Keeping America Exceptional: Patriotism, the Status Quo, and the Culture Wars
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Political Science of the College of Arts and Sciences by
Nate Ramsey
B.S. Political Science, Oregon State University, 2004
August 2011
Committee Chair: Stephen T. Mockabee, PhD
Abstract
For over a decade, patriotism has been a subject of deep cultural resonance in America (Huntington 2004). Historians and philosophers regularly debate whether or not national affection demands critical analysis (e.g. Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999; Schweikart and Allen 2007), or whether it should even be geographically bounded at all (e.g. Nussbaum 1996; Primoratz 2002). Political leaders increasingly use patriotic rhetoric to advance arguments and garner support from the public (e.g. Palin 2010; Romney 2009). And prominent policies frequently imply some level of commitment to either the nation or its first principles (e.g. multiple wars, domestic wiretapping, restrictions on the writ of habeas corpus). Yet despite that patriotism has proven at times capable of structuring political judgments (Sullivan et al. 1992), few researchers have sought to systematically evaluate its role in American politics.
In this dissertation, I assess the causes, consequences, and constraint surrounding contemporary patriotic belief. I examine the leading social, psychological, and political antecedents using a relatively new theoretical framework that emphasizes individuals’ differential tendencies to support the status quo and justify existing societal arrangements (Jost and Banaji 1994). Also, I challenge the extant culture war paradigm that explains political preferences on the basis of religious motivation (e.g. Hunter 1991; Layman and Green 2005). I argue instead that political opinions connected by cultural argumentation (Leege, Wald, Kreuger, and Mueller 2002) are best understood today according to patriotically orthodox and progressive worldviews. Finally, I adapt Peffley and Hurwitz’s (1985) hierarchical model of attitude constraint to evaluate ideological reasoning at three different levels of ideational abstraction: fundamental predispositions, general attitudinal postures, and specific political opinions.
Results from multiple regression analysis and structural equation modeling largely confirm the core hypotheses of this research. Individuals anxious about changes in America’s status and its basic domestic institutions generally adopted orthodox attachments to the nation. Such was the case in terms of their national pride, their willingness to criticize the country, their symbolic affections, as well as other aspects of patriotism that were strongly correlated. Also, patriotic belief proved a more potent and consistent predictor of political opinions than did measures of religious belief, belonging, and behavior. And an evaluation of attitude constraint indicated that while Americans may not walk around with sophisticated ideologies preformed, they are capable of meaningful abstract political reasoning. In all, findings from this research suggest that patriotism is an increasingly important concept, likely to influence American politics in the years to come.
ii
iii Acknowledgements
Successful completion of this project is due in large part to the role played by numerous people in my life. I owe great thanks to Steve Mockabee for both his big picture and small picture advice throughout the writing of this dissertation. Feedback from Barbara Bardes vastly improved the readability and overall quality of the work. And Jim Stever offered numerous valuable insights. I’m grateful for the training I received during my time at the Institute for Policy Research. Eric Rademacher, Kim Downing, Chuck Hulen, and others, helped me develop practical skills that I utilized throughout the dissertation-writing process. Also, I’m indebted to numerous fellow graduate students for their support and companionship. In particular, John Callaghan has generously shared with me a wealth of good advice, both academic and otherwise, since the day I met him. And Misook Gwon has been an ideal confidant, cheerleader, colleague, and friend. I’ll miss our meetings enormously. Support from family members, including grandparents, siblings, and in-laws, has been selfless and sincere throughout my long journey in higher education. I wish saying “thank you” could do justice to how I feel towards them. This is doubly true for my parents, Dave and Tara, for whom I am so incredibly lucky to have in my corner. Their love and complete support, regardless the circumstances, is what has always afforded me the privilege to pursue my goals. Even with all the assistance I’ve received from friends, family, and colleagues in recent years, it’s difficult to imagine where I’d be without Rae. My best friend and life partner since we were 17, she’s been a positive force in my life each and every day. I’ll be forever grateful to her for first convincing me this goal was achievable back when we were undergraduates at Oregon State, and for agreeing to move across the country with me to make it happen. She makes it all possible and worthwhile.
iv Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Of Politics and Patriotism 1 Tables and Figures 23
Chapter 2: America as ‘Higher Power’ 24 Tables and Figures 57
Chapter 3: Status and Status Quo 64 Tables and Figures 116
Chapter 4: Patriotism and Attitudinal Constraint 128 Tables and Figures 153
Chapter 5: Conclusion 157
Bibliography 165
Appendices Appendix A 186 Appendix B 190 Appendix C 192
v Chapter 1 Of Politics and Patriotism
“I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.” - President Barack Obama, April 20091
“This President and his fellow traveler’s in Washington fundamentally don’t understand America. They don’t understand what it is that makes this nation so successful, so powerful, so good.” - Mitt Romney, January 20112
Patriotism: In Philosophy, Policy, and Politics
Patriotic appeals are long familiar in American politics. Ritualistic usage among politicians include conspicuous displays of the flag and glorification of the nation’s achievements, principles, and the character its people. This custom generally accompanies an attempt to advance a political argument. At times however, due to the prominence of various issues impinging upon patriotic beliefs, such entreaties transcend the role of a background prop, becoming instead a foreground lens. The presidential election of 1988 illustrates this phenomenon. In their analysis of that year’s campaign, Sullivan, Fried, and Deitz (1992, 203) evaluated whether “the current era is characterized by significant disputes over issues of patriotism.” In their affirmative conclusion, they determined that varying forms of national attachment3 constituted the basis of many voters’ eventual choice; an impact that proved decisive in Bush’s election victory. What issues loomed large enough so as to propel patriotism to such status? According to the authors: disputes over mandating the Pledge of Allegiance in school
1 Obama’s comment was made on April 4, 2009 at a public gathering in Strasbourg, France. 2 Romney’s quote: Michael Scherer, “Election 2012: Mitt Romney Readies a Different Kind of Campaign”, Time Magazine, 24 January 2011. 3 Throughout this dissertation I will use the following terms interchangeably: patriotism, national attitudes, national attachment, national loyalty, national affect, and national identity. I do so with full knowledge that some authors make distinctions between some of these terms. However, my intent is to reference the totality of individuals’ sentiment in this regard. This matter is addressed in more detail in Chapter 2.
1 classrooms, Governor Dukakis’s membership in the ACLU, and the possibility that his wife participated in demonstrations during the Vietnam War where flag burning occurred.
To even casual observers of politics today these matters are indeed likely to appear noteworthy; though not for any obvious provocation, but rather for their banality. Compared to heated debate in recent years over the pro- versus anti-American beliefs and behaviors associated with wars, dissent, disputed elections, mosque-building, birtherism, and many other issues, the context of 1988 appears mild. It also appears rather narrow; particularly when juxtaposed with the present-day wide-ranging application. This is not to say the definition of patriotism itself has changed. It is still generally understood as a collection of attitudes “that refers to individuals’ attachment and loyalty to their nation and country” (Kelman 1997, 166). But in principle, in practice, and as form of struggle over political ends, it is pervasive. To highlight one unremarkable example evidencing its reach, Democratic Congressman Henry Waxman recently accused Republicans who voted against cap-and-trade legislation of “rooting against the country.”4
Contemporary argumentation through and about patriotism is both purely political as well as policy-based, as was the case in 1988. Yet it also involves questions of philosophical import.
Indeed, Johnston (2002, 286) argues that patriotism is presently “enjoying a renaissance” among political theorists. And far from being merely a product of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, discourse concerning preferred forms of national attachment was “on the comeback trail” prior to that day’s events (Johnston 2002, 286). That this is the case is evidenced by widespread scholarship on the subject among leading thinkers within political philosophy, including Richard Rorty (1998), Alisdair MacIntyre (1999), Charles Taylor (1994), and Martha
4 Waxman’s quote: Doug Heye, “Waxman Questions GOPers’ Patriotism — Will Mainstream Media Go After Waxman Like They Did Limbaugh?”, The Hill, 30 June 2009.
2 Nussbaum (1994, 1996). The substance of this literature broadly explores the morality and logic of beliefs concerning nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and places in-between. This discussion continues today among theorists who argue that national affections ought to be bounded by identifiable borders, versus those suggesting they extend only to abstract values rather than particular peoples or institutions (see for instance Bader 2005; Canovan 2000; Keller 2005;
Miller 2005).5
A second philosophical point of contention has been more widespread in American society. This debate centers on competing interpretations of U.S. history. Namely, should
America’s traditionally revered figures, institutions, characteristics, episodes, and narratives be judged from a perspective that is broadly critical or supportive? This controversy is currently playing out among state and local leaders across the country vis-à-vis the content of middle and high school civics and history texts.6 The debate, however, stretches beyond the classroom and into popular interpretations of American history. Two best-selling books encapsulate the contrasting approaches. In A Patriot’s History of the United States, Larry Schweikart and
Michael Allen emphasize the benevolence and the fruits of American exceptionalism. A favorite among conservative thinkers,7 their book reached the top of The New York Times Best Sellers list in 2010. Its style stands in stark contrast to that found in Howard Zinn’s A People’s History, which not only continues to sell widely8 (it was first published in 1980), but recently spawned its
5 This debate is encapsulated by the arguments contained in two popular edited volumes: For Love of Country? (Nussbaum, 1996) and Patriotism (Primoratz, 2002a). 6 For a review of this controversy see Russell Shorto’s article in the New York Times Magazine titled “How Christian Were the Founders?” (24 February 2010). 7 Wall Street Journal: http://www.patriotshistoryusa.com/reviews-interviews/wall-street-journal/; Rush Limbaugh: see the interview with Larry Schweikart in The Limbaugh Letter from March, 2005 (also reprinted in the 2007 edition). 8 In March, 2010 the book was in the top 10 of the New York Times Best Sellers list.
3 own genre of historical non-fiction.9 Like their progenitor, these works critically examine the properties of American institutions and events by highlighting patterns of oppression and injustice.
In addition to these abstract theoretical considerations, controversies over national attachment permeate many of America’s contemporary policy decisions. To an extent, this phenomenon is not confined to the present-day. The country’s strong and distinct national culture, combined with its role as a leader of the West and the world, have long imbued many of its policy choices with symbolic as well as substantive importance. However, perceptions that
U.S. government policy both reflects and projects America’s national character appear particularly true of late. Such is due in part to the prominence of several social issues with strong ties to America’s cultural distinctiveness. Perry (2009), for instance, suggests Americans’ devotion to their own unique political culture lies behind much of the combat associated with recent proposals to reform the nation’s health care system. Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) argue that concerns over maintaining ‘Americanism’ are heightened by rapidly changing social and demographic characteristics. Thus, decisions made over matters of immigration, race, and ethnicity, are quickly infused with questions of national identity. Others find nation-centered beliefs closely tied to considerations over economic policy. For instance, the weakening of traditional economic relationships caused by globalization has been linked to both the loss and rejuvenation of national loyalties (Barber 1996a; Johnston 2002, 286-7; Wolfe, 1998). And while patriotism has long hovered over America’s foreign policy, this may be even more the case in the absence of a singular and static global competitor. For instance, Zakaria (2008) points to
American anxiety as a response to the “new nationalism” exhibited by the growth of countries
9 See for example A People's History of Science (Conner 2005) and A People's History of the Supreme Court (Irons 2000).
4 such as China and India. But in perhaps the most comprehensive explanation, Huntington (2004) argues that the fall of the Soviet bloc created an opportunity for a host of foreign and domestic policy issues to surface beginning in the 1990’s, leading to:
“…intense debates over immigration and assimilation, multiculturalism and diversity,
race relations and affirmative action, religion in the public sphere, bilingual education,
school and college curricula, school prayer and abortion, the meaning of citizenship and
nationality, foreign involvement in American elections, the extraterritorial application of
American law, and the increasing political role of diasporas here and abroad. Underlying
all these issues is the question of national identity. Virtually any position on any one
these issues implies certain assumptions about that identity. So also with foreign policy.
The 1990s saw intense, wide-ranging, and rather confused debates over American
national interests after the Cold War” (9, emphasis added).
Such a policy trend no doubt was exacerbated by 9/11. First and foremost, it added to the nation’s political agenda a host of issues that either implicitly or explicitly pit the United States in opposition to other countries or world actors, or directly challenged the veracity of several of its long-held national principles. This included policy disputes involving the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan (including their conduct), domestic wiretapping, detainee rights, torture, the role of the United Nations, border security, profiling, among many others. Another result of the terrorist attacks was a renewed sense of national consciousness, including an increased invocation of the concept of ‘nation’ in political discourse (McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle, in press).
Consequently, policy proposals stemming from this new political context would help define
5 America’s present national character. They could also quickly and easily take on the veneer of national loyalty tests.
Beyond substantive policy-oriented and philosophical discourse, patriotism is today a commonly-used political cudgel. Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller (2002, 158) argue that patriotic/nationalist themes emerged as a prominent argumentative tool for use in the “permanent campaign” that followed World War II. During that time, they note, Republicans and Democrats alike utilized nation-based rhetoric in their political battles, with varying intensity, to varying effect, and through varying issues as vehicles. Based on the criteria elucidated in these authors’ assessment, the current political epoch easily meets or surpasses past periods of fierce patriotic argumentation, such as the early 1970’s and late 1980’s. Political leaders today regularly frame issues and arguments as being consistent or inconsistent with national loyalty, national pride, or the fundamental principles on which America traditionally stands. This includes attempts to criticize opponents and alternative viewpoints, as well as to garner support and agreement.
Subtle usage, such as the invocation noted earlier by Congressman Waxman, is commonplace.
Examples of more high-profile usage would certainly include, but are by no means limited to, the following: vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s distinction pitting “real Americans” and the
“pro-America areas of this great nation” versus her opponents; suggestions that John Kerry dishonored his country during the Vietnam War by criticizing its premise and conduct; charges that John Kerry looks French; Representative Michelle Bachmann’s suggestion that certain members of congress ought to be investigated to determine whether they are “pro-America” or
“anti-America”; criticisms that President Obama is overly deferential and apologetic to foreign leaders; controversies over President Obama’s decision not to wear a flag pin or place his hand on his heart during the Pledge of Allegiance; the “movement” centered on questioning President
6 Obama’s place of birth; suggestions that Michelle Obama is not proud of America; assertions by
President Obama that those who oppose the government’s investments in the U.S. economy also oppose American workers; and suggestions that Republican plans to decrease entitlement spending are un-American.10
Based on the evidence cited above, the role of patriotism in contemporary American politics appears to outpace not only the highly-influential context set in 1988, but perhaps any other in the modern era. The aforementioned evidence is however heavily focused on discourse among elites or others actively engaged in politics. This begs the question: Is the public making political distinctions on the basis of national attachment consistent with the rhetoric of their political leaders? Or, in other words, is the empirical evidence, relative to American citizens, consistent with the aforementioned anecdotal evidence? A multitude of polling data suggests it is.
Not surprisingly, presidential politics proves illustrative on this point. A September 2008 poll by the Pew Research Center asked voters whether or not they found the Republican John
McCain and the Democrat Barack Obama to be patriotic. This relatively innocuous question revealed not only a 26% difference in perceived patriotism among the two candidates, but found that only 42% of Republicans thought Obama patriotic at all. A poll taken earlier that year found a 41-point gap in the percentage of registered voters who thought Obama and McCain were
10 Palin’s quote: Lyndsey Layton, “Palin Apologizes for ‘Real America’ Comments”, Washington Post, 22 October 2008; Kerry and Vietnam: Jim VandeHei, “Group to Air Ad Attacking Kerry’s 1971 Testimony”, Washington Post, 21 August, 2004; Kerry’s appearance: Adam Nagourney, “On the Campaign: The Birth of the ‘Breck Girl’ Story Line”, New York Times, 23 April 2007; Obama’s Apologies: Mitt Romney, “No Apology: The Case for American Greatness”, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010; Flag Pin: Jay Newton-Small, “Obama’s Flag-Pin Flip-Flop”, Time Magazine, 14 May 2008; Pledge of allegiance: Michael Dobbs, “Obama Nabbed by the Patriot Police”, Washington Post, 2 November, 2007; Birthers: Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Hawaii Governor Takes on ‘Birthers’”, New York Times, 24 December, 2010; Michelle Obama; http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,331288,00.html, “Michelle Obama Take’s Heat for Saying She’s Proud of My Country for the First Time”, 19 February 2008; American workers: Peter Baker, “At Chicago Ford Plant, Obama Says Critics Lack Faith in Americans”, New York Times, 5 August 2010; Entitlements: Tony Blankley, “Governing While Drunk on Faith”, Real Clear Politics, 20 April 2011.
7 “very patriotic” (29% and 70%, respectively).11 Americans believing each candidate’s
“patriotism is strong,” was 29% larger for McCain in August 2008, with 35% reporting that they
“have questions about how patriotic Obama is.”12 And when asked what “one word best describes” each candidate, Pew found “patriotic” was the second most frequent response for
McCain (36%), a term that did not even register on the list for Obama. It also failed to register for his Democratic predecessor John Kerry when asked in 2004, while 7% offered the term as description of George W. Bush.13
Polls conducted prior to the most recent turn-of-the-century showed that partisan differences on measures of patriotism were minimal (Smith, Rasinski, and Toce 2001, 5). For instance, a 1996 poll by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago found only a 6% difference in the proportion of Democrats and Republicans who considered themselves “very proud” of the way American democracy was working (28% and 34%, respectively). Since that time however, a noticeable gap in partisanship relative to patriotism has emerged. Self-described Republicans in 2010 were more likely than Democrats, by a 26% margin, to consider themselves “extremely patriotic.”14 This difference is higher even than the
23% gap seen in 2003, when the divisive war in Iraq was most fiercely debated.15 In 1987, Pew found 51% of Republicans fully agreed with the statement “I am very patriotic,” compared to
40% of Democrats. In 2009, 71% of Republicans agreed, compared to 46% of Democrats.
While such partisan differences are not nearly as pronounced when it comes to explicit judgments about the patriotism of the parties themselves, they are consistent with what is a growing disparity in the contents of individuals’ patriotic beliefs. For instance, Table 1.1
11 April 2008, CBS News/New York Times 12 LA Times/Bloomberg poll 13 Pew 2004 Report 14 http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=1374 15 http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=752
8 displays a mostly increasing split since the mid-1990’s in the percentage of Americans who register their national pride with some qualifications (“mostly agree”) versus those who do not
(“completely agree”).16
[TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]
While differences regarding the completeness of Americans’ attachment to country may be increasing, is the same true of their intensity? That is, did patriotic sentiment peak and then dissipate in the days and weeks following 9/11? Evidence suggests that for some people it has actually increased over the last decade. A USA Today/Gallup poll taken in June 2010 found that one in three Americans (32%) considered themselves “extremely patriotic.” This was up from
26% in 2005, 24% in 2002, and 19% in 1999. If strong national attitudes are a singular event- driven phenomenon, this would certainly be news to many. Yet at the same time that more
Americans view themselves as highly patriotic, they are increasingly skeptical about their fellow citizens. For instance, a 2007 CBS News/New York Times poll found that a majority of the public believes the average American is not patriotic.17
This myriad of public opinion data overwhelmingly suggests that national attitudes are becoming increasingly intertwined with America’s contentiously polarized political environment. Important differences exist in how individuals view their own patriotic attachment, as well as that of their fellow citizens and political leaders. Combined with observations from discourse among elites, little doubt is left as to the strengthening nexus between patriotism and politics today. Notwithstanding this overwhelming evidence, researchers have yet to explore this
16 Data were obtained from the Pew Research Center’s patriotism table results (p. 146) in the Complete Report entitled “Trends in Political Values and Core Attitudes: 1987-2009”. 17 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/06/27/opinion/pollpositions/main2987075.shtml
9 relationship with any measure of breadth or depth. This is despite patriotism’s similar conceptual qualities with a long line of general attitudinal attachments with proven effectual capacity in American politics. Social scientists have long examined the antecedents and consequences of symbolically-rooted attitudinal constructs, including party identification (e.g.
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2003), political ideology (e.g. Converse 1964; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976), political tolerance (Sullivan,
Pierson, and Marcus 1982; Stouffer 1955), religiosity (e.g. Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1989), race
(e.g. Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986), economics and social welfare (e.g. Feldman 1988; Lane 1962), among others. Findings from such studies have significantly advanced not only the discipline of political science, but societies’ broader understanding of human behavior in the political realm. With the goal of filling this theoretical and empirical void as it relates to patriotic belief, this dissertation asks and seeks answers to three fundamental questions:
1) On what basis do individuals adopt more or less patriotic views?
In other words, what psychological, sociological, or other factors compel Americans
to attach themselves in differential degrees to their nation and to those qualities to
which it is popularly associated?
2) What role do patriotic attitudes play in influencing individual opinions across
political issues and on candidate evaluations?
This question seeks to elucidate the exogenous effects for political behavior
associated with differential forms of national attachment.
10
3) Are attitudes surrounding patriotism structured within a broader body of
ideological constraint?
That is, does patriotism form the central or intervening variable in what can be
understood as a coherent ideological system of beliefs? This third and final research
question is a byproduct of the two propositions – that patriotism has causes as well as
political consequences – associated with those preceding research questions. The
intent, in this case, is to explore patriotism’s role in connecting abstract preferences
and manifest behavior.
Only after addressing questions to this effect, it would seem, can one determine with confidence and comprehensiveness the role of patriotic belief in American politics today. The following section further explores the details surrounding these questions. In doing so, it briefly describes the major theories either previously applied to or logically bearing upon the above research questions. It also reveals the core arguments to be developed and explicated throughout this dissertation, as well as the associated hypotheses to be tested. Finally, the design of this research, its potential contribution to the discipline, and a chapter outline are discussed.
Patriotism: Its Causes, Consequences, and Constraint
-- Antecedents: The System Justifying Tendency
Leading explanations of patriotic belief focus heavily on the role of individuals’ cognitive-motivational tendencies. Generally speaking, this approach seeks to account for the influence of core psychological preferences or personality traits bearing upon people’s nation-
11 based attitudes. Most notable among these are explanations rooted in theory and findings on authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Research within the authoritarian tradition historically argued that national attitudes fluctuate according to one’s attendant level of an entailed personality trait: ethnocentrism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford
1950). More recent accounts have estimated patriotism based on interpretations of the nation as a type of collective authority (Altemeyer 1988, 2004), or as the byproduct of threatening situational contexts combined with authoritarian tendencies (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner
2005). Social dominance theorists, on the other hand, highlight the influence of group-based dynamics in explaining individual differences in patriotic belief. Such beliefs, they argue, constitute a form of in-group bias commensurate with one’s orientation toward social dominance
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle 1994, 742). Said orientation is based on one’s preference for or acceptance of group hierarchy in a society, particularly pertaining to hierarchies involving race, ethnicity, and social class (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Other social psychological accounts include effects based on the strength of various personal and social identifications
(Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001), and differences in cultural meaning (Kelly and Ronan 1987).
Substantive variation in Americans’ national attachments, not surprisingly, also is associated with social-demographic characteristics. Influences related to age, income, race, religion, and other like factors, continually prove effectual (Ishio 2010).
Insightful as these theories are, none seem to directly or comprehensively address those elements of patriotic belief so frequently tapped by leaders in contemporary political discourse.
Such a sentiment has, however, been the comment of various political observers of late. The consistent theme among them relates to an increasing anxiety among many Americans as a response to the potential for large-scale societal changes, both globally and at home. Matt
12 Miller, of the liberal think-tank Center for American Progress, notes that politicians are keying on Americans’ status-related anxieties “when they evoke the idea of American exceptionalism as far as not wanting to lose dominance.” Similarly, conservative New York Times columnist David
Brooks (2010) argues that “change in the global social structure has created a psychological crisis in the U.S. Since World War II, we’ve built our national identity on our rank among the nations — at the front with everybody else trailing behind. But in this age of convergence, the world doesn’t have much of a tail anymore.” And broadening the point even further, Zakaria
(2008, 44) writes: “American anxiety springs from… a sense that large and disruptive forces are coursing through the world. In almost every industry, in every aspect of life, it feels like the patterns of the past are being scrambled.” To date, unease associated with changing societal systems or conditions has yet to be empirically assessed as a source of variation in American patriotism.
Previous patriotism research fails to attribute proper importance to the desire to maintain long-familiar assumptions. A proper account of opinion on the subject would focus heavily on the “psychological crisis” that is consistent with argumentative usage among political leaders, the policy-issues being discussed, and the philosophical principles at stake. It would emphasize the differential levels of negative affect caused by various forms of uncertainty and change.
Pursuant to offering such an account, I adapt tools from recent findings within the school of cognitive-motivational psychology in introducing an alternative explanation for the variation in patriotic belief. This explanation assumes the vast majority of Americans are early-on socialized to view the nation, its history, and prominent features as positively unique or “exceptional.”
Because notions to the contrary are likely to cause cognitive dissonance, persons should experience national attachment commensurate with their desire to preserve the familiar.
13 Such an explanation is rooted within the broader principles of system justification theory
(Jost and Banaji 1994). This theoretical framework emphasizes individuals’ tendencies to support the status quo and uphold existing social arrangements. It suggests people are differentially motivated to rationalize existing social, economic, and political systems as fair and legitimate because of its dissonance-reducing results. Palliative effects become most desirable for people when the legitimacy of key institutional systems is questioned, threatened, or otherwise destabilized (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway 2003a). The system justifying tendency therefore has a highly functional purpose in that it simplifies potentially complex or nuanced societal situations. Political psychologists have previously established this desire as a motivating force behind sociopolitical attitudes including support for the free market (Jost,
Blount, Pfeffer, and Hunyady 2003), political conservatism (Jost et al. 2003a), attributions of racial discrimination (Kaiser, Dyrenforth, and Hagiwara 2006; Kaiser, Eccleston, Hagiwara
2008), gender relations (Lau, Kay, and Spencer 2008), and belief in a just world (Jost and
Burgess 2000; Lerner 1980). Because system justification theory was developed with the specific goal of understanding how and why people accept and preserve society’s social systems
(Jost and Hunyady 2005, 260), it would appear aptly-suited to serve as a tool through which to assess people’s attachment to country. In an era of significant challenges to American supremacy, hegemony, and world leadership, and changes in its norms, demographics, and social standards, the desire to maintain the status quo serves as a potentially powerful psychological basis for determining the strength of individuals’ patriotic beliefs.
14 -- Consequences: Opinionation on Cultural Issues
As previously noted, Sullivan et al. (1992) assessed the effects of various beliefs about patriotism on vote choice. Beyond this analysis however, few empirical studies have sought to assess patriotism’s influence on other aspects of political behavior. Those that do, include a small and somewhat haphazard set of outcome variables. National attitudes have been previously linked to voter turnout and attention to politics (Huddy and Khatib 2007), attitudes toward nuclear policy (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989), views of immigrants (De Figuiredo and
Elkins 2003), and views of foreigners (Mummendey, Klink, and Brown 2001). No examinations, however, have to date focused on the domain of politics that falls under the broad banner of cultural issues, such as homosexuality, gender roles, immigration, religion, race, ethnicity, among others.18 This analytical paucity persists despite that opinions of cultural significance have proven to be highly susceptible to identity-based arguments, of which patriotism is an obvious source (Leege et al. 2002). And it continues notwithstanding the parallel prominence of patriotic conjecture19 and deepening political polarization in America (see
Abramowitz 2010; Hetherington and Weiler 2009).
Alternatively, theory concerning matters of cultural importance continues to emphasize theologically-based explanations (Hunter 1991; Green, Guth, Smidt, and Kellstedt 1996; Jelen
1990; Layman and Green 2005; Sobnosky 1993; White 2003; Wuthnow 1988, 1989). Such is notable not only because it is the dominant paradigm in the field, but also for the reason that patriotism and religiosity share similar conceptual and prescriptive properties. Both suggest devotion to a higher form of authority. Both tap deeply felt moral sentiments, particularly among Americans (Wolfe 1998, 133). Like religion, patriotism is a transcendent idea
18 As will be discussed much more extensive in Chapter 3, the domain of cultural issues is expansive so as to include any subject regularly debated through the mechanism of cultural argumentation (Leege et al. 2002). 19 This point is based on and substantiated by the examples cited earlier in this chapter.
15 (Hammond 1976), with the capacity to stand “above the mundane worlds of (so-called) interest or ideology politics” (Johnston 2002, 287). Allport (1937) long ago likened the behavioral traits of nationalists to religious fundamentalists. While Doob (1964, 247) suggests both concepts share a similar “compelling power.”
Given such similarities, it is perhaps not surprising then that a theologically-based framework for explaining cultural behavior might light the way for a patriotic analysis. In this research, I adapt the language and structure of Hunter’s (1991) “moral” worldviews thesis in conceptualizing patriotic belief. This theoretical account posits that differing approaches toward a recognized authority, as concerns ideas of loyalty, skepticism, devotion, and rationality, produce starkly contrasting political views. When this orthodoxy-progressivism framework is applied to the nation as authority, it should serve as a potentially powerful mechanism for predicting opinions across an array of culturally divisive issues.
-- Attitudinal Constraint: A Hierarchical Model
In positing an explanation of patriotic belief that spans from its causes to its effects, the potential exists to assess a unified model of attitude constraint. Few issues have spurred as much debate within the political science literature as that pertaining to the existence of ideology in the mass public. At one end, supporters of Converse’s (1964) “nonattitudes” thesis argue that most
Americans make political choices based on scant understanding of the underlying principles at stake, or otherwise do so on the basis of social groupings (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al.
2002). Others argue, in contrast, that Americans generally hold rational political preferences that are stable and consistent with their broader values and interests (e.g. MacKuen, Erikson, and
Stimson 1989; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004). Over the last three decades, however, a
16 broad theoretical approach focusing on the process of social cognition has added important nuance to the traditional debate. Building on theory and findings by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), Fiske and Taylor (1984), Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989), Zaller (1992), and others, many now understand attitude constraint as a function of loosely-principled reasoning, influenced by fundamental psychological predispositions, and the broad use of heuristics (see for instance Barker and Tinnick 2006; Conover and Feldman 1984; Feldman 1988; McCloskey and
Zaller 1984; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985).
Based on theory and findings from within this school of thought, Peffley and Hurwitz
(1985) developed a hierarchical model of attitude structure. Such a model assumes opinions are formed vertically, whereby preferences are derived from more primary views, regardless of whether thought-process is conscious or deliberate. This hierarchical framework links idea elements at three differing levels of abstraction. That is, it links abstract principles to general attitudinal postures to issue-specific opinions. Such a model is ideal for evaluating the highly abstract symbolism and principles associated with nation-based reasoning. And it has previously been applied to broad issue-domains similar to that of culture, including race, economics, foreign policy, and society (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004; Peffley and
Hurwitz 1985). In this research, I adapt this hierarchical model of attitude constraint in arguing that individuals’ status quo predisposition strongly informs their general patriotism attitudes, from which they derive political opinions on various issues of cultural relevance. Figure 1.1 offers a graphical depiction of this hypothesized phenomenon.
[FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]
17 The proposed model entails three core hypotheses, each of which is to be systematically investigated in this research:
1) Individuals’ patriotism attitudes will be most strongly and commensurately
influenced by their general tendency to support the broader status quo.
2) Increasingly orthodox patriotic beliefs will influence individual opinions on cultural
issues in a traditionally conservative direction.
3) Opinions on cultural issues will be constrained temporally by predispositions to
support the status quo and general patriotism attitudes, respectively.
Research Design and Data
The overall design of this research is intended to explore the role of patriotically-based reasoning and behavior in modern American politics by explicating the derivative relationships at multiple levels of abstraction. Examination of this sort will involve a comparative theoretical assessment based on the existing literature. This includes reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of previous approaches versus the explanatory tools offered by the proposed model.
Accompanying this review will be an empirical evaluation. In this, I rely primarily upon quasi- experimental methods to quantitatively evaluate political behavior at the individual level. This includes controlling for potentially confounding characteristics or other external influences by operationalizing concepts that correspond to patriotism-related theories. Assessment of data will occur at the posttest phase only. Because random assignment of this research’s core variables of
18 interest is not possible (i.e. system justifying tendency, patriotic belief), its internal validity necessarily suffers. However, unlike in the case of findings drawn from classical experiments, analytical results from this research should be broadly generalizable since most will be based on a national sample of randomly generated respondents (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2006).
Data will be assessed through various forms of multivariate statistical analysis, including multiple regression and structural equation modeling. These and related statistical methods should allow for a quantitative evaluation of individual and combined linkages between the status quo psychological predisposition, patriotism, and public opinion on cultural issues. Along with the theoretical review, this empirical assessment should allow for a systematic evaluation of the proposed hypotheses.
To test these hypotheses, I rely on two main sources of data. These include the 2004
American National Election Studies survey (N = 1,212) and a student sample collected in 2004 by the author (N = 186). Because the 2004 ANES is an omnibus survey of attitudes and behaviors, it measures individual beliefs across an array of prominent political issues, such as race, equality, morality, social spending, among many others. It also includes a number of individual items related to political efficacy, trust in government, and equalitarianism, and that combine to capture the system justifying tendency. And it contains five items that collectively offer a comprehensive account of people’s patriotism-related attitudes.
The student sample is based on a survey of responses from undergraduates at Oregon
State University. The 81-item survey was designed intentionally to assess the strength and type of individual’s national attachment. It contains 41 items directly measuring patriotism, in addition to a battery of questions tapping the system justifying tendency. The design and size of the sample comprising this data set is similar to numerous other student studies used to assess
19 patriotism (e.g. Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, N = 239; Li and Brewer 2004, N = 148;
Mummendey et al. 2001, N = 103, 107, 96, and 105; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1997, N = 291 and 253). Many of the survey questions were either inspired by or adapted directly from questionnaires previously used in the literature.
That data for both the ANES and the student sample were collected in 2004 is unintentional. Each was selected for analysis based on its ability to represent the key concepts of this research, and thus to empirically test its relevant hypotheses. Obviously, data drawn from multiple years over the last decade or less would offer the most complete depiction of events.
Nonetheless, the data utilized from this time period should offer a fair and accurate picture of both patriotism and related concepts in the contemporary political era.
Contribution of Research to the Discipline
The analysis and findings contained within this dissertation should make numerous contributions of note to the discipline of political science. First, and most generally, it offers an extensive evaluation of the concept of patriotism. Despite its ubiquitous presence in electoral campaigns, political debates, and media conjecture, the breadth and depth of patriotic belief remains all-too-little studied and understood by scholars (Sullivan et al. 1992, 230). This research will offer a comprehensive evaluation of the subject from which future researchers may readily draw. Second, this research applies directly to the study of political behavior a new and potentially powerful theoretical framework in system justification theory. To date, this theory has largely remained the tool of social and political psychology. However, existing research suggests its core properties contain explanatory power relevant to contemporary American
20 politics. Use here explores and seeks to validate its fit within the field of public opinion and political science more broadly.
This dissertation also challenges existing theory regarding causal explanations of
American public opinion on cultural issues. The notion that theological reasoning underlies the nation’s cultural divide is comparatively assessed in light of individuals’ patriotic views. The principles associated with patriotic orthodoxy and progressivism offer a novel explanatory framework through which to understand many of leading social and political issues of the day.
Finally, this research offers a further test of an underutilized model of attitude constraint. The hierarchical model (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985) offers a new approach to understanding cultural issue-opinions and attitudes about patriotism. As a result, related findings will add nuance and useful insight into the classic debate over the nature and existence of mass belief systems.
General Chapter Outline
This dissertation proceeds with an exploration in Chapter 2 of the culture war literature and the paradigm that explains political division by theological convictions.20 I compile previous findings to show how the reach of this religion-based approach has proven to be both narrow in issue-scope, as well as lacking in theoretical import for many of today’s most controversial political topics. Assuming an expansive understanding of cultural conflict, I argue in favor of the increasing importance of people’s commitment to “American” values, rather than religious values. Multivariate regression analysis is used to predict attitudes on contentious social issues, such as immigration and gay marriage, as well as preferences relevant to economics, foreign policy, and vote choice.
20 This dissertation proceeds with an analysis of patriotism’s consequences (Chapter 2) rather than its causes (Chapter 3) so as to provide an early introduction to the key theoretical concept of patriotic orthodoxy/progressivism.
21 Chapter 3 offers an in-depth review of the leading causal explanations relevant to patriotic belief. After also examining the principles and findings of system justification theory as it has developed over the past decade-and-a-half, I lay out the argument that support for the status quo is a psychological tendency of great importance for American patriotism. I also discuss in detail how this concept is operationalized, prior to directly assessing it empirically.
This includes testing several interaction hypotheses suggested by system justification theory.
The primary goal of Chapter 4 is to evaluate the proposed linkages between support for the status quo, patriotism attitudes, and public opinion, based on a hierarchical model of attitude constraint. I first review the literature related to ideological constraint. In doing so, I describe the emergence of vertical opinion formation as a strand of thought within the cognitively-focused ideological school. To assess the suitability of the hierarchical model of attitude constraint to issues of cultural relevance, I employ structural equation modeling techniques while controlling for covariates.
Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, brings together the major findings of this research. I offer an expanded discussion of the scope with which results from hypothesis-testing ought to be considered. This includes implications for attitudes surrounding patriotism and the continued polarization of America’s political environment. And it includes discussion of where and how the extant literature is most profoundly affected. I also make reference to qualifications associated with this research’s internal and external validity. Finally, questions for future research are discussed, with particular interest in how future scholars, political leaders, and the broader American public, may benefit from further knowledge of the causes and consequences of patriotic belief.
22 CHAPTER 1 TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1.1 Percentage of Americans agreeing with the statement “I am very patriotic” (Pew Research) 1994 1997 1999 2001 2003 2007 2009 Completely Agree 51% 48% 49% 54% 56% 49% 54% Mostly Agree 40% 42% 38% 38% 35% 41% 34% Difference -11 -8 -11 -16 -21 -8 -20
Figure 1.1: A Hierarchical Model of Attitude Constraint
Core Value Status Quo Support
General Attitudinal Posture General Patriotism Attitudes
Specific Issues Environmentalism Homosexuality Immigration Gender roles
Social spending Foreign Affairs Crime and Punishment Blacks Pres. Vote
23 Chapter 2 America as “Higher Power”
“[T]he individual who has a pseudopatriotic21 conception of America in relation to other nations actually regards most of America as an outgroup: various religions, non-whites, ‘the masses,’ too-educated people and too-uneducated people, criminals radicals, and so on, tend largely to fall in the outgroup category.” - Adorno et al. 1950, 148
“We believe that the best of America is in these small towns that we get to visit, and in these wonderful little pockets of what I call ‘the real America,’ being here with all of you hard- working, very patriotic, very pro-America areas of this great nation.” - Vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin22
Worldviews: Religious and Patriotic
In the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth, religion was an important source of political division in America. The country’s largest and longest-lasting political coalition was characterized in part by solid support among non-Protestants, like Catholics and Jews, particularly in the North. But as the New Deal alliance began to come apart after the 1960’s, traditional religious group differences started to become less important. This did not however, mean a lessening of theologically-rooted political division. In fact, the opposite was true.
Starting in the 1980’s and continuing into the 21st century, the influence of religious belief in
American politics has grown.
This rift was characterized by a growing split between fundamentalists and modernists that stretched across America’s major religious groups (Green and Guth 1991; Hoffmann and
Miller 1997; Hunter 1991, 1994; Layman 1997, 1999; Wuthnow 1988). As a result, more/less
21 To some degree, confusion exists over Adorno et al.’s (1950) use of the term “pseudopatriotism,” which they understand as being similar to national ethnocentrism. This contrasts with what they define as “genuine” patriotism, or “love of country.” However, the two are sometimes used interchangeably. For a discussion on the confusion regarding these terms see Kosterman and Feshbach (1989, 259). 22 Sarah Palin’s comments were made at a fundraiser in Greensboro, North Carolina on October 16, 2008 (http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/10/palin-clarifies-her-pro-americ.html).
24 conservative versus progressive denominations and movements within Protestantism,
Catholicism, and Judaism, came to constitute a new point of departure for political attitudes.
And to a degree, splits along such lines were occurring within denominations (Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 1994; Miller and Hoffman 1999; Wuthnow 1988). Non-believers were found to hold views similar to religious progressives (Hunter 1991, 45, 75). Consistent with these affiliation-related changes were increasingly important religious philosophical and behavioral differences. In particular, the literalness of individuals’ doctrinal interpretations and the closeness of their ties to a place of worship affected people’s political opinions in predictably liberal and conservative directions (Green and Guth 1991; Guth and Green 1993; Kellstedt and
Smidt 1993; Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Mockabee 2007; Mockabee, Monson, Grant 2001;
Welch, Tittle, and Grasmick 2006).
This disjuncture in theological belief systems is often described in the literature using the language of ‘worldviews.’ Worldviews, which are fundamental and expansive understandings of authority and morality, are believed by many to be at the root of America’s ongoing culture wars and the broader political polarization seen in politics today (Guinness 1993; Evans 1997; Hunter
1991; Klatch 1992; Neuhaus 1992; Wuthnow 1988, 1996). While some critics of the worldviews typology argue instead for the role played by competing social groups (Evans 1996, 1997; Miller and Hoffman 1999), religiously-motivated reasoning has proven to be an influential force across numerous political domains. It has been tied to attitudes on social-moral issues, such as abortion, gender roles, and homosexuality (Davis and Robinson 1996; Layman and Green 2005; Hunter
1991; Wuthnow 1988), noted as a basis for views on economic issues, such as health care and levels of taxation, and linked to opinions on issues related to race, such as affirmative action
(Hunter 1991; Klatch 1992; Wuthnow 1988). Religious worldviews have been offered as a
25 source for beliefs on foreign policy, such as support for the Iraq War and the broader war on terror (Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008; Guth, Fraser, Green, Kellstedt, and Smidt 1996;
Jelen 1994). An explanatory framework with the capacity to illuminate America’s cultural divide with such scope is, not surprisingly, highly intriguing.
Yet despite these findings, doubts remain as to whether worldviews premised on religious beliefs constitute an accurate description of the primary forces behind cultural conflict. As the scope of cultural disputes widens with the fluctuation of ongoing debates and the emergence of new issues (see Layman and Carsey 2002), recent evidence suggests religion is at times extraneous to political opinionation. For instance, a Pew Research Center poll conducted in
August of 2010 found that only 7% and 6% of respondents said that religion was the most important influence in their views on immigration and the environment, respectively. And
Layman and Green (2005) showed that the range of issues over which the religious orthodox- progressive divide exists is narrow and relevant only under particular policy contexts involving special political leadership. These findings come on the back of others that show theological reasoning pertains only to a handful of issues such as reproductive rights, sexuality, schooling, and gender, and not to the domains of racial and economic equality (Davis and Robinson 1996;
Wuthnow 1994).
At the same time, beliefs pertaining to issues of national attachment appear increasingly important in American politics (Barber 1996b; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Huntington 2004;
Johnston 2002; Li and Brewer 2004; McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle in press). As the previous chapter explained, patriotism sits at the center of broad disagreements among political theorists and over popular interpretations of U.S. history (e.g. Nussbaum 1996; Primoratz 2002a,
2002b; Schweikart and Allen 2007). It infuses the substance of a host of new and old policy
26 decisions (e.g. Huntington 2004). It is an oft-employed tool of argumentation among political leaders (e.g. Palin 2010; Romney 2009). And many Americas feel increasingly strongly about patriotism such that it consistently aligns with their broader political views.23 But perhaps most interestingly, patriotism appears to contain many of the structural elements which individuals might look to for moral and authoritative guidance. That is, like religiosity, it contains the makings of an orthodox/progressive ideational foundation for interpreting and evaluating political issues and candidates.
In this chapter, I argue that opinions on issues of cultural relevance are best explained by contrasting belief systems rooted in patriotism, rather than religion. In making this argument, I adopt the basic theoretical framework that distinguishes between orthodox and progressive worldviews. Patriotic orthodoxy and progressivism, I suggest, offers a powerful explanatory basis for understanding individual attitudes across a broad array of polarizing political issues in
America today.
-- Orthodox and Progressive Worldviews
The theoretical basis behind the worldviews dichotomy is most widely associated with the work of James Davison Hunter and his 1991 book Culture Wars. In it he describes a disjuncture amongst the American public that in many ways resembles the classic and global debate between enlightenment and anti-enlightenment philosophy. In a sense, it pits principles of Lockean liberalism against those of Burkean conservatism. The latter, or orthodox worldview, is signified in large part by adherent’s “commitment…to an external, definable, and transcendent authority” (Hunter 1991, 44, italics in original). Objective and supreme authority defines for such persons, at least in the abstract, a consistent, unchangeable measure of value,
23 This point is evidenced by the polling data included in Chapter 1.
27 purpose, goodness, and identity, both in personal and collective terms. In turn, they adopt a more rigid, traditional approach to interpreting and solving matters affecting society. In contrast, the progressive worldview is associated with a relativistic view of society. In this case, what is true, proper, and moral may be evolving or even indeterminable. “Within cultural progressivism…moral authority tends to be defined by the spirit of the modern age, a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism” (ibid). Not surprisingly, these competing worldviews connote very different models for generating opinions about leading figures, institutions, and issues in society. Key to this chapter, and to this dissertation, is that while the authoritative basis underlying these belief systems has long been assumed to rest on religious motivation, I suggest a more accurate description today hinges upon individuals’ nation-oriented belief structure.
Assumption of a patriotism divide is based on the idea that individuals hold strong and varying views about what it means to love and honor one’s country, the extent to which one should value its qualities, and the proper way to interpret its legacies. Authority, in effect, is constituted by the popular constitutional, historical, and societal principles and stories of the nation. Because “the dominant American cultural values celebrate American exceptionalism”
(Leege et al. 2002, 158), one’s broader social outlook is shaped by his or her attitude on this score. The patriotically orthodox value traditional American social characteristics and America’s enduring systems and institutions, believing them to be inherently moral and enlightened.
Adherents subscribe to an intrinsic effectiveness and uniqueness about the nation, and trust its general practices are in the direction of a broadly preordained or righteous path. They, in sum, subscribe to the notion that “America is the vanguard of humanity” Richard Rorty (1998, 29).
Juxtaposing this image is a progressive form of patriotism that is characterized in part by a critical approach to evaluating the nation. This includes a willingness to recognize and adopt
28 alternative national viewpoints, ideas, and interests. Adoptees of this worldview are skeptical of notions that the U.S.’s position, principles, and broad policies are inherently unique or benevolent.24
The plan for the remainder of this chapter is to explore the nature and consequences of this patriotic worldviews thesis. First, I examine existential arguments surrounding the culture war divide in America. I then review previous attempts in the literature to conceptualize patriotism, as well as elaborate on its capability as an explanatory mechanism. Hypotheses are subsequently outlined and tested by way of the 2004 ANES data set, using multivariate regression analysis. A summary of findings and concluding remarks follow.
Culture War: Myth or Reality?
Despite widespread anecdotal and empirical indications of a broad cultural divide in
America, many scholars remain skeptical as to the very basis of its existence (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Evans 2003; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005;
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Williams 1997). A key critique of the culture war thesis is that a public long-known for its political apathy (see Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), cannot simultaneously harbor a range of strong political preferences and policy prescriptions. Fiorina et al. (2005) claim it is a falsehood driven by the pursuit of media storylines and poor political analysis to suggest that America is deeply divided politically. Their findings – drawn by examining the intensity and marginal rate of opinions on supposedly contentious topics at the individual and state levels – reveal a public that is dispassionate, ideologically moderate, and characterized best by consensus (see also Evans 2003). Some also criticize Hunter’s (1991) assertion that political elites, such as elected officials and interest group leaders, effectively
24 It should be noted that I make no normative judgments regarding either orthodox or progressive patriotism.
29 compel wayward citizens onto one political pole or the other by forcing them to choose sides in political debates (see Fiorina et al. 2005; Green, Guth, Smidt, and Kellstedt 1996; Layman 2001;
Wilcox 2000; Williams 1997). Instead, they argue, heated rhetoric offered by political leaders and inflamed on 24-hour cable networks and internet sites, largely goes unnoticed by most average Americans.
These and similar criticisms add valuable perspective to the cultural worldviews thesis.
However, they only too quickly and indiscriminately dismiss widespread evidence of a meaningfully polarized political landscape. Several recent findings provide substantial support to notions of a broad cultural divide in America. First, ideology and partisanship are more highly correlated now than they were in years past. The effect seems to have been to push citizens into opposing political camps with distinct outlooks. And second, the contentious atmosphere surrounding both particular issues and politics more generally, cause Americans to become
“divided over things that conjure more visceral reactions” (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 11).
Such is the case in spite of survey researchers’ difficulty in measuring this phenomenon.
Ideological consistency in liberal and conservative political views has risen over the past three decades. During the 1980’s the average correlation on seven issue-questions regularly asked by the ANES survey (liberal and conservative identification, defense spending, abortion rights, jobs and living standards, government services and spending, aid to blacks, and health insurance) was .20. It rose to .26 in the 1990’s and reached .32 in 2002-2004 (Abramowitz and
Saunders 2008, 544). Party identification also plays a more cohering role than in years past. For instance, partisan differences in evaluations of George W. Bush and the major policies he is associated with were wider than for any previous president (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008;
Jacobson 2007). This polarization has only continued under the presidential tenure of Barack
30 Obama. Polls identified a 61-point gap in partisan evaluations of the president a mere four weeks after his inauguration (Abramowitz 2010, 3).
Americans today are also keener to align their partisan identification with their ideological leanings (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Killian and Wilcox 2008; Putz 2002).
Erikson and Knight (1993) argue that as individuals become more cognizant of their own political predispositions they adjust their partisanship accordingly; while Levendusky (2009) argues that liberal-conservative ideologies are corrected to match party identification.
Regardless of the directionality, an acute “sorting” process – increased consistency between party identification and ideology – is underway (for a review see Fiorina and Abrams 2008).
This process is driven primarily by increased divisions among partisan elites over the last four decades. Because citizens take cues and accept political choices from elites (Carmines and
Stimson 1989; Hetherington 2001), the societal effect is a clarification of what it means to be a member of each party, and prompts “voters to adopt the ideological outlook of their same-party elites (Levendusky 2009, 3). As result, sorting leads inevitably to political polarization as voters adopt party positions at the ideological poles (Hetherington and Weiler 2009).
Additionally, the polarization of political attitudes is affected by the contentiousness of the environment surrounding it. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that differences in opinions on issues that are salient constitute a greater level of polarization than those that are not.
They cite same-sex marriage as an example. Because it is today an established, regularly- debated issue before the public, attitudinal deviations between groups are substantively more important than an equivalent difference on a peripheral issue. And on this and numerous other political issues of prominence, such as immigration, national security, and the environment,
Americans increasingly show up in polls as being meaningfully divided.
31 Also, in a rebuttal to his critics, Hunter (1996) argues that an overreliance on survey data to assess cultural conflict likely underestimates its existence. Preferring an ethnographic approach, he argues that competing expressions of moral visions by social organizations and through societal institutions creates a polarized plane on which citizens are forced to operate
(246). The more empirical version of this argument suggests that measurement error in surveys dilutes the variation between individuals’ and groups’ actual opinions. This is caused by the fact that few people “have the cognitive ability and/or political certainty to cluster toward the poles of a distribution” (Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 20). As a result, real polarization in American’s political attitudes is artificially depressed by their tendency to cluster around the midpoint in survey responses.
Despite the potential for such bias, several point estimates do resoundingly evidence the existence of an impassioned and divided electorate. Namely, 85% of Americans professed to care “a great deal” who won the 2004 presidential election, the highest level seen since WWII
(Hetherington and Weiler 2009, 16). Also, more Americans than ever have become what
Abramowitz (2010, 38) calls “active citizens,” or individuals who engage in at least one or more political activities beyond voting. And even voting itself is on the rise after having long been declining. As a percentage of the voting age population, more Americans turned out to vote in
2008 than in any election since 1968, while more than ever voted in that election’s presidential primaries. Each of the above factors, taken together, combine to paint a portrait of an electorate that is meaningfully divided along broad cultural lines.
32 Cultural Conflict and Patriotism
Despite describing the characteristics of today’s increasingly polarized political landscape, I have yet to offer a definition of the type of cultural conflict at issue in this research.
This ambivalence is due largely to the fact that I am not fundamentally concerned with exploring a specific set of policy issues, such as those involving abortion and school prayer. As was indicated earlier, the religious worldviews thesis has previously been applied to subjects that span the political spectrum, including social, economic, racial, and foreign policy matters. An equally broad range of issues will be examined in this chapter to assess cultural conflict. In doing so, I seek to avoid unnecessarily constraining the analysis by narrowly emphasizing a handful of “moral” issues (see Mockabee 2007, 226).
Nonetheless, to add precision to this research, I adopt Leege et al.’s (2002, 27, italics in original) conceptualization of cultural conflict as “any political controversy that turns on conflicts about social values, norms, and symbolic community boundaries.” A definition as such is characterized as much or more by the type of political argumentation surrounding an issue, than the subject matter itself. This style of discourse has the effect of enhancing the importance of group distinctions and differences in social standards in political controversies. Therefore, it generally involves disagreement over what society should accept or prescribe as moral, proper, or acceptable, without being restricted to a particular set of issues or policy questions.
Vehicles for translating arguments about social values and standards have in the past involved a number of different cultural dimensions. Such dimensions have included subjects such as race (Carmines and Stimson 1980, 1989; Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and Sanders
1996), education (Carmody and Carmody 1990), gender (Freeman 1983; Katzensten and Mueller
1987; Klein 1987), and religion (Green and Guth 1991; Leege 1992, 1993). The latter of which
33 has of course, been proposed as the catalyst in creating distinct cultural worldviews that structure people’s issue-opinions across political domains (Hunter 1991, 1996; White 2003; Wuthnow
1988, 1989). In contrast to this view, I contend that competing cultural worldviews in the U.S. are most heavily shaped by nation-based motivations; and furthermore, that these motivations are intentionally and powerfully enlivened by leaders playing on “patriotic/nationalistic themes”
(Leege et al. 2002, 160).
Previous research has intermittently assessed the role of patriotism as a mechanism for sowing political division on the basis of culture. Analyses have primarily been focused in the realm of voting behavior. Leege et al. (2002, 158-78) found that Barry Goldwater’s campaign promises to put “America first” did keep many Democrats home on Election Day in 1964, despite his large electoral defeat. They also determined that Richard Nixon successfully infused discord into the Democratic coalition in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s by painting war opponents and other agitators as unpatriotic. Hetherington and Weiler (2009, 10) have speculated that the burning of an American flag outside the Republican National Convention in
1984 made patriotism an important set piece in that year’s presidential race. And George H.W.
Bush’s repeated emphasis during the 1988 presidential campaign of his own devout patriotic views, and questioning of those of his opponent, proved key in determining that year’s election outcome (Sullivan et al. 1992). While these findings suggest the potential political impact of national attitudes, scant research has sought to systematically assess its role as an argumentative vehicle affecting opinions across political issues.
More often, patriotic belief has been assessed in the context of political participation.
Huddy and Khatib (2007), for instance, found that a strong American identity is linked to higher levels of attention to politics and voter turnout. Schatz et al. (1999) found patriotism was
34 positively associated with increased gathering of political information and activism. And Theiss-
Morse (2003) connects heightened patriotic sentiment to feelings of responsibility toward government and one’s fellow citizens. Additionally, a handful of studies have identified national attitudes as motivating opinions on a number of topics that generally involve respondents making overt ingroup-outgroup comparisons. De Figuiredo and Elkins (2003) explain views toward immigrants based on variations in people’s national pride. Several authors have found national attitudes to be closely related to the aggressiveness of people’s foreign policy preferences (Citrin et al. 2001; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). And Mummendey et al. (2001) suggest that the tendency to derogate foreigners and foreign ideas is in part due to the tendency toward blind patriotism. Despite that all of these examples imply some concern for social standards and the use of group comparisons to make political judgments, patriotism has yet to be assessed within a broader perspective of cultural conflict.
That it is capable of widespread attitudinal effects – upon becoming prominent through political discourse – is made all the more possible by its unique and ubiquitous role in American society. Several enduring qualities evidence this point. Schools in the United States generally teach children about the country in resoundingly patriotic ways (Bardes, Shelley, and Schmidt
2010, 195; Easton and Dennis 1969). And unlike is the case with religion, they do so with little fear of violating First Amendment protections or incurring the wrath of administrators and parents. Perhaps for this and other institutional reasons, “the belief that there is a unique
American identity” is “pervasive in the United States” (Citrin et al. 2001, 95). Janowitz (1985) suggests that in an effort to quell the sense of isolation often felt amongst Americans as a result of the country’s strong tradition of individualism, many Americans develop a robust sense of patriotism as a palliative measure. Similarly, Staub (1997) argues that many Americans maintain
35 strong feelings of unity as a way of overcoming the nation’s extensive pluralism. And
Huntington (2004, 108) contends that the nation’s identity is so important to people’s psyches in part because “[m]ore than many European nations, the American nation is a fragile and recent human construction.”
Regardless, national identity remains close to the surface of many Americans’ broader societal outlook. For this reason, the opportunity exists for political leaders to seek to garner support for various policy decisions by underscoring the “American” qualities in choices they favor, as well as their absence where they stand in opposition. The same potential is true as regards the ability to define various groups, issue-positions, ideologies, persons, and parties as more or less “American” than others. When characterized in such a manner, patriotism can become not only an issue “easy” for average citizens to understand (see Carmines and Stimson,
1980), but serve as a standard of evaluation to be applied to other issues. The present political context appears well-suited toward this type of usage. Such a context includes: looming threats of terrorist attacks; the parrying of First and Fourth Amendment protections (e.g. the Patriot Act, domestic wiretapping); foreign challenges to U.S. industries and systems (e.g. the auto market in
Japan, the health care system in Europe and Canada) during a time of economic uncertainty;25 a host of pressing social issues that can involve cross-national policy choices (e.g. immigration, climate change) or engender comparisons to other countries (e.g. same-sex marriage, legalization of marijuana). In such a political environment, national attachment may serve as a powerful perspective for individuals in forming opinions across various issues of the day.
25 The 2008 financial crisis, which continues as of this writing, appears only to have exacerbated deep economic insecurity in the United States (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/12/business/12fomc.html?ref=jeremywpeters#).
36 -- Patriotism: Unidimensional vs. Multidimensional Conceptualizations
Recent scholarship has frequently treated patriotism as a multidimensional concept.
Schatz et al. (1999) advance a two-dimensional model involving blind patriotism and constructive patriotism. The former is characterized by an unwavering attachment to country and its popular symbols, while the latter is characterized by a critical attachment to the nation and a desire to highlight and improve upon its deficiencies. Huddy and Khatib (2007) conceptualize four unique dimensions of patriotic belief, including national identity, symbolic patriotism, constructive patriotism, and uncritical patriotism. Sullivan et al. (1992) develop a five-dimensional model that includes iconoclastic patriotism, symbolic patriotism, instinctive environmental patriotism, capitalistic patriotism, and nationalistic symbolic patriotism. And still other patriotism researchers choose to emphasize a distinction between patriotic attitudes and nationalistic attitudes (Figuiredo and Elkins 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Li, and
Brewer 2004). The result, writes one scholar, is that “[p]atriotism has almost as many definitions as people who write about it” (Theiss-Morse 2003, 3).
In each such case, the authors offer a plausible theoretical justification for emphasizing particular aspects of national attachment. It is, after all, a complex concept. Moreover, each also documents statistically distinct correlations or effects among unique dimensions of patriotism, when assessed in conjunction with other variables. Nonetheless, it is dubious to suggest that there do not exist two broadly identifiable and opposing images relative to patriotic belief. Some individuals seem to harbor a patriotic/national outlook that tends to be conservative or orthodox, while others, one that tends to be more liberal or progressive. In fact, such a scenario is often apparent in the analyses employing multidimensional conceptualizations. In Huddy and Khatib’s
(2007) evaluation, for instance, three dimensions of patriotism are used to assess three types of
37 civic participation. In each case, the more progressive form of patriotism is associated with attention to politics, knowledge of the Middle East, and voting.26 This is consistent with a progressive patriotic outlook; or with Schatz et al.’s (1991) constructive patriot, who seeks out information in order to agitate for positive change. Schatz et al. (1999, 163) themselves found enough similarity between their blind and constructive patriotism constructs to conclude: “That blind and constructive patriotism were both positively correlated with national attachment indicates that they share core patriotic sentiment.” Despite the complexity of patriotism as a concept, treating it multidimensionally should not be considered necessary to capturing its essential character.
MacIntyre (2003, 286) argues in regards to patriotism that “the range of conflicting views can be placed on a spectrum with two poles.” In his unidimensional conceptualization, he places loyalty and particularism at one end, and universalistic beliefs rooted in generic political principles at the other. Other patriotism scholars similarly outline the unidimensional nature of the concept by emphasizing the importance of intensity and rootedness of patriotic belief (Citrin et al. 1990; Habermas 1990; Nathanson 1993, 1997; Taylor 1989; Viroli 1995). For instance,
Citrin et al. (1990) create a unidimensional index of Americanness based on scores rating the importance of such things as defending America when criticized, speaking and writing in
English, and voting in elections. Nathanson (1997) develops five components of a unidimensional construct, where the two ends constitute “extreme patriotism” and “moderate patriotism.” Similarly, Doob (1964) conceptualizes a continuum that varies between “strong patriotism” – characterized by an intimate interest in preserving the nation’s culture and power, and the desire to justify its uniqueness and the decency of its aspirations (12-13) – and “weak patriotism” – characterized by the belief that consideration of views and interests should extend
26 This finding is based on their study of political involvement (72-75).
38 beyond national borders, and that the nation’s power and culture are of little concern (13).
Nationalism is viewed simply as an extreme form of strong patriotism (6).
Regarding the distinction between patriotism and nationalism, Billig (2003, 132) argues it is based on tenuous empirical findings that fail to match the rigid theoretical claims often accompanying it (see also Eller and Coughlan 1993). He cites as evidence their strong correlation together (r = .28) and the comparable correlations they generally demonstrate in connection with other variables. The conceptual distinction between patriotism and nationalism appears increasingly suspect as of late. That a general convergence between the two has been occurring over the past decade or more (assuming a meaningful difference ever actually existed) is now routinely demonstrated (see Kemmelmeier and Winter 2008; Li and Brewer 2004;
McDaniel et al. in press; Parker 2010). For instance, McDaniel et al. (in press, 1) find that post-
9/11, patriots and nationalists alike express similarly “nativist conceptions of national identity.”
Even items once used to measure patriotism and nationalism separately are now sometimes used interchangeably. Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, and Schmidt (2010) use “agree-disagree” responses to the classic patriotism metric, “I am proud to be a [German]” to capture what they conceive as nationalism. They define nationalism (in Germany) simply as a “generalized positive assessment of the nation, and a positive evaluation of German history” (p. 4).
Consistent with this broader understanding of national attitudes, and the patriotic worldviews thesis of this research, I adopt a unidimensional conceptualization. This construct contrasts orthodox and progressive patriots at opposite poles. As previously described, orthodox patriots subscribe strongly to notions of “American exceptionalism,” emphasize its classic social and demographic characteristics, and are highly particularistic in their national affections.
Progressive patriots, in contrast, are skeptical as to the benevolence of America’s interests,
39 actions, and the equitable application of its principles, and are more open to recognizing competing ideas and interests. This proposed framework suggests the following core hypothesis:
Individuals should rely on varying orthodox and progressive understandings of America as a means of interpreting societal events, evaluating group characteristics, assessing political candidates, and determining the right (and wrong) policy solutions for tackling the nation’s problems (H1). Below I list four specific sub-hypotheses relative to the ensuing analysis of cultural conflict:
H1a: Social issues. Orthodox patriots will support traditional social institutions and
patterns of behavior on the basis that such are the ones that have thus far allowed
America to become uniquely stable and strong. From this perspective, America should
not sanction unorthodox behavior, such as homosexuality, and should deal harshly with
criminal behavior. It should not intervene to advance the standing of blacks, women, or
other minorities,27 nor allow a large influx of or influence by immigrants and foreign
cultures. Progressive patriots are expected to adopt alternative perspectives.
H1b: Economic issues. Orthodox patriots will support the foundations of capitalism and
the values of the free-market, as core drivers behind America’s prosperousness and its
differentiation with both Western and non-Western nations. This should include support
of the nation’s market-driven health care system, preferences for entrepreneurial ideas
27 Rogers Smith (1997) documents how American liberal theory has often deviated from practice. He cites as examples from America’s nativist past, such as in its treatment of women, Native Americans, blacks, Chinese, among others. Therefore, Smith goes on to note, it should not seem contradictory that individuals who emphasize America’s ideals may also be unconcerned that they be equitably applied.
40 and groups, and an opposition to social welfare programs. Progressive patriots should
adopt alternative viewpoints.
H1c: Foreign policy. Orthodox patriots will support ideas that advance the security,
power, and status of the nation and its ideals, with minimal regard for the views of other
nations. In this image, aggressive, interventionist policies are preferable. Support for the
military, ongoing foreign conflicts, and spreading American principles globally are
consistent with this perspective. Progressive patriots are likely to prefer alternate policy
prescriptions.
H1d: Partisan Politics. Orthodox patriots will align themselves with the Republican
Party, conservative political ideology, and the candidates reflective of these preferences.
Progressive patriots will align themselves with the Democratic Party, liberal political
ideology, and the candidates reflective of these preferences.
Data and Measurement
To test the above hypotheses I utilize the 2004 ANES survey (N = 1,212). Respondents for the survey were chosen by random selection through area probability sampling, with interviews taking place in-person. The items in this data set relative to patriotism and religion make it particularly well-suited to operationalizing these concepts. This includes five questions that, when combined, offer a comprehensive measure of individual’s patriotic orthodox/progressive worldview. Several of the items are similar in content to those used in previous analyses of patriotism (see Citrin et al. 2001; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Staub
41 1997). Questions include: “There are some things about America today that make me feel angry about America—do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree?” “There are some things about America today that make me feel ashamed of America—do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree?” “Is being an American extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important to you personally?” “When you see the
American flag flying does it make you feel...—extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very good?” and “How strong is your love for your country—extremely strong, very strong, somewhat strong, and not very strong.” Responses to the latter three questions were transformed into three-point variables so that each item’s contribution would be equal in creation of an additive index.28 The five items therefore form an index that ranges from 5 to 15, where 5 represents progressive patriotism and 15 represents orthodox patriotism. The reliability of the index is strong (alpha = .70).
Consistent with previous research, I identify religious orthodox/progressive worldviews based on three key components: religious affiliation, commitment to faith, and interpretations of religious documents. Regarding religious affiliation, many scholars now agree that devotional differences have replaced denominational differences (Davis and Robinson 1996; Mockabee,
2007; Layman and Green, 2005; Hunter, 1991; Wuthnow, 1988). Therefore, they frequently operationalize religious traditions as a categorical variable, rather than an ordinal variable (Davis and Robinson 1996; Layman and Green 2005; Mockabee 2007; Mockabee, Monson, and Grant
2001). Consistent with this approach, religious categorization is represented here by a series of dummy variables indicating whether or not the respondent identifies with a particular religion or denomination. Protestants are divided into evangelical or mainline groups based on the
28 See Mockabee (2007) for a similar operationalization of a patriotism index using these items from the 2004 ANES.
42 respondent’s denomination (see Appendix A). Black Protestants, Jews, those with no religious affiliation, and those who subscribe to other small traditions are also included in the analysis.
Catholics function as the excluded reference category.
Religious commitment is a useful component for capturing religious orthodoxy because it generally implies behavioral traits (Guth and Green 1993; Welch, Tittle, and Grasmick 2006). In this analysis, religiosity is measured by creating an additive index of three variables: frequency of attendance at a place of worship, frequency of prayer, and the degree to which religion is a guiding force in one’s life. Consistent with previous treatments of religious commitment
(Mockabee 2007; Mockabee, Monson, Grant 2001), all three items were transformed into dummy variables prior to creating the index so that each would carry equal weight. The reliability coefficient for this index is .66.
Doctrinal beliefs are generally characterized in the literature by the literalness with which individuals interpret a faith’s dictates (Kellstedt and Smidt 1993; Leege and Kellstedt 1993;
Mockabee, 2007). This component is captured here by asking respondents the literalness with which they interpret the Bible. The least literal category for this variable states that the Bible is written by men and is not the word of God, the middle category states that the Bible is the word of God but should not be interpreted literally, and the most literal category states that the Bible is a precise account of events. This item is similarly employed by Kellstedt and Smidt (1993) and
Mockabee (2007).
Additional variables used in the analysis include measures for a host of social- demographic characteristics. They are operationalized as follows: Age is measured in years.
Sex is a dummy variable labeled male, with females as the reference category. Race/ethnicity is a dummy variable for non-Hispanic whites. Education is measured by a 6-point variable of
43 completion from “8th grade or less” to “graduate degree.” Income is a measure of respondent’s household income for the year preceding the interview. Rural is a dummy variable, with urban serving as the reference category. South is a dummy variable denoting respondent’s region of the country. Non-southern states make up the reference category.
Party identification is measured by a 7-point variable ranging from “strong Democrat” to
“strong Republican.” Liberal-conservative ideology is measured by a 7-point variable ranging from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.”
An array of items concerning social, economic, foreign policy, and political issues serve as dependent variables in this study. Operationalization of these variables is described throughout the analysis. All variables used in the analysis, except social-demographic measures and feeling thermometer ratings, were coded so that a higher score corresponded with a traditionally conservative response and a lower score with a liberal response. Multiple regression and logistic regression are the primary tools of statistical analysis used to evaluate the data. Since the sample size for this data set is relatively large, cases with missing data were excluded from the analysis using listwise deletion.
Analysis
-- Patriotic Orthodoxy/Progressivism
Despite positing the existence of juxtaposing ideological camps, Hunter (1991, 43) acknowledged that the bulk of Americans would situate themselves toward the middle of a distribution denoting religious orthodoxy/progressivism. He approximated that roughly 20% of
Americans would congregate at each pole. They would primarily include political activists, elites, and others with a deep interest in policy outcomes. This estimate proved largely accurate
44 in an empirical assessment conducted by Davis and Robinson (1996).29 These authors operationalized religious orthodoxy/progressivism using an index that included responses to the aforementioned question measuring biblical literalness, as well as agreement/disagreement with two additional items: “The course of our lives is decided by God” and “Right and wrong should be based on God’s laws.” The poles of the distribution were estimated at one standard deviation above or below the mean. Based on this standard, the authors found 13.3% of the sample grouped at the progressive end of the distribution, while 21.9% grouped at the orthodox end.
Using the same standard, I estimated the distribution of the patriotism scale. Results largely mirrored those for the religious scale. Patriotic progressives constituted 21.3% of the sample, while the patriotic orthodox made up 18.3%. The mean score was 10.82, the mode 11, and the standard deviation 2.72 (N = 1,136). Figure 2.1 displays the distribution of the patriotism scale.
[FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
Based on the conceptual similarities between religion and patriotism (see Allport 1927;
Anderson 1991; Gelernter 2007), I sought a further exposition of their qualities. I crosstabulated scores on the ANES measure of biblical literalness with the patriotism index, after rescaling it so that both were represented by 3-point variables.30 Results displayed in Table 2.1 show notable similarities. For instance, only 6.5% of orthodox patriots agree that the Bible was written by men, while 37.8% agree it is the word of God. This is consistent with what we might expect given two like-minded concepts. However, important differences also exist. A higher percentage
29 Analysis was conducted using the NORC General Social Survey data set from 1991 (N = 1,359). 30 The variable was rescaled consistent with the aforementioned assessment of religious orthodoxy/progressivism by Davis and Robinson (1996). Respondents scoring one standard deviation below the mean were coded 1, those scoring one standard deviation above the mean were coded 3, with those in-between were coded 2.
45 of progressive patriots (28.1%) agree that the Bible is the literal word of God than believe it was written by men (26.4%). This shows that a measure of devotion toward national authority is far from a redundant measure of devotion toward religious authority. Distinction between the concepts is further evidenced by a modest correlation between the full patriotism index and the religious commitment index (r = .115, p < .01).
[TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
Based on the comparatively strong variation seen amongst orthodox patriots in Table 2.1, one might expect the bulk of explanatory power to be located toward that end of the distribution.
It would also be consistent with previous findings. When measured multidimensionally, uncritical patriotism, blind patriotism, and nationalism frequently have been found to contain more robust linkages to various political issues than their progressive counterparts (Huddy and
Khatib 2007; Schatz et al. 1999; Citrin et al. 2001; respectively). To assess whether respondents at the orthodox end of the patriotism scale are likely to account for much of the variable’s predictive power, I again utilize the collapsed 3-point measure. Three separate crosstabulations were performed with patriotism as the independent variable and a representative set of dependent variables, including measures of support for government assistance to benefit Hispanics, support for the death penalty, and preferences for protecting the environment versus protecting jobs.31
For all three comparisons, the results showed little difference in the level of variation between the orthodox and progressive categories. That is, the difference between each pole category (1 or
3) and the middle category (2) were largely comparable across categories of the dependent
31 Dependent variables measuring aid to Hispanics and the environment/jobs were collapsed from a 7-point variable to a 4-point variable to facilitate analysis and interpretation.
46 variable for all three measures. Contrary to previous findings, this suggests that a proportional share of the explanatory power is likely to be derived as much from the progressive end of a patriotism spectrum as from the orthodox end.
-- Social Groups, Issues, and Policy
As the opening quote to this chapter by Sarah Palin would suggest, pro/anti-American interpretative perspectives are commonly advanced by political elites. Doing so facilitates the application of patriotic principles by citizens toward matters of politics. Patriotism worldviews may perhaps be most appropriately applied toward the formation of opinions about social groups and practices. The first model in Table 2.2 displays the results from regression analysis where the dependent variable is an index of support for gay rights. The index combines scores measuring support for the ability of gays to marry, adopt children, serve in the military, and obtain protections from workplace discrimination (alpha = .72). Patriotism’s effect in this case is modest yet statistically significant. The impact of the political and religious variables is strong, particularly in the case of biblical literalness. The second model measures support for job protections for women. Controversies involving gender role in society have long been a subject of cultural argumentation. In this case, patriotism reveals a more robust effect than each of the religious variables, which fail to meet levels of statistical significance, save for the dichotomous measure for mainline Protestants. The third model in the table shows results for estimates of sentiment toward Christian fundamentalists, as measured by a feeling thermometer (0-100 degrees). Interestingly, patriotism displays effects comparable to that of religious commitment and larger than evangelical affiliation itself (betas = .117, .120, .097, respectively). Based on
47 feeling thermometer ratings, patriotism also proved among the leading factors in views toward
Catholics and illegal immigrants.
[TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
In addition to measuring affect toward illegal immigrants, the ANES also gauges responses toward policy proposals aimed at limiting immigration (legal and illegal). I created an index based on preferences for controlling immigration, as measured by the importance of limiting illegal immigration as a foreign policy goal, spending on border security, and decreasing the amount of people allowed into the country every year (alpha = .62). The first model in Table
4 shows that only race had a larger impact than patriotic views on attitudes toward immigration.
None of the religion variables approached patriotism’s level of predictive capacity. Also of note is that party identification was not a statistically significant factor in the model.
In 2003 affirmative action reemerged on the political landscape largely as a result of two landmark rulings that year by the U.S. Supreme Court. Though the decisions themselves were narrowly tailored, the issue’s connection to race and class makes it prime for cultural disputes.
Accordingly, I expected that orthodox and progressive patriots would divide sharply over government-mandated endeavors to rectify blacks’ social standing. The second model in Table 4 shows results of a regression model where the dependent variable combines support for the federal government ensuring blacks fair treatment in the workplace and for hiring and promoting blacks (alpha = .66). Results show only political ideology, race, and Black Protestant are more influential than patriotism. In a further test, I evaluated effects on a summary index relative to blacks’ position in America. The variable combined respondents’ level of agreement that blacks
48 should overcome prejudice without special favors, should simply “try harder,” are hindered from moving out of lower classes by past discrimination, and have recently gotten “less than they deserve” (alpha = .78). Again, patriotism was a significant factor in the model, along with primarily political and race-specific variables.
[TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
Another area of cultural conflict in the U.S. surrounds approaches toward crime and punishment. In contrast to other western nations, America is unique for its harsh criminal penalties, such as mandatory minimum sentences and “three strikes” rules. No policy issue better captures this dispute however than that over the death penalty. The third model in Table
2.3 shows estimates of support/opposition for the death penalty. Patriotism is the leading explanatory variable in the model. At the same time, religious commitment continues to demonstrate effects contrary to Hunter’s (1991) religious orthodoxy/progressivism hypothesis.
As regards crime, views were measured based on support for levels of spending in the area. A test of the variables influencing opinions toward spending on crime showed patriotism once again the most influential factor in the model.
-- Economic Groups, Issues, and Policy
Consistent with an expansive definition of cultural conflict, this section evaluates the impact of national attitudes relative to several contentious economic issues and groups. As much as any issue of economic import, Americans perennially divide over the issue of health care.
Controversy generally focuses on the proper role of government in regulating the health care
49 system. Obviously, sentiment related to health care is most acute in the wake of the policy debate that occurred throughout the course of 2009 and early 2010. Throughout this debate, rhetoric frequently involved comparisons between America’s private system versus the
“socialized” systems of Western Europe and Canada. Unfortunately, the fallout from this debate does not inform data used in this analysis (collected in 2004). Perhaps for that reason, results from regression analysis estimating support for a government versus private system failed to evince a patriotism-based effect. The bulk of the effect was due to the model’s political variables, partisanship and political ideology. However, it’s possible that patriotism’s effects on health care opinions are mediated in part by these political variables. When measures for party and ideology are removed from the model, patriotism emerges as the leading factor (beta = .171, p < .01).
Similar to debates over health care, broad cultural disagreements persist over the proper role of government in assisting persons least economically advantaged. Often such political debates are situated within the context of applying a more or less “American” approach to a policy problem. To assess the role of patriotic outlooks in this regard, I estimated its impact on measures of support for government spending on the poor and guaranteeing a job and standard of living. Table 5 shows that only party identification and political ideology are more efficacious than patriotism in forming opinions about spending to help the poor. Only religious commitment reached statistical significance among the theological variables and it was predictive in the liberal direction. That is, individuals most theologically committed were most likely to support increased spending. The same pattern largely holds true as regards support for the government guaranteeing jobs (model 2, Table 2.4).
50 [TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE]
I also expected patriotism worldviews to inform opinions relative to economic strength and success. Indeed, the third model in the table shows estimates based on feeling thermometer ratings toward business. Along with views of the Bible, party identification, political ideology, and race, patriotism again accurately predicted these economic-related opinions.
-- Foreign Policy Groups, Issues, and Policy
If the adage was ever true that political disputes in America ended “at the water’s edge,” such is certainly not the case today. Contentious debates relevant to foreign affairs are frequent in contemporary discourse and not surprisingly are embedded in the nation’s cultural differences.
This is no more the case than as regards attitudes toward the military, advancing interests and ideas abroad, and combatting international terrorism.
Compared to other groups in society, affect toward the military is strong. The mean score on the feeling thermometer for the military is 79.5 (s.d. = 21.4). Nonetheless, as the first model in Table 2.5 reveals, the large amount of variance in the measure is estimable most notably by patriotic views. It far surpasses any other predictor variable, with biblical inerrancy, mainline Protestants, other small traditions, age, and education also having an effect. Similar results occurred when estimating preferences that the U.S. maintain a strong military. Patriotism again proved the leading explanatory factor, followed by political ideology.
I next assessed cultural differences relative to national security using two distinct measures as dependent variables. The first measure asks respondents to rate their willingness to use diplomacy versus military force to solve international problems. The second model in Table
51 2.5 shows patriotism’s strong impact on the variable, while only the dummy for other small traditions was significant among the religious variables. The second dependent variable asked respondents to rate the importance of promoting democracy globally. In this case, variables capturing biblical literalness, Black Protestants, and evangelicals, along with patriotism, had a significant effect. It seems that both in advancing U.S. goals abroad, as well as the means often used for doing so (the military), individuals readily draw on their principles of national attachment in generating their preferences.
[TABLE 2.5 ABOUT HERE]
In the years following September 11, 2001, combatting terrorism became the overriding focus of American foreign policy. Not surprisingly in an already polarized political environment, opinions as to the optimal approach to ward off terrorist attacks frayed. I evaluated the role of patriotic views in this area in part by estimating spending preferences to combat terrorism. Orthodox patriotic views were consistent with increased spending to fight terrorism.
Only the influence of age demonstrated a more potent effect. Also, when responses measuring the importance of combatting terrorism as a foreign policy goal were evaluated, patriotism proved the leading indicator in the model. As the third model in Table 6 shows, only the dichotomous variable denoting affiliation as a mainline Protestant had a significant effect among religious variables.
52 -- Political Parties, Ideologies, Candidates, and Voting
By now it’s clear that patriotic belief forms an important outlook for evaluating numerous political issues tied together by cultural differences. Based on these findings and the overarching patriotism worldviews thesis, we should expect that nation-based orthodoxy/progressivism will likewise influence views toward various political orientations and voting behavior. To this point, party identification and liberal-conservative ideology have been utilized in this analysis as control variables. Yet what role might national attitudes have in informing views on these explicitly political measures? Table 2.6 answers this question definitively. When estimating partisanship, patriotism demonstrates a larger impact than all other variables, save ideology.
Dummies for Black Protestants, evangelicals, and Jews demonstrated an effect among the theological variables. Additionally, results from a logistic regression predicting which party best represents the respondent showed that, other than partisanship and ideology, patriotism was the only variable to have a statistically significant effect.
The third model in Table 2.6 shows that religious beliefs do play a greater role in affecting political ideology than was the case relative to party attachment. Biblical inerrancy, religious commitment, evangelicals, and Black Protestants each reached levels of statistical significance in the model, along with patriotism and party identification. The fully-specified model was also used to predict affect toward liberals and conservatives based on separate measures from feeling thermometer questions. Interestingly, while patriotism and views of the
Bible were both strong predictors of affect toward conservatives, neither had a meaningful impact on affect toward liberals.
[TABLE 2.6 ABOUT HERE]
53 I also estimated the model’s ability to predict opinions on a political variable with overt cultural connotations. The measure captured perceptions of President Bush’s success in improving the moral climate in the U.S. since taking office in 2000. Patriotism proved by far the strongest predictor, followed next by age and ideology (betas = .250, p < .01; -.132, p < .01; -
.104, p < .05; respectively). As evidenced by several negative values, it seems religious liberals and conservatives were quite conflicted over the issue.
Few subjects have gotten as much attention in recent years as the role of the “Religious
Right” in affecting election outcomes. While voter turnout among religious conservatives may indeed carry the potential to swing elections, are religious beliefs driving the decision-making process amongst most of the American electorate? To answer this question in terms of the 2004 presidential election, I assessed three models based on differing levels of specificity. The first model in Table 2.7 shows the results for estimates of vote choice, with partisanship and political ideology excluded. Both patriotism and several religious variables demonstrate a significant effect. But when party and ideology are included in model 2, only the Jewish categorization variable maintains an effect among the religion variables. The same holds true in model 3. Even after controlling for abortion, support for gay marriage, interventionism, and support for the Iraq
War, patriotism maintains a significant effect on vote choice, along with the Jewish categorization variable.
[TABLE 2.7 ABOUT HERE]
Clearly patriotism has staying power when it comes to explaining vote behavior. But did it formerly have such power? That is, was the 2000 election between Al Gore and George W.
54 Bush influenced by patriotism worldviews, or was that perhaps the election where theological reasoning proved strongest? To assess this question I used self-report measures from the 2004
ANES of how people claim to have voted for president four years earlier. Based on their responses, only categorization as Black Protestants and members of other small traditions had an impact among religion variables. Along with partisanship, ideology, income, and region, patriotism proved a significant explanatory factor.
Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter I sought to advance the argument that political opinions relative to differences in culture are increasingly determined by belief systems rooted in patriotism. In doing so I illustrated how religion is a shrinking basis for orthodox and progressive worldviews.
That is, while the culture wars thesis with which it is regularly attached endures, religion’s role wanes as the major political issues and arguments of the day increasingly involve devotion to a national “higher power,” not a theological one.
Controversies over issues such as abortion frequently shined during cultural disputes in the 1980’s and 1990’s. And outsized religious figures such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson were often effective at generating associated media attention. Perhaps as a result, religion has since been paradigmatically applied as a basis for orthodox/progressive views on culturally- rooted political matters. Yet the findings from this analysis support recent evidence suggesting its predictive capacity is limited to a narrow set of controversies (Davis and Robinson 1996;
Layman and Green 2005). In particular, issues increasingly prominent in recent years, such as immigration, national security, and social welfare spending, were found to be the least likely to be empirically tethered to religious beliefs. Furthermore, numerous estimates from regression
55 models also showed that religious commitment was almost as predictive of progressive opinions as it was orthodox ones.32 This suggests that simplistic theologically-based prescriptions that equate religiosity with right-wing views lack theoretical import across many political issues.
The analysis showed also that patriotism’s effects were generally more consistent and robust. On social, economic, foreign policy, and purely political matters, converging evidence pointed to the influence of orthodox/progressive patriotism worldviews. Moreover, the relationships depicted in the regression models could be logically traceable to nation-based reasoning or motivations. This is likely due in no small part to the fact that political leaders today are keen to paint political issues with the broad brush of the nation in order to evoke people’s cultural orientation toward patriotism. The obvious question to ask next is, “what makes individuals more or less susceptible to such arguments, and leads them to adopt the patriotic orientations they do?” Such is the question addressed in Chapter 3.
32 Similar results were found by Mockabee (2007).
56 CHAPTER 2 TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 2.1: Patriotism Scale Distribution33
Table 2.1 Views of the Bible by the Patriotism Index Patriotism Index Progressive Moderate Orthodox Total 28.1% 39.6% 37.8% 36.9% Word of God (66) (266) (76) (408) 45.5% 46.1% 55.7% 47.7% Not literal (107) (309) (112) (528) 26.4% 14.3% 6.5% 15.4% Written by men (62) (96) (13) (171) Chi-square < .000
33 All results in this chapter are based on data from the 2004 American National Election Studies survey.
57 Table 2.2: Models of Positions on Social Groups, Issues, and Policies Gay rights Women at work Christian fundamentalists Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Patriotism index 0.035 0.018* 0.072 0.035 0.021* 0.082 1.089 0.318*** 0.117 Views of Bible 0.490 0.083*** 0.257 -0.132 0.103 -0.076 10.953 1.505*** 0.291 Religious commit. 0.143 0.045*** 0.129 -0.003 0.054 -0.003 2.557 0.791*** 0.120 Evangelical 0.417 0.129*** 0.134 0.225 0.149 0.080 5.796 2.262** 0.097 Mainline -0.017 0.142 -0.004 0.273 0.161* 0.083 2.728 2.456 0.039 Black Protestant 0.454 0.201** 0.100 -0.260 0.231 -0.065 5.257 3.568 0.061 No affiliation 0.204 0.148 0.056 0.054 0.179 0.016 -3.050 2.697 -0.042 Jewish 0.131 0.262 0.017 0.188 0.316 0.026 -9.654 4.798** -0.063 Small traditions 0.119 0.216 0.019 0.081 0.260 0.014 -6.029 3.961 -0.047 Party ID 0.071 0.027** 0.113 0.075 0.033** 0.133 0.419 0.489 0.035 Political ideology 0.174 0.039*** 0.194 0.196 0.045*** 0.253 3.162 0.708*** 0.181 Age 0.006 0.003** 0.069 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.062 0.049 -0.040 Male 0.407 0.088*** 0.151 -0.298 0.103*** -0.122 -1.148 1.574 -0.022 White, non-Hisp. 0.011 0.134 0.003 0.265 0.153* 0.093 -4.106 2.424* -0.066 Education -0.101 0.031*** -0.118 -0.057 0.035 -0.075 -1.507 0.547*** -0.091 Income -0.028 0.030 -0.033 0.037 0.036 0.049 -0.525 0.544 -0.032 Rural 0.136 0.116 0.039 -0.038 0.138 -0.012 3.014 2.039 0.045 South -0.014 0.097 -0.005 -0.175 0.113 -0.066 2.047 1.704 0.037 Constant -1.091 0.295*** 0.871 0.355* 19.190 5.356**
Adj. R-squared 0.413 0.211 0.436 Sample size 604 485 677 *p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01
58 Table 2.3: Models of Positions on Social Groups, Issues, and Policies Immigration Affirmative action Death penalty Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Patriotism index 0.125 0.020*** 0.243 0.089 0.033*** 0.120 0.076 0.016*** 0.181 Views of Bible 0.305 0.093*** 0.149 0.176 0.163 0.059 0.010 0.076 0.006 Religious commit. -0.089 0.050* -0.076 -0.191 0.086** -0.112 -0.165 0.040*** -0.172 Evangelical 0.107 0.141 0.033 0.225 0.241 0.047 0.174 0.114 0.066 Mainline 0.126 0.155 0.033 0.526 0.262** 0.092 0.289 0.125** 0.092 Black Protestant 0.778 0.223*** 0.165 -1.458 0.374*** -0.213 -0.334 0.178* -0.089 No affiliation 0.112 0.168 0.029 -0.159 0.289 -0.027 -0.001 0.135 0.000 Jewish -0.191 0.297 -0.023 0.539 0.471 0.047 0.193 0.234 0.029 Small traditions 0.425 0.248* 0.061 0.328 0.423 0.031 0.068 0.200 0.012 Party ID -0.041 0.031 -0.062 0.120 0.052** 0.122 0.092 0.024*** 0.171 Political ideology 0.183 0.044*** 0.192 0.369 0.074*** 0.272 0.095 0.035*** 0.122 Age 0.006 0.003* 0.068 -0.008 0.005 -0.064 -0.001 0.002 -0.016 Male -0.026 0.098 -0.009 -0.060 0.165 -0.014 0.131 0.079* 0.057 White, non-Hisp. 0.851 0.150*** 0.253 0.647 0.247*** 0.132 -0.019 0.120 -0.007 Education -0.140 0.034*** -0.156 -0.098 0.058* -0.074 -0.095 0.027*** -0.130 Income -0.013 0.034 -0.015 0.060 0.057 0.046 0.042 0.028 0.058 Rural -0.023 0.129 -0.006 0.459 0.219** 0.085 0.043 0.103 0.014 South -0.151 0.107 -0.050 -0.275 0.182 -0.061 0.176 0.086** 0.072 Constant 5.087 0.333*** 3.092 0.574*** 2.088 0.271***
Adj. R-squared 0.239 0.380 0.216 Sample size 693 432 728 *p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01
59 Table 2.4: Models of Positions on Economic Groups, Issues, and Policies Spending on poor Job guarantees Business Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Patriotism index 0.026 0.009*** 0.108 0.080 0.025*** 0.121 1.354 0.311*** 0.174 Views of Bible -0.045 0.044 -0.048 -0.298 0.115** -0.112 4.963 1.453*** 0.160 Religious commit. -0.041 0.023* -0.075 -0.082 0.061 -0.054 -1.035 0.775 -0.058 Evangelical 0.087 0.067 0.058 0.175 0.174 0.042 -2.575 2.201 -0.052 Mainline 0.068 0.073 0.038 0.187 0.191 0.037 0.075 2.402 0.001 Black Protestant -0.154 0.104 -0.072 -0.100 0.271 -0.017 -1.555 3.486 -0.022 No affiliation 0.053 0.080 0.029 0.005 0.208 0.001 -0.947 2.613 -0.016 Jewish 0.198 0.136 0.053 -0.600 0.354* -0.058 5.554 4.719 0.043 Small traditions 0.151 0.117 0.047 -0.032 0.306 -0.004 -0.531 3.859 -0.005 Party ID 0.061 0.014*** 0.197 0.154 0.037*** 0.179 1.035 0.476** 0.103 Political ideology 0.056 0.020*** 0.126 0.367 0.054*** 0.295 3.095 0.684*** 0.214 Age 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.048 0.055 0.048 0.043 Male 0.034 0.046 0.026 0.072 0.122 0.020 0.251 1.529 0.006 White, non-Hisp. 0.094 0.070 0.061 0.425 0.181** 0.099 -10.500 2.339*** -0.205 Education 0.011 0.016 0.026 -0.001 0.042 -0.001 0.033 0.530 0.002 Income 0.015 0.016 0.037 0.067 0.042 0.058 0.046 0.531 0.003 Rural -0.092 0.061 -0.053 0.138 0.160 0.029 0.358 1.998 0.006 South -0.011 0.050 -0.008 -0.168 0.131 -0.043 0.322 1.666 0.007 Constant 0.856 0.158*** 1.528 0.413*** 25.302 5.187***
Adj. R-squared 0.162 0.298 0.197 Sample size 739 705 697 *p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01
60 Table 2.5: Models of Positions on Foreign Policy Groups, Issues, and Policies Military Interventionism Terrorism Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Patriotism index 2.349 0.287*** 0.311 0.111 0.025*** 0.175 0.025 0.007*** 0.158 Views of Bible 4.181 1.343*** 0.139 -0.016 0.116 -0.006 0.038 0.032 0.059 Religious commit. 0.325 0.718 0.019 -0.051 0.062 -0.036 0.000 0.017 -0.001 Evangelical -2.229 2.038 -0.047 -0.154 0.176 -0.038 -0.073 0.048 -0.073 Mainline -5.422 2.212** -0.096 -0.175 0.188 -0.037 -0.100 0.052* -0.084 Black Protestant -5.263 3.217 -0.076 0.190 0.281 0.031 0.008 0.076 0.006 No affiliation -1.442 2.411 -0.025 -0.231 0.207 -0.047 -0.023 0.057 -0.019 Jewish -2.510 4.277 -0.021 0.037 0.349 0.004 0.049 0.101 0.019 Small traditions -6.449 3.567* -0.063 -0.605 0.295** -0.073 -0.108 0.084 -0.050 Party ID 0.628 0.440 0.065 0.241 0.037*** 0.297 0.021 0.010** 0.104 Political ideology 1.240 0.632* 0.088 0.137 0.054** 0.117 0.030 0.015** 0.101 Age 0.140 0.044*** 0.113 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.039 Male -0.380 1.413 -0.009 0.278 0.122** 0.079 0.054 0.033 0.061 White, non-Hisp. 1.092 2.162 0.022 0.295 0.184 0.070 0.072 0.051 0.069 Education -1.013 0.490** -0.077 -0.098 0.042** -0.087 0.010 0.012 0.037 Income 0.411 0.491 0.031 -0.007 0.042 -0.007 0.002 0.012 0.009 Rural 2.806 1.853 0.052 -0.005 0.162 -0.001 -0.012 0.044 -0.010 South 2.021 1.536 0.045 0.166 0.133 0.044 0.002 0.036 0.002 Constant 34.513 5.183*** 1.243 0.454*** 2.093 0.122***
Adj. R-squared 0.266 0.250 0.085 Sample size 698 688 701 *p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01
61 Table 2.6: Models of Party Attachment and Political Ideology
Representation by Party identification party Liberal-conservative ideology Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Beta Patriotism index 0.144 0.024*** 0.184 0.217 0.082*** 0.060 0.017*** 0.112 Views of Bible 0.122 0.116 0.039 0.053 0.359 0.278 0.079*** 0.130 Religious commit. -0.015 0.062 -0.008 0.015 0.187 0.175 0.042*** 0.142 Evangelical 0.370 0.174** 0.075 0.487 0.536 0.252 0.121** 0.074 Mainline 0.206 0.192 0.035 -0.309 0.628 0.139 0.133 0.034 Black Protestant -0.949 0.270*** -0.136 0.144 0.836 0.578 0.187*** 0.120 No affiliation 0.323 0.208 0.054 0.935 0.701 0.138 0.144 0.033 Jewish -0.687 0.356** -0.057 -0.338 1.116 0.257 0.246 0.031 Small traditions -0.119 0.307 -0.011 -0.700 1.152 0.181 0.212 0.025 Party ID - - - 1.284 0.136*** 0.341 0.022*** 0.493 Political ideology 0.714 0.047*** 0.494 0.453 0.181** - - - Age -0.014 0.004*** -0.105 -0.014 0.013 0.007 0.003** 0.074 Male 0.134 0.121 0.031 0.056 0.384 0.241 0.083*** 0.081 White, non-Hisp. 0.505 0.183*** 0.100 0.296 0.568 0.176 0.127 0.050 Education 0.055 0.042 0.041 0.207 0.142 -0.034 0.029 -0.036 Income 0.056 0.042 0.042 0.105 0.142 0.058 0.029** 0.062 Rural -0.026 0.160 -0.005 0.315 0.503 0.125 0.110 0.032 South 0.081 0.132 0.018 -0.218 0.406 0.004 0.091 0.001 Constant -1.121 0.447** -10.710 1.700*** 0.592 0.310*
Adj. R-squared 0.455 .833 (Nagelkerke) 0.455 Sample size 745 518 745 *p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01
62 Table 2.7: Models of Presidential Vote Choice, 2004 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Patriotism index 0.325 0.034*** 0.235 0.057*** 0.174 0.076** Views of Bible 0.505 0.155*** 0.324 0.266 0.080 0.383 Religious commit. 0.151 0.084* 0.143 0.145 -0.035 0.198 Evangelical 0.629 0.237*** 0.025 0.401 0.142 0.550 Mainline 0.142 0.255 -0.286 0.493 0.256 0.646 Black Protestant -1.172 0.387*** -0.984 0.613 -0.607 0.853 No affiliation 0.479 0.278* 0.252 0.501 0.518 0.650 Jewish -1.067 0.570* -1.547 0.925* -3.268 1.544** Small traditions -0.139 0.418 -0.715 0.787 0.455 0.975 Party ID - - 1.171 0.101*** 0.948 0.135*** Political ideology - - 0.333 0.124*** 0.150 0.164 Abortion index - - - - 0.302 0.096*** Gay marriage - - - - 0.588 0.477 Interventionism - - - - 0.397 0.121*** Iraq war support - - - - 2.226 0.441*** Age -0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.010 0.006 0.013 Male 0.397 0.168** -0.179 0.295 -0.277 0.406 White, non-Hisp. 0.894 0.260*** 0.324 0.412 0.337 0.599 Education 0.010 0.059 -0.098 0.105 0.076 0.144 Income 0.156 0.059*** 0.064 0.103 0.047 0.139 Rural 0.287 0.214 0.346 0.374 0.123 0.532 South 0.459 0.185** 0.743 0.323** 0.567 0.425 Constant -6.277 0.694*** -9.444 1.239*** -12.459 1.964***
Nagelkerke R-squared 0.388 0.781 0.841 % correctly predicted 74.6% 89.5% 92.4% Sample size 887 698 529 *p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01
63 Chapter 3 Status and Status Quo
“There is apprehension that something elemental is changing and eroding the notion of exceptionalism, even perhaps in the national character.” - Mort Zuckerman, U.S. News and World Report
“Americans don’t want to be like Canadians who don’t wake up saying ‘we’re the greatest country in the history of the world.’” - Matt Miller, Center for American Progress34
The Origins of Patriotic Belief
Historians and social anthropologists generally agree that feelings of national attachment develop in regions where people who share relatively similar social traits undergo common experiences. Deutsch (1953), for instance, discusses the importance of shared language and widespread communication among community members in fostering national sentiment. Smith
(1983, 1988, 1998, 2001, 2004) notes the power of ethnic identity in stirring national affections.
Anderson (1983) emphasizes how socially constructed “imagined communities” effectively tie to a single nation a great swath of persons who will never know one another. And in the case of the
United States specifically, McKenna (2007) traces patriotism to the early puritan assumption that the New World was sacred and that salvation was a collective endeavor.
These accounts establish a common justification for persons experiencing feelings of national attachment. They also suggest general causes for different types and degrees of patriotism between nations. However, because their primary unit of analysis is at the aggregate level, their explanatory ability is necessarily limited as concerns individual variation in patriotic belief. And as Blank (2003, 260) rightly observes, “in the end it is always individuals who act
34 The comment was made on KCRW’s talk radio show Left, Right, and Center during a program that aired on December 31, 2010. Matt Miller is the host of the show, as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.
64 on behalf of the nation.” Indeed, it is individuals who support policies, oppose groups, vote for candidates, and hold opinions on a range of public issues. And as the previous chapter demonstrated, where they stand on such measures is strongly related to their general patriotic outlook.
This chapter seeks elucidation of the forces underlying people’s patriotic worldviews.
The factors assessed in this study are assumed to exist at the most basic or primary level of causation.35 Two major theoretical camps structure the literature on patriotism in this regard.
Sociological approaches emphasize the influence of group characteristics and social norms, while psychological approaches emphasize the role of attitudinal orientations and personality traits. Not surprisingly, several theories straddle the area in-between these two general styles.
What should become clear as this literature is reviewed in the beginning of the chapter is that none of the leading explanations appear to correspond to the popular usage and relevance of patriotism in contemporary political discourse. This includes the philosophical, policy-based, and purely-political treatments discussed in the opening chapter of this dissertation. While it’s possible that political elites are “waltzing before a blind audience”36 in their habits of patriotic argumentation, this seems highly unlikely. More plausible is that the extant literature is outmoded or inadequate to the task of adequately describing and explaining the leading basis for variation in national attitudes today.
This basis, I contend, is premised on individual’s psychological tendency to support the status quo. This principle, which is at the core of system justification theory (Jost and Banaji
1994), posits that people are differentially motivated to uphold existing societal arrangements, norms, and institutions, usually resulting in the adoption of corresponding attitudinal outlooks or
35 This refers to causation as discussed within the social sciences literature. 36 This phrase was used in a similar context in the title of an article by Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989).
65 ideologies (ibid). Persons are assumed to grow accustomed to existing conditions through processes of socialization (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009). The argument, in terms of this research, begins with the assumption that most Americans, beginning in childhood, are socialized to believe their country is unsurpassed in world status, economic prosperity, and domestic tranquility, stemming from its unique socio-political values. Consistent with individuals’ general desire to maintain conditions of this sort, including the extent of cognitive dissonance experienced when confronted with alternative scenarios, Americans are likely to develop their patriotic views. In other words, the predisposition to support the status quo should establish the basis for differing outlooks relevant to patriotism. The prevalence of system justifying tendencies should stimulate orthodox patriotic worldviews, whereby individuals eschew nation-focused dissent, harbor a strong emotional attachment to the nation and its symbols, and endorse wholly notions of American exceptionalism. Persons less-imbued with the status quo tendency should evince qualities consonant with a progressive patriotic worldview.
This includes skepticism relative to America’s exceptionalism, the belief that socio-political principles are universalizable, and a critical view of the nation’s institutions and traditions. In all, a focus on system justifying motivations offers a novel and solid theoretical foundation for explaining patriotic attitudes, and in turn, cultural public opinion.
This chapter is structured so as to assess this argument, first by reviewing the leading theories and findings relative to variation in patriotic belief. These include explanatory models based on political socialization, social groups, social identity, social dominance, and authoritarianism. I then describe in further detail the properties of system justification theory, and the existing findings to which they relate. Based on this theoretical framework I derive five hypotheses, which are assessed in two separate studies. Study 1 takes advantage of the national
66 sample and extensive batteries of questions included in the 2004 American National Election
Studies survey. Study 2 utilizes the wide-ranging assortment of questions measuring patriotic belief included in a 2004 survey of undergraduates. Results of the analyses and the conclusions to be drawn are then discussed.
Elusive to the Core: A Review of the Extant Literature on the Sources of Variation in Patriotic Belief
Because the goal of this chapter is to explore the origins of national attitudes generally, this review of the literature includes conceptions of the subject with varying emphases. As such, the theory and findings discussed may at times focus on patriotism, nationalism, national pride, national identification, or the like. In each case, the conceptualization will resemble the basic definition given earlier, as a set of attitudes relating to national loyalty and attachment (Kelman
1997, 166). However, this definition of patriotism is offered with the understanding that “at their core all the definitions express a strong identification with and positive attachment to a specific nation and its defining symbols” (Pena and Sidanius 2002, 783).
-- Political Socialization
An early theoretical approach to understanding patriotic belief is one that emphasizes its developmental qualities, or the role of political socialization. “Political socialization is the process by which people acquire relatively enduring orientations toward politics in general and toward their own particular political systems” (Merelman 1986, 279). Acquisition may stem from some combination of family, school, religion, the media, peer groups, large-scale societal events, or the like. From these sources, political values and beliefs are transmittable across generations. The socialization of broad-based socio-political attitudes has previously been
67 applied to developing religious beliefs (Green and Guth 1993, 101), party identification
(Jennings and Niemi 1968), as well as general views and affect toward the nation and government (Easton and Dennis 1969).
Easton and Dennis (1969) assessed the transmission of political ideas to children in elementary school. They collected data on 12,000 children from 2nd through 8th grade, evaluating student’s views, affect, and awareness of government and political authorities. They found that basic political orientations, including confidence, support, and recognition of norms, were developed and pervasive at each grade level (with varying degrees of sophistication commensurate with age). Such findings largely echo others showing that children develop among their earliest political attitudes a strong emotional connection with the nation, along with the belief that the US is superior to other nations (Hess and Torney 1968).
Jennings and Niemi (1968) studied the political socialization process by examining the results of a national survey of political beliefs based on responses from high school seniors and their parents. They determined that, along with the media, schools act as highly effective patriotism socializing agents. Schools convey largely positive views of the nation through both the curriculum and rituals (e.g. the Pledge of Allegiance), and largely refrain from critical evaluation of the government. However, it’s possible that the socialization of traditional patriotic values ceases upon entering college. Ishio (2010) argues that the values and norms learned in higher education, including critical thinking and cosmopolitanism, may not be conducive to maintaining the positive national attachment developed earlier in school. This is consistent with findings from Conover and Feldman’s (1987) ANES “memo” on patriotism, which found a negative relationship with education (see also Smith and Kim 2006).
68 Patriotic socialization may also occur through religious agents. Such was certainly true in the case of America’s earliest settlers (McKenna 2007). Today, however, “[r]eligious organizations may affect patriotism by providing patriotic, neutral or unpatriotic socialization experiences” (Ishio 2010, 75). Patriotic experiences might include rituals such as singing The
Star-Spangled Banner, most likely at a Christian church. Neutral experiences might include teaching the value of internationalist norms and ideas, such as at a Unitarian Universalist church.
While unpatriotic experiences might include forbiddances of certain acts such as saying the
Pledge of Allegiance or voting, as in the case of some Jehovah’s Witnesses (ibid).
Despite its insights, the capacity of political socialization alone to explain individual variation in patriotic belief is limited. One reason is that its evaluative ability rests considerably on the data needed to assess the socialization of patriotism. Using childhood socialization data alone to explain political attitudes during adulthood naturally leaves many potentially confounding variables unaccounted for (Greenstein 1970, 974). The large time gap between childhood socialization and adult attitudinal outcomes has in the past often hampered the amount of variance researchers have been able to explain in their behavioral models (Rosenberg 1985,
725). While panel study data are potentially capable of overcoming some such limitations (see
Jennings and Niemi 1968), a lack of available detailed information of this sort makes its overall utility difficult to assess.
-- Social Groups
Beyond the effects of socialization from childhood into adulthood, the antecedents of patriotism have been traced to various social group differences. The general assumption at hand in this perspective is that the social inequalities between groups influence individuals’ affection
69 toward the nation, with members of higher status groups being more patriotic than those of lower status groups. Ishio (2010) finds strong evidence in favor of this hypothesis as regards race/ethnicity, religion, age, and socioeconomic class. In the case of age, he finds that persons of middle age are often more patriotic than persons in either younger or older cohorts. The reason, he argues, is based on the lack of power associated with being either young or elderly, versus the relative opportunity, connections, and activities available in middle age. His findings show that patriotism indeed correlates positively with age until about 60, when it begins to decline. Ishio
(2010) also argues that identification as a Christian in America affords individuals a form of symbolic power. As the nation’s dominant religion, Christians are likely to garner more symbolic resources that lead them to adopt a stronger sense of national ownership and attachment. On the other hand, non-Christians, including atheists and agnostics, may be less apt to identify with America’s “civil religion,” thereby becoming less patriotic.
Hobsbawm (1990) has argued that differential forms of attachments to nations develop as a function of the influence of class consciousness. This is consistent with a Marxist-influenced approach that emphasizes the role played by economic industrialization and social modernization
(see Gellner 1983). In his statistical analysis, Ishio (2010) finds that socioeconomic class, as a function of income, is positively associated with patriotism. Also, Kelly and Ronan (1987) examined the differences in what it means to be “American” or “patriotic,” as a function of the psychocultural distance between demographic groups. Their methodology involved using
Associative Group Analysis to assess the descriptions offered by high school students. They found social class, as well as gender, were influential factors on almost every patriotism item, with poorer students and females being less inclined toward aggressive forms for patriotism, such as militarism and chauvinism.
70 It is, however, in the case of race and ethnicity where the impact of social group membership generally proves most effectual, complex, and dependent upon the strength of individual’s social identifications. White Americans, Ishio (2010) argues, express higher levels of patriotism compared to their non-white counterparts due to their long-held resource-related advantages in society. Racial and ethnic minorities, who are less able to determine and benefit from resource allocation, develop a weaker sense of national pride. His confirmatory finding on this point is broadly consistent with national survey results that regularly show blacks as less patriotic than whites. Studies by the Pew Research Center over the past two decades, for instance, find self-reported levels of patriotism amongst blacks to be about 10%-15% lower than for whites, on average (Kohut 2003).
Researchers have also hypothesized that due to past discrimination, social cohesiveness amongst members of racial or ethnic minority groups is likely to result in a diminished identity as Americans (Uhlaner and Garcia 2002, 80-82). Some evidence suggests that this is indeed the case. Citrin et al. (2001) report findings from the 1996 General Social Survey which asked respondents to gauge their closeness to their own racial and ethnic group as well as to the U.S.
Twenty-four percent of blacks felt closeness toward their own ethnic group but not the country, compared to 14% of Hispanics and 11% of whites. Sidanius and colleagues likewise found that the stronger ethnic and racial minorities identify with their respective groups, the more diminished is their sense of patriotism. Interestingly, the inverse also proved true. The more whites identified with their European-American heritage, the more likely they were to express positive national attachment (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, and Pratto 1997; Sinclair, Sidanius, and
Levin 1998).
71 Nonetheless, several empirical studies find strong evidence to indicate a minimal or even reverse impact of racial and ethnic identity on patriotic belief. In the same study cited earlier by
Citrin et al. (2001), the authors assessed the views of whites, blacks, and Hispanics using three separate data sets. Ultimately, they interpreted the findings to be generally suggestive of a complimentary rather than competitive relationship between national and ethnic attachments
(86), with “no evidence of a deep ethnic divide in feelings about American nationality” (95).
Sears and Henry (1999) similarly find that in the United States racial and ethnic identity are generally subordinate to identification of oneself as an American. And contrary to almost all previous findings, De la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia (1996) show that non-white ethnics may in fact be more patriotic than their counterparts in the majority. These authors assessed data from the Latino National Political Survey of 1990 to categorize Mexican-Americans according to six different levels of acculturation. At all six levels, Mexican-Americans expressed higher levels of patriotism than non-Hispanic whites, with two of the levels reaching statistical significance.
An emphasis on social group membership in evaluating national attitudes appears to be at its most effective when research accounts for the strength of the connection between individuals and groups, particularly in the case of race and ethnicity. In its absence, groups can become reified as part of the natural environment regardless of any actual interaction amongst members.
As a result, this social perspective can become a largely individual perspective (Antaki and
Widdecombe 1998; Billig 1996, 346-351; Jenkins 1996, 114-115). Additionally, sociological theory’s built-in assumptions can also limit its explanatory power as regards patriotism.
Particularly constraining is the notion that human behavior is not determined “by any personal organization of actions” but by “the context of its relation to the action of others” (Rosenberg,
1985, 717). Close adherence to this assumption forsakes the contribution of individual
72 psychological processes. Doing so belies a wealth of evidence demonstrating that the meaning, import, or other qualities an individual attributes to an idea element can differ from that of the collective or culture (e.g. Converse 1964; Klingemann 1979; Lane 1962). And in the case of a complex, controversial, variegated concept such as patriotism, individual psychological factors are likely to be all the more influential.
-- Social Dominance
Groups, in many ways, are a natural starting place for explaining individual differences in patriotic belief. The nation, after all, can be viewed as a type of group. Therefore it’s plausible that some of the same qualities informing sentiment toward the nation are premised on a broader belief about the nature of groups. Such constitutes the basis of explanation put forward by social dominance theorists in regard to patriotism. Representative of this view is the argument that national attachment signifies an “attitudinal bias in favor of the in-group” that is consistent with one’s orientation toward social dominance (Pratto et al. 1994, 742).
Based on extensive and continuous examples of group-based prejudice, Sidanius and colleagues (Sidanius 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 1993) developed social dominance theory as means of interpreting intergroup relations. This theory postulates that many societies, including the U.S., consist of a hierarchy of groups; some of which either come to dominate or are subordinated by others. This hierarchy is maintained by various individuals and institutions in society who propagate related ideologies. The degree to which hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies or “myths” are adopted by people is determined by the presence or absence of a presumed social dominance orientation. This orientation constitutes an attitudinal belief system premised on the superiority of one’s ingroup and the desire for it to dominate (Pratto et al. 1994).
73 The ratio of an individual’s patriotism relative to his or her social dominance orientation is believed to be based in part on the prevalence of group hierarchy in a society or various other sub-societal environments. Group hierarchy may take a number of forms, but for social dominance theorists, it is most demonstrably manifested in terms of race, ethnicity, and social class. Sidanius and Pratto (1999, 240) argue that “in countries organized as arbitrary-set hierarchies, such as the United States, love of country will imply the endorsement of that country’s hierarchical ethos…at least among members of dominant groups.” And indeed their findings evidence this proposition. In a study focusing on racial and ethnic hierarchy, they found whites to be the most patriotic group. Asian-Americans, an intermediate ethnic group based on social status, trailed whites in patriotism, followed by blacks, whose racial/ethnic status ranks at the bottom. The authors conclude that national attachment among non-whites is based on the degree of “disidentification” with one’s subordinated ethnic group.
In an assessment of the specific psychological dynamics involved in social dominators’ patriotic views, Pena and Sidanius (2002) sought to distinguish between preferences for group anti-egalitarianism and group dominance. Using a sample restricted to whites and Hispanics drawn from Los Angeles County (N = 405), they found that whites who scored highly on measures of group dominance were linked to higher levels of patriotism. For Hispanics, higher endorsement of group dominance led to diminished levels of patriotism. Anti-egalitarianism was neither a significant factor for whites nor Hispanics. The asymmetry of this relationship is consistent with previous findings and social dominance theory more generally (e.g. Pratto et al.
1994; Sidanius, Pena, and Sawyer 2001; Sidanius and Pratto 1999).
The empirical evidence clearly supports the hierarchy-centered expectations of social dominance theorists in relation to patriotism. National attachment appears to be driven, at least
74 in part, by the status of people’s social group and a desire to enhance or distance oneself from its position. Yet despite this evidence, important questions remain unanswered. Namely, why do some studies continue to find that members of lower-status groups are only nominally-less patriotic (e.g. Citrin et al. 2001), or even more patriotic (e.g. De La Garza et al. 1996), or that such group-based identities are subordinate to individuals’ national identity (e.g. Sears and
Henry 1999)? Also potentially troubling for social dominance theorists is their assumption that people prefer hierarchical relations “ordered along a superior-inferior dimension” (Pratto et al.
1994, 742). This supposition seems to contradict a fairly extensive history of findings suggesting that most Americans support equalitarian ideas, at least in principle (e.g. McClosky and Zaller
1984).
-- Authoritarianism
The authoritarian research tradition emphasizes the role of individuals’ personality traits in determining political behavior. Key to the personality concept is the idea that people hold stable internal predispositions that produce consistent patterns of behavior across time and settings (Allport 1937, 1961; Cattell 1965). It’s expected that these predispositions, which vary amongst individuals, will broadly orient people’s social outlook, including that relative to national attachment.
The Authoritarian Personality is considered “[p]erhaps the most influential work in the study of nationalistic and patriotic attitudes” (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, 259). Adorno et al.’s (1950) study explains the authoritarian personality to be largely the byproduct of a parenting style that is strict, domineering, and discipline-focused, which goes on to produce children who are anxious, fearful, aggressive, and submissive toward authority. The personality type was
75 measured by nine related indicators37 that combined to denote one’s place on a Fascism scale, or
F-scale. But it is the lesser known Ethnocentrism scale, or E-scale, that was most directly related to patriotism (De Figuiredo and Elkins 2003, 172). And the E-scale was itself not conceived to explain patriotic belief. Rather, it was conceptualized as one of three dimensions of ethnocentrism,38 along with animosity toward racial and religious minorities.
The E-scale correlated strongly with the F-scale (r = .75), suggesting that prejudice was a core aspect of the authoritarian personality. But more importantly for patriotism is the authors’ belief that authoritarianism, or ethnocentrism, entails fierce allegiance to the ingroup. Thus, patriotism was seen as a part of a broader authoritarian personality structure, rather than an effect of its propositions. In other words, Adorno et al. (1950) conflate, both empirically and conceptually, an attitudinal outcome with its potential underlying motivation. On this point,
Stenner (2005, 141) writes that to identify “one potential source of authoritarianism with the predisposition itself…comes so close to confounding the predisposition with some of its attitudinal and behavioral consequences – patriotism, nationalism, in-group glorification – as to render the explanation of those outcomes tautological.” This uncertain relationship between cause and consequence, combined with the book’s well-documented measurement problems (e.g. coverage error in sampling methods, acquiescence bias in response set items, use of the same item to inform multiple scales, etc.; for a review see Christie and Jahoda 1954 or Brown 2004) suggest that it is wisest to think of Adorno et al.’s (1950) original linkage between authoritarianism and patriotism as an analytical starting place.
37 The nine indicators include conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, rigid thinking, power and toughness, destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and concerns about sex. 38 The patriotism dimension was measured through items such as, “There will always be superior and inferior nations in the world and, in the interest of all concerned, it is best that the superior ones be in control of world affairs” and “In view of the present national emergency, it is highly important to limit responsible government jobs to native, white, Christian Americans.”
76 Indeed, subsequent scholars of authoritarianism have added conceptual rigor to this relationship, supplying significant credibility to its role as an explanatory force. Sampson and
Smith (1957) utilized the F-scale to assess nationalist and internationalist beliefs. They developed as a dependent variable a measure of worldmindedness, which was described as a value orientation “whose primary reference group is mankind” (99). Authoritarianism was found to be negatively associated with worldmindedness and positively associated with nationalism. A similar study by Levinson (1957) found also that authoritarianism held a strong, positive relationship with nationalism. Doob (1964) however, observed contradictory results. In his extensive study of national attachment among North and South Tyroleans, he found no relationship between nationalism and authoritarianism.
Blank (2004) examined the causes behind national attitudes by operationalizing four items that measured submissiveness. Authoritarianism measured in this way demonstrated a strong relationship with distinct measures of patriotism, nationalism, and national identity.
Similarly, Baughn and Yaprak (1996) created a scale using five common authoritarian measures, finding it correlated strongly with both nationalism and economic nationalism.39
Criticisms of and revisions to the original F-scale have had important implications for patriotism.
Through numerous item-selection studies, Altemeyer (1981) determined that of authoritarianism’s original nine constructs, three demonstrated substantial variation: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. These three attitudinal clusters form what is known as the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale. RWA theorizes that authoritarians are likely to view the nation as a collective actor and therefore a station of authority. Consistent with this expectation, it has repeatedly demonstrated a strong, positive
39 Economic nationalism was defined as support for discriminatory policies that benefit one’s nation economically at the expense of others.
77 relationship with patriotism, in addition to sub-dimensions or related concepts such as blind patriotism, ethnocentrism, militarism, and nationalism (Altemeyer 1988, 2004; McFarland 2005).
Stenner and colleagues have challenged the notion that authoritarian personality characteristics are in fact stable predispositions. They argue instead that political attitudes are manifested through a dynamic process that varies across social settings based on the level of threat detected by individuals. In an assessment of this relationship, Feldman and Stenner (1997) found significant evidence indicating that authoritarian traits do become activated by various threatening environmental conditions (political, economic, and existential). The effect was to influence attitudes across a range of socio-political issues, including endorsing the existence of qualities that make someone a “true American.”
The authoritarianism model has proven an effective tool for understanding national attitudes. Its basis in personality studies provides it strong theoretical footing by linking predominant internal characteristics to consistent outward behavior. It has also proven amenable to conceptual and operational refinement (e.g. Altemeyer 1981), allowing it to maintain explanatory relevance toward an array of prominent, contemporary political variables (e.g.
Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Mockabee 2007). Regardless, there is a degree of questionable theoretical import at the heart of authoritarian explanations of patriotism. The core feature of the personality dynamic directs aggressiveness toward individuals, groups, and institutions with unorthodox or deviant characteristics, and submissiveness toward those in power with conventional ideas and qualities. This however, appears to be a psychological basis directed toward explaining something quite different than affect toward country. A better explanation, it seems, would more precisely link individuals’ cognitive motivations to their patriotic sentiments.
78 An Alternative Theory to Understanding Patriotism Attitudes: System Justification
In this section, I describe the core properties of system justification theory (SJT). I then explore how implications based on such properties have been assessed empirically in the psychology and political psychology literature. Finally, I outline several specific hypotheses to be tested in this chapter.
-- Core Properties of System Justification Theory
System justification theory was developed with the specific goal of understanding how and why people accept and preserve society’s social systems (Jost and Hunyady 2005, 260). It posits as an answer the differential presence of a universal psychological tendency: the motivation to support the status quo by establishing existing conditions as fair and legitimate. In doing so, SJT integrates elements of existing theories, including social dominance, cognitive dissonance, belief in a just world, and others that suggest aspects of this said desire. Yet system justification theory is the most concentrated and forceful among these in making the argument that “[o]nce a given social order, social norm, societal rule, or political policy becomes firmly entrenched in the social structure, it stands to benefit from a slew of psychological biases” (Kay,
Banfield, and Laurin 2010, 313). Bolstering this main proposition are three key properties of relevance to this research: the system focus, the dissonance-palliation process, and the socialization assumption.
SJT is well-suited to explaining patriotic belief in part due to its uniquely societal-level focus. Motivational theories are distinguishable between those that emphasize the role of the ego, the group, and the system (Jost and Banaji 1994). Ego or self justifying theories emphasize validation of the individual, including one’s beliefs and desires (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950;
79 Altemeyer 1981, 1988; Festinger 1957; Lerner 1980; Rokeach 1960; Wilson 1973). As evidenced in the case of the Adorno et al. (1950) study, internal conflicts are projected onto others, with the goal of maintaining a positive self-image, and thus satisfying one’s individual needs for obedience and projection. Group justifying approaches posit motivation directed toward rationalizing and defending a collective of individuals (e.g. Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and
Turner 1979). Through processes of positive differentiation, the group, and thereby its members, are able to garner acclamation and higher status. The system justifying approach, on the other hand, emphasizes the furtherance of goals directed at society. In this case, individuals benefit psychologically through the maintenance of existing social arrangements (e.g. Jost and Banaji
1994; Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004).
Simplifying, clarifying, and validating the status quo is believed to fulfill the psychological function of palliating anxiety. This is true in the case of satisfying both existential needs, such as threat management, as well as epistemic needs, such as cognitive closure (Jost et al. 2009). Threats might simply be statements, actions, ideas, scenarios, proposals, or the like, which in some way carry the potential to confer illegitimacy upon an existing institution(s). This potentiality creates psychological dissonance from which individuals are apt to seek relief in reaffirming attitudes or ideologies (Jost, Pietrazak, Liviatan, Mandisodza, and Napier 2008).
People also differentially experience negative affect in the presence of uncertainty. So as to alleviate discomfort associated with the exposition of inadequacies or need for changes to the accepted “rules of the game” or “way of the world,” individuals are likely to seek closure by legitimating the prevailing norms.
System justification theory differs from other psychological theories of behavior in its incorporation of social learning and norm development (Jost 2001, 90). In this, the formation
80 and structure of individual beliefs are assumed to be driven by “a combination of top-down socialization processes and bottom-up psychological predispositions” (Jost et al. 2009, 308).
This assumption is key to the theory’s relevance for explaining patriotic belief. As indicated earlier, “national pride and a sense of the country’s exceptionalism are strongly socialized attitudes” (Citrin et al. 2001, 78). Whether it occurs vis-à-vis the education system (Easton and
Dennis 1969; Ishio 2010; Jennings and Niemi 1968), the media (Jennings and Niemi 1968), places of worship (Ishio 2010), or elsewhere, “The Case for American Greatness”40 is hardly one in need of being made (see also Leege et al. 2002, 158). A priori reasoning, as such, provides the grist for connecting system justifying motives with patriotic beliefs.
-- Research and Findings from System Justification Theory
The theoretical implications of SJT are potentially expansive. While it will not be the primary psychological motivator in all circumstances, Kay et al. (2010, 335) argue that it is likely to take precedence as regards particular subjects and/or under various conditions. Below, I review notable findings relative to such subjects and conditions within the economic, social, and political spheres.
Jost et al. (2003b) assessed individuals’ motives for supporting America’s free market economic system. Specifically, they sought an explanation to the paradox that most people support egalitarian goals, acknowledge widespread inequality, and yet still believe the economic system to be just.41 A correlational analysis found that endorsing the free market as “fair” was positively associated with index scores for various system justifying ideologies, such belief in a
40 This phrase refers to the subtitle of a Mitt Romney’s (2009) book No Apologies: The Case for American Greatness. 41 Research related to this paradoxical scenario has previously been pursued by Kluegel and Smith (1986), Lane (1962), Jost et al. (2003b).
81 just world (Lerner 1980) and economic system justification (Jost and Thompson 2000). The authors concluded that “believing in the inherent fairness of the free market system has less to do with genuine fairness concerns than it does with defending existing institutions and authorities, including both corporate and political actors” (Jost et al. 2003b, 72). Similar research on the influence of system justifying motives on economic attitudes has found that opposition toward policies designed to reduce inequality is not due primarily to self-interest or a belief in free market principles. Rather, it is based on the ostensible reason that equality is unlikely to be attained, and thus, inconsistent with the existing system (Jost and Thompson 2000; Kluegel and
Smith 1986).
System justification scholars have also revealed the influence of status quo support as regards the maintenance of America’s existing gender-based status structure. Lau et al. (2008) analyzed Canadian men’s reported levels of attraction toward women after having read an article questioning the legitimacy of the Canadian federal system of government. They found that respondents who felt more threatened about the stability of that country’s political system were more likely to cognitively activate stereotypical views of women and to seek out those who displayed “benevolent” sexist ideals. In another study, Jost and Burgess (2000) evaluated the impact of belief in a just world (Lerner 1980), a type of system justifying ideology (Jost and
Hunyaday 2005), by measuring people’s reactions to a story about a woman who sued a university for gender discrimination after not being admitted to a program. They found that individuals more prone to believe the world is inherently just were more likely to negatively evaluate the woman.
In addition to economic and social domains, the system justifying tendency has also been linked to political matters. It has been found to be a motivating force behind opposition toward
82 changes in policy and support for political leaders. An analysis of people’s willingness to address letters of protest to their elected representatives found that behavior was strongly correlated with a generalized score measuring support for the status quo (Gaucher, Chua, and
Kay 2008; cited in Kay et al. 2010). Using Kay and Jost’s (2003) system justification scale, the authors were able to accurately predict those who would send postcards challenging a pre- existing policy. In a further assessment of a slightly modified version of the scale, Banfield and
Kay (2008) examined the level of competence respondents applied to a high-ranking government official. They found that for individuals who both scored highly on the index and perceived the leader as relevant (a two-way interaction), scores on the measure of competency increased significantly.
-- Hypotheses
In this chapter, I seek to extend the system justifying theoretical perspective to American national attachment. The socio-political attitudes to which this theory has previously been linked suggest it is an evaluative tool well-suited to this task. This is particularly true in light of various contemporary societal circumstances that are potentially discomfiting to many Americans’ national-level assumptions (i.e. issues noted in Chapters 1 and 2 regarding challenges to
America’s status as a global leader and economic and military power; domestic challenges to social and demographics traditions; widespread economic uncertainty; etc.). Also, anxiety related to the change versus status quo principle corresponds with the type of rhetoric predominant in today’s political discourse. Matt Miller notes: “The arguments being made by politicians is [sic] about devotion to the idea of American exceptionalism. Politicians like Sarah
Palin are playing on that anxiety that comes along with not wanting to lose [economic]
83 dominance.”42 I expect patriotic belief to be consonant with and motivated primarily by one’s psychological tendency to support the status quo.
H1: Core Hypothesis - Main Effect. Americans prone to support the societal status quo
will demonstrate orthodox patriotic attitudes. Alternatively, those less-inclined to support
the status quo will demonstrate progressive patriotic attitudes.
In addition to the core hypothesis, I test several additional hypotheses related to threat perception and group status. The first assesses whether external threats – political, economic, and personal – moderate the relationship between status quo support and patriotism (H2a). I also test for a direct effect of external threat perception on patriotism (H2b). The second interaction hypothesis examines whether status quo support moderates the relationship between membership in a low-status group and patriotic belief (H3a). Disadvantaged group membership is operationalized by education, and income. I also test for a direct effect of group status on patriotism (H3b). Previous findings establishing the bases for these hypotheses are elaborated below.
The literature on SJT shows that the system justifying motive is subject to influence by situational factors (e.g. Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 2004). Moderation by situational variables occurs when events in the external environment interact with one’s tendency to support the status quo to produce a particular attitude or behavior. That is, it occurs when events beyond
“natural” or “resting” conditions engage one’s system justifying tendencies (Kay et al. 2010,
322). Such is most apt to occur during instances of acute system threat (Napier, Mandisodz,
42 The comment was made on KCRW’s talk radio show Left, Right, and Center during a program that aired on December 31, 2010. Matt Miller is the host of the show, as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.
84 Andersen, and Jost 2006, 61). “Under circumstances of system threat, people who endorse system-justifying ideologies may be especially likely to experience negative emotions, such as fear, anxiety, and dissonance” (Jost et al. 2008, 598).
To assess the impact of acute threats on attitude outcomes, SJT scholars often introduce stimuli intended to evoke an individual’s motives to support the status quo. In some cases, an interaction effect between such motives and the threat is assessed. For instance, examples cited earlier by Kay and colleagues demonstrated the interactive effect between chronic status quo support and an outside threat variable in influencing people’s willingness to seek redress from elected officials (Gaucher et al. 2008), and in their evaluation of political officials (Banfield and
Kay 2008).
In other cases however, the main effect of the threat itself is evaluated. The assumption in this case is that persons more susceptible to threat are so because they’re experiencing negative affect consonant with high system justifying tendencies. For example, Jost, Kivetz,
Rubini, Guermandi, and Mosso (2005) assessed the impact of system threat in Israel on one’s willingness to adopt traditional, stereotypic views of different types of Jews (Ashkenazi vs.
Sephardic). They found that those who felt more threatened after being exposed to a passage critical of Israel were also more apt to endorse stereotypic differences that favored the currently dominant group (Ashkenazi). Similar findings have resulted among those studying mortality salience and terrorism management, concepts previously linked to system justification (Jost et al.
2004). For instance, Landau and colleagues (2004) studied the impact of more explicit system threats by examining reactions to government-issued warnings. They found that presidential approval increased significantly after respondents were primed to think about the events of
85 September 11, 2001. And Willer (2004) similarly found that support for President Bush increased along with the government’s decision to increase the threat level in the country.
Whether testing for a particular interaction effect or a direct effect, the above evidence suggests that the desire to support the status quo is heightened under conditions of external threat. Thus, it is expected here that individuals predisposed to support the status quo should express more orthodox patriotic attitudes if more readily susceptible to situational system threats.
H2a: Threat Hypothesis – Interaction Effect. Perceptions of threat will moderate the
effect of system justifying predispositions on patriotism attitudes.
H2b: Threat Hypothesis – Main Effect. Individuals more susceptible to external
situational threat will reveal orthodox patriotism views, while those less-susceptible will
reveal progressive patriotism views.
Researchers have long-encountered evidence suggesting that those individuals most disadvantaged in their capacity for influence and opportunity in America are at times the fiercest advocates of existing arrangements (Festinger 1957; Hewstone and Ward 1985; Lane 1962;
Lerner 1980; Mullen, Brown, and Smith 1992; Olson and Hafer 2001; Spears and Manstead
1989; Wilson 1973). For instance, Robert Lane (1962), in his ethnographic analysis of working- class Americans in the 1950’s, found that people frequently failed to support candidates and policies likely to bring greater, more direct economic benefits to themselves and members of their group. He surmised that people justified inequality as inevitable in order to overcome the negative affect associated with economic hardship. Wilson (1973) similarly found that low
86 socioeconomic status created uncertainty in people’s life that was likely to lead them to gravitate toward conservative, system justifying ideologies.
Today, system justification scholars appear most committed to developing the theoretical and empirical properties related to the counterintuitive notion that those most apt to adopt beliefs or ideologies that extend the status quo are often also those most disadvantaged by it (Jost and
Kay 2005). They argue that despite being stratified, and thus potentially seen as unjust, social structures elicit support because they “satisfy our cognitive needs for validity and rationality” by virtue of their established existence (Jost 2001, 90). As a result, persons most underprivileged by existing social arrangements may in fact have the most to rationalize and most dissonance to overcome. They become the most ardent in their support of ideas or policies that bolster the status quo, even to the detriment of their own self or group interest (Jost and Banaji 1994).
Recently, Jost and colleagues have examined the motives behind such behavior, using both field research and experiments. In a survey study of three traditionally disadvantaged groups,
African-Americans, low-income Americans, and less-educated Americans, respondents were assessed in terms of their willingness to defend the nation against criticism. Results of maximum likelihood estimation showed that all three groups were more likely than their advantaged counterparts (whites, high-income, more educated) to impose limitations on the media’s and citizen’s ability to criticize government (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, and Sullivan 2003; Study 1).
They also found that low-income Latinos expressed higher levels of trust in government as compared to high-income Latinos (Study 2).
Also, in three separate experiments, ingroup and outgroup favoritism was examined by manipulating respondents’ perceived social status, as defined by socioeconomic success (Jost
1996; Jost 2001; Jost and Burgess 2000). For each case, one group of students at a pair of rival
87 universities was led to believe that alumni from their own university or the other university systematically achieved less socioeconomic success. In each experiment, random assignment to the more successful university lead respondents to express ingroup favoritism, while assignment to the low-success university lead to outgroup favoritism. That is, it prompted individuals in the supposedly less successful group to construct and confer positive qualities upon their rivals, while also conferring more negative qualities on themselves and fellow group members. Yet perhaps most noteworthy was that in two of the studies an interaction hypothesis was tested, which revealed that outgroup favoritism functioned in accordance with the perceived legitimacy of the socioeconomic status differences. That perceived legitimacy of the system will sometimes lead to differential attitude outcomes for low-status and high-status groups is consistent with the predictions of system justification theory (Jost 2001, 97).
Based on the above findings and the principles of SJT, I expect that status quo support will moderate the relationship between membership in disadvantaged groups and patriotic belief.
I also test for a direct effect of a group status on patriotism.
H3a: Disadvantaged Group Hypothesis – Interaction Effect. The relationship between
low-status group membership and patriotism will be moderated by the presence of system
justifying motives.
H3b: Disadvantaged Group Hypothesis – Main Effect. Low-status group members will
be more likely to express orthodox patriotism views, while members of high-status
groups will be more likely to express progressive patriotism views.
88 STUDY 1
Data and Methods
This study uses data from the 2004 American National Election Studies survey to test the above hypotheses. The ANES, an omnibus survey of political and social attitudes and behaviors, contains batteries of questions concerning various cognitive tendencies and general political attitudes. It is from such batteries that I draw on to create a measure of a system justifying orientation, in addition to several rival explanatory concepts. Scholars applying the tenets of system justification theory to political phenomena frequently use experimental survey designs with small sample sizes. However, use large-N national surveys are not uncommon and have previously proven effective at assessing the political outcomes of SJT (Jost et al. 2002; Nosek,
Banaji, and Jost 2009). The ability of system justifying tendencies to influence attitudes of national attachment is examined here using ordinary least squares regression analysis. This includes testing several interaction hypotheses. In doing so, I control for cognitive-motivational factors, social group variables, and several political variables. Operationalization of these variables is discussed below.
-- Cognitive-Motivational Variables
Researchers seeking to assess the tendency to support the status quo often seek to identify and measure the predisposition in general economic, social, political spheres, while remaining free of content (Jost and Kay 2005; Kay and Jost 2003). In pursuit of this end, Kay and Jost
(2003) designed a measure of “general system justification.” The authors indexed the following eight items, scored on 9-point agreement-disagreement scales: “In general, the American
89 political system operates as it should,” “Most policies serve the greater good,” “The United
States is the best country in the world to live in,” “American society needs to be radically restructured,” “Our society is getting worse every year,” “Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness,” “In general, you find society to be fair,” “Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve” (alpha = .87).43 The same eight indicators were also used to create a scale of
“diffuse system justification” in Jost and Kay (2005) and Jost, Ledgerwood, and Hardin (2008).
Based on the substance of Jost and colleagues’ eight indicators, a general system justification scale was adapted for this research using the following seven items: “One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance,” “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the United States?” “Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government,” “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” “People like me don't have any say about what the government does,” “Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what people think when it decides what to do?” and “How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think?”44
Prior to scaling, several items were recoded so that response categories ranged from 1 to 5. Also, all items were scored so that higher figures represented increased system justification. Scores
43 While Kay and Jost’s (2003) measure of general system justification depicts an outcome variable rather than a predictor variable, interest for this research is in the content of the indicator. Thus, it serves the purposes of this research as a predictor variable. Also, the scale demonstrated convergent validity with a seven-item scale measuring belief in a just world. It also converged with a scale created to measure “balance” and “complementarity” which included questions such as “All in all, the world is a ‘balanced’ place.” 44 It should be noted that the created index constitutes an indirect measurement of system justification. A direct measurement would presumably capture cognitive proclivities related to intolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, and need for order. However, to date, system justification scholars have not designed such a measurement scale. But such cognitive desires are measureable on a manifest or societal level on the basis that “these needs are satisfied to a greater extent by a fair society than by an unfair and likely arbitrary (unpredictable, inconsistent, etc.) society” (Kay et al. 2010, 327).
90 range from 7 to 35 and the mean for the sample is 22.5. The alpha coefficient for the seven-item index is .69. While lower than the alpha level for Kay and Jost’s (2003) eight-item index, it is comparable to other system justification indices (see for instance Jost and Kay 2005). The index appears to meet standards of face validity, in that it offers a general representation of status quo support as regards social, economic, and political arrangements. Also, an item-by-item comparison shows that the ANES items match the content and spirit of the original index.
I assessed the convergent validity of the seven-item index using a comparative measure of “contentedness” with levels of taxation in America. The created measure combined responses to three questions: “Do you feel you are asked to pay more than you should in federal income taxes, about the right amount, or less than you should?” “Do you feel rich people are asked to pay more than they should in federal income taxes, about the right amount, or less than they should?” and “Do you feel poor people are asked to pay more than they should in federal income taxes, about the right amount, or less than they should?” Responses were recoded so that individuals who indicated “about the right amount” received a 1 while the two other response- options (“more” or “less”) received a 0. Responses were then summed to create a 4-point scale of contentedness with federal income tax levels (alpha = .52). The scale demonstrated an acceptable zero-order correlation with system justification of .303 (p < .01). The taxation index is an appropriate and effective comparative concept for the reason that it taps ascension to the fairness of the existing level of government intervention in individual’s economic lives on a society-wide scale.
A measure of authoritarianism was constructed using four questions that ask respondents to choose between the desirability of juxtaposing childhood traits, including: independence vs. respect for elders, curiosity vs. good manners, obedience vs. self-reliance, and being considerate
91 vs. well-behaved. Scores on the four items were then summed to create an index of authoritarianism (alpha = .61). The same child-rearing items have been widely adopted to denote authoritarianism (e.g. Barker and Tinnick 2006; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hetherington and
Weiler 2009; Mockabee 2007). Collectively, responses to these child-rearing questions are an effective indicator of the presence of an authoritarian belief system because they tap preferences toward submitting to conventional authority and preferences for order.
A measure of the orientation toward social dominance was created with the intent of capturing the concept’s two core conceptual and operational emphases: anti-egalitarianism and social group hierarchy (e.g. Pena and Sidanius 2002; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Consistent with
Pena and Sidanius (2002), I measure social dominance orientation using three anti-egalitarian and three group dominance measures. Preferences for anti-egalitarianism were measured via three items used in Pratto et al.’s (1994) original study of social dominance.45 The following questions were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly”
(all items were coded so that higher scores indicated increased levels of social dominance): “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are,” “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others,” and “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.” To tap preferences for social group hierarchy I combined answers to questions that asked respondents to rate on a 7- point scale the degree to which blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are “hardworking.” Based on their scores, respondents were recoded into five categories of comparable size. The same procedure was undertaken for responses concerning how “intelligent” and “trustworthy” each racial/ethnic
45 Items refer to those contained in the 14-item SDO scale (Appendix A), not the 16-item SDO scale (Appendix C).
92 group was perceived to be.46 Employing these three race-conscious variables is a conceptually appropriate operationalization of preferred group hierarchy based on social dominance’s association with endorsing racially prejudiced views (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto
1999). The six measures were combined to create an index of social dominance orientation
(alpha = .64).
-- Social Group Variables
Effects associated with membership in a variety of social groups have also been linked to patriotism. Consistent with previous research, I control for affiliation with a Christian religious denomination. Protestants and Catholics were coded 1, while Jews, members of other minority religions, and persons with no religious affiliation were coded 0. Age is measured in years, in order to account for the variable’s linear effects. To account for age’s curvilinear effects, I created a dummy variable (age47), which makes a demarcation at the mean age of the sample,
47. This was done by subtracting the mean from each respondent’s age before squaring the value.47 Education is measured by a 6-point variable from less education (coded 1 for “8th grade or less”) to more education (coded 6 for “advanced degree”). Income is measured by respondent’s 2003 household income. This 5-point variable ranges from “$0-$29,999” (1) to
“$80,000 and up” (5). Class consciousness is controlled for by utilizing a subjective, self-report indicator of social class, measured on an eight-point scale where 1 means “lower class” and 8 means “upper class.” Sex is included as a dummy variable labeled male, with females as the reference category. And a dummy variable for race/ethnicity is measured by non-Hispanic
46 While the 2004 ANES data set includes a measure for whites on the same three categories (hardworking, intelligent, trustworthy), it was not included in constructing the social dominance construct on the basis that whites are obviously the dominant racial/ethnic group in America. 47 I adopted Ishio (2010) and Davis and Robinson’s (1996) method for treating the curvilinear effects of age.
93 whites (1) versus non-whites (0). Other demographic control variables include a dummy variable for rural, where the reference category includes those living in an urban environment.
South is a dummy variable signifying respondent’s region of the country. Non-southern states constitute the reference category.
In this analysis, I also seek to account for previous explanations of patriotism based on the strength of one’s non-nation-oriented social identifications. Previous findings show that social group identity is most portentous for patriotic belief when identification concerns race and ethnicity. Therefore, I operationalize racial and ethnic identification using a combination of items intended to measure one’s degree of “closeness” to said groups. The questions read: “In addition to being American, what do you consider your main ethnic group or nationality group?
With which of these groups do you most closely identify?” Responses for blacks, Hispanics,
Native Americans, and an “other” category, were coded as dichotomous variables. Native
Americans serve as the excluded reference category.
-- Political Variables
Parker (2004) has argued that President Bush and his policy in Iraq became linked with patriotism around the time of the 2004 presidential election. To control for effects on patriotic belief due these or related factors, I included three political variables in the analysis.
Partisanship is measured by a 7-point variable ranging from “strong Democrat” (1) to “strong
Republican” (7). Political ideology is measured on a 7-point scale from extremely liberal (1) to extremely conservative (7). And support for the war in Iraq is measured by a dichotomous variable of whether the Iraq War is worth the cost (1) or not (0).
94 Additional independent variables used to assess hypotheses 2 and 3 are described as they appear in the analysis.
-- Patriotism Variables
In the analysis, I assess how the system justifying motive affects responses on items measuring patriotism both individually and in terms of an additive scale. The scale involves the same five measures used to create the patriotism index in the previous chapter. Again, the summary index was created by rescaling some items so that each measure was represented by a three-point variable (alpha = .70). Combined, these items offer a comprehensive assessment of patriotism for the reason that responses group in a manner that is logical theoretically and consistent empirically. The average correlation between the five unstandardized items is .338.48
The items are also assessed individually because each emphasizes a different aspect of patriotic belief. Specifically, the question which asks respondents to rate the importance of “being an
American” taps the extent to which one identifies and thinks of oneself within the context of the nation. This is consistent with Huddy and Khatib’s (2007) emphasis on the unique qualities of national identification for its “subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation” (65).
Items measuring respondent’s tendency to feel “angry” and “ashamed about America” capture one’s willingness to render critical judgments of the nation. Critical evaluation is the key characteristic behind Schatz et al.’s (1999) “constructive patriotism” concept. Questions which ask how respondents feel when they “see the American flag flying” and about the strength of
“love for your country,” emphasize the symbolic nature of national attachment. They also serve as a broad measure of general and enduring affect toward the nation. They measure the degree to
48 Both here and throughout the analysis, where patriotism items are assessed individually (i.e. not within the patriotism scale), they are measured based on their original scaling (1-5).
95 which individual’s exhibit pride in the nation and those symbols associated with it, original foci of the 1987 ANES Pilot Study measures of patriotism and nationalism (Conover and Feldman
1987).
Analysis and Findings
-- Test of Hypothesis 1
Results from multiple regression analysis for all five individual patriotism items and the patriotism index are located in Tables 3.1 – 3.3. Table 3.1 assesses patriotic belief as a function of being critical or unwaveringly supportive of America. This first model shows strong system justifiers were highly unlikely to harbor feelings of anger toward the nation. It proved the leading factor in the model (beta = .220, p < .01). Partisanship, support for the Iraq War, and the dummy variable for age also had significant effects. System justification demonstrated a similar impact when it came to feeling shame toward America. Variables for Iraq war supporters, whites, the less educated, Republicans, and authoritarians also had a statistically significant influence. Results for both models were consistent with the expectation that individuals will experience differential levels of cognitive dissonance due to system-based criticism, and thus derive their patriotism outlook accordingly.
[TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3.2 shows results for the model where the dependent variables emphasize patriotism’s purely affective and symbolic qualities. Interestingly, social dominance orientation is negatively related to the patriotism variable measuring love of country, while authoritarianism
96 had no statistically significant impact (p > .10). On the other hand, status quo support proved strongly predictive, along with both age variables, race, and urbanicity. Also, feelings of closeness toward blacks and other ethnically based groups had negative relationships with the love of country measure.
As expected, the system justifying motive was also strongly related to holding the
American flag in high esteem. This result is not surprising given the socialization in U.S. culture of reverence for the flag, and thus, the desire by many to see it continue to be held in high regard.
Authoritarians, Christians, older Americans, whites, and the less educated also reported that they feel “good” upon seeing “the American flag flying.” Of note is that in neither of these two models were the political variables, partisanship, political ideology, or Iraq War support statistically significant factors. This suggests that affective and symbolic patriotic sentiments are more apt to be driven highly fundamental impulses, rather than politically-based preferences.
[TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
Variables influencing the importance of individuals’ identity as an American appear in the first model of Table 3.3. Those heavily imbued with tendency to support the status quo were expected to most cherish their status as an American citizen, on the logic that an irresolute national identity would evoke negative affect. Indeed, the system justifying motive demonstrated the largest impact on this aspect of patriotic belief, while controlling for other explanatory variables (beta = .185, p < .01). Other factors positively related to national identity included authoritarianism, conservatism, Christianity, age, being white, and living in rural area.
97 Finally, the patriotism index – a summary score for all five items – was regressed onto system justification. Results from this model test should theoretically offer the most comprehensive assessment of the model thus far, given the index’s ability to best capture orthodox/progressive patriotic beliefs. Support for the status quo was by far the most influential factor in the model.
Its beta weight was more than double the next largest predictor, authoritarianism (betas = .257,
.118, respectively; p < .01). Republicans, Iraq War supporters, Christians, those less educated, and persons older in age (linear) and of middle age (curvilinear) also evinced more orthodox national attitudes, all else equal.
[TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
-- Test of Hypothesis 2
To assess the effect of threat perception on patriotism I adopted Feldman and Stenner’s
(1997) strategy for both treating variables and analyzing the data. These authors studied interaction effects between threat perception and authoritarianism across a range of political attitudes, including patriotism. System justification shares numerous cognitive-motivational qualities with authoritarianism, including those related to need for order and closure (Jost et al.
2003a). Thus, it’s reasonable to expect that the particular threat variables most effectual in interacting with authoritarianism play a similar role as regards the system justifying motive.
Like these authors, I examine threat perception of three types: political, economic, and personal.
Political threat is operationalized in accordance with “ideological distance.” Ideological distance is the disparity between individuals’ own liberal-conservative views and the perceived position of views by the major political actors of the day. The assumption involved is that persons
98 furthest ideologically from the primary sources of political thought and action in society are the most likely to experience threat-related anxiety. A variable measuring ideological distance was created by taking the summed difference between one’s own self-placed ideology and that of the
Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the presidential candidates from each (John Kerry and George W. Bush, respectively). Because status quo justifiers desire to maintain the legitimacy of the existing political system, I expect perceived ideological remoteness from major political actors would have anxiety-induced effects.
Economic threat was operationalized by Feldman and Stenner (1997) using retrospective national economic judgments. This variable demonstrated the largest interactive effect with authoritarianism in their analysis. Similar to their approach, I created a measure of national economic judgments using responses to two items that ask how much better or worse the economy has gotten both in the past year and the past 4 years.49 Responses ranged from “much better” to “much worse” and were summed to create a 9-point scale of retrospective economic evaluation.
Feldman and Stenner (1997) operationalized personal threat with a variable measuring one’s fears relative to nuclear war. While an appropriate measure in 1992 (the year their data was collected), a more accurate metric today is likely to involve the threat posed by international terrorism. Terror management theory posits that culture-based worldviews and institutions develop in part as a way of dealing with existential anxiety (e.g. Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and
Solomon 1986). In addition to its theorized connection to authoritarian views (Feldman and
Stenner 1997), terror management has also been suggested as partial motivation for engaging in system justifying behavior (Jost et al. 2003a). In four separate studies, Ullrich and Cohrs (2007)
49 Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) measure is differed only in that it also included responses to the following question: “How about America's ability to compete in the world economy? Over the past year has that gotten better, stayed the same, or gotten worse?” This question does not appear in the 2004 ANES.
99 found evidence of a relationship between the salience of terrorist attacks and system justifying beliefs. They note that “the claims of SJT are certainly broad enough to include terrorism as a source of threat, insofar as, by definition, terrorism threatens the stability and legitimacy of existing social, political, and economic systems” (119-120). Therefore, I assess personal threat as a function of the desire to manage terror. Personal threat perception was operationalized according to responses to the following item: “Should federal spending on the war on terrorism be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?” Responses were dichotomized so that answers of “decreased” or “kept about the same” were juxtaposed with preferences for “increased” spending.
Each of the three threat variables were used to create an interaction term with the system justification index.50 These interaction variables, along with their stem variables, were then separately evaluated in three ordinary least squares regression models. The combined patriotism scale served as the dependent variable in each model. This assessment is intended to allow for a thorough test of Hypothesis 2a. H2a asserts that the relationship between system justifying beliefs and patriotism is moderated by the influence of situational threat perception. For Baron and Kenny (1986, 1174), “moderation implies that the causal relation between two variables changes as a function of the moderator variable.”
Table 3.4 displays the results for a test of interaction effects between system justification and political, economic, and personal threats occurring above and beyond the direct effect of these variables. Model 1 assesses the impact of ideological distance on patriotism. It shows a modest effect for the interaction term (beta = .062, p < .10). This suggests that system justifying motives are likely to be somewhat intensified amongst individuals who feel disconnected from
50 Both the system justification index and other continuous threat indicators were centered prior to interaction throughout this analysis (see Aiken and West 1991).
100 prevailing political choices, in manner causing more orthodox patriotic views. Such was not the case for economic anxiety or fear of terrorist threats. In models 2 and 3, both interaction variables failed to reach levels of statistical significance.
[TABLE 3.4 ABOUT HERE]
Hypothesis 2b tests whether external threat conditions have a direct effect on national attitudes. Recall that the assumption in this case is that endorsing orthodox patriotic beliefs is a way for individuals to ratify the status quo under conditions of threat. Again, the full patriotism index serves as the dependent variable in the analysis. Table 3.5 displays the results of the full model for each of the threat terms assessed separately. Contrary to expectations, ideological distance and national economic anxiety both demonstrated a significant negative effect on patriotism. That is, controlling for other explanatory factors, individuals who were ideologically and economically content were in fact more patriotic. However, in the case of personal threat, spending to combat terrorism did demonstrate a significant effect on patriotism in the predicted direction. I also assessed the model whereby all three threat variables were included at the same time. In this case, all three threat variables maintained statistically significant effects in the same directions as previously noted.
These conflicting results suggest the possibility that the political context at the time of data collection played a role in the responses to the threat perception questions. Because
Republicans controlled the White House and Congress in 2004, it’s not surprising that persons feeling ideologically distant are more likely to be liberal-minded, and thus more progressively patriotic. The same is true of people most apt to evaluate the economy negatively. On the other
101 hand, because waging the “war on terror” was likely to be associated with the policies of
President Bush, support for spending on terrorism could be expected to connote more conservative, and thus orthodoxly patriotic views. Also of note is that for each of the four models, all three political variables were statistically significant. That is, Republicans, ideological conservatives, and Iraq War supporters all positively influenced patriotic belief.
[TABLE 3.5 ABOUT HERE]
-- Test of Hypothesis 3
The third and final proposition assessed in this chapter involves the counterintuitive notion that belonging to certain low-status groups causes people to become more orthodox in their patriotic belief. In testing this hypothesis, I adopt a similar analytical strategy to Jost et al.
(2003b; Study 1) in their evaluation of the system justification hypothesis relative to protections against government criticism. Group status is operationalized in this study using measures of income and education (see previous description). These indicators are separately assessed first in terms of a possible interaction with system justification, followed by a test of possible direct effects.
Hypothesis 3a posits that the relationship between membership in a disadvantaged social group and national attitudes is moderated by the presence of the system justifying motive. To test this hypothesis I created interaction terms for both income and education. Table 3.6 displays results where the dependent variable, the patriotism index, is regressed upon the fully-specified model that includes the interaction variables. Neither of the interaction terms for income or education proved statistically significant in the model (p > .10). Instead, the variance was
102 explained by the main effect for system justification, authoritarianism, and other previously potent predictors.
[TABLES 3.6 AND 3.7 ABOUT HERE]
Hypothesis 3b suggests a direct effect of membership in a low-status group on patriotism.
This expected relationship is based on the idea that persons in disadvantaged groups will evince more orthodox patriotic views based on their motivation to maintain the legitimacy of the broad social structures and institutions of which they are a part. Because each of the group status variables are also control variables in the model, only one regression test needed to be conducted.51 Table 3.7 displays the results. The measure of household income failed to reach levels of statistical significance, suggesting that low economic group status does not manifest in relation to patriotism, as a type of system justifying behavior. However, as predicted, a negative relationship did emerge between education and patriotism. That is, people with less education were more likely to express orthodox national attitudes. While this finding is consistent with the principles of system justification theory, it would be a mistake to draw overly strong conclusions on this point. As previously noted, research has shown that this relationship may also be due to the development of critical analytic skills or perspectives attributable to advanced education
(Ishio 2010).
51 I also ran models where education and income were separately excluded in order to control for possible overlapping effects. However, no meaningful differences were detected.
103 Conclusion: Study 1
Overall, the simple hypothesis from this chapter – that prevalence of the system justifying tendency causes patriotic attitudes to become more orthodox – was widely supported by statistical analysis of the data. This motivation proved efficacious for each of the five individual patriotism measures, as well as for the orthodox/progressive summary scale. The system justification index’s predictive power was generally strong despite extensive controls for rival explanatory variables. Authoritarianism tendencies also proved broadly related to patriotism (the authoritarianism index had a statistically significant effect in four of the six model tests). Such findings are indicative of the conceptual similarities shared by RWA and SJT. However, judging by the notable differences in beta values, status quo support appears to better describe the psychological sources of opinionation regarding patriotism. Interestingly, the model tests showed social dominance to be essentially unrelated to patriotism, when controlling for other factors. This suggests that national attitudes in America are not driven by a generalized preference to foster social group hierarchy.
Effects relative to three social groups were consistent throughout the analysis: race, age, and education. Not surprisingly, whites were more patriotic than non-whites. However, neither race nor ethnicity mattered much when the closeness or strength of individual’s group identity was considered. Age demonstrated a consistently positive relationship with patriotism. It seems orthodox patriotism is generally most acute during middle age, as demonstrated by a variable gauging age’s curvilinear effects. Also, increased education proved to be generally indicative of progressive patriotic beliefs. And contrary to previous findings (Ishio 2010), affiliation with a
Christian religion, a higher income, and a higher social class status for the most part had only minimal effects on patriotism.
104 Politics played an important, though far-from-dominant role in determining patriotic views. Consistent with polling going back decades, Republicans and conservatives were generally more devout in their national attitudes than Democrats and liberals. Yet their impact was somewhat underwhelming. Partisanship failed to reach statistical significance in three of the six models testing Hypothesis 1. Perhaps more surprisingly, liberal-conservative ideology reached levels of significance in only one of the models. The role of ideology may have been overshadowed for some by attitudes toward the war in Iraq (see Parker 2004). The variable measuring support or opposition to the war proved a significant predictor in half the models, though its impact was generally far less than status quo support.
Unlike in the case of H1, results related to SJT’s threat proposition and group status proposition were less decisive. Statistically significant interaction between the system justifying motive and threat occurred only in the case of ideological distance, and even then, the effect on patriotism was small (H2a). And tests for a main effect due to political, economic, and personal threats demonstrated contradictory findings (H2b). Disadvantaged group status was also only minimally-related to patriotism as predicted by SJT. Neither income nor education interacted with the system justifying motive to predict patriotism (H3a), and only education had significant direct effect (H3b).
105 STUDY 2
Data and Methods
In this study, data are drawn from an undergraduate student sample. Information was collected through a questionnaire administered in seven political science courses at Oregon State
University from April 21 through April 28, 2004. Eighty-four females and 92 males completed the survey. Students participated in the survey during class and were told only that it was part of an ongoing research project by a fellow student. Convenience samples of this kind have previously been used to assess both the system justifying tendency (Federico and Goren 2009;
Jost 2001; Jost and Burgess 2000; Jost and Thompson 2000) and patriotism (Kosterman and
Feshbach 1989; Li and Brewer 2004; Mummendey et al. 2001; Schatz et al. 1999).
For most items in the 81-question student survey, respondents’ statements were recorded using a 4-point scale anchored by “strongly agree” (1) and “strongly disagree” (4). A middle or
“neutral” position was not included in the survey. It is not expected that omission of a middle category should significantly impact the results. In a detailed study using 16 split-sample survey experiments, Schuman and Presser (1981) previously determined that researchers would likely reach the same substantive conclusions, regardless of inclusion or omission of a middle position category.
The student survey does not include the extensive set of cognitive or social-demographic independent variables available in the 2004 ANES survey. Therefore, analyses in Study 2 are limited in the rival explanations being controlled. However, the assortment of patriotism variables in the sample does allow for more extensive analysis of the dependent variable. Again, data are analyzed using OLS regression for both main and interaction effects.
106 -- System Justification
Support for the status quo was derived using an additive index that included two items measuring views concerning the sanctity and efficacy of the country’s political system.
Responses were measured on the 4-point agreement-disagreement scale. Questions included:
“The framers of the U.S. Constitution constructed a nearly perfect document,” and “It is appropriate that many Americans think of the U.S. Constitution as an almost sacred or divine piece of text.” The alpha coefficient for this index was .65. While this is not an ideal measurement of the system justifying motive, the substance of the questions are similar to several items in both the Kay and Jost (2003) index and the index constructed in Study 1.
-- Social Group Variables
Social group variables controlled for in the analysis include parent’s education, family income, religiosity, and sex. Parent’s education represents the combined level of education for each parent. Response options ranged from “grade school” (1) to “advanced degree” (5).
Responses were totaled and recoded so that scores of four or less combined to form the lowest category. The index was then rescaled so that 1 represented the lowest category of combined education and 7 represented the highest category. Parental income was measured by five categories ranging from “less than $25,000” (1) to “$100,000+” (5). Religiosity was measured on a 5-point scale from “not at all religious” (1) to “very religious” (5).
-- Political Variables
To control for potential explicit political influences on patriotism, variables were included in the model measuring partisanship and political ideology. Party identification was
107 measured on a 7-point scale from “strong Democrat” (1) to “strong Republican” (7). Political ideology was measured on a 5-point scale from “very liberal” (1) to “very conservative” (5).
-- Patriotism Variables
In Study 1 I described three previously enumerated classifications of patriotic belief: symbolic patriotism, national identification, and constructive patriotism. One or more of the
ANES patriotism items were consistent with previous research on these concepts. In the student sample assessed in Study 2, measures of each of these facets of patriotism are included as dependent variables, using three unique indexes. Symbolic patriotism included questions such as
“I am very proud to be an American” and “There has been too much displaying of the American flag since 9/11” (alpha = .77). National identification included questions such as “Being an
American is an important part of how I define myself” and “I am more patriotic than the average
American” (alpha = .66). Constructive patriotism included question such as “Even if people criticize government war plans prior to a war, they should end all further criticism once the war has begun” and “A person who loves America, should notice its problems and work to correct them” (alpha = .71).
Also included are variables representing two additional patriotism classifications: blind patriotism and a created measure of particular patriotism. Blind patriotism, which is national attachment premised on “unquestioning positive evaluation” (Schatz et al. 1999, 151) is operationalized by items such as: “I support U.S. policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country” and “People who do not wholeheartedly support America's policies should live somewhere else” (alpha = .84). The measures constituting particular patriotism share with one another the attitudinal quality of favoring U.S. interests at the potential expense of other
108 nations. It was conceptualized by items including: “In general, Americans are more patriotic than citizens of other countries” and “We should be more concerned for the lives of Americans than that of others.” The alpha coefficient for this created measure was .69.
[TABLE 3.8 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3.8 displays a correlation matrix for each of the five patriotism indexes. Consistent with the logic of the orthodoxy/progressivism framework outlined in Chapter 2, each patriotism scale is strongly related. The average correlation between variables is .526. In order to assess the influence of system justification on a comprehensive measure of orthodox/progressive patriotism, I also created a cumulative additive index by combining the five patriotism indexes.
Prior to adding, the five measures were rescaled so that each contributed equally to the index.
The cumulative patriotism index ranged from 7 (progressive) to 35 (orthodox). The index demonstrated strong reliability (alpha = .83)
Analysis and Findings
-- Test of Hypothesis 1
In testing hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, I follow the same general analytical approach as in
Study 1. This involves conducting OLS regression analyses to estimate the impact of the system justifying motive on various aspects of patriotic belief. These aspects include symbolic patriotism, national identification, constructive patriotism, blind patriotism, and particular patriotism.
109 Tables 3.9 – 3.11 show the results for empirical tests of Hypothesis 1, which posits a straightforward relationship between system justification and patriotism. Along with partisanship and ideology, system justification was a leading explanatory variable affecting symbolic patriotic sentiment. And consistent with previous theory (e.g. Ishio 2010) and findings from Study 1, education (combined for respondent’s parents) had a negative relationship with this measure of patriotism. The second model in Table 3.9 measures effects regarding the strength of the individual’s identification as an American. Resulted were similar to the Model 1 test, except that effects for Republican self-identifiers and persons with lower parental education were not statistically significant.
The index measuring constructive patriotism captures respondents’ inclination to evaluate their country critically. Democrats, women, and those from more highly educated families expressed progressive patriotic views on this variable. Status quo support and political ideology failed to reach levels of statistical significance. These results differed from those for the similar characteristic of blind patriotism. Blind patriotism emphasizes the devoutness of individual’s allegiance to America. System justifiers, conservatives, and biblical literalists endorsed more orthodox blind patriotic views.
[TABLES 3.9, 3.10, AND 3.11 ABOUT HERE]
The first model in Table 3.11 shows regression results for a created measure of particular patriotism. This dependent variable taps individuals’ regard for other nations where U.S. policy and interests are concerned. As expected, status quo supporters strongly endorsed the view that
America’s goals should not be tempered by other nations. Conservatives and those with lower
110 parental education levels also endorsed this view. The second model in the table includes an assessment of the broadest measure of patriotic orthodoxy/progressivism – a cumulative scale of all five patriotism variables. Results from the model offer a good overall understanding of the role played by each of the independent variables. System justification and conservative ideology demonstrate a strong positive effect, along with lesser influences by partisanship and religiosity.
Family income and sex had little impact on patriotism attitudes.
-- Test of Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 posits that patriotic belief is affected in part by individuals’ perception of threat. I operationalized threat perception only in terms of personal mortality salience, based on available data. The threat variable was measured based on responses (agree-disagree) to the following statement: “The recent war in Iraq has reduced the threat of terrorism in the U.S.”52
The assumption in this case was that individuals agreeing with this item were more likely to feel anxiety from terrorism and thus supported military action. Clearly the item is imperfect to the extent that persons who believe the war has reduced the terrorism threat would seemingly now experience less mortality salience than they otherwise would have. But I suspect that the former case is much more likely than the latter.
Results from regression analysis do not support the interaction term hypothesis postulated by Hypothesis 2a. In none of the six models did the system justifying motive interact with personal threat to affect patriotism scores (p < .10). This finding is similar to results from Study
1 that also failed to show an effect on patriotism due to interaction between status quo support and personal threat perception. Yet it runs counter to the proposition derived from SJT.
52 The variable was centered prior to creating the interaction term (as with all interaction terms throughout this dissertation).
111 Hypothesis 2b tests the assertion that perceived threat directly affects patriotism by prompting individuals to support ideas or policies that would conceivably reaffirm faith in the broader social system. In this case, affirmation is assumed to take the form of strong national attachment. This hypothesis was tested for all six patriotism dependent variables (with the system justification index excluded from the model). Results displayed in Tables 3.12 – 3.14 show the terrorism measure was a significant factor (in the predicted direction) in five of the six model tests. Only in the case of constructive patriotism was a direct effect not identifiable (p >
.10). Consistent throughout the results was a positive relationship with conservative ideology and a negative relationship with parent’s education. Overall, the findings suggest that to the extent people feel personally threatened, their tendency to justify existing social arrangements is likely to manifest in the form of orthodox patriotic views.
[TABLES 3.12, 3.13, AND 3.14 ABOUT HERE]
-- Test of Hypothesis 3
System justification theory submits that individuals will at times be more likely to express sentiment in favor of the status quo despite occupying a disadvantaged societal position.
To the extent that orthodox national attitudes serve to perpetuate America’s broader societal arrangements, this assertion is testable in terms of this research. Group status was operationalized using parents’ education level and parents’ income level as proxies for the
(student) respondent’s group status.
112 To assess Hypothesis 3a, I created an interaction term between parents’ education and system justification, as well as parents’ income and system justification.53 The system justifying motive was presumed to moderate the relationship between group status and patriotism. Among the six tests of the model, only in predicting blind patriotism did the interaction variable demonstrate a statistically significant impact (p < .10). Both of the interaction term’s stem variables, as well as political ideology, proved responsible for most of the models’ explanatory power. The interaction term representing parents’ income and system justification displayed similarly null findings. None of the six models estimating patriotic belief had a statistically significant impact by way of the interaction term. Overall, the results reflect those seen in Study
1.
Hypothesis 3b offers a somewhat different take on this hypothesis. It tests for a main effect on patriotism by disadvantaged group status. To evaluate this hypothesis, the system justification index is excluded from the model. Also, both group variables are included in the model at the same time because each also acts as a control variable in the model. Results from the regression analysis show that education has a direct negative relationship with patriotism in four of the six models. Only in estimating symbolic and blind patriotism was low-education not a statistically significant related to orthodox patriotism. On the other hand, family income proved unrelated to patriotism. It failed to reach statistical significance in any of the six models.
The findings from this hypothesis test suggest that low education is a potential source for system justifying behavior, while low income is unlikely to be.
[TABLES 3.15, 3.16, AND 3.17 ABOUT HERE]
53 Both items were reverse-scored prior to interaction with system justification.
113 Conclusion: Study 2
Empirical assessment relative to the core hypothesis of this research (H1) was bolstered by the results from Study 2. Though the student sample data set did not offer the extensive set of control variables available in the ANES, it allowed for a more complete picture of patriotism attitudes based on its diversity of questions. Each of the five types of patriotism – symbolic patriotism, national identification, constructive patriotism, blind patriotism, and particular patriotism – were determined through multiple regression analysis to be driven in large measure by individuals’ status quo supporting tendencies. The same was true in regards to the cumulative patriotism index, which was constructed from these five measures. Such findings demonstrate the fit of the relationship between support for the status quo and patriotism. It is also consistent with the notion of a relative unity across national attitudes, as discussed in Chapter 2.
The threat hypothesis derivable from SJT demonstrated results similar to Study 1. Threat perception measured based on fear of terrorist attacks did not interact with system justification to affect patriotism (H2a). However, a main effect was consistent across measures of patriotism.
This indicates that anxiety induced by threat does cause people to endorse attitudes and behaviors likely to have system-justifying effects (H2b). Also, in the student sample, neither of the proxy status variables, parents’ education or parents’ income, interacted with status quo support to affect patriotism (H3a). Yet a direct effect assessing disadvantaged group status on patriotism was evident in the case of low-education (H3b).
General Discussion
Attachment to country is an inherently broad concept. The nature of this attachment is, for any individual, sure to have numerous influences. This point is evidenced by the litany of
114 explanatory factors discussed in the literature review for this chapter. Regardless, no collection of causal forces informing a variable of this type must necessarily remain stagnant. More likely is that they will fluctuate along with the environmental, cultural, political, and other broad societal circumstances of the day. For instance, different motivations might be triggered by the prevalence of racially-based social hierarchies, or the rise of a belligerent military-dominated political regime, or vast socioeconomic inequalities, or other similar circumstances. As I have suggested in this chapter, America’s uncertain world status entails conditions apt to stimulate one’s cognitive motivations relative to their preferences for change versus the status quo. The findings from both Studies 1 and 2 showed that this dynamic indeed has large implications for people’s patriotic attitudes in contemporary America. The tendency to uphold existing societal arrangements generally prompted orthodox national attachment, while amenability toward change was consistent with progressive patriotic belief. Such a finding is highly significant for its ability to describe the current state of many Americans’ affect toward their country. Yet it is perhaps most noteworthy for its potential to describe public opinion in the years to come.
Because America’s global position is almost certain to be in flux in ensuing decades – as other countries continue to challenge its economic, military, and cultural dominance – system justifying motives are likely to be a main root of patriotism outlooks well into the future.
115 CHAPTER 3 TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 3.1: Models of Critical and Unwavering Patriotism Attitudes Angry Ashamed Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta System justification 0.037 0.007*** 0.220 0.019 0.007** 0.115 Authoritarianism 0.008 0.009 0.040 0.020 0.009** 0.102 Social dominance 0.008 0.008 0.039 0.007 0.008 0.034 Party ID 0.057 0.025** 0.130 0.048 0.025* 0.112 Political ideology 0.014 0.033 0.023 0.024 0.032 0.038 Iraq war support 0.245 0.095** 0.129 0.290 0.094*** 0.155 Christian -0.010 0.094 -0.005 0.037 0.094 0.017 Views of Bible 0.004 0.065 0.003 0.036 0.064 0.027 Age 0.004 0.002 0.063 0.003 0.002 0.050 Age 47 0.000 0.000* -0.070 0.000 0.000 -0.035 Close Hispanic 0.013 0.126 0.007 0.035 0.125 0.018 Close black -0.018 0.080 -0.017 -0.020 0.080 -0.019 Close other 0.002 0.049 0.004 0.070 0.049 0.118 Male 0.085 0.072 0.046 0.022 0.071 0.012 White, non-Hisp. -0.142 0.134 -0.064 -0.258 0.133* -0.118 Education -0.036 0.027 -0.061 -0.080 0.027*** -0.137 Social class -0.004 0.024 -0.009 -0.009 0.024 -0.018 Income -0.007 0.027 -0.012 0.003 0.027 0.004 Rural -0.084 0.092 -0.036 0.013 0.092 0.006 South 0.051 0.078 0.026 0.010 0.077 0.005 Constant 0.562 0.373 0.737 0.370**
Adjusted R-squared 0.161 0.149 Sample size 614 614 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
116 Table 3.2: Models of Symbolic and Affective Patriotism Attitudes Love of Country Flag Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta System justification 0.020 0.006*** 0.152 0.042 0.007*** 0.245 Authoritarianism 0.010 0.007 0.066 0.029 0.008*** 0.146 Social dominance -0.010 0.006* -0.067 -0.001 0.007 -0.004 Party ID -0.010 0.020 -0.029 0.027 0.024 0.061 Political ideology 0.028 0.026 0.056 0.048 0.031 0.073 Iraq war support 0.035 0.076 0.023 0.094 0.091 0.048 Christian 0.110 0.076 0.061 0.289 0.091*** 0.125 Views of Bible -0.081 0.052 -0.075 -0.035 0.062 -0.025 Age 0.008 0.002*** 0.174 0.006 0.002*** 0.109 Age 47 0.000 0.000** -0.096 0.000 0.000 -0.036 Close Hispanic -0.005 0.102 -0.003 0.170 0.121 0.085 Close black -0.117 0.065* -0.134 -0.109 0.077 -0.098 Close other -0.093 0.040** -0.193 -0.032 0.047 -0.052 Male 0.011 0.058 0.008 -0.101 0.069 -0.053 White, non-Hisp. 0.295 0.108*** 0.166 0.263 0.129** 0.115 Education -0.027 0.022 -0.057 -0.059 0.026** -0.096 Social class 0.010 0.019 0.024 -0.006 0.023 -0.012 Income 0.009 0.022 0.019 0.035 0.026 0.058 Rural 0.147 0.074** 0.077 0.011 0.089 0.004 South 0.005 0.063 0.003 -0.014 0.075 -0.007 Constant 2.827 0.300*** 2.328 0.358***
Adjusted R-squared 0.150 0.268 Sample size 614 613 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
117 Table 3.3: Models of American Importance and Indexed Patriotism Attitudes
Importance of being American Patriotism index Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta System justification 0.027 0.007*** 0.185 0.127 0.020*** 0.257 Authoritarianism 0.016 0.008** 0.091 0.068 0.023*** 0.118 Social dominance -0.004 0.007 -0.024 0.001 0.021 0.002 Party ID -0.012 0.022 -0.031 0.134 0.067** 0.104 Political ideology 0.062 0.029** 0.111 0.134 0.088 0.072 Iraq war support -0.009 0.085 -0.005 0.654 0.254** 0.116 Christian 0.247 0.084*** 0.124 0.566 0.253** 0.085 Views of Bible 0.005 0.058 0.004 -0.007 0.173 -0.002 Age 0.005 0.002** 0.089 0.023 0.006*** 0.133 Age 47 0.000 0.000** -0.102 -0.001 0.000** -0.088 Close Hispanic 0.106 0.113 0.062 0.267 0.338 0.047 Close black -0.035 0.072 -0.037 -0.235 0.215 -0.073 Close other -0.035 0.044 -0.065 -0.056 0.132 -0.031 Male -0.082 0.064 -0.050 -0.099 0.193 -0.018 White, non-Hisp. 0.289 0.120** 0.148 0.263 0.359 0.040 Education -0.008 0.024 -0.015 -0.197 0.072*** -0.112 Social class -0.005 0.021 -0.012 -0.011 0.064 -0.008 Income 0.019 0.024 0.037 0.052 0.072 0.030 Rural 0.179 0.082** 0.085 0.251 0.248 0.036 South 0.010 0.069 0.006 0.091 0.209 0.015 Constant 3.041 0.333*** 5.321 1.000***
Adjusted R-squared 0.143 0.316 Sample size 613 613 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
118 Table 3.4: Models of Threat Interaction Effects on Patriotism Index Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta System justification 0.120 0.020*** 0.245 0.120 0.020*** 0.244 0.138 0.024*** 0.280 Ideological Dist. -0.010 0.005* -0.069 ------SJ x Ideological Dist. 0.001 0.001* 0.062 ------Economic threat - - - -0.096 0.052* -0.086 - - - SJ x Economic Threat - - - 0.002 0.007 0.008 - - - Terror threat ------0.558 0.205*** 0.099 SJ x Terror Threat ------0.029 0.034 -0.039 Authoritarianism 0.063 0.024*** 0.109 0.067 0.023*** 0.115 0.065 0.023*** 0.112 Social dominance -0.007 0.021 -0.012 0.003 0.021 0.006 0.004 0.021 0.007 Party ID 0.150 0.068** 0.117 0.102 0.069 0.079 0.132 0.066** 0.103 Political ideology 0.099 0.093 0.053 0.130 0.088 0.069 0.133 0.087 0.071 Iraq war support 0.648 0.261** 0.116 0.554 0.267** 0.098 0.557 0.256** 0.099 Christian 0.512 0.262* 0.077 0.532 0.256** 0.080 0.570 0.252** 0.086 Views of Bible -0.051 0.177 -0.013 -0.020 0.174 -0.005 0.001 0.173 0.000 Age 0.022 0.006*** 0.130 0.023 0.006*** 0.134 0.019 0.006*** 0.112 Age 47 -0.001 0.000* -0.071 -0.001 0.000** -0.085 -0.001 0.000** -0.080 Close Hispanic 0.343 0.338 0.061 0.256 0.338 0.045 0.261 0.336 0.045 Close black -0.113 0.218 -0.034 -0.218 0.215 -0.068 -0.220 0.214 -0.068 Close other -0.050 0.132 -0.028 -0.063 0.132 -0.036 -0.062 0.132 -0.035 Male -0.145 0.199 -0.026 -0.103 0.195 -0.019 -0.152 0.193 -0.027 White, non-Hisp. 0.465 0.372 0.070 0.307 0.360 0.047 0.247 0.358 0.038 Education -0.208 0.074*** -0.118 -0.182 0.073** -0.103 -0.185 0.072** -0.105 Social class 0.008 0.066 0.005 -0.011 0.065 -0.007 -0.011 0.064 -0.007 Income 0.067 0.073 0.038 0.037 0.073 0.021 0.047 0.072 0.027 Rural 0.184 0.252 0.026 0.229 0.248 0.033 0.255 0.246 0.036 South 0.047 0.215 0.008 0.049 0.210 0.008 0.053 0.208 0.009 Constant 8.369 0.987*** 8.342 0.988*** 8.146 0.964***
Adjusted R-squared 0.323 0.319 0.322 Sample size 580 606 613 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
119 Table 3.5: Models of Threat Direct Effects on Patriotism Index Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Ideological Dist. -0.017 0.005*** -0.117 ------Economic threat - - - -0.160 0.051*** -0.143 - - - Terror threat ------0.560 0.203*** 0.100 Authoritarianism 0.051 0.024** 0.088 0.049 0.023** 0.085 0.050 0.023** 0.087 Social dominance -0.011 0.021 -0.019 0.003 0.021 0.006 0.004 0.021 0.007 Party ID 0.206 0.068*** 0.161 0.126 0.069* 0.098 0.185 0.066*** 0.144 Political ideology 0.217 0.090** 0.119 0.188 0.087** 0.101 0.193 0.086** 0.104 Iraq war support 0.894 0.260*** 0.161 0.744 0.266*** 0.133 0.856 0.254*** 0.153 Christian 0.544 0.264** 0.082 0.567 0.255** 0.086 0.641 0.252** 0.097 Views of Bible -0.095 0.177 -0.024 -0.095 0.172 -0.024 -0.070 0.172 -0.017 Age 0.025 0.006*** 0.143 0.024 0.006*** 0.143 0.020 0.006*** 0.120 Age 47 -0.001 0.000 -0.055 -0.001 0.000** -0.081 -0.001 0.000** -0.076 Close Hispanic 0.638 0.336* 0.113 0.571 0.332* 0.101 0.621 0.331* 0.110 Close black -0.044 0.217 -0.013 -0.129 0.212 -0.040 -0.131 0.212 -0.041 Close other 0.035 0.129 0.020 0.014 0.128 0.008 0.035 0.128 0.020 Male -0.105 0.201 -0.019 -0.100 0.195 -0.018 -0.133 0.194 -0.024 White, non-Hisp. 0.577 0.370 0.088 0.406 0.357 0.063 0.349 0.356 0.054 Education -0.205 0.075*** -0.117 -0.186 0.072** -0.107 -0.196 0.072*** -0.113 Social class 0.044 0.066 0.029 0.013 0.064 0.009 0.033 0.063 0.022 Income 0.083 0.074 0.048 0.055 0.072 0.032 0.072 0.072 0.041 Rural 0.177 0.256 0.025 0.213 0.250 0.030 0.265 0.250 0.037 South 0.072 0.217 0.012 0.071 0.210 0.012 0.079 0.209 0.013 Constant 7.592 0.959*** 8.689 1.064*** 7.184 0.931***
Adjusted R-squared 0.278 0.278 0.278 Sample size 598 630 636 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
120 Table 3.6: Models of Disadvantaged Group Interaction Effects on Patriotism Index Model 1 Model 2 Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta System justification 0.078 0.037** 0.158 0.098 0.052* 0.199 Income 0.045 0.072 0.025 - - - Income x SJ 0.017 0.011 0.115 - - - Education - - - -0.199 0.072*** -0.113 Education x SJ - - - 0.006 0.011 0.061 Authoritarianism 0.068 0.023*** 0.117 0.068 0.023*** 0.118 Social dominance -0.003 0.021 -0.005 -0.001 0.021 -0.001 Party ID 0.126 0.067* 0.098 0.134 0.067** 0.104 Political ideology 0.138 0.088 0.074 0.133 0.088 0.071 Iraq war support 0.662 0.254*** 0.117 0.664 0.255** 0.118 Christian 0.541 0.253** 0.081 0.566 0.253** 0.085 Views of Bible -0.008 0.173 -0.002 -0.002 0.174 -0.001 Age 0.023 0.006*** 0.132 0.023 0.006*** 0.132 Age 47 -0.001 0.000** -0.086 -0.001 0.000** -0.087 Close Hispanic 0.282 0.338 0.049 0.260 0.338 0.045 Close black -0.239 0.215 -0.074 -0.240 0.215 -0.074 Close other -0.067 0.132 -0.037 -0.058 0.132 -0.032 Male -0.111 0.193 -0.020 -0.100 0.193 -0.018 White, non-Hisp. 0.289 0.359 0.044 0.264 0.359 0.040 Education -0.186 0.072** -0.105 - - - Social class -0.016 0.064 -0.010 -0.012 0.064 -0.008 Income - - - 0.055 0.072 0.031 Rural 0.274 0.248 0.039 0.254 0.248 0.036 South 0.072 0.209 0.012 0.088 0.209 0.015 Constant 8.375 0.982*** 7.342 0.932***
Adjusted R-squared 0.317 0.315 Sample size 613 613 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
121 Table 3.7: Models of Disadvantaged Group Main Effects on Patriotism Index Model 1 Coeff. S.E. Beta Income 0.078 0.072 0.045 Education -0.202 0.072*** -0.116 Authoritarianism 0.052 0.023** 0.089 Social dominance 0.001 0.021 0.003 Party ID 0.187 0.067*** 0.146 Political ideology 0.194 0.087** 0.105 Iraq war support 0.964 0.253*** 0.173 Christian 0.639 0.254** 0.097 Views of Bible -0.072 0.173 -0.018 Age 0.024 0.006*** 0.142 Age 47 -0.001 0.000** -0.080 Close Hispanic 0.617 0.334* 0.109 Close black -0.146 0.214 -0.045 Close other 0.034 0.129 0.019 Male -0.073 0.195 -0.013 White, non-Hisp. 0.358 0.359 0.055 Social class 0.022 0.064 0.015 Rural 0.233 0.251 0.033 South 0.130 0.210 0.022 Constant 7.223 0.938***
Adjusted R-squared 0.266 Sample size 637 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
122 Table 3.8: Correlation Matrix of Patriotism Types Symbolic National Constructive Blind Particular Patriotism Identification Patriotism Patriotism Patriotism Symbolic Patriotism Pearson Corr. 1.0 - - - - N-size 146 - - - - National Identification Pearson Corr. 0.619*** 1.0 - - - N-size 143 179 - - - Constructive Patriotism Pearson Corr. 0.431*** 0.210*** 1.0 - - N-size 140 168 174 - - Blind Patriotism Pearson Corr. 0.522*** 0.426*** 0.750*** 1.0 - N-size 144 176 173 183 - Particular Patriotism Pearson Corr. 0.566*** .366*** 0.645*** 0.712*** 1.0 N-size 136 162 161 167 168 ***p < .01
Table 3.9: Models of Symbolic Patriotism and National Identity Symbolic Patriotism National Identification Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta System justification 0.426 0.111*** 0.277 0.227 0.090** 0.198 Party ID 0.256 0.108** 0.277 -0.042 0.085 -0.060 Political ideology 0.477 0.231** 0.257 0.528 0.183*** 0.390 Parent's education -0.225 0.091** -0.205 -0.069 0.069 -0.084 Parent's income 0.048 0.130 0.031 0.055 0.092 0.050 Religiosity -0.005 0.112 -0.003 0.062 0.092 0.056 Male 0.104 0.279 0.026 0.384 0.218* 0.128 Constant 0.949 0.695 1.915 0.535***
Adjusted R-squared 0.461 0.256 Sample size 125 149 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
123 Table 3.10: Models of Constructive and Blind Patriotism Attitudes Constructive Patriotism Blind Patriotism Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta System justification 0.170 0.113 0.112 0.435 0.129*** 0.219 Party ID 0.314 0.109*** 0.335 0.187 0.125 0.153 Political ideology 0.373 0.234 0.203 0.809 0.261*** 0.342 Parent's education -0.182 0.088** -0.161 -0.262 0.100** -0.180 Parent's income 0.095 0.119 0.061 0.108 0.136 0.054 Religiosity 0.106 0.117 0.068 0.269 0.134** 0.135 Male -0.666 0.281** -0.163 -0.312 0.321 -0.059 Constant 1.221 0.691* -0.319 0.778
Adjusted R-squared 0.364 0.470 Sample size 146 153 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Table 3.11: Models of Particular Patriotism and Patriotism Index Particular Patriotism Patriotism Index Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta System justification 0.418 0.158*** 0.186 1.808 0.436*** 0.271 Party ID 0.153 0.151 0.110 0.763 0.414* 0.191 Political ideology 1.040 0.316*** 0.389 3.117 0.881*** 0.389 Parent's education -0.282 0.123** -0.172 -1.175 0.355*** -0.248 Parent's income 0.208 0.166 0.094 0.799 0.500 0.120 Religiosity 0.085 0.165 0.038 0.825 0.451* 0.128 Male 0.297 0.396 0.050 -1.010 1.112 -0.058 Constant 1.727 0.950* 4.830 2.797
Adjusted R-squared 0.407 0.601 Sample size 144 112 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
124 Table 3.12: Models of Threat Direct Effects on Symbolic Patriotism and National Identity Symbolic Patriotism National Identification Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Terror threat 0.437 0.208** 0.203 0.551 0.163*** 0.338 Party ID 0.140 0.118 0.150 -0.162 0.090* -0.229 Political ideology 0.656 0.235*** 0.350 0.542 0.177*** 0.396 Parent's education -0.133 0.094 -0.121 -0.035 0.068 -0.041 Parent's income 0.023 0.138 0.015 0.068 0.092 0.060 Religiosity -0.017 0.119 -0.011 0.061 0.092 0.053 Male 0.068 0.296 0.017 0.357 0.217 0.118 Constant 1.892 0.654*** 2.223 0.467***
Adjusted R-squared 0.417 0.284 Sample size 123 148 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Table 3.13: Models of Threat Direct Effects for Constructive and Blind Patriotism Attitudes Constructive Patriotism Blind Patriotism Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Terror threat 0.331 0.202 0.151 0.490 0.242** 0.171 Party ID 0.253 0.115** 0.270 0.095 0.136 0.077 Political ideology 0.394 0.227* 0.215 0.942 0.262*** 0.396 Parent's education -0.152 0.086* -0.134 -0.214 0.102** -0.147 Parent's income 0.098 0.118 0.063 0.135 0.140 0.067 Religiosity 0.094 0.116 0.061 0.274 0.138** 0.136 Male -0.717 0.278** -0.176 -0.369 0.327 -0.070 Constant 1.512 0.612** 0.580 0.701
Adjusted R-squared 0.365 0.452 Sample size 147 152 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
125 Table 3.14: Models of Direct Threat Effects for Particular Patriotism and Patriotism Index Particular Patriotism Patriotism Index Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Terror threat 1.212 0.273*** 0.374 2.067 0.630*** 0.272 Party ID -0.070 0.153 -0.050 0.186 0.360 0.057 Political ideology 0.997 0.296*** 0.368 2.994 0.716*** 0.454 Parent's education -0.222 0.117* -0.135 -0.730 0.293** -0.187 Parent's income 0.293 0.160* 0.131 0.555 0.418 0.101 Religiosity 0.120 0.160 0.052 0.585 0.374 0.110 Male 0.219 0.381 0.037 -1.288 0.928 -0.090 Constant 1.910 0.798** 8.218 2.037***
Adjusted R-squared 0.468 0.592 Sample size 142 112 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Table 3.15: Models of Disadvantaged Group Direct Effects on Symbolic Patriotism and National Identity Symbolic Patriotism National Identification Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Parent's income -0.022 0.136 -0.014 0.046 0.093 0.041 Parent's education -0.153 0.094 -0.139 -0.052 0.069 -0.062 Party ID 0.214 0.113* 0.232 -0.054 0.087 -0.076 Political ideology 0.764 0.231*** 0.411 0.678 0.177*** 0.499 Religiosity -0.052 0.117 -0.035 0.045 0.093 0.041 Male 0.144 0.295 0.036 0.377 0.222* 0.125 Constant 2.397 0.615*** 2.641 0.455***
Adjusted R-squared 0.398 0.238 Sample size 125 150 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
126 Table 3.16: Models of Disadvantaged Group Direct Effects on Constructive and Blind Patriotism Constructive Patriotism Blind Patriotism Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Parent's income 0.083 0.118 0.053 0.090 0.141 0.045 Parent's education -0.161 0.087* -0.143 -0.222 0.103** -0.152 Party ID 0.314 0.109*** 0.335 0.186 0.129 0.152 Political ideology 0.475 0.223** 0.259 1.057 0.260*** 0.447 Religiosity 0.086 0.117 0.056 0.239 0.139* 0.120 Male -0.714 0.280** -0.175 -0.397 0.332 -0.075 Constant 1.773 0.594*** 1.088 0.679
Adjusted R-squared 0.357 0.433 Sample size 147 153 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
Table 3.17: Models of Disadvantaged Group Direct Effects on Particular Patriotism and the Patriotism Index Particular Patriotism Patriotism Index Coeff. S.E. Beta Coeff. S.E. Beta Parent's income 0.193 0.169*** 0.087 0.377 0.433 0.069 Parent's education -0.250 0.125** -0.153 -0.788 0.306** -0.201 Party ID 0.148 0.154 0.107 0.533 0.360 0.162 Political ideology 1.276 0.310*** 0.477 3.544 0.728*** 0.537 Religiosity 0.053 0.168 0.024 0.507 0.390 0.095 Male 0.227 0.404 0.038 -1.127 0.969 -0.079 Constant 3.113 0.809*** 10.211 2.032***
Adjusted R-squared 0.381 0.554 Sample size 144 112 *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
127 Chapter 4 Patriotism and Ideological Constraint
“This [2012 presidential] election is about how to avert national decline. All other issues flow from that anxiety.” - David Brooks, The New York Times
Americans’ Political Ideologies: An Oxymoron?
Since survey research emerged as a reliable tool for measuring public opinion in the
1930’s and 1940’s, voluminous evidence has accumulated demonstrating Americans’
“ideological innocence” when it comes to politics (e.g. Bishop 2005; Campbell et al. 1960;
Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Converse’s (1964) seminal study on mass belief systems was among the earliest, most pointed, and most convincing in making this case.
Through a broad assessment of the coherence and consistency amongst individuals’ political views, he determined that vapid, unstable opinions were the norm, not the exception. While this image remains a leading paradigm in the field of American politics, it is not without contest.
Parried somewhat over the years by theoretical revisions (e.g. Fiorina, 1980; Nie and Anderson,
1974) and methodological revisions (e.g. Achen 1975; Levitin and Miller 1979), a more optimistic image of American public opinion today contrasts Converse’s non-attitudes thesis.
Relying heavily on analyses of aggregate data, this view argues that most citizens are rational consumers of political information who mostly hold considerate and coherent opinions (e.g. Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004).
While these traditions broadly structure the classical debate over ideological constraint, a more nuanced approach to the subject has steadily evolved over the last three decades. Distinct from the orthodoxy of either of the aforementioned camps, this view emphasizes the cognitive-
128 psychological processes that often unconsciously inform and direct political attitudes (e.g.
Conover and Feldman 1981; Fiske and Taylor 1984; Popkin 1991; for a review see McGraw
2000). Research within the political cognition tradition generally examines the qualities and dynamics involved in how individuals think about politics, and therefore often departs from the classic unidimensional liberal-conservative framework. In particular, some scholars have elucidated the processes by which people draw on or are otherwise motivated by certain fundamental ideas, values, or predispositions in generating more concrete political opinions (e.g.
Barker and Tinnick 2006; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Feldman 1988; McCloskey and Zaller
1984; Zaller 1992). Because similar such processes have occupied the background of this research thus far, I look to the tools offered by political cognition in this chapter to assess ideological constraint involving patriotic belief.
Findings from Chapter 3 show one’s patriotic attitudes are heavily influenced by the extent to which he or she is psychologically predisposed to support the societal status quo.
Findings from Chapter 2 show that patriotism worldviews structure opinions on a host of issues falling under the broad banner of the “culture wars.” Considered collectively, these results suggest political attitudes surrounding patriotism relate to one another at varying degrees of specificity. In other words, individuals may be generating political opinions on social, economic, foreign policy, and other issues in accordance with multiple levels of causation, involving patriotism and the system justifying motive. A “hierarchical” model of attitude constraint relating to similar ideational elements has previously been theorized within the political cognition literature (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). In depicting this model, Peffley and Hurwitz (1985, 876) posit “a pyramidal structure…organized with more
129 abstract attitudes at the top of the belief system and more specific attitudes subsumed under the general ones.”
Consistent with this and similar “multitiered” frameworks (Moskowitz and Jenkins
2004), I examine attitude constraint relative to cultural issues based on this multi-level conceptualization. Because this model posits a connection between attitudes at three different levels of abstractness, I use structural equation modeling techniques to assess the individual and overall relationships assumed in this type of opinion formation. The findings from this research should weigh heavily on one of the classic debates in political science, the existential nature of ideology. They also provide a further assessment of an emergent patriotic outlook informing
American politics. Prior to empirically examining the model, I first review the extant literature on ideological constraint. I then describe in further detail the key properties relative to inter- level reasoning generally, and hierarchical reasoning specifically.
Innocent, Rational, and Nuanced Attitude Structures
-- Ideological Innocence
It’s a great irony of American politics that at the same time a great many citizens were sacrificing on behalf of their country both at home and abroad during World War II, evidence was emerging that would undermine the foundation of classical democratic theory in this country. Classical democratic theory envisions a populace deeply engaged in the important political and social issues of the day, as well as the philosophical principles undergirding them
(Clawson and Oxley 2008, 4-6). But in their study of the 1940 presidential campaign,
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) discovered no such electorate. They assessed responses from roughly 600 Erie County, Ohio voters taken at six intervals leading up to the election.
130 Results showed that most people knew which candidate they would vote for prior to the campaign, and thus were only minimally interested in weighing the day’s leading arguments.
Moreover, those most amenable to altering their vote choice also happened to be persons least interested in the election outcome. The authors concluded that social relationships, not political ideologies, weighed heaviest in determining people’s political views.
Images of a classical democracy eroded further when researchers at the University of
Michigan discovered through extensive analysis of survey results that most voters relied on party affiliation as a filter through which to evaluate political phenomena (Campbell et al. 1960).
Rather than judge policy proposals on their merits, it seemed people were content to tow the party line. And based on Converse’s (1964) findings, doing so might have been out of necessity based on their limited political knowledge. His analysis showed that most citizens had an elementary-level conceptualization of liberal-conservative ideology. They also held contradictory and often random views on political issues. Leading theorists within this pessimistic tradition today often argue that Americans are most likely to make political judgments based on their identification with various social groups (Green et al. 2003). Most important among these groups is of course one’s political party. But one’s relationship with a party is itself a product of connecting his or her own identity with the appropriate or like-minded groups in society. Some scholars, including Bishop (2005), go even further by arguing that most people’s political opinions are merely artifacts of measurement generated on the spot by unsuspecting survey respondents. Moore (2008) also argues that the public is ignorant as to the details of most political matters. People mostly deliver survey responses to pollsters as a means of accommodating them, he notes (see also Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, and Bennett 1980).
131 And even when they are knowledgeable about a subject, they are often agnostic as to whether they’d like to see their policy preferences enacted.
-- Ideological Rationality
Pessimistic conclusions relative to the public’s lack of ideological sophistication have not gone unanswered. Achen (1975), for instance, charged that ideological coherence was lacking in survey responses due to extensive measurement error. Individuals don’t necessarily hold fixed opinions on issues, he argued. Rather, they harbor a range of views on the same topic. Also, because survey questions are often worded vaguely, consistency should be defined by a distribution of attitudes around a mean position. After all, on some issues, even elites have difficulty distinguishing between liberal and conservative positions (Levitin and Miller 1979).
Revisionist criticism has been most sustained when directed toward the non-attitudes theory rather than its common methodology. Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976) examined responses to questions in the ANES time series from 1956-72. Over that time, they found that attitudes became more ideologically constrained based on increased correlations among issue- opinions. At the same time, party attachment appeared to be declining. Ideological innocence, they concluded, was unique to the placid politics of the 1950’s, and thus incompatible with the politically vibrant 1960’s and early 1970’s. Though these findings were determined soon after to be at least partially based on changes in question wording (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber
1978; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1978), the argument that citizens were calculating consumers of political information has lived on, often under the broad banner of rational choice.
Key (1966) argued that citizens can and do consider issues to the extent that their features are emphasized and articulated by the parties and candidates. Aldrich et al. (1989) tested Key’s
132 hypothesis that “voter are not fools” within the seemingly opaque sphere of foreign affairs. They found that even in this complex issue-area, individuals made specific political judgments based on their general preferences in this domain. Consistent with this line of reasoning, though based in a distinct methodological approach, some public opinion scholars argue in favor of a collective form of ideological sophistication. Most notably, Page and Shapiro (1992) assert that inconsistencies in individual opinions are corrected for by a lucidity of views among the aggregate public. Because citizens’ overall opinions are stable and interpretable, most people therefore must hold solid policy preferences across issues. Moreover, when changes in aggregate opinion do occur, they are almost always in response to logically related political events. Stimson (2004) similarly assesses aggregate survey data reaching back decades to show that the public’s views become either more liberal or more conservative in reaction to related public policy decisions.
-- Ideological Process
Around 1980, an approach to understanding opinion formation emerged focusing on the psychological processes involved in generating and organizing issue-attitudes. In its most basic form, this tradition explores the main steps involved in producing survey responses. For instance, Tourangeau and colleagues theorized a general process of opinion formation based on four steps: interpretation of the question, retrieval of relevant information, judgment formation, and answer editing (Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988; Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000).
Alternatively, Krosnick (1991) developed a “two-track” theory of survey response. It suggests that while some people follow the four steps laid out by Tourangeau, others are cognitively taxed by the task of forming a judgment such that they resort to “satisficing.” In effect, they settle on
133 the first seemingly plausible response that comes to mind. In doing so, opinions are more susceptible to a host of biases, including social desirability, acquiescence, and choosing “no opinion” or “don’t know” response options.
Among the other notable findings of Krosnick and others is that individuals often employ cues or heuristics in the process of generating opinions. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1993), for instance, find that given limited time, energy, interest, and potential influence, individuals will often adopt reasoned shortcuts in their attempts at decision-making. Popkin (1991) focuses on how voters arrive at their eventual candidate preferences based on minimal information holdings. He argues that they make rational, calculated decisions using proxy data from their daily lives to project a politically-relevant corollary. Similarly, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) argue that people make political decisions by taking cues from substitutes. For example, they might identify an individual or group in the media or their personal life whom they find trustworthy, and mimic their political preferences.
Conover and Feldman (1981) grapple explicitly with the content of ideology by assessing the meaning and affect people associate with “liberal” and “conservative” labels. They argue that differences in positive or negative impressions of various political symbols and groups related to a political ideology or party ultimately determine one’s willingness to adopt such ideological identifications. Building on this notion of non-dimensionality, Kerlinger (1984) posits a theory of critical referents based on multiple dimensions of ideology. He argues that various political values – namely civil liberties and equality for liberals, and individualism and private property for conservatives – carry differential weights, which structure orthogonal ideologically-based opinions.
134 Several scholars within the political cognition tradition emphasize the “vertical” qualities of ideological constraint. Vertical opinion formation assumes that issue preferences, candidate evaluations, and other political choices are premised on more fundamental or abstract ideas or predispositions. It posits simply, “the relationship between general and specific attitudes”
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1100), where “causation flows from the abstract to the specific”
(Peffley and Hurwitz 1985, 876). This notion in part resembles the early Michigan school two- step framework of ideology based on deductive reasoning from liberal-conservative principles.
However, as Moskowitz and Jenkins (2004, 415) note, “[t]he key problem” with the Michigan framework “is its implicit assumption that the mass public must be deductively consistent across a wide range of political issues and use a bipolar liberal/conservative scheme to form consistent attitudes.” Vertical opinion constraint, on the other hand, does not go nearly as far in positing a logical relationship between an explicitly political abstraction and an expansive range of specific issues. Instead, it focuses on general values or orientations which form the basis of consistent attitudes at multiple levels of abstraction within a particular issue domain(s).
According to vertical opinion formation theory, preferences may be derived from more primary or superordinate beliefs whether or not thought processes are conscious or deliberate
(Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004). In many cases, individuals will take advantage of cognitive shortcuts in arriving at their opinions. Thus, vertical constraint draws heavily on the theoretical properties of schema theory. The schema literature suggests that certain bits of topically-related information cluster together in memory (Hamill, Lodge, and
Blake 1985). Information within particular domains may be organized coherently around a given set of criteria, characteristics, and rules, whereby individuals then “link their schemas together in what appears to be a meaningful hierarchial [sic] fashion” (Conover and Feldman 1984, 113).
135 These processes offer a plausible and potentially powerful theoretical foundation for assessing attitude constraint as regards the causes and consequences of patriotic belief.
Inter-Level Ideological Constraint: From Abstract to Specific
Hierarchical political reasoning is a type of vertical or inter-level ideological constraint.
Inter-level relationships between concepts may be differentiated based on the ideational abstractness of predictor variables. Scholars differ in their emphasis of: (1) the exogenous effects of fundamental values or predispositions on political opinions; (2) the exogenous effects of general attitudinal postures on political opinions; or (3) the successive combination of each in affecting political opinions. The latter process is what is suggested by the hierarchical hypothesis. Inevitably, some overlap exists between levels based on the variable of interest and the focus of the researcher. The following discussion describes the main differences between levels of abstractness in generating political opinions.
The exogenous effects of fundamental values or predispositions can be understood in terms of the effect of personality characteristics. Adorno et al.’s (1950) classic text is highly instructive and influential as concerns the centrality of individual’s belief systems. Their authoritarian personality profile emphasizes the importance of prejudice in political reasoning.
The extent of one’s prejudice against unconventional individuals, groups, behaviors, and ideas, the authors argue, served as a key basis for determining political preferences. Rokeach (1960) similarly argued that dogmatism, defined by people’s level of closed-minded or open- mindedness, structured opinions across an array of socio-political issues (e.g. Maykovich 1975;
Rokeach 1973). After a long interlude, personality-based studies of politics are again prominent
136 in the literature today, including by way of authoritarianism (e.g. Altemeyer 1981, 1988;
Feldman and Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Mockabee 2007), social dominance orientation (e.g. Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius et al. 2001; Sidanius and Pratto 1999), system justification (e.g. Jost 2006; Jost et al. 2003a), as well as others firmly rooted in the psychology literature. For instance, one study assessed the impact of fundamental predispositions on political ideology using the “Big Five” personality dimensions (Carney, Jost, Gosling, and Potter
2008). The authors found openness to new experiences was positively related to liberal opinions, and conscientiousness was positively related to conservative opinions, particularly as it concerned social-cultural issues. While clearly not an evaluation of the proximal factors affecting issue-opinions, this line of research demonstrates the potential political influence of some of people’s most basic motivations.
Research that does assess more proximal causal forces often posits a general attitudinal posture within a political domain or set of domains. Lipset (1981), for instance, argues that attitudes surrounding civil rights and government welfare constitute the two dimensions of political ideology. Interestingly, he finds these two orientations to be inversely correlated as a result of social-structural cross-pressuring. Using the same logic but a different causal ordering, several studies have found that values in the economic domain were highly predictive of opinions on civil rights issues (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears, Huddy, and Schaffer 1986;
Sniderman, Brody, Kuklinski 1984), gender policies (Sears et al. 1986), and policies related to welfare (Feldman 1983). Feldman (1988) also found that a host of opinions on issues primarily in the economic domain, such as taxes, welfare, and jobs, are driven by people’s general beliefs
137 surrounding economic individualism and equality structure.54 And Sears et al. (1980) determined that general symbolic attitudes concerning liberal-conservative ideology, partisan identification, and race are most influential in structuring political opinions. These postures proved far better predictors on domestic policy issues concerning unemployment, national health insurance, busing, and law and order, as compared to measures of self-interest.
Unlike the aforementioned examples, a hierarchical model of opinion formation distinguishes between the effects of fundamental principles and attitudinal postures on issue- specific political preferences. Core values or predispositions occupy the base of the model. This includes abstract idea elements resembling “personal statements regarding the individual’s priorities and concerns” (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1105-6). Such interests or tendencies are broad such that they transcend governmental priorities (ibid). At the intermediate level of abstractness in the model are broad symbolic attitudes. They are characterized by a general approach toward solving society’s problems, both by citizens and the government. These broad postures consist largely of normative beliefs (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1104). At the most concrete, or least abstract level, are issue preferences. This includes specific views on matters of policy or politics, generally within a given issue domain.
In their original article establishing a theoretical basis for a hierarchical model of attitude structures, Peffley and Hurwitz (1985) used structural equation modeling to estimate opinions across domains of race, economic, foreign policy, and social-moral issues. The utility of this framework is best exemplified however, in the authors’ focused assessment of foreign policy attitudes (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). They theorize ethnocentrism and morality as abstract core values. These values are assumed to influence domain-relevant political orientations of
54 While Feldman (1988) and other authors sometimes refer to causal variables such as economic individualism as “core values,” I treat them at the intermediate level of abstractness because they are largely area-specific and causally secondary to concepts such as system justification.
138 militarism, anticommunism, and isolationism. The multi-level model proves an accurate predictor of opinions on issues of defense spending, military involvement, nuclear arms, Soviet relations, and international trade. Findings from this study contradicted longstanding notions that people do not think ideologically about matters of foreign policy (e.g. Almond 1956, 1960;
Converse 1964; Erskine 1963; Free and Cantril 1968; Simon 1974). In explaining the constraint in this issue area, the authors concluded that “a paucity of information does not impede structure and consistency; on the contrary, it motivates the development and employment of structure”
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1114).
Subsequent scholars have employed similarly structured models of attitude constraint.
Moskowitz and Jenkins (2004) posit a “multitiered framework” opinion formation. In it, concrete opinions are presumed to be based on attitudinal postures, which are themselves driven by structuring principles. In successfully estimating ideological constraint concerning economic, racial, and social attitudes, they emphasize a flexible, non-linear process of cognition. They note that opinion formation “combine[s] inductive and deductive reasoning, the use of information shortcuts, and an interactive mixture of emotional and cognitive reasoning” (397). Barker and
Tinnick (2006) also posit a hierarchical framework of ideological constraint for various tests of their model surrounding the political influence of parenting styles (nurturant versus disciplinarian). They find that such styles influence issue and candidate preferences indirectly, by affecting political values relating to equal rights and individualism-humanitarianism, as well as self-placed ideological orientation.
139 -- A Patriotism Hierarchical Model of Ideological Constraint
The ideational characteristics articulated at each of the hierarchical model’s three levels of abstraction share obvious similarities to those discussed in the first three chapters of this research. The status quo predisposition is a broad psychological tendency capable of structuring beliefs in multiple areas. Most importantly it does so in a consistent ideological direction. Jost and colleagues have previously argued that the status quo versus change dichotomy is one of two core aspects of the left-right ideological continuum known to American political discourse (Jost
2006, 2009; Jost et al. 2003a). In other words, it is a key dimension on which liberal views may readily be distinguished from conservative views (Jost 2006). Individuals tending to support the status quo are generally acting in concert with conservative ideological principles by upholding longstanding traditions or institutions. On the other hand, persons more amenable to change are generally advancing notions consistent with liberal ideology.
Patriotism is an appropriate fit at the intermediate level of the model because it constitutes a general attitudinal posture. Consistent with previous criteria (see Peffley and
Hurwitz 1985), it is a largely symbolic pose that is free of specific policy content. Nonetheless, it suggests or allows one to derive orthodox or progressive prescriptions for addressing specific political matters. At the most concrete level of the model are preferences concerning specific political issues, political groups, or public policies that are connected by a style of cultural argumentation (see Leege et al. 2002; Mockabee 2007). Preferences on issues of cultural relevance are comparable to previous treatments at this level of abstraction in hierarchical reasoning, including those involving economic issues (Barker and Tinnick 2006; Moskowitz and
Jenkins 2004; Peffley and Hurwitz,1985), social issues (Barker and Tinnick 2006; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985), racial issues (Barker and Tinnick 2006;
140 Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985), and foreign policy issues (Barker and
Tinnick 2006; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). For the most part, this includes those subjects examined as dependent variables in Chapter 2, such as immigration, gay marriage, race, the environment, health care, among others. In contrast to the higher levels of abstraction, these concrete items should be clear to most people in terms of their general meaning and/or policy implications.
For the remainder of this chapter, I assess the following hypothesis:
H1: Attitude Constraint. The system justifying motive and patriotism will demonstrate
an ordered, constrained influence on political opinions of cultural relevance.
Methodology
-- Structural Equation Modeling
In assessing the validity of their hierarchical model of ideology, Peffley and Hurwitz
(1985, 877) seek “to estimate constraint or consistency between abstractions and specific applications. Such consistency is demonstrated by significant correlations between different levels of [the] model.” To accomplish this task, these and other hierarchical scholars use structural equation modeling techniques. Structural equation modeling is a statistical methodology of confirmatory examination among structured causal processes (Bentler 1988;
Byrne 2001, 3). It assesses the goodness-of-fit of a hypothesized model to the sample data. And unlike other procedures, it allows for an evaluation of relationships between and among latent and observable variables, and thus, at different levels of abstraction.
141 In this research, I assess the hypothesized model of ideological constraint using structural equation modeling with AMOS. Kline (2005) distinguishes between three types of structural equation models: path analysis, which analyzes relationships among observed variables; confirmatory factor analysis, which evaluates whether various indicators adequately measure hypothetical constructs; and structural regression models, which test hypotheses about direct and indirect causal effects potentially involving latent variables. The latter form of analysis effectively combines the other two approaches by allowing the researcher to account for measurement or factor models, as well as to assess the effects of latent variables on one another in modeling causation (Byrne 2001, 6). In employing the structural regression approach, I follow
Kline (1998) and Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) advice in analyzing the proposed model in two distinct steps. The first step involves conducting a confirmatory factor analysis with the variables at each level of abstraction. The goal is to determine the existence of a generally well-fitting
CFA (confirmatory factor analysis) model. Once an acceptable CFA model is defined, step two involves assessing the structural model by evaluating the relationships between variables, as judged by the strength of the path coefficients (using Beta values as a metric). Also, results from model fit tests such as chi-square and RMSEA are used as indicators of how well the overall model represents the data.
Structural equation modeling holds several advantages over other multivariate procedures, including factor analysis and multiple regression. Unlike these statistical techniques, structural equation modeling estimates measurement error rather than ignoring it, as based on the adequacy of observed variables to depict their associated factors. Also, Hayduk, Ratner, Johnson, and Bottorff (1995) argue that factor analysis is conceptually unsuited for estimating theories of ideology. This is due to the fact that the covariance it observes between items does not account
142 for causal effects by higher-order items. Because proper treatment of direct effects from higher- order factors (beyond the first order) is ambiguous, it is frequently abandoned by researchers. In all, it ignores “whether the data prompt (demand) the insertion of effects leading directly from the background causes to the attitudinal items, thereby bypassing the ideological variables and potentially rendering them unnecessary” (500). In sum, the overriding focus of confirmatory factor analysis on the relationship between factors and measured variables makes it incompatible with assessing hierarchical models.
Multiple regression likewise is inadequate to the task of properly assessing a three-tiered model of ideology due to its inability to account for causal ordering. In testing their nation-as- family theory, Barker and Tinnick (2006) include both superordinate and intermediate level variables in their regression model. However, unlike in the case of structural equation modeling, they’re unable to adequately assess the role of their model’s hypothesized mediator variables.
They therefore do not empirically distinguish between direct and indirect effects of key variables at different levels of abstraction. In all, the above reasons suggest that the complexities of the proposed hierarchical model can best be evaluated using structural equation modeling techniques.
-- Model Specification
I specify and test two unique models in this analysis. The first model includes only those latent variables and their observable indicators operationalized to represent system justification, patriotism, and cultural opinions. Previous scholars testing hierarchical attitude structures using structural equation modeling have opted to assess only the core hypothesized components of their model, thus excluding all or most covariates (e.g. Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Moskowitz
143 and Jenkins 2004; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). The intent in this case is to provide an overall view of the model fit as well as establish a baseline for subsequent models. An analysis of several prominent psychology journals finds this approach to be more common than not, both for theoretical and methodological reasons (Fletcher, Germano, and Selgrade 2006).
As both previous theory and previous chapters in this dissertation demonstrate, additional factors beyond the proposed model varyingly impact views on both patriotism and culture war issues. Therefore, I also specify a model that controls for the leading psychological and political indicators of cultural attitudes and patriotism (patriotism is also endogenous in the model).
Control variables at the second-order level of abstraction in this analysis include measures of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Control variables at the first-order level include party identification, liberalism-conservatism, and religiosity. These measures are not intended to amount to exhaustive list of attitudinal political determinants. Rather they are included based on their demonstrated influence both in this dissertation and in previous research.
Limiting the control variables in this manner allows for both model parsimony and manageability (Eisenstein 2006).
-- Data
The data used in this analysis are familiar by now. I test the three-tiered model by fitting it to the data collected for the 2004 American National Election Studies survey (N = 1,212). This data set should offer a thorough test of the hierarchical hypothesis because it includes variables at all three levels of abstraction. Both second-order variables, which are exogenous, and first- order variables, which are endogenous, are considered latent factors in the model. The outcome variables, specific culture war items, are largely those examined as dependent variables in
144 Chapter 2. These constructs are also latent in that they are represented by either two or three observed variables. A measure for vote choice is an observed variable.
Cases with missing values were imputed using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. In this, missing values are treated as dependent variables in a regression model with all independent variables acting as predictors. Maximum likelihood estimation is also the overall method of analysis used to fit the model. Procedures of maximum likelihood estimate parameter values based on the highest likelihood of replicating the actual data (Meyers, Gamst, and
Guarino 2006). This is in contrast to employing the ordinary least squares method using multiple regression, as is the case when using programs not designed for model-fitting.
The primary statistical indicator of relationships between variables at different levels of abstraction is the path coefficient. “[P]ath coefficients represent the magnitude of expected change in the observed variables for every change in the related latent variable (or factor)”
(Byrne 2001, 10). This metric is represented in the form of a beta value, which offers an account of the data standardized across the data.
Consistent with the strategy employed in similar analyses (e.g. Hurwitz and Peffley 1987;
Peffley and Hurwitz 1985), specific cultural items are grouped by subject matter in order to evaluate the broader contours of the model, and to limit the number of individual analyses to a manageable level. Attitudes toward blacks include the two-item affirmative action measure noted previously, as well as an index of four items assessing support for the notion that society is to blame for blacks’ lower group status. Views regarding homosexuality include measures of support for allowing gays to marry and to adopt children. Preferences for social spending involve measures of support for spending on safety net programs (aid to the poor, child care, welfare), government-supplied health insurance, and job guarantees. Attitudes toward the environment
145 include a feeling thermometer rating for environmentalists, as well as measure of preferences for protecting the environment versus creating jobs.
Individuals’ views relative to gender roles in society involve responses for three items: a feeling thermometer for feminists, preference for male/female role equality, and whether women should be granted work-related legal protections. Immigration attitudes involve measures of support for limiting immigration, its importance as a policy issue, and preferred spending on border security. Views on foreign policy include the interventionism index, a feeling thermometer for the military, and a two-item index of support for combating international terrorism. Attitudes on crime and punishment include responses relative to spending levels on crime and support for the death penalty. Also, a measure of vote choice is for the 2004 presidential election. See Appendix C for a complete list of items and question wording.
Findings
In this analysis, I first assess the fit of the patriotism-centered hierarchical model to the data, where only the latent and manifest variables are included. Next, I evaluate the model in light of leading covariates as suggested by the extant literature and the previous two chapters of this dissertation. A brief discussion of conclusions follows.
-- Test 1: The Patriotism Model without Covariates
Table 4.1 displays results for the measurement model. This includes correlations between observed indicators and their latent theoretical constructs. Overall, observed variables at the postural level (patriotism attitudes) and issues level constitute strong indicators of their latent constructs, with the exception of one item denoting preferences for spending on crime (r = .14).
146 Other than the construct associated with this item (crime and punishment), all of the other factors at the second and first orders recorded at least two observed variables above, at, or near .50. Each of the observed variables constituting system justification was above .40.
[TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
The overall fit of the model to the data is modest. The chi-square goodness-of-fit test was statistically significant (p < .01). The chi-square statistic to degrees-of-freedom ratio was 6.60
(3208.54 / 486; N = 1,212). However, scholars generally advise that the chi-square test alone should not serve as a decisive judgment of the model (Bentler, 1992; Bollen and Long, 1993).
Thompson (2004) also recommends use of the comparative fit index (CFI), normed fit index
(NFI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) as overall measures of fit. While the CFI and NFI fail to reach the preferred level .90 (they are .70 and .67, respectively), the
RMSEA does indicate a good fit. At .068 it is below the preferred level of .08.
Figure 4.1 displays coefficients for the structural regression model. These figures represent the estimated relationship between constructs at different abstraction levels. Several general points are worthy of note. First, the strength of the relationships at each of the different levels of abstraction is quite high. This suggests that opinion on issues as argued through the rhetoric of the culture wars is likely traceable to more fundamental psychological idea elements.
Second, the expansive reach of the influence of general patriotism attitudes on particular issue- areas is impressive. Each of the eight areas was significantly impacted by individuals’ varying beliefs about national attachment. Third, as demonstrated by the R-squared values, a large
147 amount of predicted variance for the latent constructs is explained by more abstract model variables.
[FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
Regarding the more abstract relationship between core values and postures, the data show that the status quo predisposition has an impressive effect on patriotism attitudes (beta = .63; p <
.01). This finding strongly suggests that those discomfited by broad social change are likely to adopt highly orthodox American identities. As regards the relationship between the general patriotism posture and specific issue or policy preferences, the data also strongly support the proposed model. Each of the hypothesized relationships between patriotism and the eight culture war issue-areas were statistically significant at the .01 level. The magnitude of the beta coefficients at this level generally meets or exceeds those seen in similar previous estimates
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). All were in the predicted direction, with more patriotic respondents expressing more conservative political beliefs. Classic culturally disputed issues concerning gender roles, homosexuality, and spending on social programs such as welfare, all demonstrated relationships with patriotism at high levels
(betas = .62, .47, and .63, respectively). More recently prominent issues frequently debated through the lens of cultural differences also appeared to be strongly affected by patriotic beliefs.
Opinions related to the environment registered a beta coefficient of .49, while views on immigration policies were at .57. Patriotism was also strongly related to both attitudes toward blacks (beta = .66) as well as approaches to combating and punishing crime (beta = .76). Finally, the patriotism posture most thoroughly explained opinions concerning foreign policy preferences
148 (beta = .99). This finding is less surprising given the association between nation-based evaluations and foreign affairs. Regardless, the completeness of the relationship is impressive, particularly in light of the high R-squared statistic, .87. Finally, patriotism attitudes strongly informed vote choice in the 2004 presidential election, with orthodox patriots heavily supporting
President George W. Bush (beta = .65, p < .01).
All of the hypothesized inter-level relationships were well-evidenced in the analysis. Its effects were distributed across all eight of the culturally-relevant issue-areas. Moreover, according to the results of the model test, individuals’ patriotism posture is heavily informed by the prevalence of system justifying tendencies, which are thereby indirectly related to opinions on culturally divisive topics. Thus, despite some shortcomings in the model fit indices, attitude constraint within the given domain appears to be hierarchically constrained.
-- Test 2: The Patriotism Model with Covariates
Table 4.2 displays results for the measurement model, including covariates. Among the three additional latent constructs, religiosity and authoritarianism appear to be well-constituted by their associated observed variables. The lowest correlation among observed variables in the religiosity construct is .65. Regarding the factor measuring social dominance orientation, a clear split in the items is evident. Items measuring anti-egalitarianism appear far outweighed by the three item measures for social group hierarchy. Results of the measurement model among variables included in the original model remained largely unchanged.
[TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE]
149 Findings for the overall model fit also largely resembled that of the original model. The chi-square test was statistically significant (p < .01). The chi-square statistic to degrees-of- freedom ratio was 4.83 (5226.76 / 1082; N = 1,212). Again, neither the CFI or NFI fit indices reached above the preferred .90 level (.74 and .70, respectively). However, the RMSEA index indicated an even better overall fit than the original model, declining to .056.
The coefficients for the structural regression model, including covariates, are displayed in
Table 4.3.55 In general, the themes recognized from the first test of the model largely held.
Relationships between the three different levels of abstraction were strong. The reach of the patriotism construct was limited somewhat by the addition of other attitudinal postures, though it still maintained widespread influence. Also, R-squared measures of overall variance explained in the latent constructs were largely similar to those in the first model test.
[TABLE 4.3 ABOUT HERE]
At the core values to general attitudes levels, the system justifying tendency revealed a notably stronger effect on patriotism (beta = .55, p < .01) than either authoritarianism (beta = .34, p < .01) or social dominance personality traits (beta = .04, p > .10). This indicates that compared to the other leading psychological explanations of patriotic belief, the status quo predisposition appears to offer a preferable account of such attitudes. Interestingly, it also demonstrated a more robust impact on both party identification and political ideology than the other two factors.
Authoritarianism had the strongest effect on religiosity.
Relationships linking general attitude postures to specific issue-opinions were also notable when compared to the previous model test. Among the four second-order variables,
55 A graphical depiction of the model was not included due to the size and complexity of estimated relationships.
150 patriotism displayed the broadest impact across the eight different culture war areas of opinion. It proved the leading predictor of four of the variables in the model, including attitudes toward blacks, immigration, crime and punishment, and foreign policy (betas = .42, .54, .41, and .81, respectively; all significant at the .01 level). Even among those four constructs where patriotism was not the leading explanatory factor, it still registered a statistically significant relationship with variables measuring views toward social spending and homosexuality (p < .01). Liberal- conservative ideology was the most potent indicator for opinions on the environment, social spending, and gender issues (betas = .33, 41, and .48 respectively; all significant at the .01 level).
Religiosity best explained attitudes toward homosexuals (beta = .47, p < .01). Yet, overall, the questionable empirical and theoretical influence of theological reasoning toward cultural issues was again evidenced in the findings. This construct failed to reach statistical significance for four of the eight issues. And for four of the variables it was significant in the opposite direction as would be predicted by popular theory (e.g. Hunter 1991). Not surprisingly, party identification displayed the largest impact on presidential vote choice (beta = .66, p < .01), though patriotism proved more influential than both ideology and religiosity. Generally speaking, none of the other postural constructs showed the consistent range of influence across cultural issues that patriotism displayed.
In all, addition of the covariates in this second test of the model did not substantially contradict the findings of the first model test. Based on the overall model fit indices, both demonstrated modest suitability to the data. And while the addition of various leading public opinion indicators did demonstrate that views on culture war issues are subject to a confluence of factors, patriotic belief showed itself to be clearly among the most important.
151 Conclusion
A test of Peffley and Hurwitz’s (1985) hierarchical model of attitude constraint was largely confirmed based on a patriotism-centered system of beliefs. Across a range of variables, core tendencies influenced general attitudinal postures, producing specific issue-preferences. In other words, high system justifiers were more patriotic, leading to more conservative views on culturally-relevant issues. This affirmative evaluation of ideological constraint suggests that, contrary to Converse’s (1964) classic thesis, on numerous issues of cultural relevance many individuals harbor “real” attitudes. This finding is understandable given the “moral” element either inherent to or transferred upon (through public political debate) many of the aforementioned political issues. When such is the case, drawing on abstract idea elements as a source of beliefs is likely to be easier than it would otherwise be. However, it does not go so far as to suggest that such ideas are “rational” or thoroughly considered judgments. Instead, we can conclude that most Americans are able to either consciously or unconsciously base their specific opinions on more abstract, superordinate, yet relevant, ideas. Such is consistent with a nuanced, cognitive-psychological understanding of attitude constraint.
152 Chapter 4 Tables and Figures
Figure 4.1: A Hierarchical Model of Attitude Constraint
Core Value Status Quo Support
.63 General Attitudinal Posture General Patriotism Attitudes
.49 .47 .62 Specific Issues Environmentalism Homosexuality Immigration Gender roles .57
.76 .65 .99.99 .66 .63 Social spending Foreign Affairs Crime and Punishment Blacks Pres. Vote
All values are statistically significant at the .01 level.
153 Table 4.1 Epistemic Correlations between Indicators and Factors Latent Construct Indicator Correlations R-squared Core Value A. Status Quo Support 1. Democracy satisfaction 0.68 2. Democracy best 0.41 3. Big interests run govt 0.48 4. Little say in govt 0.45 5. Govt pays attention 0.49 6. Elections work 0.56 7. Equality problem 0.48
General Posture B. Patriotism 1. Flag 0.67 0.40 2. Ashamed 0.41 3. Angry 0.41 4. Love of country 0.54 5. Importance 0.54
Specific Issues C. Blacks 1. Affirmative action 0.75 0.43 2. Blacks and class 0.87 D. Homosexuality 1. Gay marriage 0.87 0.22 2. Gay adoption 0.67 E. Social Spending 1. Safety net 0.59 0.4 2. Health insurance 0.62 3. Guaranteed job 0.77 F. Environment 1. Environment vs jobs 0.66 0.24 2. Environmentalists therm. 0.55 G. Gender Roles 1. Feminists therm. 0.47 0.38 2. Women's role 0.38 3. Women and work 0.61 H. Immigration 1. Immigration levels 0.46 0.32 2. Control illegal immig. 0.73 3. Border security 0.62 I. Foreign Policy 1. Interventionism 0.55 0.98 2. Combat terror 0.36 3. Military therm. 0.56 J. Crime and Punishment 1. Crime spending 0.14 0.58 2. Death penalty 0.61 K. Vote Choice 1. Presidential vote 04 1.00 0.42 Coefficients are standardized betas computed using maximum likelihood estimation with Amos 18.
154 Table 4.2 Epistemic Correlations between Indicators and Factors, including Covariates Latent Construct Indicator Correlations R-squared Core Value A. Status Quo Support 1. Democracy satisfaction 0.65 2. Democracy best 0.41 3. Big interests run govt 0.47 4. Little say in govt 0.43 5. Govt pays attention 0.47 6. Elections work 0.53 7. Equality problem 0.50 B. Authoritarianism 1. Independence vs respect 0.45 2. Curiosity vs manners 0.62 3. Self-reliance vs obedience 0.63 4. Considerate vs behaved 0.39 C. Social Dominance 1. Chance not problem 0.11 2. Worry less equality 0.18 3. Equality fewer problems 0.09 4. Untrustworthy 0.71 5. Unintelligent 0.79 6. Lazy 0.75
General Postures D. Patriotism 1. Flag 0.76 0.42 2. Ashamed 0.38 3. Angry 0.36 4. Love of country 0.68 5. Importance 0.65 E. Religiosity 1. Attendance 0.69 0.28 2. Prayer 0.79 3. Guidance 0.76 4. Biblical literalness 0.65 F. Party Identification 1. Party identification 1.00 G. Political Ideology 1. Political ideology 1.00
Specific Issues H. Blacks 1. Affirmative Action 0.77 0.43 2. Blacks and class 0.84 I. Homosexuality 1. Gay marriage 0.86 0.49 2. Gay adoption 0.68 J. Social Spending 1. Safety net 0.60 0.47 2. Health insurance 0.62
155 3. Guaranteed job 0.75 K. Environment 1. Environment vs jobs 0.60 0.28 2. Environmentalists therm. 0.60 L. Gender Roles 1. Feminists therm. 0.52 0.46 2. Women's role 0.40 3. Women and work 0.53 M. Immigration 1. Immigration levels 0.46 0.37 2. Control illegal immig. 0.72 3. Border security 0.64 N. Foreign Policy 1. Interventionism 0.52 0.94 2. Combat terror 0.38 3. Military therm. 0.59 O. Crime and Punishment 1. Crime spending 0.10 0.29 2. Death penalty 0.91 P. Vote Choice 1. Presidential vote 04 0.18 0.62 Coefficients are standardized betas computed using maximum likelihood estimation with Amos 18.
Table 4.3 Estimated Relationships between Three Different Factor Levels Specific Issues General Postures Patriotism Party ID Ideology Religiosity Blacks 0.42** 0.19** 0.26** -0.18** Homosexuality 0.16** 0.08* 0.26** 0.47** Social/welfare spending 0.23** 0.28** 0.41** -0.17** Environment 0.07 0.26** 0.33** 0.04 Gender roles 0.09 0.28** 0.48** 0.00 Immigration 0.54** -0.08* 0.19** 0.01 Foreign policy 0.81** 0.17** 0.12** 0.06 Crime and punishment 0.41** 0.15** 0.11** -0.23** Presidential vote 2004 0.18** 0.66** 0.07** 0.02
General Postures Core Values System Just. Authoritarianism Social Dominance Patriotism 0.55** 0.34** 0.04 Party identification 0.59** 0.16** 0.08* Political ideology 0.52** 0.38** 0.13** Religiosity 0.10** 0.52** -0.02 *p < .05; **p < .01 Coefficients are standardized betas computed using maximum likelihood estimation with Amos 18. All variables are scored such that higher scores correspond to more traditionally conservative responses.
156 Chapter 5 Conclusion
The Patriotism Perspective in Perspective
The goal of this research was to elucidate the causes, consequences, and constraint surrounding patriotic attitudes in contemporary American politics. I explored patriotism’s main conceptual properties primarily through a theoretical assessment. And I empirically evaluated its antecedents and effects while accounting for the role of rival explanations. The results of this research tell a coherent and informative story about American politics that should be of interest to anyone who studies, or even casually follows it. In this final dissertation chapter, I briefly review this project’s major findings before going on to discuss their broader implications. I then discuss the contribution of this work to the discipline of political science. Caveats to the study are then noted, with particular focus on the data used in the analyses. Finally, I discuss questions for future research.
-- Overview of Findings
Sullivan et al.’s (1992) major finding of nearly two decades ago revealed that, upon becoming prominent in political discourse, patriotic belief can serve for Americans as a basis for making political judgments. In a different epoch, this finding might be of little importance for study of culturally-rooted political behavior. But it resonates demonstrably in the current political era, where philosophical, policy-based, and purely political issues regularly revolve around matters of national attachment. As the polling data noted in the opening chapter of this dissertation showed, these are facts not lost on most Americans. Individuals are more apt to diverge in terms of the devoutness of their patriotism, and are more likely to connect their
157 national attitudes to politics than in years past. Such circumstances served as the premise for this study of patriotism, political preferences, and the origins of each.
Chapter 2 dealt with patriotism as an independent variable. It examined the extent to which national loyalty, national criticism, and national affection form the basis of orthodox/progressive cultural worldviews. In doing so, it challenged the long-held idea that religious beliefs act as the primary source of cultural differences in the country (e.g. Hunter
1991; Wuthnow 1988). Results from multiple regression analysis showed the unidimensional patriotism scale to be a more robust and reliable predictor of political preferences than variables of religious belonging, belief, or behavior. Opinions were based on an expansive conceptualization of cultural conflict, which included issues, groups, or policy matters subject to a style of argumentation about the values and goals of society (see Leege et al. 2002). Social, economic, and foreign policy-related opinions all proved to be heavily structured by general patriotism attitudes, as did party identification, liberal-conservative ideology, and vote choice.
The efficacy of this aspect of the patriotism worldviews thesis underscored the significance of the main question posed in Chapter 3: what motivates national attitudes? In this case, patriotism served as a dependent variable. This examination assumed that while national attachment may structure a broad cultural outlook, it nonetheless is subject to more primary or fundamental impulses. Based on America’s increasingly uncertain status as a global hegemon, as well as mounting evidence that various socio-political ideologies hinge on individuals’ tendencies toward support of the status quo (for a review see Jost et al. 2004), I assessed the proposition that system justifying motives best explain patriotic belief. Results showed that people’s desire to uphold existing arrangements was indeed the primary determinant of orthodox and progressive patriotic views. Several other psychological motivations and social group and
158 identity-based factors proved to be important, but were generally secondary to the status quo predisposition. SJT propositions regarding the effects of threat and disadvantaged group status on patriotism revealed mixed results.
Chapter 4 examined the major concepts discussed up to that point, within the broader context of ideological constraint. Support for the status quo, general patriotism attitudes, and opinions on culture war issues were hypothesized to be linked in an ordered form of opinion development, from ideationally abstract to specific. Results from structural equation modeling supplied evidence suggesting that political attitudes are indeed constrained hierarchically.
Models assessed at two different levels of specificity each adequately matched the ANES data set. More still, the relationships at each level of causation, as well as the factorial relationships, were all impressively robust.
-- Implications
Determining what a set of research findings implies is sometimes as treacherous as the empirical analysis itself. Overgeneralizations can be a tempting pitfall for researchers.
Fortunately, the results of this dissertation offer a relatively clear picture of what the proliferation and mechanics of patriotism worldviews entails.
One notable inference surrounds the development of patriotism-related political debate.
Carmines and Stimson (1989) found that political leaders emphasize issues and issue-differences in accordance with the prospect of garnering a balance of public support. Based on this knowledge, we can assume that elites are propagating patriotic arguments based on their perception of a widespread cultural divide in the country. That is, they are responding to what they view as a popular source for partitioning citizens’ political opinions. As such, patriotic
159 invocations serve to foster patriotism’s usage as an evaluative perspective. This self- perpetuating process suggests its prominence is likely only to rise, at least in the near future.
The proliferation of patriotically-based worldviews is almost certain to exacerbate existing political polarization. Yet this phenomenon is also mass-driven. Like theological reasoning, patriotic reasoning can also be interpreted to suggest the absence of middle ground.
Thus, political prescriptions may be seen in terms of being either “pro-American” or “anti-
American,” or as “with us or against us.” To the extent citizens adopt this perspective they may be less apt to respect contrary opinions held by their fellow citizens, or accept compromises posed by lawmakers. After all, treason is hardly a basis for mutual understanding.
Findings from this research suggest also that future effects due to system justifying motives will vary in accordance with how forthcoming generations of Americans are socialized to think about the country. In other words, much depends on the nature of the popular national narrative used educate and otherwise inculcate citizens. Emphasis on the inevitability of
American power, preeminence, and virtue could become either more or less prevalent in response to increasing challenges from abroad. Should the nation’s institutional and informal socialization sources move more toward endorsement of the inevitability narrative, it seems likely that the patriotism divide will continue unabated. Yet should the opposite occur, it seems likely that it will gradually dissipate.
Contribution to the Discipline and Beyond
This dissertation contributes most directly to the study of public opinion, but also to the broader field of American politics. Perhaps most notably based on the extant literature, this research offers a constructive counter to the religious orthodoxy/progressivism explanatory
160 paradigm, by showing how devotion toward an American authority sits at the center of many of
Americans’ socio-political worldviews. This is in contrast to previous challenges to the culture war thesis, which focus mainly on the existential qualities of attitudinal polarization (e.g.
DiMaggio et al. 1996; Fiorina et al. 2005). Such arguments have had the effect of precluding consideration of alternative explanations of culturally-based divisions in the country.56 This research rectifies this imbalance while furthering knowledge of a culture war phenomenon that has received significant media (e.g. Broder 2000; Dionne 2003; O’Reilly 2007) and scholarly attention (e.g. Barker and Tinnick, 2006; Layman and Green 2005) in recent years.
Also notable is this dissertation’s direct application of the psychology-rooted theory of system justification to the study of public opinion. While previous research on SJT has linked its core propositions to numerous variables of interest to political scientists, this study significantly advances the breadth and depth of its reach. This obviously includes a thorough assessment of how its properties correspond to feelings of national attachment. But it also includes connection of the status quo motive to an array of social, economic, and foreign policy-related subjects.
Also of note are the indirect effects it demonstrated on vote choice relative to the 2004 presidential election.
Finally, this research applied the conceptual and theoretical knowledge developed in
Chapters 2 and 3 to an analysis of attitude constraint. Assessment based on a hierarchical model of constraint (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985) demonstrated the importance of considering multiple levels of ideational abstractness in the opinion formation process. This contrasts with the findings of most attitude constraint skeptics (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2003) and
56 Two notable exceptions premised on authoritarianism include Mockabee (2007) and Hetherington and Weiler (2009).
161 proponents (e.g. Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2004). And it also offers an important insight on one of political science’s longest standing and most-discussed political debates.
Qualifications to the Study
Regardless of how thorough and conscientious its author, no single study is without qualifications relative to the generalizability of its findings. This research is no different. And like many studies, the qualifications most worthy of note are based on the fit of the data to the assessed hypotheses.
Perhaps the clearest caveat to this research relates to the year in which the data were collected. Both data sets used in the analyses – the ANES and student sample – were collected in 2004. This fact is somewhat troublesome for an argument being made in and about 2011 and into the future. And a more up-to-date data set could indeed strengthen the argument that contemporary American politics increasingly revolves around individuals’ patriotic orientations.
Nonetheless, this weakness is hardly debilitating. In Chapter 1 I cited a host of polling data that showed the continuing divergence in patriotic belief in both 2008 and more recently. Also, throughout this dissertation I’ve noted an array of anecdotal evidence attesting to patriotism’s rising societal prominence.
Additionally, a heavy reliance on secondary data also meant that some of the survey items used in the study were imperfectly-specified or unavailable at all. For instance, a more precise account of orthodox/progressive patriotism qualities could likely have come from a more extensive battery of questions. Particularly useful would have been questions asking directly about respondent’s commitment to ideas of American exceptionalism. Also, the ANES survey’s questions measuring feelings of anger and shame toward America are vaguely worded. This is
162 notable because national criticism and dissent is core to the orthodox/progressive dynamic.
Additional and better-specified items might in the future provide a deeper understanding of where and why individuals’ views diverge in this regard, thus making any general patriotism metric more efficacious.
Similarly, measurement of the system justifying tendency contains caveats. As noted earlier, both the ANES and the student sample scales primarily capture the situational expressions of status quo support. Ideal assessment of the psychological tendency would involve measures underscoring its cognitive proclivities, such as need for order and openness to new experiences (see for instance Jost and Hunyady 2005). Such sentiments might more thoroughly and explicitly capture some of the dispositional qualities at the heart of the system justifying motive. In later iterations of this dissertation research, I intend to seek more precise measurement of this study’s key concepts so as to eliminate or minimize data-related qualifications that might limit the internal and external validity of the findings.
Questions for Future Research
A quality research project does not necessarily answer every question related to the subject matter at hand. Rather, it also provides a platform for asking and answering additional questions that lead to new avenues of research. In this dissertation, several such questions emerged which other scholars and I might look to when attempting to predict and explain
American politics in the early twenty-first century.
First among future avenues of research involves the relationship between patriotic and religious motivation. The increasing cultural influence of the former versus that latter raises questions as to the timeline of events. Did patriotism overtake theological reasoning in a gradual
163 process that evolved throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s? Or was this change jumpstarted by a series of events that included the 9/11 terrorist attacks? Furthermore, evidence from the analysis indicated that patriotic and religious reasoning sometimes diverge in their effects on certain dependent variables. This was particularly true in the case of religious orthodoxy, as measured by behavioral traits such as frequency of church attendance. This raises questions as to when their conceptual qualities differ relative to cultural orthodoxy/progressivism, and when they act in concert.
Future research should also focus on the relationship between Americans’ system justifying motives and their national attitudes. Deserving of particular attention is the role of status-related anxiety. For instance, much could be learned by tracking the rise in economic, military, and cultural influence of countries and nation-state unions such as China, India, and the
European Union, and Americans’ sense of national attachment. Results would likely say much about America’s willingness to cooperate with other nations in seeking to solve transnational problems such as climate change and threats from rogue political regimes. Additionally, the contradictory findings relative to the threat and disadvantaged group hypotheses also call for further analysis. For instance, what other types of threats and group affiliations might affect patriotic belief? And do such effects also indirectly influence political preferences and vote choice?
Answers to these and similar questions should help scholars and the public to better understand how America’s exceptional history corresponds to its vital yet divided present.
Hopefully, this account of the causes, consequences, and constraint surrounding patriotism in contemporary American politics serves as a basis for future knowledge along these lines.
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185 Appendix A: 2004 American National Election Studies Survey
Cognitive-Motivational Variables
System Justification - One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance— agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly. - On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the United States? (reverse-scored) - Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government—agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly. (reverse-scored) - Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? - People like me don't have any say about what the government does—agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly. - Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what people think when it decides what to do—a good deal, some, or not much? (reverse-scored) - How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think—a good deal, some, or not much? (reverse-scored)
Authoritarianism - Introduction: Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: o Independence or Respect for Elders o Curiosity or Good Manners o Self-Reliance or Obedience (reverse-scored) o Being Considerate or Well-Behaved
Social Dominance Orientation - This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are—agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly. (reverse-scored) - It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others—agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly. - If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems—agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly. (reverse-scored) - Introduction: Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be "hard-working." A score of 7 means that you think most people in
186 the group are "lazy." A score of 4 means that you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of course, you may choose any number in between. … Where would you rate BLACKS on this scale? … Where would you rate HISPANIC- AMERICANS on this scale? … Where would you rate ASIAN-AMERICANS on this scale? o The next set asks if people in each group tend to be "intelligent" or "unintelligent". o The next set asks if people in each group tend to be "trustworthy" or "untrustworthy".
Patriotism Variables
Patriotism Scale - Is being an American extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important to you personally? (reverse-scored) - There are some things about America today that make me feel angry about America—do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree? - There are some things about America today that make me feel ashamed of America—do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree? - When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel—extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very good? (reverse-scored) - How strong is your love for your country—extremely strong, very strong, somewhat strong, and not very strong? (reverse-scored)
Religion Variables
Classification of Religious Affiliations into Religious Traditions - Mainline Protestants o American Baptist Churches, USA; Disciples of Christ; United Church of Christ; generic Congregational; Episcopal; Society of Friends; Evangelical Lutheran Church in America; generic Lutheran; United Methodist Church; generic Methodist; Presbyterian Church, USA; generic Presbyterian; Reformed Church in America. - Evangelical Protestants o Non-denominational (fundamentalist, charismatic, neo-evangelical); all Adventists; all Baptists (except American Baptist Churches, USA); all Brethren; Christian Church; Church of Christ; Conservative Congregationalists; Evangelical Congregationalists; Reformed Episcopal; Evangelical Covenant; Evangelical Church in North America; Evangelical Free Church; Moravians; Evangelical Friends; Independent Fundamentalists; Plymouth Brethren; Christian and Missionary Alliance; Church of God—Anderson, IN; Church of God—Holiness; Free Methodist; Salvation Army; Wesleyan; generic Holiness; Free Lutheran; Lutheran Brethren; Missouri Synod Lutheran; Wisconsin Synod Lutheran; sectarian Lutheran; sectarian Methodists; Mennonites; Assemblies of God;
187 Church of God—Cleveland, TN; Church of God—Huntsville, AL; Church of God of Prophecy; Church of God—Apostolic; Worldwide Church of God; Four Square Gospel; Pentecostal Church of God; Pentecostal Holiness; generic Pentecostal; Cumberland Presbyterian; Orthodox Presbyterian; Presbyterian Church in America; Reformed Presbyterian; sectarian Presbyterian; Christian Reformed Church. o (In addition to the denominational coding above, the views of the Bible item was used to assist in classifying respondents with ambiguous Protestant affiliations.) - African-American Protestant o Black non-denominational; National Baptist Convention; Progressive Baptist Convention; other Black Baptists; Black Holiness; African Methodist Episcopal Church; African Methodist Episcopal Zion; Christian Methodist Church; Church of God in Christ; other Black Pentecostals. o (In addition to the denominational coding above, African-American respondents who were initially classified in the Mainline or Evangelical Protestant categories were classified as Black Protestants. Ideally one would use a question asking about the racial composition of the congregation to make this determination, but the ANES questionnaire does not include such an item.) - No Affiliation o Atheist; Agnostic; No religious preference. - Roman Catholic - Jewish - Other Smaller Religious Traditions o Eastern Orthodox—Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Serbian Orthodox, other Orthodox o Latter-Day Saints (‘‘Mormons’’) o Conservative non-traditional—Jehovah’s Witnesses; Christian Science o Liberal non-traditional—Unitarian-Universalists; Unity; Humanists; Spiritualists; Divine Science; New Age o Other non-Christian non-Jewish religions—Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam. o (In addition to the groupings described above, the religious tradition classification scheme also includes several groups that are relatively small in the United States, and thus do not have adequate representation in most sample surveys. The ‘‘catch-all’’ category used in this analysis is too diverse to permit any meaningful interpretation, but it is useful because it preserves the reference category in the regression models.) Sources: Kellstedt, Green, Guth, and Smidt (1996), pp. 188–189; Mockabee, 2007, pp. 242-243; Steensland et al. (2000), pp. 314–316.
Views of the Bible - Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? You can just give me the number of your choice. o The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word. o The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word. o The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God.
188
Religious Commitment Scale - Lots of things come up that keep people from attending religious services even if they want to. Thinking about your life these days, do you ever attend religious services, apart from occasional weddings, baptisms or funerals? (If ‘‘yes’’) Do you go to religious services...—every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never? - Outside of attending religious services, do you pray...—several times a day, once a day, a few times a week, once a week or less, or never? - (If R says religion is important in his/her life) Would you say your religion provides some guidance in your day-to-day living, quite a bit of guidance, or a great deal of guidance in your day-to-day life?
Other Selected Survey Items
Tax Level Support - Do you feel you are asked to pay more than you should in federal income taxes, about the right amount, or less than you should? - Do you feel rich people are asked to pay more than they should in federal income taxes, about the right amount, or less than they should? - Do you feel poor people are asked to pay more than they should in federal income taxes, about the right amount, or less than they should?
Subjective Social Class - Most people say they belong either to the middle class or the working class. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging in one of these classes? [Which one? / Well, if you had to make a choice, would you call yourself MIDDLE CLASS or WORKING CLASS? ] Would you say that you are about AVERAGE [middle/working] class or that you are in the UPPER PART of the [middle/working] class? 1. Lower class {VOLUNTEERED} 2. Average working class 3. Working class -- NA if average or upper 4. Upper working class 5. Average middle class 6. Middle class -- NA if average or upper 7. Upper middle class 8. Upper class {VOLUNTEERED}
Racial/Ethnic Group Closeness - “In addition to being American, what do you consider your main ethnic group or nationality group? With which of these groups do you most closely identify?” o Native American American Indian or Native American; tribal mentions o Hispanic-American Mexican (excluding explicit mention of "Chicano", "Mexican-American")
189 Central American South American--any country Chicano; Mexican-American; Hispanic; Latin American o African-American Black; Negro; American Black; African American o Other
Appendix B: Oregon State University Student Sample
Patriotism Variables (universal scale: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
Symbolic Patriotism - I am very proud to be an American. (reverse-scored) - There has been too much displaying of the American flag since 9/11. - The US is the best country in the world. (reverse-scored)
National Identification - I am more patriotic than the average American. (reverse-scored) - Being an American is an important part of how I define myself. (reverse-scored)
Constructive Patriotism - A person who loves America, should notice its problems and work to correct them. - Even if people criticize government war plans prior to a war, they should end all further criticism once the war has begun. (reverse-scored) - Those individual citizens and public officials who opposed the war in Kosovo are disloyal citizens. (reverse-scored) - Those individual citizens and public officials who opposed the war in Iraq are disloyal citizens. (reverse-scored)
Blind Patriotism - I support US policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country. (reverse-scored) - Loyalty to one's country and its ideals does not allow for questioning and criticism of them. (reverse-scored) - People who do not wholeheartedly support America’s policies should live somewhere else. (reverse-scored) - There is too much criticism of the US by foreign governments and their citizens. (reverse-scored)
Particular Patriotism - In general, Americans are more patriotic than citizens of other countries. (reverse-scored)
190 - We should be more concerned for the lives of Americans than that of others. (reverse- scored) - War that makes the US more secure are good no matter who they may affect other nations. (reverse-scored) - The US gives too much economic assistance to other countries. (reverse-scored) - The US went to sufficient lengths to convince other countries that the war in Iraq was necessary. (reverse-scored)
All Other Survey Items
System Justification - The framers of the US Constitution constructed a nearly perfect document—strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. (reverse-scored) - It is appropriate that many Americans think of the US Constitution as an almost sacred or divine piece of text—strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. (reverse-scored)
Parent’s Education - Education level of your mother/father—grade school, high school, some college, college graduate, and advanced degree.
Parent’s Income - What is your parent’s approximate yearly family income—less than $25,000, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999, $100,000+?
Religiosity - How religious do you consider yourself on a scale where 1 is not at all religious and 5 is very religious?
Sex - Male, Female
Party Identification - What is your party identification—strong Democrat, not so strong Democrat, weak Democrat, independent or neither, weak Republican, not so strong Republican, strong Republican?
Political Ideology - How would you rate your political ideology—very liberal, liberal, middle of the road, conservative, very conservative?
191 Appendix C: Issue Area Constructs
Blacks - Affirmative action Do you [favor/oppose] preference in hiring and promotion strongly or not strongly? Do you feel strongly or not strongly [(that the government in Washington should see to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs)/ (that this is not the federal government's business)]? - Blacks and class 'Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.' (Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?) 'Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.' 'Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.' 'It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.'
Homosexuality - Gay marriage Should same-sex couples be allowed to marry, or do you think they should not be allowed to marry? - Gay adoption Do you think gay or lesbian couples, in other words, homosexual couples, should be legally permitted to adopt children—yes or no?
Social Spending - Safety net Should federal spending on aid to poor people be increased, decreased, or kept about the same? Should federal spending on child care be increased, decreased, or kept about the same? Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased, decreased, or kept about the same? - Health insurance Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this—(1) Govt insurance plan, (7) Private insurance plan? - Job guarantee Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this—(1) Govt should see to jobs and standard of living, (7) Govt should let each person get ahead on own?
192 Environment - Environment vs. jobs Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this—(1) Protect environment, even if it costs jobs & standard of living, (7) Jobs and standard of living more important? - Environmentalists feeling thermometer How would you rate: environmentalists (on a 0-100 scale)
Gender Roles - Feminists feeling thermometer How would you rate: feminists (on a 0-100 scale) - Women’s role Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this—(1) Women and men should have equal roles, (7) A woman's place is in the home? - Women and work Do you feel strongly or not strongly [(that the government in Washington should see to it that women get equal treatment in jobs)/ (that this is not the federal government's business)]?
Immigration - Immigration levels Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot? - Control illegal immigration Should controlling and reducing illegal immigration be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal at all? - Border security Should federal spending on tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
Foreign Policy - Interventionism Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this—(1) U.S. should solve with diplomacy and international pressure, (7) U.S. must be ready to use military force. - Military feeling thermometer How would you rate: the military (on a 0-100 scale) - Combat terror Should combatting international terrorism be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal at all? Should federal spending on the war on terrorism be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
193 Crime and Punishment - Crime spending Should federal spending on dealing with crime be increased, decreased, or kept about the same? - Death penalty Do you [favor/oppose] the death penalty for persons convicted of murder strongly or not strongly?
194