no circumstances are we going to be left. That is the objective. Some are weapons, and challenge inspections will able to verify a ton of chemical weap- trying to catch planes and trains and give the United States the opportunity ons under the evaluations of the mili- the like. to seek further indications and evi- tary. We do not need to accept this Mr. President, let me suggest quickly dence under the CWC. what this does. The amendment that I In addition, the CWC will help stymie kind of arbitrary standard. Mr. President, regardless of whether sent to the desk strikes a condition chemical weapons development by non- or not you are going to vote for or which unilaterally says at the front signatory, rogue nations by restricting end we will not allow any inspector trade in key precursor chemicals to against this treaty in the end, I urge my colleagues to vote to strike condi- from such states as China, Iran, and non-parties. Acquisition efforts for Iraq, et cetera, if they are signatories chemicals, technology, and equipment tion 33. Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 1 minute to the treaty. If they have deposited by non-signatories will provide tip-offs their instruments of ratification, now to pursue compliance concerns with on the time left. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SES- they are in the deal. We are saying, if parties who may be the source of the SIONS). The Senator from Delaware. they are in, we will not allow any in- materials. spector from their countries to be any These are real benefits to our identi- Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let’s get part of a team that would inspect U.S. fication efforts that will help ensure this straight. Verification is about facilities. the safety of our troops and citizens. whether or not we can know whether or The intention is obvious, and it is However, if we impose an impossible not our security interests are going to laudable. The intention is to keep the standard of verification and fail to rat- be put in jeopardy. A useful chemical bad-guy inspectors out because we are ify the CWC, we will lose these bene- weapons capacity requires a lot more worried that what they would do is fits. than just whether or not you can Further, condition 33 creates an arbi- produce illicit chemical weapons. It re- send over an intelligence officer as part trary definition of what is a ‘‘mili- quires a delivery system, infrastruc- of that inspection team, learn all se- tarily significant’’ amount of chemical ture, storage, and use of chemical crets from us and take them back weapons. This condition deems one weapons. It includes defense prepara- home. It is not likely that can happen metric ton of chemical weapons to be a tions, extra security around the stor- anyway. But let’s assume it did. threat to our military. But General age areas, and training and exercising The intelligence community says Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint of troops who will use those weapons. this is a very bad idea. The reason it is Chiefs of Staff, has testified that ‘‘a It goes on and on. a bad idea if we do that, Mr. President, militarily significant quantity of The ability to put together a chemi- is every other country will issue a chemical weapons is situationally de- cal weapons capability to go unde- blanket rejection of any U.S. inspec- pendent.’’ It depends on the terrain, tected that will diminish our security tors. We are the class of the field. You the weather, the number of troops, the is not real. have heard all day—and in the closed type of chemicals used, how the chemi- I yield back the time and ask unani- session—my colleagues expressing cals are delivered, and the chemical mous consent that we defer a vote on their concern about verification. The weapons defensive system of the tar- this amendment at this moment, that more we have American inspectors in- geted forces. He stated that, ‘‘The we turn to my next motion to strike, volved, the more likely we are to be quantity is totally scenario dependent, which will relate to inspectors, condi- able to detect wrongdoing because we and it would be difficult to cite a spe- tion 31, that there be 10 minutes equal- are the class of the field. We don’t want cific amount as militarily significant.’’ ly divided on condition 31, that vote on to be excluded across the board from During the Iran-Iraq war, both sides condition 33 and on condition 31 be being on any inspection team. So, used tens of tons against each other stacked after the conclusion of the de- therefore, this is intended to do some- without altering the course of the war. bate on condition 31, with 15 minutes thing good but is extremely counter- The Defense Department found that it on the first vote, 10 minutes on the sec- productive. It is counterproductive, would take several hundred to a thou- ond vote, and with 1 minute interven- and the intelligence community says sand tons to seriously disrupt U.S. lo- ing. so as well. gistics in a war; and the United The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there But beyond that, it is unnecessary. States’s own stockpile of chemical objection? There is a provision. In the interest of weapons, which we are committed to Without objection, it is so ordered. time—we were going to have an hour of destroy with or without the CWC, is AMENDMENT NO. 50 debate; I was going to put all of this about 30 thousand tons. One metric ton (Purpose: To strike condition no. 31, relating out to you—but in this treaty there is of chemical weapons, while still posing to the exercise of right to bar certain in- a provision now that says the United a horrible threat under some condi- spectors) States, or any other country, can at tions, in no way is a militarily signifi- Mr. BIDEN. I send an amendment to any time strike an inspector. The way cant threat to our national security. the desk. this works, as most of our colleagues S3622 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 know, is when there is going to be a inspectors from foreign countries un- right to bar inspectors from China, challenge inspection, or a routine in- precedented access to U.S. facilities, which has an active industrial espio- spection, there is a list of inspectors. both commercial and Government-re- nage program and has violated United They give the names. As few as 3 and as lated. Inspectors would be permitted to States nonproliferation laws, from en- many as 15 inspectors are going to interview site personnel, inspect tering the United States to engage in show up on the doorsteps of X, Y, Z records, photograph onsite apparatus, these inspections. In addition, it would company, and they list their names take samples, record readings of plant prevent inspectors from countries and their country. Guess what? Our in- equipment, and use instruments to which are hostile to the United States telligence community from the time monitor processes. The risk that trade and are state sponsors of terrorism— those names are given—it is like a jury secrets or national security secrets Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, North pool. The Presiding Officer was a Fed- could be stolen during inspection is Korea, and Cuba—from participating in eral prosecutor. It is like a grand jury. very high. these inspections. Every country submits inspectors that First, proprietary information is Mr. President, I do not think this is they want participating. Their com- often the basis for a chemical compa- an unreasonable provision. There is no mittee picks inspectors from each of ny’s competitive edge. Industrial espio- downside to the provision, only the the countries. They sit in one town and nage can enable a competitor to obtain positive potential that fewer trade and one city. When an inspection comes up, at a minimal cost information that its national security secrets would be they say ‘‘You, you, you, and you, go originator acquired only through an handed over to countries that are open- and inspect.’’ They have to submit enormous investment of time and ly hostile to the United States. those names. Our intelligence commu- money, thereby erasing the company’s Therefore, I urge the Senate to reject nity, when that pool is picked, will do competitive advantage. For this rea- the motion to strike. a background check on every one of son, the theft of trade secrets can crip- At this time I yield the remaining those guys and women. They know ple even a giant company and can be time to the distinguished majority their names. So they can, in fact, go fatal to a smaller enterprise. leader. out there and say—we can say, or the Second, because chemicals covered The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ma- intelligence community can say— by the CWC are used in a variety of jority leader is recognized. ‘‘Look, he is on that inspection group. aerospace activities, from the manu- Mr. LOTT. Could I inquire about how Strike him. We don’t want him.’’ You facture of advanced composites and ce- much time is remaining? can do that. The only time we can’t ramics to additives for paints and The PRESIDING OFFICER. There strike is when—I have a smart staff fuels, dozens of defense contractors are are 11⁄2 minutes. here. In the late hours they think they targeted for routine inspections under Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I have al- are humorous. the CWC. That means that when we are ready stated my position. I do think we You are fired. talking about proprietary information, should vote to ratify this convention, [Laughter.] we may also be talking about national but I think we should defeat this mo- I am only kidding. That is a joke; a security information. tion to strike. This is not a killer little levity at this time. A company such as Lockheed Martin, amendment. This is very serious, where As my distinguished friend on the In- Courtalds Aerospace, Hercules, we are just saying that we should have telligence Committee, formerly of my Raytheon, and the Hexcel Corp. will be the ability, the President should have staff, wrote, ‘‘They can’t strike when forced to allow foreign nationals access the ability, to bar these inspectors they are on the plane.’’ You have to to their facilities, employees, and from these countries that have violated give 24 hours notice you don’t want So records. Our national laboratories fur- U.S. nonproliferation laws. You are and So in there. ther could be inspected under this trea- talking about inspectors from so- So the point is you can already ty, as will Government facilities. called, as the Secretary of State has strike anybody. We do this in a blanket Previous national trial inspections called them, ‘‘rogue nations’’ that way. We knock the class of the field conducted in the United States in prep- want to come in here and get into find- out of the inspection process. We don’t aration for the CWC revealed that in- ing information that could help them want to do that. With all due respect, spections under the treaty are an ex- to further contribute to proliferation. this is not a thoughtful amendment. tremely dangerous threat to sensitive So I urge the Senate on this motion This is counterproductive. information. Soil and water samples to vote to defeat the motion to strike. I ask for the yeas and nays on this were collected in the vicinity of rocket We should have the ability, we should amendment. propellant production facilities on one as a matter of fact I think require that The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a such inspection. They were analyzed at we bar these inspectors from coming sufficient second? the Lawrence Livermore National Lab- into this country when they are con- There is a sufficient second. oratory. Using modern techniques, ana- tributing to the problem all over the The yeas and nays were ordered. lysts were able to discern classified in- Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, have the world. So I yield the remainder of my formation about the formulation of the yeas and nays been ordered on the pre- time. rocket propellant and the process used vious amendment? If not, I would ask Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair. to make it. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- for the yeas and nays on the previous Finally, Mr. President, China and ator from Delaware. amendment as well. others likely intend to use CWC inspec- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 30 seconds tions for espionage purposes. They sufficient second? off my time on the bill. There is a sufficient second. should not be allowed to do that. The The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- The yeas and nays were ordered. officials of the preparatory commission ator is recognized for 30 seconds. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I have for the Organization of the Prohibition Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, two very any time left on this, I reserve it, and of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW, have quick points. The companies named by I will yield the floor now for my col- stated that all of the Chinese inspec- my distinguished friend, including Her- league from Arizona. tors were directed to volunteer for the cules, which is headquartered in my Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator. organization and that these inspectors State, that are supposedly worried, Mr. President, Senator HELMS had in- have direct ties to China’s defense they support this treaty. Hercules sup- tended to present these remarks, and chemical warfare program. Accord- ports this treaty. They are not worried he cannot be here right at this mo- ingly, and the point of this condition, about this being trouble. ment. Therefore, I am going to proceed the Senate should uphold this provi- Second, this is not a killer, but it to deliver his remarks and then also sion which would direct the adminis- rips the heart out of our inspection re- yield to the majority leader should he tration to exercise a United States gime, and I would not be objecting, I wish to make a remark or two about treaty right—as the Senator from say to the majority leader, I would not this condition. Delaware pointed out, we have this be seeking to take it out if it gave the If ratified, Mr. President, the Chemi- right under the treaty—we are simply President the option. It gives the cal Weapons Convention would provide directing the President to exercise this President no option. It requires him—it April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3623 requires him—to ban. And what it does Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let met sum- The VICE PRESIDENT. Fifteen min- again, I say to my colleagues, it then marize the argument the majority utes. says they will ban us. We have the leader and I made in opposition to the Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have class of the field doing the inspection. motion to strike this condition. spoken to the majority on this. The It is not a smart thing to do, in my The treaty currently provides for the distinguished Senator from Virginia humble opinion. President to say that he does not want has been waiting around patiently all I yield the floor. inspectors from certain countries com- day and I keep bumping him. I want to VOTE ON AMENDMENT NO. 49 ing into the United States. There is a yield up to 5 minutes of my time on the The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under reason for that. What we are doing is bill to him at this moment, and then I the previous order, the question is on directing him only in two cases to, in will move, with permission of the agreeing to amendment No. 49. The advance, say, these are the countries chairman, to the last condition. yeas and nays have been ordered. The covered: Those countries that sponsor I yield to the Senator from Virginia. clerk will call the roll. state terrorism, pursuant to our defini- The bill clerk called the roll. tion of that, and China because of its The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator The result was announced—yeas 66, violation of another law. from Virginia. nays 34, as follows: So it is only those countries that Mr. ROBB. I thank my friend and col- [Rollcall Vote No. 48 Ex.] have violated American law and who league from Delaware. YEAS—66 are the state-sponsored terrorists who Mr. President, there’s not much left Akaka Feingold Lieberman can be denied inspectors in the United to say about ratification of the CWC— Baucus Feinstein Lugar States. Biden Ford McCain even here in the Senate. We’ve had sev- Bingaman Frist Mikulski The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time enteen formal hearings on the topic Boxer Glenn Moseley-Braun has expired. Under the previous order, over the last two years—both open and Breaux Gorton Moynihan the question now occurs on agreeing to closed—and as a member of all three Bryan Graham Murray the Biden amendment No. 50. They Bumpers Hagel Reed national security committees, I have Byrd Harkin Reid yeas and nays have been ordered. The participated in most of them. In addi- Chafee Hatch Robb clerk will call the roll. Cleland Hollings Roberts tion, the salient features have been dis- The assistant legislative clerk called cussed in countless meetings and fora Coats Inouye Rockefeller the roll. Cochran Jeffords Roth that have that have been widely re- The result was announced—yeas 56, Collins Johnson Santorum ported in both print and broadcast Conrad Kennedy Sarbanes nays 44, as follows: media. Finally, for everyone involved, D’Amato Kerrey Smith (OR) [Rollcall Vote No. 49 Ex.] Daschle Kerry Snowe the moment of truth has arrived and DeWine Kohl Specter YEAS—56 we will cast what will certainly be one Dodd Landrieu Stevens Akaka Feingold Lieberman Domenici Lautenberg Torricelli of the most important votes of the Baucus Feinstein Lugar 105th Congress. Dorgan Leahy Wellstone Biden Ford Mikulski Durbin Levin Wyden Bingaman Frist Moseley-Braun Mr. President, I have been committed NAYS—34 Boxer Glenn Moynihan to ratification for some time, but I Breaux Graham Murray Abraham Gramm McConnell Bryan Harkin Reed know some of our colleagues have had Allard Grams Murkowski Bumpers Hollings Reid reservations. There is no question that Ashcroft Grassley Nickles Byrd Inouye Robb respected opponents of ratification Bennett Gregg Sessions Chafee Jeffords Rockefeller Bond Helms Shelby Cleland Johnson Roth have raised important and legitimate Brownback Hutchinson Smith (NH) Cochran Kennedy Sarbanes questions. But those questions have Burns Hutchison Thomas Collins Kerrey Snowe been thoroughly and painstakingly an- Campbell Inhofe Thompson Conrad Kerry Specter swered by the proponents, including Coverdell Kempthorne Thurmond D’Amato Kohl Stevens Craig Kyl Warner Daschle Landrieu Torricelli and I believe that our failure to ratify Enzi Lott Dodd Lautenberg Wellstone this chemical weapons convention Faircloth Mack Dorgan Leahy Wyden today would represent a serious set- The amendment (No. 49) was agreed Durbin Levin back for the United States and the en- to. NAYS—44 tire international community and un- AMENDMENT NO. 50 Abraham Gorton McCain questionably would be viewed as a fail- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under Allard Gramm McConnell ure of leadership by the world’s indis- the previous order—the Senator from Ashcroft Grams Murkowski Bennett Grassley Nickles pensable nation. Delaware. Bond Gregg Roberts Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry to interrupt I will not repeat all of the arguments Brownback Hagel Santorum that have been made. In his news con- the Chair. You were going to say 1 Burns Hatch Sessions minute for explanation, is that correct, Campbell Helms Shelby ference earlier today the majority equally divided? Coats Hutchinson Smith Bob leader framed the essential question. Coverdell Hutchison Smith Gordon H And he repeated it here on the Senate The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is Craig Inhofe Thomas correct. DeWine Kempthorne Thompson floor earlier this afternoon. And I cer- Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the pur- Domenici Kyl Thurmond tainly commend him for the way he re- pose of my amendment is to strike a Enzi Lott Warner sponded. He asked will we be better off Faircloth Mack provision in the bill that requires the with or without the treaty—for me President to disallow an inspector from The amendment (No. 50) was agreed that is not a close call. any of a number of countries, from to. I believe we will be much better off, Russia to Iran. Mr. HELMS. I move to reconsider the by any measure I can think of, if we There is in the treaty already the vote. ratify the convention. ability of the United States to strike Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay it on the I hope that the 28 conditions that we any inspector. The inspectors must be table. agreed to yesterday, and the additional named before an inspection takes The motion to lay on the table was reassurances provided by the President place. The reason why we do not want agreed to. today, will insure that at least two- a blanket exemption is, if we blanket Mr. BIDEN. As I understand, there is thirds of our colleagues reach the same exempt all those folks, they will blan- 1 hour remaining on the last amend- conclusion. ket exempt any U.S. inspector. ment of the Senator from Delaware to We want inspectors in the bad guy’s strike condition 32, is that correct? The United States is getting out of country. We do not want to do this. It The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator the chemical weapons business with or is counterproductive. is correct. without an international agreement— Mr. KYL addressed the Chair. Mr. BIDEN. It is my understanding and because over 70 other nations have The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- the Senator from Delaware has control already ratified the convention, it goes ator from Arizona. of an additional 8 minutes on the bill? into effect on April 29th, regardless of S3624 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 what we do. The only matter we’ll de- who oppose this, but this is what we President Clinton has sent to him com- cide tonight is whether we’ll be able to call in the trade a killer amendment. mitting the administration to with- participate and shape banning the use, Were this to pass, there is no treaty. I draw from the CWC if other parties development, production, and stock- will speak to that later. misuse articles X and XI of the treaty. piling of chemical agents, or be cast With permission of the chairman of In the words of the majority leader, with the pariah states that will face in- the committee, I yield to the Senator this commitment is unprecedented and creasing difficulty due to permanent from Arizona, Senator MCCAIN, who, as ironclad. trade restrictions on non-CWC mem- the old saying goes, has forgotten more Let me just remind my colleagues, bers. about this treaty than most people Mr. President, that the President of If we want to play a leading role in at know. I yield such time as he con- the United States in this letter states: least reducing the likelihood that poi- sumes. In the event that a State Party or States son gas will be used against us or the Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, failure Parties to the Convention act contrary to rest of the international community, to approve the amendment proposed by the obligations under Article I by: we have no choice but to ratify this the Senator from Delaware would re- (A) using Article X to justify providing de- convention. quire the United States to delay ratifi- fensive CW equipment, material or informa- Of course, there are no absolutes cation of the Chemical Weapons Con- tion to another State Party that could result in U.S. chemical protective equipment being when it comes to arms control verifica- vention until we obtain the agreement of other CWC parties to delete one of compromised so that U.S. warfighting capa- tion, but through the most far-reach- bilities in a CW environment are signifi- ing, extensive, and intrusive inspection the treaty’s articles and significantly cantly degraded; procedures ever agreed to, the CWC alter another. (B) using Article XI to justify chemical represents a clear step in the right di- I believe the issue of technology transfers that would make it impossible for rection. transfer is a serious one because it is me to make the annual certification that the I do not question the patriotism of the one argument that seeks to dem- Australia Group remains a viable and effec- any of our colleagues who oppose rati- onstrate that ratifying the CWC will tive mechanism for controlling CW prolifera- actually harm the United States na- tion; or fication, but I belive we owe a special (C) carrying out transfers or exchanges debt of gratitude to those statesmen tional security. The critics argue because of article under either Article X or XI which jeopard- who might find some partisan or ideo- XI of the CWC we will have to elimi- izes U.S. national security by promoting CW logical advantage in opposing ratifica- proliferation: nate our national controls on chemical tion, but who put our country’s inter- I would, [the President of the United technologies and disband the Australia est first in supporting it. States] consistent with Article XVI of the Group, a multilateral framework for In that regard, I’d like to single out CWC, regard such actions as extraordinary restraining transfers of sensitive chem- events that have jeopardized the supreme in- our former colleague and Majority ical technology. This interpretation of terests of the United States and therefore, in Leader, Bob Dole, who now joins the the treaty is contradicted not only by consultation with the Congress, be prepared Presidents of both parties who nego- the text of the treaty which subordi- to withdraw from the treaty. tiated, signed, and submitted the con- nates Article XI on the basic undertak- Mr. President, I do not know how we vention for ratification, as well as a ings in Article I for parties not to ac- could be any clearer than that letter distinguished galaxy of present and quire chemical weapons or to assist an- from the President of the United past top-level national security lead- other state in doing so, but also by our States. ers. experience with other nonproliferation Conversely, if the United States re- And, I would like to conclude by treaties and the agreed consensus con- jects ratification, I doubt that we will commending Senator BIDEN, the rank- ditions included in the resolution of be able to play our traditional leader- ing member of the Foreign Relations ratification before us. ship role in attempting to persuade Committee, and Senator LUGAR, a First of all, Mr. President, our expe- other chemical suppliers to exercise re- longstanding expert in the area of arms rience with essentially similar lan- straint. control, for their leadership and tenac- guage in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation The world will blame the United ity these last few weeks. Due to their Treaty shows that we need not weaken States for undermining a chemical tireless efforts, I hope we will have the our national or multilateral export weapons ban that the vast majority of votes to ratify the CWC and signal to controls. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, other countries were willing to sign. If the world our continuing leadership, by the counterpart of the Australia we reject ratification, where will we example, to eliminate these weapons of Group, was actually founded after the get the moral and political authority mass destruction from the face of the NPT went into force. Nor has the NPT to persuade other Australian Group earth. obliged us to curtail our national con- participants to block exports to coun- Mr. President, I yield the floor. trols on the transfer of nuclear tech- tries of concern? AMENDMENT NO. 51 nology, even to other NPT parties. The Mr. President, the supporters of this (Purpose: To strike condition no. 32, relating United States enacted the Nuclear condition portray renegotiating the to stemming the proliferation of chemical Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 10 years CWC to change these two articles as a weapons) after the NPT was signed. feasible undertaking. We are talking Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an Moreover, beyond the text of the about a new treaty with more than 160 amendment to the desk and ask for its CWC itself we have condition 7 of the other signatories, more than 70 of immediate consideration. resolution of ratification before us. which already ratified. In this context, The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. This requires the President to certify retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft, former ENZI). The clerk will report. not only that the United States be- National Security Adviser, recently The assistant legislative clerk read lieves that the CWC does not require us testified: as follows: to weaken our export controls but also Starting over, as was suggested this after- The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN] that all members of the Australia noon, I think it is pure fantasy. If we reject proposes an amendment number 51. Group have communicated at the high- this treaty, we will incur the bitterness of On page 65, strike lines 5 through 24. est diplomatic levels their agreement all our friends and allies who followed us for Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we now that multilateral and multinational ten years in putting this together. The idea turn to the last condition that I am controls on sensitive chemical tech- that we can lead out again down a different seeking to strike which will require the nology are compatible with the treaty path I think is just not in the cards. We have President, before he deposits the in- and will be maintained under the CWC. got to deal with the situation we face now, strument of ratification, to certify We also have condition 15 obliging not an ideal one out in the future. that the Chemical Weapons Convention the United States to share only medi- I think that the CWC, as we have it has been amended by striking article X cal antidotes and treatment to coun- now and as strengthened by the 28 and article XI in several respects. tries of concern if they are attacked agreed conditions, is good enough. I Mr. President, I apologize for the with chemical weapons. urge my colleagues to adopt the shorthand, because it does not do jus- Finally, we have received today from amendment of the Senator from Dela- tice to the arguments of my friends the majority leader a letter which ware. April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3625 Mr. President, I don’t—to the relief eight additional provisions to the CWC. ministration, the Bush administration, of most—intend to speak again. I want These provisions tighten our intel- by the way, told the Foreign Relations to congratulate Senator HELMS for his ligence sharing procedures to keep Committee earlier this month that Ar- leadership on this issue, for his willing- classified information out of the wrong ticles X and XI amount to what he said ness to bring this treaty, which he op- hands, would maintain the stricter ex- are ‘‘a formula for greatly accelerating posed, to the floor. I congratulate Sen- porting restrictions as outlined in the the proliferation of chemical warfare ator BIDEN for his consistent leader- ‘‘Australia Group’’ protocol, would en- capabilities around the world.’’ ship. He just said that I knew more hance monitoring and verification of Now, this condition is an essential about the treaty. I know of nobody who compliance, and would greatly beef up protection in the Senate’s resolution of knows more details of the treaty than our military’s chemical warfare de- ratification. It would make approval of the Senator from Delaware, unless it is fense capabilities. In addition, the Sen- this treaty absolutely contingent upon the Senator from Indiana, Senator ate leadership this morning received a the administration’s agreement to seek LUGAR, who has consistently led on letter from the President committing modifications of Articles X and XI. You this and is also responsible in the Sen- him to withdrawing from the conven- have heard me say that over and over ate for ratification of this issue along tion if it leads to the degradation of again for the past several weeks and with Senator BIDEN. our chemical weapons defenses, or months. Now, I have urged Senators to I congratulate my colleague from Ar- leads to chemical weapons prolifera- oppose efforts to strip out that key izona, Senator KYL, who fought long tion. protection. But here we go again. If and hard in this cause. He has done a I believe this treaty is now worthy of this motion to strike prevails, it will masterful and admirable job in articu- ratification and will vote accordingly. be an invitation to the Senate to reject lating his position on this issue. Our Rest assured, however, that a treaty is the treaty entirely. But I don’t think majority leader, Senator LOTT, has only as reliable as the offices admin- the Senate is going to accept that invi- been through hundreds of hours of istering it. Consequently I have every tation. meetings and has had tough negotia- intention of continuously evaluating In any case, why should we modify tions with the administration. Senator the performance of the administration Articles X and XI? The administration and the United Nations relative to LOTT got from the President of the argues that, in spite of all its flaws, the United States a letter which he calls their implementation of these treaty CWC is better than nothing. Well, to unprecedented. I agree. I believe that it provisions. Should any party come up the contrary. With Articles X and XI is something that can assure all of our short in their verification and enforce- unmodified, this treaty is far worse citizens that if there are violations of ment duties, we will be right there to than nothing. Instead of halting the set them straight. this treaty, the United States of Amer- spread of poison gas, this treaty will be Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I sup- ica will leave, and leave immediately. aiding in its proliferation by helping pose, at this point, it would be an exer- countries like Iran modernize their Senator LOTT has done a job unequaled cise in futility to go into great detail chemical arsenals, giving them access by any in his leadership on this issue. about why the Senate should reject to our secrets for defending against I am grateful for it. this chemical weapons treaty. But let Finally, I also want to express my poison gas attack, and giving a United me touch on it. I ask the Chair to no- appreciation to the former majority States imprimatur to third country tify me when I have talked for 8 min- leader, Senator Dole, who, of course, transfers of dangerous chemicals and utes. decided that this issue was important Mr. President, this treaty won’t defensive technology to rogue states. Anybody who needs a road map or enough for him to inform our col- touch—won’t touch—terrorist states wants one for how this will work leagues. like Libya, Iraq, Syria and North doesn’t have to go to a lot of trouble. Finally, Mr. President, sometimes Korea. The administration admits this the Senate doesn’t have great days, itself. The administration also admits Just examine how Russia has taken ad- and sometimes the Senate has mo- that this treaty is unverifiable. The vantage of similar provisions in the ments of which we can all be proud. I fact that Russia is already cheating, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Rus- believe, watching carefully this debate even before this treaty goes into effect, sia is, at this very moment, using that for the last 2 days and what has tran- and the rather incredible refusal by the treaty to justify its sale of nuclear re- spired here on the floor of the Senate, administration to bar inspectors from actors to Iran, under a provision I think the opponents and proponents hostile nations, such as Iran and China, known as ‘‘Atoms for Peace,’’ if you of the treaty can be proud of the level to come and ‘‘inspect’’ the businesses can believe that. Under this CWC trea- of debate, both in its comity and also of the United States of America. It ty’s Articles X and XI—again, I have to in its content. I congratulate my col- seems to me that each of these defects, chuckle when I say it—dubbed ‘‘Poi- leagues on a hard-fought debate, one of in and of themselves, are reason sons for Peace’’—if Russia or China de- which I think every Member, whether enough to oppose the treaty. cide, for example, to build a chemical we are on the winning or losing side, But one in the Senate often has to manufacturing facility in Iran, giving can be proud. face reality. Let me say this. There is that terrorist regime the chemical I yield the floor. one issue that has raised the greatest agents and high technology it needs to Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, one of the concern among Senators, I believe—the modernize its chemical weapons pro- charges made consistently during the issue on which the ratification vote gram, Russia and China not only could weeks of debate over this treaty is the should hinge—and that is the adminis- argue that they are allowed to give charge that supporters of this treaty tration’s refusal to modify Articles X Iran this technology, but that they are desired to see chemical weapons abol- and XI of this treaty. obliged to do so under a treaty, mind ished from the earth, while opponents Now, these controversial provisions you, ratified by the Senate of the Unit- have no such interest. Nothing could be require the transfer of dangerous chem- ed States. further from the truth. Opponents of ical agents, defensive gear and know- In short, ratifying the chemical the treaty also desire to see these hei- how to any nation that joins the CWC, weapons treaty sends a signal to the nous weapons abolished. We have sim- including—get this—terrorist states world that something has been done ply contended that a poorly drafted like Iran and Cuba, and known about the proliferation of chemical treaty will not only fail to achieve that proliferators, such as Russia and weapons when, in fact, we would not worthy end, but could even lead to China. Now, think of the implications have done anything at all except make their increased proliferation. of that. If anybody is out there in bad matters worse, because Articles X I am pleased to report that, as of this televisionland, I hope you will con- and XI of this treaty—this dangerous, morning, opponents of the original template what is going on here on the dangerous treaty—assure that the treaty draft have prevailed in our ef- Senate floor and watch who votes how Chemical Weapons Convention will in- forts to add teeth and additional safe- when the roll is called up yonder in crease the spread of chemical weapons guards to what was heretofore an unac- just a little while. rather than stop it. ceptable document. To begin with, the Former Secretary of Defense, Dick So in this next to the last vote of the Senate yesterday voted to add twenty- Cheney, during the previous public ad- evening, Senators have a choice. In S3626 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 making that choice, I for one cannot vanced assistance to those nations we gitimate chemical commerce, which is imagine that the U.S. Senate would re- trust, but no obligation. reasonable. But in his April 22 letter, ject the advice of four former distin- The Administration is so comfortable Mr. Berger explains that this Article guished Secretaries of Defense, who with this reading of the treaty, that, in does not require the United States, or testified that unless Articles X and XI their negotiations with Senator HELMS any U.S. company, to provide confiden- are modified, the Senate should refuse and with the Majority Leader’s task tial business information to any for- to ratify this treaty. force on the CWC, they have agreed to eign party. Mr. President, I reserve the balance a binding condition (number 15) that As to the concern that Article XI will of my time. would ensure that the United States undercut export controls, indeed, the The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who will not provide any assistance other reverse is true. Mr. Berger makes clear yields time? than medical assistance to any rogue that all U.S. export controls now in ef- Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I note that the nation that becomes a party to the fect are fully consistent with the CWC. ranking member is not present on the treaty. In addition, our allies in the Australia floor at the moment, Mr. President. I Another concern about Article X is Group, all 28 of them, have pledged to will yield myself 10 minutes. that paragraph 3, which calls for par- maintain all existing multilateral ex- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without ties to ‘‘facilitate *** the fullest pos- port controls, which they agree are objection, it is so ordered. sible exchange’’ of information and fully consistent with the CWC. Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I technology on protection against Here again, the problem identified by want to express my strong support for chemical weapons, which some here critics of the CWC would actually be the motion to strike condition 32 from have said would require the United worse without the treaty. The CWC the resolution of ratification. States to share such equipment with will allow us to better monitor chemi- I strongly support the Chemical rogue nations who sign and ratify the cal commerce that occurs today with- Weapons Convention. I believe it is treaty. out our knowledge. It will also provide very much in our national interests to The Administration has made clear the basis for further multilateral ef- ratify this treaty. that the use of the words ‘‘facilitate’’ forts to control exports, above and be- The pending motion is to strike con- and ‘‘possible’’ in this paragraph mean yond our own existing export controls dition 32 from resolution of ratification that the United States will determine and those of the Australia Group. of the CWC. It is essential that this whether any specific exchange is appro- Furthermore, with the CWC, the motion pass, because if it does not, our priate, and we will not pursue those we countries undertaking exchanges are decision to ratify the treaty will be deem inappropriate. In making these legally bound by the fundamental obli- meaningless. decisions, we will do nothing to under- gations in Article I—the overriding Ar- During the debate over this treaty, a mine our national export controls. ticle of the treaty—never ‘‘to assist, With these assertions in hand, I am number of serious concerns have been encourage or induce in any way anyone satisfied that the United States will in raised over Articles X and XI. I myself to engage in any activity prohibited’’ no way be obligated to provide chemi- have shared some of these concerns. under the convention. It must be re- cal weapons technology to any nation But I want to address these criticisms membered that Article I supersedes all of the CWC now, because I believe that we deem to be untrustworthy. Some have also raised the concern subsequent articles of the Convention. very solid answers have been provided that Article X might induce other, less It is disingenuous to suggest that the to virtually all of them. conscientious nations, to supply rogue treaty would undercut its central pro- I met at the White House last Friday states with defense technologies. But hibition so blatantly. with National Security Adviser Sandy there is nothing that prevents those To address the concerns raised about Berger and Special Assistant to the sales from taking place today, with no Article XI, the Administration has President for Defense Policy and Arms CWC in effect. agreed to a binding condition (number Control Robert Bell, who explained Within the CWC, the countries who 7) that the President must certify now these answers to me in detail, and I make exchanges allowed in Article X and on an annual basis that the Aus- found their explanations persuasive. are legally bound by the treaty’s over- tralia Group of 30 nations is continuing Sharing Defense Technologies: Dur- riding principle, stated in Article I, to control chemical exports effectively ing the April 9, 1997 hearing in the Sen- that they can do nothing to ‘‘assist, en- and remains a viable mechanism for ate Foreign Relations Committee, the courage, or induce, in any way, anyone doing so. concern was raised by several witnesses to engage in any activity prohibited to According to this condition, the that Article X of the CWC would re- a State Party under this Convention.’’ President must also certify that noth- quire the United States to share ad- Any country’s failure to uphold this ing in the CWC obligates the United vanced chemical defense technologies obligation would enable the full force States to weaken our own export con- with rogue nations like Iran, who may of over 160 nations to coalesce in sup- trols, and that each member of the sign and ratify the treaty. port of sanctions, and possibly military Australia Group remains committed to If indeed the treaty required that, action. maintaining current export controls. there would be significant grounds for In addition, the CWC would provide With this condition added to the res- concern. But I believe the concern is us with far more ability to scrutinize olution of ratification, I believe con- unwarranted and unfounded. any exchanges of chemical defense cerns about Article XI can be laid In an April 22 letter to me, National equipment than we have today. The re- aside. Security Adviser Sandy Berger makes sult is a net increase, not decrease, in In fact, the negotiations between the it very clear that Article X of the CWC our knowledge of defense exchanges Administration and Sen. BIDEN on the would impose no obligation on the with rogue nations, and our ability to one hand, and Sen. HELMS and Sen. United States to assist Iran with its address any compliance concerns that LOTT’s task force on the other, have chemical weapons defense capabilities. may arise from these exchanges. been remarkably successful in address- I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Cooperation on Chemical Tech- ing the concerns that have been raised Berger’s letter be included in the nology: Another concern that has been about the treaty. RECORD at the conclusion of my re- raised involves Article XI. Some have If the Administration is willing to marks. suggested that Article XI, which deals meet the concerns of the critics of Ar- Mr. Berger makes clear that para- with cooperation in chemical activities ticles X and XI, as it has, and those graph 7 of Article X, which spells out not prohibited by the treaty, would re- critics still insist on the removal of the obligations of States Parties to as- quire the United States to provide those articles as their price for ratify- sist others threatened by chemical other nations with access to our dual- ing the treaty, it is clear that the in- weapons, would require the United use technologies and manufacturing se- tent is to kill the treaty altogether. States to provide nothing more than crets. Here again, the concern is un- It is completely unrealistic to sug- medical antidotes and treatments to warranted. gest that we try to drop Article X and any state we deemed unreliable. We Article XI does aim to ensure that amend Article XI of the CWC at this have the option to provide more ad- parties to the treaty can conduct le- point. These two articles were included April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3627 to reassure countries who signed the Now, I understand the concern there. party. As to the concern that article XI treaty that they would not be pre- But the administration has made it will undercut export controls, indeed, vented from developing chemical weap- clear that the use of the words ‘‘facili- the reverse is true. Mr. Berger makes ons defenses or engaging in legitimate tate’’ and ‘‘possible’’ in this paragraph clear that all U.S. export controls now chemical commerce. mean that the United States will deter- in effect are fully consistent with the None of the 160 nations who have mine whether any specific exchange is CWC. signed or 74 nations that have ratified appropriate, and we will not pursue In addition, our allies in the Aus- the treaty will agree to renegotiate those we deem inappropriate. In mak- tralia Group—all 29 of them—have these provisions at the eleventh hour. ing these decisions we will do nothing pledged to maintain all existing multi- It will simply result in our exclusion to undermine our national export con- lateral export controls, which they from the CWC—which is clearly the in- trols. agree are fully consistent with the tent. With these assertions in hand, I am CWC. Here again the problem identified As Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National satisfied that the United States will in by critics, I think, would be worse Security Adviser to President Bush, no way be obligated to provide chemi- without the treaty. The CWC allows us testified before the Foreign Relations cal weapons defense technology to any to better monitor chemical commerce Committee on April 9, 1997: nation we deem untrustworthy. And that occurs today without our knowl- Starting over * * * is pure fantasy. If we the President’s point A in his letter to edge. It will also provide the basis for reject this treaty, we will incur the bitter- the majority leader points this out as further multilateral efforts to control ness of all our friends and allies who followed exports, above and beyond our own ex- us for 10 years in putting this thing one of the three conditions under together ** *. The idea that we can lead out which the United States would with- isting export controls and those of the again down a different path I think is just draw from the treaty if it turns out Australia Group. And, once again, Arti- not in the cards. We have got to deal with any other way. cle I supersedes this article with the the situation we face now, not an ideal one Some have also raised the concern overriding obligation never ‘‘to assist, out in the future. that Article X might induce other, less encourage or induce in any way anyone The concerns raised about Articles X conscientious, nations to supply rogue to engage in any activity prohibited’’ and XI—which I shared—have been states with defense technologies. But under the convention. more than adequately addressed by the there is nothing that prevents these To address the concerns raised about agreed conditions. sales from taking place today, with no article XI, the administration has Failing to strike this condition CWC in effect. agreed to a binding condition No. 7 would be tantamount to killing the With the CWC, the countries who that the President must certify now treaty. I urge my colleagues to vote for make exchanges allowed in Article X and on an annual basis that the Aus- this motion to strike. Those who do are legally bound, as Senator MCCAIN tralia Group of nations is continuing to not are essentially voting against rati- pointed out, to the treaty’s overriding control chemical exports effectively fication of the entire CWC. and superseding principle, stated in Ar- and remains a viable mechanism for The CWC is not a panacea, and none ticle I, that they can do nothing to doing so. The President must also cer- of its proponents believes it is. It will ‘‘assist, encourage, or induce, in any tify that nothing in the CWC obligates not by itself banish chemical weapons way, anyone to engage in any activity the United States to weaken its own from the earth, but it would result in prohibited to a State Party under this export controls. The President, in his the destruction of much of the world’s Convention.’’ Any country’s failure to point B on page 2 in his letter to the chemical weapons stocks, and provide uphold this obligation would enable the majority leader, clearly points out us with a valuable set of tools that full force of 160 nations to coalesce in that, if that happens, we would with- would significantly strengthen our support of sanctions, and possibly mili- draw from the treaty. ability to monitor and defend against The negotiations between the admin- tary action. the threat of chemical weapons. istration and Senator BIDEN on the one In addition, the CWC would provide So, reiterating, Mr. President, during hand, and Senator HELMS and Senator us with far more ability to scrutinize the April 9 hearing in the Senate For- LOTT’s task force on the other, I think any exchanges of chemical defense eign Relations Committee, the concern have been remarkably successful in ad- equipment than we have today. So the was raised by several witnesses that dressing concerns raised by the treaty. Article X would require the United result is a net increase, not a decrease, So we see here that the administra- States to share advanced chemical de- in our knowledge of defense exchanges tion has been willing to meet the con- fense technologies with rogue nations with rogue nations and our ability to cerns of critics of articles X and XI, like Iran, who may sign and ratify the address any compliance concerns that and it has. It seems to me completely treaty. If indeed the treaty required may arise from these exchanges. For unrealistic to suggest that we try to that, there would be significant me, it was very helpful to be present in drop articles X and XI at this late grounds for concern. But I believe the the closed session of this Senate. I very stage. These two articles were included concern is unwarranted. much appreciate the information to reassure countries who sign the In an April 22 letter to me, National shared. But I think the bottom line is treaty that they would not be pre- Security Adviser Sandy Berger makes really this point. vented from developing chemical weap- it very clear that Article X of the CWC Let me turn to article XI, which ons defenses or engaging in legitimate would impose no obligation on the deals with cooperation in chemical chemical commerce. United States to assist Iran with its technology. None of the 160 nations who have chemical weapons defense capabilities. Another concern that has been raised signed, nor the 74 nations who have Mr. Berger makes clear that para- involves the article XI provisions on ratified this treaty will agree to re- graph 7 of Article X, which spells out cooperation in chemical activity not negotiate these provisions at the elev- the obligations of States Parties to as- prohibited by the treaty. Some fear enth hour. It will simply result in our sist others threatened by chemical that these provisions would require the exclusion from the CWC. And that weapons would require the United United States to provide other nations would truly be too high a price to pay. States to provide nothing more than with access to our dual-use tech- I urge all my colleagues to support this medical antidotes and treatments to nologies and manufacturing secrets. motion to strike condition 32 from the any state we deem unreliable. We have Here again, I truly believe the concern resolution of ratification. the option to provide more advanced is unwarranted. Article XI aims to en- I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. assistance to those states we trust, but sure that parties to the treaty can con- Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield as no obligation. duct legitimate chemical commerce. It much time as I may have to Senator Another concern about Article X is is reasonable. KYL. that paragraph 3, which calls for par- In his April 22 letter to me, Mr. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ties to * * * ‘‘facilitate * * * the full- Berger explains that this article does ator from Arizona. est possible exchange’’ of information not require the United States nor any Mr. KYL. Mr. President, first of all, and technology on protection against U.S. company to provide confidential let me say that I do not like to dis- chemical weapons. business information to any foreign agree with my friend and colleague S3628 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 from California, Senator FEINSTEIN. former Secretaries of Defense in testifying in tion relating to the development and And I find that I rarely disagree with early April when the Foreign Relations Com- application of chemistry for purposes my colleague from Arizona, Senator mittee holds hearings on the Chemical Weap- not prohibited under the convention.’’ ons Convention. Regrettably, other commit- MCCAIN. This is a treaty which has That is to say, peaceful purposes. ments will preclude me from participation. I caused division among reasonable peo- hope that this correspondence will be suffi- And, second, that the state parties ple. I respect their views immensely. cient to convey my views on this Conven- ‘‘shall not maintain among themselves We find that even former members of tion. any restrictions, including those in any the same administration, the Bush and During the years I served as Secretary of international agreements, incompat- Reagan administrations, now find Defense, I was deeply concerned about the ible with the obligations undertaken themselves on opposite sides of this inherent unverifiability, lack of global cov- under this convention, which would re- issue. So it is a matter upon which rea- erage, and unenforceability of a convention strict or impede trade and the develop- that sought to ban production and stock- ment and promotion of scientific and sonable people can differ. As I said, I piling of chemical weapons. My misgivings respect the views of those who have on these scores have only intensified during technological knowledge in the field of disagreed with me, and they have cer- the four years since I left the Pentagon. chemistry for industrial and agricul- tainly shown a respect for my views, The technology to manufacture chemical tural research, medical, pharma- which I appreciate. weapons is simply too ubiquitous, covert ceutical, and other peaceful purposes.’’ These two articles are among the chemical warfare programs too easily con- These two provisions were inserted in most important in the treaty, and I cealed, and the international community’s the treaty essentially as inducements think a little bit of background is im- record of responding effectively to violations to get the parties to join the treaty, in of arms control treaties too unsatisfactory effect, saying, ‘‘If you will join the portant for us to understand the reason to permit confidence that such a regime we believe that it is important that would actually reduce the chemical threat. CWC, those of us who have this tech- they not be included in the treaty Indeed, some aspects of the present Con- nology and these chemicals will pro- when we enter into force. vention—notably, its obligation to share vide them to you. We will sell you the We have said initially that this trea- with potential adversaries like Iran chemical chemicals for peaceful purposes—not ty is not global. It doesn’t cover coun- manufacturing technology that can be used for chemical weapons. And we will pro- tries that it should. It is not verifiable. for military purposes and chemical defensive vide you the defense technology so that It is fairly well acknowledged there are equipment—threaten to make this accord you can defend against any possible use worse than having no treaty at all. In my no sanctions. But supporters have said judgment, the treaty’s Articles X and XI against you.’’ Of course, the price for it is better than nothing. There are amount to a formula for greatly accelerating having that right is not developing some advantages to it. Our response is the proliferation of chemical warfare capa- chemical weapons. that in some respects it is not better bilities around the globe. In this respect, the treaty was com- than nothing. Those nations most likely to comply with pared to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation In particular, these two sections, ar- the Chemical Weapons Convention are not Treaty, and the so-called ‘‘Atoms for ticles X and XI, make it worse than likely to ever constitute a military threat to Peace,’’ which said that if the coun- nothing, and we ought to get rid of the United States. The governments we tries would forswear the development should be concerned about are likely to them. It is true that to get rid of them, cheat on the CWC, even if they do partici- of nuclear weapons building that the the states parties to the convention pate. developed countries of the world would have to agree. That will take some In effect, the Senate is being asked to rat- provide them peaceful nuclear tech- time. But we believe it is better, before ify the CWC even though it is likely to be in- nology. For some countries this the United States enters, when we have effective, unverifiable and unenforceable. worked. But sadly we know that a cou- the leverage to cause that renegoti- Having ratified the Convention, we will then ple of other countries used the peaceful ation to occur, to have it occur at that be told we have ‘‘dealt with the problem of technology to build their nuclear weap- chemical weapons’’ when in fact we have not. on capability. time. Therefore, the resolution of rati- But, ratification of the CWC will lead to a fication is passed, but prior to the sense of complacency, totally unjustified So, Secretary Cheney, and many oth- President actually depositing those ar- given the flaws in the convention. ers, fear that these sections, these arti- ticles, the President certify to us that I would urge the Senate to reject the cles, would permit countries—since articles X and XI have been removed, Chemical Weapons Convention. they have been induced to come into or fixed. Sincerely, the treaty with these commitments— Why is this so important? Secretary DICK CHENEY. to then call upon those commitments of Defense Cheney was quoted by the Mr. KYL. Mr. President, what is it from the countries that have this distinguished chairman of the commit- about articles X and XI that cause Sec- equipment. tee, and I think he succinctly said it. retary Cheney and so many others to Is this an unreasonable assumption? Therefore, I will summarize these conclude that they should be removed? Today, we are basically hearing state- thoughts by quoting Secretary Cheney I will quote to you the language of ments that suggest that that is not the in his letter of April of this year. both. They are on the chart behind me. way it was intended at all. He said: Article X provides that ‘‘ * * * each That is a very recent phenomenon. Indeed, some aspects of the present Con- state party undertake to facilitate, and As a matter of fact, right after the vention—notably, its obligation to share shall have the right to participate in, CWC was signed, it was very clear to with potential adversaries like Iran chemical the fullest possible exchange of equip- all states parties that they begin to manufacturing technology that can be used ment, material, and scientific and dismantle the trade restrictions they for military purposes and chemical defensive technological information concerning had in place on chemicals in order to equipment—threaten to make this accord means of protection against chemical come into compliance with the CWC. worse than having no treaty at all. In my weapons.’’ According to the administration in judgment, the treaty’s Articles X and XI In other words, in plain English, testimony before the Senate, and I am amount to a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation of chemical warfare capa- those parties which have defensive ca- quoting now, ‘‘Australia Group mem- bilities around the globe. pability will undertake to facilitate bers’’—these are the countries that Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- the fullest possible exchange of that have agreed not to sell chemicals to sent that Secretary Cheney’s letter be technology, equipment, and so on, to terrorist states—‘‘in August 1992 com- the countries that don’t have them. mitted to review their export control printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the mate- They shall have the right to partici- measures with a view of removing rial was ordered to be printed in the pate in the fullest possible exchange of them for CWC states parties in full that equipment. compliance with their obligations RECORD, as follows: Article XI is the article that says under the convention.’’ DALLAS, TX, April 7, 1997. that the states parties shall: ‘‘(b) un- They knew that those trade restric- Hon. JESSE HELMS, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, dertake to facilitate, and have the tions were incompatible with the new U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. right to participate in, the fullest pos- commitments they had undertaken in DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your sible exchange of chemical equipment, articles X and XI of the convention, letter inviting me to join several other and scientific and technical informa- and the Australia Group itself issued a April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3629 formal statement which concluded ties to the treaty. The treaty says we overrode the point of being honest in again that states parties were review- can do it, so stop complaining and, by the certification. The same thing is ing this, and I am quoting, ‘‘with the the way, don’t impose any restrictions true with the Arms Control Disar- aim of removing such measures for the on us because of what we are doing. mament Act, the annual Pell report, benefit of states parties to the conven- I do not know how long it will be be- section 51. We know that Russia is not tion acting in full compliance with the fore chemical companies in other coun- in compliance with the Biological obligations under the convention.’’ tries are going to say wait a minute, Weapons Convention or with the Wyo- The point being that when the treaty why should the Chinese have all the ac- ming Memorandum of Understanding went into effect the parties knew full tion here; we would like to have a piece or with the Bilateral Destruction well that trade restrictions they had of that action, too, and therefore when Agreement, but the most this adminis- were no longer compatible with the one country breaks an embargo it be- tration has ever done is to conduct convention, with articles X and XI, and gins to fall apart. That is why I submit high-level discussions with the Rus- that they were going to have to review that just focusing on United States ac- sians. It is too hard to certify that they limiting those trade restrictions, and tion under the treaty is not going to are in noncompliance and therefore the Australia Group is a very success- solve the problem. take the action that is required. ful group of countries that has trade There is also the idea—and this is The same thing is true under the Ex- restrictions against trade in chemicals really not a proper legal argument, but port-Import Ban Act with respect to to these terrorist states. some have said that article I super- violations by China and several other Well, we then began raising the ques- sedes the specific articles of the con- laws that China has violated with re- tions about articles X and XI. The ad- vention. Now, for those who are law- spect to its chemical weapons transfers ministration position changed 180 de- yers, they recognize this is not true. to Iran. These certifications are simply grees, Mr. President. The administra- The specific always governs over the too hard. And while I agree, I am sure tion began to say, well, actually, we general. Article I is a general prohibi- the intentions of the President are ap- could continue our restrictions under tion. The very specific articles such as propriate in this regard, those certifi- these two articles. And we said, well, it articles X and XI will control. They are cations I submit are not going to be will not do any good unless everybody the specific implementation of the done. else does it. They said, we could even treaty. The time line here is important, too. But to conclude now, Mr. President, persuade the Australia Group countries This is a commitment by President the President of the United States has to do that. In other words, to do ex- Clinton. It is between 2 and 3 years be- said given the fact that there are con- actly the opposite of what they had fore any action can be taken under this cerns, continuing concerns about arti- originally decided they had to do to be convention. That means that this cles X and XI, I am going to write a in compliance. President’s term will almost be expired So the administration has made letter which maybe will put your mind before he would have the opportunity much of and my colleagues have spo- at ease, and that letter has been re- to even consider the issues that are set ken of the fact that the United States ferred to here by some of my col- forth in his letter. So it is not an effec- will now interpret the Chemical Weap- leagues. I do not doubt the sincerity of tive commitment. ons Convention as not requiring us to the President in sending the letter and provide this equipment and as enabling certainly do not doubt the sincerity of And finally, Mr. President, the letter us to maintain trade restrictions even my colleagues in believing that letter only deals with United States actions, despite articles X and XI. Moreover, provides some solace, but I would like the point that I made in the beginning. that we have even tried to get our fel- to make five points with respect to The question here is not United States low Australia Group countries to main- that letter. actions. The question has always been tain their restrictions in place. If the things under articles X and XI what are we going to do with those That is laudable. We have at least happen that we think will, it does not countries of the world that seek an of- pushed the rock that far up the moun- solve anything for the United States to fensive chemical weapons capability, a tain. We have got them to agree these pull out of the treaty as the President capability that we would like to deny two sections should not operate the says he might do. The time to exercise them, countries like Iran, the one I way they plainly say they will. I think leverage is now before we are a party have been talking about here. This it is a little unseemly to be signaling to the treaty. And what we are saying commitment, the President’s commit- before we have entered the convention is prior to the United States getting ment in his letter does absolutely that we are going to violate it up front into the treaty, we should make sure nothing with respect to the sales of and convince many of our friends to that articles X and XI are removed so chemicals and chemical technology violate it, because, frankly, it is the that these bad things do not happen. from a country like China to a country right thing to do because articles X Once they happen, there is no point of like Iran. It doesn’t affect it at all. and XI ought to be violated by us. They the United States pulling out of the So while it is a nice commitment to have no place in this treaty. treaty. That does not solve anything. have made with respect to the United The problem is the administration So what the President says he is will- States participation and attempting to has also glossed over the fact that ing to do, frankly, is not an induce- keep the Australia Group together, the while we may interpret the treaty this ment. fact is it does not deal with part of the way, there are others who do not. For Moreover, there is the argument that problem that has concerned us from example, China does not. Iran does not. it is better to be inside the treaty than the very beginning. And there are other countries that we outside the treaty. And believe me, I conclude with this letter to simply heard about in our classified session once we are inside it is going to be make this point. As I said, reasonable this morning that do not. They explic- much harder to leave than it is to get people can differ, and I respect the itly understand that the treaty means in in the first place. views of those who disagree with me. what it says. And therefore two parties Third, certifications of the kind that They have sincere belief that this trea- that have signed, not yet ratified but the President indicated he would be ty is better than nothing. And if they signed the agreement have indicated willing to make are very, very hard to believe that way, they should vote yes that they intend to continue their do. There are a whole series of certifi- on this treaty. There are also those of trade. And this is China selling chemi- cations that have to be made under us who disagree with that proposition. cals to Iran, for Iran’s chemical weap- U.S. law. They are too hard. We end up But I urge my colleagues, if you believe ons program. That is the problem. And not doing them. The certification of that this letter provides the basis for it is true that nothing prevents that Mexico is a good example, to certify support for the treaty, I honestly be- trade from occurring today, Mr. Presi- that they are cooperating with us in lieve that is incorrect. If you are going dent, but the problem is that the the war on drugs. Most people believe to vote yes on this treaty, do it for Chemical Weapons Convention gives that that was not an honest certifi- grounds other than this letter because them the color of law, the legal author- cation. But the desire to cooperate it does not provide a satisfactory re- ity to be able to say: Look, we are par- with Mexico was so strong that it sponse to the very real problem that S3630 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 has been discussed by Secretary Che- If we are signing a treaty, don’t we ports don’t contribute to the spread of chem- ney, by Secretary Weinberger, by Sec- mean to comply with all of it. And ical weapons. retary Rumsfeld, by Secretary Schles- then again we are not just talking But Articles X and XI of the CWC require inger, and a host of other people who about the United States, because I member countries to transfer chemicals and technology to any other member country have all said that the fundamental hope that we don’t just give our tech- that asks. This goes a long way toward ex- problem is articles X and XI. Unless nology away to some countries, some plaining why the Chemical Manufacturers they are removed, we are looking for countries that will sign this conven- Association is so loud in its support of the more proliferation, not less, under this tion and will not comply. We know treaty. treaty. And it is for that reason the that. We have had some experience. We Senators who are still considering how to motion to strike should be defeated, have seen it not only with the Geneva vote might consider whether selling such Mr. President. Protocol on chemical weapons, but we chemicals to China or Iran or Cuba will help make the world safe from chemical weap- Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair. also have seen it with the biological The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ons—or make the world a more dangerous weapons convention which a lot of place. ator from North Carolina. countries signed but they have not MUSTARD GAS FOR SALE Mr. HELMS. From my general debate complied with and we know that. Our time I yield 10 minutes to the assistant Trade in these 20 precursors for chemical intelligence community has done a weapons agents, now regulated, would be majority leader. pretty good job, and in many cases we The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- permitted under the Chemical Weapons Con- know a lot of countries are not comply- ator is recognized for 10 minutes. vention: Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, first I ing. 3-Hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine But I think it is legitimate to ask, would like to compliment my colleague Potassium fluoride are we better off with it or without. 2-Chloroethanol from Arizona, Senator KYL, for an ex- And I have heard good debate on both Dimethylamine (DMA) cellent statement. I happen to think Dimethylamine hydrochloride that this amendment we are debating sides. But this language says to me we have to share this technology. Not only Hydrogen fluoride is the key amendment of the entire de- Methyl benzilate bate. I certainly compliment all Sen- do we have to but also other countries, 3-Quinuclidone ators for their involvement in this de- including countries like China, would Pinacolone bate. I think it has been one of the best be sharing this technology with Iran. Potassium cyanide debates we have had in the Senate for Under the treaty, they would be Potassium bifluoride obliged to, or certainly that is what Ammonium bifluoride a long time. It is also one of the most Sodium fluoride important issues we have had where we they will be saying. Does that increase the likelihood and the dangers of Sodium bifluoride have seen so many colleagues, particu- Sodium cyanide larly on this side of the aisle, who have chemical weapons? I am afraid it does. Phosphorus pentasulfide been undecided and probably because of And then looking at article XI, and Diisopropylamine (DIPA) this language dealing with article X again just looking at the treaty and Diethylaminoethanol (DEAE) and article XI. looking at the language of the treaty— Sodium sulfide This is the language we have heard every once in a while I think it is im- Triethanolamine hydrochloride former Defense Secretary Cheney, portant we do it—under article XI, sec- Source: Senate Foreign Relations Committee former Secretary of Defense Schles- tion 2(c) it says: Mr. NICKLES. This article lists inger, and Cap Weinberger, really Not maintain among themselves any re- about 20 chemicals that are not prohib- speak out against in their statements strictions, including those in any inter- ited by this treaty, that basically this before the Senate Foreign Relations national agreements, incompatible with the section of article XI says you will be obligations undertaken under this conven- able to sell those chemicals. As a mat- Committee. tion, which would restrict or impede trade Also, I note that President Clinton and the development and promotion of sci- ter of fact, no restriction. This lan- has a letter addressing this issue. But I entific and technological knowledge in the guage says that countries cannot main- looked at it a little bit more. I cer- field of chemistry for industrial, agricul- tain amongst themselves any restric- tainly concur with the goals and objec- tural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or tions including those in any inter- tives; we want to reduce chemical other peaceful purposes. national agreements. It does not say weapons. And we have taken a lauda- In other words, we want a lot more some. It says any international agree- tory step of saying we are going to ban trade in other chemicals that aren’t ments. That sounds pretty open. A lot them in this country and we want to banned by this treaty. of those chemicals can be used to de- encourage other countries to ban them, There is an editorial in the Wall velop chemical weapons. They can also and I think that is great. And that is in Street Journal that I ask unanimous have a dual purpose. It can be kind of article I. I see article I is over here, consent to have printed in the RECORD. confusing. and if one reads article I it looks great. There being no objection, the article I understand the President in his let- But I think it is incumbent upon us as was ordered to be printed in the ter today said, well, he would try to Senators to read the balance of the RECORD, as follows: end the confusion. And so I looked at treaty. [From the Wall Street Journal, Apr. 24, 1997] his letter, and in his letter on page 2 he When you read article X, and it is in CHEMICAL REACTIONS says—dealing with article X, he said: the treaty, it says: Before today’s vote on the Chemical Weap- Using article X to justify providing defen- Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, ons Convention, we hope that some Senator sive chemical weapon equipment, material and shall have the right to participate in, will twist his tongue around the 20 chemicals or information to another State Party that the fullest possible exchange of equipment, listed here and read their names into the could result in U.S. chemical protective material and scientific and technological in- record. This list makes two important points equipment being compromised so that U.S. formation concerning means of protection about what’s wrong with the treaty. war fighting capabilities in a chemical weap- against chemical weapons. First is that many ordinary chemicals can ons environment are significantly degraded. Share defensive technology. I know be put to deadly use. The chemicals on this If that is the case, he wants out. list can be used in such mundane products as the administration said, well, we are laundry soaps, ink and fumigation agents— What is ‘‘significantly degraded’’? How not going to do that. But it is in the or they can be used in lethal weapons. Bear do you reach that level. I do not know treaty that we are going to. I find that this in mind when you hear the President as- that you would ever reach—since he a little contradictory, we are going to sert that the CWC will ‘‘banish poison gas has ‘‘significantly degraded,’’ I do not limit what we are going to share. This from the Earth.’’ know, because the word ‘‘significantly’’ says to the fullest extent possible. The The second point is that the CWC not only is there that it would ever be treated. language is very contradictory in what will permit trade in these 20 potentially And then in (b) he talks about where it the administration says they are going deadly chemicals, it will require it. American would be impossible for him to make a companies currently are restricted from ex- to do in subsequent letters and what porting these dual-use chemicals under the certification on the Australia Group. the language of the treaty is. I think terms of an organization called the Australia But in the final language he says we maybe the language of the treaty will Group, which is made up of 29 Western coun- would get out if the implementing of supersede. tries committed to ensuring that their ex- this convention carries out transfers or April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3631 exchanges under either article X or XI The PRESIDING OFFICER. They Secretary Cohen replied on Meet The which jeopardize U.S. national security have not. Press on Sunday—and Secretary by promoting chemical weapons pro- Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask for Albright, likewise, who was sitting be- liferation. When is that going to be the yeas and nays. side him responded to this question— triggered? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a they pointed out that is a very good His final conclusion is kind of inter- sufficient second? reason for us to be around the table esting. I read the AP story that said, There is a sufficient second. with the other countries from the be- well, because of the President’s letter, The yeas and nays were ordered. ginning, setting the rules. he said if these things happen, we are Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much If Senators are seriously concerned out of there, we are going to walk away time remains under the control of the that other countries are going to give from the treaty. I do not read that in Senator from Delaware? away the store, we had better be there his language. It says I would be pre- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eleven to help restrain them, to offer our lead- pared to withdraw. It did not say he minutes. ership. It comes back to that, our lead- would withdraw. So if it really jeopard- Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest ership. We were the ones that started izes our national security, he might be my colleague and I divide that time. I the whole process—President Reagan, prepared, but it did not say he would yield 5 minutes to my friend from Indi- President Bush, President Clinton. We withdraw, after consulting with Con- ana. are the ones who had a good idea: If we gress. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- were getting rid of our chemical weap- In other words, I do not find a lot in ator from Indiana. ons, others ought to get rid of theirs. this letter that gives me any real com- Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the con- This is our treaty, as Secretary fort or assurance that article X or XI dition we are discussing, all Senators Albright said, ‘‘Made in the USA.’’ And has really been addressed. And I appre- by this time, I am certain, understand, we ought to be there to set the rules, to ciate the fact that a lot of our col- requires the President to certify that be the governing board, to assert our leagues have addressed this issue, but the parties to the convention have leadership at the moment that it is to me treaties are important. And we agreed to strike article X of the con- crucial after April 29. have had a lot of significant discussion vention and amend article XI of the So I say simply to those who have over various sections of the treaty, convention. That means, in simple lan- qualms about articles X and XI, we are maybe none more than article X and guage, that the United States would not going to give away the store, any XI, but it happens to still be in the simply say a treaty negotiated by 160 of us, as patriotic Americans. We would treaty. And the President’s letter not- countries, now ratified by, apparently, like to be at the table to make sure no withstanding, at the conclusion of his 74—unilaterally, we simply knock out one else entertains that thought. But I letter he said if all these things happen article X and severely amend article say again, whether we are there or not, or any of these things happen, I would XI. the treaty is going to happen after be prepared to withdraw. As all Senators who have addressed April 29. We better be there and, hope- Frankly, Senator KYL is right. That this will admit, this means effectively fully, with affirmative votes to strike is not going to happen in 2 or 3 years. the end of the treaty, at least in terms this fifth situation we have discussed It is not going to happen under Presi- of our participation, because, clearly, this evening, this fifth condition, and dent Clinton’s term. I do not know that the other nations of the world are for final passage, to vote for the treaty. this letter would be binding on suc- under no obligation to renegotiate the These are very important for the for- ceeding or successors of the President. entire treaty at that point. This is the eign policy and security of our coun- So, Mr. President, this language is reason it is strictly a killer amend- try. vitally important. I would tell my col- ment. It simply knocks out material The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- league from North Carolina my vote on parts of the convention. ator from Delaware. final passage depends on this amend- If those who are advocating this had Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much ment. If we are able to make this a point, there might be reason to pause time do I have remaining? change by the Senator from North at this point and not ratify the treaty. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six min- Carolina, I will vote maybe for final But by and large it appears to me that utes 11 seconds. passage. I think this is a killer amend- most of us want to ratify the treaty Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield ment, having it in the treaty. I think it and we do so with assurance, first of myself 5 minutes and I ask to be in- is that important. We are ratifying the all, that as a country we have our wits formed at the end of those 5 minutes. I entire treaty including article X, in- about us. There is no possibility this am not going to take the time to speak cluding article XI. And again I com- President, the next President, Members to why this is a killer amendment and pliment my colleagues. I have the of the Senate, any responsible Amer- why this is so important, because I greatest respect for Senator LUGAR. I ican is going to furnish material to could not improve upon what the Sen- know he has worked hard on this. I countries that are rogue states that ator from Indiana said. I mean that have the greatest respect for Senator are going to jeopardize our security. sincerely. MCCAIN and a lot of other people on The treaty does not call for that, as It is real basic. This gets down to both sides of the aisle. They have con- again and again we pointed out. This real basic considerations. Anybody who ducted an excellent debate. I have was a generous interpretation that the has the capacity to transfer technology made a long list of pluses and minuses Iranians gave because, at least from can do that right now. They can do it on this treaty. I could debate either that standpoint, they would like to right now. If they are in the treaty, the side of the treaty, I have spent just have the material. But why we should treaty does not require them to trans- that amount of time on it. But I hap- ever be that gullible escapes me. There fer that technology, but they, theoreti- pen to think that this article X and ar- is no mandate to give anything away. cally, could transfer technology. If we ticle XI do a lot of damage. Since we Those of us who advocate the treaty are not in the treaty we are not there are ratifying not just article I, but the have been saying we will not. The to modulate their attitudes, their ac- entire treaty, I urge my colleagues to President of the United States has been tivities. We are out of the game. vote to delete the section. I urge my asked for assurance, and he said that This seems to me to be so simplistic colleagues to vote no on this. I think he will not. He has sent letters to the and basic. But let me put on the hat I this is the most important amendment majority leader and to individual Sen- have been wearing for the past 5 years. and discussion that we will have to ators affirming this in any number of I have been teaching constitutional law date. ways. at Widner University on Saturday I yield the floor. Furthermore, the question arises, mornings, a three-credit course. You The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ‘‘Fair enough, Mr. President, or Mr. know the old joke is, if you want to ator from North Carolina. Senator, if you will not give things learn a subject, teach it. If I had spent Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, have the away to the Iranians, how about the nearly as much time studying it when yeas and nays been ordered on this French or the Germans or some other I was in law school, as much time as I amendment? nation? Perhaps they will do so.’’ As have spent teaching it, I would have S3632 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 ended up in the top of the class, not the Mr. President, what are we talking in, the fullest possible exchange of equip- bottom. I don’t think I would have the about here? Do you know what this de- ment, material and scientific and techno- record the Senator from Indiana had, bate on article X and article XI re- logical information concerning means of pro- but it would be better. minds me of, speaking of law school? tection against chemical weapons. But all kidding aside, there is some- The only thing I ever did do well in law Note that this paragraph contains thing, to quote Elliot Richardson, our school was moot court. I won that. ambiguous terms like ‘‘facilitate’’ and former Attorney General, and Abe Does that surprise you all? But I did. ‘‘possible.’’ There’s a reason for that— Chayes, Harvard Law School professor, It reminds me of what we used to the negotiators did not want us to and a number of other professors, do—maybe when my friend from Indi- make a concrete commitment. which I will submit for the RECORD, ana was at Oxford. You would walk in And the Administration has made there is, as the letter to me says, re- and you would be presented a question. clear that it interprets this paragraph garding article X and article XI, it The question before the court or the to mean that it will have the flexibility says: question before the House is—and you to decide what exchanges, if any, will occur under this paragraph. As it is axiomatic that all treaty provi- got assigned a side and you came up sions must be interpreted in view of the pur- with the best arguments. On April 15, Sandy Berger wrote to poses and objectives of the treaty and that a This reminds me of that, as if we all me to say that: subsidiary obligation should never be read got together earlier today and said, ... any exchange which does occur is lim- out of context to authorize behavior that OK, one side has to argue that article ited to that which we determine would be ap- would contravene a primary obligation, X and article XI do all these terrible propriate and permitted under the Conven- tion and consistent with our national export nothing in article X or XI may undermine things. I am glad I did not get that side article I . . .. controls on these heavily regulated items. to argue. The reason is, it is much I ask unanimous consent that this But the first part of that sentence— harder to make the case. My friend letter be printed in the RECORD. maybe I spent too much time in law from Arizona, who is an able trial law- schools. There is no legal scholar in There being no objection, the letter yer, is doing a very good job. But, look, was ordered to be printed in the America who will tell you that you can you cannot avoid the central purpose read a subsidiary provision in a treaty, RECORD, as follows: of the treaty and that is: Never, under THE WHITE HOUSE, a document, a contract or anything any circumstances, can any party as- else, that contravenes the stated pur- Washington, April 15, 1997. sist, encourage, induce in any way any- Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., pose of the treaty—the stated purpose one to engage in any prohibited activ- Washington, DC. of the contract. You cannot do that. ity. DEAR JOE: During the Senate Foreign Rela- Think about it. Forget being a law- I yield myself 2 more minutes on the tions Committee’s hearings last week, con- yer, just think about it. How could you bill. cerns were again raised about the impact of write a contract, make a deal that So we are in a position here where I the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on the ability of rogue states to acquire ad- said, ‘‘This is our purpose,’’ and five really understand the worry. But, even paragraphs later say, ‘‘but if you don’t vanced chemical defense or chemical manu- if there was any merit to the reading facturing technology. I would like to take want to meet the purpose, you don’t that is given by my friends, we have, in the opportunity to elaborate further on have to.’’ It is bizarre. This is an abso- the conditions that we did support, we these issues and set the record straight. lute bizarre interpretation. have two conditions which cover this— First and foremost, I would like to take Let me also point out—I wish my double cover it. We promise we are not issue with the charge that the Nuclear Non- friend had not taken down their chart. going to transfer anything that is not Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biologi- The Senator’s chart, those in opposi- cal Weapons Convention (BWC), which have medical in nature. language similar to the CWC on promoting tion to my amendment, a chart on arti- Mr. President, a party cannot do cle XI, is somewhat incomplete. The trade for peaceful purposes, have hastened something in the treaty by transfer- the spread of these dangerous weapons and paragraph that sat up there for a half- ring material which would have the ef- technologies. In fact, export controls in hour or so, paragraph 2 in the chart, fect these Senators are worried about, these areas have been made tougher and read, ‘‘The state party shall—’’ and because if it had the effect they were these controls, as well as the treaties them- then it goes on, and then the subpara- worrying about, then it would be as- selves, have gained the support of more and graphs (b) and (c) were shown. But they sisting, encouraging, inducing or in more countries over the years. In the early left out the remaining part of that. The some way engaging in activity prohib- 1960s, President Kennedy predicted that there would be 15–20 nuclear weapon states words that were missing are very key. ited by the treaty. Chemical weapons They read as follows:. by the 1970s. Due largely to the NPT, that are prohibited by the treaty. number if far lower today. Controls on bio- Subject to the provisions of the convention To reiterate, Mr. President, this is a logical weapons continue to be strengthened, and without prejudice to the principles and killer, pure and simple. This will pre- including in 1992, when the Australia Group applicable rules of international law, the vent the United States from joining decided to add biological pathogens and re- state party shall. . .. the Chemical Weapons Convention. lated equipment to their list of controlled That is the part they left out of arti- The condition requires the President items. cle X and XI. What does article X and to certify that he has achieved the im- The CWC, like the NPT and the BWC, will XI refer to? They are referring to arti- result in a strengthened export control re- possible: that he has been able to sub- gime on dangerous chemicals. The CWC al- cle I. stantially rewrite the treaty. lows for maintenance and strengthening of I do not want to be overly technical There is no chance—none—that he the controls already in place, while also for- here. This is not rocket science. What can achieve this by April 29, and it is mally expanding controls over a broad range does article I of the treaty say? It says: highly unlikely that he can ever do of chemicals and precursors. The CWC also Each State party to this convention under- so—because amendments may be prohibits novel agents which are not cur- takes never under any circumstances: blocked by any State party to the con- rently covered. The informal Australia (a) to develop or produce or otherwise ac- vention. If a party wants to keep us Group consists of 30 countries, while the quire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons CWC has been ratified by 72 countries and out—and thus render the treaty inef- the list is growing. Furthermore, the CWC or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical fective—it can easily do so. weapons to anyone; provides for trade restrictions against states (b) to use chemical weapons; Aside from the practical difficulties who are not party to the treaty. (c) to engage in any military preparation of rewriting a treaty that took nearly Regarding the specific CWC Articles in to use chemical weapons; a decade to negotiate, there is no need question, one area of concern has been (d) to assist, encourage or induce in any to do so. whether Article X of the CWC might force us way anyone to engage in any activity pro- Let me start with article 10. The Sen- to share advanced chemical defense tech- hibited to a state party under this conven- ator from North Carolina wants to get nologies and equipment with rogue nations tion. like Iran and to assist in the development of rid of it completely. CW defensive capabilities. Let me assure you The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time Article 10 contains two paragraphs at that Article X does not require the U.S. or of the Senator has expired. issue. Paragraph three provides that: any other Party to the treaty to share its ad- Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 2 addi- [E]ach State Party undertakes to facili- vanced chemical weapons defense tech- tional minutes under the bill. tate, and shall have the right to participate nologies and equipment with countries such April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3633 as Iran or to assist them in the development ance.’’ This paragraph does not require or chemical and biological weapons-related ma- of such capabilities. obligate a Party to provide emergency bilat- terials. If this certification cannot be made, Although Paragraph 7 of Article 10 obli- eral assistance, but simply states that a the President must consult with the Senate gates States Parties to provide assistance party may choose to provide such emergency for the purpose of obtaining a resolution of through the treaty organization in response assistance. Again, I would underscore that continued adherence to the Convention. to a request by a State Party that has either with the CWC in force, any exchange of CW I hope this information facilitates the Sen- been threatened by the use of chemical weap- defense assistance takes place within the ate’s consideration of the CWC. I look for- ons or has had chemical weapons used framework of the fundamental obligations of ward to continuing to work with you and against it, assistance is broadly defined in the treaty not to assist anyone in acquiring other CWC supporters to ensure a successful the article as including medical antidotes a chemical weapons capability. vote on this vital treaty in the days ahead. and treatments. Article X provides complete A specific concern also has been raised Sincerely, flexibility to States Parties to determine that Paragraph 5 of Article X could be read SAMUEL R. BERGER, what type of assistance they provide and to require the release of advanced and classi- Assistant to the President how they provide it. A State Party’s obliga- fied information about defensive capabilities for National Security Affairs. tion under paragraph 7 of Article X may be and technologies. This is simply not the Mr. BIDEN. Moreover, as with any met in one of three ways—by contributing case. Paragraph 5 requires the international monies to a voluntary fund (managed by the Technical Secretariat which will administer treaty, this paragraph must be read in treaty organization); by concluding an agree- the Convention to establish and maintain light of the object and purpose of the ment with the organization concerning the ‘‘for the use of any requesting State Party, a convention. The purpose of the treaty, procurement, if requested, of specific types data bank containing freely available infor- quite obviously, is to ban chemical of assistance; or by declaring (within 180 mation concerning various means of protec- weapons. days after the CWC’s entry-into-force) the tion against chemical weapons as well as And any nation which provides tech- kind of assistance it might provide in re- such information as may be provided by nology to a country of concern would sponse to an appeal by the organization. States Parties.’’ As stated in the Article-by- find itself in violation of the overriding To meet its obligations under Article X, Article Analysis submitted to the Senate on therefore, the U.S. can choose from a variety November 23, 1993, ‘‘freely available’’ means obligation of Article One of the treaty, of options and forms of assistance. In no case ‘‘from open public sources.’’ Further, the which requires states ‘‘never under any would we be required to share advanced CWC imposes no obligation on States Parties circumstance * * * to assist, encour- chemical defense technology and equipment, to contribute to this database. Hence, the age, or induce, in any way, anyone to or even to provide older model gas masks. provision does not require the release of clas- engage in any activity prohibited to a During our extensive negotiations with Ma- sified or otherwise sensitive information state party under this Convention.’’ jority Leader Lott and the Task Force he es- about U.S. chemical defense capabilities. This is an overriding obligation. It tablished on the CWC, the Administration A second area of concern has been whether has agreed to a binding condition, regarding Article XI of the CWC, which relates to co- governs everything you do under the Article X, on the resolution of ratification operation in the field of chemical activities treaty. that will ensure that no assistance other for purposes not prohibited by the CWC, Ronald Lehman, the head of the than medical antidotes and treatments is might force our industry to share dual-use Arms Control and Disarmament Agen- provided by the United States to any coun- technologies and manufacturing secrets with cy during the Reagan Administration, try of concern. other nations. This is not what the treaty stated during a recent Foreign Rela- A particular concern has also been raised says. Let me assure you that Article XI does tions Committee hearing that: about Paragraph 3 of Article X. This para- not require private businesses to release We made it very clear throughout the ne- graph states that ‘‘Each Party undertakes to such proprietary or otherwise confidential gotiations that all of this was subject to facilitate, and shall have the right to partici- business information, nor does it require the [A]rticle I, which is the fundamental obliga- pate in, the fullest possible exchange of U.S. Government to force private businesses tion [under the Convention] not to assist. So equipment, material and scientific and tech- to undertake such actions. we reiterated that again and again and nological information concerning means of Article XI is explicitly subject to the fun- again. But the most important, I think, tell- protection against chemical weapons.’’ The damental ban in Article I on assisting any- ing factoid in support of the U.S. interpreta- inclusion of the words ‘‘facilitate’’ and ‘‘pos- one in acquiring a chemical weapons capabil- tion is the fact that after the Convention sible’’ underscores that no specific exchange ity. Here again, far from undercutting export was done so many of the usual list of sus- is required and that any exchange which controls, the CWC will be a basis for stronger pects were so unhappy that they did not get does occur is limited to that which we deter- controls, enforced by more countries. I want what they wanted in these provisions. mine would be appropriate and permitted to make clear that the export controls that under the Convention and consistent with we and other Australia Group members have On this point, I would also like to our national export controls on these heavily undertaken, as well as our own national ex- refer to a letter submitted to me by a regulated items. Paragraph 3 of Article X port controls, are fully consistent with the group of eminent legal scholars, in- does not override any other rights and obli- CWC and will further its implementation. cluding Abe Chayes of Harvard Law gations under international law, such as the This is not just a U.S. Government position. School, former State Department legal right to have export controls. In recent weeks, we have instructed our em- adviser, and Elliot Richardson, former The concerns about Article X also include bassies to confirm with our Australia Group whether other less scrupulous countries partners that they agree that the Group’s ex- Secretary of Defense and former Attor- might seek to use this article as an excuse to port control and nonproliferation measures ney General. profiteer by giving away defense secrets. are fully compatible with the CWC. Our part- They write that the language in This concern misses the main point, which is ners have confirmed this and have also con- paragraph three which discusses that that any such unscrupulous exchanges can firmed that they are committed to maintain- each State Party has the right to ‘‘par- take place now without the CWC. With the ing such export control and nonproliferation ticipate in exchanges of equipment’’ is CWC, the countries undertaking any ex- measures in the future. axiomatic—that is, it ‘‘merely reaf- changes in Article X are legally bound by the In order to address the concerns raised fundamental obligation of the treaty in Arti- about Article XI, the Administration has firms current trade policies that allow cle I, which obligates Parties never to ‘‘. . . agreed to a binding condition in our negotia- nations to exchange goods and services. assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, tions with the Majority Leader’s Task Force Each State Party retains the right to anyone to engage in any activity prohibited that would have the President certify prior participate in this trade at the level of to a State Party under this Convention.’’ to the deposit of our instrument of ratifica- its own choosing, including not to The Chemical Weapons Convention will tion that nothing in the Convention obli- trade at all. There is no affirmative mean not only that all relevant trade is sub- gates us to accept any weakening of our ex- duty to trade * * *.’’ ject to closer scrutiny, especially with coun- port controls, that we maintain the right to I ask unanimous consent to have the tries whose compliance may be in doubt, but impose export controls unilaterally or col- letter printed in the RECORD at this it will also provide the legal basis as well as lectively on chemicals and chemical produc- the verification and compliance measures to tion technology, and that each member of point. redress those compliance concerns. the Australia Group agrees that its export There being no objection, the letter In this regard, concern has been raised spe- controls and nonproliferation measures are was ordered to be printed in the cifically that Paragraph 6 of Article X could consistent with the CWC and is committed RECORD, as follows: provide the basis for other Parties to argue to maintaining such controls in the future. APRIL 23, 1997. that they must share defensive technologies. Furthermore, as prescribed in the condi- Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Paragraph 6 states that ‘‘Nothing in this tion, the President must certify on an an- U.S. Senate, Convention shall be interpreted as impeding nual basis that the Australia Group contin- Washington, DC. the right of States Parties to request and ues to maintain equivalent or more effective DEAR SENATOR BIDEN: You have asked us to provide assistance bilaterally . . . concern- controls over exports and that it remains a state whether Articles X and XI of the Chem- ing the emergency procurement of assist- viable mechanism for limiting the spread of ical Weapons Convention (CWC) require S3634 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 States Parties to ‘‘undertake to share every- claim that the United States has breached Former Bush Adminis- thing that is hard to achieve in a chemical its obligations. tration arms control weapons capability’’ thereby enabling States Article XI is titled ‘‘Economic and Techno- negotiator. Parties to develop a ‘‘militarily effective logical Development’’ and seeks to balance JOHN B. RHINELANDER, chemical weapons capability.’’ free trade in chemicals, equipment and tech- Former deputy legal Before analyzing Articles X and XI, we nology with the prevention of proliferation advisor and arms note that the CWC primarily obligates all of chemical weapons. It is modeled on Arti- control negotiator, States Parties, as set forth in Article I, cle X of the Biological Weapons Convention Nixon Administra- ‘‘never under any circumstances’’ to ‘‘assist, and is analogous to Article IV of the Nuclear tion. encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) dealing with GEORGE BUNN, engage in any activity’’ prohibited under the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Subpara- Center for Inter- CWC. This includes the obligations not to de- graphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) of paragraph 2 ad- national Security velop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain dress the right of each State Party to par- and Arms Control, chemical weapons, and not to engage in any ticipate ‘‘in the fullest possible exchange’’ of Stanford University. military preparations to use chemical weap- information; generally prohibits restrictions BARRY KELLMAN, ons. As it is axiomatic that all treaty provi- on trade; and prohibits using the Convention DePaul University sions must be interpreted in view of the pur- as grounds for measures not provided under Law School. poses and objects of that treaty and that a the CWC. Only paragraph (2)(e) contains an DAVID KOPLOW, subsidiary obligation should never be read affirmative obligation: each State Party Georgetown University out of context to authorize behavior that must review its existing national regulations Law School. would contravene a primary obligation, to make them consistent with the CWC. The nothing in Article X or XI may undermine remainder of its provisions clarify that the Mr. BIDEN. More to the point, even Article I by assisting a country in developing CWC should not restrict commercial and re- if we were obligated—which we’re not, a chemical weapons capability. search activity that would be otherwise per- we maintain export controls on chemi- Article X is titled ‘‘Assistance and Protec- missible. Moreover, these provisions are ex- cal defense equipment. In other words, tion Against Chemical Weapons.’’ Paragraph plicitly balanced against general provisions, we do not allow it to be sold to the (7) is the only provision in Article X which including: (1) ‘‘without prejudice to the prin- rogue states. contains a specific obligation: each State ciples and applicable rules of international Party must elect to take one or more of law,’’ (2) ‘‘for purposes not prohibited under The only specific obligation con- three specified measures of assistance. Under this Convention’’, (3) ‘‘other peaceful pur- tained in Article Ten is in paragraph Agreed Condition 15 to the Resolution of poses’’, and (4) to ‘‘render them consistent seven, which is where you provide as- Ratification of Advice and Consent, the with the objects and purpose of the Conven- sistance to nations facing attack by United States, to meet its commitments, tion’’. chemical weapons. Article XI, when read in its entirety and will only provide medical antidotes and This provision also has much flexibil- treatment to states not eligible for assist- together with Article I, undoubtedly permits ance under the Foreign Assistance Act of the United States to continue national secu- ity—it allows a nation to choose one of 1961. Nothing in paragraph (7) can remotely rity controls over exports of chemical weap- three methods for providing assistance. be construed as requiring the United States ons material, equipment and dual use items. But to ensure that this paragraph to provide equipment or assistance that We believe that Agreed Condition 7 to the does not become a loophole, we have would enhance a rogue state’s offensive or Resolution of Ratification of Advice and added a binding condition, condition defensive chemical weapons capability; Consent the continuing vitality of the Aus- number fifteen, which limits the type again, a proper reading of the treaty as a tralia Group and national export controls is consistent with Article X and XI, and the of assistance we will provide—at least whole would prohibit the provision of assist- when it comes to countries ineligible ance that would encourage such a result. CWC as a whole. Accordingly, we believe Paragraph 2 clarifies that the CWC does that Agreed Condition 7 should alleviate con- for economic or military assistance, not restrict a State Party from researching cerns raised by critics of the CWC concerning which includes the rogue states—to chemical weapon protection capabilities for United States obligations under Articles X medical antidotes and treatment. purposes not prohibited. Paragraph 6 clari- or XI. Furthermore, we would note that the Let me now turn to Article Eleven. fies that the CWC does not impede parties United States has never been prevented (or The proponents of this condition con- from providing assistance or entering into seriously challenged) from legally pursuing tend that this article requires us to bilateral agreements concerning the emer- unilateral and multilateral export controls gency procurement of assistance. Neither of on nuclear technology that it deems nec- weaken our export controls under the these paragraphs compels any conduct what- essary on national security grounds, despite CWC. soever but merely enables States Parties to objections from certain states citing Article There is nothing in the CWC that re- pursue these activities without fear of being IV of the NPT. We do not believe that the quires us to weaken our export con- in breach. CWC requires any different course. trols. But just to ensure that there Article X, paragraph 3, asserts that: ‘‘Each Throughout the Chemical Weapons Con- isn’t any doubt, we have agreed to a vention is a manifest effort to balance the State Party undertakes to facilitate, and binding condition that addresses the shall have the right to participate in, the elimination of chemical weapons with the le- fullest possible exchange of equipment, ma- gitimate security requirements of States as problem. terial and scientific and technological infor- well as their legitimate need to use, develop Condition seven requires the Presi- mation concerning means of protection and trade chemicals for commercial pur- dent to certify that nothing in the Con- against chemical weapons. In our view, noth- poses. The critical characterization of the vention requires us to weaken our ex- ing in paragraph (3) requires the United CWC quoted in the first paragraph of this port controls, and that the Australia States to provide any particular matter or letter focuses on selected provisions of the Group—an informal group of potential information. Accordingly, this paragraph CWC reflecting only one side of this bal- supplier states to which the United ancing effort, misreads those provisions to would require the United States to withhold, States belongs—will continue to main- either unilaterally or as part of a multilat- render them obligatory instead of voluntary eral group, materials or information that or conditional, and ignores the language of tain controls over chemical weapons could enhance the chemical weapons capabil- the treaty as well as principles of inter- precursors that are equal to, or exceed, ity of any particular state. national law. We disagree. We do not believe those in effect today. That each State Party has the right to par- Articles X and XI require the United States the Australia Group has already indi- ticipate in exchanges of equipment, etc. re- to take any steps contrary to its security in- cated, as a group, that it would main- garding chemical weapons protection merely terests. Accordingly, we do believe that Dis- tain its export controls. On October 17, reaffirms current trade policies that allow agreed Condition 32, which would require an nations to exchange goods and services. Each amendment to strike Article X and amend 1996—a little more recently than the State Party retains the right to participate Article XI, is legally unnecessary to preserve statement read by the Senator from in this trade to the level of its own choosing, U.S. security interests if the United States Arizona—the Australia Group stated including not to trade at all. There is no af- ratifies the CWC. that the ‘‘maintenance of effective ex- firmative duty to trade, but only a reaffir- Respectfully, port controls will remain an essential mation that States Parties wishing to trade ABE CHAYES, practical means of fulfilling obliga- may do so without fear of contravening the Harvard Law School. tions under the CWC.’’ CWC. Under recognized principles of treaty ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON, But just to be sure, I asked the ad- interpretation, the use of the intentionally Former Secretary of vague and weak verb ‘‘undertakes to facili- Defense and Attor- ministration to ask each country—in- tate’’ conveys no specific affirmative obliga- ney General, Nixon dividually—whether it intended to tion nor would the refusal to trade in sen- Administration. maintain existing levels of controls. sitive items support even the most tenuous MICHAEL MOODIE, The answers have come back—all in April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3635 the affirmative—as the president stat- states parties to the convention. That trols in a streamlined and effective manner ed today in his letter to the majority is why it says we will undertake to fa- which allows trade and the exchange of tech- leader. cilitate, and the other states parties nology for peaceful purposes to flourish. Finally, the President committed have the right to the fullest possible They agreed to continue working to focus these national measures efficiently and sole- today, in the event that either Article trade in these chemical weapons. This ly on preventing any contribution to chemi- Ten or Article Eleven to legitimate is not just my view. I read to you what cal and biological weapons programs. Par- trade in a manner that endangers our Secretary Cheney said before, James ticipants noted that the value of these meas- security, the President will consult Schlesinger, former Secretary of De- ures in inhibiting CBW proliferation bene- promptly with Congress on whether we fense and head of the CIA. It is plain fited not only the countries participating in should withdraw from the Convention. that article X legitimizes such trans- the Australia Group, but the whole inter- This is an extraordinary commit- fers. national community. ment. So I hope it resolves everyone’s The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Participants also agreed to continue a wide range of contacts, including a further pro- concern. ator from Delaware has 33 seconds. gram of briefings for countries not partici- Mr. President, I reserve the remain- Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask pating in the Paris consultations to further der of the time on the bill. I think I unanimous consent to have printed in awareness and understanding of national have used up all the time on the the RECORD a letter dated October 17, policies in this area. Participants endorsed amendment. 1996—speaking of superseding—which in this context the importance of regional The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is supersedes the statement referred to by seminars as valuable means of widening con- 1 minute remaining on the amendment. my colleague about the Australia tacts with other countries on these issues. In Mr. BIDEN. Oh, there is 1 minute re- Group. It says: particular, Romania’s plans to host a semi- maining on the amendment? Mr. Presi- nar on CBW export controls for Central and In this context, the maintenance of effec- Eastern European countries and the Com- dent, in that case I have another 10 tive export controls will remain an essential monwealth of Independent States in Bucha- minutes. practical means of fulfilling obligations rest on Oct. 21–22 and Japan’s plans to host No, if the majority is ready to yield under the CWC and the BTWC. a fourth Asian Export Control Seminar in back their time, I will yield back my Translated into ordinary English, it Tokyo in early 1997 were warmly welcomed minute. means that we adhere to the commit- by participants. Argentina will also host a The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ment we made in the Australia Group regional seminar on non-proliferation mat- ator from North Carolina. with export controls. We believe it is ters, in Buenous Aires, in the first week of Mr. HELMS. A bum deal, just like consistent with the CWC and required December 1996. France will organize a semi- this treaty. nar for French-speaking countries on the im- by the CWC. plementation of the CWC. This will take Mr. BIDEN. I reserve the remainder There being no objection, the letter place shortly before entry into force of the of my time. was ordered to be printed in the Convention. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- RECORD, as follows: The meeting also discussed relevant as- ator from Arizona. AUSTRALIA GROUP MEETING pects of terrorist interest in CBW and agreed Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I always Australia Group participants held informal that this serious issue requires continuing enjoy holding court with my friend consultations in Paris between Oct. 14–17, to attention. Participants agreed to hold further con- from Delaware. We have had some of discuss the continuing problem of chemical sultations in October 1997. these debates in the past, and this is and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. the thing that lawyers like to argue Participants at these talks were Argentina, AUSTRALIA GROUP COUNTRIES WELCOME PRO- about, but I believe that most lawyers Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the SPECTIVE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CHEMI- will agree with me that what they Czech Republic, Denmark, the European CAL WEAPONS CONVENTION learned in law school was that the spe- Commission, Finland, France, Germany, The countries participating in the Aus- Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, tralia Group warmly welcomed the expected cific provisions of the contract always Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zea- entry into force of the Chemical Weapons prevail over a general statement at the land, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Convention (CWC) during a meeting of the beginning of the contract. There are a Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzer- Group in Paris in October 1996. They noted lot of rules of instruction. Later provi- land, United Kingdom and the United States, that the long awaited commencement of the sions generally govern over previous with the Republic of Korea taking part for CWC regime, including the establishment of provisions on the theory that you later the first time. the Organization for the Prohibition of describe your intent, fully cognizant of Paticipants maintain a strong belief that Chemical Weapons, will be an historic water- what existed before. The same thing is full adherence to the Chemical Weapons Con- shed in global efforts to abolish chemical vention (CWC) and to the Biological and weapons for all time. They also noted that true with specific provisions of the con- Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be all states adhering to the CWC are obliged to tract, and that is why article I is the best way to eliminate these types of par- ensure their national activities support the called, not ‘‘CWC article I,’’ but rather ticularly inhumane weapons from the goal of a world free of chemical weapons. ‘‘general article.’’ ‘‘Article I, General world’s arsenals. In this context, the mainte- All of the participating countries reiter- Obligations.’’ nance of effective export controls will re- ated their previous statement underlining Then article II is definitions, and main an essential practical means of fulfill- their intention to be among the original after that are the specifics. This is the ing obligations under the CWC and the States Parties to the CWC. They noted that reason why the Australia Group itself BTWC. 24 of the 30 countries participating in the All participants at the meeting welcomed Australia Group have already ratified the issued a statement right after this con- the expected entry into force of the CWC*, Convention. Representatives also recalled vention was entered into undertaking noting that this long-awaited step will be an their previous expressions of support for the to review, in light of the implementa- important, historic moment in international CWC, and reaffirmed these commitments. tion of the convention, the measures efforts to prohibit chemical weapons. Par- They restated their view that the effective that they take to ‘‘prevent the spread ticipants agreed to issue a separate state- operation and implementation of the CWC of chemical substances and equipment ment on this matter, which is attached. offers the best means available to the inter- for purposes contrary to the objectives Participants also welcomed the progress of national community to rid the world of these of the convention with the aim of re- efforts to strengthen the BTWC in the nego- weapons for all time. They called on all sig- tiations taking place in the Ad Hoc Group of natories to ratify the CWC as soon as pos- moving such measures for the benefit BTWC States Parties in Geneva. All Aus- sible, and on the small number of countries of states parties to the convention act- tralia Group participating countries are also which have not signed the Treaty to join the ing in full compliance with the obliga- States Parties to this Treaty, and strongly regime and thereby contribute to inter- tions under the convention.’’ support efforts to develop internationally- national efforts to ban these weapons. Australia Group members would not agreed procedures for strengthening inter- Representatives at the Australia Group have had to do this under the interpre- national confidence in the treaty regime by meeting recalled that all of the participating tation of the convention by my friend verifying compliance with BTWC obliga- countries are taking steps at the national from Delaware. Rather, they began to tions. level to ensure that relevant national regula- Experts from participating countries dis- tions promote the object and purpose of the do this because they read articles X cussed national export licensing systems CWC and are fully consistent with the Con- and XI the same as the many experts aimed at preventing inadvertent assistance vention’s provisions when the CWC enters do that I cited earlier as limiting our to the production of CBW. They confirmed into force for each of these countries. They ability to impose trade restrictions on that participants administered export con- noted that the practical experience each S3636 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 country had obtained in operating export li- for a large number of the American In addition, since the treaty has been censing systems intended to prevent assist- people, both Republicans and Demo- before the Senate for nearly 3 years, ance to chemical weapons programs have crats in coming to the conclusion he Members have had ample opportunity been especially valuable in each country’s did about this treaty. I rise to com- to request the information needed to preparations for implementation of key obli- reach their judgment, and more than gations under the CWC. They noted in this mend him and to support him in the context, that these national systems are decision that he made. sufficient time to carry out a thorough aimed solely at avoiding assistance for ac- I also wish to commend the distin- examination of the treaty’s impact on tivities which are prohibited under the Con- guished ranking member of the Foreign our national security. vention, while ensuring they do not restrict Relations Committee, the Senator During that 3-year period, nearly 20 or impede trade and other exchanges facili- from Delaware, for his leadership on hearings have been conducted in sev- tated by the CWC. our side of the aisle. No one could have eral different Senate committees, in- Mr. BIDEN. We are ready to vote, Mr. managed this bill better. And we could cluding Armed Services, Foreign Rela- President. not have come to this point were it not tions, Intelligence, and Judiciary. In The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time for the remarkable commitment he has addition, the administration has made has expired. The question is on agree- made in the effort to pass this treaty. available over 1,500 pages of docu- ing to amendment No. 51. The yeas and I thank him for his leadership in bring- mentation on the Chemical Weapons nays have been ordered. The clerk will ing us to this point tonight. Convention and answered over 300 ques- call the roll. Under the terms of article II, section tions from Senators and their staffs. The assistant legislative clerk called 2 of the Constitution, the Senate alone Moreover, as a result of intensive, around-the-clock negotiating sessions the roll. was granted the power to advise and between the administration, Senator The result was announced—yeas 66, consent to treaties made by the Presi- HELMS and Senator BIDEN, the resolu- nays 34, as follows: dent. Our Founding Fathers also de- tion of ratification now contains 28 [Rollcall Vote No. 50 Ex.] cided that approval by a simple major- separate conditions on the U.S. Sen- YEAS—66 ity was simply not sufficient for legis- ate’s resolution of ratification. That is Akaka Feingold Lieberman lation of this magnitude. Instead, they 28 individual clarifications by the Sen- Baucus Feinstein Lugar established the requirement that two- ate about the terms and conditions Biden Ford McCain thirds of the Senate must support a Bingaman Frist Mikulski under which the U.S. would enter into Boxer Glenn Moseley-Braun treaty for it to take effect. the Chemical Weapons Convention. Breaux Gorton Moynihan This is as it should be. There is no These conditions were the product of Bryan Graham Murray more important or unique power as- over 100 hours of discussion. And I am Bumpers Hagel Reed signed to the Senate by the Constitu- Byrd Harkin Reid told that the vast majority of the con- Chafee Hatch Robb tion than the authority to provide ad- ditions address problems first raised by Cleland Hollings Roberts vice and consent on treaties. With this Republicans. I think it is safe to say Coats Inouye Rockefeller authority, however, comes obligations. that these list of conditions address Cochran Jeffords Roth Senators must examine a treaty not Collins Johnson Sarbanes virtually every legitimate concern that Conrad Kennedy Smith (OR) through a prism of narrow political has been raised about the potential im- D’Amato Kerrey Snowe pursuits, but rather from the perspec- pact of the CWC on our national secu- Daschle Kerry Specter tive of broad national interests. DeWine Kohl Stevens rity and economy. Dodd Landrieu Torricelli Put simply, the most important Mr. President, we must now evaluate Domenici Lautenberg Warner question we should ask ourselves when what has been revealed during this Dorgan Leahy Wellstone considering the Chemical Weapons process that has spanned three Presi- Durbin Levin Wyden Convention, or any other treaty, is, dential Administrations and includes NAYS—34 does this make sense for the Nation numerous hearings, briefings and Abraham Gramm McConnell and are its citizens more secure? mounds of documents. What have we Allard Grams Murkowski Mr. President, after a thorough re- determined about the merits of the Ashcroft Grassley Nickles view of this treaty, its negotiating his- 1 Bennett Gregg Santorum CWC in the nearly 3 ⁄2 years since Bond Helms Sessions tory, and the 28 conditions added by President Clinton submitted it to us? Brownback Hutchinson Shelby the Senate, I believe the answer to this First, officials from previous Admin- Burns Hutchison Smith (NH) question is a resounding and unquali- istrations who were involved in the Campbell Inhofe Thomas Coverdell Kempthorne Thompson fied yes. CWC negotiations support the treaty. Craig Kyl Thurmond The Chemical Weapons Convention General Brent Scowcroft, the National Enzi Lott bans the development, production, Security Advisor to Presidents Reagan Faircloth Mack stockpiling, and use of toxic chemicals and Bush, has said the following: The amendment (No. 51) was agreed as weapons. A look at the negotiating ‘‘The time has come for the Senate to up- to. history of the CWC reveals that this hold U.S. leadership in combating the pro- Mr. HELMS. I move to reconsider the treaty is truly a bipartisan product. liferation of weapons of mass destruction by vote. Negotiations, as has been mentioned providing its consent to the [Chemical Weap- Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that mo- now on several occasions throughout ons] Convention. tion on the table. the day, began with President Reagan And President Bush himself, in a The motion to lay on the table was in the early 1980s. February meeting with Secretary of agreed to. While the bulk of the negotiations State Madeleine Albright and former Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair. and most of the difficult decisions oc- Secretary of State James Baker, noted: The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mi- curred during the Bush administration, ‘‘I . . . strongly support efforts to get this nority leader. President Clinton finished the work chemical weapons treaty approved. This Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask should be beyond partisanship. I think it is started by his two predecessors and vitally important for the United States to be unanimous consent that I be allowed to submitted the treaty to the Senate for out front. . . . We don’t need chemical weap- use the 5 minutes allocated to each consideration in November of 1993. ons, and we ought to get out front and make leader for purposes of closing debate in The Senate’s counsel on crucial is- clear that we are opposed to others having addition to my 15 minutes for the lead- sues was sought and provided repeat- them.’’ er in an effort to make my statement edly throughout the course of the dec- Second, what are the views of Ameri- at this point in the debate. ade-long negotiations. Playing an espe- ca’s chemical manufacturers—the in- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without cially important role in this regard was dustry that will be most directly af- objection, it is so ordered. the Senate’s Arms Control Observer fected by the provisions of the CWC? Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me Group, a bipartisan gathering of Sen- The chemical industry is America’s begin by commending the distinguished ators with special interests and exper- largest export industry, posting $60 bil- majority leader for his leadership on tise in arms control matters. Cur- lion in export sales last year alone. Op- this issue and for his eloquent state- rently, Senators STEVENS and BYRD ponents of this treaty claim its ratifi- ment earlier today. I think he spoke lead the group. cation will lead to onerous and costly April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3637 restrictions and regulations on this in- Some may argue that General The Senate has heard from President dustry as well as the exposure of con- Shalikashvili is but one general who Reagan’s National Security Advisor, fidential, proprietary information. was appointed by President Clinton. To from President Bush, from the leading The chemical industry has repeatedly those skeptics, let me say three things. figures in the chemical industry, from refuted these claims; yet, it appears First, General Shalikashvili’s record of the current chairman of the JCS, three that CWC’s critics are so blinded by service to this country is unparalleled. of his predecessors and 14 other three- their ideological zeal to kill all arms Second, a comprehensive review of this and four-star generals and admirals, control treaties that they cannot take record will not reveal a single instance and from the intelligence community. no for an answer. One of the industry’s where he failed to offer anything but Each of these groups and individuals best responses was contained in a let- than his objective, untarnished opin- have looked at the CWC from their ter sent late last year to the distin- ion. Third, he is not alone. unique perspectives and interests and guished Majority leader, Senator LOTT. An April 3 letter to the President each has reached the same conclusion: This letter is an important one, so I states the following: the Senate should support this treaty will quote it at length: The CWC destroys stockpiles that could and should do so promptly. ‘‘The chemical industry has long supported threaten our troops; it significantly im- Mr. President, I would submit since the Chemical Weapons Convention. Our in- proves our intelligence capabilities; and it the Senate received the CWC treaty for dustry participated in negotiating the agree- creates new international sanctions to pun- its advice and consent, one other group ish those states who remain outside of the ment and in U.S. and international imple- has spoken all too loudly to us: those mentation efforts. The treaty contains sub- treaty. For these reasons, we strongly sup- port the CWC. who commit terrorist acts. In the 31⁄2 stantial protections for confidential business years this treaty has been before the information. We know because industry Mr. President, that letter was sent on helped to draft these provisions . . . In short, behalf of 16 three- and four-star gen- Senate, terrorist incidents have oc- our industry has thoroughly examined and erals and admirals, including Colin curred with a sickening and disturbing tested this Convention. We have concluded Powell, John Vessey, and Norman regularity: the sarin gas attack in the that the benefits of the CWC far outweigh Schwartzkopf. This letter, in addition Tokyo subway; the bombing of the the costs. . . . Indeed, the real price would to an endorsement by David Jones, Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma come from not ratifying the CWC. . . . If the City; the attack on Khobar Towers in Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC, we means that every occupant in the last 20 years of the position of chairman of Dharan, Saudi Arabia; the suspected stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars bombing of TWA flight 800; the bomb- in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this Nation’s of good-paying American jobs.’’ highest military office, has come out in ing in Olympic Park in Atlanta. Each incident has painfully dramatized the So says the chemical industry in a support of the CWC. fact that we live in an age where, un- letter signed by the CEOs of 53 of The final group the Senate has heard fortunately, no one is inoculated America’s preeminent chemical manu- from in its efforts to weigh the pros against the threat of terrorism. No facturers. Signees include the ARCO and cons of the Chemical Weapons Con- community stands outside the reach of Chemical Company, the Ashland Chem- vention is the intelligence community. determined terrorists. As President ical Company, the Bayer Corporation, The task of verifying this treaty, like Clinton noted in a recent address, the B.F. Goodrich Company, the Dow other arms control treaties, ultimately ‘‘Terrorism has become an equal oppor- Chemical Company, the Eastman falls on the shoulders of the Central In- tunity destroyer, with no respect for Chemical Company, the E.I. Dupont telligence and the other organizations within the intelligence community. borders.’’ Company, the Exon Chemical Company This treaty is an opportunity to send and the Monsanto Company. I should Despite the most comprehensive, intru- sive verification regime in the history a small message to those who threaten also note that these companies issued our families, our communities and our this statement before we agreed upon of arms control, critics of CWC argue that it is unverifiable; if they had their way of life with their unprovoked acts the 28 conditions I discussed earlier, way, the Senate would reject the CWC of violence. several of which would further reduce because the intelligence community The United States Senate has heard the possibility that proprietary infor- will be unable to detect any violations what terrorists have to say. Today, mation from American businesses of the treaty itself. But in this case, with our votes on this treaty, we deter- would fall into the hands of our adver- the perfect is the enemy of the good. mine how the United States Senate saries. While the intelligence community will respond to these acts. I hope we Well, Mr. President, what about the has rightly acknowledged that it can- will send the message that we are military? After all, it is our men and not detect any production of chemical going to do all we can to ensure that women in uniform who must face, as agents—anywhere or at anytime—it these deadly chemicals will never be they did in Desert Storm, the threat of has also said that it can effectively the means terrorists employ to ad- an attack from lethal chemical weap- verify the provisions of this treaty. vance their cause. It is time we said to ons. Make no mistake. We are talking Moreover, the critics’ argument ig- the terrorists, on the issue of chemical about invisible and instantaneous kill- nores the fact that, with or without the weapons, enough is enough. ers. What about our people in the Pen- Chemical Weapons Convention, our in- Now the argument will be made that tagon who have to make the decisions telligence community will still seek to this treaty will not halt terrorism, will that may ultimately lead to the expo- collect information on efforts by for- not shut down the private laboratories sure of our troops to that insidious eign nations to develop and produce of insane extremists and will not halt threat? General Shalikashvili, the chemical weapons. The more important the efforts of various rogue nations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, question is whether our intelligence To a certain degree, that is probably testified before the Senate Foreign Re- and nonproliferation efforts are helped true. But what this treaty will do is lations Committee: or hindered by the adoption of the trea- begin the orchestration of a concert of ‘‘The potential benefits of the Chemical ty. nations—an orchestration of civilized Weapons Convention will have a positive im- According to James Woolsey, then di- voices that speaks out forcefully pact on the lives of our service people and rector of the Central Intelligence against an unambiguous evil. how the U.S. military fulfills its responsibil- Agency, and since confirmed by George Tonight America has the opportunity ity to national security.’’ Tenet, acting director of the CIA: to make the moral stand. We are de- In another appearance before the The Intelligence community has the broad- stroying our own chemical stockpiles. Foreign Relations Committee, General er mission—with or without the treaty—of We began that cleansing process under Shalikashvili noted: detecting the existence and assessing the President Reagan and it continues ‘‘From a military perspective, the Chemi- threat from chemical weapons programs of today. Why should we oppose a treaty cal Weapons Convention is clearly in our na- any country. This mission must be carried that demands the world to live up to a tional interest. The non-proliferation aspects out regardless of whether we have the addi- of the convention will retard the spread of tional requirement to assess such activities moral standard that we have already chemical weapons and, in so doing, reduce against the provisions of the treaty. And it is willingly accepted ourselves? Why de- the probability that U.S. forces may encoun- to this broader mission that the CWC can prive ourselves of the right to call upon ter chemical weapons in a regional conflict.’’ make a significant contribution. our neighbors to live up to the example S3638 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 that we in the United States are will- cant vote any of us cast in this Con- mean the substance of what we are ing to act? gress. talking about. But I honestly believe In summary, Mr. President, this is a Twice today I have been referred to this is one of the most important necessary treaty. It has been endorsed as the senior Senator from Delaware. I votes, in terms of the future of this by a bipartisan group of Senators who want the record to show, I know I am country and its ability to lead at a mo- are experts on this issue, by advisors to the junior Senator. I am the second ment in history that seldom comes to Presidents Reagan and Bush, and most senior junior Senator in the Unit- any nation, that may be the most im- President Clinton, by the U.S. mili- ed States. I have been here 25 years, portant vote that any of us will cast. If tary, by our chemical industry and by but that young man in the back there we embark on this path of continuing our intelligence community. is the most senior junior Senator, the to engage the world and lead the world, To all of this I would add two final distinguished Senator from South we maintain the reasonable prospect points. First, over 80 percent of the Carolina, Senator HOLLINGS, because that we can make the world—the American people have indicated their the most senior Senator of senior Sen- world—a better place in which to live. support for ridding the world of toxic ators is his colleague, Senator THUR- I yield the remainder of my time, and agents by ratifying the CWC. Second, MOND. I yield the floor. over 70 countries have already ratified Mr. President, I am not sure that The PRESIDING OFFICER. The this treaty and thereby forsworn the there is any vote that I have cast in Chair recognizes the Senator from use of chemical weapons. Mr. Presi- the last 4 or 5 years that I think is as North Carolina. dent, this treaty is going to happen significant for the future of the United Mr. HELMS. I am profoundly dis- with or without us. I urge the Members States as this treaty. And as I said, and appointed in the five votes of the Sen- of this body to set aside partisan dif- I will conclude with this, not merely ate on the important, vital amend- ferences, demonstrate leadership to our because of what the treaty attempts to ments. After all the debate, all the gal- friends and enemies alike, join with do—and that is, for the first time in lons of newspaper ink spilled, all of the those who have already ratified this the history of modern man, ban even negotiations—ultimately, I had hoped treaty and take the first step toward the possession of an entire category of for better. But so be it. eliminating these evil weapons. Mr. weaponry—but that is not the reason There isn’t a person in this room, President, I ask that the Senate ratify why this is the most important vote. rhetoric aside, who can believe that the this treaty. We are at a juncture in our history, amendments that we have just consid- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who Mr. President, in my opinion, where ered are ‘‘killer amendments.’’ The na- yields time? the United States has an opportunity, ture of international relations, and of Mr. BIDEN. How much time remains? which rarely comes to any nation in its treaties is that what is negotiated can The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- history—it has come to us, in my opin- be renegotiated, and if necessary, nego- ator from North Carolina has 21 min- ion, on two occasions—where our ac- tiated anew. If our aim is a better fu- utes, the Senator from Delaware has 7 tions and our leadership can literally, ture, what are a hundred more meet- minutes, the Senator from Vermont not figuratively—and it is not hyper- ings in Geneva, or Vienna or the has 81⁄2 minutes, and the majority lead- bole—can literally shape, at least on Hague? These amendments would have er has 5 minutes. the margins, the future of the world. ensured that this treaty did no harm, Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself such time After World War II, we stepped up to even if it did no good. as I may consume under the 7 minutes. the plate. My father’s generation and Now, we must vote on a treaty that, I do not plan on using it all. my grandfather’s generation and stripped of these key protections, four Mr. President, it has been a long road grandmother’s and my mother’s gen- former Defense Secretaries have told to this spot, this point. We have had eration stepped up to the plate. They us is contrary to the national security not only extensive debate in the last 2 did things, when we look back on them, interests of the United States. days, we have had an extensive debate that must have taken incredible cour- The truth is that I cannot abide the on this floor, in committees, in the age. Can you imagine having over 10 pretense of action on a matter as press, among foreign policy experts, million men still under arms and weighty as the proliferation of weapons think-tank types, for the past 3 years. standing up as a Senator, or as a Presi- of mass destruction. If we ratify this We reached the point where we are con- dent, or as a Secretary of State, and treaty today, the Senate, with the stitutionally required to fulfill a duty saying, by the way, I want us now to President, will announce to the world of either giving our consent to ratifica- send billions of dollars to those people that we have done something about the tion or withholding it. As both leaders who killed our sons and daughters? scourge of chemical weapons. We will have pointed out, it is maybe the most That was the Marshall Plan. Can you pat ourselves on the back and go home. significant responsibility delegated to imagine the foresight it took and how But, Mr. President, we will have done the U.S. Senate difficult it must have been to cast a nothing. And, worse than nothing, we I realize that we sometimes stand on vote to set up an outfit called NATO, of will have done harm. In the name of this floor, particularly when any one of which Germany, our sworn enemy that curbing the proliferation of these us and all of us have invested a signifi- killed our sons and daughters, were chemicals, we will allow rogue states cant amount of time in one issue or an- members? Those people had courage. to gain access to our most precious de- other where we feel that we have spent But they did what the Senator from In- fense secrets. We will guarantee that most of our waking hours for the past diana, Senator LUGAR, said: They led. rogue nations of the World—both those month, two, or three—everyone has ex- This is about leadership. This is who have signed this treaty and those perienced that on this floor—and we about the role of the United States in who have not—have the ability to man- tend to think that since we put so leading the world. If we refrain from ufacture chemical weapons and pene- much time into the passage of a piece exercising that opportunity—and we trate our Nation’s most advanced of legislation, or in this case, a treaty, will if we do not vote for this treaty— chemical defenses. that maybe it is the most important we will have passed up an opportunity Article X and XI—‘‘Poisons for thing that the Senate has done or that, as I said, rarely comes to any na- Peace’’—will foster the proliferation of could do because I guess we say to our- tion in the history of the world. We can those very poisons. Anyone who doubts selves we would not invest that much affect, if we are wise, the behavior, ac- that need only look to how Russia has of our time, our energy, our mind, our tivity and actions for a generation to abused similar provisions in the Nu- soul, into the effort if it was not so im- come, not for what is contained in this clear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The portant. treaty, but because of the leadership N.P.T.’s ‘‘Atoms for Peace’’ provisions Acknowledging that we all err on that was demonstrated in drafting this allows Russia to transfer to Iran, a ter- that side of thinking what we do is treaty, in ratifying this treaty and en- rorist state, a nuclear reactor. Russia sometimes more important than what forcing this treaty. has argued that the sale is perfectly it is, I respectfully suggest that the So, Mr. President, I realize that all of legal, and Russia is right. Iran, despite vote each of us is about to cast on this us—myself included—tend to engage in its nuclear weapons program and its treaty is likely to be the most signifi- hyperbole and rhetoric that doesn’t chemical weapons program, is a nation April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3639 in full compliance with the Non-Pro- Mr. President, let us listen to the On page 59, line 15, strike the comma. liferation Treaty. And so it will get one wisdom of the four former Secretaries On page 61, line 11, strike ‘‘on an involun- nuclear reactor from Russia, maybe of Defense, who have urged us to op- tary basis’’. more. And perhaps China will throw in pose this treaty. Let us listen to the On page 61, line 12, insert ‘‘where consent has been withheld,’’ after ‘‘States,’’. a reactor or two as well. And we can do mountain of evidence—classified and On page 8, line 8, insert ‘‘, if accepted,’’ nothing to stop it. unclassified—that has been presented after ‘‘provision’’. The administration says that we will over the past two days as to the dan- On page 25, line 19, insert ‘‘on Intelligence’’ not sell Iran chemical technology or gers posed by this treaty. And most im- after ‘‘tee’’. defensive gear under the similar provi- portant, let us listen to our con- On page 27, line 7, strike ‘‘is’’ and insert sions of the CWC. We are not selling sciences. Let us vote to reject the ‘‘are’’. them nuclear reactors either. Russia is. Chemical Weapons Convention. On page 27, line 22, insert ‘‘on Intelligence’’ after ‘‘Committee’’. And it will not be the United States AMENDMENT NO. 52 which provides Iran the chemical tech- On page 57, line 15, strike ‘‘Ruanda’’ and Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send an insert ‘‘Rwanda’’. nology. They will get it from Russia amendment to the desk and ask for its and China under ‘‘Poisons for Peace.’’ The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without immediate consideration. objection, the amendment is agreed to. And Iran will give it to its terrorist al- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The The amendment (No. 52) was agreed lies Syria and Libya, who have not clerk will report. signed up to the treaty. And we will be The assistant legislative clerk read to. powerless to protest—because if we rat- as follows: Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, it was President Ronald Reagan who said, ify this treaty, here, today, in this The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ‘‘Trust but verify.’’ Sound advice I be- body, we will have endorsed those HELMS], for Mr. BIDEN, proposes an amend- transfers. ment numbered 52. lieve we should heed today. Now this morning the President has Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask Reluctantly, I rise in opposition to offered us some sweeteners for the unanimous consent that reading of the the Chemical Weapons Convention. Do hemlock he is asking us to swallow. He amendment be dispensed with. I want to see the elimination of chemi- promises to keep an eye on any prob- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without cal weapons and deadly poisons? Abso- lems Articles X and XI may cause. I ap- objection, it is so ordered. lutely. Will the proposed treaty actu- preciate his willingness to recognize The amendment is as follows: ally prevent the use of chemical weap- ons? Not in my opinion. As I’ve lis- the legitimacy of the concerns my col- On page 2, line 18, strike ‘‘payments’’ and leagues and I have expressed. However, insert ‘‘any payment’’. tened carefully to all of the arguments, I can’t help but feel that this last ditch On page 6, line 3, strike ‘‘the head of’’. I have concluded the proposed treaty attempt to buy off opponents to this On page 8, line 2, insert ‘‘or such other or- will not do what it is intended to do, dangerous treaty is nothing more than ganization, as the case may be,’’ after and, in fact, may actually do more empty promises. ‘‘nization’’. harm than good. On page 8, line 10, insert ‘‘or the affiliated Again, trust but verify. I am a veteran of the counter-pro- organization’’ after ‘‘tion’’. liferation wars. Every week, I see more On page 9, line 11, insert ‘‘or the affiliated Like many Americans, I took notice and more classified information about organization’’ after ‘‘Organization’’. when four recent Secretaries of Defense proliferation activities that should re- On page 9, line 17, insert ‘‘or the affiliated came out in opposition to the Chemical quire the President, under existing law, organization’’ after ‘‘Organization’’. Weapons Convention. The opposition of to levy sanctions against Russia, On page 13, line 21, insert ‘‘, and any offi- Secretaries Schlesinger, Cheney, China, or both. We never do, and we cial or employee thereof’’ after ‘‘it’’. Rumsfeld and Weinberger is based, in On page 14, line 5, insert ‘‘, and any official part, on the fact that the treaty is not won’t under the terms of the CWC with or employee thereof’’ after ‘‘functions’’. or without the assurances under Arti- On page 15, lines 6 and 7, strike ‘‘to United verifiable. In other words, we have no cle X and XI. The President doesn’t States ratification’’ and insert ‘‘affecting the way of knowing if our ‘‘partners’’ in want to fight with those 800-pound go- object and purpose’’. this agreement are living up to their rillas. In much the same way as we will On page 18, line 2, insert ‘‘support for’’ end of the deal. Like the four former turn a blind eye while Russia helps after ‘‘resolution of’’. Secretaries of Defense, I am troubled On page 20, line 12, strike ‘‘citizens,’’ and by statements by CIA and Department Iran get a nuclear weapon, we will insert ‘‘citizens and’’. allow others to develop chemical weap- On page 23, line 18, strike ‘‘obligation’’ and of Defense officials that admit they do ons. And there won’t be a darn thing insert ‘‘obligations’’. not have ‘‘high confidence’’ the treaty we’ll be able to do. On page 25, line 19, strike the comma. can be verified, key provisions ‘‘can be Should Articles 10 and 11 of the CWC On page 32, line 13, insert ‘‘of Representa- thwarted’’ and detection of small be renegotiated? Yes. Did the Senate tives’’ after ‘‘House’’. amounts of chemical weapons ‘‘will ad- err by stripping out the protections we On page 32, lines 19 and 20, strike ‘‘Foreign mittedly be extremely difficult.’’ In my Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing,’’ mind, the admission of Clinton Admin- inserted that would have required the and insert ‘‘Foreign Military Sales and For- administration to do so? Yes. And I am eign Military Financing under the Arms Ex- istration officials that the treaty is not deeply disappointed that I was unable port Control Act’’. verifiable raises serious questions to convince my colleagues of the dan- On page 34, line 1, strike ‘‘Committee’’ and about the value of the agreement. ger to the people of the United States insert ‘‘Committees’’. The Chemical Weapons Treaty also and our allies. We have made a terrible, On page 34, line 3, insert ‘‘the’’ after ‘‘and’’. contains provisions, Articles X and XI, potentially cataclysmic, mistake today On page 37, line 11, insert a comma imme- which mandate the sharing of all chem- diately after ‘‘games’’. in ignoring the desperate need to revise On page 40, line 9, strike ‘‘of’’ and insert ical equipment and technology, includ- the terms of this treaty. ‘‘for’’. ing chemical weapons defensive tech- Without revision of Articles 10 and On page 41, line 16, insert ‘‘of the Conven- nology, with other countries. These 11, this treaty is bad for America, and tion’’ after ‘‘ratification’’. provisions might allow countries like bad for the world. It must be voted On page 47, line 19, insert ‘‘the ratification Iran and Iraq to acquire advanced de- down. For it we ratify this treaty, our of’’ after ‘‘to’’. fensive technologies so they can im- children and our grandchildren will On page 49, line 5, move the margin of ‘‘(i)’’ prove their chemical weapons combat 2 ems to the right. hold us accountable. They will hold us On page 49, line 11, move the margin of capability. This exchange of technical accountable when Iran or Syria or ‘‘(ii)’’ 2 ems to the right. information, mandated by the treaty, Libya or North Korea finally uses a On page 49, line 16, move the margin of may also be used to develop ways to de- chemical weapon—and they will do so— ‘‘(iii)’’ 2 ems to the right. feat our chemical weapons defensive built with technology they acquired On page 52, line 9, insert a comma after technology. Because of these flaws in thanks to Articles 10 and 11 of the ‘‘(D)’’. the treaty, Secretary Cheney wrote ‘‘In On page 53, line 21, strike the comma. CWC. They will look back on this de- On page 55, line 4, insert ‘‘a schedule of’’ my judgement, the treaty’s Articles X bate, look back on where each us of after ‘‘to’’. and XI amount to a formula for greatly stood, and—mark my words—they will On page 57, line 1, strike ‘‘the’’ the first accelerating the proliferation of chemi- hold us accountable. place it appears and insert ‘‘to’’. cal warfare capabilities around the S3640 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 globe.’’ This mandated sharing of tech- soldiers. I am also very proud of the I am pleased that—more than 3 years nology represents one example of how leadership role of the United States in after the administration sent this trea- the treaty may actually do more harm the fight to stop the spread of chemical ty to the Senate—the CWC is finally than good. weapons. Without a doubt, this leader- before us on the floor of this Chamber. I want to point out that one of the ship role will continue whether or not In these three years, Mr. President, conditions removed from the Resolu- we ratify the CWC. three Senate committees have held nu- tion of Ratification directed the U.S. But we must also be honest with our- merous hearings—nearly 20 of them— to renegotiate Articles X and XI to en- selves. The Chemical Weapons Conven- on the efficacy of this treaty. As a sure the treaty does not inadvertently tion cannot be verified. The treaty will Member of both the Foreign Relations increase the threat of chemical weap- not prevent countries or terrorists and Judiciary Committees, I have been ons. The Clinton Administration from acquiring or using chemical weap- privileged to participate in several of viewed the requirement to renegotiate ons. The treaty may in fact increase these hearings and to hear numerous the treaty as a ‘‘killer amendment’’ proliferation of advanced defensive perspectives during this debate. and encouraged the Senate to strike technologies and the treaty may jeop- More recently, several Senators and this condition. Under pressure from the ardize proprietary information of U.S. Administration officials have spent a President, the Senate voted to remove companies. considerable amount of time negotiat- this condition so renegotiation of these As I weigh these facts, I conclude the ing the terms under which this treaty important articles will not happen. Chemical Weapons Convention will do would come to the floor. And so I think In addition, the President’s letter to more harm than good and I will cast we should all thank the Chairman of Majority Leader LOTT on the day of the my vote against the ratification of this the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. vote acknowledges that there are le- treaty. HELMS] and the Senator from Delaware gitimate security concerns regarding Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I will [Mr. BIDEN], the ranking member of the flaws in Articles X and XI. I’m vote today to ratify the Chemical that committee, for the time they both troubled because the letter is non-bind- Weapons Convention (CWC). I do so have spent on this issue. ing and it will be three years before we without any illusions. I have concluded I would also like to recognize the ef- will discover if Articles X and XI lead that it will be of marginal benefit, but forts of the White House Working to the proliferation of chemical weap- that its benefits do outweigh the risks. Group and the LOTT Task Force to ons technology. The President says the Clearly, no chemical weapons treaty come to a consensus on the aspects of U.S. could then withdraw from the can be 100% verifiable. Inside the CWC, this treaty on which we can agree. I Convention, but by then the damage there is at least a better chance of know that the Members and Adminis- will have been done. catching violators than if we remain tration officials involved in these nego- If I believed this treaty by itself outside the treaty. tiations have spent hours reviewing I commend the Chairman of the For- would stop chemical weapons, I would countless technical details. It is be- eign Relations Committee, Senator support it. During my own delibera- cause of these efforts that the resolu- HELMS, as well as Senator KYL, and tions regarding the CWC, I had a tion of ratification before us today con- others who have worked so hard to im- thoughtful discussion with James tains 28 agreed-upon conditions. These prove this treaty. As a result of their Schlesinger, a former Secretary of De- conditions were carefully crafted by efforts, for example, we retain the fense, Secretary of Energy and Direc- our colleagues to respond to Members’ right for our troops to use tear gas in tor of the Central Intelligence Agency. specific concerns. I am myself com- hostage rescue operations; we require Secretary Schlesinger made the point search warrants in cases where consent fortable with these conditions, which, that although scores of nations ratified is not granted to protect 4th amend- for the most part, duly exercise the the Geneva Protocol which claimed to ment rights; and we restrict U.S. as- Senate’s prerogatives with respect to ‘‘prohibit’’ the use of poison gas, Iraq sistance to rogue nations under Article treaty ratification, and instruct the used mustard gas against Iran and its X to medical antidotes and humani- administration to undertake certain own citizens with impunity. In my tarian assistance. commitments. They also require great- mind, this episode demonstrates one of This is a historic agreement bringing er reporting requirements which will the weaknesses of international trea- together 74 countries that have ratified help the Senate to monitor U.S. par- ties which sound good on the surface the treaty in a comprehensive, world- ticipation in the Convention in the fu- but lack enforcement procedures in wide fight, to ban chemical weapons. ture. practice. The treaty requires all nations to fol- I am pleased that our colleagues have I am also concerned about the provi- low America’s lead to destroy all chem- come to agreement on these points, be- sions of the Chemical Weapons Conven- ical stockpiles by 2007. The CWC also cause throughout the deliberations tion which will allow international in- provides for sanctions against those over this convention, I have made two spectors access to chemical businesses who trade in chemical agents with non- observations: No. 1 the CWC is not a and other important national security parties to the treaty. These provisions perfect document, and No. 2 notwith- facilities. The idea that North Korea or will help to ensure that on a future standing that, the CWC is the best ave- Iraq can come into the United States battlefield our troops will be less likely nue available today for beginning to and examine our facilities and then to face chemical agents. control the spread of chemical weap- take that information home to help Passage of this treaty should not ons, and leading, eventually, to the their own chemical and defense indus- bring a false sense of security. A treaty total elimination of such weapons. tries is wrong. The treaty makes no ar- alone will not protect our troops and Like any document arrived at rangement to compensate businesses citizens from chemical weapons. We through consensus, the Chemical Weap- for the loss of this sensitive data. This should continue to devote attention ons Convention can not claim to ad- is another reason I believe the Chemi- and resources to improving our chemi- dress every party’s concerns. But, it is cal Weapons Convention will, in fact, cal weapons defenses. We should pro- my view that the 28 agreed-upon condi- do more harm than good. vide our troops with the equipment and tions in the resolution before us today As a member of the Senate Armed training they need in combat situa- serve to strengthen what we do have. Services Committee, I understand the tions. The parties to this treaty must Let me speak first on my initial military threat posed by chemical also take action against violators who point—that the CWC is not a perfect weapons. I continue to support efforts resort to using chemical weapons. As a document. There are real flaws that we to destroy the U.S. chemical weapons member of the Intelligence Committee, all recognize, and that experts both pro stockpile in a safe and environ- I will work to ensure that the goals of and con acknowledge, related to the mentally sensitive manner. I oppose this treaty are not lost in its imple- verifiability of the CWC. There may any use of these horrible weapons and mentation. well be cheating, evasions, and at- I believe the United States should Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise tempts to disobey the spirit, as well as threaten massive retaliation against today in support of the resolution of the letter, of the treaty. Some of this any nation that might consider using ratification of the Chemical Weapons cheating may escape detection—al- these weapons against our citizens or Convention. though not enough, I believe, to pose a April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3641 legitimate threat to the security of the States into a very uncomfortable cor- the protections of the fourth amend- United States. ner, a corner from which we would be ment does not end at the corners of Nevertheless, I think we gain more unable to exit. Such conditions would this treaty. I have opposed in this Con- by establishing an international re- force the United States, which led the gress proposals to weaken the fourth gime that prohibits such behavior than negotiations of this treaty, to engage amendment’s protections, for example, we do by refusing to exercise U.S. lead- in a game of chicken with other coun- in the area of wire taps. ership in that regime. tries. It should instead join our allies In fact, I am pleased to see that My second, and more important, in ratifying this treaty. throughout the debate over this treaty, point is this: The CWC is the best ave- Mr. President, this treaty provides a many of my colleagues have taken an nue available today for beginning to solid start to limiting the flow of active interest in promoting the rights control the spread of chemical weap- chemical weapons. bestowed upon us by the fourth amend- ons, and leading, eventually, to the It urges the destruction of all chemi- ment. Indeed, I welcome the oppor- total elimination of such weapons. cal weapons. It will provide more infor- tunity to work with these members on Those countries that do ratify the mation about the prevalence of chemi- future initiatives related to this vital treaty—and this group represents most cal weapons than we have ever had be- provision of our Constitution. of the responsible players on the inter- fore. And it will make the dissemina- With respect to the claim that ratifi- national stage—recognize that through tion of such weapons—and the mate- cation of this treaty risks constitu- the CWC, the world firmly rejects the rials used to make them—more action- tional protections for Americans, I existence and use of chemical weapons. able than they have ever been before. think three points need to be stressed. The treaty puts in place mechanisms Mr. President, do I think the treaty First, this treaty, and in particular to enforce its precepts and monitor its could be improved? Of course. So I am the inspection language therein, is the progress, and signatories are commit- pleased that the CWC has the provision product of bipartisan efforts spanning ted to complying with these mecha- for amendment after it comes into many years. In fact, it was the Bush nisms. force. administration which rejected efforts What of the handful of nations who But now is not the time to debate to adopt overly broad, and undoubtedly flout international will, and will not amendments to the treaty. One hun- unconstitutional inspection proceed- sign on to this treaty? dred sixty-one nations have signed the ings in favor of those in the treaty First, defense experts at the very top Chemical Weapons Convention and 74 today. of our military command structure are of them have ratified it. Second, although the treaty itself ac- satisfied that the use of chemical I think we can all assume that—just knowledges the supremacy of the con- weapons by these so-called rogue states as we played a leading role in negotiat- stitutions of its signatories, this would does not pose a significant threat to ing the existing treaty—the United be the case even without specific lan- our national security. In March 1996, States will again be at the forefront of guage. The Senate cannot, be it then-Secretary of Defense William efforts to make the treaty more effec- through signing a treaty or passing a Perry told the Foreign Relations Com- tive after a period to test its utility. law, subvert any of the protections mittee that he was ‘‘damm sure’’ that We have the technological means and guaranteed by our Constitution. That the United States could respond mas- the economic weight to do so. But only is the very essence of our Constitution: sively and effectively to any chemical if we ratify this treaty prior to its it is the bedrock of our freedoms and weapons challenge. entry into force on April 29. Only by cannot be abrogated short of amend- Moreover, the CWC will make it easi- that deadline—now less than a week ment to the Constitution itself. er for the international community to away—will the United States be a full Mr. President, during a Judiciary track the chemical ingredients nec- participant in the Organization for the Committee hearing last September, I essary for weapons production and to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons questioned Professor Barry Kellman of inhibit the flow of these materials to [OPCW], the governing body that will the DePaul Law School on various as- rogue or non-signatory states. The have the responsibility for deciding the pects of the constitutionality of this Convention will impose trade sanctions terms for the implementation of the treaty and on each of the points I have on non-signatory countries whether or CWC. raised here today. On each point, Pro- not they are known to posses chemical Would I like to see the enforcement fessor Kellman was in agreement with weapons. This provision was devised by provisions of the CWC written in a less me. In fact, Professor Kellman, who the Bush administration specifically to ambiguous manner? Certainly. has dedicated many years, and much make it expensive for countries not to Could sanctions against violators be time and energy to reviewing the con- join this Convention. spelled out more clearly? Absolutely. stitutional implications of the Chemi- As Secretary of State Madeleine But the CWC was laboriously crafted cal Weapons Treaty, testified that, Albright said in testimony before the throughout three decades to meet the ‘‘every serious scholar’’ who has looked Foreign Relations Committee earlier security and economic interests of into the issue has found this treaty to this month, ‘‘These penalties would not States’ Parties. The United States led be constitutional. exist without the treaty. They will this effort, and the treaty which we are Finally, to the extent there are con- make it more costly for any nation to voting on reflects our needs. As Sec- cerns to be addressed, and there may have chemical weapons, and more dif- retary Albright has said, this treaty be, the proper context for airing those ficult for rogue states or terrorists to has ‘‘Made in the USA’’ written all concerns is during what I expect to be acquire materials needed to produce over it. That is why the CWC has the a lively discussion over the implement- them.’’ blessing and enthusiastic support of ing legislation, which we will have a Those states that we are most con- our defense and business communities. chance to debate in the next several cerned about currently are unwilling to Mr. President, I would like to address weeks. It is in the implementing legis- accept the norms that the treaty would an issue that is of particular impor- lation—not the treaty itself—where establish. That is why they have thus tance to me, and that is the potential these issues should be addressed and re- far chosen not to ratify. But it is just constitutional implications of this solved. as clear these states will never accept treaty. I look forward to working with con- the treaty if the United States refuses In particular, the argument has been cerned colleagues as we consider imple- to ratify. made, incorrectly in my opinion, that mentation of the treaty, so I am This is why I plan to vote in favor of adoption of the CWC would subvert, in pleased that the unanimous consent striking the so-called killer amend- some way, the constitutional protec- agreement arrived at regarding the res- ments that would tie the deposit of our tions of the fourth amendment which— olution of ratification before us today instrument of ratification to the ac- as Americans—we all enjoy. Let me say included the intent to debate and vote tions of these nations. at the outset that preserving the on the implementing legislation prior If the linkage were to remain in the fourth amendment is a responsibility to the Memorial Day recess. resolution, the Senate would become that I take very seriously and very per- As the debate over the implementing responsible for painting the United sonally. My concern about preserving language continues, I will work with S3642 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 my colleagues to ensure that the lan- First, and foremost, this treaty will Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I have guage we ultimately adopt fully and protect America’s military from the thought long and hard on whether I properly reflects the protections em- threat of chemical weapons attack should vote to ratify the Chemical bodied in the United States Constitu- without requiring America to give up Weapons Convention. I must admit tion. anything militarily. The United States that as the Convention was originally In the interim, however, we should has already decided to destroy its presented, I was inclined to oppose it. not become side-tracked by arguments stockpile of chemical weapons and has But after three weeks of hard work that this treaty is unconstitutional or vowed not to use chemical weapons in with the Majority Leader and with the subverts the fourth amendment. The warfare. Because the Chemical Weap- many thoughtful opponents of ratifica- inspections conducted pursuant to this ons Convention requires other nations tion, I believe we have resolved a sig- treaty will be conducted pursuant to to abandon chemical weapons as the nificant number of issues in contention the Constitution of this nation. Noth- United States has done, America gains and now believe that ratification of the ing in this treaty can, nor does it even from this treaty. We give up nothing, Chemical Weapons Convention will do attempt to, alter that simple, but fun- and our troops will be less likely to more to reach our common goal of damental fact. face poison gas in future conflicts. eradicating these deadly and detested Mr. President, I support the ratifica- Civilians in America and worldwide weapons from the earth than will non- tion of the Chemical Weapons Conven- will benefit from Senate ratification of ratification. tion which I believe is in the best inter- this treaty as well. Last year’s terror- First, I would like to commend my ests of the United States. ist attack in Japan, in which chemical many constituents, and the thousands And if the Senate is to lend its sup- weapons were used against innocent ci- of Americans like them, who were re- port to this treaty, we must vote to vilians, reminds us that none of us is lentless in raising their voices against strike each one of the five conditions safe from the threat of chemical weap- many dangerous aspects of the treaty before us. Four of these would pro- ons. As long as chemical weapons are and its interpretation. Without their nounce the treaty dead on arrival by produced and stockpiled, the possibil- vigilance, we would never have reached linking the deposit of the U.S. instru- ity remains real that they will end up the point we have today. ment of ratification to conditions that in the hands of terrorists. Because the I also commend Senator HELMS, Sen- are simply impossible to achieve—by Chemical Weapons Convention requires ator KYL, and the Majority Leader for April 29, or at any time in the near fu- all countries to enact laws making it a their work and negotiations with the ture. The other condition would estab- crime to develop or produce chemical Administration that has led to vast im- lish a precedent for the selection of in- weapons, the treaty will make it hard- provements in the Chemical Weapons spectors that would greatly undermine er for terrorists to obtain chemical Convention ratifying documents. the entire inspection process. weapons, making America’s cities, Since the beginning of the debate on Mr. President, it is imperative that streets, and schools safer. the Chemical Weapons Convention, I those of us who support this treaty Additionally, the Chemical Weapons have stated that the real question is help strike the language that would Convention will help America and the not whether to support the cause of re- undermine U.S. participation in the intelligence community to better track stricting the production, stockpile, and Convention in this manner. and control the spread of chemical use of chemical weapons throughout And, after doing so, Mr. President, I weapons and to punish violators. the world, but whether the Chemical hope my colleagues will join me in vot- Through the verification regime estab- Weapons Convention itself advanced or ing for final passage of the resolution lished by the treaty, our country will inhibited this honorable cause. of ratification. have an easier time monitoring chemi- As it was originally presented to the Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I cal weapons threats and establishing Senate for ratification, Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to ratify the rigorous verification procedures to pre- believe the treaty did not advance our Chemical Weapons Convention. vent cheating. cause, but instead inhibited it by mak- The Chemical Weapons Convention is Already seventy countries have rati- ing sensitive information on chemicals a historic arms control treaty which fied the treaty, and it will go into ef- and chemical weapons technology so will significantly enhance America’s fect with or without the United States. readily available as to encourage the security. The treaty prohibits the de- But if the Senate does not ratify the proliferation of these hideous weapons. velopment, production, acquisition, treaty, America will be siding with But through the good work of Senator stockpiling, and transfer of chemical rogue nations like Iraq and Libya. If HELMS and Senator KYL, we were able weapons by those countries that are the Senate does not ratify the treaty, to reach 28 agreements with the Ad- signatories. It requires signatories to American industry will be sanctioned ministration. These 28 agreements begin to destroy their chemical weap- and will lose roughly $600 million in went a long way toward advancing our ons within a year and to complete de- trade, a point I addressed more fully in cause. I think three of these agree- struction of chemical weapons within an earlier speech to the Senate. If the ments are particularly important. ten years. Importantly, it prohibits the Senate does not ratify the treaty, First, I shared the concern of many use of chemical weapons in combat, America will not be able to participate of my constituents and several former and it prohibits signatories from help- in the body that will determine the Secretaries of Defense who testified be- ing other countries to engage in any rules for implementing the treaty. And fore the Armed Services Committee activity banned by the treaty. As such, if the Senate does not ratify the trea- that the convention would create a the Chemical Weapons Convention is ty, America’s credibility as a pro- false sense of security, not only in the an important non-proliferation tool ponent of nonproliferation and arms United States, but in nations around that will help slow the spread of dan- control will be jeopardized. the world. It would be easy, Mr. Presi- gerous chemical weapons and force the Mr. President, there is no doubt in dent, for governments to believe that, destruction of most of the world’s my mind that the United States should because the Chemical Weapons Conven- chemical weapons stockpiles. join a treaty we helped to shape and tion is in force, we no longer need to President Reagan recognized the wis- which enhances our security. With the worry about the use of chemical weap- dom of working to ban chemical weap- Chemical Weapons Convention and our ons or to prepare ourselves to defend ons worldwide. Under his administra- leadership, other nations will follow against them. I found this aspect of the tion, negotiations on the terms of a the lead America set years ago by giv- treaty to be quite troubling. chemical weapons treaty began. Those ing up chemical weapons. Rogue na- No arms control treaty has yet prov- negotiations continued under President tions and terrorist countries will have en to be perfect. And chemical weapons Bush, who signed the treaty. Now, five a harder time acquiring or making are far more difficult to detect than years after completion, with the full chemical weapons, and new tools will missiles or nuclear warheads. Thus, I support of President Clinton, the be available to prevent and punish originally feared that ratification of Chemical Weapons Treaty is before the them if they try. America is much bet- the treaty would lull us into a false Senate for ratification. ter off with the Chemical Weapons Con- sense of security in which our armed There are many good reasons to sup- vention than without it, and I urge my forces would not be properly prepared port the Chemical Weapons Treaty. colleagues to ratify it without delay. to deal with a chemical attack. April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3643 I now believe, however, that the duct of peacetime military operations remarkably successful in his negotia- agreement reached between Senator within an area of ongoing armed con- tions with the President on this most HELMS and the Administration that en- flict when the United States is not a important aspect of the debate on the sures our armed forces will continue to party to the conflict; (2) in consensual treaty. I commend him for his dili- receive the equipment and training peacekeeping operations when the use gence and commend the President for necessary to complete their missions in of force is authorized by the receiving his wisdom in responding to our con- the face of chemical weapons is a state; and (3) in peacekeeping oper- cerns. major improvement which will guard ations when force is authorized by the This morning, the President sent against a debilitating false sense of se- Security Council under Chapter VII of Senator LOTT a letter in which he ex- curity. the United Nations Charter. The agree- tended a promise that the United Second, I and many of my constitu- ment also leaves in place Executive States will withdraw from the Conven- ents had grave concerns about the trea- Order 11850 signed by President Ford tion if Articles X and XI are used by ty’s impact on Fourth Amendment pro- which cites four cases where the use of other treaty parties to undermine the tections against unreasonable searches riot control agents should be permis- intent of the Convention. The specific and seizures. The treaty, in its original sible under the Chemical Weapons Con- circumstances under which the Presi- form, did not go far enough to protect vention: avoiding unnecessary loss of dent agreed to withdraw from the trea- U.S. citizens and businesses from invol- life, subduing rioting enemy POWs, ty are as follows: (1) if Article X is used untary inspections. The treaty’s provi- protecting supply convoys, and rescu- to justify actions that could degrade sions on challenge inspections of chem- ing a downed pilot from enemy troops U.S. defensive capabilities; (2) if Arti- ical producing facilities in the United or a POW from behind enemy lines. I cle XI erodes the Australia Group ex- States did not, in my opinion, comply commend the administration for agree- port controls; and (3) if Article XI pro- with the Constitution. ing to this reasonable and necessary motes increased proliferation of chemi- I am pleased that the administration condition. It will ensure that the men cal weapons. has agreed to a condition to protect and women of the United States armed With this assurance from the Presi- the Fourth Amendment rights of all forces have the tools necessary to do dent, I am now prepared to support the Americans and to conform the Chemi- their jobs in precarious situations. Chemical Weapons Convention and will cal Weapons Convention to the United While the 28 agreements made did go vote for its ratification. With the 28 States Constitution. According to this a long way to improve the Chemical agreements Senator HELMS and Sen- condition, before the U.S. deposits its Weapons Convention, I still had one re- ator KYL were able to negotiate, and instrument of ratification, the Presi- maining concern, in my view the most with this final commitment from the dent must certify to Congress that for important concern, until this morning. President, I am comfortable with the any challenge inspection in the United That concern relates to Articles X and treaty. The Convention has been trans- States for which consent has been XI of the convention and the propo- formed from one doing more harm than withheld, the inspection team must sition that they might well force the good, to one promoting rather than in- hibiting the cause of eradicating chem- first obtain a criminal search warrant United States to share sensitive infor- ical weapons from the earth. based upon probable cause, supported mation on our chemical weapons de- In closing, Mr. President, let me say by oath or affirmation, and describing fense capabilities and to eliminate our that these changes could not have been the place to be searched and the per- export controls on dangerous chemi- made without the diligent and good- sons or things to be seized. For any cals. faith negotiating done by the majority routine inspection of a declared facil- Article X of the treaty obliges all leader, and without the voices raised ity in the United States that is con- parties to provide assistance and pro- by thousands upon thousands of Ameri- ducted on an involuntary basis, the in- tection to any State Party threatened cans who went out of their way to draw spection team must obtain an adminis- by the potential use of chemical weap- attention to the treaty’s many flaws. trative search warrant from a United ons, including information on chemical They should be given the lion’s share of States magistrate judge. weapons defense and detection. Article credit for the conditions and modifica- I am now confident that this agree- XI of the treaty obliges all parties to tions we have made that make the ment will ensure that the constitu- freely exchange chemicals, equipment Chemical Weapons Convention a more tional rights of U.S. citizens and busi- and scientific and technical informa- workable, more responsible treaty. nesses will be protected under the trea- tion relating to the development and Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise ty. I commend Senators HELMS and application of chemistry for purposes today to express my firm support of KYL and the administration for their not prohibited by the Convention. It the Chemical Weapons Convention work on this vitally important condi- forbids parties to the treaty to main- Treaty. I have thought long and hard tion. tain export controls that would re- on this issue. And I believe that my Third, I was troubled by the treaty’s strict the trade and development of colleagues—both for and against this impact on the use of non-lethal riot chemicals and chemical technology treaty—have shown patience, diligence control agents. Since the Chemical with other treaty parties. and understanding during this impor- Weapons Convention was originally Ironically, these provisions of the tant debate. drafted, there has been a great deal of treaty, a treaty designed to eliminate I also believe the time has come for debate in the United States on whether the proliferation of chemical weapons, us to lead the civilized world in signing the treaty language would preclude could in fact promote that very pro- this treaty. And to remember why, we American armed forces from using non- liferation. If the United States is need to look back to our history. toxic riot control agents. Tear gas and forced under the treaty to provide this On October 30, 1918, 12 days before the other such chemicals provide the Unit- sensitive technology to countries such end of the First World War, the 362nd ed States military with an invaluable as Iran, China, or Cuba, those countries Infantry Division received orders to at- tool when conducting sensitive oper- could use that information to develop tack German positions outside the city ations. Tear gas, for example, is an ex- weapons against which we have no abil- of Audenarde in France. Many Mon- cellent means of rescuing downed pi- ity to defend. tanans served in this division. lots, or avoiding unnecessary loss of It is my contention that Articles X During this battle, German troops life when enemy troops and civilians and XI do more to inhibit the cause of lobbed several gas shells toward the are in the same area. eradicating chemical weapons than Montana troops. The wind that morn- I am pleased with the agreement that they do to promote it. Thus, they com- ing just happened to be blowing to the has been reached on this issue. Accord- prise a fatal flaw in the Chemical east, and the gas carried over the ing to a condition the administration Weapons Convention. And, until today, American area. has now accepted, the President will I was inclined to vote against ratifica- The men of the 362nd fought val- certify to Congress that the United tion because of my concerns on Arti- iantly that day. And in the end, they States is not restricted by the conven- cles X and XI. overtook the German positions with a tion in the use of riot control agents in I am pleased to say, however, that minimal loss of life. But they, and hun- the following situations: (1) in the con- the distinguished Majority Leader was dreds of thousands of other World War S3644 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 I veterans, carried scars in their lungs others, has painstakingly reviewed the The third issue of concern relates to for the rest of their lives. It made CWC for many months. The 33 condi- Condition 27’s direct affect on my state breathing difficult and left many of tions which have been the subject of and on our ability to dismantle our ex- them invalids. protracted negotiations have created a isting stockpiles. Kentucky is home to Chemical weaponry has come a long document which better protects our the Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot way in the 79 years since that battle nation’s security interests. I congratu- where thousands of chemical munitions took place. Modern technology has late Senator LOTT and the rest of the are currently stored. The community made this type of warfare more dev- participants for their efforts. surrounding this facility is justifiably astating and more deadly. It can now Despite the best efforts of all in- concerned over the method by which kill instantly as well as scar and maim volved I continue to harbor a number the weapons will be destroyed. The the lungs. of strong reservations about the con- Treaty mandates signatories register Chemical warfare is an indiscrimi- vention. I am concerned about its ver- specific technical plans for destruction nate killer. It cannot tell the dif- ifiability, the impact on U.S. business, shortly after the instruments of ratifi- ference between a soldier and a civil- the effect on U.S. efforts to eliminate cation are filed. This may undermine ian, a bunker from a subway, or a bar- existing chemical weapons stockpiles, alternatives currently being explored. racks from a school. and the number of rogue nations which Let me explain. Last year, I offered And worst of all, some chemical are not party to the CWC. an amendment to the Defense Appro- weapons are relatively easy to create. Former CIA director James Woolsey priations Bill which directed the Sec- As we have seen in recent news reports, testified that detection of violations of retary of Defense to pursue the acquisi- if the substances used to create chemi- the CWC is so difficult that we cannot tion of at least two alternative tech- cal weapons are freely available, ter- ‘‘have high confidence in our ability to nologies to the current plan of inciner- rorist groups and cults can make them detect noncompliance, especially on a ation. Condition 27, provides some as- and use them against civilians. small scale.’’ Nowhere is this more evi- surance that the development and use This, of course, often makes them dent than Iraq. In a recent column, of alternatives to incineration would hard to detect. So the critics of this Charles Krauthammer pointed out that not be affected by the CWC regime. Convention have a point when they say Iraq has been subjected to the most in- However, if this agreement between it will be hard to verify. trusive, comprehensive inspections for Congress and the Administration is But this agreement will make it weapons of mass destruction ever de- overruled, reversed or challenged by much easier than it is now for us to vised or implemented by an inter- the Organization for the Prohibition of find out when rogue states try to cre- national organization. Yet, we con- Chemical Weapons, my constituents ate or stockpile chemical weapons. We tinue to uncover secret sites and weap- will be placed at increased risk. I ac- will have the right to inspect the fac- ons and have no confidence we know cept the President’s written guarantee tories and defense installations of the extent of Saddam Hussein’s lethal at this point, but will keep a close those we suspect are creating these stockpile. If we are uncertain under the watch to assure his commitment is not weapons. And we will be able to block best of conditions, we should not un- reversed or revised. I ask unanimous those who do not sign from buying the derestimate the significant risks under consent that a letter from President substances they need to create chemi- adverse circumstances. Clinton to me on this issue be included cal weapons. Mr. President, my second concern is in the RECORD following my remarks. That is why this treaty has wide sup- the unforseen impact inspection re- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without port. If we choose not to ratify it, we quirements might have on U.S. busi- objection it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) cast ourselves with such countries as nesses. One estimate puts the number Mr. MCCONNELL. Condition 27 also Iraq and Libya—one which used chemi- of Kentucky businesses which are like- presents another problem. Current law cal weapons against Iran and its own ly to be impacted by the CWC at 44. requires the President to destroy the Kurdish citizens, another suspected of Not all of these companies are large U.S. stockpile by 2004. Condition 27 ex- clandestine efforts to create a chemical enough to be able to afford the in- tends the deadline to 2007. Mr. Presi- weapons program. creased costs of additional burdensome dent I am emphatically opposed to this And we make it more likely that regulations. The chemical industry is provision. I do not believe it wise to some day, another generation of Amer- already one of the most over-regulated give the Army, or any party the oppor- ican servicemen and servicewomen will industries in America. Currently, the tunity to slow down efforts to identify suffer the same kind of outrageous at- combined costs of EPA, OSHA and alternative technologies or to delay tack that the Montanans in the 362nd other federal regulations on the indus- the destruction process. went through in 1918. That must not try is near $4.9 billion annually. Adding The weapons stored in the U.S. need happen. And the Senate must pass this to this incredible financial burden is to be dismantled now. They are aging Convention. overkill. and therefore becoming more unstable If we ratify this treaty now, we allow In addition to the costly regulatory every day. As this occurs, safe destruc- the United States to participate in its burdens CWC asks these companies to tion becomes increasingly difficult and administration from the outset. To fail withstand, the treaty will require com- the chance of an accident increases to ratify the treaty is to lose our seat panies to open their books and facili- dramatically. I hope the Administra- at the table. I want to make sure that ties to foreign inspection teams—creat- tion will not seek a delay in the de- we put American inspectors on the ing a Pandora’s box of commercial haz- struction deadline unless it is abso- ground to ensure the eventual end of ards. Former Defense Secretary Donald lutely necessary in order to undergo these horrible weapons. Rumsfeld points out, despite best ef- the safe and effective elimination of Again, I urge my colleagues to join forts its possible, even likely, that in- our weapons. me in supporting this treaty. And I spection teams could come away with Finally, Mr. President, the fact that look forward to the day we remove classified and proprietary information. many of the nations with either the in- chemical weapons from the face of the Specifically, the inspection require- tent or the means to attack U.S. sol- earth. ments may compel companies to pro- diers and citizens with chemical weap- Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I vide proprietary technical data which ons are not covered by the CWC is rise today to join my colleagues in ad- could be used to considerable financial deeply troubling. Libya, Syria, Iraq dressing the issue of ratification of the advantage by competitors. Worse yet, and North Korea are all suspected of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). the results might enable adversaries to possessing chemical weapons and not While some who are less familiar enhance their chemical weapons capa- one is a participant in the CWC. This with the advice and consent process bilities, putting American soldiers and fact is strong justification for main- may regret the pace the Senate has un- citizens at potential risk. These risks taining Condition 30 which compels dertaken, I strongly believe it is a underscore the need to include the im- their participation. point of pride. The Senate, led by Ma- perative protections in Condition 31 en- If the U.S. ratifies the CWC the hor- jority Leader LOTT, Senator KYL, Sen- abling the President to ban inspection rors of chemical attack will not magi- ator HELMS, Senator LUGAR and many teams with terrorist track records. cally disappear. Those of us in the April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3645 United States Senate must remain commitment to exploring alternatives to in- That’s why it is incredible to me, less vigilant in ensuring that America con- cineration for the destruction of the U.S. than a week before the ratification tinues to prepare adequate defensive chemical weapons stockpile and clarifies the deadline, that this treaty has become a capabilities against potential chemical relationship between the CWC and our chem- point of political division here in the ical weapons demilitarization program. A or biological attack. Incidents such as copy of the condition is attached. U.S. Senate. the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo sub- I am gratified that you agree on the impor- This treaty is the first global arms way cannot be prevented by this or any tance to U.S. national security of banning control agreement to ban an entire other treaty. the production, possession and use of chemi- class of weapons. Participating states The world remains a dangerous place cal weapons worldwide. I look forward to must destroy their chemical weapons and this treaty will not substantially your support for Senate ratification of the within 10 years of the treaty’s enact- change that fact. The Secretary of CWC in the weeks ahead. ment and pledge to never make them State insists that this Treaty is not Sincerely, again. The agreement also creates an BILL CLINTON. about our chemical weapons—it is a Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. Presi- international organization to monitor means to limit other nations’. The dent, in recent weeks we have heard a compliance, and signatories must ex- plain fact is it will not constrain one great deal about the Chemical Weapons change data and permit routine inspec- nation from acquiring or using these Convention. tions of their facilities. weapons. Even if we are able to deter- We have talked about the risks of in- Nations refusing to participate will mine that a participating nation is vio- formation sharing, the reliability of be barred from purchasing the ingredi- lating the CWC, the means of redress or the verification systems, and whether ents necessary to make chemical weap- sanction available under the treaty are Russia should go first. We have debated ons and many commercial chemical toothless and largely ineffective. The the dangers of exchanging inspectors, products, and will face heightened United Nations Security Council must we have questioned whether outcasts scrutiny over their chemical weapons craft penalties which could avoid po- like Iran, Iraq and North Korea should activities. Their chemical and bio- tential Chinese or Russian vetoes. I am sign this international agreement, and technology industries will face great certain this would be a near impossible whether anything would change if they international trade obstacles. Opponents of the Chemical Weapons task. did. Fundmentally, we have been con- Convention argue that this treaty With these objections stated, it is sidering whether the proposed treaty is should not be ratified because coun- clear that I do not believe the CWC is a step forward, or whether it is worse tries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria are a perfect document. In fact, it remains than no treaty at all. unclear whether the treaty will have Opponents have argued that the trea- not signatories. They argue that the any of the positive effects its pro- ty is fatally flawed, and that the Unit- treaty is unverifiable, that it is intru- ponents allege. ed States is better off without it. It’s sive and damaging to confidential Why then do I feel compelled to sup- true that the Chemical Weapons Con- trade information held by the U.S. port U.S. ratification? Quite simply it vention is not perfect. Chemical weap- chemical industry, and that, due to the comes down to one issue—the necessity ons are cheap and easy to make, and Clinton administration’s refusal to to sustain the strength and credibility despite our best efforts, we will never modify article 10 and 11, the United of U.S. leadership. As the principal ar- be able to monitor every laboratory, or States will be forced to share critical chitect of the CWC, the United States stop every nation in this world that is technology with other nations. I do not subscribe to this interpreta- risks our authority and stature should driven to make tools of biological war- tion. The sanctions provided by this we refuse to ratify the convention. If fare. this treaty is to enjoy any success it But this debate is not about whether treaty for nonmembers were designed will be due to U.S. participation and the treaty is perfect, or whether its with the distinct understanding that leadership. As President Bush has stat- provisions must be changed. This de- pariah states were unlikely to join the ed repeatedly, ‘‘it is vitally important bate is about what happens if the Unit- agreement, and therefore would be iso- for the United States to be out front.’’ ed States fails to act. lated and targeted for sanctions. Fur- I also agree with former Secretary of Every weapon of war is horrible. thermore, article 10 does not obligate State James Baker’s assertion that While the bloodshed, violence and de- the United States to share chemical de- failure to ratify the convention ‘‘would struction caused by things that kill fense technologies and equipment with send a message of American retreat people cannot be ranked, death by poi- member or nonmember states. Article from engagement in the world.’’ son gases or viruses is particularly 10, in fact, provides the United States The United States must be in a posi- grisly. I am reminded of the words of with the flexibility to determine how tion to lead, and it must use this lead- Erich Maria Remarque in his novel and what types of assistance should be ership to push other nations to follow about men lost to poison gas attacks provided to signatories. Article 11 will our example and eliminate their chem- during the Great War in the early part not force private businesses to release ical stockpiles. Just this week we of this century: proprietary information. The conven- tion legally binds signatories, via arti- heard from a former high ranking We found one dug-out full of them, with North Korean official of that country’s blue heads and black lips. Some . . . took cle 1, never to engage in any activities significant chemical and nuclear capa- their masks off too soon . . . they swallowed prohibited under the convention, great- bilities and willingness to use both. enough to scorch their lungs. Their condi- ly decreasing the likelihood that na- The U.S. must actively work to ensure tion is hopeless; they choke to death with tions would seek to profit by giving se- that the North Korea’s of the world hemorrhages and suffocation—‘‘All Quiet on crets to non-signatories. recognize the futility in relying on The Western Front’’ Erich Maria Remarque. For the American people, the bene- these weapons. The CWC is a modest It was experiences like this that fits of the Chemical Weapons Conven- step on that road, a road which I hope helped to generate worldwide hatred tion are clear. Its provisions will di- yields success. and fear of chemical weapons, and is minish the threat of chemical warfare EXHIBIT 1 what led to the Geneva Protocol of against our young troops overseas. It 1925. will help protect Americans at home THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, March 19, 1997. In the 70 years since that time, nego- from terrorist attacks like the kind DEAR SENATOR MCCONNELL: Thank you for tiations have been conducted, con- that occurred in the Tokyo subway. your letter concerning your support for the ferences have been held, and agree- And it gives us new tools to help us Chemical Weapons Convention and for the ments have been signed to permanently track down and punish nations that alternative technologies program. ban chemical weapons from the earth. violate this treaty. I want to assure you that nothing in the It is universally recognized that out- The amount of good that this treaty Convention would preclude the consideration lawing chemical and biological weap- can accomplish has been recognized by of alternative technologies funded by your amendment to the FY 1997 Defense Appro- ons and their manufacture—while it the rest of the civilized world. One hun- priations bill. Indeed, the Administration might not completely prevent any use dred and sixty-four nations have has agreed to a condition to the CWC resolu- in future conflicts—is the right thing signed, and seventy-four nations have tion of ratification which makes clear my to do. ratified this agreement. The treaty, S3646 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 which was negotiated by the Repub- The Chemical Weapons Convention is lateral chemical weapons destruction lican administrations of Reagan and not a liberal or a conservative docu- agreement with the Soviet Union in an Bush, has been endorsed by military ment. It is not a Democratic or a Re- effort to begin the process of reducing leaders like General Powell and Gen- publican document. It was negotiated that country’s stockpiles, the largest eral Schwartzkopf. It’s supported by by the Reagan and Bush administra- in the world. The leadership of the the chemical manufacturers, and most tions and it is supported by the Clinton United States through the years has significantly, it is supported by the administration. It is in the tradition of been crucial in forging the broad inter- American people. a nonpartisan foreign policy. national consensus which produced the The Senate has less than 1 week, The Chemical Weapons Convention Chemical Weapons Convention. The however, to ratify this treaty. If we was made in America. It is inconceiv- whole world is watching us closely miss the April 29 deadline, the world able that we—the world’s only super- today to see whether or not the United will move ahead without us, and the power—would refuse to ratify a Con- States is going to continue its leader- United States will lose a critical oppor- vention that we were instrumental in ship role on this critical issue. tunity to take a stand against the drafting. The United States must not retreat worldwide proliferation of chemical Of course no treaty can ever elimi- from more than a decade of leadership weapons. America will lose its seat at nate every threat. That is why the on controlling chemical weapons. We the table in the international enforce- United States must continue to main- must ratify the Chemical Weapons ment process, and American inspectors tain our strong chemical weapons de- Convention before it comes into force will be barred from examining foreign fense program. At the Aberdeen Prov- on April 29—not just to maintain our facilities. Our chemical industry will ing Ground in Maryland, scientists and leadership on this issue, but because it lose hundreds of millions of dollars per technicians are developing better ways is in our best interests to do so. year as a result of the treaty’s trade to protect our troops from the effects The issue is not whether the Conven- restrictions. And we will sit on the of chemical weapons. This important tion will completely eliminate the sidelines with outlaw nations like work must continue. threat of chemical weapons. There is Libya, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. In addition, our intelligence agen- no magic wand to do that. However, The United States is not an outlaw cies, like the National Security Agen- what the Chemical Weapons Conven- nation, and should not be considered cy, must continue to provide the kind tion will do is nevertheless substantial. one because of our failure to act. We of information that prevents the use of It will establish—for the first time—an cannot stop these deadly weapons chemical weapons. The National Secu- international standard against the pro- alone, and the world cannot stop these rity Agency is listening in on the inter- duction and use of chemical weapons. weapons without us. As President Clin- national criminals and terrorists as It will provide us with significant addi- ton said in his State of the Union Ad- they seek to buy chemicals and tional monitoring and inspection tools dress, ‘‘We must be shapers of events, produce weapons. The Chemical Weap- to detect chemical weapons activities. not observers.’’ If we want to continue ons Convention will aid these efforts by And it will impose trade restrictions our leadership role into the next cen- making it harder for terrorists to get that will make it more difficult for tury, then it is time for the United chemicals that could be turned against ‘‘rogue’’ states and terrorist organiza- States to be leagued with the rest of Americans. tions to start or continue chemical the world and put an end to these America has always led the effort to weapons programs. weapons of death. end the use of chemical weapons—and Opponents of the Convention argue We have a clear choice. We can take the convention will ensure that other that it is not adequately verifiable, al- the path of political partisanship, and countries follow our lead. We have al- though many of those same critics stand in isolation. Or we can set aside ready decided not to use chemical argue at the same time that the treaty discord, take responsibility for our weapons and we have started to dis- is too intrusive. The fact is that the children’s future, and ratify this agree- mantle our chemical stockpile. Convention includes the most exten- ment. Maryland is one of seven States that sive monitoring and inspection regime This is the decision that the Senate stores chemical weapons left over from of any arms control treaty to date. The must make. In the 100 years since the the First and Second World Wars. For U.S. chemical industry—which will be Hague Conventions, a historic oppor- many years, we have lived with the the target of most of the monitoring tunity is within reach to ban chemical threat of an accident. We are only now and inspection under the Convention— weapons forever. It is time for the Sen- preparing to neutralize the chemical helped write these provisions and is ate to complete the job and ratify the stockpile that is stored in Maryland. comfortable with them. Chemical Weapons Convention. We in Maryland know first-hand the The U.S. intelligence community be- Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I sup- dangers these chemical weapons pose lieves that the Convention will signifi- port the ratification of the Chemical to military personnel and civilians. cantly enhance its current ability to Weapons Convention. This inter- America’s priority must be to safely detect suspicious patterns of chemical national treaty is our best hope to end dispose of these lethal chemicals—not activity in other countries. I am par- the use of lethal chemical weapons. It to produce them. ticularly pleased with the Condition will protect Americans by making it Mr. President, The Chemical Weap- #5, which has been agreed to, that pro- harder for terrorists to produce chemi- ons Convention will make it harder for tects U.S. intelligence information cal weapons and it will protect our sol- thugs and rogue nations to make and that may be shared with the Organiza- diers on the battlefield. This treaty use chemical weapons. I urge my col- tion for the Prohibition of Chemical will make America and the world more leagues to join me in voting for its Weapons. It reflects the legislation I secure. ratification. have introduced to protect U.S. intel- The Chemical Weapons Convention Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, in my ligence which is shared with inter- bans the development, production, view there is no greater threat to our national organizations. stockpiling, and use of chemicals as nation’s security than the proliferation The trade restrictions imposed by the weapons. Each and every nation that of weapons of mass destruction. Among Convention represent another key ele- signs this treaty becomes an ally in the these is the scourge of chemical weap- ment in controlling the proliferation of fight against chemical weapons used by ons which have been unleashed in this chemical weapons. Building on the ex- terrorists or by outlaw states. If we century with such horrifying effect in isting trade restrictions in chemicals don’t ratify this treaty, America will the trenches of the First World War, in under the informal Australia Group, join countries like Libya and Iraq who the villages of Iraq a decade ago, and the Convention limits trade in the refuse to join the worldwide effort to more recently in the Tokyo subway. most likely chemicals to be used in end the use of chemical weapons. I In 1985 the United States took a bold weapons production—Schedule I chemi- can’t speak for my colleagues, but I unilateral decision to destroy our cals—to trade among countries that know that this Senator does not want chemical weapons stockpiles because have already ratified it. The same re- the United States to be aligned with they serve no military purpose. And in strictions will apply after three years those terrorist states. 1990 the United States negotiated a bi- to Schedule II ‘‘dual-use’’ chemicals April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3647 which have both commercial and mili- A total of 162 countries have now ish War Veterans of the USA. The Na- tary applications. signed the Chemical Weapons Conven- tional Gulf War Resource Center, a co- Therefore, if we do not ratify, we tion and 74 countries have ratified it. alition of two dozen Gulf War veterans hurt our own chemical industry which Russia, China and Iran—all with known organizations has also publicly en- will be excluded from commerce in chemical weapons programs—have dorsed the CWC. Schedule I chemicals with some of our signed the Convention, but it is un- Such distinguished senior US mili- principal trading partners, including likely that these countries will ratify tary commanders as General Norman the United Kingdom, France, Germany, it if the U.S. does not do so first. Schwarzkopf, former Chairmen of the Japan, and Canada. The economic loss Mr. President, American leadership Joint Chiefs of Staff Generals John M. to the United States is estimated to be is needed once again. The U.S. must be Shalikashvili and Colin Powell, former $600 million annually. among the original ratifying states in Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Opponents of the Convention also order to play a central role in setting Elmo Zumwalt, and former National argue that it is contrary to our na- up the new Organization for the Prohi- Security Adviser General Brent Scow- tional security interests because coun- bition of Chemical Weapons and to par- croft have all publicly called for the tries like Iraq and North Korea will ticipate fully in the Convention’s mon- ratification of the CWC. Colin Powell continue their chemical weapons pro- itoring, inspection, and trade control appeared before the Veterans Affairs grams while we destroy our own stock- activities. I urge my colleagues to sup- Committee last week; he gave the com- piles. But the Convention will make it port the resolution of ratification for mittee his unequivocal support for the harder for these countries to obtain the Chemical Weapons Convention. CWC. General Powell stated that the critical chemical ingredients for their Mrs. MURRAY. Mr President, I am treaty will lessen the likelihood that weapons programs. And, by outlawing pleased that the United States Senate U.S. troops will be safer from chemical the production of chemical weapons for has finally turned its attention to the attack in the future. Given the prob- the first time, the Convention will Chemical Weapons Convention. Before lems many of our Gulf War veterans allow the international community to this body today sits the work of Presi- are suffering that many attribute to take collective action to isolate dent Reagan, President Bush and now exposure to chemical weapons, I be- ‘‘rogue’’ states intent on developing President Clinton. The CWC will place lieve the Senate should give General these weapons. a global ban on the manufacture, Powell’s comments in support of the The Pentagon’s top military leaders CWC special consideration. have all testified that chemical weap- stockpiling and use of chemical weap- Also of great importance to me in ons are not needed to deter other coun- ons by its signatories. Along with pro- considering the merits of the CWC is tries from using these weapons against tocols for inspections and sanctions the strong support of the chemical in- the U.S. or our armed forces. In fact, against countries that do not abide by dustry, including both small and large chemical weapons serve no useful mili- the CWC, it contains a specific time- businesses. It is noteworthy that our tary purpose as a method of warfare. table for the destruction of existing business community provided advice to America’s ability to inflict overwhelm- chemical weapons and production fa- the Reagan and Bush administrations ing destruction, without resorting to cilities. on the treaty provisions affecting this chemical warfare, serves as a sufficient The United States provided valuable deterrent to the use of chemical weap- leadership for many years in the effort industry. If the United States does not ratify ons against our armed forces. I agree to outlaw chemical weapons and their the Chemical Weapons Convention it strongly with Condition #11, which has use. Our government was the driving will not have access to the Treaty’s already been agreed to, that requires force behind the negotiations that pro- tools to help detect rogue states and the United States to maintain a robust duced the Chemical Weapons Conven- terrorists who seek to acquire chemical program of chemical and biological de- tion. The CWC will go into effect next weapons. The United States will not be fenses to ensure that our forces are week with or without U.S. participa- allowed to participate in the Organiza- provided with maximum protection in tion. Failure to ratify the CWC would the event such weapons are ever used be a monumental error for the United tion for the Prohibition of Chemical against U.S. forces. Such a policy is States; a symbolic retreat from our Weapons (OPCW), the governing body only matter of prudence and common traditional role in the world that will deciding the terms for the implementa- sense. likely impede our efforts to further tion of the Treaty. Therefore, Ameri- The resolution of ratification before eliminate and combat proliferation of cans will not be able to serve on inspec- the Senate today sets out further con- weapons of mass destruction. tion teams or influence amendments, ditions that address widely-shared con- I do strongly support the immediate and Americans now serving as head of cerns about the Chemical Weapons ratification of the Chemical Weapons administration, head of industrial in- Convention. For instance, conditions Convention. I want to add my personal spections, and head of security will be will ensure the primacy of the U.S. thanks to my many colleagues who replaced by nationals from countries Constitution, limit U.S. financial obli- have worked so hard to bring the arti- that have ratified the CWC. Chemical gations under the Convention, ensure cles of ratification to the Senate floor. proliferation and terrorism are un- appropriate cost-sharing arrangements, Senator BIDEN and Senator LUGAR have doubtedly problems the United States and require consultation with this both been champions in this effort. I can fight more effectively within the body in cases of noncompliance with have great admiration and respect for framework of global cooperation. the treaty. By clarifying and reinforc- both of these Senators and I know The Chemical Manufacturing Asso- ing the Senate’s views on these and many thousands of my constituents ciation has stated that the CWC ‘‘does other important issues, the conditions also appreciate their leadership on the not trump US export control laws.’’ In- constitute a useful complement to the CWC. stead, the Treaty will expand and im- Chemical Weapons Convention. As a Member of the Senate Commit- prove the effectiveness of non-pro- Mr. President, it is important to note tee on Veterans Affairs, I have been liferation by instituting a strong sys- that this Convention has a history of particularly impressed by the support tem of multilateral export controls. No bipartisan support. Negotiations began given to the CWC by numerous veter- information will be disclosed regarding under the Reagan Administration and ans service organizations. My own imports, exports or domestic ship- were concluded by the Bush Adminis- state has more than 700,000 veterans ments. The CWC will affect approxi- tration. Former President George Bush and thousands of additional active mately 2,000 companies, not 8,000 as the has said, and I quote, ‘‘This Convention duty personnel stationed in every cor- Treaty’s opponents hold. About 1,800 of clearly serves the best interests of the ner of my state. The following veterans those 2,000 companies will do nothing United States in a world in which the organization have all called upon the more than check a box regarding the proliferation and use of chemical weap- Senate to ratify the CWC; the Veterans range of Discrete Organic Chemicals ons is a real and growing threat . . . of Foreign Wars, the Vietnam Veterans they produce, without specifying the United States leadership is required of America, the Reserve Officers Asso- nature of these chemicals. Of the some once again to bring this historic agree- ciation of the United States, the Amer- 140 companies most likely to be sub- ment into force.’’ ican Ex-Prisoners of War and the Jew- jected to routine inspections, a large S3648 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 proportion are CMA members, who as- treaty and amending article 11, and security. I have read the Convention, sisted in writing the provisions of the having our intelligence agencies cer- and I wish to state that I read Article Treaty. Regardless, it is anticipated tify that the treaty would be credibly XI, section (d) to mean that the U.S. is that any challenge inspections will verifiable were critical to making the free to pursue any action—unilaterally more than likely involve military, treaty worthwhile. or multilaterally—against nations hav- rather than commercial facilities. The fact that the President suggested ing chemical weapons. Furthermore, I Thus, we should not concern ourselves we could withdraw from the convention will insist on clarification indicating with a potential negative impact of the if there were a compelling reason to do that current trade sanctions promoting CWC on the industry, because clearly so, was a placebo which carried little U.S. national security, and supported this is not the case. On the contrary, if viable meaning. I believe that it would by this body as well the executive, will the US Senate chooses not to ratify the not only be more difficult to withdraw not be infringed by this Treaty. Chemical Weapons Convention, Amer- from the convention once we ratify it, The benefits of this Treaty will not ican chemical companies risk losing as it would be much more dangerous to nearly approach the rhetoric of some of much as $600 million a year in sales world stability if we were to withdraw its proponents. In my opinion, over- and many well-paying jobs when the after obligating ourselves to a flawed blown rhetoric enhanced the possibility mandatory trade sanctions against treaty. And so, I must, in good con- that this Treaty could have failed, as non-parties are enforced. science, vote not to ratify. some of us studied the document and Critics insist that the CWC will be in- Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, the first realized the great gap between the effective because rogue states sus- thing I wish to express is my gratitude rhetoric and reality. pected of possessing or attempting to to the Chairman of the Foreign Rela- The current resolution of ratification acquire chemical weapons, such as tions Committee and the Majority helps to close that gap. The conditions Syria, Iraq, North Korea and Libya, Leader for the work they have done in included in the resolution preserve the have not joined the convention. Ac- the final weeks to improve this resolu- Senate’s constitutional role in treaty- cordingly, they argue that the United tion of ratification. making, including approval of amend- States should hold up ratification until The Chemical Weapons Convention ments to the CWC. Agreed conditions these states join. The reality is that before us is significantly better than established standards for U.S. intel- only about 20 states are believed to what we faced last year. In addition, I ligence sharing, including requiring re- have or to be seeking a chemical weap- wish to compliment both the Chairman ports on such sharing. They limit the ons program, more than two-thirds of and the Ranking Member of the For- sharing of defensive capabilities under which have already signed the CWC. eign Relations Committee for holding Article X. They clarify our position on For the past 40 years, the United numerous hearings during the past the use of riot control agents in war- States has led nonproliferation regimes month and for the way they have led time circumstances, preserving for us that have established accepted norms the debate over the past two days. The that option along the lines originally of international behavior. Failing to duty of this body to advise and consent intended by our negotiators under ratify the convention will not persuade has never been more honorably met. President Reagan. They require the the rogue states to join the CWC. Rath- This treaty, with the resolution of President to report regularly on the er, it will legitimize their action and ratification, while now an acceptable threat of chemical weapons. Finally—and this is extremely impor- hurt US credibility in the inter- treaty, is not the panacea for chemical tant, Mr. President—the resolution of national community. The Treaty en- weapons that some of the more ada- ratification requires criminal search sures that non-party states are isolated mant proponents have implied or sug- warrants for challenge inspections and makes it extremely difficult for gested. It will not, in and of itself, against non-complying parties. them to pursue their nefarious objec- spare our grandchildren from the hor- I stress again, Mr. President, my tives. rors of chemical warfare. It will not, in gratitude to those, on both sides of the I urge my Senate colleagues to re- and of itself, protect our citizens from aisle as well as in the Clinton Adminis- flect on the measure of American lead- terrorists intent on using chemical tration, who negotiated this resolu- ership and the indispensability of our weapons. tion. nation on nonproliferation issues and This Convention will not signifi- The letter the Majority Leader has to vote for the Chemical Weapons Con- cantly reduce the threat of terrorism, obtained from President Clinton also vention. This Treaty makes sense on Mr. President. Now that this debate is helps close the gap between rhetoric political, legal and moral grounds. As almost concluded, it would be of great and reality. The President recognizes, officials of both Republican and Demo- benefit to the future of this agreement with this letter, that the Treaty may cratic administrations assert, the that everyone be realistic about this. not guarantee the cessation of pro- Chemical Weapons Convention will en- The Administration and other pro- liferation of these monstrous weapons sure that Americans live in a safer ponents of this agreement recognized and their precursors. He recognizes America and a safer world. this when they stated in the resolution that, despite the goals of this docu- Mr. BOND. Mr. President I will vote of ratification, condition 19 that: ‘‘The ment, our defenses against their pos- against ratification of the Chemical Senate finds that without regard to sible use on our troops should not Warfare Convention. I came to this de- whether the Convention enters into wane. He recognizes that we have a re- cision, not because I am against doing force, terrorists will likely view chemi- gime—the Australia Group—in place away with chemical weapons, we all cal weapons as a means to gain greater that has addressed the problem of il- are. I will vote against ratification be- publicity and instill widespread fear; licit trade in chemicals and that that cause amendments which I believe and the March 1995 Tokyo subway at- regime should not go by the wayside. were critical to ensuring our safety and tack by the Aum Shinrikyo would not With this letter, the President recog- security were stricken rendering the have been prevented by the Conven- nizes that if this Treaty is seen to be convention more dangerous to our well tion.’’ failing, we can and will exercise Article being than one which would include Mr. President, I am greatly con- XVI, which defines how a State Party those conditions, even if it means hav- cerned about future terrorist threats to may withdraw from the CWC. ing to renegotiate the convention. Of the citizens of this country, and I urge Despite these improvements and as- the outstanding amendments which those who have suggested that this surances, Mr. President, I know that a were debated through out the day Convention will curb that threat to de- number of thoughtful colleagues con- today, I believe those covering Russian cease from such counterproductive tinue to have reservations about the ef- ratification and their compliance with rhetoric that could disastrously mis- fectiveness of this Treaty. And I wish previous treaties, the rejection of in- lead us about future threats. to say that I respect their decisions, spectors or inspections by states with a In addition, I must note to the ardent and I object to certain exceptional no- history of violating non-proliferation proponents of the CWC that a number tions heard during the debate that op- treaties or which have been designated of nations will remain outside of this ponents of this Treaty object because by our State Department as sporting regime, and some of them have policies they are against all arms control trea- terrorism, striking article 10 of the inimical to this nation’s welfare and ties. I don’t believe this to be the case April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3649 at all. This Treaty has many practical through on his pledge for strict inter- interest. I fear the Administration will limitations, and I believe that we national compliance and for vigilence have a lot of work building the bridge should not impugn the motives of indi- regarding threats by terrorists or rene- between the rhetoric and reality. On viduals who, at the end of the day, gade groups. that bridge lies the future of this Con- have great reservations over its bene- Over 70 nations have ratified this vention and the future of arms control. fits. Convention. Of course, we decided to Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, let me I have supported many arms control unilaterally destroy our stockpile more state the order of distinguished speak- agreements myself, Mr. President, but than a decade ago, and we are proceed- ers on this side of the aisle. I am going always after careful consideration of ing as expeditiously as possible, re- to start with the most distinguished of the strategic value as well as practical strained only by prudence regarding all. The President pro tempore of the consequences of making so grave a safety and the environment. We’ve Senate, Senator THURMOND, will have 5 commitment. And I must say that it known all along that our unilateral de- minutes; followed by Senator has never been more difficult for me to struction plan was not contingent on HUTCHISON of Texas, for 5 minutes; Sen- determine the net worth of an arms the outcome of this debate. We deter- ator HUTCHINSON of Arkansas to follow control agreement as it has been for mined these weapons were not mili- with 2 minutes; Senator BROWNBACK, me regarding the Chemical Weapons tarily useful to us; our defense estab- for 1 minute; Senator KYL, for 1 Convention before us today. lishment can preserve and promote our minute; Senator ASHCROFT, for 2 min- I have concluded that this treaty can national security without them. But as utes. They will be recognized in that advance our security, but only if Ad- of the moment that our instrument of order. ministration matches the rhetoric of ratification is deposited, we will be the The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- arms control with the muscle of politi- first of the countries with a large ator from South Carolina is recognized. cal will. Because, Mr. President, inter- stockpile to ratify. The United States Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I national norms without political will is leading. Will other nations follow? want to recognize the work done on do not become norms. Mr. President, I wish to say a few this treaty by the floor managers— The benefits of treaties are measured words about Russia. With the consent both in opposition and in support of on achievements, not intentions. If in- of the Senate today, the Administra- this very important international trea- tentions were all that mattered, all tion will be able to deposit the instru- ty. Both sides have made laudable ar- treaties would be beneficial prima ment of ratification before the April 29 guments in supporting their different facie. By this standard, the Kellogg- deadline, allowing U.S. participation in positions. This subject is one of great Briand Treaty, which outlawed war, or the formation of the Organization for importance. I want to especially com- the 1925 Geneva Convention Against the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. mend our able majority leader for the the Use of Chemical Weapons, would The U.S. and Russia are the only pow- long hours he spent working with both floor managers and the administration. have been rousing successes. History ers that voluntarily declare they have Mr. President, during the Senate has proven that they were not. But, the chemical weapons. On two occasions Armed Services Committee’s review of success of treaties is measured in re- the Russians have joined us—in the the national security implications of ality, not rhetoric. And the benefits of 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement the Chemical Weapons Convention, I this Treaty are measured on a narrow and under the 1989 Wyoming Memoran- raised concerns about the ability of the margin. dum—in bilateral commitments to ex- U.S. to comply with the treaty obliga- It is after a careful parsing of this pose and destroy our stockpiles. As tion to destroy our chemical stockpile margin, and much reflection, that I those who have studied this question within the timeframe stipulated, the have determined that I will vote for know, the record of Russian compli- universality of the treaty, the verifi- the Chemical Weapons Convention. But ance is not good. As those who read the ability of the treaty, and the adminis- I do so with the expectation that this papers and get the briefings know, the tration’s interpretation of the provi- Chief Executive, and subsequent ones, Russian chemical arms capability is sion on the defensive use of riot control must be wholly dedicated to imple- not stagnant. agents by U.S. forces. menting this agreement in a way that President Yeltsin has indicated that During the committee’s hearings on advances U.S. security interests and he wishes the Russian Duma to approve the treaty in August 1994, I took no po- protects U.S. domestic interests. ratification before the April 29 dead- sition on this treaty. I made it clear Mr. President, this Treaty will give line. I hope they do. The Russians need that the administration would have to us some tools—inspections and other to join and participate in the initial convince me that it was in the national data collections—that will enhance our construction of this regime. And we security interests of the United States. knowledge of the threat of chemical need to begin to inspect and expose all I have concerns about statements weapons. The information will not be of our stockpiles. If the Russians are made over the past few weeks, by the comprehensive; it will not apply uni- not part of this Treaty, Mr. President, President and several administration versally. But, if in collecting this infor- this regime may be stillborn, because representatives, that if the United mation we reduce the possibility that the largest stockpile of chemical weap- States does not ratify the Chemical our troops will face a chemical threat, ons in the world exists in the Russian Weapons Convention, that we would be then this is a tangible, defensible goal, Federation. I hope we can work with aligning ourselves on the side of rogue for which anyone could support this the Russians as partners beginning nations, like Iraq and Libya, and Treaty. next week. against our allies. The United States has been a prin- If the Senate gives its consent today, Mr. President, in 1985 the Congress cipal negotiator of this agreement, Mr. President, next week the hard legislated the requirement for the through Republican and Democratic work will begin. The success or failure United States to destroy its chemical administrations. To abandon it now of this regime will not be a function of stockpile, and has reaffirmed that deci- would be to abdicate U.S. leadership. depositing the instrument of ratifica- sion every year since that time. The We are now burdened to support it and tion. It will be a function of imple- Senate agreed to take actions against implement it. The goals are admirable. menting the agreement. I am support- Iraq for attacking its neighbor, and The bridge to achieving those goals, to ing this Convention today because I against Libya for terrorist actions bridging the gap between the idealistic think it can only succeed with U.S. which resulted in the death of Amer- rhetoric and the vexing reality, will be participation—and leadership. It can ican citizens. How can the President, difficult. On that bridge, Mr. President, fail for many reasons, including non- the Secretary of State and other ad- will ride the credibility of the United compliance or nonparticipation by na- ministration representatives liken a States, and, I believe, the credibility of tions around the world. But it won’t decision by the Senate, in its perform- future arms control. Past administra- succeed without U.S. leadership. ance of its constitutional duties to pro- tions have led in the establishment of Leadership will require more than vide advice and consent to inter- this international norm. Future admin- idealistic promises. We must abandon national treaties, to be aligning the istrations will need to verify its legit- the rhetoric of unattainable promises United States with rogue nations? Re- imacy. President Clinton must carry and commit to the reality of national gardless of the outcome of the CWC, S3650 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 the United States will continue to de- that make weapons, because we are not I believe that prudence and caution stroy its chemical stockpiles. going to make weapons, but into our call out for a ‘‘no’’ vote. By ratifying Last Sunday, the Secretary of De- chemical plants that might be doing this treaty, we spurn the sage advice of fense talked about his recent visit to research on how to defend against former Secretaries of Defense. And I South Korea and the discussions he had chemical weapons. That technology close with the words of one of those about the threat posed to U.S. Forces can then be transferred to the nations Secretaries, Secretary Cheney, who by the chemical weapons in North who would use the chemical weapons. wrote that ‘‘This accord is worse than Korea. He also mentioned General It seems to me that we are unilater- no treaty at all.’’ Tilelli’s support for ratification of the ally disarming ourselves, Mr. Presi- So, while I recognize and applaud the CWC because it would reduce the chem- dent, with a treaty that would say we sincerity and the passion with which ical weapons threat faced by his troops must allow international groups to the advocates of this treaty have spo- in South Korea. come into plants that use chemicals, ken and how they articulated their po- Mr. President, North Korea has not whether it is to make fertilizer or dis- sition, I believe firmly that it is not in signed the CWC. As I read the treaty, infectant, or defenses to chemical the interest of the sovereignty and the none of the provisions will apply to na- weapons, any of those things. An inter- security of the United States. And I tions that have not signed and ratified national group will be able to come in urge a ‘‘no’’ vote on the treaty ratifica- it. Only trade sanctions will apply to and, I think, violate our constitutional tion. countries that have not signed it. Unit- right against search and seizure. I am I yield the floor. ed States ratification of the CWC will concerned that we are hurting our abil- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The not minimize the North Korean chemi- ity to defend our country. Chair recognizes the Senator from Kan- cal weapons threat which face our So, Mr. President, I think we have a sas for 1 minute. United States forces. choice here between America being the Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very Mr. President, I cannot support the leader and undercutting our defenses, much, Mr. President. I appreciate that. Mr. President, I join with other Sen- Chemical Weapons Convention. I appre- or standing on principle and protecting ators noting how extremely difficult ciate the efforts made by the White our security. Mr. President, I just don’t and important this decision is to vote House to work out conditions to the think there is a choice. We must stand for treaty ratification. I have taken it resolution of ratification that respond on principle. So that if our young men very seriously, as well as everybody to concerns raised about the treaty and women in the field are attacked by else. I have read the entire treaty. I sat made by Members of the Senate. How- chemical weapons by those who will down and thought it through. I have ever, I do not believe they go far not sign this treaty, we will surely talked with people. I have talked with enough. I remain concerned about the have the defenses to protect them; and President Bush, Bob Dole, Colin Pow- ability of the intelligence community so that we will keep the ability in our ell, Casper Weinberger, James Schles- to verify compliance with the treaty. country to have the strength to fight inger, Richard Perle, and my 9-year-old Rogue nations which pose a military the chemical weapons that will be pro- son, too, who I think has a stake in and terrorist threat to the United duced, that we know are being pro- this as well. States have not signed the treaty, and duced right now, by nations who will I find it a terribly tough call to make most likely will not sign it. I am also not abide by this treaty. on this treaty; a tough one to be able concerned about the potential com- So I do not buy the argument that we to decide what is in the best interest promise of U.S. defensive capability are better off with this treaty than and ultimately what will get the fewest through potential transfers of chemical without it. In fact, I think we are hurt- chemical weapons used in this world. defensive protective equipment, mate- ing our ability to combat the rogue na- That to me is the real litmus test rial or information under article X and tions, the terrorist nations with whom issue. What is going to make the world article XI. we are dealing all over the world, and safer is when we are going to have It is for these reasons that I cannot I could not vote in good conscience to fewer chemical weapons used in the vote for this treaty. do that. Thank you. world. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- I would like to bare to the body that Chair recognizes the Senator from ator from Arkansas is recognized. I chair the Middle East Subcommittee Texas for 5 minutes. Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I of the Foreign Relations Committee. Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to especially applaud this evening We held a hearing just last week on respect everyone who is going to vote the Senator from North Carolina and U.S. policy toward Iran. Our policy has today for the position that they are the Senator from Arizona for their cou- failed to stop them from receiving taking because I know that it is sin- rageous opposition to this treaty. I weapons of mass destruction, particu- cere. I respect the people who have also want to recognize the good and pa- larly chemical weapons. The Iranians come out for this convention treaty— triotic Americans and Senators who are receiving precursor chemical weap- the former Presidents—and I respect have differed on this treaty and have ons from the Chinese. the people who have come out against come down to different places on how May I have an additional minute and the treaty, the former Secretaries of they are going to vote. a half? Defense. But this treaty is not about who is Mr. HELMS. Please. Yes. It comes down, for me, to a basic committed to and who believes in the Mr. BROWNBACK. I thank the chair- question, and that is: Do we believe elimination of chemical warfare in this man very much. that international conventions and world. I believe all of us are equally As I mentioned in our hearing last conferences keep us safe at night? Or committed to that goal. week, it was noted and pointed out do we believe a strong national defense I rise in opposition to the CWC be- that the Iranians have received chemi- is what keeps us safe at night and what cause I simply believe that it is a cal weapons, precursor chemical weap- has served us so well for this century? flawed treaty in which we claim to ver- ons, from the Chinese and from other Mr. President, I think it is a commit- ify the unverifiable, we are ratifying sources. ment to a strong national defense, and the unenforceable, and we are trusting I have reluctantly but clearly con- I have decided, reluctantly, to vote the untrustworthy. We are binding our- cluded that Iran would be more likely against this convention treaty because selves and our friends, while those that to obtain and use chemical weapons if I believe this does more to harm our we should be most concerned about go we enter into this Chemical Weapons strength and our national defense than unrestrained and undeterred. When ad- Convention with article X in place, it does to help it. dressing the ratification of a treaty, we which is currently how it sits; that Mr. President, we have seen our al- in this body are executing one of our they will be more likely to get and use lies transfer nuclear technology that most solemn duties. When addressing chemical weapons, weapons of mass de- can be made into weapons to rogue na- our Nation’s security and when ad- struction. Iran is our erstwhile terror- tions. So now we have a treaty that dressing our Nation’s sovereignty, our ist enemy. will allow people to come into our watch words should be ‘‘prudence’’ and I spoke to Colin Powell. He noted chemical plants—not chemical plants ‘‘caution.’’ that chemical weapons today are the April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3651 weapons of choice, primarily, for ter- As a result, I think it is ill-advised Mr. President, I will vote for advice rorists. These are primarily weapons for us to accept assurances which and consent of this treaty so the Presi- used by terrorists. That certainly fits would mislead us. We need to read the dent can ratify it. the Iranians. treaty, and the treaty is not one which I yield the remainder of my time. So that is why I have, unfortunately, merits our approval. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who reluctantly yet clearly, decided that The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yields time? with article X in it and with the likeli- Chair recognizes the Senator from Ari- Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I, on be- hood of that being used by the Ira- zona for 1 minute. half of the leader’s time and any other nians, that this treaty would actually Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me begin time that may be assigned to me, yield cause more chemical weapons to be by thanking Senator HELMS and Sen- the remainder of time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The used by people that we don’t want; by ator BIDEN, the floor managers of this question is on agreeing to the resolu- terrorist regimes such as the Iranians. treaty, for the work they did in bring- tion of ratification. On this question, Therefore, I will have to vote against ing it before us. the yeas and nays have been ordered, this treaty. Mr. President, I share the hope of the and the clerk will call the roll. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The supporters of this treaty that it will The legislative clerk called the roll. Chair recognizes the Senator from Mis- help end the proliferation of chemical The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 74, souri. weapons. I believe, however, that his- nays 26, as follows: Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I tory will record this treaty as one of [Rollcall Vote No. 51 Ex.] thank you for this opportunity to the most well-intentioned yet least ef- YEAS—74 make some comments in regard to this fective in our history. My hope is that Abraham Feinstein McCain serious matter. we will not relax our efforts in other Akaka Ford McConnell None of us has any affection for ways to reduce this threat, that we will Baucus Frist Mikulski chemical weapons. Each of us hates not be lulled into a sense of security Biden Glenn Moseley-Braun chemical weapons. We would all like to when it is ratified. Bingaman Gorton Moynihan Boxer Graham Murkowski see chemical weapons abolished. None With the protections in the original Breaux Gregg Murray of us would like to see chemical weap- resolution of ratification, I voted for Bryan Hagel Reed ons used. We would all like to believe the treaty. But the protections having Bumpers Harkin Reid the statements of prominent experts Byrd Hatch Robb been stricken, I must vote ‘‘no.’’ Chafee Hollings Roberts that have been made about this treaty. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Cleland Inouye Rockefeller We would all like to embrace the assur- Chair recognizes the Senator from Coats Jeffords Roth ances of the President that, if some- North Carolina. Cochran Johnson Santorum Collins Kennedy Sarbanes thing goes wrong, the treaty could be Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Senators Conrad Kerrey Smith (OR) something easily walked away from. will be glad to hear this. D’Amato Kerry Snowe But, in spite of all our aspirations, in I ask for the yeas and nays on the Daschle Kohl Specter spite of all of our desires, and in spite final vote in the Senate. DeWine Landrieu Stevens Dodd Lautenberg Thomas of all our hopes, there is one reality The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a Domenici Leahy Torricelli which will persist; and that reality is sufficient second? Dorgan Levin Warner the language of the treaty itself. Long There is a sufficient second. Durbin Lieberman Wellstone Enzi Lott Wyden after the assurances have stopped echo- The yeas and nays were ordered. Feingold Lugar ing through this Chamber, long after Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair. the President has left office, who is The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- NAYS—26 trying to assuage the fears of those ator from Vermont. Allard Faircloth Kyl Ashcroft Gramm Mack who have misgivings about this treaty, Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, how Bennett Grams Nickles the black and white letters of the trea- much time remains to the Senator Bond Grassley Sessions ty itself will be the controlling compo- from Vermont? Brownback Helms Shelby The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Burns Hutchinson Smith (NH) nents of what happens. And the thing Campbell Hutchison Thompson 1 that gives me great pause is that the ator from Vermont has 8 ⁄2 minutes. Coverdell Inhofe Thurmond treaty will remain. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I will not Craig Kempthorne There are the requirements, particu- use all of that time, only to say this. The VICE PRESIDENT. On this vote, larly in articles X and XI of the treaty, We will advise and consent so the the yeas are 74, the nays are 26. Two- which require us to share technology, President can ratify this treaty. I truly thirds of the Senators present having to share information, and to share, in believe we will. It will show the moral voted in the affirmative, the resolution particular, the defensive technology of leadership that the Senate should show of ratification is agreed to. chemical weaponry. There is an anom- and that the United States should The resolution of ratification, as aly in chemical weaponry which is show. We will act as the conscience of amended, was agreed to, as follows: challenging. It is that when you pro- this Nation, and we will advise and Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present vide the defensive technology for consent to this treaty. We will show concurring therein), chemical weapons, you are providing the moral leadership because we began SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUB- one of the essential components of de- this by saying we would act unilater- JECT TO CONDITIONS. ally, if need be, renouncing our own use The Senate advises and consents to the livering chemical weapons. No one can ratification of the Chemical Weapons Con- deliver chemical weapons, unless it is of chemical weapons with or without a vention (as defined in section 3 of this reso- launched by a missile, without having treaty. That was true leadership. lution), subject to the conditions in section to have all the technologies of how to Not all countries are going to join 2. defend against the chemistry of the with us. But most did join with us on SECTION 2. CONDITIONS. weapons. this, and we should be proud of that The Senate’s advice and consent to the The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- leadership that brought them together. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Con- ator’s time has expired. We will never have all of the countries vention is subject to the following condi- tions, which shall be binding upon the Presi- Mr. ASHCROFT. I ask for 30 addi- with us, but we know that it is in the dent: tional seconds. best interests of the United States to (1) EFFECT OF ARTICLE XXII.—Upon the de- If a rogue state wants to deliver do this. posit of the United States instrument of chemical weapons, one of the things I suggest, after we do this, Mr. Presi- ratification, the President shall certify to they need to do is to acquire the defen- dent, that we should again look at the the Congress that the United States has in- sive technology to defend against them question of antipersonnel landmines formed all other States Parties to the Con- and to protect their own soldiers in de- and show the same moral leadership to vention that the Senate reserves the right, pursuant to the Constitution of the United livery. That seems to me one of the get countries to join with us—not all States, to give its advice and consent to rati- substantial problems contained in arti- countries will—to ban antipersonnel fication of the Convention subject to res- cles X and XI. The risks far exceed the landmines which kill and injure far ervations, notwithstanding Article XXII of benefits. more people than chemical weapons. the Convention. S3652 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997

(2) FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS.—Notwith- pendent entity) established by the Organiza- (I) IN GENERAL.—The Director of Central standing any provision of the Convention, no tion to conduct and supervise objective au- Intelligence may waive the application of funds may be drawn from the Treasury of the dits, inspections, and investigations relating clause (i) if the Director of Central Intel- United States for any payment or assistance to the programs and operations of the Orga- ligence certifies in writing to the appro- (including the transfer of in-kind items) nization. priate committees of Congress that provid- under paragraph 16 of Article IV, paragraph (4) COST SHARING ARRANGEMENTS.— ing such information to the Organization or 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII, (A) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Prior to the deposit an organization affiliated with the Organiza- paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any of the United States instrument of ratifica- tion, or to any official or employee thereof, other provision of the Convention, without tion, and annually thereafter, the President is in the vital national security interests of statutory authorization and appropriation. shall submit a report to Congress identifying the United States and that all possible meas- (3) ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNAL OVER- all cost-sharing arrangements with the Orga- ures to protect such information have been SIGHT OFFICE.— nization. taken, except that such waiver must be made (A) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 240 days (B) COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENT RE- for each instance such information is pro- after the deposit of the United States instru- QUIRED.—The United States shall not under- vided, or for each such document provided. ment of ratification, the President shall cer- take any new research or development ex- In the event that multiple waivers are issued tify to the Congress that the current inter- penditures for the primary purpose of refin- within a single week, a single certification nal audit office of the Preparatory Commis- ing or improving the Organization’s regime to the appropriate committees of Congress sion has been expanded into an independent for verification of compliance under the Con- may be submitted, specifying each waiver is- internal oversight office whose functions vention, including the training of inspectors sued during that week. will be transferred to the Organization for and the provision of detection equipment and (II) DELEGATION OF DUTIES.—The Director of Central Intelligence may not delegate any the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons upon on-site analysis sampling and analysis tech- duty of the Director under this paragraph. the establishment of the Organization. The niques, or share the articles, items, or serv- (B) PERIODIC AND SPECIAL REPORTS.— ices resulting from any research and develop- independent internal oversight office shall (i) IN GENERAL.—The President shall report be obligated to protect confidential informa- ment undertaken previously, without first periodically, but not less frequently than tion pursuant to the obligations of the Con- having concluded and submitted to the Con- semiannually, to the Select Committee on fidentiality Annex. The independent internal gress a cost-sharing arrangement with the Intelligence of the Senate and the Perma- oversight office shall— Organization. nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the (i) make investigations and reports relat- (C) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this para- House of Representatives on the types and ing to all programs of the Organization; graph may be construed as limiting or con- volume of intelligence information provided (ii) undertake both management and finan- stricting in any way the ability of the Unit- to the Organization or affiliated organiza- cial audits, including— ed States to pursue unilaterally any project tions and the purposes for which it was pro- (I) an annual assessment verifying that undertaken solely to increase the capability vided during the period covered by the re- classified and confidential information is of the United States means for monitoring port. stored and handled securely pursuant to the compliance with the Convention. (ii) EXEMPTION.—For purposes of this sub- general obligations set forth in Article VIII (5) INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND SAFE- paragraph, intelligence information provided and in accordance with all provisions of the GUARDS.— to the Organization or affiliated organiza- Annex on the Protection of Confidential In- (A) PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMA- tions does not cover information that is pro- formation; and TION TO THE ORGANIZATION.— vided only to, and only for the use of, appro- (II) an annual assessment of laboratories (i) IN GENERAL.—No United States intel- priately cleared United States Government established pursuant to paragraph 55 of Part ligence information may be provided to the personnel serving with the Organization or II of the Verification Annex to ensure that Organization or any organization affiliated an affiliated organization. the Director General of the Technical Sec- with the Organization, or to any official or (C) SPECIAL REPORTS.— retariat is carrying out his functions pursu- employee thereof, unless the President cer- (i) REPORT ON PROCEDURES.—Accompanying ant to paragraph 56 of Part II of the Verifica- tifies to the appropriate committees of Con- the certification provided pursuant to sub- tion Annex; gress that the Director of Central Intel- paragraph (A)(i), the President shall provide (iii) undertake performance evaluations ligence, in consultation with the Secretary a detailed report to the Select Committee on annually to ensure the Organization has of State and the Secretary of Defense, has Intelligence of the Senate and the Perma- complied to the extent practicable with the established and implemented procedures, and nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the recommendations of the independent inter- has worked with the Organization or other House of Representatives identifying the nal oversight office; such organization, as the case may be to en- procedures established for protecting intel- (iv) have access to all records relating to sure implementation of procedures, for pro- ligence sources and methods when intel- the programs and operations of the Organiza- tecting from unauthorized disclosure United ligence information is provided pursuant to tion; States intelligence sources and methods con- this section. (v) have direct and prompt access to any nected to such information. These proce- (ii) REPORTS ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLO- official of the Organization; and dures shall include the requirement of— SURES.—The President shall submit a report (vi) be required to protect the identity of, (I) the offer and provision if accepted of ad- to the Select Committee on Intelligence of and prevent reprisals against, all complain- vice and assistance to the Organization or the Senate and the Permanent Select Com- ants. the affiliated organization in establishing mittee on Intelligence of the House of Rep- (B) COMPLIANCE WITH RECOMMENDATIONS.— and maintaining the necessary measures to resentatives within 15 days after it has be- The Organization shall ensure, to the extent ensure that inspectors and other staff mem- come known to the United States Govern- practicable, compliance with recommenda- bers of the Technical Secretariat meet the ment regarding any unauthorized disclosure tions of the independent internal oversight highest standards of efficiency, competence, of intelligence provided by the United States office, and shall ensure that annual and and integrity, pursuant to paragraph 1(b) of to the Organization. other relevant reports by the independent in- the Confidentiality Annex, and in establish- (D) DELEGATION OF DUTIES.—The President ternal oversight office are made available to ing and maintaining a stringent regime gov- may not delegate or assign the duties of the President under this section. all member states pursuant to the require- erning the handling of confidential informa- (E) RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING LAW.—Noth- ments established in the Confidentiality tion by the Technical Secretariat, pursuant ing in this paragraph may be construed to— Annex. to paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality Annex; (i) impair of otherwise affect the authority (C) WITHHOLDING A PORTION OF CONTRIBU- (II) a determination that any unauthorized of the Director of Central Intelligence to TIONS.—Until a certification is made under disclosure of United States intelligence in- protect intelligence sources and methods subparagraph (A), 50 percent of the amount formation to be provided to the Organization from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to of United States contributions to the regular or any organization affiliated with the Orga- section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act budget of the Organization assessed pursuant nization, or any official or employee thereof, of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(c)(5)); or to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall be with- would result in no more than minimal dam- (ii) supersede or otherwise affect the provi- held from disbursement, in addition to any age to United States national security, in sions of title V of the National Security Act other amounts required to be withheld from light of the risks of the unauthorized disclo- of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.). disbursement by any other provision of law. sure of such information; (F) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: (D) ASSESSMENT OF FIRST YEAR CONTRIBU- (III) sanitization of intelligence informa- (i) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON- TIONS.—Notwithstanding the requirements of tion that is to be provided to the Organiza- GRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate committees this paragraph, for the first year of the Orga- tion or the affiliated organization to remove of Congress’’ means the Committee on For- nization’s operation, ending on April 29, 1998, all information that could betray intel- eign Relations and the Select Committee on the United States shall make its full con- ligence sources and methods; and Intelligence of the Senate and the Commit- tribution to the regular budget of the Orga- (IV) interagency United States intelligence tee on International Relations and the Per- nization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of community approval for any release of intel- manent Select Committee on Intelligence of Article VIII. ligence information to the Organization or the House of Representatives. (E) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this para- the affiliated organization, no matter how (ii) ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘Organiza- graph, the term ‘‘internal oversight office’’ thoroughly it has been sanitized. tion’’ means the Organization for the Prohi- means an independent office (or other inde- (ii) WAIVER AUTHORITY.— bition of Chemical Weapons established April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3653 under the Convention and includes any organ (II) the Australia Group remains a viable nificantly harmed by the limitations of the of that Organization and any board or work- mechanism for limiting the spread of chemi- Convention on access to, and production of, ing group, such as the Scientific Advisory cal and biological weapons-related materials those chemicals and toxins listed in Sched- Board, that may be established by it and any and technology, and that the effectiveness of ule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals. official or employee thereof. the Australia Group has not been under- (10) MONITORING AND VERIFICATION OF COM- (iii) ORGANIZATION AFFILIATED WITH THE OR- mined by changes in membership, lack of PLIANCE.— GANIZATION.—The terms ‘‘organization affili- compliance with common export controls (A) DECLARATION.—The Senate declares ated with the Organization’’ and ‘‘affiliated and nonproliferation measures, or the weak- that— organizations’’ include the Provisional Tech- ening of common controls and nonprolifera- (i) the Convention is in the interests of the nical Secretariat under the Convention and tion measures, in force as of the date of rati- United States only if all State Parties are in any laboratory certified by the Director- fication of the Convention by the United strict compliance with the terms of the Con- General of the Technical Secretariat as des- States. vention as submitted to the Senate for its ignated to perform analytical or other func- (ii) CONSULTATION WITH SENATE REQUIRED.— advice and consent to ratification, such com- tions and any official or employee thereof. In the event that the President is, at any pliance being measured by performance and (6) AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION.— time, unable to make the certifications de- not by efforts, intentions, or commitments (A) VOTING REPRESENTATION OF THE UNITED scribed in clause (i), the President shall con- to comply; and STATES.—A United States representative will sult with the Senate for the purposes of ob- be present at all Amendment Conferences (ii) the Senate expects all State Parties to taining a resolution of support for continued be in strict compliance with their obliga- and will cast a vote, either affirmative or adherence to the Convention, notwithstand- negative, on all proposed amendments made tions under the terms of the Convention, as ing the fundamental change in circumstance. submitted to the Senate for its advice and at such conferences. (D) PERIODIC CONSULTATION WITH CONGRES- (B) SUBMISSION OF AMENDMENTS AS TREA- consent to ratification; SIONAL COMMITTEES.—The President shall TIES.—The President shall submit to the (B) BRIEFINGS ON COMPLIANCE.—Given its consult periodically, but not less frequently Senate for its advice and consent to ratifica- concern about the intelligence community’s than twice a year, with the Committee on tion under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of low level of confidence in its ability to mon- Foreign Relations of the Senate and the the Constitution of the United States any itor compliance with the Convention, the Committee on International Relations of the amendment to the Convention adopted by an Senate expects the executive branch of the House of Representatives, on Australia Amendment Conference. Government to offer regular briefings, not Group export control and nonproliferation (7) CONTINUING VITALITY OF THE AUSTRALIA less than four times a year, to the Commit- measures. If any Australia Group member GROUP AND NATIONAL EXPORT CONTROLS.— tee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and (A) DECLARATION.—The Senate declares adopts a position at variance with the cer- the Committee on International Relations of that the collapse of the informal forum of tifications and understandings provided the House of Representatives on compliance states known as the ‘‘Australia Group,’’ ei- under subparagraph (B), or should seek to issues related to the Convention. Such brief- ther through changes in membership or lack gain Australia Group acquiescence or ap- ings shall include a description of all United of compliance with common export controls, proval for an interpretation that various States efforts in bilateral and multilateral or the substantial weakening of common provisions of the Convention require it to re- diplomatic channels and forums to resolve Australia Group export controls and non- move chemical-weapons related export con- compliance issues and shall include a com- proliferation measures in force on the date of trols against any State Party to the Conven- plete description of— United States ratification of the Convention, tion, the President shall block any effort by (i) any compliance issues the United States would constitute a fundamental change in the Australia Group member to secure Aus- plans to raise at meetings of the Organiza- circumstances affecting the object and pur- tralia Group approval of such a position or tion, in advance of such meetings; pose of the Convention. interpretation. (ii) any compliance issues raised at meet- (B) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—Prior to (E) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph. ings of the Organization, within 30 days of (i) AUSTRALIA GROUP.—The term ‘‘Aus- the deposit of the United States instrument such meeting; tralia Group’’ means the informal forum of of ratification, the President shall certify to (iii) any determination by the President states, chaired by Australia, whose goal is to Congress that— that a State Party is in noncompliance with discourage and impede chemical and biologi- (i) nothing in the Convention obligates the or is otherwise acting in a manner inconsist- cal weapons proliferation by harmonizing na- United States to accept any modification, ent with the object or purpose of the Conven- tional export controls, chemical weapons change in scope, or weakening of its national tion, within 30 days of such a determination. precursor chemicals, biological weapons export controls; (C) ANNUAL REPORTS ON COMPLIANCE.—The pathogens, and dual-use production equip- (ii) the United States understands that the President shall submit on January 1 of each ment, and through other measures. maintenance of national restrictions on year to the Committee on Foreign Relations (ii) HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC LEVELS.—The term trade in chemicals and chemical production of the Senate and the Committee on Inter- technology is fully compatible with the pro- ‘‘highest diplomatic levels’’ means at the levels of senior officials with the power to national Relations of the House of Rep- visions of the Convention, including Article resentatives a full and complete classified XI(2), and solely within the sovereign juris- authoritatively represent their governments, and does not include diplomatic representa- and unclassified report setting forth— diction of the United States; (i) a certification of those countries in- (iii) the Convention preserves the right of tives of these governments to the United cluded in the Intelligence Community’s Mon- State Parties, unilaterally or collectively, to States. itoring Strategy, as set forth by the Director maintain or impose export controls on (8) NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES.— of Central Intelligence’s Arms Control Staff chemicals and related chemical production (A) REEVALATION.—In forswearing under and the National Intelligence Council (or technology for foreign policy or national se- the Convention the possession of a chemical any successor document setting forth intel- curity reasons, notwithstanding Article weapons retaliatory capability, the Senate ligence priorities in the field of the prolifera- XI(2); and understands that deterrence of attack by (iv) each Australia Group member, at the chemical weapons requires a reevaluation of tion of weapons of mass destruction) that are highest diplomatic levels, has officially com- the negative security assurances extended to determined to be in compliance with the municated to the United States Government non-nuclear-weapon states. Convention, on a country-by-country basis; its understanding and agreement that export (B) CLASSIFIED REPORT.—Accordingly, 180 (ii) for those countries not certified pursu- control and nonproliferation measures which days after the deposit of the United States ant to clause (i), an identification and as- the Australia Group has undertaken are instrument of ratification, the President sessment of all compliance issues arising fully compatible with the provisions of the shall submit to the Congress a classified re- with regard to the adherence of the country Convention, including Article XI(2), and its port setting forth the findings of a detailed to its obligations under the Convention; commitment to maintain in the future such review of United States policy on negative (iii) the steps the United States has taken, export controls and nonproliferation meas- security assurances, including a determina- either unilaterally or in conjunction with ures against non-Australia Group members. tion of the appropriate responses to the use another State Party— (C) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.— of chemical or biological weapons against (I) to initiate challenge inspections of the (i) EFFECTIVENESS OF AUSTRALIA GROUP.— the Armed Forces of the United States, Unit- noncompliant party with the objective of The President shall certify to Congress on an ed States citizens and allies, and third par- demonstrating to the international commu- annual basis that— ties. nity the act of noncompliance; (I) Australia Group members continue to (9) PROTECTION OF ADVANCED BIO- (II) to call attention publicly to the activ- maintain an equally effective or more com- TECHNOLOGY.—Prior to the deposit of the ity in question; and prehensive control over the export of toxic United States instrument of ratification, and (III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting chemicals and their precursors, dual-use on January 1 of every year thereafter, the at the highest diplomatic level with the non- processing equipment, human, animal and President shall certify to the Committee on compliant party with the objective of bring- plant pathogens and toxins with potential bi- Foreign Relations and the Speaker of the ing the noncompliant party into compliance; ological weapons application, and dual-use House of Representatives that the legitimate (iv) a determination of the military signifi- biological equipment, as that afforded by the commercial activities and interests of chem- cance and broader security risks arising Australia Group as of the date of ratification ical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical from any compliance issue identified pursu- of the Convention by the United States; and firms in the United States are not being sig- ant to clause (ii); and S3654 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 (v) a detailed assessment of the responses (ii) an identification of the priorities of the ly regional coalition partners, including of the noncompliant party in question to ac- executive branch of Government for the de- those countries where the United States cur- tion undertaken by the United States de- velopment of new resources relating to de- rently deploys forces, where United States scribed in clause (iii). tection and monitoring capabilities with re- forces would likely operate during regional (D) COUNTRIES PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED IN spect to chemical and biological weapons, in- conflicts, or which would provide civilians COMPLIANCE REPORTS.—For any country that cluding a description of the steps being necessary to support United States military was previously included in a report submit- taken and resources being devoted to operations, to determine what steps are nec- ted under subparagraph (C), but which subse- strengthening United States monitoring ca- essary to ensure that allied and coalition quently is not included in the Intelligence pabilities. forces and other critical civilians are ade- Community’s Monitoring Strategy (or suc- (11) ENHANCEMENTS TO ROBUST CHEMICAL quately equipped and prepared to operate in cessor document), such country shall con- AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSES.— chemically and biologically contaminated tinue to be included in the report submitted (A) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense environments. under subparagraph (C) unless the country of the Senate that— (ii) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later has been certified under subparagraph (C)(i) (i) chemical and biological threats to de- than one year after deposit of the United for each of the previous two years. ployed United States Armed Forces will con- States instrument of ratification, the Sec- (E) FORM OF CERTIFICATIONS.—For those tinue to grow in regions of concern around retaries of Defense and State shall submit a countries that have been publicly and offi- the world, and pose serious threats to United report to the Committees on Foreign Rela- cially identified by a representative of the States power projection and forward deploy- tions and Armed Services of the Senate and intelligence community as possessing or ment strategies; to the Speaker of the House of Representa- seeking to develop chemical weapons, the (ii) chemical weapons or biological weap- tives on the result of these discussions, plans certification described in subparagraph (C)(i) ons use is a potential element of future con- for future discussions, measures agreed to shall be in unclassified form. flicts in regions of concern; improve the preparedness of foreign forces (F) ANNUAL REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE.—On (iii) it is essential for the United States and civilians, and proposals for increased January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the and key regional allies to preserve and fur- military assistance, including through the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit ther develop robust chemical and biological Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing under the Arms Export Control to the Committees on Foreign Relations, defenses; Armed Services, and the Select Committee (iv) the United States Armed Forces are in- Act, and the International Military Edu- cation and Training programs pursuant to on Intelligence of the Senate and to the adequately equipped, organized, trained and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Committees on International Relations, Na- exercised for chemical and biological defense (D) UNITED STATES ARMY CHEMICAL tional Security, and Permanent Select Com- against current and expected threats, and SCHOOL.—The Secretary of Defense shall take mittee on Intelligence of the House of Rep- that too much reliance is placed on non-ac- resentatives a full and complete classified those actions necessary to ensure that the tive duty forces, which receive less training United States Army Chemical School re- and unclassified report regarding— and less modern equipment, for critical (i) the status of chemical weapons develop- mains under the oversight of a general offi- chemical and biological defense capabilities; cer of the United States Army. ment, production, stockpiling, and use, with- (v) the lack of readiness stems from a de- in the meanings of those terms under the (E) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—Given its con- emphasis of chemical and biological defenses Convention, on a country-by-country basis; cerns about the present state of chemical within the executive branch of Government (ii) any information made available to the and biological defense readiness and train- United States Government concerning the and the United States Armed Forces; ing, it is the sense of the Senate that— (vi) the armed forces of key regional allies development, production, acquisition, stock- (i) in the transfer, consolidation, and reor- and likely coalition partners, as well as ci- piling, retention, use, or direct or indirect ganization of the United States Army Chem- vilians necessary to support United States transfer of novel agents, including any uni- ical School, the Army should not disrupt or tary or binary chemical weapon comprised of military operations, are inadequately pre- diminish the training and readiness of the chemical components not identified on the pared and equipped to carry out essential United States Armed Forces to fight in a schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a missions in chemically and biologically con- chemical-biological warfare environment; (ii) the Army should continue to operate country-by-country basis; taminated environments; (iii) the extent of trade in chemicals poten- (vii) congressional direction contained in the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan until such time as the re- tially relevant to chemical weapons pro- the Defense Against Weapons of Mass De- placement training facility at Fort Leonard grams, including all Australia Group chemi- struction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law Wood is functional. cals and chemicals identified on the sched- 104–201) should lead to enhanced domestic (F) ANNUAL REPORTS ON CHEMICAL AND BIO- ules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a coun- preparedness to protect against chemical and biological weapons threats; and LOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE ACTIVITIES.—On try-by-country basis; January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the (iv) the monitoring responsibilities, prac- (viii) the United States Armed Forces President shall submit a report to the Com- tices, and strategies of the intelligence com- should place increased emphasis on potential mittees on Foreign Relations, Appropria- munity (as defined in section 3(4) of the Na- threats to forces deployed abroad and, in tions, and Armed Services of the Senate and tional Security Act of 1947) and a determina- particular, make countering chemical and the Committees on International Relations, tion of the level of confidence of the intel- biological weapons use an organizing prin- ciple for United States defense strategy and National Security, and Appropriations of the ligence community with respect to each spe- House of Representatives, and the Speaker of cific monitoring task undertaken, including development of force structure, doctrine, planning, training, and exercising policies of the House of Representatives on previous, an assessment by the intelligence commu- current, and planned chemical and biological the United States Armed Forces. nity of the national aggregate data provided weapons defense activities. The report shall (B) ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSE CAPA- by State Parties to the Organization, on a contain for the previous fiscal year and for BILITIES.—The Secretary of Defense shall country-by-country basis; the next three fiscal years— (v) an identification of how United States take those actions necessary to ensure that (i) proposed solutions to each of the defi- national intelligence means, including na- the United States Armed Forces are capable ciencies in chemical and biological warfare tional technical means and human intel- of carrying out required military missions in defenses identified in the March 1996 report ligence, are being marshaled together with United States regional contingency plans, of the General Accounting Office entitled the Convention’s verification provisions to despite the threat or use of chemical or bio- ‘‘Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis monitor compliance with the Convention; logical weapons. In particular, the Secretary Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing and of Defense shall ensure that the United Problems’’, and steps being taken pursuant (vi) the identification of chemical weapons States Armed Forces are effectively to subparagraph (B) to ensure that the Unit- development, production, stockpiling, or use, equipped, organized, trained, and exercised ed States Armed Forces are capable of con- within the meanings of those terms under (including at the large unit and theater ducting required military operations to en- the Convention, by subnational groups, in- level) to conduct operations in a chemically sure the success of United States regional cluding terrorist and paramilitary organiza- or biologically contaminated environment contingency plans despite the threat or use tions. that are critical to the success of the United of chemical or biological weapons; (G) REPORTS ON RESOURCES FOR MONITOR- States military plans in regional conflicts, (ii) identification of the priorities of the ING.—Each report required under subpara- including— executive branch of Government in the de- graph (F) shall include a full and complete (i) deployment, logistics, and reinforce- velopment of both active and passive chemi- classified annex submitted solely to the Se- ment operations at key ports and airfields; cal and biological defenses; lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate (ii) sustained combat aircraft sortie gen- (iii) a detailed summary of all budget ac- and to the Permanent Select Committee on eration at critical regional airbases; and tivities associated with the research, devel- Intelligence of the House of Representatives (iii) ground force maneuvers of large units opment, testing, and evaluation of chemical regarding— and divisions. and biological defense programs; (i) a detailed and specific identification of (C) DISCUSSIONS WITH REGIONAL ALLIES AND (iv) a detailed summary of expenditures on all United States resources devoted to mon- LIKELY COALITION PARTNERS.— research, development, testing, and evalua- itoring the Convention, including informa- (i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretaries of Defense tion, and procurement of chemical and bio- tion on all expenditures associated with the and State shall, as a priority matter, initiate logical defenses by fiscal years defense pro- monitoring of the Convention; and discussions with key regional allies and like- grams, department, and agency; April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3655 (v) a detailed assessment of current and tion of the Convention in any other manner support assistance) of the Foreign Assistance projected vaccine production capabilities so as to threaten the national security inter- Act of 1961— and vaccine stocks, including progress in re- ests of the United States, then the President (i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of searching and developing a multivalent vac- shall— Article X will be provided to the State cine; (i) consult with the Senate, and promptly Party; and (vi) a detailed assessment of procedures submit to it, a report detailing the effect of (ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of and capabilities necessary to protect and de- such actions; Article X other than medical antidotes and contaminate infrastructure to reinforce (ii) seek on an urgent basis a challenge in- treatment will be provided to the State United States power-projection forces, in- spection of the facilities of the relevant Party. cluding progress in developing a nonaqueous party in accordance with the provisions of (16) PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMA- chemical decontamination capability; the Convention with the objective of dem- TION.— (vii) a description of progress made in pro- onstrating to the international community (A) UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF UNITED curing light-weight personal protective gear the act of noncompliance; STATES BUSINESS INFORMATION.—Whenever and steps being taken to ensure that pro- (iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis the President determines that persuasive in- grammed procurement quantities are suffi- a meeting at the highest diplomatic level formation is available indicating that— cient to replace expiring battle-dress over- with the relevant party with the objective of (i) an officer or employee of the Organiza- garments and chemical protective overgar- bringing the noncompliant party into com- tion has willfully published, divulged, dis- ments to maintain required wartime inven- pliance; closed, or made known in any manner or to tory levels; (iv) implement prohibitions and sanctions any extent not authorized by the Convention (viii) a description of progress made in de- against the relevant party as required by any United States confidential business in- veloping long-range standoff detection and law; formation coming to him in the course of his identification capabilities and other battle- (v) if noncompliance has been determined, employment or official duties or by reason of field surveillance capabilities for biological seek on an urgent basis within the Security any examination or investigation of any re- and chemical weapons, including progress on Council of the United Nations a multilateral turn, report, or record made to or filed with developing a multichemical agent detector, imposition of sanctions against the non- the Organization, or any officer or employee unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned compliant party for the purposes of bringing thereof, and ground sensors; the noncompliant party into compliance; and (ii) such practice or disclosure has resulted (ix) a description of progress made in de- (vi) in the event that the noncompliance in financial losses or damages to a United veloping and deploying layered theater mis- continues for a period of longer than one States person, sile defenses for deployed United States year after the date of the determination the President shall, within 30 days after the Armed Forces which will provide greater ge- made pursuant to subparagraph (A), prompt- receipt of such information by the executive ographic coverage against current and ex- ly consult with the Senate for the purposes branch of Government, notify the Congress pected ballistic missile threats and will as- of obtaining a resolution of support for con- in writing of such determination. sist in mitigating chemical and biological tinued adherence to the Convention, not- (B) WAIVER OF IMMUNITY FROM JURISDIC- contamination through higher altitude withstanding the changed circumstances af- TION.— intercepts and boost-phase intercepts; fecting the object and purpose of the Conven- (i) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 270 days (x) an assessment of— tion. (I) the training and readiness of the United (B) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section after notification of Congress under subpara- States Armed Forces to operate in a chemi- may be construed to impair or otherwise af- graph (A), the President shall certify to Con- cally or biologically contaminated environ- fect the authority of the Director of Central gress that the immunity from jurisdiction of ment; and Intelligence to protect intelligence sources such foreign person has been waived by the (II) actions taken to sustain training and and methods from unauthorized disclosure Director-General of the Technical Secretar- readiness, including training and readiness pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National iat. carried out at national combat training cen- Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(c)(5)). (ii) WITHHOLDING OF PORTION OF CONTRIBU- ters; (C) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATIONS.—If the TIONS.—If the President is unable to make (xi) a description of progress made in in- President determines that an action other- the certification described under clause (i), corporating chemical and biological consid- wise required under subparagraph (A) would then 50 percent of the amount of each annual erations into service and joint exercises as impair or otherwise affect the authority of United States contribution to the regular well as simulations, models, and war games, the Director of Central Intelligence to pro- budget of the Organization that is assessed and the conclusions drawn from these efforts tect intelligence sources and methods from pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall about the United States capability to carry unauthorized disclosure, the President shall be withheld from disbursement, in addition out required missions, including missions report that determination, together with a to any other amounts required to be with- with coalition partners, in military contin- detailed written explanation of the basis for held from disbursement by any other provi- gencies; that determination, to the chairmen of the sion of law, until— (xii) a description of progress made in de- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and (I) the President makes such certification, veloping and implementing service and joint the House Permanent Select Committee on or doctrine for combat and non-combat oper- Intelligence not later than 15 days after (II) the President certifies to Congress that ations involving adversaries armed with making such determination. the situation has been resolved in a manner chemical or biological weapons, including ef- (14) FINANCING RUSSIAN IMPLEMENTATION.— satisfactory to the United States person who forts to update the range of service and joint The United States understands that, in order has suffered the damages due to the disclo- doctrine to better address the wide range of to be assured of the Russian commitment to sure of United States confidential business military activities, including deployment, a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles, information. reinforcement, and logistics operations in Russia must maintain a substantial stake in (C) BREACHES OF CONFIDENTIALITY.— support of combat operations, and for the financing the implementation of both the (i) CERTIFICATION.—In the case of any conduct of such operations in concert with 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement and breach of confidentiality involving both a coalition forces; and the Convention. The United States shall not State Party and the Organization, including (xiii) a description of progress made in re- accept any effort by Russia to make deposit any officer or employee thereof, the Presi- solving issues relating to the protection of of Russia’s instrument of ratification of the dent shall, within 270 days after providing United States population centers from chem- Convention contingent upon the United written notification to Congress pursuant to ical and biological attack, including plans States providing financial guarantees to pay subparagraph (A), certify to Congress that for inoculation of populations, consequence for implementation of commitments by Rus- the Commission described under paragraph management, and a description of progress sia under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction 23 of the Confidentiality Annex has been es- made in developing and deploying effective Agreement or the Convention. tablished to consider the breach. cruise missile defenses and a national ballis- (15) ASSISTANCE UNDER ARTICLE X.— (ii) WITHHOLDING OF PORTION OF CONTRIBU- tic missile defense. (A) IN GENERAL.—Prior to the deposit of TIONS.—If the President is unable to make (12) PRIMACY OF THE UNITED STATES CON- the United States instrument of ratification, the certification described under clause (i), STITUTION.—Nothing in the Convention re- the President shall certify to the Congress then 50 percent of the amount of each annual quires or authorizes legislation, or other ac- that the United States shall not provide as- United States contribution to the regular tion, by the United States prohibited by the sistance under paragraph 7(a) of Article X. budget of the Organization that is assessed Constitution of the United States, as inter- (B) COUNTRIES INELIGIBLE FOR CERTAIN AS- pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall preted by the United States. SISTANCE UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE be withheld from disbursement, in addition (13) NONCOMPLIANCE.— ACT.—Prior to the deposit of the United to any other amounts required to be with- (A) IN GENERAL.—If the President deter- States instrument of ratification, the Presi- held from disbursement by any other provi- mines that persuasive information exists dent shall certify to the Congress that for sion of law, until— that a State Party to the Convention is any State Party the government of which is (I) the President makes such certification, maintaining a chemical weapons production not eligible for assistance under chapter 2 of or or production mobilization capability, is de- part II (relating to military assistance) or (II) the President certifies to Congress that veloping new chemical agents, or is in viola- chapter 4 of part II (relating to economic the situation has been resolved in a manner S3656 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 satisfactory to the United States person who ment of ratification, the President shall cer- the inability of the Organization to conduct has suffered the damages due to the disclo- tify to the Senate that no sample collected challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX sure of United States confidential business in the United States pursuant to the Conven- or would otherwise jeopardize the national information. tion will be transferred for analysis to any security interests of the United States; and (D) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph: laboratory outside the territory of the Unit- (II) Congress enacts a joint resolution ap- (i) UNITED STATES CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS ed States. proving the certification of the President. INFORMATION.—The term ‘‘United States con- (19) EFFECT ON TERRORISM.—The Senate (ii) STATEMENT OF REASONS.—The President fidential business information means any finds that— shall transmit with such certification a de- trade secrets or commercial or financial in- (A) without regard to whether the Conven- tailed statement setting forth the specific formation that is privileged and confiden- tion enters into force, terrorists will likely reasons therefor and the specific uses to tial, as described in section 662(b)(4) of title view chemical weapons as a means to gain which the additional contributions provided 5, United States Code, and that is obtained— greater publicity and instill widespread fear; to the Organization would be applied. (I) from a United States person; and and (D) ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR VER- (II) through the United States National (B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack IFICATION.—Notwithstanding subparagraph Authority or the conduct of an inspection on by the Aum Shinrikyo would not have been (A), for a period of not more than ten years, United States territory under the Conven- prevented by the Convention. the President may furnish additional con- tion. (20) CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POW- tributions to the Organization for the pur- (ii) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ERS.— poses of meeting the costs of verification ‘‘United States person’’ means any natural (A) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the fol- under Articles IV and V. person or any corporation, partnership, or lowing findings: (23) ADDITIONS TO THE ANNEX ON CHEMI- other juridical entity organized under the (i) Article VIII(8) of the Convention allows CALS.— laws of the United States. a State Party to vote in the Organization if (A) PRESIDENTIAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later (iii) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United the State Party is in arrears in the payment than 10 days after the Director-General of States’’ means the several States, the Dis- of financial contributions and the Organiza- the Technical Secretariat communicates in- formation to all States Parties pursuant to trict of Columbia, and the commonwealths, tion is satisfied that such nonpayment is due Article XI(5)(a) of a proposal for the addition territories, and possessions of the United to conditions beyond the control of the State of a chemical or biological substance to a States. Party. (17) CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES.— (ii) Article I, Section 8 of the United States schedule of the Annex on Chemicals, the (A) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the fol- Constitution vests in Congress the exclusive President shall notify the Committee on lowing findings: authority to ‘‘pay the Debts’’ of the United Foreign Relations of the Senate of the pro- (i) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the States. posed addition. United States Constitution states that the (B) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT.—Not later than (iii) Financial contributions to the Organi- President ‘‘shall have Power, by and with 60 days after the Director-General of the zation may be appropriated only by Con- the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to Technical Secretariat communicates infor- gress. make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the mation of such a proposal pursuant to Arti- (B) SENSE OF SENATE.—It is therefore the Senators present concur’’. cle XV(5)(a) or not later than 30 days after a sense of the Senate that— (ii) At the turn of the century, Senator positive recommendation by the Executive (i) such contributions thus should be con- Henry Cabot Lodge took the position that Council pursuant to Article XV(5)(c), which- sidered, for purposes of Article VIII(8) of the the giving of advice and consent to the rati- ever is sooner, the President shall submit to Convention, beyond the control of the execu- fication of treaties constitutes a stage in ne- the Committee on Foreign Relations of the tive branch of the United States Govern- gotiation on the treaties and that Senate Senate a report, in classified and unclassi- ment; and amendments or reservations to a treaty are fied form, detailing the likely impact of the (ii) the United States vote in the Organiza- propositions ‘‘offered at a later stage of the proposed addition to a schedule of the Annex tion should not be denied in the event that negotiation by the other part of the Amer- on Chemicals. Such report shall include— Congress does not appropriate the full ican treaty making power in the only man- (i) an assessment of the likely impact on amount of funds assessed for the United ner in which they could then be offered’’. United States industry of the proposed addi- States financial contribution to the Organi- (iii) The executive branch of Government tion of the chemical or biological substance zation. has begun a practice of negotiating and sub- to a schedule of the Annex on Chemicals; (21) ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY.—It is the mitting to the Senate treaties which include (ii) a description of the likely costs and sense of the Senate that the On-Site Inspec- provisions that have the purported effect benefits, if any, to United States national se- tion Agency of the Department of Defense of— curity of the proposed addition of such chem- (I) inhibiting the Senate from attaching should have the authority to provide assist- ical or biological substance to a schedule of reservations that the Senate considers nec- ance in advance of any inspection to any fa- the Annex on Chemicals; and essary in the national interest; or cility in the United States that is subject to (iii) a detailed assessment of the effect of (II) preventing the Senate from exercising a routine inspection under the Convention, the proposed addition on United States obli- its constitutional duty to give its advice and or to any facility in the United States that gations under the Verification Annex. consent to treaty commitments before ratifi- is the object of a challenge inspection con- (C) PRESIDENTIAL CONSULTATION.—The cation of the treaties. ducted pursuant to Article IX, if the consent President shall, after the submission of the (iv) During the 85th Congress, and again of the owner or operator of the facility has notification required under subparagraph (A) during the 102d Congress, the Committee on first been obtained. and prior to any action on the proposal by Foreign Relations of the Senate made its po- (22) LIMITATION ON THE SCALE OF ASSESS- the Executive Council under Article sition on this issue clear when stating that MENT.— XV(5)(c), consult promptly with the Senate ‘‘the President’s agreement to such a prohi- (A) LIMITATION ON ANNUAL ASSESSMENT.— as to whether the United States should ob- bition cannot constrain the Senate’s con- Notwithstanding any provision of the Con- ject to the proposed addition of a chemical stitutional right and obligation to give its vention, and subject to the requirements of or biological substance pursuant to Article advice and consent to a treaty subject to any subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), the United XV(5)(c). reservation it might determine is required States shall pay as a total annual assess- (24) TREATY INTERPRETATION.—The Senate by the national interest’’. ment of the costs of the Organization pursu- affirms the applicability to all treaties of (B) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense ant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII not more the Constitutionally based principles of trea- of the Senate that— than $25,000,000. ty interpretation set forth in Condition (1) of (i) the advice and consent given by the (B) RECALCULATION OF LIMITATIONS.—On the resolution of ratification with respect to Senate in the past to ratification of treaties January 1, 2000, and at each 3-year interval the INF Treaty. For purposes of this declara- containing provisions which prohibit amend- thereafter, the amount specified in subpara- tion, the term ‘‘INF Treaty’’ refers to the ments or reservations should not be con- graph (A) is to be recalculated by the Admin- Treaty Between the United States of Amer- strued as a precedent for such provisions in istrator of General Services, in consultation ica and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- future treaties; with the Secretary of State, to reflect lics on the Elimination of Their Intermedi- (ii) United States negotiators to a treaty changes in the consumer price index for the ate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, to- should not agree to any provision that has immediately preceding 3-year period. gether with the related memorandum of un- the effect of inhibiting the Senate from at- (C) ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS REQUIRING derstanding and protocols, approved by the taching reservations or offering amendments CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.— Senate on May 27, 1988. to the treaty; and (i) AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding subpara- (25) FURTHER ARMS REDUCTIONS OBLIGA- (iii) the Senate should not consent in the graph (A), the President may furnish addi- TIONS.—The Senate declares its intention to future to any article or other provision of tional contributions which would otherwise consider for approval international agree- any treaty that would prohibit the Senate be prohibited under subparagraph (A) if— ments that would obligate the United States from giving its advice and consent to ratifi- (I) the President determines and certifies to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or ar- cation of the treaty subject to amendment or in writing to the Speaker of the House of maments of the United States in a militarily reservation. Representatives and the Committee on For- significant manner only pursuant to the (18) LABORATORY SAMPLE ANALYSIS.—Prior eign Relations of the Senate that the failure treaty power as set forth in Article II, sec- to the deposit of the United States instru- to provide such contributions would result in tion 2, clause 2 of the Constitution. April 24, 1997 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S3657 (26) RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.— would preclude the United States from meet- the American people. Last September, (A) PERMITTED USES.—Prior to the deposit ing the deadlines of the Convention. treaty proponents were pressing the of the United States instrument of ratifica- (28) CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST Senate to vote on a treaty that had tion, the President shall certify to Congress UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.— none of the key protections that some that the United States is not restricted by (A) IN GENERAL.—In order to protect Unit- the Convention in its use of riot control ed States citizens against unreasonable of us succeeded in inserting in this agents, including the use against combatants searches and seizures, prior to the deposit of treaty. Had we not been a phalanx of who are parties to a conflict, in any of the the United States instrument of ratification, common sense standing in their way, following cases: the President shall certify to Congress the exact same treaty would have been (i) UNITED STATES NOT A PARTY.—The con- that— before the Senate for ratification duct of peacetime military operations within (i) for any challenge inspection conducted today, and that would have been a dis- an area of ongoing armed conflict when the on the territory of the United States pursu- aster. United States is not a party to the conflict ant to Article IX, where consent has been The treaty approved by the Senate (such as recent use of the United States withheld, the United States National Au- Armed Forces in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwan- thority will first obtain a criminal search tonight was toned down with 28 condi- da). warrant based upon probable cause, sup- tions, most of which the administra- (ii) CONSENSUAL PEACEKEEPING.—Consen- ported by oath or affirmation, and describing tion was until recently calling ‘‘killer sual peacekeeping operations when the use of with particularity the place to be searched amendments.’’ Those include, among force is authorized by the receiving state, in- and the persons or things to be seized; and many others, conditions that limit the cluding operations pursuant to Chapter VI of (ii) for any routine inspection of a declared cost of the treaty to the American tax- the United Nations Charter. facility under the Convention that is con- payer, place safeguards on intelligence (iii) CHAPTER VII PEACEKEEPING.—Peace- ducted on the territory of the United States, sharing, enhance our chemical de- keeping operations when force is authorized where consent has been withheld the United by the Security Council under Chapter VII of States National Authority first will obtain fenses, and protect confidential busi- the United Nations Charter. an administrative search warrant from a ness information. (B) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President shall United States magistrate judge. Further, concessions on what I con- take no measure, and prescribe no rule or (B) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this reso- sider some of the most important is- regulation, which would alter or eliminate lution, the term ‘‘National Authority’’ sues—such as protecting the right of Executive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975. means the agency or office of the United American commanders in the field to (C) DEFINITION.—In this paragraph, the States Government designated by the United term ‘‘riot control agent’’ has the meaning use tear gas, and requiring criminal States pursuant to Article VII(4) of the Con- search warrants for foreign inspec- given the term in Article II(7) of the Conven- vention. tion. tors—came only the final days before I SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS. (27) CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION.— agreed to allow the treaty to go to the As used in this resolution: Prior to the deposit of the United States in- Senate floor for a vote. If we had not strument of ratification of the Convention, (1) CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OR CON- VENTION.—The terms ‘‘Chemical Weapons held out so long—in spite of all the the President shall certify to the Congress criticism and derision lobbed in our di- that all of the following conditions are satis- Convention’’ and ‘‘Convention’’ mean the fied: Convention on the Prohibition of Develop- rection—none of those protections (A) EXPLORATION OF ALTERNATIVE TECH- ment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of would be in the treaty today. NOLOGIES.—The President has agreed to ex- Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, I hope I may be forgiven for taking plore alternative technologies for the de- Opened for Signature and Signed by the some satisfaction in the knowledge struction of the United States stockpile of United States at Paris on January 13, 1993, that, thanks to what our critics called chemical weapons in order to ensure that the including the following protocols and memo- our stubbornness, our soldiers in the United States has the safest, most effective randum of understanding, all such docu- ments being integral parts of and collec- field will be a little safer, and the con- and environmentally sound plans and pro- stitutional rights of American citizens grams for meeting its obligations under the tively referred to as the ‘‘Chemical Weapons Convention for the destruction of chemical Convention’’ or the ‘‘Convention’’ (contained will be a little better protected. Final weapons. in Treaty Document 103–21): judgment of our efforts will be left to (B) CONVENTION EXTENDS DESTRUCTION (A) The Annex on Chemicals. future generations. DEADLINE.—The requirement in section 1412 (B) The Annex on Implementation and Ver- I do know this: those great Senators of Public Law 99–145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for com- ification. with whom I was honored to stand pletion of the destruction of the United (C) The Annex on the Protection of Con- fought the good fight, we won some States stockpile of chemical weapons by De- fidential Information. (D) The Resolution Establishing the Pre- battles, and lost others. But we fought cember 31, 2004, will be superseded upon the with honor, and integrity, and for the date the Convention enters into force with paratory Commission for the Organization respect to the United States by the deadline for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. cause of right. required by the Convention of April 29, 2007. (E) The Text on the Establishment of a Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair. (C) AUTHORITY TO EMPLOY A DIFFERENT DE- Preparatory Commission. The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator STRUCTION TECHNOLOGY.—The requirement in (2) ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘Organiza- from Delaware. Article III(1)(a)(v) of the Convention for a tion’’ means the Organization for the Prohi- Mr. BIDEN. I would like to thank the declaration by each State Party not later bition of Chemical Weapons established Vice President for being at the ready than 30 days after the date the Convention under the Convention. the whole day, and I would like to enters into force with respect to that Party (3) STATE PARTY.—The term ‘‘State Party’’ means any nation that is a party to the Con- thank my colleagues for not making it on general plans of the State Party for de- necessary. I am glad they deprived the struction of its chemical weapons does not vention. preclude in any way the United States from (4) UNITED STATES INSTRUMENT OR RATIFI- Vice President of the United States the deciding in the future to employ a tech- CATION.—The term ‘‘United States instru- opportunity to vote on the five condi- nology for the destruction of chemical weap- ment of ratification’’ means the instrument tions and on final passage. But I want ons different than that declared under that of ratification of the United States of the to point out to my colleagues who are Article. Convention. being very nice and solicitous about (D) PROCEDURES FOR EXTENSION OF DEAD- Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, of course my efforts in this regard, the Vice LINE.—The President will consult with Con- I am disappointed by today’s vote on President of the United States, who is gress on whether to submit a request to the the CWC. But I find some solace in the Executive Council of the Organization for an in the Chair, played a critical role in extension of the deadline for the destruction fact that, thanks to our efforts, this pushing this, making sure that we kept of chemical weapons under the Convention, treaty is much less harmful than it it before the Nation, generating the in- as provided under part IV(A) of the Annex on would have been. I am enormously teresting debate so this could not be Implementation and Verification to the Con- proud of Senators KYL, INHOFE, and left untouched, and I want to publicly vention, if, as a result of the program of al- other Senators who stood with us de- thank him. ternative technologies for the destruction of spite enormous pressure against this There is that old expression in poli- chemical munitions carried out under sec- treaty. I believe history will vindicate tics that politics makes strange bed- tion 8065 of the Department of Defense Ap- their efforts. fellows. I have had the distinction and propriations Act, 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104–208), the President determines that Make no mistake, this is a dangerous the honor of having been the ranking alternatives to the incineration of chemical treaty. But it is a little less dangerous member and/or chairman with the dis- weapons are available that are safer and thanks to the efforts we made to tinguished Senator from South Caro- more environmentally sound but whose use amend it, and to deliver the truth to lina, Senator THURMOND, and when I S3658 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE April 24, 1997 got that assignment I think most of of the Air Force’s 50th anniversary, the THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE my colleagues looked at me and said, Kentucky Air National Guard proved Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the this is going to be an interesting time, to be the perfect hosts. They not only close of business yesterday, Wednes- BIDEN and THURMOND. We turned out to brought in all the aircraft, but coordi- day, April 23, 1997, the federal debt be very good friends. This is the first nated all the different services. stood at $5,345,088,835,181.58. (Five tril- occasion after 25 years that I have had Thunder Over Louisville has already lion, three hundred forty-five billion, to work as closely as I have with my gained a reputation as a one-of-a-kind eighty-eight million, eight hundred new chairman of the Foreign Relations air show and fireworks display. But I thirty-five thousand, one hundred Committee, on which I rank, and that think everyone agreed that this year eighty-one dollars and fifty-eight is Senator HELMS. I want to publicly will be hard to top. The performances cents) thank him. He kept his word at every were truly spectacular, but much of One year ago, April 23, 1996, the fed- stage of this long, arduous, and for me the success is also due to the tremen- eral debt stood at $5,106,372,000,000. ultimately rewarding negotiation. I dous job the city, the Air Force, the (Five trillion, one hundred six billion, want to acknowledge how much I ap- Derby Festival and the Kentucky Air three hundred seventy-two million) preciate it. National Guard did to assure the event Five years ago, April 23, 1992, the fed- I conclude by saying, because I do ran smoothly and safely. eral debt stood at $3,877,376,000,000. not want to turn this into some litany Called ‘‘Wild Blue Thunder’’ in trib- (Three trillion, eight hundred seventy- of people to thank, what a pleasure it ute to the Air Force’s 50th Anniver- seven billion, three hundred seventy- has been to work with and receive the sary, it was the world’s largest show of six million) guidance and encouragement from the its kind in America, both for the fire- Ten years ago, April 23, 1987, the fed- Senator from Indiana [Mr. LUGAR]. He works display and for the air perform- eral debt stood at $2,264,001,000,000. has served this Nation well on this oc- ances. (Two trillion, two hundred sixty-four casion, as well as Senator MCCAIN. I The fireworks were reported to be billion, one million) hope I am not hurting their credentials larger than the opening and closing of Fifteen years ago, April 23, 1982, the in the Republican party by acknowl- the Atlanta Olympics combined and of federal debt stood at $1,058,822,000,000 edging how closely I worked with both the Inaugural fireworks. The impres- (One trillion, fifty-eight billion, eight of them. However, I think it should be sive show culminated in an 11,000 wa- hundred twenty-two million) which re- noted that without the two of them terfall of fireworks off the Clark Me- flects a debt increase of more than $4 weighing in on this treaty I not only morial Bridge. trillion—$4,286,266,835,181.58 (Four tril- doubt, I know we would not have The television and radio commercials lion, two hundred eighty-six billion, passed this. for Thunder Over Louisville use the tag two hundred sixty-six million, eight I conclude by saying I truly think line ‘‘you haven’t seen anything until hundred thirty-five thousand, one hun- this is a very important moment in the you’ve seen everything.’’ The Air Force dred eighty-one dollars and fifty-eight Senate, and I do think the vote we just and other armed services certainly cents) during the past 15 years. cast will be within the next hour heard pulled out all the stops with air per- f around the world. Had we voted the formances showcasing the ‘‘Thunder- PATRICK H. WINDHAM other way, it would have been a louder, birds USAF Aerobatic Team,’’ the F– Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I more resounding sound than the one 117 A Stealth Fighter, the B–2 Stealth now. It will be heard around the world, would like to take a few moments to Bomber, the SR–71A Strategic Recon- pay tribute to Patrick H. Windham, and it will reaffirm American leader- naissance Plane, the B–1B Long Range ship. the long-serving Senior Democratic Strategic Bomber, F–14 ‘‘Tomcat’’ jet Professional Staff Member for the Sub- I thank the Vice President for being fighter, the A–10 Warthog Tank Killer here again and I am also thankful we committee on Science, Technology and jet fighter, the F–15 ‘‘Eagle’’ jet fight- Space. Pat is leaving Washington for did not have to have his vote, but I er, the T–33 ‘‘Thunderbird,’’ and knew where it was if we had needed it. California with his wife Arati Apache and Blackhawk helicopters. Prabhakar and newborn baby Katie I yield the floor. The performances were not only a The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the after nearly 20 years of service to the great source of entertainment, but also Senate, primarily on science and tech- previous order, the President will be were a tremendous learning experience immediately notified. nology policy issues. For the many for spectators of all ages, especially people here who knew or worked with f about Kentucky’s homegrown talent. Pat, including my staff and me, he will LEGISLATIVE SESSION Kentucky’s 123rd already has an im- be sorely missed as a great source of pressive list of accomplishments under institutional knowledge but most of all The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate their belt. And I’ve come to the Senate as a friend, a genuine and nice guy in now returns to legislative session. floor time and again to commend them a town not always known for its friend- f on their exceptional work in places liness. like Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. MORNING BUSINESS Originally from California, Pat com- But as part of the Derby Festival’s pleted his undergraduate work at Stan- Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask spectacular display, the 123rd got to ford, received a Masters in public pol- unanimous consent that there now be a show off for the hometown crowd. icy from the University of California at period for the transaction of morning 650,000 Kentuckians saw first-hand the Berkeley and first came to the Hill in business, with Senators permitted to 123rd’s skill and expertise with the C– 1976 as a Congressional Fellow to the speak up to 5 minutes each. 130Hs, getting a better idea of how im- Committee on Commerce, Science and The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. portant this unit is to the overall oper- Transportation. In 1982 Pat began his ENZI). Without objection, it is so or- ations of this nation’s active duty Air long association with Senator HOL- dered. Force. And that will make my job LINGS, joining his personal staff as a f much easier this year if Pentagon offi- legislative assistant. He has held his cials start making moves to pull any of present position of Senior Democratic COMMENDING KENTUCKY AIR the 123rd’s C–130Hs. Professional staff member for the Sub- NATIONAL GUARD Mr. President, let me close by thank- committee on Commerce, Science and Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I just want ing the 123rd for their hard work and Transportation since 1984. to take a moment to extend my per- their hospitality. I know the true test I met Pat through his many hours of sonal thanks to the Kentucky Air Na- of their abilities happens when they work on the important issue of tech- tional Guard for a job well done. When are far from home. But it’s nice to re- nology partnerships, especially those the U.S. Air Force chose the Kentucky mind everyone at home just how lucky run through the Commerce Depart- Derby Festival’s annual Thunder Over we are to have such a talented, com- ment such as the Advanced Technology Louisville celebration as one of the mitted group of service people right Program. Pat, along with my able col- high points in a year-long celebration here in Kentucky. league Senator HOLLINGS, has been a