JANUARY 2012 HASC COMMITTEE PRINT 112-4 2120 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20515 202.225.4151 ARMEDSERVICES.HOUSE.GOV LEAVING GUANTANAMO LEAVING As of September 2011, the LEAVING U.S. government believed that 27 percent of former GTMO detainees were confi rmed or suspected to have been engaged GUANTANAMO in terrorist or insurgent activities. POLICIES, PRESSURES, AND DETAINEES RETURNING TO THE FIGHT SUSPECTED OR CONFIRMED HASC 71-370_cover.indd 1 3/14/12 12:44 PM JANUARY 2012 HASC COMMITTEE PRINT 112-4 2120 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 20515 202.225.4151 ARMEDSERVICES.HOUSE.GOV LEAVING GUANTANAMO LEAVING As of September 2011, the LEAVING U.S. government believed that 27 percent of former GTMO detainees were confi rmed or suspected to have been engaged GUANTANAMO in terrorist or insurgent activities. POLICIES, PRESSURES, AND DETAINEES RETURNING TO THE FIGHT SUSPECTED OR CONFIRMED HASC 71-370_cover.indd 1 3/14/12 12:44 PM SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS of the COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 71-370_text_CX.indd i 3/23/12 8:55 AM ….we have been very selective in terms of returning people. One of the things we have discovered over time is that we are not particularly good at predicting which returnee will be a recidivist. Some of those that we have considered the most dangerous and who have been released or who we considered dangerous and potentially going back into the fi ght have not, and some that we evaluated as SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES not being much of a danger or much of a risk FEBRUARY 17, 2011 we have discovered in the fi ght. Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing “A Statement by the United States Government,” New York Times, April 24, 2011 (issued in connection with the decision by the newspaper and other organizations to publish documents obtained illegally by Wikileaks). Both the previous and the current Administrations have made every eff ort to act with the utmost care and diligence in transferring detainees from Guantanamo. Both Administrations have made the protection of American citizens the top priority and . we will continue to work with allies and partners around the world to mitigate threats to the U.S. and other countries . GEOFF MORRELL PENTAGON PRESS SECRETARY AMBASSADOR DANIEL FRIED SPECIAL ENVOY FOR CLOSURE OF THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION FACILITY II LEAVING GUANTANAMO 71-370_text_CX.indd ii 3/23/12 8:56 AM Contents 02 Executive Summary and Introduction 04 Methodological and Stylistic Notes 06 Snapshots of Reengagement 10 Reengagement: The Basics 13 Defi nitions 16 FINDING 1: Mechanisms to reduce the GTMO population were fi rst contemplated when the facility was established in 2002. However, procedures to accomplish this took about eight months to fi nalize, and were spurred by persistent concerns that some detainees should not be held. 23 FINDING 2: After the fi rst review process began, political and diplomatic pressures to reduce the GTMO population arose, resulting in releases and transfers. 27 Russia 31 Foreign Prosecution 33 Pakistan 34 Saudi Rehabilitation Program 42 FINDING 3: Pressure to reduce the GTMO population accelerated in the second Bush term, before reengagement dangers became fully apparent. 50 Success Story? 57 Litigation Pressures 64 FINDING 4: While the GTMO transfer and release process instituted by the Obama administration diff ered in some important respects from what preceded it, there are suffi cient continuities so that the threat of reengagement may not be lessened in the long term. 74 Conclusion and Recommendations 76 Dissenting Views 86 Appendix Classifi ed Annex UNDER SEPARATE COVER HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 01 71-370_text_CX.indd 01 3/23/12 8:56 AM Executive Summary and Introduction In March 2011, Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon and Ranking Minority Member Adam Smith directed the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee to undertake an in-depth, comprehensive bipartisan investigation of procedures to dispatch detainees from the Guantanamo Bay detention facility (GTMO) over the past decade. Th is necessarily included an examination of mechanisms intended to prevent former detainees from reengaging in terror-related activities. In conducting this study, committee staff travelled to eleven countries, interviewed nearly every senior offi cial directly involved in these matters in both the Bush and Obama administra- tions, received briefi ngs from the Department of Defense and Department of State, consulted with eighteen subject matter experts, met with two former detainees, and reviewed thousands of pages of classifi ed and unclassifi ed documents. Subcommittee Members convened a hearing, three Member briefi ngs (including one that was classifi ed), and travelled to several relevant locations. Th is report fi nds that the Bush and Obama administrations, in reaction to domestic political pressures, a desire to earn goodwill abroad, and in an attempt to advance strategic national security goals, sought to “release” or “transfer” GTMO detainees elsewhere. Th ose “released” were judged a suffi ciently low threat that they were sent to countries with no expectation of follow up. “Transferred” detainees, because they were assessed as relatively more dangerous, were conveyed with the expectation that some process would be applied in the receiving nation to mitigate the threat they potentially posed. Despite earnest and well-meaning eff orts by offi cials in both administrations, properly evaluating detainees and ensuring that their cases were handled appropriately by receiving countries was, and remains, a challenge. Th is is demonstrated by the fact that the Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) estimated in September 2011 that 27% of the 600 former detainees who have left GTMO were confi rmed or suspected to be presently or previ- ously reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities. Th is total percentage has consistently increased. Furthermore, the Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence noted in 2010 that the Intelligence Community “assesses that if addition- al detainees are transferred from GTMO, some of them will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities.” Five of 66 detainees who left GTMO in the 20 months between February 2009 and 02 LEAVING GUANTANAMO 71-370_text_CX.indd 02 3/23/12 8:56 AM October 2010 are confi rmed (two) or suspected (three) by ODNI of involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities. Although two of the fi ve were released pursuant to court orders, this nonetheless yields a seven and one half percent reengagement rate. Although it is diffi cult to compare two disparate groups of former detainees (a smaller pool which left GTMO relatively recently and a much larger pool which has been gone for a much longer period), the reengage- ment rate indicates that challenges remain. Th is report posits four fi ndings: • Finding 1. Mechanisms to reduce the GTMO population were fi rst contemplated when the facility was established in 2002. However, procedures to accomplish this took about eight months to fi nalize, and were spurred by persistent concerns that some detainees should not be held. • Finding 2. After the fi rst review process began, political and diplomatic pressures to reduce the GTMO population arose, resulting in releases and transfers. • Finding 3. Pressure to reduce the GTMO population accelerated in the second Bush term, before reengagement dangers became fully apparent. • Finding 4. While the GTMO transfer and release process instituted by the Obama ad- ministration diff ered in some important respects from what preceded it, there are suffi cient continuities so that the threat of reengagement may not be lessened in the long term. In addition to chapters discussing each fi nding in depth, this report includes several compan- ion articles illustrating specifi c issues. A classifi ed section sets forth material which cannot be reproduced here. Th e following recommendations are off ered: • Th e Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Offi ce of the Director of National Intelligence collaborate to produce a report (in classifi ed and unclassifi ed versions) to congressional committees of jurisdiction assessing factors causing or contributing to reengagement; including a discussion of trends, by country and region, where reengagement has occurred; • Th e Department of Defense and Department of State produce a report (in classifi ed and unclassifi ed versions) to congressional committees of jurisdiction assessing the eff ectiveness of agreements in each country where transfers have occurred; • Congress continue the certifi cation requirements on GTMO transfers which are contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. No. 112-81; 125 Stat. 1561 [2011]), at least until receiving and reviewing the specifi ed reports; and • Additional action as outlined in the classifi ed annex. HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 03 71-370_text_CX.indd 03 3/23/12 8:56 AM Methodological and Stylistic Notes Th is study is based primarily upon 19 interviews with current and past key policy makers and staff ers from the White House, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, as well as hundreds of pages of declassifi ed documents, and some secondary sources. A large vol- ume of classifi ed information provided to the committee was also evaluated. Th at data forms, in part, the basis of a classifi ed annex to this report. In addition to visiting the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, committee staff traveled to eleven countries where detainees have been sent and met with U.S. and foreign government offi cials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and two former detainees. Staff also received briefi ngs from the Department of State, the Department of Defense (and several components including the Defense Intelligence Agency), as well as many groups and individuals knowledgeable about detainee disposition matters. Th e Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee convened one hearing and three briefi ngs (including one classi- fi ed briefi ng), and Members travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan and GTMO for meetings and fi rst-hand observations.