SINGAPORE AND MALAYA

ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL DIFFERENTIATION

YUSOF M, HASHIM Bachelor of Economic a

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Economics in the Faculty of Economics (in the School of Government)«

University of Sydney December, 1966. CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 1 INTRODUCTION 3 ABSTRACTS 7 (a) Environment 7 (b) The Elite and Mass Inter-relation 9 (c) The Process of Nation-building 10 (d) The Approach to the problems of nation-building 11

PART I SINGAPORE AND MALAYA

CHAPTER I. BACKGROUND

(a) Distinct and Parallel Political Development 12 (b) Singapore: Political Determinants 23 (c) Malaya: Political Development 32

CHAPTER II. THE ELITE AND MASS INTER-RELATION

1. SOCIAL SETTING OF THE ALLIANCE 37 (a) The Malays and UMNO leadership 37 (b) MCA leadership and the Chinese 44 (c) The Alliance: Contents 49 (d) Leaders and Political Style 54

2. THE PAP CONTENTS STYLE 68

3. THE PAP AND ALLIANCE: STYLE AND TYPOLOGY 74

PART II SINGAPORE-MALAYA INTERACTION

CHAPTER III. THE PROCESS OF NATION-BUILDING 85

CHAPTER IV. THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF NATION-BUILDING 105

CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 123

BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 • Books 1 29 2• Pamphlets and Official Publications 132 3* Selected Articles 134 4* Newspapers 138 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: -

I am indebted to Mr. K. Turner for hie kind assistance and encourage­ ment. When I started writing the thesis, there was no sense of

direction as to the approach to the thesis. The whole idea was to

tabulate the causes of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia.

Since Singapore's secession has been an event of recent occurrence,

commentary on such a controversial issue would be coloured by personal

ideological commitments. There would be too much accent on the

immediate or "sensational" causes.

The aim of this thesis is to look at the underlying political differences

between Singapore and Malaya. In this way Singapore's secession could

be more understood. The political patterns of Singapore and Malaya

are such that merger between the two countries was a difficult problem.

I should like to thank Dr. Power for his schema on analysis of leader­

ship. The studies of the politics of developing countries are greatly

involved with studies in elite formation and recruitment and the

question of legitimacy.

I should also like to thank Professor Spann for giving me the opportunity

to look at political development of developing countries and the

recommendations for me to go back to Malaya for interviews.

In Malaya I was able to interview Dr. Ismail, the Minister of Home

Affairs and graduate of Melbourne University in Medicine. We exchanged views about the Malaysian Problem* His pamphlets titled "Alliance

Malaysian Malaysia in Two Stages" is an invaluable help to me to see more deeply into the Malaysian issue and this was helped by our

exchanges on his paper*

The Assistant Minister of Culture (Assistant to Tunku) explained the

aim of hi8 Ministry and to my mind there is a striking similarity to the aims of Singapore*s Ministry of Culture* Both are trying to

encourage the development of the Malaysian contents in the culture*

I found that most people did not want to talk about the Singapore

secession* Most agreed, however, that the patterns of politics in

Singapore are different from Malaya* On the whole, politics in Malaya

is mild and the event surrounding Singapore's secession was probably

Malaya's biggest political involvement which had international

repurcussion* 3

INTRODUCTION: -

There are many issues which should be considered relating to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia* Some issues are immediate issues which became very important just prior to separation* Some issues are more fundamental* The immediate issues are involved with practical politics such as finance and taxation, the role of the banks, defence, development etc* The fundamental or underlying issues are more subtle and subjective and are involved with social and economic factors such as attitudes to institution, religions, independence etc*

The difference between Singapore and Malaya in these subjective factors are the reflection of the difference in their social make-up*

The aim of this thesis is to present the more fundamental differences between Singapore and Malay and not purely the oauses of separation*

It is to be concerned with the difference in the social structure between the two countries* Social mobilisation is a dynamic process and the differences would accentuate or diminish in time* The differences between Singapore and Malaya axe not total but are in degrees* They are more concerned with different accent on certain fundamental issues and institutions, but these accents are important for they denote differences in methods of approach and style of politics, and in turn are the products of their societies*

With regard to Malaysia, there was at the outset a similar attitude*

There was a good measure of similarity between the government of Malaya and Singapore* The drive towards merger showed a conscious effort 4 of the two countries towards congruence of views* On deeper analysis, the process of merger and the areas of discard were played down.

Merger could he seen as being created rather than evolved as a natural development•

The areas of similarity were imposed. Their agreements were super­ ficial. For a while, there was a semblance of similarity but as the process of nation-building went on, the difference became quite irreconcilable. Merger meant different things to different parties and as a result, the ends and means of merger were looked at differently.

Merger has been brought about by the two parties, the PAP of Singapore and the Alliance of Malaya. Hence the difference between Singapore and

Malayan politics is measured mostly in terms of the interaction of these two parties. There are as many similarities as there are differences.

While the PAP is to the right of Barisan Sosialis in strictly limited ideological term, the Alliance is to the left of the Pan Malayan Islamic

Party (PMP). In other words, if there’s a point of similarity between the parties of Malaya, as far as Multi-racial nationalism is concerned, then the PAP and the Alliance would be most compatible. The studies on the areas of political differentiation between the Alliance and the PAP are not total, at the point of interaction, when Singapore became part of the Federation, though at the point of separation the differentiation looked total.

I propose to present the political differentiation between Singapore and 5

Malaya within this framework. The top national elites of the two countries had many things in common in their educational background, but they come from distinct cultural backgrounds. Their politics are, in part the reflection of their environments* They are prepared to co-operate where their interests merged but they have different views in the vital question of the forms of nationalism* They have different ideas in the question of equality and rights and liberty and above all the questions of loyalty*

Though they both aspired to the same goal of a Malaysian nation, the contents of the nation they had envisaged were different* Nationalism as an ideology connotes different things to different people* They differ in the cultural form of nationalism as well as the economic form of nationalism* They differ in degrees, not complete, otherwise there would not be Merger in the first place*

Broadly, the attitude of the Alliance in the question of nationalism would be in the evolution of Malay norms and the PAP in the evolution of the Overseas Chinese norms* In spirit they point to a convergence because of the equality balanced population* In practical politics, total form of Malay nationalism as expounded by the PMIP would be impractical and dangerous* In the same way total form of Overseas

Chinese form of nationalism would be inappropriate because of the population structure and geo-politics* The middle course approach by the Alliance by playing down Malay nationalism managed,to a certain extent, to appeal to the aspiration of the people of Malaya* The same could be 6. said about the PAP to Singapore in dampening Chinese chauvinism and inculcating multi-racial nationalism*

The difficulty in Merger is the incorporation of the two aspirations within a system, where two similar systems exist. Merger failed because the two systems cannot be completely merged without upsetting the aspirations of the two countries*

POLITICAL PARTIES ABBREVIATED

The Alliance composed of: UMNO: United Malays National Organisation* MCA : Malayan Chinese Association* MIC : Malayan Indian Congress*

THE PMIP: Pan Malayan Islamic Party.

The PAP: People's Action Party.

The PPP: People's Progressive Party.

NOTATION

Emergency: Period of National emergency in view of Communist disturbances, 1948-1960.

Expatriate Officera: British Officers in the Malayan Public Service*

Merdeka: Independenc e•

Merger: Used in terms of unification of Singapore with Malaya*

The analysis in this thesis is strictly in terms of Singapore and Malaya* 7

ABSTRACTS.

The Environment:-

This is an analysis of the differences of the environments of the two countries which had produced the difference in the politics of Singapore and Malaya. The population structure, the economics, the development towards independence and socialisation constitute the *historical experience* of the two countries which shape the form of politics of the countries.

Singapore and Malaya are inter-related under the British Administration for a very long time. The inter-war period is the most crucial period.

It shows the ‘harmony' of the two areas within one economic unit.

Singapore unofficially became the capital of the whole of Malaya. This period lasted for about thirty years. The period beginning in 1914 roughly saw the development of parallel political system. They shared many similar institutions but they were never united.

The war brought a jolt to the whole of Malaya and ironically enough the interim occupation period saw the achievement of a unified Japanese military command with Singapore as the headquarters.

1946 saw the beginning of Singapore's isolation from Malaya made official by the formation of the Federation in 1948. The Straits Settlement was broken up and Malacca and Penang became part of the Federation. 8

The period from 1948 to 1963 saw the development of separate political framework yet with similar pattern* There was a kind of psychological loss on the part of Singapore after the second World War, from its former status as the unofficial, capital of Malaya* Yet

Singapore wanted to recapture this and it tried to do this in the brief merger* Merger can be seen as an attempt to revert back to the inter­ war years* However, the set-up failed* It failed because, though always close, was closest only economically. Politically Singapore and Malaya have never been in one unit in its history except perhaps prior to 1819•

In its economic integration there was always the ’British umbrella* to shield them from internal and external disturbances* The war has changed the whole picture*

When British disengagement started, forces went to work, which brought quite distinct political development* Singapore the 'capital* was left on a limb; the rest of Malaya developed a different pattern*

1946 was the crucial year which accentuated the difference by the separation of Singapore*

The second part of the introduction shows the degree of the differences which determine the politics of the two countries* Broadly it is an analysis of politics of a city (the 'capital*) with the politics of the rest of the community* By the very nature of its smaller size, etc* tempo in the city is quicker* The pattern of population and economic structure determine the political differences. 9

The Elite and Mass Inter-Relation:-

The two environments had produced distinct leaders and their actions and behaviour patterns had produced distinct political styles* The attitudes of the mass towards the leaders and vice cersa provide the norms of political actions of the two countries*

When considering elite-mass inter-relation the most important consider­ ation for Singapore and Malaya is not the question of the difference but why they differ* There are well defined factors which have caused the difference in the political pattern of the two countries.

In Malaya, the plural and differentiated mass has been a great restrain­ ing influence on the capacity of the leaders to take action* The communal pull, by their very nature, meant that they are conservative pulls* As a result, in Malaya the leadership pattern has not yet changed completely, though the contents are different* This is true to both the Malay auad Chinese leadership* Communalism has been a big stumbling block in breaking down the types of leaders* Hence the

Alliance leadership is still of the transitional types coming after the

Colonial indirect* leaders and, the yet to emerge, professional politicians.

Singapore’s leadership on the other hand has 'jumped* the transitional stage* The leadership is composed of professional politicians* The influence of the business elite in Singapore faded after 1955 and in

1959 modern professional political elites came into power* A similar 10. force was exerted in Malaya by this type of elite in the MCA of the

Alliance in 1959 but the force of communalism was a resisting factor.

The MCA as a result is still composed of the business elite, which would otherwise have been replaced as in Sii^apore.

The result of these *whys* meant that leadership in Singapore and

Malaya have veolved different styles of politics which extend from dress( l) to party structure, to methods of approach.

The Process of Nation-Building:-

When two environments and two different styles of politics merged, the result was a clash of viewpoints on the forms in which the new nation should take. What constitutes a nation is viewed differently by the leaders of the two countries. The points of differences surround the twin problems of * nation* and *nationalism*• They are involved subjectively in the form of national consciousness, national identity etc., and objectively in the form of the ’physical* nation - in territorial integrity, the national language, the population etc.

Essentially the difference between the Alliance and the PAP in the question of the Malaysian nation is a matter of interpretation about merger. To Malaya, by merger, is meant an incorporation of Singapore as part of Malaysia and the extension of the Malayan political pattern.

The incorporation of Singapore was aimed at containing Communist influence 11

The Alliance idea of a Malaysian nation was involved with the evolution of Malay norms and the incorporations into these norms the non-Malay population of the country. The PAP on the other hand, had looked upon merger as a form of partnership, not an absorption. They look at the

Malaysian nation not solely as evolution of Malay norms but the inforporation of the best of the Malaysian norms, by accentuating on the similarities and by trying to eradicate the "Malay-ness" and wChinese-ness" identity. The aim was to create a Malaysian identity.

The Approach to the Problems of Nation-Building:-

The approach calls for the method of achieving the national consolidation.

This is involved with the question of how the nation could develop in order to achieve political and economic 1 independence*• There are many approaches to national integration of the developing countries.

There are also many problems. In the Singapore-Malaya context there is a hint in ideological commitments. The difference is not straight­ forward, but more on economic approach in nation-building - the objective factor which is as important as the subjective mention in the "what" of & nation PART I

SINGAPORE AND MALAYA 12 CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND: -

(a) Distinct and Parallel Development.

A model in chronological order shows the distinct and parallel development of Singapore and Malaya* There are several phases in the development, which was brought as a result of the British Administration of the whole of Malaya including Singapore*

DIAGRAM No* I 13.

Before the expansion of British interest in Malaya the country was divided into several semi-autonomous Malay states under the feudal

Sultanate system. Nothing of significance came out of this first period except perhaps the Sultanate system. ”0f more immediate importance to the Malaysians of the Peninsula is the system of Malay states. The system in the m o dem form has existed for over a hundred years. Within each state there exists a political structure which links the kampongs through sub-districts with the Sultans at the head of the state” (l).

The second period in this analysis is the extension of British interest into the Peninsula, which became of great significance to both Malaya and Singapore. The first British interest in Malaya was the acquisition of Penang in 1786 from the Sultan of Kedah. This was followed by the acquisition of Singapore in 1819 by Baffles from Sultan

Hussein of Johore. Finally Malacca was exchanged to the British in

1824 in place of Bancoolen which became a Dutch possession. In 1826 both Malacca and Singapore became dependencies of the Presidency of

Penang. When Penang declined Singapore became the centre in 1932 with the head the Governor and Penang and Malacca had a Resident Councillor each. This was the beginning of the Straits Settlements.

Singapore*s trade grew rapidly. From England came woollens, copper­ sheathing, wines and spirits. Coffee, sugar, raw silks etc. were exported to Europe through Singapore. Goods also came from the Indian cities such as Madras, Bombay and Calcutta. Even South America sent

(1) 14. its copper and iron* Singapore had become as early as 1829 the centre of trade in the area*

The entrepot trade expanded but suffered a slight restriction in 1833 when the East India Company’s monopoly of direct trade between Europe and China was abolished and the private traders were no longer required to tranship cargoes to and from China* Singapore would lose the commission charges of loading and reshipping as well as employment* In

1842 Britain acquired Hong Kong and in 1846 Labuan* Both began to take away the China trade which Singapore had formerly held* Singapore was also losing its entrepot trade as a result of direot trading between

England and the treaty-ports of China*

Singapore's entrepot position was threatened in the 1860's when there was a great competition among the European merchants* The Dutch had restricted merchant ships flying the British flag from the coastal trade of Dutch territories* Discriminatory duties were placed on British goods* The French were expanding in the French Indo-China*

Singapore's entrepot position was receiving a tough competition* There was demand for greater sense of direction for the Straits Settlement*

An event of crucial significance happened in 186? when the Straits

Settlements were transferred from the India Office to the Authority of the Colonial Office* This change has tremendous effect on relation with the Malay states which at this time were in turmoil* (2)

(2) A History of Malaya* J* Kennedy. Paige 155 15

J. Kennedy wrote "So far as the relations between the Straits Settlements and. the Malay States were concerned, the change to the Colonial Office in 1867 had two effects. The Straits Settlements could not be viewed from London in a broad perspective...... Secondly, the Singapore trading community, especially the Chamber of Commerce, could press harder than before for the achievement of settled conditions for business enterprise in the Malay States"•

The British intervention in the Malay States in 1874> signalled the

first formal Singapore - Malaya interaction. The business community

in Singapore had been pressing for intervention in the Malay States.

There was an increase in the demand for tin especially as the price of

tin had increased due to the American Civil War. The demand for

intervention in the Malay States had coincided with the disorders

there resulting from the Perak succession and the rivalry between the

two Chinese secret societies, the Ghee Hin and Hai Son in Larut Perak.

The Pangkar Treaty of 1874> was the forerunner of the event in the

formation of Malaysia. The factors were almost identical especially

from Singapore’s point of view. Tregonning (3) on writing about this

event had this to say:-

"But in the Straits (Kimberley, Minister for Colonies) found a unanimous body of opinion wholeheartedly in support of intervention, and he was strengthened in his resolve to act by the petition waiting for him from just on 250 Chinese merchants who wrote complaining to the British Government that the anarchy of the Western Malay States was so affect­ ing their interests that there was serious danger of all their tin under­ takings being ruined. Britain was asked to provide protection for their trade."

(3) A History of Modern Malaya. K.C. Tregonning. Page 146. 16

The opening up of the Malay states provided a boost to Singapore trade which has slipped somewhat as a result of increased competition from the newly acquired areas in Asia and the opening of the Suex Canal in

1869* Singapore almost lost a trading monopoly but with the develop­ ment of Malaya*s tin and later rubber, Singapore became the outlet for

Malaya’ s produce to the Western markets. The two economies became interrelated.

The great improvement in Singapore Harbour facilities after the second half of the nineteenth century further assisted the export of Malayan

produce. The two economies became complementary, with Malaya providing

the hinterland. The B ritish merchant cap ital in Singapore was used for investment in the tin and rubber and other agricultural produce.

The Straits Trading Company eventually specialised in tin-3melting. Its

smelting plant was established in 1887 on Palau Brani. This industry and other similar industries like tin-canning provided the basis of the

complementary nature of the economies.

Meanwhile, the Residential System in Malaya was extended and in 1896 the

four Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang were

federated with the capital in Kuala Lumpur. This was an important date

in the histozy of Malay. "The significance of this step was perhaps

not appreciated at the time, but today we can see that this federation

introduced for the first time since the days of the Malacca Sultanate

some measure of unity among the central states of the Malay sta te s. I t

was also the first step in the emergence of the Federation of Malays as we know it today. The importance of the 1896 movement towards unity should not therefore he underestimated for, although the immediate system of Federation discouraged other states from joining, in the long term view it was to serve as the nucleus of modern Malaya. An example of the significance of this closer association was the Ruler’s

Conference." (4)

The complementary nature of the Malayan and Singapore economies was further strengthened by the formation of the Federated Malaya States.

Rubber which had a shakey start when it was introduced in 1977 began to be very productive by 1910 when there was a rubber Boom. This was strengthened by the First World War demand for rubber and later the manufacture of rubber products.

From about 1900 to 1914 the whole of the Malaya Peninsula came under the

British control. By 1914 Malaya had three types of Administrative units the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States and the Undefederated

Malay States. Malaya became in effect an integrated economic unit as well as being under the British Administration. Singapore became the unofficial capital of Malaya.

The period from the First World War to the Second World War, a span of about thirty years is the longest period in this analysis and a very important one as far as the relation between Singapore and Malaya is concerned. The period saw the achievement of Malaya as integrated

(4) The Making of M o d e m Malaya. N.J. Ryan. Page 132 18 economio unit with Malaya and Singapore complementary to each other.

Singapore developed its tin smelting industry and later the pineapple­ canning became very important which was connected with pineapple growing in Johore. There were rubber mills as well as mills for copra oil and palm oil and there was refining of sago. Most of these industries were connected with Malaya. The expansion of Malaya which lead to increase in living standards has led to the demand of consumer goods.

This in turn led to the expansion of Singapore import and export trade.

The period too saw the transformation of Malaya into a plural society.

There was a great deal of immigration and emigration of population especially the Chinese which altered the population structure of the country.

MALAYA AND SINGAPORE MAIN RACIAL G-ROUPS

1911 1921 1931 1947 MALAYS 1 ,420,000 1 ,600,000 1 ,900,000 2 , 5 4 0 ,0 0 0 CHINESE 920,000 1 , 180,000 1 ,710,000 2 ,6 2 0 ,0 0 0 INDIANS 270,000 470,0 0 0 620,000 610,000

It was a period of great economic integration but it was also a period of political uncertainties. Internally the Malays were suspicious of the centralisation of power in Kuala Lumpur and this attitude was opposed by the Chinese when in the middle of the 1930's de-centralisation was in fact carried out in the Federated Malay States. This problem was small in comparison to the external forces at work. The activities of the Japanese in China had aroused the overseas Chinese into sending funds to China to fight the Japanese; most of these funds came from

* A History of Malaya. J. Kennedy. Page 235 19.

Malaya# "The Chinese in Malaya became conscious of forming instruc­ tive paradox of modern Malaya that the nationalist 'school* culture of the Chinese has been strongest in the very period when they have been preparing to have their place in a Malayan nation." (5)

The Japanese occupation further put a strain in the relation between

the Malays and the Chinese# The Chinese were badly treated by the

Japanese, and the former had taken up arms in the jungle to fight a

guerilla warfare against the Japanese. The effect was to arouse

Chinese nationalism. At the same time the Japanese tried to nurture

Malay nationalism by combining the administration of Malaya and Sumatra

through the Headquarters in Singapore# This scheme failed and was

abandoned in 1944* The period of Japanese Occupation created great

suspicion between the Chinese and the Malays, and though serious clashes occurred, they did not become widespread. The period of the Japanese Occupation was only a short interlude to the story before the British came back#

All the divergent elements came into sharp focus when the Second World War came to an end. The Malayan People's Anti- Japanese Army (MPAJA)

who were mostly Communists were driven into the jungle at the time of

the settingup of the British Military Administration (BMA). Further

complication to the Malayan problem was the B ritish attempt to introduce

'Malayan Union' at a time when prior to the War there was active

de-centralisation. This led to the growth of Malay nationalism as

well as Chinese chauvinism. The Malayan Union Proposals were la te r

abandoned.

------*ThT Growth of Plural Society in (falaya11# Maurice ¿’reedman. (5) Pacific Affairs 33 June i960 : ’ 20

The introduction of Malayan Union in 1946 with the exclusion of Singapore meant a first real estrangement of Singapore from Malaya* In fact

Singapore*s connection was severely curtailed with the breaking up of the Straits Settlement and the inclusion of Malacca and Penang into

Malayan Union* Tregonning put three reasons for the exclusion of

Singapore:

’’The British had regarded Singapore in 1946 as a naval base that was to remain under their control; they had acquiesced in the susceptibilities of the Malays, fearing racial imbalance if the million Chinese of the Island were added to those on the Peninsula; and they had acquiesced in local Singapore demand that the Island remain a free port*"

The Malayan Union was replaced by the Federation of Malaya in 1948*

Singapore became a Crown Colony* From 1948 on the development of

Singapore and Malaya was parallel and distinct* They were still under

the British Administration and the pattern of development has been

similar* In 1948 both Singapore and Malaya declared •Bnergency* to

fight the Communist uprising* They both had their first General

Election in 1955 and were preparing for independence. In 1956 they

held Constitutional talks, Singapore following Malaya* They still had

joint Departments in Broadcasting, joint University, and the same

currency* With Independence to Malaya in 1957 there was movement away

from the joint arrangement* In 1958 the University of Malaya was

separated into the University of Singapore and the University of Malaya.

The pan-Malayan Broadcasting Department was also separated.

(6) Malaysia and Singapore. K.G-. Tregonning. Page 38. 21

The estrangement was brought about by the uncertainties in the political

situation in Singapore* In 1959 Singapore achieved her internal self

Government* The PAP Government began to abridge the gap between Malaya and Singapore*

Besides the Parallel development, the end of the War and especially the

formation of the Federation of Malaya in 1948, had brought also distinct

differences. The first was connected with Citizenship. The citizen­

ship requirement for Malaya is much stricter than Singapore* In

Malaya there was different treatment between the subject of the Sultans who are automatic citizens and the non-Malays who had to possess certain

citizenship qualification such as period of residence not less than

eight years out of twelve years and not less than fifteen years out of

twenty years preceding application* This was relaxed after Independence

in 1957 when those born in the Federation are automatically citizens,

and other local-born aliens must seek citizenship by registration*

Singapore citizenship requirement is much easier* Foreign-born residents

can register for citizenship after eight years residence* In Malaya

they must seek citizenship naturalisation* Where there is no language

qualification in Singapore in Malaya they are required to know basic Malay*

In matters of language too there is difference* In the Malayan Parlia­

ment only Malay and English are allowed, whereas in Singapore there are

four languages, English, Chinese, Tamil and Malay and provisions are

made for simultaneous translation* 22

Other vital difference is in the special treatment of the Malays in

Malaya, in government appointments, in scholarship, in land reservation and in certain business permits and licences. In Singapore there is * equality of citizens irrespective of racial origins. Since 1959 there is a basic difference in the two governments in power and will be discussed fully later.

* see Emily Sadica* article; Malaysia ”The Political Background” in The Economy of Independent Malaya. Edited: Silcock and Fisk. 23

(b) Singapore: Political Determinants«

The politics in Singapore are involved with three constant factors:-

1* Singapore is a city-state. 2* The p o p u latio n stru c tu re * 3* Proximity to Malaya.

1 • Singapore is basically an urban community and hence political develop­

ment is more sophisticated than the majority of the newly emergent

countries* In this sense, politics in Singapore is associated

with aspects of modem life, especially the Western society, which

relates to employment, industrialisation, welfare, labour management

and housing*

Politics reflect to a great extent the economic situation of Singa­

pore* By the very nature of its entrepot economy, fluctuation in

trade affects the labour force more directly and with greater political

implications* Hence the population is conscious of economic

development and planning than most other Asian countries* The

situation demands greatest use of resources, greater efficiency

in administration and greater incentives for any openings in trade

and industrialisation* The economic planning from the start is

weighted towards industrialisation, first because the island is too

small (224 sq* miles) to have room for agriculture, as well as the

soil is not too fertile, and secondly and more importantly,

Singapore had already achieved a standard of living and a high

degree of urbanisation which had attuned its people to the ‘industrial

mentality*. Professor Tregonning described Singapore:-

“Singapore is a highly developed urban centre* Its 1*7 million 24 people are served by thirty-four banks, most of them over fifty years old, with a long experience of financing one of the most competitive and active markets in the world. There are over eighty insurance companies, while the Singapore rubber and tin markets are world centres. An active Stock Exchange is another financial institution of more than regional importance.

Singapore is also an outstanding communications centre* It is today the fifth largest port in the world* Over a million tons of cargo a month moves over its 31 berths on the miles of wharfage of Keppel Harbour. Forty-one shipping lines link Singapore with the rest of the world, their vessels using either the main harbour or the always crowded small ships harbour nearby. A third harbour employing thousands of workers is the British Naval Base*

Singapore is also a major air centre. In its trade, Singapore alone handles a greater value than the whole of Indonesia, and only slightly less than all of India.

1960 TRADE (in Million) Japan 25,500 India 10,000 Singapore 5 ,7 0 0 Indonesia 3 ,5 0 0 Hong Kong 5,4 0 0

Singapore’s long experience of commerce, and the skills and techniques demanded by its role in South-East Asia, had produced an indigenous middle class with capital and business experience. It has produced a community that has achieved the sociological and psychological 25

conditions necessary for economic development. Singapore is one

of the few areas of South-East Asia where the group ideal is hard work and where the motivation passion is for progress and

education."

With urbanisation coimes , the great emphasis placed on education and its effect on employment•

"Education has become almost a public obsession in Saingapore. The aim is to get all children into schools, even if there are not enough schools, if classrooms are grossly overcrowded, if teachers are overworked, under-trained and there are not enough of them, and if the general teaching and educational standard is low. But Singapore government is doing a remarkable job and has already made an advance of far-reaching significance in this part of the world."' '

The government considers education as a form of investment and about half of the state revenue is being spent on education. The result is not surprising. Singapore is probably the best educated place in Asia.

This high degree of mass education has wide political implication in that "there is greater competitiveness for jobs as well as a greater number of educated unemployed. This is a kind of structure which might strangle Singapore politically. "But with excellent educational institutions and an intelligent and hardworking population, added to the port, its geographical position and its tradition of enterprise — all of which should be of immense value to a supra-national world - Singapore is South-East Asia's greatest under-employed asset. It is also a potential volcano." (9)

Malaysia and Singapore. The Economy. K. G. Tregonning. Page 63. Malaysia In Focus - Singapore Page 26. R.McKie. Asian Red Riding Hood - Economist 197: Dec. 17, i960. 26

Another pressure on employment would he in the composition of the

population. About half of the population is under eighteen years

of age and about are under fifte e n . On top of th is Singapore

has a high birth-rate; 3* **9/& yearly rate of increase. MIt is this

youth which in jects into the city i t s tremendous v ita lity , whioh gives it a brash adventurous probing purpose. Its youth too, is

the source of some of its most significant problems of today and

tomorrow.w

Lately, Singapore has tried to diversify its economy from too much

reliance on the entrepot trade. As a result there developed a

multitude of small-scale industries, ranging from the production of

consumer goods to light industries. A lot of complications are

involved in th is. F irst i s the problem of the trade unions whioh

have been very active and organised. Wages are high, as a result.

Perhaps the greatest problem is associated with the markets. The domestic market is too small to have heavier industries. The

small industries such as for milling rubber, making rubber footwear, electric batteries, bottles, furniture, pipes, industrial gases, ** soap, metal windows and plywood , have to compete in the export market with such established competitors as Hong Kong and Japan.

These are also the types of industries which Malaya has adopted in

the f i r s t stages of the in d u strialisation programmes.

* Report on the Economic Aspects of Malaysia by a Mission of IBRD July '63, about employment. (10) Malaysia In Focus - Singapore Page 23* ** Encyclopaedia Brittanica. 27

These eronomic facts are important consideration in the analysis

of Singapore politics* It would mean that the politicians would be

facing a very politicised people* With all the problems in

Singapore, politics is a very tough profession* The demand for

sense of purpose and direction is tremendous* There is, first of

a ll, the employment problem and related to it the problem of active

trade union* Above all there is the problem of economic

reorganisation which demanded the setting up of industrial complexes

to provide the *engin' of economic growth* Service industries

associated with the entrepot economy cannot provide the growth in

the face of increasing population* These problems are pressing*

They provide the dynamics of Singapore politics*

* ♦

2* & 3* are very much related to the economic determinants of politics in

the socio-cultural factor* This is the subjective factor associated

with conditioned feelings and beliefs in the course of time* First,

is the cultural tie with China, which even as late as mid-fifties

had been strong. This is only natural in a country where the

majority of the population is Chinese. "Their attitude in this

respeot closely resembles the Anglo-Saxon peoples such as

Australians and New Zealanders, long established in distant land

but still sharing the old culture and have links with the homeland."^11^

In some sense Singapore is lucky for there is little or minimum

problem associated with inter-communal relation* Singapore is

relatively free from the tug of war and delicate maneuverings of

(11) The Nation; Oct* 11 1%3* The Expulsion of Singapore. C*P* Fitzgerald. 28

sectional interests which bedevilled such countries as Malaya,

Ceylon or even the United States and Canada.

The tie with China though loosened at the present time, is important

in its historical context. The intellectuals the rich Chinese

of South-East Asia were greatly involved with the republican move­

ment in China which led to the overthrow of the Manehu dynasty and

the setting up of a republic of China. The end product of this

movement is the present generation of South-East Asian Chinese, and

in particular in Singapore, who have been imbued with liberal ideas

and republican in outlook. The immigrant streak has produced

rugged individuals with great capacity for hard work as well as

young and enquiring minds.

Associated with this liberal tradition is the part played by the

intellectuals, in mobilising the Chinese mass. Fitzgerald wrote:-

"Traditional submission to such leadership led to the unquestioning acceptance of a political programme which was in itself quite unfamiliar to them. The attitude that political ideas came from China, and that the political fashions of China were those which should be accepted, became strongly entrenched and still persists as one of the underlying factors in the political situations of South- East Asia." (12)

The strong republican tradition which saw the fall of the feudalistic

Manehu Dynasty is now being reinforced by the great stride made by

modern China.

(12) The Third China"History to 1939-41 K C.P. Fitzgerald. Page 24 29

HThe rise of the Communists to power on the Chinese mainland has produced interesting responses among the Singapore Chinese. Regardless of party, religion, or political affiliation, the average Chinese acknowledges the people of Communist China as his own, and still feels that the mainland is his motherland* He tends to identify himself with the positive accomplishments of the Communist regime* He shares their military and diplomatic victories* He prides himself on the elimination of dirt, disease, illiteracy, slovenliness - and flies - in his homeland. Indifferent of hostile, perhaps, to communism as such, the overseas Chinese takes satisfaction in and admires the development of the modern ( a -z ) revolution which China is now experiencing*11

The writer of the article made the survey in 1956, at the height

of the disturbance in Singapore* The situation in Singapore has

changed* Lee Kuan Yew has vigorously tried to put in a new

spirit into the Singaporeans which is more in keeping with Singapore * s

development* However, Communism is still a strong appeal*

"Communism among the overseas Chinese appealed to the young educated class, including many whose parents were rich «pd prominent merchants and financiers* The reasons were psychological rather than economic or social* With the decline or disappearances of the colonial regimes, whether temporarily during the war, or permanently thereafter, the Chinese in South-East Asia were faced with a new situation, which called for new attitudes and new

allegiances. The main driving force in the political life of the nations among whom they lived was nationalism: but it was a local nationalism, based on ethnic affinities, and it automatically

(13) Students and Politics in Singapore* Stanley Spector* Par Eastern Survey. May 1956. Vol. XXV No. 5. 30

excluded the Chinese. A Chinese could not become a Malay, it was much more difficult for him to be fully accepted as a Thai, and in Indonesia the Chinese were still regarded as an alien people who had shown pro-Dutch sympathies.**

This is the greatest dilemma facing the overseas Chinese. By

virtue of being the middle class of the countries, they live, as

well as the entrepreneurs and the brains, they would be just right

for evonomic utilisation. However, they are hedged in by the

conservative local nationalism.

"In the post war political arrangement, the emerging Malayan nationalism of the region failed to take root in Singapore because it lacked an enthnic and culture basis, but anti-colonialism and socialism did actively appear there and gave powerful impulse to (15) demands for far-reaching social and political change.**

The demand for self determination in Singapore differed from the

rest of other emerging countries of Asia and Africa. Political

awakening was mainly concerned with economic well-being, and with

their liberal tradition associated with the overthrow of a

monarchical form of government, they cannot be expected to uphold

such a system. They abhor any traditional institutions and since,

Singapore has no traditional institutions to identify, institutions

are not sacred to them. Hence in the Malayan context they advocated

equalitarian democracy, associated with equality of opportunity,

(1A) The Third China. C.P. Fitzgerald. Communism In The ‘Third China*. Page 62. (15) Singapore: Problem Child. W.P. Maddox. Foreign Affairs April 1962. 31

not a democracy where it ia biased towards a section of the popu­

lation* They want to incorporate the best of the West and the

East* The fight against colonialism was fierce* When Mr* Ong

Eng Guan became the first mayor of Singapore, he refused to have

anything to do with symbols, like the city mace, which he considered

to a relic of Colonialism*

The kind of nationalism nurtured in Malaya, which is in the form

of evolution of norms does not win the sympathy with the majority

of Singapore's population.

"•••••••• but all 'advance* Chinese are profoundly out of sympathy with the type of society which the Malay ruling class in Malaya wishes to perpetuate and sustain. That class is itself aristocratic, but recently feudal, and maintains and enhances the privileges of the Malay royalty and nobility. The Chinese in South-East Asia have not this origin and do not feel at home in such society. Most of the very wealthiest among them are the sons, at the most the grandsons, of men who came to the country as poor labourers* Some began that way themselves* They feel much more sympathy for the more socially democratic society which is emerging in Indonesia than for the Malay aristocratic society, archaic and old-fashioned in their view, which seems to be so firmly established by the Malaysian Constitution in their own country."

Singapore's drive for self-government was not associated with the

'human dignity* side of independence which has been the main factor

of African nationalism* Marshall declared "It would be foolish for Singapore to beguile itself with sophisticated phrases of liberty, democratic rights, and freedom, while we go down the drain.** ^ ^

(16) The Third China. Page 98. (17) See"Sequel to Colonialism" by Hanna A Comprehensive on the Spot Analysis of Politics of Singapore and Malaya, iiuote ro.i page 32

(°) Malaya: Political Determinants.

The greatest determinants of politics in Malaya is commun&lism, that is the interaction of the ethnic groups of the country* In fact the ethnic structure of the population form the basis of the story of

Malaya. Malaya's plural society is unique and analysis of politics should be made within this framework. The population is made up of about 50% Malays, who consider themselves as the sons of the soil, 37% (18) Chinese and about 11% Indians. R.S. Milne^ , in a nutshell described the Malayan society as "not only transitional, on the way from traditional to modern: it is also multiracial, or plural. There is little loyalty to a general political system, but rather loyalties to particular groups* There is little consensus, but well-defined cleavages."

The main feature of the plural nature of the population is the divergence of their political interests* This is explained by the societal structure of the races. The Malays believe that they have greater claim to the country than any other groups in the country* This claim for special privileges in the country is reinforced by their economic weakness. (19) Hence the Malays are undifferentiated and united f ir s t communally and secondly because they are economically depressed. About 30% of the Malays are engaged in rice cultivation producing only one

(18) P o litics and Government. Page 327 in the book "Malaysia Edited": Wang Gunwu. (19) IBID Communal and Party Structure T.H. Silcock'The Political Economics of Modern Malaya* edited Silcock and Fisk* "One of the basic facts of Malaya race relation - too often ignored outside Malaya - i s the relativ e poverty the0Mhlaÿis/%7. jUS# aggregate Malay inedite 125,VJ)0 and the Chinese is $M1,975,000 30$ and 54$ respectively. Page 3. 33 crop a year. They are also small rubber growers and fishermen. Their economic status also means that they are not fully urbanised yet. In

1957 only 604,000 Malays live in urban areas as compared to 1,704,000

Chinese/20^

The Chinese on the other hand have the greatest range of economic life of Malaya. As a result they are the most urbanised of the three major communal groups, with about 50$ living in the towns. Hence while the

Malays are politically unified, virtually, the Chinese are politically stratified. Hence the Chinese are differentiated among themselves and differentiated with the Malays as well.

The interaction of these two ethnic units form the substructure of the present Malayan political system. Prior to World War II, these ethnic factors were submerged under the British Administration. In the process of de-colonialisation after the Second World War, these ethnic factors came into sharp focus as a result of nationalism. As a result Malayan politics is ooncered with accommodating the ethnic units into one whole. At the very outset it is involved with compromise of various interests. Compromise in politics form the semi-constant factor. It is a conviction that "Malays and Chinese must co-operate in building the new nation and that failure to achieve co-operation will

/ A ^ i \ result in inter-racial conflict that will destroy them both."^ '

’’Malaysia”. ( 20) *L P Cit"Urbanisation" Hamsah Sendut • Page 89 • (21) Hanna Op Cit "Ascendency of the Alliance". Page 48. These two communities are important by their weight of population in

Malaya. So important is the consideration of these two communities, was highlighted by the speech by Mr. Tan Siew Sin when speaking during the Constitutional Debate in 1957* He said:

"In the last analysis, the pillar of Malayan independence is communal unity and understanding in general and Sino-Malay unity and understanding in particular. Without it no constitution will work whether written or unwritten, perfect or imperfect•••.•. I have particularly mentioned Sino-Malay unity, not because any of us want Malays or Chinese or both to dominate Malaya politically to the detriment of the other communities of minorities, but because understanding between these two major communities, which together between them form 9Q$ of the total population, will automatically take care of the problems of the other communities (22) by that very fact. That, I think, is clear.’1'

Politics in Malaya is governed by negative forces at work rather than any

positive forces such as economic forces. Politics is not economically based as in Singapore, and even if there is economic contents, there is bound to be communal factors involved. Hence there are no aotive

pressure groups in the Malayan politics. "Among the reasons for their

relative lack of political activity were the absence of political

experience, legal barriers and official pressures against political

activity, the lack of strong belief by some in the wisdom of advancing

their interest through political action, and the conviction of others

that their particular interests should be subordinate to broader interests.

Legislative Council Debates 10th July 1957* Governments and Politics of South-East Asia. Editor: Kahin Malaya and Singapore. J. Norman Parmer. Page 276. 35.

This is the clear difference between Malaya and Singapore. Where

trade union movement in Singapore is politically oriented, the trade

unions in Malaya have not emerged as a political force at all.

The political parties in Malaya as a result are organised on communal

appeal in the beginning and broaden their outlook only later, as in the

Alliance, only after 1952. In Singapore politics, political parties

do represent interest and class. There is practically no communal

politics in Singapore. Where in Singapore the interest run along

economic lines, in Malaya they run along cultural and communal lines. * Ratnam observed this important political factor.

MBy and large, the interests which most clearly seem to act as pressure groups on the political system are those which, though appearing to be functional, are efficacious mainly because they operate within a communal framework and represent communally sensitive issues. In the case of the Chinese community, the best examples would be the various guilds, chambers of commerce and educational groups; among the Malays, teachers and religious leaders (between them representing the areas of Malay culture which are politically of most consequence today) are the ones with greatest political influence. But for these, there are few effective pressure groups in the country.

Communalism seem to pervade the whole political structure. Because of

the divergent of interests, strong adherents to ideology is not being

(24) "Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya". K. J. Ratnam. Page vii Preface. 36 adopted by the political parties* Instead of ideological blueprints along economic lines, the parties seem to follow cultural lines* The

Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), adopted the line of Islamism; the

Sooialist Front has ’Marhaenism' as its ideology* This party is composed of the Labour Party, which is urban proletariate, and Party

Rakyat, which tries to win the rural peasants* Hence the appeal to * * Marhaeini sra ’ • The Alliance tries to bridge the communal gap but has yet to put any positive ideology. The closest ideology that can be labelled is nationalism in the broadest sense* The People*s Progressive

Party appealed for multilingualism* All these parties have communal appeal to some extent* A strictly multi-racial party cannot as yet capture the Malayan population* The reason lies in the double ethnic and economic cleavages*

* Soekarno coined this ideology term aimed at embracing the whole structure of the population - the workers and the peasant. 37

CHAPTER II

THE ELITE-MASS INTER-RELATION

1 . SOCIAL SETTING- OF THE ALLIANCE.

In order to evaluate the leadership function of the Alliance, the mass

should he understood in their component parts and not as undifferentiated

whole, which does not yet exist. How the differentiated mass in the

plural society have different ideas about their leaders are governed by

various factors, mostly cultural in contents. This is more prevalent

in pre-urbanised societies. In the Malayan context the most important

component of the Alliance is the Malay mass. There are elements in the

Alliance leadership, especially UMNO which seem to contain the essentials

which satisfy their need. In the same way, to a smaller extent, the

MCA leadership contains elements whioh their limited followers feel the

leadership possess.

(a) The Malaya and UMNO Leadership.

The UMNO leaders of the Alliance represent the leadership requirement of

the Malays more so than can be said of the Chinese leadership. There is

a close inter-relation between the leaders and the mass. The relation

is involved with Malay nationalism and the culture, language and religion

that constitutes that form of nationalism. The mass demands certain

standards of leadership which do not differ very much from the

traditional form of leadership associated with the Sultans. The present

leaders are one step ahead of the leaders associated with the Malay

feudal system. In fact, the British intervention of 1874 and especially

the control of the Malay states by Britain after 1919 "had upset the old

concept that government existed merely for the benefit of the Rulers."^)

(l) Journal S.E. Asian History Vol. 1. March i960. "Malay Nationalism 1900-1945* Radin Soefaarno. Pages 2-3*______38

The Sultans who were once looked upon as more than ordinary human beings, as representative of God on earth (his ’daulat* *) and his

commands (Titah) were law, were reduced by the British to mere figure- * heads* With the introduction of money economy and the improvemenfc of education and communication, the Sultans1 position became weaker*

When Malay nationalism began to take shape in the form of activities

of the Malay educated elites, the targets were often directed at the

Malay rulers, the Government and the alien people (non-Malays) "But with the new Ruler-subject relationship their unquestioning acceptance

could only last as long as there was prosperity and peace in the country*

As long as these two prevailed the government to the Malays remained

much the business of the government officials* The subjects had only

to follow* But when there was a crisis such as the economic crisis of

the 1920*s and the 1930’s or the political crisis of 1942-1945» the (2) government came to be more and more critically examined*

The process of social mobilisation of the Malays really began after the * British intervention of 1874* The whole Malay society, including the

rulers were affected. The end of the World War II brought new arrange­

ments in world politics and had brought a jolt to the Malays* The

influence of the rulers was already withering even before the war but the war brought the crucial point of departure* Hence, just before the

Japanese surrender, when the Malay left-wing movement under Ibrahim Jaacob

* The famous British Colonial Policy of Government by 'Indirect Rule*. (2) IBID. *See Growth of a Plural Society in MalayanPacific Affairs”. Vo*# 33* June 1960. 39 was preparing to meet the Indonesian leaders for the inclusion of Malaya into the fold of "Indonesian fatherland", Sultan Aziz of Perak was to be included in the delegation.

The crisis came after the Japanese surrender when Britain tried to intro­ duce Malayan Union and the Malay rulers were expected to surrender their sovereignty to the Central government, Dato* Onn founded UMNO to figh t the Malayan Union and provided the leaders to the Malays. The leader­ ship came from the Malay aristocracy.

Hence the birth of the Malay nationalism was associated with the fear against the economic power of the non-Malays, and not with the British

Administration as such, and hence the strength of UMNO leadership as a protector of the Malays. Dato* Onn warned the S\2fcans to "desist from taking part in any function connected with the Union •••••• I f the

Rulers in sisted on meeting the Governor they would be disowned by the ( 3) people, who were determined to boycott the Malayan Union."' ' The Sultans complied with the demand, and stayed away from the installation ceremony of Sir Edward Gent, the Governor. The Malays went to the hotels where the Sultans were staying and demonstrated their approval.

Harry Miller quoted the attitude of the more unyielding UMNO leaders as saying "We brought them down those stairs to teach them a lesson* They were lucky we did not destroy them completely for having signed the

MacHichael treaties. As it was, we told them we would support them."^^

(3) Harry Miller: Prince and Premier Birth of a Party. Page 78* (4) IBID Page 78: "When the Malays demonstrated, the Sultans walked down to meet them, an event according to M iller "without parallel in the history of the country." 40

The episode connected with the Malayan Union proposals, showed much the delicate relation of the Malay mass and the leaders. The leader­

ship of UMNO comes between the traditional leaders of the Eulers and the

Malay mass. The mass cannot provide leadership except from the

aristocratic leaders, who provide the leadership and in turn installed

the Eulers as protection against the encroachment of the non-Malays.

Hence the UMNO leadership manages to satisfy the requirement of the

Malay mass and legitimised their action through the rulers. The position

of the Eulers became a political necessity to the UMNO leadership as well

as to the mass. This is a case of a type of leadership which made use

of the traditional leadership to satisfy the mass. The traditional

leadership at the same time is happy about the arrangement. The Sultanate

system in existence in Malaya is not the by-product of the Malay society

as such, but an arrangement whereby the Malays could shelter within while

trying to improve their lot.

The attitude of the Malays towards the leaders have changed as a result

of the impact of the British Administration. The Malays have not gone

that fax to sever all links with the traditional form of Malay leadership

but there is more questioning on the mass-leader relation in the question

of justice and rights. One such case is related to the exploits of the

legendary Hang Tuah t the Laksmana (Admiral) of Sultan Mansur Shah

(145^“1457)> when Malacca was at the heights of its power in the Malay

Archielago. Such exploits of the legendary folk hero is still being

told to Malay children. However, among the intellectual Malays the

'greatness* of Hang Tuah has been watered down greatly. This is the

A bas relief of Hang Tuah, 7 ft. high by Mrs. Waveney Jenkins is displayed in the Museum Negara (National Museum) in Kuala Lumpur 41 result of the new acquired values among the Malay intellectuals, relating to the question of justice and fair-play* The climax of Hang

Tuah’s life was the dual between him and his ’brother*, Hang Jebat.

The issue at stake was involved with the question of justice* Hang

Jebat went amuck when he found out that Hang Tuah had been unjustly

sentenced to death by Sultan Mansur Shah of Malacca over certain accusations levelled at Hang Tuah. Legend had it that the city of Malacca could not

contain Hang Jebat, who was also a great warrior, second only to Hang Tuah.

Sultan Mansur mused that only one man could have saved the Kingdom and that man would be Hang Tuah. At this critical juncture, one of the

Officials at the Sultan’s Court confessed that he had spared Hang Tuah’s life and in fact the Laksmans was alive. The official had risked his life in hiding Hang Tuah. Sultan Mansur pardoned Hang Tuah and he called upon him to deal with Hang Jebat. The duel that followed has become the greatest folk drama in the Malay Society. Hang Jebat was killed in the fight, and it was here that the present Malay intellectuals had their own literary ’fight on the merits and demerits of the Malays* concept of justice and obedience to the leader.

Hang Jebat had rebelled against the Sultan (which is unpardonable to the

Malays) because he felt that am injustice has been laid on a citizen.

Hang Tuah, on the other hand defending the rights of the Ruler on any account.

This folk episode amd the surrounding controversy at the present time about the legend, mirrored to some extent the dilemma of the Malays towards the leaders. The Sultains’ prestige had gone after 1946 and in 42 their place they have substituted the leadership of the aristocratic elite of UMNO* Their old attitude to the leaders still remain* They still expect the leaders to ressemble the old traditional fiulers in dress, behaviour, ceremonies beside being politicians* There was a spirit of consensus in the Malay leadership, which has also been recognised as the feature of the Indonesian leadership - the •mushawarah* and the 'mupakat*.

The first meaning ‘consultation* and the second meaning ’agreement*. Both the Indonesians and the Malays have evolved this character of leadership organisation* The Malays in fact, seem to require a charismatice form of leadership and UMNO in many ways try to institute such flavour of pomp and ceremony* Tunku’s leadership in many ways is surrounded by this kind of charisma, which pervades through the top UMNO leadership*

Their positions are unquestioned* **The people in general accepted what the leaders stood for, not without question, of course, when it was ( 5) necessary, but on the whole they showed considerable solidarity.**v /

This probably explained the lack of any leadership struggle in UMNO. Even when Dato* Onn first formed a political party outside UMNO, he was for some time still the President of UMNO* He was never expelled from the party* He resigned*

The strong attachment to the leaders, especially the top leaders, is an off-shoot of the traditional attitude towards the Islamic leaders* Islam had insulcated a strong and unchallenged role of the leaders, the caliphate, and the Malays were influenced by this, though Islam itself

(5) Journal S.E. History* March 1960* Page 26 43 played very little role in political agitation or independence in

Malaya* ** -Another point is the fact that the Malays are socio-economically backward and are helpless in the modern world to face separately* Thus the growing importance of the leaders at the present time since the Malays felt that their progress would ohly come through the collective effort of the leaders* The leaders have become symbolic of Malay aspirations* To attack this symbol by disparaging remarks or criticisms would mean an attack on the whole Malay aspirations and this would, in turn, arouse

Malay nationalism* Hence Malay nationalism is in the form of a reaction, rather than a positive force*

UMNO leadership has very strong control over the Malay mass but the leaders have to be cautious, not to be too ahead of the Malay opinion, as Dato* Onn failed to change the form of UMNO and as Tunku managed to bring about the alliance with the MCA. The Malay leadership is conservative because of many influences. First there is the conservative Malay mass which has a restraining influence on the leaders* The mass is slower than the leaders when considering the process of modernisation, hence on the whole the mass is more religious bound and expect their religion to be taken care of and leaders are less religious but have to •appear* religious and have ** to attend to their demands. This is the inter-action between the

* Islam has not been a dominating force as in Indonesia* In fact, according to Soeharno, the influence of Islam withered a round 1926 "When under the economic and political pressures from the alien population Malay political attitudes became more secularist". Page 27. IBID. ** Tunku* s fondness for brandy and soda is jovially described by McKie ‘Malaysia in Focus* Page 184; another hilarious incident was recollected by Lord Ogmore in Contemporary Review of December 1963* Tunku invited Lord Ogmore by saying "We thought that you must be getting a bit tired of polite conversation and pink lemonade. And he poured out a glass not of pink lemonade". 44 leaders and the mass, and the success of the leaders is dependent on this balance, of appearing to satisfy the mass demand as well as imposing their ideals across.

(b) MCA Leadership and the Chinese.

Just as the leadership of UMNO is still in the hands of the traditional form of leadership, the MCA leadership too is in the hands of the traditional type of leadership associated with the Chinese in Malaya.

However, the type of leaders axe different in that the UMNO leadership is derived from the aristocratic status, whereas the MCA leaders derived from their economic status. The difference is the result of the separate socio-environmental conditions of the two communities. Within

Malaya, the leadership is not associated with politics another departure from the Malay leadership.

Leadership of the Chinese goes to those who are leaders in business. The reason is obvious. They lack "continuity with a Malayan traditional past. The Chinese population is by origin predominantly rural, but its pursuits in Malaya, have been so commercial and industrial as to keep it either urban or, when rural, of a rather urban e a s t . " ^ Hence the leaders are not the cultural or religion types. The leaders are basically the top businessmen. This is only natural as they did not become part

of the administrative machinery. "Organising themselves in relation to the

economic roles for which they have been oast they built up a social system in which leadership went to rich men and status depended on economic power."^^ This is unlike the Malay status which had continued to the

(6) Notes and Comment: The Growth of Plural Society in Malaya. Maurice Freedman Pacific Affairs. June 1960. (7) IBID Page 165. 45 present time which plane status more on administrative position in the

Government Service.

Related to the economic differentiation is the social differentiation, which embraces class divisions. This is related to the traditional

Chinese social kinship organisation derived from the old Chinese social order in feudal China, and transported to Malaya. Being transplanted the social order became quite important, in the same way, perhaps of the

Mormons, the Quakers in the early days of America* * "As aliens in strange countries the Overseas Chinese developed a social structure based on real and simulated kinship ties, ties of dialect and village of origin, (8) craft guilds and - most important secret societies."' ' The activities of the seoret societies were severely restricted after 1900 when their activities were regulated by the ’Protector of Chinese*, but they remained as underground movements. In place of the secret societies the leader­ ship of the Chinese after the second World War was oentred around the

Chambers of Commerce and trade associations*

CHINESE COMMUNITY: DTALKCT GROUPS* Dialect Group 1921 1931 1941 Hckkien 379,028 538,852 827,411 Cantonese 331,757 417,516 641,945 Hakka (Kehe) 217,697 317,506 437,407 Tiechew (Teochiu) 130,026 208,681 364,232 Hainanese (Hail&m) 68,200 97,568 157,649 Kwongsai 998 46,095 71,850 Hokchiu 13,821 38,908 48,094 Hokckia 4,058 15,301 12,754 Henghwa (Hinhoa) 1,759 ( 17,065 Other Tribes 24,469 ( 13.025 36,260 Total 1,171,740 1,704,452 2,614,667

(8) Communal and Party Structure T*H. Silcock Page 10. "The Political Economy of Independent Malaya". * Rat nam ap cit Page 5« 46

The monopoly of leadership with the business is the result of the slow growth of the trade union movement among the Chinese workers which should out across class lines among the Chinese. Another difficulty is the lack or organised Malay labour organisation to reinforce labour movement in

Malaya, and is due to the undifferentiated Malay community* Other impediments were related to the Chinese secret societies themselves and

"the guild and clan structure of Chinese economic life, which made joint trade union aotivity with other races very difficult. An exception is found in the unions under the control of the Communist Party, which is in principle inter-racial and is organised on secret society lines which its (9) own fighting men and supply organisation. '

Another natural development was that the leadership went to those who had been in Malaya for a long time, whose roots went deepest in Malaya. This is the same way perhaps to the power heirachy resting with the Yankees in

New England in America and later giving way to the Irish and perhaps the

Italians finally. In the same way leadership of the Chinese in Malaya was vested in those Chinese who had achieved recognition in business and in turn was due to the fact that they had been in Malaya a long time.

Traditional Chinese leadership in feudal China or in modern China has always been vested to the scholars. "Traditional society in China was governed by a gentry and official class which consisted principally of those who successfully competed in a rigid examination system.

(9) Communal and Party Structure. T.H. Silcock Page 10. "The Political Economy of Independent Malaya". (10) Students and Politics in Singapore. Stanley Spectore. "Par Eastern Survey" May 1936. He further wrote "Study was worthwhile in itself, study imparted personal charisma, and finally, study successfully pursued was on the road to wealth and power through gentry and official status". 47.

Hence in the Malayan context, the first leadership not only went to those who were rich but who were educated as well especially British educated, and they were able to get proper education because of their wealth*

This is an important consideration in Malaya because not only were they recognised by the Chinese themselves but they were given the recognition by the British and hence their inclusion into the machinery of the

Government, especially in the Councils first the Straits Councils, then the Federal Council*

The development of Chinese leadership in Malaya was not associated with politics at first. The leadership was concerned with the cultural and eoonomic side, hence leadership also went to the teachers* A good example would be Tan Cheng Lock who was a teacher-turned businessman and who became a foremost Chinese leader prior to Malaya*s independence. The lack of interest in politics at first was not only due to the fact that they were not encouraged, it was also due to their "being primarily of a transient nature*.•• did not generally interest themselves in gaining (l 1) local political rights. 7

The Chinese leadership went to those in big business. However they could not operate as political activists because of the communal barrier.

So,when the MCA was formed, the first aim was to take care of the welfare of the Chinese rather than to policise them. This is in contrast to the formation of UMNO, which was organised as a political force. The MCA

(11) Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya - Ratnam Page 6. was organised to help the Chinese to identify with Malaya, and in doing so indirectly became a political force. "«•••• it gave the Chinese themselves greatly increased scope for promoting communal solidarity so as to enhance the chances of improving their status under the new

Constitution. To the wealthier and middle class Chinese, the founding of the MCA had yet another significance; it gave them the opportunity and the means to compete more effectively with the Communists in wooing (12) the poorer classes within their community.

The leadership of the MCA came from those who were involved with the

British Administration and in many ways the MCA was a sort of supplement of the Government machinery to fight the Communists. "It started in

1949 as a welfare organisation, primarily to help the Government in settling the Chinese squatters in New Villages, and it has recruited a ( ) large membership• 13 There were two achievements: first, the Chinese mass did not turn Communist en mass and secondly and more importantly, the Chinese became organised.

Apart from being supplement to the Government, the MCA became in the end a supplement of UMNO as well. This was no mere accident that the aim of the MCA was to foster better understanding between the Malays and the

Chinese. Tan Cheng Lock said "It is a matter of supreme significance and

(12) IBID Page 153. (13) 'Malay and Chinese' Report from Malaya Vernon Barlett. Page 111. * Norman Parmer in 'Malaya and Singapore** Page 261 in the book 'Government and Politics of South East Asia' Edited: Kahin, believed that the British Government encouraged the "Straits-born Chinese and persons of similar outlook to engage in political activity." 49 indisputable necessity that a basic purpose of the organisation must be the attainment of inter-communal understanding and friendship, particularly between the Malays and the Chine se . " ^ ^

(c) The Alliance: Contents

The Alliance elites are a coalition of elits. The UMNO elites of the

Alliance are the products of the Malay society, which is still in its preurbanised stage* As a result the elites are not yet differentiated by their economic standing in the society* In such a society the dominant segment of the society are those who are the traditional leaders of the Malays, the Malay aristocracy* They are leaders by virtue of their status in the society as well as by the higher education they received*

They hold the leadership because modern economy has not yet differentiated their society into various categories of jobs and functions as in the industrialised societies* Slowly, there is the displacement of the aristocratic elite by the professional political elite, but even if they are successful in the years to come, they would not be too radically different from the traditional elites, because they still come from the seme societal background*

The MCA elites of the Alliance are mostly in business or in the profession*

They represent traditional Chinese leadership associated with the business and scholarship, but unlike the Malay leadership which is undifferentiated, the Chinese leadership is quite fragmented* This is due to the fact that the Chinese are more urbanised than the Malays, and the ensuing occupational differentiation is more marked, as a result* This leadership is now being

(14) K*J* Ratnam Op Cit Page 154 50 challenged by the more progressive sectors of the Chinese community, the trade unions and the progressive professional elites. The MCA, though representing the Chinese community is less solid than UMNO, and in fact, a weak partner in the Alliance.

'J ^ btp f UTt,t> Mauy

plural SOCIITY

ATLD DOM - MALAY M AS^

DIA CRAM NO. II 51

The emergent and subsequent rise of the Alliance Party is partly historical and partly accidental. The t r ia l balloon of the Independent Malayan party failed because at that stage the Malay nationalism was still intense.

Another factor was the death of the B ritish High Commissioner, S ir Henry

Gurney, who was trying to nurture this party in the hope of achieving peaceful internal self-government. However, the party failed because the

Malays following in UMNO did not abandon UMNO as expected. ‘ UMNO was prepared to fight the election alone and it could have won because the

number of Chinese eligible to vote was small (about 11$ of the electorate).

The arrangement to allocate seats among UMNO and MCA in the Kuala Lumpur

Municipal election in 1952 sealed the co-operation of the two organisations.

Mr. Tan Cheng Lock, who was active in the formation of the Independent

Malayan Party had deserted i t and had supported the formation of the

Alliance•

P o litics in Malaya i s centred around the Alliance Party, whether in in ter­

party political battle or in intra-party political bargain. The first

election of 1955 was fought over which party would bring independence to Malay, f i r s t . There was no xenophobia associated with the fight for

independence of other Afro-Asian countries. What was important was that

at the time when Malaya was demanding independence there was a change in

attitude of the B ritish Government. Malaya obtained i t s independence through negotiation. So whereas in other emergent countries, independence was won through the whole forces of nationalism, in Malaya’ s case independ­

ence was won through the co-operation of the Malays and the Chinese through

the Alliance and the British Government. 52.

The Alliance Party is like the Indian Congress Party in that it has accommodated a lot of interests and the interests along ethnic lines rather than economic lines. The Alliance has to balance the interest resulting from Malay nationalism and Chinese chauvenism, and this could be a tricky business. This was demonstrated in 1959 when the MCA President sent a letter to Tunku Abdul Rahman putting forth the demand from certain sections of the MCA. The letter by Dr. Lira Chong Eu (who has since formed United Democratic Party. The leadership is an interesting feature in that the Chinese community now about to change its content as did

Singapore in the same 1959* It did not eventuate because of Conservative

Malay forces) was sent on June 24, a day which coincided with the Alliance loss to PMIP of 28 seats out of 30. This was a black period for the

Alliance besides losing in the state of Kelantan (which has never been retrieved) the Alliance also lost the state of Trengganu. This happened two months before the Federal Election.

The demand of the MCA was for 40 seats and not 28 as set, out of 104 and their selection by the MCA and not by the Alliance National Council. They also demanded that the Alliance should uphold the Constitution and not be prejudicial to the Chinese. They wanted the review of the Federal

Education Policy and job opportunities. The Alliance was in crisis.

Dato* Abdul Razak, the Prime Minister declared "To-morrow you will read bad news concerning the Alliance.... The existence of the Alliance is being threatened by a section which has doubted the sincerity of UMNO ••••

If this section continues to cast its doubts on our sincerity, we shall be forced not to co-operate with t h e m . " ^ ^

(15) Sequel to Colonialism: Foundation of Malaysia. Page 70. 53

It was the first challenge from the MCA and the Tunku was very disappointed.

He replied to Dr. Lim's letter MI ...... have even gone to the extent of saying that I would risk losing every seat rather than lose the friendship of the Chinese beoause in my mind, that is the only guarantee for the happiness, peace and prosperity of our country.* There began the consultation between UMNO and MCA, and the crisis was resolved on July 12.

The MCA Central General Committee voted 89 to 60 in favour of Tunku. The crisis averted, Tunku allocated 31 seats to MCA, 69 seats to UMNO and

4 seats to MIC.

It was a close shave to the Alliance. Some MCA leaders resigned and contested the election separately. The result of the election was inter­ esting in that out of 31 MCA candidates only 18 won their seats. The

'rebel' MCA candidates did not do well either. Out of 14 candidates only

2 won their seats. The total Alliance seats won was 74 out of 104* In this election the Alliance lost 14 seats (Malay candidates) to the FMIP, showing that the Malays could vote against the Alliance when the Malay interest was involved. On the other hand six non-Malay Alliance

Candidates lost to the anti-Malay People's progressive Party.

Ideology aside, politics in the Alliance involved a lot of bargain, not only between UMNO and MCA but also between the various elements, Left or

Right within the two partners. The only form of unity which bind the various elements is the moderate approach of the small national elite, at the top of the party hierarchy. Since this is a small group, pressure from the less Malayan conscious interest group would be hard to control 54*

(d) Leader a and P o litica l Style

The Alliance, while incorporating the main body of the Malay elite, is incorporating only a portion of the Chinese elite* (As Diagram No.H suggests*) As a result, the MCA managed to satisfy only a section of the Chinese mass and the views representative of this portion, whereas,

UMNO managed to represent the majority of the Malay mass* The UMNO-MCA coalition of elites managed to a certain extent, to resemble a unified national elite, a small percentage of the whole of the Malayan society*

The masses are differentiated communally and as in the case of the Chinese, ideologically* ”The MCA is not representative of the two and half million Chinese in the Federation either is the MIC of the six hundred thousand Indians* Neither of them has roots in the villages and small towns.

The Alliance leadership has managed to satisfy at least one of the two aspirations of the plural mass. Of a ll these leaders, Tunku would probably claim to transcend purely one communal aspiration* He has managed to win the support of the great bulk of the population. The Malays look to leaders with attributes associated with the Rulers but with the difference in contents* He is a member of the Kedak Ruling Family, being the son of the late Sultan of Kedah* Though he was far down the line of succession, he was near enough to be involved with the trappings of the aristocratic background. At the same time, he was far enough to be fitted with the education of a ’’Modern Intelligentsia” . He went to cosmopolitan Penang

Free School and la ter Cambridge*

( 16) M iller Op Cit Page 216 55

In England, his interest in politics as a student was strictly involved with organising the Malay Society of Great Britain. The aim was to unify the Malay students in England.

Tunku*s transition came when he came back to Malaya, where he joined the

Civil Service. He became politicised while working as a District

Officer, meeting the peasants and administrating the districts* He became critical of the Government of Kedah. MHe did not just voice his

criticism: he went to the extent of writing to the Penang newspaper, the Straits Echo, whenever he felt he should express disapproval. He was often summoned to Alor Star to explain his actions to the Mentri Besar and the British Advisor. Both threatened him with severe disciplinary action.”^ ^

During the Japanese occupation, Tunku became nationalistic in approach.

He became patron of *Saberkas* (Unity), formed under Khir Joharl and Senu

Abdul Rahman (both Cabinet Ministers now). Tunku*s relation with his immediate relatives became estranged. He became detached from the

Sultanate System. "He was popular with the people, but not with his

relatives, the ruler, the courts and the administration generally, for he (• was too much opposed to feudalism and colonialism to be their favourite."

Harry Miller in an episode connected with the surrender of the Japanese

in Kedah, described Tunku* s activities: "In the confusion that reigned

in Kedah upon Japan*s surrender Abdul Rahman*s defensive preparations - particularly placing young men into villages and police stations outside

Alor Star - gave rise to reports that he planned a coup d*etat, and that

(17) Miller IBID Page 56. (18) Tregonning Op Cit Page 296. 56 only the return of the British saved the State from falling into his hands. Abdul Rahman was never a revolutionary •••••• the gossip, however, was ugly enough to strain further the relations between Badlishah and

Abdul Rhaman."^*^

So the Malay mass expects the leaders to have attributes associated with

the Malay Rulers but the contents of the leadership would have to alter.

This would probably explain the success of Tunku*s leadership to the

Malays, as possessing the attributes of the traditional Rulers but at the

same time, slightly differentiated. “Politically Abdul Rhaman, unlike

some Kedah politicians, did not adopt a creed against Colonialism or use the British as his whipping boys. Instead he critised feudal Kedah and

Royal Malaya: his targets were the Sultans and the Mentri-Mentri Besar.

In May 19¥) he leapt into the limelight with a scathing article published in the Malay newspaper, the Utusan Melayu, which then backed the UMNO.

Some of his statements were enlightening; they point to his line of thought, and also to his political immaturity.

The first part was a bitter attack on his Sultan-brother and a warning to the Rulers generally. He then took a slightly anti-British line, but ended his article with another warning to the Rulers of what could happen to them if they did not back the UMNO •"^ ^

Representative of the MCA leadership, and almost at the top of the

Alliance hierarchy is Tan Siew Sin, the Finance Minister. He was bora in Malacca, whose family has been in Malaya for generations.

(19) Miller Op Cit Page 73* Chapter "The Occupational Years". (20) Prince and Premier. Miller Page 96. 57

He is a * Straits Chinese* or *Baba* Chinese, whose mode of dress and language intermingle with the Malays. He was educated at Raffles and drawn into politics at an early age through the influence of his father,

Tan Cheng Lock. He has a lot of experience in Government and Finance.

He became Malacca Municipal Commissioner as early as 1946-47 and a member of the Legislative Council since 1948.

His education and background would entitle him to the title *a proper

Tory*. In fact the rich Straits Chinese, with their wealth and education and their Anglophil are sometimes called the *Queens Chinese*• Tan was

President of Malacca Rotary Club in 1950-51» He later became President,

Malayan Estate Owners* Association, 1956 and 1957» and member of its council, 1948-57» Between 1956-7 he was Member of Joint Consultative

Council for Planting Industries.

From such impressive credentials, he graduated into the Federal Government, first as Minister of Commerce and Industry, 1957-59 and he has held the

Finance portfolio since 1959»

Both Tunku and Tan Siew Sin belong to the more conservative type of leader­ ship. They are noted for their status in their communities by virtue of their births; the former in the Ruling class and the latter in the

Business class. This is considered even before they entered politics.

However, the Alliance leadership is shifting more towards the professional political elites, though the forms are not very radically changed. They

* Ratnum quotes a letter sent by a Strait Chinese to Straits Times of 11th December 1948, which shows a remarkable attitude. "The time has come for the Straits Chinese to assert themselves. If they don*t they will be swamped by Chinese born Chinese. Page 98. 58 are professional politicians because they spend more time in politics rather than in business or in the civil service. They too oome from these two professions.

The leader with the greatest synthesis in the Malayan context would be

Tun Abdul Razak. He is a member of the Pahang aristocracy, as one of the Four Chiefs of the State "Orang Besar Berempat**. A patriot from quite an early age, he became a member of *Wataniah* during the Japanese invasion. This Malay Resistance Movement was organised by the Secret

British Force 136 from India. He became a captain in command of a guerilla company at the end of the war.

He had a short spell at Raffles College, where Malayans of all races met.

He went to England to study Law and was called to the Bar in 1950. Here he was both active in the Malay society where he became Secretary while

Tunku was president. He was also active in the Malayans Forum where other Malayans like Dr. Toh Chin Chye of Singapore was also active. He was also a member of the Fabian Society in London. In 1949, Razak represented Malaya at the first World Assembly of Youths.

When he returned to Malaya, he joined the Civil Service. When he became

Mentri Besar of Pahang in 1955, he was the youngest Mentri Besar in Malaya.

He has been active in politics right from student days. In UMNO he was active in the Youth Section as President in 1950. He was responsible for

Tunku*s election to the Presidency of UMNO. He has been Acting to Tunku ever since. ^hen Tunku formed the first Government in 1955, before

Mal a y s independence, Razak became the youngest man in the Cabinet. At

33 he became Minister of Education. He is now Deputy to Tunku. 59

He has achieved the synthesis by incorporating and belonging to three forms of leadership* Essentially he is a professional politician, not only by being involved in politics from such an early age, but also by achieving and maintaining the leadership almost right from the start*

Though he spent less time in the bureaucracy than in politics, less time than Tunku for instance, the amount of time that he was in the Civil

Service, he was at the most strategic point of the Civil Service* He was a Mentri Besar in a State and when he was in the Federal Council, he was involved with Committee work and planning*

From his education at Raffles and London, he is also a member of the

Intelligentsia of Malaya, with similar background as Lee (Raffles and

Cambridge) or Goh Keng Swee (Raffles and London)* As a student he was not only active in the Malay Society, he was also active in the Malayan

Forum, where Lee too started his early politics*

Dr, Ismail Abdul Rahman is more the professional elite, though he too came from a distinguished Malay family of Johore (his father was a Mentri Besar of Johore and at present a Speaker in the Malaysian Parliament). He

graduated in Medicine from Melbourne University in 1945 * After only five years* practice, he joined Tunku*s nationalist movement. Prior to

Malaya*s independence, when Tunku wanted leaders to take over when independence came, Dr* Ismail became Malaya*s firs t M inister of Commerce and Industry. He later represented Malaya in the United Nations. He is probably the most intellectual of Tunku's men.

Urbane and international, Dr. Ismail is a pragmatic politician. He is .one of resolute, and tough. As Minister of Home Affairs, he is probably/the 6 0 . most powerful men in Malaysia. He is respected and feared. His scholarly approach is respected and he is progressive as well, mingling with nationalities in Malaya.

Another combination of professional and p o litic a l e lite would be

Saadon Zubir. Educated at R affles In stitu te, Singapore (Forerunner of the University of Malaya). He joined Middle Temple in 1937 and was called to the Bar in January 1941* His involvement in politics went way back to 1945 when he was one of the founder members of the Malay

Nationalist Party formed in Ipoh. He was also active in Singapore, when he became President of Malay Union from 1947 to 1951» He la te r became the President of UIv.N0 Youth from 1951* This wing of UMNO is closely allied to the grassroots and in fact the Action* part of the party.

He is the proto-type ’developing countries intelligentsia’ . He belonged to the professional class, the strategic elite class. He played leading roles in Malaya’s formative years in forming political parties, He is also identified with the British Administration, not as an administrator as such but as a member in the Legislative Assembly f ir s t in Singapore, then in the Johore State Council in 1951 &nd 1954 in the Malaya’s Legislative Council.

The new professional political elite, who is to the forefront now would be

Senu Abdul Rahman. He would be the new group of slig h tly differentiated

Malay leaders - the leader with strong political awakening after being educated at Sultan Idris Training College. This is a Malay medium

Teachers College, where grassroot nationalism played a big part. This was the place where Malay leadership did not come from the aristocracy. 61

They were educated in Malay and were influenced by Nationalistic works through translation from Arabic or non-inglish or English sources.

When Senu graduated he became a teacher from 1939 to 1941* During the * Japanese occupation he organised 1Seberkas* which was a political party based in Kedah, aimed at achieving independence for Malaya after the

Japanese surrender. Tunku was the Patron of this party. After the war,

Senu left for the United States, where he studied at the University of

California Los Angles, and later graduated in Political Science.

After returning to Malaya, he became Secretary General of UMNO in the vital years of 1935 to 1957* Senu would probably qualify as the most professional politician of the Alliance Government. Senu does not come from the ’Bureaucratic line*, nor does he come from the Malay aristocracy.

His education and background would qualify him as representative of the new leaders of developing countries, such as Nyerere of Tanzania, Nkrumah of Ghana or Kenyatta of Kenya.

The election of Senu as President of UMNO Youth in 1964 in place of Sadon

Zubir who has held the position since 1951 > was an important event for it foresee the type of leaders that will emerge in Malaya in place of the beaucratic political elites of the present. -Another significant office­ holder in the top UMNO executive was Ghaffar Baba the Chief Minister of

Malacca. On the peripheral of UMNO executive was Syed Nasir, the Director of the Language Institute. These three top leaders of UMNO have one

* Another member of Seberkas is Khir Johari, the Present Minister of Education. 62 thing in common, they have been associated with Sultan Idris Training

College** either as students or as teachers. At the time of the dominance of the English educated prior to independence, they were merely school teachers, but post-independence, they came to the forefront as p o liticia n s. These leaders are in the running fo r top leadership in the near future and their style would be different from the bu reau cratic- heavy” of the present UMNO leaders.

** Others Chaffar Baba - Chief Minister o f Malacca, and A. Rahman Yalib - Former Minister of Education. 1937-40 Site - Ast. Inspector of Malay Schools. Tuan Syed Nasir - Probationary Ast. Inspector of Schools Site. (21) Op Cit.

Soenarno observed: ’’These Malay school teachers were the group of Malays at home who were most exposed to external influences. The training College became the focal point, as did the Malay College, for the educated youth from all parts of the Peninsula. But unlike those in the Malay College, the students came from all levels of Malay society. Thus they were more receptive towards propaganda of political and social change for they had more to gain than those by such changes. Literature of revolutionary tone, written in Indonesia and Egypt, was read widely and it was at the Training College that the radical Left-wing nationalism among the Malays first found a footin g in Malaya. The Malay school teachers were the furthest lim it to which European influences could penetrate into Malay society with any conspicuous e ffe c t. In the Malay school the impact of Western ways of life and education had the effect of modifying the irrate conservatism of the Malays, yet the impact was never serious enough to k ill the Malay sp irit completely. There was thus in them a counter-balance between acceptance and resistance, producing a somewhat receptive but cautious mind. This assimilation and adaption of external influences has been a characteristic of the Malay throughout history.” (21) 63

* However, in the present analysis their influence is relatively minor though they could be very important in the future* ** Tunku, Tun Razak and ( 22) Dr* Ismail are still firmly in the saddle. Margaret Roff in her article ”UMN0 - The 1st Twenty Years”, observed. ”In particular the UMNO of today bears an extra-ordinarily close resemblance to the UMNO of ten or fifteen years ago* Its leadership group has remained stable and their view of Malaya* s political needs and problems are relatively unchanged*”

Though the potential of such men like Senu and Ghaffar Baba is great, they are not yet very influential at this stage* The leadership composition of the top Alliance elite is relatively unchanged since independence and their style of politics bears closely to the contents of this small national elite* At the moment, the Alliance elites are unified broadly by a common English education, and their strategic position with the

British administration of pre-independence Malaya either in the Admin­ istrative services or in the Legislative council*

Independence to Mdaya meant in effect a transference of legitimacy from the British administrators to the Alliance elites* It could be said to ♦♦ be a change of personnel rather than change in contents.

* With the exception of Senu, Minister for Information, the others are not in the Federal Cabinet. Rahman Talib resigned as Minister of Education* See Cab ”Malaysia” June 7> 1965* (22) Her article commemorating UMNO*s 20th anniversary appeared in the Australian Outlook* August 1966. V20 168-176* ** The rejection of the Malayan Union Proposals and the subsequent formation of the Federation of Malaya in effect established the system of Malay Mentri Besar (Chief Ministers) in each of the States in place of the proposed British Residents. Since independence, the office of the Mentri Besars have become e le c tiv e * 64 <

ELECTED AND PARTY ELITE: AVENUES OF RECRUITMENT^^ Cab inet-Party Cabinet Party Total Elite n=1 £ n=l8 n=33 n=38 Bureaucracy 46 50 39 42 Professional 23 22 15 16 Business 23 22 24 24 Other -- 12 11 Unknown 8 8 9 8

The Alliance elites are a coalition of bureaucratic, professional and business e lite s with heavy preponderence towards the bureaucracy. There are no ’professional politicians* in the real sense of the words. As a result, the Alliance rulling elites are prone to retain systems and symbols associated with the colonial past.

“While many of the elite s share a common background in Malay tradition on the whole the present groups owe their emergence to the Malayan colonial experience. Colonialism provided the environment; colonial officers introduced the seeds of political change; government-sponsored education and government service provided the means of political socialisation ; English was the language of p o litic a l communication; and the present elites of Malaya are those who passed through this sociali- h(24) sation process."'

There was in fact no real difference in social order in the new manage­ ment. When Independence came to Malaya there was change in Management and not in the whole structure of the organisation. What was even more significant was the fa ct that the new Management wanted to emulate the style of the predecessor not only in going about the business but in dress, taste and ceremonies. Malaya, through the Alliance’s effort of Indepen-

(23) Policy Formulation. R.O. T il man. Malaysia: A Survey. Page 350

(24) Policy Formulation. R.O. Tilman. Malaysia: A Survey. Page 352. 65 dence and retaining quite intact, the Colonial order, in fact is unique among the newly emerging countries# When Tunku first formed his

Cabinet as Prime Minister, he had uniforms made for the Cabinet, "complete with helmets plumed with red, white and blue feathers so reminiscent of British Colonial Governors - and in sets of uniforms for ceremonial ( 25) and formal occasions#"' ' This is in contrast to Lee's Cabinet members who were discreetly dressed in open-necked white shirts.

They also like to retain the Malay institutional framework first because they are part of that institution and secondly because they feel that the

Malay mass need to have such a framework to hedge them from too much questioning on the system of running the country. The conservatism associated with the Alliance is related to the extension of the British colonial policy and the running of such a policy within existing Malay institutions. There is a great deal of hesitancy on the part of the leaders to venture beyond the prescribed boundary laid down by the

British administrators, until very lately, in matters concerning economic policy and national integration. There seemed to be a certain amount of reluctance to initiate policies, fearing that the changes might upset the existing system. A kind of 'bureaucratic mentality' seemed to pervade.

Tunku once said

"As far as I am concerned, I am not interested in politics, I am more interested in administering the government and looking after the welfare and well being of the people and the nation." (26)

(25) Prince and Premier. Harry Miller Page 211 Chapter 29* "Whither Man and Country." (26) Selection from the Tunku's Speeches and Writings. Page 133> Tribute to Tunku Abdul Rahman edited by Durai Raja Sing am. 66

The bureaucracy as a result plays a very important role in the initiation

of policies especially in the delegation of responsibilities to the * heads of departments* ** The result of this kind of arrangement was the

strong complementary relation between the governing elite and the Civil

Servants. The main change in the early days of independence has been

in the replacement of expatriate officers by the Malayans, i.e. change

at the top, a kind of elite replacement and not in the reorganisation of

the Malayan society to suit the new environment of independence. There

was no dislocation in the old structure of the Malayan society, especially

the Malay social structure. The Malay religion, their customs and

culture remained in tact. There was no attempt made to be accommodating

** to the emerging new Malayan society.

Independence was seen in the 'emotionalism* aspect. The people were

'emotionalised' to be happy and contented with the change at the top -

to their own traditional leaders. There was pageantry and there was

* Chasali Shaafi Malayan top Civil Servant plays an important role in actual policy making. He was not only active at the time of the Indonesian Confrontation by providing policy for retaliatory response, he was also instrumental in bringing about the end of Confrontation. There was no 'anonymity' (mark of a civil servant about it. Even on the home front he was not involved with*political neutrality', when he mentioned the political scene, For instance, he said "And the Malaysian of Chinese origin know this, that nowhere else in South-East Asia would they be civilly treated as in Malaysia with the various constitutional safeguards and guarantee of freedom. They also know that in body politics they must not upset the balance, that the strength of politics of South-East Asia is native-based and any attempt at upsetting this will bring dire consequences." Confrontation: A Manifestation of the Indonesian Problem Speech by Dato' Ghazali Shafi at the Conference of the Junior Chamber Inter­ national in Penang on 1st May, 1964* ** A Sub-Ministry of Culture and Sports was set up ohly after 1964. In fact just after independence there was a clamour to revive the traditional culture and PESTA was organised in 1957 * The work of the Ministry of Culture is more for the Malaysian culture, i.e. Malayan ______contents. ceremony associated with the new ‘Managers* • There was a great deal of activity going on to fit these people at the top to the new status and responsibilities expected of them in an independent nation* The citizens of the new nations are expected to be ‘happy* and ‘proud* at the ‘new* changes to the leaders* They were told to be loyal and to identify with the achievement of the leaders* They were told to work hard in what they do* 68

2. THE PAP CONTENTS & STYLE

The Alliance theme of projecting a ’satisfied' order in the society was the very opposite of the PAP elites. The PAP leaders see so much poverty still around to he satisfied. Independence is seen as a trans­ formation of the society not by bloody revolution but by planning and programming so that the mass achieve the rewards. The aim was to merge the best of the techniques of the developed societies into the new independence, i,e, to transform or modernise the traditional patterns of living into the modern life# Where the local contents do not impede or divide the achievement of great prosperity, they are to be incorporated into the new society# There was to be no slavish imitation but one of achieving quality from any source#

When there was any divisive elements cropping up or elements which the

PAP think might divide the people or impede their proper development into responsible citizens, the leadership attacked them swiftly# The leader­ ship is more aggressive and is prepared to take up unpopular issues in order to achieve a more just society. There was tremendous vitality and initiative - they are always on the move#

When the PAP set the goal of achieving independence for Singapore, they did so by mobilising the mass and educating them about independence and about the kind of opportunities in store for them when independence oame#

They did so not so much by despising everything to do with colonialism but that part of colonialism which impede the participation of the majority of the people in the productive sphere# The leadership wanted to improve their lot# "Lee will not listen to British protests that 69

Britain never intended to challenge independence and wished only to bring it about realistically and practically. Not believing this, Lee and his party adopted a fighting posture, and he still feels that the

British would never have handed over complete government of the island to the local people had they not, in effect, forced the British to do s o . " ^

The PAP leadership is essentially composed of professional politicians who are interested in ideas and how to put the ideas into aotion. Unlike the

Alliance leadership who had worked within the British administration of

Malaya, the PAP leadership is composed of mostly professional men, middle-class in their economic standing but foremost politicians. As a result they are not greatly influenced by too indulging bureaucratisation.

In a way the PAP leadership had * jumped* the transitional stage of the

Alliance leadership. The transitional leadership in Singapore where the lo cal people were brought into administrative and le g isla tiv e machinery had already taken place in Singapore prior to 1955* The ‘traditional* leadership from the big Chinese business group, as tran sition al leader­ ship were gone after the election of 1955 in the defeat of the Progressive Party. The leadership of the PAP is connected with intellectuals from the University, not bureau era cy, as; in Malaya. Instead they are the professions. They represent a wider spectrum of the society and the most dynamio portion of the society. As a result they represent greater interest groups appealing to wider aspirations.

(1) Singapore's Fantastic Mr. Lee Duan Yew. Alex Josey. Bulletin October 26, 1963* Page 30. 70

At the top of the PAP is Lee Kuan Yew, who is a professional politician par excellence* He was not born with a silver spoon like the MCA leader, Tan Siew Sin. He is the product of the middle class, of the

'Evatt Fort Street Boys High* type. His academic b rillia n ce brought him to Cambridge, where he achieved a crowning academic glory coming first in the Honours list.

He did not work with the Government, lik e the other Malayan leaders.

Instead he became a practicing lawyer and went headlong into politics.

He was not connected with the Colonial Administration at sill but he started his politics among the trade unions. He is the prototype

'conscious* leader, who worked directly with the grassroots in this case, the unions and arouse them into political awareness. In this respect in the Malayan context, he is in the class of his own. There is no one like him. All the other leaders, especially in Malaya, however, professional politicians they are, were at some stage involved with the Colonial Administration.

After working with the unions as Legal Adviser, and winning their approval, Lee in November of formed the People’s Action Party.

He planned and organised the machinery of the party, incorporating the most dynamic forces in Singapore the intellectuals, the student leaders, the journalists etc. He aimed at creating a truly "people’s party with a broad base, but his main strength lies with the trade unions. The

PAP became from the beginning a truly modern party, incorporating the cream of Singapore leaders, and representing the various interest groups. 7 1 .

L ee's deputy, Dr» Toh Chin Chye has a s im ila r background as Lee* He went to Raffles just like Lee and Raxak and later went to London* He

ended up by gaining a PHD in Physiology at the National Institute for

Medical Research, London* While in London he became Chairman of the

'Malayan Forum* • He is similar to the 'American' version of an academic

in Administration, a Wilson type. He was involved with politics from

the student days and helped the formation of the PAP*

Dr* Goh Keng Swee, the former Finance M inister and now M inister for

Defence, also went to Raffles. He finished his education in London,

gaining first a BSc (Economics) and later a PHD at London School of

Economics. Besides being the economic brain of the party, he also has

experience in the Civil Service for 20 years* He would be included in the bureaucratic-political elite, a Hasluck or Bury type who sprang from the Public Service into Politics.

Representing the Press is Rajaratnam. He is a professional politician possibly at the most strategic position in the country. He was

Assistant Editor of Singapore Standard from 1950 to 195^ and he has also worked with the Straits Times. Incorporating the trade unions in the formative years of the PAP wcuaeLim Chin Siong and Devan Nair.

The new government Lee said "had no future apart from the future of the people* We share the same future - be it good or bad"* The leadership is composed of the most active sectors of the society and with a high

degree of political consciousness. They are all directly related to the majority of the activities of the society. Hence, the apt name of the

People's Action Party* Like 'research specialists* they are, they plot 72 their move and plan their action* They have a pretty good idea of the kind o f society they hoped independence would bring. They wanted to bring their ideas into action and not necessarily an extension of a system.

When the PAP came into power in 1959, they swiftly carried out the reforms which they had preached. The most important change was the

'institutionalisation' of Singapore into democratic and efficient frame­ work. Though following the British pattern, the contents are distinctly

'Malayan*. "The Speaker and his s ta ff retained their wigs and robes, the new PAP assembly men adopted the dignified informality of open- necked shirts." (2)

Instead of the Governor, there was introduced the 'Yang di-Pertuan

Negara* (head of State). There was a new National Anthem 'Majullah

Singapura* (Let Singapore flo u ris h ). There was a new crest with animal supporters comprising the 'Singapore Lion* and the 'Malayan Tiger*.

Unprogressive elements and factors divisive to the good relation between

Singapore and Malaya were properly cast aside. There was a sense of direction in Singapore, where there was none. The people could look to the future with purpose. The Singapore Chinese were bluntly told about the reality of the position of Singapore, geographically and economically. Chinese schools were organised to suit the new Singapore.

The materials in the textbooks were ohanged in order to have more Malayan contents. A conscious effort was made in order to achieve national

( 2 ) State of Singapore Annual Report. Page 12 73 integration* The people of Singapore were wakened from their apathy.

MFor the first time the majority of the people of Singapore, with little traditional concept of the rights of the individual or the freedom and restrains of democracy, felt that the Government was their government."

The leadership of the PAP is less 'emotional'. There is less sentiment but there is more rationality in politics, a rarity in Asian politics.

They liked to go for open arguments, to bring up issues which they considered the people should know so that they know where they stand. Men should govern the course of human action rather than vice versa, "The future is what we all together make of it."^^

(3) Focus in Malaysia - Singapore. Page 99* Ronald McKie. (A) Straits Times - Lee Kuan Yew. June 26, 1964* 74

3. THE PAP AND ALLIANCE: STYLE AND TYPOLOGY

Being professional politicians, the PAP is more sure of what they want and how they want to build their society* The Alliance on the other hand is less sure of where they stand on certain issues. In many ways this is due to the structure of their party. The structure of the two parties govern the attitudes and approaches of their politics. Where the Alliance is a coalition of elites at the top with the plural society at the base, the PAP leadership is more of an interlocking leadership which embraces the interest groups. This leadership has the preponder­ ance of the English educated. Where Malaya’s society is differentiated and plural, Singapore, again because of its Chinese preponderance over the other communities, is more of an interlocking and differentiated * mass than a purely plural society.

The Chinese-educated intellectuals are intimately involved with the trade union movement. They are the direct representation of the unions.

They are occupationally and socially involved with the workers. The

English-educated elites, on the other hand, were involved with the unions mostly as advisers. Lee, for instance was the legal adviser of the

Naval Base Labour Union in 1953* Mr. S. Woodhull, his colleague from the University of Malaya Socialist Club was the Secretary.

* Freedman in "The Growth of Plural Society”. Op Cit. observed: "It is wrong, nevertheless, to ascribe all the Westernising elements in Malayan Chinese life to the ’English* schools (for in one sense the Chinese schools have been more Westernised than the ’English’ counterparts, bringing in modern influence via China), and it is a mistaken view of the Malayan Chinese society which makes a sharp division between the Chinese- educated and %glish-educated sections of the community. The two forms of education overlap, often in the same family, some­ times in the same individual.” 75

\ >s~rt^e.uOC.vc\ri c A D C?»FPEJ^E^'r\A>Tt,t> MASS DIAGRAM NO, III.

The structure of the PAP is more modern and organised than the Alliance.

■Whereas the PAP is a strong organisation, with a strong inner executive, the Alliance is very weak organisationally. In fact, it is a quite fragmented political party. It is more a coalition of interests party, similar to the Literal-Country Party of Australia. It is also a coalition of ethnic interests. Since the PAP is organised with strong leadership core, the party is capable of acting swiftly. The Alliance fragmented structure made it a relatively weak party to act considering the fact that it is a big party. The PAP is more horizontal encompassing varied interest groups. In theory this would be a strong cohesion, but in practice as in 1961 the interest group in this, the trade union, could exert greater force than other interests which would break the party.

The Alliance is more vertical, in the Malayan setting, since it encompasses not interest groups but ethnic interest. 76

COMPARATIVE PARTY STRUCTURE

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.PKP ’w\OG WORiZOMTAtC • '¿JOiMGO COtUMN \S YVApU ALb\A/^CE> STRllCTU Rt »SUPPORT P R O M RRE^SSUR/L-; «C R O U P Í,

*>STRO OP THt/ COUMTRY^ STRÆ^Î><^TH OR lM5T\TUTiOrSS .

DIAGRAM NO. IV 77

The effect of the party organisation can be seen on the style of their politics* The coalition of interests of the Allianoe meant that changes were made more slowly* There were periods of adjustments and re- admustments before changes could take effect* Hence the approach is more conservative, more cautious. Politics and discussions were often held in the * committee rooms” where decisions are made without indulging in great debates in public. The politicians were expected to play down politics, in contrast to the PAP's great enthusiasm in public debates.

Tunku likes to keep politics as mild as possible. He said "There is already too much trouble in this world for us to grow or get unduly excited over trifles, when there is no need for it*MV( 1 )

There is a strong paternalistic approach on the part of the leaders towards the mass* Thus the approach is similar to the British adminis­ trators whose attitudes towards the Malay culture was one of 'disengage­ ment** In the case of the Alliance leaders,policy adopted was one of accepting the Malay culture, and encouraging its growth rather than bringing into line with the Malayan cultural stream*

The Alliance wanted to stay above politics and achieve a kind of consensus*

The Alliance style becomes recognised for its * non-political* and the leaders preached the people not to indulge in politics* In fact, being

'non-political' they expected other politicians to be the same, a most difficult and extraordinary business* This would be most difficult for other parties with different ideologies than the Alliance. Paternalism

(1) Opening Conference of Information and Broadcasting Officials From Malaysian Territories* Sari Berita. 4th October, 1962* 78. pervaded and interest groups were required to accept the Alliance and the Alliance will bring them to social justice. The only thing open is for others to join the Alliance, but never to plot other courses than the Alliance.

'Non-politics* * in fact became the basis by which the Alliance plot the

course of Malaya. Associated with this is the absence of any ideology in politics. There was no political ‘blueprints*, no public discussion or participations. At the height of the Ejection of 1964, Razak said,

**I don't care about Socialism, Communism, neo-Colonialism, or Capitalism.

I give you what is the most important *ism* not only in Malaysia but in

South-East Asia. It is Alliance-ism. It is an example to the world

of what real progress can mean. Development is our defence, discord our danger.**v( 2 ) This situation prevailed. At UMNO 20th Anniversary, * there was discussion about adopting a certain ideology, but there was no

enthusiasm. Razak described the goal as 'democratic nationalism*•

Whereas the Alliance wanted to retain the institutions, especially the bureaucracy, the PAP in fact went headlong in changing the form of the

Civil Service in keeping with the sprit of Singapore. Lee said as he took office "The political leadership understands that they have to improve on the apparatus of the state they have inherited and work it.

The Administrative personnel, on the other hand, have appreciated that

( 2) Straits Times. April 23, 1964* * A Review Article about the Meeting called 'Socialist UMNO' by Harvey Stockwin appeared in 'Far Eastern Economic Review August 18, 1966. Stockwin believed that ’'Socialism** is still a *bogey-man* for many in Malaysia, and there is fear that its adoption may adversely affect foreign investment." 79 there are constant pressures from the ground on the p o litic a l leader- ( 3) sh ip.” ' ' To implement the new administration, the PAP Government in the first instance of achieving power in Singapore, established a

Political Study Centre* ”where senior civil servants could study their new role as national administrators in the service of a popularly elected government

The attitude to the civil service and the forms of the civil service constituted important differences between the Alliance and the PAP which continued to the present day. "Whereas the Alliance relied on the

Civil Servants such as the important role played by Date* Ghazalli, the

PAP on the other hand dominated them so that they could do the work not make policy. In the beginning of independence both the Alliance and the PAP were concerned with ,Malayanisation* of the Civil Service.

Possibly the main difference between the Alliance leadership and the PAP and which affect their style, is the high degree of political consciousness on the part of the PAP. Whereas the Alliance leaders are noted for their

*non-politics*, the PAP leadership, especially as displayed by Lee Kuan Yew, is in constant ‘apolitical* state. *’..••• He has a highly developed sense of p o litic a l drama. He sometimes gives the impression that ( 5 ) p o litic s are a daily trauman which he has learned to liv e . What happened was that being very apolitical the leadership dwells in politics

(3) State of Singapore Annual Report 1939* Page 12. (4) IBID Page 13. (5) The Age, March 1963. 80 constantly and expects others to do the same. Whereas the Alliance wanted to keep politics on the low pitch, the PAP wanted politics to be in high pitch# The problem for the PAP is that the political area is too small#

Hence the PAP is always on the move, constantly seeking solutions to problems and constantly challenging the opponents for open arguments#

They are aggressive politicians who want to achieve the best possible result and hence in the political battles they tend to go alj| out to defeat their opponents# This is seen in the personalities of Lee and

Tunku# Their styles of politics, which in good measure reflects the political styles of the PAP and the Alliance are so different. "Lee's aggressive personality is noticeable, and felt at once, just as the Tunku*s relaxed affability instantly charms and soothes#"^^ Where Tunku wanted to keep politics on the quiet side and to plan down on the communal problems by leaving the problems as they are, Lee on the other hand wanted to tackle this problem# He therefore criticised Tunku. "He does not like to think certain things exist# Personally, I believe people gain heart when they know a threat to their lives is being discussed and it concerns people in high places #"^^

A good analogy in the difference in style between Tunku and Lee would be between Eisenhower and Kennedy# The consensus style of Tunku is reminiscent of Eisenhower’s# In fact, both of them were involved with

(6) Singapore’s Fantastic Lee Kuan Yew# Alex Josey, The Bulletin October 19, 1963 * (7) Sunday Telegraph, March 28, 1965* 81

staff management before they entered politics. Eisenhower in the army and Tunku in the Civil Service, and hence their fondness for the delegation of responsibilities. Lord Ogmore called Tunku *a commander* and not a ’staff officer', in the same way that Elsenhower's leadership could be described. The keynote in this method of leadership lies in the amount of staff-work involved, in preparation of reports before the leader makes a decision. This would mean that the system would require good and competent lieutenants. On the credit side, Tunku*s style meets the requirements of his able deputy Tun Razak, Dr. Ismail and Tan

Siew Sin. On the debit side, the leader would be relying too much on his deputies to provide new and challenging response to problems. Another point is that leadership in politics is certainly different from leader­ ship as a Commander in the army.

In the Malayan context, at this time of nation-building, there is greater need for integrative or consensus style of leadership. Hence Tunku's

'father' image of the nation pictures him above politics. Henry Miller likened him to a "country squire who wants to look after his people, who with considerable generosity, tact, and goodwill endeavours to help them

(8 ) to merge their individualities and become a single contented society."'

In youth and approach, Lee's political style resembles Kennedy's. They are both professional politicians, who would not tolerate any nonsense in politics. Kennedy's 'Let's get this country moving' theme resembles Lee's

* inContemporary Review, December 1963* 'The Tunku' Lord Ogmore.

(8) Op .Cit Page 27. 82

( Q \ •We cannot afford to be negative, and see time being lost."v ' There

is sense of urgency in running the country, 'a keener awareness of time * and space* ***•

Lee’s politics is more of the Western model* There is more rationality

in his approach. MHe believes the ordinary man is not a fool, and

expects people to make the correct judgement if they are told the truth

and given the factsin his political manouvre, he likes to

present the facts to back his arguments. This he did after long weighing

the pros and cons of issues* Once he has made up his mind, his arguments

became forceful and aggressive* This is reminiscent of Kennedy's style.

Both leaders were involved with some tough political battles before they

finally reached the top (Kennedy's primary battle in Virginia and

Wisconsin before the Los Angeles Convention in 1960 was always tough).

It is in this light that sometimes these leaders were accused of being

ruthless politicians. However, in their administration they displayed great political integrity.

Tunku's Alliance has been relatively free from political struggles as

compared to Lee's PAP in Singapore. Hence the Alliance could not be seen as far as their techniques in terms of party contests. There was a difference, however, in their method of achieving independence. Malaya's road to independence was relatively peaceful. On the other hand the fight for independence for Singapore was tougher. Without being more

(9) Battle for Merger. Lee Kuan Yew. Page 173* * As described by a reporter quoted by CAB of June 7, 1965. ** Tunku’s politics are more intuitive. Time Cover Article April 12, 1963 says that Tunku "understands the Malay mind better than anyone else has. Tunku himself said, "I have the feel of the people.... I have the touch". (10) Singapore's Fantastic Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. Alex Josey. 83. aggressive in their demand, the B ritish would probably deny Singapore of complete independence since the Base is of such important strategic value •

Besides the difference in their style, political parties in power have their sim ilarities. Parties in opposition might be aggressive, but once power has become responsible, since power is a conservative influence.

In the same way, having been in power in Singapore and Malaya, the PAP and the Alliance developed similar or parallel attitudes to administration.

This can be seen in their attitude to national planning, and their constant recruitment of foreign experts to advise them in the economic planning, in the armed services and in the universities. They both employ British pattern of Government, in parliamentary procedure, though Kuala Lumpur, through Tunku, has tried to employ British method even to ceremonies and p rocedure.

Being in power, they make use of the press a great deal more than the

Western democracy. Singapore’s Ministry of Culture became the instrument of the PAP, so is the Ministry of Information as the organ of the Alliance.

There is less political neutrality in the state-controlled radio and tele­ vision, unlike the statutory corporations in Australia, or Canada which has maintained strict neutrality.

As the parties in power in Singapore and Malaya, the PAP and the Alliance do not differ very much. The PAP appeared to be more aggressive when in opposition, but this cannot really be compared with the Alliance which has not really experienced oppositional politics* They would probably resort to the same tactics as any oppositional parties in a democracy. The pace in Malaya is slower than in Singapore and the

Alliance is more concerned at 'order maintaining* than the PAP which aimed more at changing or 'transforming*• The institutional develop­ ment in Malaya is more 'mixed' than Singapore, since Singapore has

♦ less acquaintance with the local institutional framework. Singapore is concerned more at the functional or the effective types of institutions.

* For an analysis of comparative politics, see "The Politics of The Developing Countries" by Almond and Coleman. PAKT I I

SING-APQRE-MALAYA INTERACTION 85

CHAPTER III

THE PROCESS OF NATION-BUILDING-

The Alliance idea of a nation is involved with the evolution of Malay norms and the incorporation into these norms of the non-Malay citizens o f the country* lii/hat the norms are and now the non-Malays are to be incorporated into these norms are important factors in the Alliance idea of what the Malaysian should be* This form of national process is more institutional and the norms are embodied in the Constitutions* They are involved with certain character: that the country shall be a form of a Monarchy (Part 4 of the Constitutions, Chapt. I and II), that Malay

shall be the national language, and that there should be a Parliamentary form of government* The language and Monarchy are associated with the

Malay norms and the Parliamentary system are on the British model*

The Sultans of the old Malay States become Constitutional Heads. Together with the Governors they form the Conference o f Rulers (Chapt* II A rticle

38) and have lim ited powers such as the alteration of State boundaries, religious observations, thespecial position of the Malays and the Sultans* own privileges* The evolution of Malay norms, as basis o f a Malaysian

consciousness and identity has its historical explanation* In his Ratnam *Communalism And The P o litica l Process In Malaya*, K*J^ wrote

"When divided into Malay and non-Malay categories, one of the most significant features of the Malayan society is that the former has a cultural and institutional continuity in the loyal context, while the latter lacks a Malayan traditional past* The fact that they axe now settled is certainly a most v ita l feature of the non-Malay communities; ( 1 ) but also important is the fact that they are only recent settlers.'*' '

(1) Page 5-6 86

This framework of the nation as formulated by the Alliance has been reiterated many times by their top leaders in order to dispel any doubt of their intention* ** The basis of the national, goal had been sealed in the Constitutional arrangement made prior to Malaya’s independence in

1957* Tunku introduced the Motion of the Constitutional Proposals on * 10th July, 1957* Among other things he said :-

"A formula was agreed upon by which it was decided that in considering the rights of the various peoples in this country, no attempt must be made to reduce such rights which they have enjoyed in the past* As a result you find written into the Constitution rights of the various peoples thçy have enjoyed in the past and new rights, in fact, accorded to new people whom it was the intention to win over into the fold of the Malayan nation* I refer to the Citizenship rights* It is a right which has given the Malays very grave concern and fear* Nevertheless because of their desire and anxiety to put Malaya on the pedestal as an independent Nation, they are prepared to give that right to the new people*"

This clearly shows the normative approach to the problem of nation­ building* It also showed the emphasis placed on the relative weights of the Malays over the non-Malays in the question of the Constitution*

* Legislative Council Debate. ** The Normative Approach to the process of nation-building is associated with the evolution of Malay norms* In this approach, based on the concept of Welfare Economics, happi­ ness is increased when welfare of a person is increased without diminishing the welfare of another* I believe this was the spirit in which the Malayan Constitution of 1957 was made, as Tunku*s speech showed (excerpts on Page i)* This was the evolution of the Federation Agreement of 1948* In other words the 1957 Constitution, while increasing the rights of the non- Malays, the Malay rights should at least remain on the 1948 level. "The safeguarding of the special position of the Malays and of the legitimate interests of the other communities" of the Tunku*s speech pointed the goal of the Alliance about the concept of

the Malayan nation. He elaborated the forms in which the Malayan

nations should evolve. There were practical matters discussed which

provided the basis for the running of the country. Such matters were

concerned with Citizenship, which became the most explosive issue in

the Constitutional discussion. Then there was the matter concerned with

Parliament and the Executive. Other matters were concerned with the

Federal-state financial set-up; the Judicial set-up; the Civil Service

and the fundamental rights. These are general Constitutional topics.

1948 Federation Agreement became the Article 153 of the Malayan and Malaysian Constitution.

Mr. Tan Siew Sin, addressing the University of Singapore Students Union on 23rd July 1965, brought about this theme in discussing Article 153* He said that ”The effect of this provision is that firstly, all existing rights are preserved; secondly, no citizen can be prohibited from engaging in business activity merely because he is non-Malay.” (Communal Relations In Malaysia. Page 9)

On the other hand I propose that the approach of the PAP is a Functional Approach which put priority on the utility of particu­ lar institutions. Hence the heavy accent on economics and industrialisation, etc. In so far as being normative as in the Maley language, the PAP saw the efficiency value in it as well, in the sense that the language would increase contacts among the various communities and this would increase efficiency. Hence the norms to the PAP did not lie in a vacuum but they have utilitarian value. There was greater awareness to economic efficiency. Lee said HWe have an international airport at Paya Lebar. The Federation is also building an enormous airport costing $(m )50 million near Kuala Lumpur. But no international airline wants to land its aeroplanes in two such short stops - Kuala Lumpur and Singapore which are 250 miles from one another.” ‘Merger and the Stakes Involved* Page 5 Battle For Merger. Lee Kuan Yew. 88#

In the Malayan context, the most important subjects are concerned with the contents of the institutions*

These institutions are concerned with the Malay norms and are specific subjects in the Constitutions* These are the norm3 by which the

Alliance hoped the substance of the Malayan nation would take* First of these provisions were concerned with the Office of the 'Yang Di-

Pettuan Agong* Tunku said "The person chosen should be one who will command the love, respect and absolute and undivided loyalty of the ( ) Malayan peoples."' 2 Then there was the question relating to Article

153, about the ’Special position of the Malays'* Tunku said "When discussing the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities, we must never forget that our main object is to unite our people* We should do all we can to remove communal barriers and help build a united and patriotic Malayan people* This Article 153 gives each of us a great opportunity to show that we have the true

(2) Legislative Council Debate, 10th July 1957* Page 2850 89 interests of our country at heart and that we are prepared to place the interests of Malaya as a whole before the interests of any single (3) community."' 7

Other institutional matters were concerned with Islam as the Official religion of Malaya and Malay as the National Language* These two subjects are important on the Official level* Article 152 provides that no person shall be prohibited from learning and using his own language*

Tunku's theme was taken by his colleagues during this Constitutional debate* Tan Siew Sin elaborated on the content of Article 153 of the

Constitution in the new Malayan nation* Among other things he said:

"In the first place, the principle of the special position of the Malays has already been embodied in the Federation of Malaya Agreement* The Malays therefore cannot be expected to give up what they already have in the same way that they do not expect the other communities to give up their existing rights*••••♦the main object of this provision is to ensure that the Malays do not lose the little that they already have, and if possible be given a reasonable handicap to enable them to catch up with the other races* I cannot think of a more laudable objective nor a more necessary one* An economically depressed Malay community in a prosperous Malaya will not mean a peaceful Malaya* An economically depressed Malay community will never be able to achieve the desired degree of co-operation with the substantially more prosperous non-Malay communities* It is, therefore, to the long term interest of all of us to support any measures which will enable our Malay brethren to improve their economic status*

(3) IBID Page 2862 90

Such an attitude and policy is dictated not only by sentiment but by sheer commonsense and will benefit not only the Malays themselves but this country as a whole, because anything which tends to raise total productivity and productivity per capita must obviously benefit the whole country* *”' '

Article 153 was incorporated to ensure that the Malays can compete with the non-Malays* The problems of nation-building of Malaya, according to this provision of the Constitution have to take account of the position of the Malays* Besides acceding to Malay opinion, it was a serious attempt at redressing the imbalance of the communities.

DIAGRAM NO * V u v i'O'rHE/Tic-^u

< Q P (4 ) Second Legislative Council Debate, 10th July 1957» Page 2869* * Tunku wrote: "I must point out that although the Constitution provides for a special position of the indigenous peoples at present, it also provides for periodic review of the position when necessary* Ultimately the time will come when it will be possible by legislative action to amend the Constitution because this special position will no longer be needed*” ’Malaysia: Key Area In Southeast Asia* Foreign Affairs, July 1965* 91

The other aspect of the Alliance national goal would be in the promo­ tion of national identity* This was a subtle point of the Constitution which saw the development of a Malayan national identity, emerging out of the acceptance of the * Official* provision of the Constitution* This side of the nation-building is the cultural aspect, on the grassroot level and more in keeping with the spirit of identification with the local scene. Dato' Sir Clogh Thuraisingham, a non-Malay, and one of the early leaders of Malaya, saw this cultural aspect of the Malayan nation* In the Constitutional Debate he mentioned the trend of develop­ ment :-

"What is the pattern to-day in Malaya? In many Chinese homes, and in some Indian homes too, Malay is the home language and they follow a Malayan mode of life. They share daily cultural, social and sporting events together and enjoy them* In my home my own children speak Malay fluently, and claim with pride that they have topped their classes in the national language. You see to-day one of the most conservative news­ papers in this Peninsula has put on a Malay edition, (Laughter), and I am sure that other newspapers will follow suit. In my mind there has always been a great conflict whether the * sarong kebaya*, or the ’cheongsam*, or the *sari‘, or the Indonesian style with an upward lift of the *batik sarong* was the most becoming for a female. I have myself put on a *songkok* in my room and admired myself (Laughter), and even thought that when my figure looked better (Laughter) I would challenge the Honourable Chief Minister to a male beauty contest. (Laughter)

But all these are symptoms and signs that the different cultures, observances and traditions are blending in this country. If you are patient the united Malayan Nation of single unity and single loyalty is now shaping and it won’t be many decades before a powerful and united nation will take its place with pride in the community of nations of this world." ^5)

(5) Second Legislative Council Debate, 10th July 1957* Page 2878. 92

Dr* Ismail, when speaking at this Constitutional Debate further added

the theme of what constitutes a nation* Besides creating opportunities

and economic well-being for the people, Dr* Ismail saw a nation as more

than this* He said that a country, Mlike a human being, needs more

than material things for it to be of full stature. It needs something

spiritual; it needs that quality which inspires patriotism to those who

owe loyalty to it**.*** It is with this that we must try to create an

independent Malaya."^^

When Tunku dropped a hint about merging with Singapore, he again

emphasised this factor of bringing the non-Malays into the Malay norms.

He said:

HWe who are here have only our little Malaya. The Chinese, Malays and others have to make the best of our home here. If the Chinese didn’t change the Malays would be made to feel nervous of their presence as Chinese and not as Malayans*”^ ^

When Malaysia was about to be formed, Tunku mentioned this theme of bring­ ing the non-Malays into the framework already established. This was

explicitly declared by Tunku when speaking at a dinner given by the (8) Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce* ^ In this important speech

Tunku clearly stated :-

”To the Chinese in Singapore in general I would like to say here that in no other country in the world do the Chinese enjoy so much happiness and freedom as in the Federation, not even in China itself. In some other countries as South-East Asia many Chinese have complained of the treatment

(6) IBID Page 2953. (7) Battle For Merger. Page 120. (8) Sari Berita, 27th March 1962. 93 they received at the hands of the government, but nobody can say this of the Federation Government, If this is not apparent to them they have only to visit these other countries to see for themselves* *

In the Federation the Chinese have shown that they want to make Malaya their home, and the Malays have extended to them their friendly hands* The peace and harmony in the Federation i3 assured so long as this state of affairs continues, but the danger is that in years to come, long after I am gone, if the Chinese chauvenists threaten the security of the Malays, the inevitable result would be that for their own security the Malays might look elsewhere for protection*" (9 )

When Malaysia was formed, the PAP seemed to agree to this approach but the difference is again in the matter of emphasis* *

National identity is an important feature of the Alliance concept of the

Malaysian nation* To create this distinct Malayan identity, the Alliance have created symbols: such as the wearing of the *songkok’ (headgear) at the international sporting meeting or the system of creating awards for services, etc.

(9) Sari Berita* Weekly Digest of the Malayan Press, 29th March 1962. * MWhat I have in mind is to call such an association or federation of states the Federation of Malaysia, i.e. all the Federation of Malaya states, the Borneo territories and Singapore, in which the states of the Borneo territories and the states of the Federation of Malaya join in together as a Federation of Malaysia 94.

The PAP put less emphasis on rational identity, but there is emphasis

as with the Alliance, on national consciousness. Certainly the PAP

does not subscribe to the evolution of the Malay norms. Loyalty to

Malaysia is foremost, and national identity is not emphasised.

and Singapore is joined in partnership on a footing something like that which exists between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.

An association of such a nature would recognise the Federation of Malaysia with Singapore as partners in one identity.

At this moment our Attorney-General is making a study of the Northern Ireland Constitution which defines the relationship and sets out the respective position of the two states. The information I have available at this moment is roughly this.

Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. She enjoys a certain measure of local self-government and has a legislature of her own with powers to deal with purely local affairs.

The essential feature of the constitution of Northern Ireland is that her territory forms an integral part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

She elects twelve members direct to the U.K. Parliament in West­ minster and a large range of legislative and administrative functions are delegated to her government•"

Tungku*s Merger Speeches in Federal Parliament. Appendix 4 Page 132.

The Battle for Merger by Lee Kuan Yew. 95

Nationalism to the Alliance should have the cultural elements as well; to the PAP, nationalism is more economic# The difference in emphasis is important# In the short run, to achieve the Alliance goal, national symbols, such as sports stadiums, Parliament House, museums, etc. were built without regard to economic gains and in this the PAP viewed with apprehension# The Alliance method too would be a long process# To the PAP the concept of nationalism and national identity is only second­ ary to the concept of socialism. The difference with the Alliance is now dual; cultural as well as ideological* Again, the difference is in a matter of emphasis but they are important in the short run# In the concept of socialism there was less emphasis on national identity#

All mankind should be equal politically and economically. The elimination of poverty would solve the problem of national consciousness and identity#

The difference in accent on certain approaches caused the political struggle between the Alliance and the PAP. The goal of a Malaysian nation integrated as a single unit would constitute the same focus but the method was different# At the time when the two parties were beginn­ ing to drift apart in this question of approach, Dr# Ismail explained the differences

(10) Alliance ”Malaysian Malaysia” 96

"In order to create a firm foundation for inter-racial harmony the leaders of the three parties - MCA, MIC and UMNO had to do hard bargaining. Before these three Parties agreed to fight for Independence, they were each representing their racial interests. It was not uncommon in the days of the Legislative Council for each racial leader to play politics on racial lines. However, the pull of nationalism which inspires them to live in an independent country drew them closer together and their representatives sat around a table to discuss how best they could prepare for an independent Malaya in which the races could live in harmony with one another, which would ultimately lead to a United Malayan Nation. They agreed on major basic principles, which today still form the platform of the Alliance Party. They agreed that non-Malays who had lived and were prepared to owe loyalty only to Malaya should be given citizenship on the fairest of terms. They agreed that not only the special position of the Malays should be preserved, but also pledged that the special position of the Malays should be their main weapon to uplift the social and economic standard of the Malays, so that they would ultimately be able to compete on equal footing with other non-Malay citizens; but also they agreed that in helping the Malays, others should not be robbed of their wealth and opportunities. They agreed that the Malay Rulers should retain their position and that a monarchial system of government with one of the Rulers to be chosen in turn to be Supreme Head, should be established, because they realised that in a country where citizens are drawn from various races there must be a focal point to symbolise unity. They agreed that there must be a common language which must be developed to become the National Language and they had chosen Malay.

Their fundamental principles were accepted by the people of Malaya as a whole and Independent Malaya was born in August, 1957*

This was the state of affairs in Malaya when Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak decided to join Malaya to form Malaysia. To achieve a Malaysian Malaysia, there must be two stages - the present stage of inter-racial harmony lead­ ing to the ultimate stage of non-communal Malaysian Malaysia, The 97 special position of the Malays and other indigenous races must be preserved and made use of to elevate the social and economic status of these races to the same level as those of other races in Malaysia. The special position of the Rulers and the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong must be preserved to ensure that there is a focal point of loyalty; the National Language must be the ultimate language of the people of Malaysia, without of course denying Malaysians the right to learn languages from which Malaysians draw their racial origin. This has in fact been spelt out in the Constitution.

The Alliance have never deviated from these Fundamentals ever since Malaysia was established.”

Dr. Ismail’s emphasis on the framework especially the framework associated with Malaya (pre-Malaysia) is in contrast to Lee’s attitude# Of the

Singapore Malays, he said ”We are helping the Malays in the democratic

socialist way, not merely in giving them money. We increase their

ability and raise their amount of training and education they get so that

they could live at par with other communities in Singapore.” (11 ) This

is the method of bringing the Malays into the non-Malay line, a subtle

difference with the Alliance method of bringing the non-Malays into the

Malay line. The clash here is one of achieving national consolidation

through increase in the standards of living, and the other, the Alliance,

through increase in the standards of living as well as the cultural element

of national consolidation#

This emphasis on the cultural form of nationalism, so evident in most

homogeneous society becomes a very difficult problem in a plural society.

For the Alliance, the goal is Malaysian consciousness and identity. This

(11) The Battle For a Malaysian Malaysia. Page 31 Lee Kuan Yew# 98 is the point which the non-Malays were sceptical about* The short run analysis is a very difficult one. The Constitution of the

Federation of Malaya (1957)> provided for the development of a Malayan nation, according to Ratnam, within the bounds of 'assimilation’ and

'accommodation*• "••••.constitutional development in the Federation of Malaya seems to indicate a certain conditional acceptance of both policies (that is, 'assimilation' and 'accommodation') by the different communities. The fact that Malay has been established as the national language is a way indicative of an assimilâtionist policy, but allowance for the preservation of non-Malay cultures and ways of life reflect the degree to which 'accommodation' is accepted. (12)

This problem of the development of the nation is the most crucial factor in the difference between the Alliance and the PAP. Both believed in the end there should be one indivisible nation, without minority problems.

The difference is in the matter of approach. In fact in discussing the difference in approach to the problems of nation-building, four political parties of Malaya should be considered. On the surface the

Alliance and the PAP are similar, the difference is more subtle. The

PMIP's idea of a Malaysian nation is one in which the Malays are the dominant force. The PMIP wanted simply to bring the non-Malays into the

Malay norms while the Malays remain Malays. In other words, there is the permanent minority. On the other extreme there is the People's progressive Party (PPP). They want a Malaysian nation without any group

(1 2)"Constitutional Government*' . Communalism and the Political Process In Malaya. K.J. Ratnam. Page 27* 99 being dominant. All will participate together, within the nation, speaking their languages and pursuing their way of life. The PAP and the Alliance hoped the eventual integration. The difference is in a matter of timing and emphasis.

The aim of the Alliance is to develop two constellations. While trying to bring in the non-Malays into the norms of the Malays for national identity and consciousness, the other constallation is to have the evolution of the Malay norms. This is an important point which has been elaborated by Dr, Ismail, The difference with the PAP is that the

PAP*s emphasis is more on the new Malaysian consciousness. The Malays should not be Malays and the Chinese should not be Chinese. All should be Malaysians. In other word, there is less emphasis on the PAP*s part on the evolution of the Malay norms. This is the crux of the difference between the PAP and the Alliance. The FMIP, for instance, believed in total Malay nationalism, with distinct Malay culture, religious in nature by incorporating Islamic laws, and imposing these standards on the non-

Malays. The Alliance believed in religious freedom. The Alliance does not believe in the religious form of nationalism, the same applies to the PAP, but here the difference is on accent. The Alliance believed in Islam as the state religion. 100

THE ALLIANCE APPROACH

Ev o l u t i o n O f r-^\Ai_AY N O R M ^ M^LA>V Aj~VC? riOfS - MALAY CHAS?^C- MAl.A ' r o M A LA>\9 l A

THE PAP APPROACH

M UAV4 l VM M ALAX^IA

THE PMIP APPROACH 101

The question of emphasis is clearly felt in the language issue, Lee

said: nBut let me remind members in the UMNO and the MCA and their

associates that it is very dangerous to lead people to believe that if

in 1967 we merely switch from English to Malay in the courts, and in

business, the imbalance in social and economic development will disappear* *

It will not disappear. How does our talking Malay here, or writing to

the Ministers of the Federal Government - both Malays and non-Malays - (13) in Malay, increase the production of the Malay farm?"' This clearly

shows the difference in emphasis. Both the PAP and the Alliance agreed a on Malay as the national language. The difference is on speed. To

Lee the introduction of the language and institutions are too fast and

rigid and to the Alliance, Lee’s economic emphasis is too fast, even

prior to the achievement of the Malayan identity.

Further, in the question of national language, Malaya has been pursuing

the policy for almost ten years. The languages used in Parliament have

always been limited to Malay and English. In Singapore four langauges * have been used in Parliament. Singapore has a long way to go in the

adoption of Malay as the national language. For Malaya, some government

departments use only Malay, as well as some of the states of Malaya.

Steps have been taken to bring in the non-Malays into line in the question

of the national language. "In Malaya to-day, the Malay language is

referred to as ’Bahasa kebangasan* (national language) and not so much

(13) Malaysian Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew. Page 37» * In radio and television, in Singapore and Malaya, four languages are used at different times. Hence, in reality the difference between Singapore and Malaya is very subtle. In Malaya programmes in Malaya would run longer than other languages. 102 as 'Bahasa Melayu* * (the Malay language). This change in nomenclature is purely to avoid undue emphasis on Malay as the language of the Malays since it is sought to stress its suitability as the national language of a nation comprising peoples of different racial origins. It is hoped

(14) to unify the peoples of Malaya through a common language.” The

University of Malaya has already enrolled students from the Malay stream

Secondary Schools, and they are now in their second year at the

University.

Another aspect of the language issue is its political emotionalism involved. To UMNO to go short of the language issue is to lose the big supporters of the Alliance to the FMIP. The question of the language has not been challenged quite openly in the old Malaya. In the new

Malaysia, there was a new focus on the language and again the difference is in accent on speed rather than in complete differentiation.

The problems of cultural assimilation is a big one in Malaysia. The difference between the Alliance and the PAP is mainly concerned with accent and contents and mainly the result of the difference in the ethnic * composition. Both parties have tried to inculcate the spirit of belong­ ing to the country but their contents are different. In Malaya the development of a Malayan culture at least on the official or formal level

(14) Malaysia: A Survey: Religion and Culture. Page 186. * See Malayan culture in the Making, by Mr. S. Rajaratnam "Towards Socialism - Vol. 2. A Ministry of Culture Series. 103 is loaded towards the Malay contents. At the head is the Agong, nurtured to be the focus of the new Malaysian nation, and has been made the focus of the Malayan nation prior to Malaysia. The spirit of a constitutional head was brought in line with Malaya by the PAP when they appointed a Malay to be the first Head of state. The aim was to create in Singapore a focus of loyalty.

With Singapore, however, the Head of state could be anyone and need not necessarily be a Malay. Hence there is less emphasis of a person or a system than in Malaya and later in Malaysia. The divergence of emphasis could be seen in point of loyalty. In the speeches by the leaders of the Alliance and the PAP, there was a subtle accent when they talked about the theme of Malaysia. The Alliance tends to talk more about loyalty to the country, whereas the PAP always talked about equality. Ratnara pointed out this subtlety in explaining the attitudes of the various community in Malaya:

"It is only natural that the non-Malays should want to allay the suspicions of the Malay community, but it is quite likely that they do not sufficiently recognise the difference between their loyalty which the Malays have for the State. The essence of this difference lies in the fact that the loyalty of the non-Malays is more particularly political in nature, while the Malays have added feeling of cultural belonging. For the non-Malays, the community continues to be the basic of social identity, while political identity is inspired by the State in varying degrees. By and large, these two identities continue to exist somewhat independently of one another. For the Malays, on the other hand, there is a close link between the two: the Sultanate, the Malay aristocracy in the States, Islam's acceptance as the State religion, the recognition of Malay as the national language - all these have more than a merely political implication for them. They have a direct bearing on their social existence."^

(15) Ratnam. Op Cit. Page 28 104

At the time when the divergence between the Alliance and the PAP (16) became clear, Lee spoke in the 1965 Malaysian Parliament' ' on the question of Loyalty, ”Loyalty to Malaysia is not equal and not the same as loyalty to the Alliance party or the Alliance Government,

I am under no constitutional obligation to be loyal to the Alliance party or the Government but I must be loyal to the Constitution of

Malaysia and I must obey the dicta of a democratically elected govern­ ment of Malaysia,,,,,”

(16 ) The Battle for A Malaysian Malaysia, Page 51 105

CHAPTER IV.

THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF NATION-BUILDING-

Associated with the question of nationalism is the vital problem of

integration: economic and political* This problem is the basis of

any nation* Again in the light of the difference between Singapore’s

PAP and the Alliance, the difference is also more a matter of emphasis.

Though less emotional than the question of nationalism, the difference

here is more marked and less subtle.

First, there is the attitude of both parties towards the whole question

of Malaysia. How each party interprets the form in which Malaysia

should take is an important consideration in discussing the difference

in method of approach. In the beginning, the question of Malaysia,

or Merger, has been the primaiy aim of the PAP, whereas the Alliance * had not seriously considered the question until very late. In this

respect the PAP had paid more attention to the question than the

Alliance. There was a singleness of purpose on the part of the PAP,

where the Alliance did not have. When the time came for the Alliance

to take heart to the question of merger, they did so with only one thing

in mind, and that is the containment of the Communist influence in Singa­

pore. The PAP’s consideration ranged far wider into the problems of

growth and development and less emphasis was placed on being anti­

communist but of a just society. In fact right at the very outset there

is this difference in emphasis ideologically.

Lee Op Cit Page i66• "We have clearly stated that we stand for an independent, democratic, non-Communist, Socialist Malaya. We have never said that we stood for an independent, democratic, non-Communist, Socialist Singapore." 106

The PAP had three objectives in the beginning, as stated in "The (a ) Fixed Political objectives Of Our Party":v '

"1• Politicals To strengthen the basis of national solidarity by

inculcating a national consciousness, cultivating a common cultural

identification, and establishing a national language,

2. Economics To demonstrate to a ll the people o f Malaya how despite

the limitations of an island entrepot economy, a socialist move­

ment can ensure that the fruits of labour can be more justly and

equally shared by all who contribute to our national wealth by

their physical and mental labour, regardless of race, religion , or

class. Also to start setting up the industrial base without

which there can never be the society which the people want, where

everyone has enough of the necessary material things of life #

3. Socials To ensure by cultural and social recreation and education,

that even whilst we are on the long road to an industrialised

socia list society l i f e does not become just one grim struggle with

privation and frustration."

There was a positiveness in the approach of the PAP which the Alliance

failed to take into account and the result was that whereas the PAP was

involved with all aspects, and considered it their duty and business to

be active to the problems o f Malaysia, the Alliance was mainly consider­

ing only one aspect, and that is the containment of the Communist element

in Singapore. This is true in so far as the Merger issue was brought

into their lap at the time when the Communist elements were making a

(1) This appeared in Lee Kuan Yew*s ‘ Battle For Merger*. Pages 163-174« serious headway into Singapore politics* What the Alliance failed to realise was that the Merger issue has "been the prime objective of the PAP even prior to the rise of the Communist influence* This was the view taken by the Alliance in the question of merger, and the

Communist containment theme was the overriding consideration* Razak said:^2^

'•The very danger of a communist-controlled Singapore cannot be over­ emphasised* Singapore would serve as an ideal base from which subversive operations could be mounted against neighbouring territories* There are elements in Singapore who are inclined towards Communism and its activities and violently oppose Malaysia precisely to obtain such a situation* They do not want Malaysia because we do not recognise Communism in any shape or form* Malaysia would prevent the Communist- minded from being able to align independent Singapore with the Communist bloc."

From this is seen the divergent of views felt between the Alliance and the PAP with regard to Malaysia* Again this is a matter of accent which did not matter much at the early stage of the formation of Malaysia but which became clear at the time when there was discord between them.

After the formation of Malaysia, when the Communist issue was shelved in the background, the problems of economic development became the big issue. The difference between the Alliance and the PAP showed the difference in accent on developmental sectors and were the reflections of the form of nationalism that both envisaged Malaysia would be. This was mentioned earlier.

(2) Tun Razak was addressing the National Press Club of America, Washington, April 25> 1963* This speech appeared in 'Sari Beriia’ 2nd May, 1963* 108

Due to the nature of the distribution of population and the urban- rural relation, the Alliance had evolved a policy of concurrent economic development with both emphasis on the rural sector and the industrial sector* ** This concurrent economic policy has been the feature of

Malaya's economic planning for almost ten years* Malaya's concurrent economic policy is weighted towards uplifting the rural people and expand­ ing the agricultural base. The urban rural sector is concerned with * import replacement, mainly in small consumer products. The industrial base is small. Singapore on the other hand has looked upon Malaysia ♦♦ as an expansion of the industrial sector. "We cannot afford to be negative and see time being lost, valuable time to forge the basis of national solidarity to lay the foundations of the industrial base of our economy, to develop the techniques and skills amongst our people in preparation for the economic take-off towards an industrially developed and prosperous socialist society."

The crucial difference in economic analysis between Singapore and Malaya with regard to Malaysian economic development was centred around this (3) problem of "economic take-off". ' This is the problem associated with which sectors to emphasise in order to provide the engine for economic

* See First Malaysia Plan 1966-1970. Chapt. VIII 'Manufacturing, Construction and Mining'• Actually there are three categories of manufacturing sector: 1. The processing of agricultural products in factories off estates. 2. Manufacturing of consumer and intermediate goods with the local or imported raw materials. 3# Capital goods: basic metals, metal products, machinery and transport equipment industries. See Page 124« ** Manufacturing as a % of GNP: Singapore - Malaya - 6fo IBRD Report Page 25* (3) 'The Take-Off* Page 52. 'Stages of Economic Growth* W.W. Rosrow. 109 growth* This problem of economic growth has bedevilled most developing countries* The question of emphasis in the primary growth sector has been a debatable issue, in most developing countries and also in Malaya.

While most would agree to the need to be self sufficient in foodstuffs and the need to industrialise, the difference lies in the contents of industriali- * sation* It is in the contents of industrialisation, i*e* relation between the private and the Public sectors, and types of industry, that the difference between the Alliance and the PAP arose. With regard to import replacement and the expansion of the domestic markets, so much the accepted policy of the developing countries, both the PAP and the Alliance have in fact agreed to this (Annex J of The Malaysian Agreement), and looked forward to this development* The difference is in political and regional interest s*^ ^

In The House of Representatives on December 24, 1964, Tun Razak outlined the aims of the Alliance policy, particularly in the economics policy*

On agriculture, he said :-

”•••• I am glad to report that in the field of Agriculture, no less than 102 irrigation schemes have been completed, resulting in 68,000 acres of padi land being opened up for double-cropping. The Federal Land Develop­ ment Authority has launched 60 land development schemes which will open up an eventual area of not less than 290,000 acres. Considerable progress has been made on the planning of a large multi­ complex of land schemes known as the Jengka Triangle area in Pahang, and negotiations are under way toborrow funds, for the implementation of this Scheme, from the World Bank* Under the Rubber Replanting Fund *B*, the area replanted has risen to over 637,000 acres which is a hundred per cent increase over the original area at the beginning of our plan*" * See ’Industrialisation In Malaya E.L. Wheelwright, in the book The Political Economy of Independent Malaya. (4) The CAB issue of October 22 1962, called Malaysia - Federal Experiment discusses the economic implications of Merger* 110

He further talked about the Development Programme, which was really the

Alliance economic programme*

"This House will remember that when we launched our Development Programme we did it in phases. The first phase was to re-organise the administrative machinery of Govern­ ment so that we could maintain, and sustain, day to day, definite and constructive action on Development implementation* The next phase was to call the people themselves in opening up new land for them, and giving them every facility possible towards a better way of life, no matter how far away was their kampong from the Federal capital. And now, Mr* Speaker, Sir, I am glad to report that as these two phases of Development go on ahead, hand in hand, we are now entering the third phase.

The basis of the prosperity of the Rural Areas is to ensure that the Rural Producer is not deprived of a fair return for his labour* And I am glad to say that legislation is being drafted now, for the setting up of a National Rural Marketing Authority which will be a very active and dynamic organisation, charged with the important task, not only of adjust­ ing and re-organising the present marketing system but also, with a well- qualified and competent team of Economists, Market Research Experts and Market Investigators it will be able, in parallel, with action on present- day marketing carry out planning, and forward thinking to explore new markets and new techniques.

The future progress and prosperity of our country will also depend on our ability to diversify our agricultural production, and plans have been prepared, and research is being carried out, to ensure that we will not be entirely dependent on the rubber tree, but will have a broader base on which to develop our Agricultural Economy*

Already the Federal Land Development Authority has started several oil palm schemes and this new area of the Jangka Triangle is particularly suitable for the production of palm oil* This is the first step towards Diversification. There is a possibility that the large-scale growing of sugar-cane may be 111 successful in the northern regions of Malaya. The present forest policy i s being reviewed and changed so that the vast timber resources of our country may be more greatly exploited and turned into a thriving industry with such subsidiary industries as the making of paper, hard-boards and other 3uch forest by-products.”

When Tun Razak formulated the rural development programme, he i s attack­ ing the more urgent sector of the economy. In doing so, however, he is quite explicitly trying to uplift the standards of living of the Malay population. In a homogeneous society to attack the depressed sector of the economy to bring it into line with the developing sector*, is the most lo gical thing, in a plural society, there is a tremendous p o litic a l problem. Both the Alliance and the PAP agreed on the diversification of the evonomy. The Alliance hoped that by raising the standards of living of the Malays they would be able to compete la te r on an equal footing with the non-Malays. Razak further spoke :-

’’The Government regards this subject of improving the economy of the rural people and in particular of giving them a greater share in the business and commercial lif e of the country as one of utmost importance. The Government considers that it would be best if this important task is given to independent authority under general direction and guidance of * Government. That i s why i t is my intention to re-organise RIDA which has now been relieved of many of its multifarious functions and give RIDA a new image, a new look and perhaps a new name. It is also my intention to re-organise the composition of the membership of the Authority, to give

RIDA stands for Rural Industrial Development Authority. This Authority was set up even before Malaya’s independence, and the aim was to help improve the standards of living of the rural people. Tun Razak*s plan of changing the from of the Authority was in fact carried out. The new name is MAJLIS AMANAH RA*YAT (MARA). It means the "Authority which the people can t r u s t .” MARA is a Malay word which means *to move ahead*• 112 and to invite Malays and others who have experience in business to sit on this Authority, to help formulate the policy and to help implement that policy*....

For example, in order to help Malay contractors in the Rural Areas to have their fair share of work, projects and participation in business, a regional organisation will be set up in the form of Technical Advisory Centres to which Malay Contractors can go and seek advice and help in the drawing up of construction plans, building plans and other technical assistance*"

When the antagonism between the Alliance and the PAP developed, the PAP attacked this approach of the Alliance. This could be the basis of the

PAP attack which smacked the Malay special position. At the outset, of course, the PAP emphasised the industrial sector, and since the Alliance emphasis has been one for the rural sector, and affecting the position of the Malays, the divergence of views became quite clear. The difference was focused on accent on different economic sectors and communal factors. (5) Dr. Ismail viewed this differentiation:v 7

"The PAP concept of non-communal Malaysian Malaysia as expounded by its leaders, especially Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, among other things, is to divide Malaysians into haves and have-nots. PAP contended that the have-nots are not only confined to the Malays but also to the Chinese. Therefore, they concluded, by raising the economic and social status of the have-nots as a group, they would also help to raise the economic and social status of the Malays. This argument is not acceptable to the Malays because in order to uplift the social and economic status of the have-nots, opportun­ ities must first be created for which the have-nots not only avail them­ selves, but also compete. The Malays contend that if they have to compete for the opportunities, then they are bound to lose because the

(5) Alliance *Malaysian Malaysia* Dr. Ismail. Page 9 113 competition would be unequal, the Chinese being more equal to compete fo r equal opportunities. Since the Malays cannot accept the PAP*s concept, the PAP non-communal Malaysian Malaysia will only succeed to undermine the newly acquired Malay confidence in themselves to compete with o th e rs....*1

What amounts to in Dr. Ismail* s analysis was that the rural problem and the problem associated with the Malay economic plight should be dealt in the way it has been tackled for almost ten years. The aim was to bring the level of the Malay incomes to the level of the non-Malay incomes.

In th is problem of rural development, i t is not ohly an economic problem, but a political problem as well in the sense that support of the Alliance, particularly UMNO comes from the rural areas. Again in this matter, reference could be made to the ‘ nationalism* question in which the Malay norms were to be evolved. If the whole structure of the pattern of living of the people is changed, then the end product would not be the evolution of the Malay norms. This economic problem has i t s p o litic a l implication in that the leadership of the country should be Malays until such times as the Malays are on par with the non-Malays economically.

Tunku said :-

**There are still some persons, however, who wish to upset this carefully planned system of ensuring that all races have a fair share in economic progress. They are out of touch with general feeling and reveal a sorry lack of understanding of the importance of goodwill and co-operation in a multi-racial nation. It would be foolish, however, to hasten the day of revision of these constitutional rights prematurely; to do so would defeat the whole purpose of this particular aspect of our economic planning^

(6) **Malaysia, Key Area in Southeast Asia’* Tunku Abdul Rahman, Foreign A ffairs, July 1965« 114

The PAP version was that the whole problem should be solved now. Lee wanted to change the whole pattern of living, by bringing the people into the industrial age, and not so much as the short term of increasing their incomes. In this respect, Lee's line was an impatient one. Lee's accent was on industrialisation with the transformation of society into technocrats and workers, etc. He attacked the concurrent economic policy because the Malays will continue to be rural and the Chinese will continue to be urban and isolated. Lee's line was clearly urban. He said j-

"In fact our worry is not with Article 153, which gives special reser­ vations to the Malays for jobs and licences. But I draw attention to the fact that although it has now been in force for ten years, the imbalance between the rural and the urban areas is widening.

The Minister for Finance is aware of this, as he has the figures, and knows the disparity in the rate of growth between the urban and the rural areas. We have visible evidence to show that the Malays are drift­ ing from the kampongs into shanty towns in Kuala Lumpur. They are also coming to Singapore looking for jobs. From changes in identity-cards, we know that 10,OCX) young men came to Singapore looking for jobs last year. This is equivalent to quarter of our birth-rate in the age group from 20 to 25 years, our own annual birth-rate being around 40,000. This means an additional quarter is added to our burden and of the 10,000, more than 3,500 were Malays. How can these problems be solved on the basis of Article 153? They (the Alliance) hope to be solve these problems on the basis of a 'Kongress Economic Bumiputra? * (Economic Congress of Indigenous People). The Congress is apparently designed "to give opportunities to all those who are familiar with the problems connected with participation of the Malays and other indigenous people population in the field of commerce and industry."

* This Congress was convened in order to help the rural economy. It was Tun Kazak's pet subject. Lee's speech was made in the parliament of 1965, and this criticism of the Alliance policy was a form of criticism of Tun Razak* s speech in the House of Representatives, 24th December 1964, which became the basis of the First Malaysia Plan 1966-1970. 115

Lee did not elaborate on the form in which the rural development should take but he derived the migration trend into towns from the effect of urbanisation, and hence the absorption of migrants into the industrial structure. This is a delicate problem in Malaysia because of the ethnic cleavages which impede this kind of absorption, so much the pattern of the classical form of industrialisation in the industrialised countries.

Lee's strong point is the industrial sector. His criticism is in the form of industrialisation rather than in the industries themselves. This industrial question touched on the touchy problem of ideology. Again (7) it is a matter of accent. Tun Razak said '

I do not want to get involved in an argument about the ’isms* - Socialism, Communism or Capitalism, but the Alliance Government have, from time to time, been criticised as being too conservative in our outlook and not running the Government in the way the Socialist intellectuals would like to run it. This criticism only comes from people who do not really understand what we are doing. Our policy is to take the best from both worlds. Nothing could be more socialistic than our Rural Development Programme and yet, at the same time, in our industrial programme we can get the best, and we believe it will be the best, from the spirit of free enterprise.

The ideal policy for the industrial sector of our Development Plan is a continual and detailed examination and execution of how we can industrialise

(7) Speech on 24th December 1564* This speech is an interesting inter­ action with Lee's speech on 27th May 1965* which became the basis of the analysis of the difference in approach especially in economic matters. The basic difference in national philosophy between these very much alike leaders would be in Lee's "democratic socialism" and Razak's "democratic nationalism". The difference is so subtle. 116 with those industries which will make the greatest us of our own primary products. And as long as the Alliance Government is in power, we will encourage the setting up of factories by both local and external investors who are prepared to turn our rubber into tyres, our timber into paper, our tin into metal boxes, and our primary produce into finished Malaysian products."

This kind of industrialisation programme as a first stage has been the practice of most of the emerging countries. Both the Alliance and the

PAP had in fact carried out these policies even before Malaysia. Both had in fact introduced the policy of encouraging certain pioneer companies, and diversifying the economy in the manufacture of the local raw materials. In fact the very similarity of industries being developed in the two countries had to a certain extent, brought the conflict on interest. Lee’s socialism, at least on the Singapore level is very mild. However, he had hoped to see the real basis of socialism with its industrial base in Malaysia. Though he was not quite so explicit in the fonn of his socialism, i.e. state-controlled industries, he criticised the extent of the industrialisation policy of the Alliance.

The difference is in the emphasis not too ideological, though there is a 8 hint of ideology. Lee said ( ')

"Let us examine the position of the non-Malays, the Chinese and the Indians, in commerce and industry. How many of them are bosses or shareholders? The answer is about .2 per cent, .3 per cent. As an example, I will take the bus company which is a simple unit which all can understand. In one bus company, there are 20 shareholders and about 2,000 workers - mechanics, fitters, ticket collectors, drivers and

(8) The Battle For A Malaysian Malaysia Pages 40-41 117 so on* Will creating *3 per cent shareholders out of the million Malays and another % million Ibans, Kadazans and others solve the problem? How does the Malay in the karapong find his way out into the modernised civil society? How does the creation of this *3 of share­ holders bring about a new and just society? Most likely they will become the servants of the *3 per cent, who will command the money to hire them to clean their shoes and drive their cars.”

Though Lee d id not mention i t , h is c ritic ism on the A llian ce in d u s t r ia li­ satio n programme was in doing too l i t t l e about i t . He wanted the in d u s tr ia lis a tio n programme to be broad-based, p o ssib ly to take precedent over the rural programmes* He continued :-

’’The Minister of Finance, the Honourable Minister can confirm that the urban rate of growth is at least 2^ to 3 times that of the rural rate for the population generally* He had discussions with my colleague Dr* Goh Keng Swee (Singapore's Finance Minister) and he knows why the per capita income in Singapore is also higher* Can the general level of prosperity be raised by trying to compete with Singapore as to who can build a better urban society?"

Lee saw the industrialisation programmes around Kuala Lumpur as a competitor to the in d u s tr ia lis a tio n programme in Singapore and th is has been a very touchy issue between Singapore and Malaya* This is also the greatest dilemma in the Malaysian economic dispute. To industrialise in Malaya in any form, by utilising the country's raw material would inevitably mean competition with Singapore* In fact any form of urbanisation programmes to be undertaken would be in the urban Malayan areas like Ipoh,

Kuantan or Port Swettenham, if considered the saturation point reached in

Singapore as far as the employment and raw materials available in Singapore.

Economic planning with Singapore in Malaysia w ill have to be supra- nationally based. 118.

There is no way out of it. This is the dilemma which was faced by both Malaya and Singapore. "While Malaya*s concurrent economic policy will have to be adjusted with Singapore’s entry, Singapore’s economic policy too will have to be adjusted. Unfortunately the remedy would involve more than economic solution but social problems as well, such * as migration of people away from Singapore into other parts of Malaysia

or the migrating of rural Malays into the urban centres or the movement

into the pre-urban centres for de-centralisation. Migration problems

as well as ethnic problems have not been solved yet when Malaysia came

into being. This is the dilemma facing Malaysia at the time of the

dispute and Lee said :-

"It is wrong objective (i.e. to compete with Singapore). Surely the right way is by setting out to bring about social uplift change and (9) progress in the rural areas."

This is the dilemma. This was, in fact, what the Alliance was doing.

If industrialisation Lee meant by industrialising the rural areas, i.e.

de-centralisation, then Singapore will be affected. If it meant what

the Alliance has been doing but more so, then the ethnic factors of urban

non-Malays and rural Malays will continue.

There seemed to be no way out of the dispute. The PAP tried to co-operate but they found the Alliance to be too rigid in their approach. The

* The Formation of Malaysia. New Factor in World Politics. W.A. Hanna. Page 14* "Most specifically, the densely over- populated and in many respects overdeveloped island of Singapore, be given the opportunity to export population, not only labourers, but also excess professional, business and administrative personnel." (9) IBID Page 41 • 119 unfamiliarity with the Alliance system (which Tunku had feared) began to take shape* The PAP then began to exert itself* The PAP chose to present alternatives to the process of Malaysian Malaysia* The PAP said that they could create the society in a shorter time* In this respect, the PAP began to challenge the norms of the Alliance and the political struggle began* To the Alliance, this was too presumptious* Tun Razak warned :-

"It is true, Sir, that with the establishment of Malaysia all of us who are citizens of this country have a right to claim ourselves as Malaysians from the very day Malaysia was established* But citizenship carries with it duties and responsibilities and it is not enough for us to claim our legal rights as citizens but we must at the same time show that we are worthy of such rights by serving our country, by working for its true interest and by showing undivided loyalty. The establishment of Malaysia, that is the coming together of various states to a bigger and more economically viable entity is like a marriage* It is true that when a young man marries a daughter of another person he is entitled, on the day after the marriage, to claim that he belongs to the family of his father- in-law* However, his father-in-law, indeed all members of his wife's family would be surprised and would be greatly taken aback if in addition to his claiming that he joined the family, he also claims that he has a right to inherit the family property. Surely his father-in-law will expect that the least the son-in-law could do, would be to make himself acceptable to the family, to show that he is a worthy son-in-law before he can even open his mouth, and say that he has a right to inherit the property of the family* So, Sir, is the same with the coming together of the States.

(10) House of Representative 24th December, 1964

120,

This was a strong protest to the PAP to go slow in imposing their method in Malaysia, In fact, it is expected that the PAP should at first adhere to the norms set up by the Alliance. Razak continued

"We have the constitution and we should adhere to the Constitution according to the letters and spirit. Democracy cannot work satisfactorily if we do not follow the spirit and adhere to certain unwritten rules and conventions and if our democracy is to grow in strength it is necessary for all of us, in our speeches and our actions to practice democracy and not merely paying lip service to democracy."

The speeches of the leaders of the Alliance and the PAP showed that they looked at Malaysia in different ways and saw Malaysia as the extension of their style on the new Federation. The fact that theywere so determined to push their style on the other showed quite early that Merger could not be preserved. Razak continued with finality

"There is a saying among sailors on the sea that *A convoy of ships travel at a speed of the slowest ship in the convoy*• And we as a Nation, are somewhat similar. We will travel at a pace, the pace of the slowest of our own people."

The PAP was not prepared to abide by the Alliance system because they felt that their system was better. They became very determined to see that their approach will finally win. The Alliance too, felt the same way. What would constitute a proto type ’Liberal Country Party* versus the ALP in the Australian sense (the former as the Alliance and the latter PAP, in the Malaysian context), the political battle assumed greater magnitude. This was due to the fact that the Federation was quite new.

Added to this was the fact that both Alliance and the PAP had looked at 121. institutions quite differently. In Australia the institutions are established. Lee explained his ideas about the short co-operation he gave the Alliance :-

”We have not done this before, because we tried to do things the friendly way. But I am afraid the time has come when we have to speak quite clearly, what we think is happening and how we think these problems have to be tackled ......

Sooner or later the Alliance will have to meet us on this issue - develop­ ment in the economical, social and educational sectors. If the Alliance does not have the answers to this problem, let them admit it .... We have an alternative which can work and which has worked in Singapore and which will continue to bear fru it.”s(l 1)

Lee was quite explicit when he proposed to provide the alternative to the

Alliance method, the method would be the one he had already employed in

Singapore. He had wanted to introduce to Malaysia the same kind of approach as in Singapore as the Alliance had felt Malaysia as the extension of the old Malaya. The imposition of the PAP norms into Malaysia would clash with the Alliance. There was no way out. Lee was in fact quite emphatic about this point.

”We carefully and methodically calculated the issue and there is no other way. It may be possible to impose your pattern on Malaya but ( 12) certainly not on the whole of Malaysia.”v

While the Alliance cannot tolerate the expansion of the PAP version of the

Malaysian Malaysia, as the contents would definitely be different from the

(11) The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia. Federal Parliament, May 27» 1965. Page 44 (12) The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia. Federal Parliament, May 27, 1965* Page 45 122.

Alliance, the PAP on the other hand, toward the end of the dispute

cannot accept the Alliance norms extending beyond Malaya, particularly

in Singapore. Both were determined about their stand. There was no

way out. TChat looked like subtle differences became quite irreconcilable

in matters of approach. Lee would take his stand to the end.

( ) "We are for a Malaysian Malaysia or nothing...... nV13

(13) IBID Page 49 CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION:

The political development of the two countries is intimated each with the requirement of the respective countries. The pattern of one country should be seen within the context of that country. In this way the difference in the political pattern of Singapore and Malaya can be more understood; T.S. Silcock observed this situation before merger took place.

"Recent events have demonstrated that it is impossible to gain control of the machinery of government, without making some concession to Chinese political ideology. On the other hand, any excessive concession to Chinese racial feelings undermines both directly and indirectly, the possibility of union with the federation, which all parties regard as an economical and political necessity. It undermines it directly by stimulating Malay racial feelings which cannot be allowed to get out of hand, in the Federation if the policy of nation-building under Malay (l ) leadership is to have a change of success."' '

Hence to be successful politically in Singapore, a political party has to take account of the local aspirations and this could be also said about Malaya.

The relation between Singapore and Malaya is so special. The difference between Singapore and Malaya can be seen in terms of the difference between a whole and a part of the whole. Both are within each sphere of influence. Malaya is the whole - the country, with Singapore, the city-state, part of the whole, the severed city of Malaya. Comparing

(1) Straits Times, July 10, 124.

Singapore with Malaya is like comparing New York with the United States or Sydney with Australia. This oan be seen in the complementary nature o f the economy a s expressed in the land u se.

Malaysia - Area and Land Use, by Country. 1960-61 (Square Miles) Land Use Malaya Singapore Rubber 6,130 10 Rice 1,489 Coconut 813 8 O il Palm 220 Pepper 1 Sago F r u its 332 3 Shifting agriculture Other crops and fallow land 600 39 Forest reserves* 13,250 All other land 27.865 16O Total 50,700 220

* Land devoted to permanent production of forest crops.

The division between Singapore and Malaya seems so illogical when viewed economically and academically. In order to get a clear picture, the whole issue has to be viewed within its historical context.

In the chronological analysis of Singapore-Malaya interaction, there was no period in their history where they had become a single political unit.

This is a vital consideration. The almost perfect set-up in 1914-1942 whereby there was a semblance of a unitary state was achieved only economically and within the overall British administrative unity.

Importantly there was no cultural affinity.

When the British left after the Second World War, they left a lot of similar administrative and institutional machinery. As a result, though they have become separated in 1946 they have continued to practise 125 similar institutional framework of administration*

In the process of de-colonisation, there has been tremendous social upheaval in the newly developing countries in the form of te rrito ria l and ethnic nationalism. Colonialism has produced states within its boundary where there was none before and when independence came nations began to emerge within the territorial unit brought by colonialism.

Examples of such countries would be Indonesia, India, Nigeria etc. When independence came they closely guarded their te rrito ria l in tegrity.

On a smaller scale, there was this pattern about Malaya and Singapore.

Independence to Malaya in 1957 has resulted in an almost complete severance o f relation with Singapore. Malayan nationalism began to take shape. vYhen Singapore achieved its internal self-government in 1959, Singapore too began to acquire it s own identity and sty le. Because of Singapore-

Malaya special relation, attempts have been made to bridge the gap which was finally achieved in the brief period of 1963-1966.

Merger, especially on Singapore's part was an attempt to revert to the ex-ante status quo of Colonial days of the period 1914-1942 when Singapore was the unofficial capital of Malaya. Lee said, after the signing of the

Malaysian Agreement: "This is what the Tunku meant when he said 'Singa­ pore will be the New York of Malaysia.* And this is as it should be.

The geography, the history of Singapore and the dynamism of a young and industrious people make it inevitable that it should be so."v( 2 )

( 2) Singapore in Malaya. Far Eastern Summary. March 1960 126

The merger difficulty showed the extent of 1local' pattern already established within each territory’ which made common agreement d ifficu lt.

When the PAP pressed in for merger before Singapore's independence which was about to take place in 1963, they were thinking of bridging the gap before independence came. The PAP was afraid that once independence came, merger would be quite impossible. "Modern history knows of only one example where two independent nations merged by consent - Egypt and

Syria, both Arab Moslems to form the United Arab Republic."'(3 )

Unfortunately, merger failed because the national pattern had already set in - Malaya from 1957 and Singapore from 1959*

Merger between Singapore and Malaya could be seen as a political exercise by the ru lin g e l i t e s , without r e a lly becoming a mass movement. The public was not really made aware of the implication of merger. Singapore's

PAP did manage to get across to the people and educate them about merger as the referendum showed, but this was not done in Malaya at all. This is the characteristic of a newly developing country, where the politicians are in the centre of things and the interest groups are not sufficiently articulated and aggregated.

A pre-requisite for a successful merger would be its wider acceptance by the mass. In Malaya-Singapore case, there was this lacking in perspec­ tive in the whole question of a federation, which marked the success of the founding of the Australian federation for instance. In Singapore-

Malaya case, merger came before all relevant topics of a federation were thrashed out.

(3) Battle for Merger. Lee Kuan Yew. 'Independent Singapore: Not Realistic.* Page 17- Note: The merger of Syria and Egypt has since broken up. 127

For Malaya, merger was political rather than economic. For Singapore, however, economic was the main consideration. Economics and politics could not be separated. Malaya was reluctant to be drawn into discussions on economic problems because it thought that merger was essentially a political problem. On the other hand, Lee stressed the importance of settling the economic issues. He said

”... We can’t go in just on the basis of one statement or one letter..... we have got to have the terms spelt out .... spelt out in far detail to ensure that our entrepot trade goes on as Malaysia industrialises. There was no question of starting from scratch since the full report of the Rueff Commission was already with the two governments l These are matters which have been properly thought out by men who know what they are talking about.”

Since the economic question was not properly evaluated, there was tremen- * dous federal-state arguments once merger took place. A controversy on economic matters inevitably brought political questions. In the end, both economic and political questions flared up, which brought Singapore-

Malaya interaction into a crisis and finally led to Singapore’s secession.

Merger has been a very difficult problem. The pointer to a successful merger would be, not political at the outset but a setting up of pre­ conditions or atmosphere for merger whereby points of mutual interest could be encouraged and co-operation established. Once this is gaining

(4) Straits Times, June 22, 1963* * * See Malaysia and Singapore. K.G-. Tregonning. Chapter 8 ’Challenge and Response 1963-65* Page 107, about the contro­ versial budget presented by the Malaysian Finance Minister, Mr. Tan Siew Sin. 128 momentum, merger could then proceed. The merit of this point can be seen in the complexities of Malaya. There is no other country so complex and problematical as Malaya (closest semblance would be F iji).

Hence the solution would be for a whole-hearted attitude to solving economic problems and increasing the standard of living in order to offset any political tension. 129

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 . BOOKS

Almond & Coleman The Politics of the Developing Countries.

B a r tle tt Report From Malaya.

Burham, Jam es. The Machiavellians.

Cowan. 19th Century Malaya.

D artford, A. A Short History of Malaya.

Emerson. M alaysia•

Ginsburg. M alaya.

Gullick, J.M. M alaya•

Groves, H.E. The Constitution of Malaysia.

Hall, E.G.E. A History of South East Asia.

Hanna• Sequel to Colonialism. The Formation of Malaysia.

Josey, Alex. Trade Unionism in Malaya.

Kahin (Editor). Governments and Politics of South East Asia.

K austsky, John H. P o lit ic a l Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism.

Kennedy, J. A History of Malaya.

Lockhart, R.H. Bruce. Return to Malaya. 130

McKie, Ronald* Malaysia in Focus*

Miller, Harry* Prince and Premier. The Story of Malaysia.

Mills. Malaya. Malaysia - A Political Economic Appraisal.

Michels, Robert* Political Parties* A Sociological Study of Oligarchial Tendencies of Modern Democracy.

Morais, J* Victor (Editor). Who*s Who - Malaysia.

Moorehead. A History of Malaya.

Ooi Jin-Bee. Land, People and Economy in Malaya.

Osborne, Milton E. Singapore and Malaysia (Cornell University).

Parmer J.N. Malaysia.

Ratnam, K.J. Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya.

Rose Saul ed. Politics in South-East Asia.

Singham, Durai Raja. Tribute to Tunku Abdul Rahman.

Shah, A.B. Nehru, A Critical Tribute.

Ryan N.J. The Making of Modern Malaya.

Silcock T.H. The Economy of Malaya.

Silcock and Fish. The Political Economy of Independent Malaya.

Smith T.E. The Background to Malaysia. Swettenham F. Footprints In Malaya.

Tilman R.O.

Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya. Thorson. Plato, Totalitarian or Democrat?

Tregonning, K.G-. A History of Modern Malaya.

Turnbull, R. The Scrutable East.

Warner, Denis. Reporting South East Asia.

Winstedt, R.O. A History of Malaya.

Wheeler, L.R. The Modern Man.

Wheelwright, E.L. Industrialisation of Malaysia. 132

2. PAMPHLETS & OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

"A Place in the Sun for Everyone" • Speech of the Hon*able The Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, at the National Press Club of Malaya Dinner in Kuala Lumpur, on 27th October, 1964*

"Alliance Malaysian Malaysia" in Two Stages 1• Inter-Racial Harmony. 2• Non-Communal Malaysia• By The Hon*able Dato* Dr. Ism ail b. Dato Abdul Rahman, P.M.N., Minister of Home Affairs.

Democratic Socialism in Action. Edited and Published by the Publicity Division, Ministry of Culture, Singapore. June 1959-April 1963*

"Development Estimates 1965"* Full text of Speech by the Minister of National and Rural Development in the House of Representatives by Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein.

"Communal Relations in Malaysia". Speech by the Hon*able Tan Siew Sin, Minister of Finance, Malaysia, to the University of Singapore Students' Union on Friday 23rd July, 1965. "First Malaysia Plan"• Full text of Speech by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National and Rural Development, Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein, in moving the adopting of the first Malaysia Plan 1966 - at the House of Representatives on 15th December, 1965* "Let the World Judge". Speeches of the Malaysian Chief Delegate to the Security Council, Dato' (Dr.) Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman on 9th and 10th September, 1964- Legislative Council Debates. O fficial Report of the Second Legislative Council (Second Session) October, 1956 to August 1957« "Malayan Culture in the Making", delivered by the Minister for Culture, Mr. Rajaratnam, to the Menorah Club, Singapore on July 25> i960. Malaysia, August 1965« Produced by the Department of Information, Malaysia•

Malaysia 1966 Budget. Full text of speech by the Hon'able Enche Tan Siew Sin, Minister for Finance in introducing the Supply Bill (1966) to the House of Representatives on 17th November, 1965«

Malaysia and the Asian Perspective. Speech delivered by Dato* Mohd. G-hazali bin Shafie, Permanent Secretary for External Affairs at the Ipoh Rotary Club on 28th October, 1965*

Malaysian News issued by the Office of the High Commissioner for Malaysia in Australia, and New Zealand, Canberra, ACT. No's 10/65; 1/65; 12/65; 8/65; 15/65; 13/65. 133

Malaysia Comes of Age, by Lee Kuan Yew*

New Chapter in History of Singapore* A Ministry of Culture Publication Address of the Yang di-Pertuan Negara, Tun Yusof bin Ishak, delivered at the opening of a new session of the Legislative Assembly on 29th November, 1963*

The People*s Plan. A Ministry of Culture Publication*

Questions and Answers on Malaysia - Published 1964* Kuala Lumpur*

Separation of Singapore: The Agreement: The text of agreement concluded on August 7, 1963 by the Malaysia and the Singapore Governments in regard to the separation from Malaysia.

”Sab£hwill never Secede” Dato* Donald Stephens* Pull text of Speech by the Minister of Sabah Affairs and Civil Defence, Dato* Donald Stephens, in the House of Representatives on 2nd June, 1965*

Some Problems of Industrialisation* By Dr* Goh Keng Swee, Minister for Finance, Singapore*

Sari Berita. Weekly Digest of the Malayan Press, issued by the Department of Information, Federation of Malaya. Vol. II No* 5th July, 1962* Vol* No* 13, 29th March, 1962* Vol* No* 18, 2nd May, 1963* Vol. No* 2, 11th January, 1962. Vol. No. 33, 16th August, 1962.

Sabah and Sarawak, Text of broadcast made in English by the Prime Minister Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra over Radio Malaysia on August 13, 1965*

Tax changes within Malaysia. Paper presented to Parliament on 25th November, 1964, with the Budget Speech of the Minister of Finance, Malaysia.

Tunku*s Call for Unity, Extract from the Speech by the Hon’able the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, at the Malaysian Alliance Convention on 17th April, 1965* 134.

3. SELECTED ARTICLES

Armstrong, Hamilton Fish. "The Troubled Birth of Malaysia’1 • Reprinted from Foreign Affairs, July 1963*

Boyce, Peter. ’’The Tunku’s Style”. The Bulletin, September 21, 1965«

Caine, S. ’’Passing of Colonialism in Malaya”. Political Quarterly, July 1959, 29.258.

Carnell, F.G-. ”Communalism and Communism in Malaya”. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 26 (1953) Pp. 99 - 117.

’’Political Ferment in Singapore”. Far Eastern Survey, July 1959, Vol. XXIV. No. 7.

”The Malayan Election”. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28, 1955* Pp. 315 - 30.

Cilento, Sir Raphael. “The Danger to Australia”• Australian International Review, August 28, 1965*

Crowley, Desmond, Editor. Rorke, John Rorke (Executive Editor). ’’Australia and South East Asia”. CAB. May 2, 1966, Vol. 37 No. 12.

“Malaysia”. CAB. June 7, 1965» Vol. 36 No. 2.

Fitzgerald, C.P. “The Expulsion of Singapore”. The Nation, October 11, 1965*

“The Malaysian Break”. Nation, August 21, 1965*

Grossholtz, Jean. ’’The Exploration of Malaysian Meanings”. Asian Survey, April, 1966, Vol. VI No. 4.

Hashira bin Sultan. ’’Factors that will determine the Future of Malaysia.” Commonwealth Journal, Vol. VII No. 2, Page 63*

Josey, Alex. “Singapore’s Fantastic Mr. Lee Kuan Yew”. The Bulletin, October 19* 1963«

’’The Equal of Any Englishman”. The Bulletin, October 26, 1965«

“The Tunku” . The Bulletin, September 28, 1963* 135

Kahin, George McT. '•Malaysia and Indonesia"• Pacific Affairs, Fall 1964, Vol. XXVII No. 3.

Kernial, Singh Sandhu. "Communalism: The Primary Threat to Malayan Unity". Asian Survey, August 1962.

King, Seth. S. "Singapore's Restless Chinese". The Reporter, August 12, 1965*

Kroek, Justus M. Van Der. "Peking, Djakarta and the Malaysia Problem". Contemporary Review, 205* 348 - 51 > July 1964*

Leifer, Michael. "Communal Violence in Singapore". Asian Survey, October, 1964, Vol. IV No. 10.

"The Politics of Federation"• Journal of South East Asia History, Vol. 6 No. 2, September 19^5*

Lipski, Sam. "Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore". The Bulletin, August 21, 1965*

"Never Again The Bulletin, August 28, 1965*

Milne, R.S. "Singapore's Exit from Malaysia; The Consequences of Ambiguity". Asian Survey, Vol. VI No. 5, March 1966.

Maddox, W.P. "Singapore; Problem Child". Foreign Affairs, April, 1962.

Moharamand Hah. "One Indonesian View of Malaysia Issue". Asian Survey, March 1965, Vol. V No. 3*

Nash, Manning. "South East Asian Society - Dual or Multiple". The Journal of Asian History, Vol. XXXIII No. 3, May 1964.

Ness, Galy D. "Modernization and Indigenous Control of the Bureaucracy in Malaysia". Asian Survey, Vol. V No. 9, September, 1965*

Ograore, Lord. "The Tunku". Contemporary Review, December, 1963*

Parmer, Norman J. Constitutional Clause in Malaya's Plural Society. Far Eastern Survey, October.

"Malaysia 1965s Challenging the Terms of 1957” • Asian Survey, February, 1966. Vol. VI No. 2. 136

Rahman, Tunku Abdul. "Malaysia: Key Area in Southeast Asia". Foreign Affairs, July, 1965*

Roff, Margaret. "UMNO - the first 20 years". Australian Outlook, August 1966, Vol. 20 Pp. 168 - 171.

Roff, William. "Malaya - Muslim World of Singapore at the Close of the 19th Century". Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIV No. 1, November, 1964»

Reid, Alan. "Malaysia". The Bulletin, August 21, 1965*

Shadbolt, Maurice and Winfield Parks. "Storied Lands of Malaysia". National &eographic, November 1963, Vol. 124.

Shils, Edward. "The Concentration of Disperson of Charisma". 7/orld Politics, Vol. II, October 1958.

Silcock, T.S. "Singapore In Malaya". Far Eastern Survey, March 1960.

"Forces in Unity". International Affairs, October 1949, Vol. XXV No. 4.

Smith, Arthur Norman. "Asian Issues in the Australian Press". Current Notes on International Affairs, November 1965*

Smith, T.E. "Malaysia After the Election". The World Today, August 1964*

So enarno, Radin• "Malay Nationalism 1900-1945”* Journal South East Asian History, March 1960, Vol. 1 Pp. 2 - 3.

Spector, Stanley. "Students and Politics in Singapore". American Institute of Pacific Affairs Far Eastern Survey, May 1956, Yol XXV No* 5*

Stockwin, Harvey. "Socialist UMNO". Far Eastern Economic Review, August 18 , 1966.

"Malaysia*s Next P.M." The Bulletin, February 5, 1965*

Sington, Derrick. "The New Singapore"• The Spectator, June 5, 1959* 137

Takeyama, Michio. "Journey to Kuala Lumpur” . Quadrantt July-August, 1966.

Tregonning, K. G-.P. "Malaya 1955” • The Australian Quarterly, June 1956.

Tilman. "Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya". CAB, Vol. 26 No. 10, 1960.

Vasil, R.K. "Malaya’s Wild Men". Nation, August 21, 1965*

Wilson, J.L.J. (Editor). "Malaysia - Federal Experiment". CAB, October 22, 1962, Vol. 30 No. 12.

Year Book 1966. Far Eastern Economic Review. 138

4 . NEWSPAPERS

Malayan Papers 1♦ Straits Times - English Language 2. Sunday Times - " " 3* Sunday Mail - ” " A great deal of reference was made on these papers about Malayan politics on events prior to independence, post independence and the events surrounding the merger and dismerger of Singapore from Malaysia.

4* Utusan Melayu - Malay language - Jawi Script 5. U tusan Zaman - " ” " " 6. Berita Harian (Daily News) - Malay language - Roman Script.

Australian Papers

1 • The Age. 2. The Daily Mirror and Sunday Mirror. 3* The Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph. 4* The Sun-H erald. The Sydney Morning Herald. These papers have given great coverage amount events in South-East -asia and Malaysia in particular; special reference should be mentioned about the coverage on Lee Kuan Yew's Visit to Australia and the secession of Singapore from Malaysia.

British Papers

1• The Times. 2. The Observer. Coverage on events about Malaya's independence in 1937 and the Malaysian issues.