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Afghanistan Regierungsfeindliche Elemente (AGE) European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan Regierungsfeindliche Elemente (AGE) Informationsbericht über das Herkunftsland August 2020 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan Regierungsfeindliche Elemente (AGE) Informationsbericht über das Herkunftsland August 2020 Weitere Informationen über die Europäische Union sind im Internet verfügbar (http://europa.eu). PDF/Volume_01 BZ-02-20-563-DE-N 978-92-9485-680-7 10.2847/81954 © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020 Die Wiedergabe mit Quellenangabe ist vorbehaltlich anderslautender Bestimmungen gestattet. Für die in dieser Veröffentlichung wiedergegebenen Inhalte Dritter wird auf deren Urheberrechtsvermerke verwiesen. Titelfoto: © ResoluteSupportMedia/Major, James Crawford, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 11. April 2011 url CC BY 2.0 Am 11. April 2011 fand in der Stadt Kandahar eine Zusammenkunft von Taliban-Kämpfern mit Regierungsbeamten der Republik Afghanistan statt, bei der die Kämpfer im Rahmen des von der Regierung initiierten Friedens- und Wiedereingliederungsprozesses ihre Waffen niederlegten. 4 — AFGHANISTAN: REGIERUNGSFEINDLICHE ELEMENTE − EASO INFORMATIONSBERICHT ÜBER DAS HERKUNFTSLAND Danksagung Dieser Bericht wurde von der Abteilung für Informationen über Herkunftsländer (COI = Country of Origin) des Europäischen Unterstützungsbüros für Asylfragen (EASO = European Asylum Support Office) verfasst. Die folgenden nationalen Asyl- und Migrationsstellen und Organisationen haben diesen Bericht gegengelesen: Dänemark, Dänischer Einwanderungsdienst Niederlande, Büro für Länderinformation und Sprachanalyse (OCILA), Justizministerium ACCORD (Österreichisches Zentrum für Herkunftsland- und Asylforschung und -dokumentation) Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die Prüfung durch die vorstehend genannten Stellen und Organisationen zwar zur Gesamtqualität des Berichts beigetragen hat, jedoch nicht notwendigerweise auf deren förmliche Annahme des endgültigen Berichts schließen lässt, für den ausschließlich das EASO verantwortlich ist. Die Übersetzung auf Deutsch dieses Berichts wurde geprüft von: Deutschland, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) AFGHANISTAN: REGIERUNGSFEINDLICHE ELEMENTE − EASO INFORMATIONSBERICHT ÜBER DAS HERKUNFTSLAND — 5 Inhalt Danksagung ....................................................................................................................................... 4 Inhalt ................................................................................................................................................. 5 Haftungsausschluss ........................................................................................................................... 7 Glossar und Abkürzungen ................................................................................................................. 8 Einleitung ........................................................................................................................................... 9 Aufgabenstellung .......................................................................................................................... 9 Methodik ....................................................................................................................................... 9 Aufbau und Verwendung des Berichts ......................................................................................... 9 Karte ................................................................................................................................................ 11 1. Allgemeiner Überblick ................................................................................................................. 12 1.1 Regierungsfeindliche Elemente (AGE) .................................................................................. 12 1.2 Verhandlungen mit den Taliban über das Abkommen von Doha ......................................... 14 1.2.1 Beweggründe und Angriffsziele seit dem Abkommen von Doha ................................... 15 2. Die Taliban ................................................................................................................................... 18 2.1 Struktur und Führung ............................................................................................................ 18 2.2 Stärke, Präsenz, territoriale Kontrolle und Kapazität ........................................................... 22 2.3 Ziele ....................................................................................................................................... 23 2.4 Rekrutierungsstrategien ....................................................................................................... 23 2.4.1 Rekrutierung von Kindern............................................................................................... 24 2.5 Menschenrechtsverletzungen .............................................................................................. 24 2.6 Gezielt angegriffene Personen .............................................................................................. 24 2.6.1 Angehörige der afghanischen Sicherheitskräfte und regierungstreuer Milizen ............ 24 2.6.2 Regierungsbeamte und Personen, die mutmaßlich die Regierung unterstützen .......... 27 3. Der Islamische Staat in der Provinz Khorasan (ISKP) ................................................................... 32 3.1 Struktur und Führung ............................................................................................................ 32 3.2 Stärke, Präsenz, territoriale Kontrolle, Kapazität .................................................................. 33 3.3 Ziele ....................................................................................................................................... 35 3.4 Rekrutierungsstrategien ....................................................................................................... 36 3.5 Menschenrechtsverletzungen .............................................................................................. 37 3.6 Gezielt angegriffene Personen und in letzter Zeit verübte Anschläge ................................. 38 3.6.1 Hazara-Schiiten ............................................................................................................... 38 3.6.2 Sikhs ................................................................................................................................ 39 3.6.3 Weitere Beispiele für die Behandlung von Gegnern, einschließlich mutmaßlicher „Ungläubiger“, „Apostaten“ und Spione sowie anderer Aufständischer ................................ 39 6 — AFGHANISTAN: REGIERUNGSFEINDLICHE ELEMENTE − EASO INFORMATIONSBERICHT ÜBER DAS HERKUNFTSLAND 4. Sonstige AGE................................................................................................................................ 40 4.1 Haqqani-Netzwerk ................................................................................................................ 40 4.2 Al-Qaida und seine Verbündeten .......................................................................................... 41 4.3 Ausländische AGE und ausländische Kämpfer ...................................................................... 42 Anhang I: Bibliografie ...................................................................................................................... 44 Anhang II: Aufgabenstellung ........................................................................................................... 56 AFGHANISTAN: REGIERUNGSFEINDLICHE ELEMENTE − EASO INFORMATIONSBERICHT ÜBER DAS HERKUNFTSLAND — 7 Haftungsausschluss Dieser Bericht wurde nach der „Methodik für das Erstellen von COI-Berichten des EASO“ von 2019 erstellt.1 Er basiert auf sorgfältig ausgewählten Informationsquellen. Alle Quellen sind als solche gekennzeichnet. Die in diesem Bericht enthaltenen Informationen wurden mit äußerster Sorgfalt recherchiert, bewertet und analysiert. Das Dokument erhebt jedoch keinen Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit. Sollte ein bestimmtes Ereignis, eine Person oder eine Organisation in dem Bericht nicht erwähnt werden, bedeutet das nicht, dass das Ereignis nicht stattgefunden hat oder die Person oder Organisation nicht existiert. Dieser Bericht lässt keine Schlüsse im Hinblick darauf zu, ob ein bestimmter Antrag auf internationalen Schutz begründet ist. Die verwendete Terminologie darf nicht als Hinweis auf eine bestimmte rechtliche Position aufgefasst werden. „Flüchtling“, „Risiko“ und ähnliche Begriffe werden als Sammelbezeichnungen verwendet und nicht im Sinne der rechtlichen Definition im EU-Asyl-Acquis, in der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention von 1951 und im Protokoll über die Rechtsstellung der Flüchtlinge von 1967. Weder das EASO noch in dessen Namen oder Auftrag tätige Personen können für die Nutzung der in dieser Veröffentlichung enthaltenen Informationen haftbar gemacht werden. Der Bericht wurde am 18. Juni 2020 fertiggestellt. Spätere Ereignisse sind daher nicht berücksichtigt. Nähere Informationen zum Bezugszeitraum dieses Berichts sind im Abschnitt „Methodik“ in der Einleitung zu finden. 1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu. 8 — AFGHANISTAN: REGIERUNGSFEINDLICHE ELEMENTE − EASO INFORMATIONSBERICHT ÜBER DAS HERKUNFTSLAND Glossar und Abkürzungen AAN Afghanistan Analysts Network (Analysten-Netzwerk Afghanistan).
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