Academy of Romanian Scientists

ANNALS OF THE ACADEM Y OF ROMANIAN SCIENTIS TS ACADEMY OF ROMANIAN SCIENTISTS

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Series on H I S T O R Y A N D ARCHAEOLOGY 20

, , 4

,No.

CONTENTS (STUDIES) 5

Vol. Vol.

PART ONE Revolutions in Modern History GY Eric ANCEAU La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 7 Lavinia Dacia GHEORGHE The Revolutionary Doctor Ibrahim Themo in Romania 25 ANNALS

PART TWO 1912-1913: The Balkan Wars SERIES ON H I S T O R Y A N D ARCHAEOLOGY HISTORYAN ARCHAEOLO Leonida MOISE The Southeast European Context in the Period of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 41 VOLUME 5 2013 NUMBER 4

Jipa ROTARU on series

– Involvement of Romania in the Second Balkan War - Retrospective Sketch - 49 ONLINE EDITION ISSN 2067 - 5682 Ion GIURCĂ TOPICS: The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 61  POLITICS Costin SCURTU  DIPLOMACY The Romanian Troops of Dobrudja in the Bulgarian Campaign of 1913 81  SOCIAL LIFE Ioana RIEBER  CIVILISATION Romania and Germany: Friends and Interests in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) 95  HABITAT Enache TUŞA  C ULTURE The Peace of Bucharest of 1913: Political Effects and Demographic  ETHNOGRAPHY Realities in Southern Dobrogea 109 Academyof Romanian Scientists  ART HISTORY

of the of PART THREE Recenzii, Note (Reviews)

Annals

ANNALS

SERIES ON HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY

VOLUME 5 2013 NUMBER 4

ONLINE EDITION ISSN 2067-5682

TOPICS:  POLITICS  DIPLOMACY  SOCIAL LIFE  CIVILISATION  HABITAT  CULTURE  ETHNOGRAPHY  ART HISTORY

Editura Academiei Oamenilor de Ştiinţă din România Bucureşti, 2013

ANNALS OF THE ACADEMY OF ROMANIAN SCIENTISTS Series on HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY

Founding Editor-in-Chief Gen. (r), Professor, M.D., Ph.D., Dr. H.C. Vasile CÂNDEA Founding Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists President of the Academy of Romanian Scientists

Series Editor-in-Chief Professor, Ph.D. Ioan SCURTU President of the Historical Sciences and Archaeology section of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Founding Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists

Coordinator Professor, Ph.D. Jipa ROTARU

Series Editorial Board Professor, Ph.D. Eric ANCEAU, University IV, Sorbonne, Paris, France Professor, Ph.D. Vasile BORONEANŢ, Bucharest, Professor, Ph.D. Constantin BUŞE, Bucharest, Full Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Professor, Ph.D. Dinu C. GIURESCU, Member of the Romanian Academy, Onorar member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Professor, Ph.D. Keith HITCHINS, University of Illinois, USA Professor, Ph.D. Frederick KELLOGG, University of Arizona, USA Professor, Ph.D. Corneliu Mihail LUNGU, „Hyperion” University, Bucharest, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Professor, Ph.D. Anatol PETRENCU, State University of Chişinău, R. Moldova Professor, Ph.D. George G. POTRA, Bucharest European Foundation Titulescu, Full-Director, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Professor, Ph.D. Jipa ROTARU, Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Professor, Ph.D. Ion I. SOLCANU, „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Iaşi, Full Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Acad. Răzvan THEODORESCU, Member of the Romanian Academy, Founding Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Professor, Emeritus Ph.D. Jacques THOBIE, University of Paris, France Professor, Ph.D. Radu Ştefan VERGATTI, „Valahia” University, Târgovişte, Full Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Professor, Ph.D. Dan ZAMFIRESCU, Bucharest, Full Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists

This series is published by the section Historical Sciences and Archaeology of the Academy of Romanian Scientists

Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 3

C O N T E N T S

PART ONE Revolutions in Modern History

Eric ANCEAU La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 7 Lavinia Dacia GHEORGHE The Revolutionary Doctor Ibrahim Themo in Romania 25

PART TWO 1912-1913: The Balkan Wars

4 Eric Anceau

Ioana RIEBER Romania and Germany: Friends and Interests in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) 95 Enache TUŞA The Peace of Bucharest of 1913: Political Effects and Demographic Realities in Southern Dobrogea 109

PART THREE Recenzii, Note (Reviews)

Retrăiri istorice în veacul XXI, seria Istorii, vol. VI. A VIII-a sesiune de comunicări ştiinţifice 7-8 septembrie 2012, „1812- 2012 – 200 de ani de la răpirea Basarabiei de către Imperiul rus” (ediţie coordonată şi îngrijită de c-dor. prof. univ. dr. Jipa Rotaru şi cpt. dr. Luiza Lazăr Rotaru), Urziceni, Editura Anca, 2013, 587 p. 121 Alin Spânu, Serviciul de informaţii al României în Războiul de Întregire Naţională (1916-1920), Bucureşti, Editura Militară, 2012, 318 p. (Gavriil Preda) 123 Generalul adjutant Paul (Pavel) Teodorescu (1888-1981) - vocaţia creativităţii, coord. prof. univ. dr. Valentin Ciorbea, PS. dr. Emilian Lovişteanu, comandor dr. Marian Moşneagu, Constanţa, Editura Ex Ponto, 439 p. (Valentin Ciorbea) 126

Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 5

PART ONE

Revolutions in Modern History

Eric ANCEAU La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 7 Lavinia Dacia GHEORGHE The Revolutionary Doctor Ibrahim Themo in Romania 25

Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 6 Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 7

LA CAMPAGNE ELECTORALE FRANÇAISE DU PRINTEMPS 1848 : UNE PREMIERE REVOLUTIONNAIRE

Eric ANCEAU*

Abstract. La campagne des élections législatives de 1848, la première au suffrage universel masculin en France (hors du cas très particulier de l'élection de la Convention en 1792) n'avait jamais été étudiée de façon systématique. C'est chose faite avec cet article. L'auteur montre les difficultés de la mise en place et les nombreux tâtonnements auxquels elle a donné lieu. Il montre en quoi elle n'a été que la première étape d'un long apprentissage.

Keywords: la Révolution de 1848, « révolution électorale », le Gouvernement provisoire, France.

Les historiens et les politologues ont beaucoup publié sur la Révolution de 1848 et sur ses conséquences politiques. Ils se sont intéressés de près aux journées révolutionnaires, aux débats qui ont précédé l’avènement du suffrage universel masculin, au déroulement et aux résultats des nombreux scrutins de cette année-là, aux travaux parlementaires. À de rares exceptions près, comme Raymond Huard1, ils n’ont en revanche pas centré leurs recherches sur la campagne électorale de mars-avril 1848, beaucoup se contentant, en l’occurrence, de reproduire le célèbre passage des Souvenirs d’Alexis de Tocqueville2. Il est en effet de coutume de ne pas attacher une trop grande importance à ce moment de confusion idéologique où les forces politiques sont désorganisées, inexpérimentées, voire désorientées face à une nouvelle pratique électorale. Il peut même paraître anachronique d’employer l’expression de « campagne électorale », pour ces élections, puisque le terme n’est alors pas utilisé et qu’aucune disposition des textes législatifs d’époque n’évoque cette pratique3. La conception de l’élection est encore centrée sur le vote lui-même et non sur la discussion

* CRH XIXe s. Paris I et IV, vice-président du CHPP. 1 « Les pratiques électorales en France en 1848 » dans Jean-Luc Mayaud (dir.), 1848, actes du colloque international du cent cinquantenaire, Créaphis, 2002, p. 59-77. Il existe en revanche quelques travaux universitaires inédits consacrés à tout ou partie de la question. Citons par exemple Didier Portes, La Pratique du suffrage universel sous la Seconde République, 2 mars 1848-31 mai 1850, à la lumière des archives judiciaires, mémoire de maîtrise dir. par A. Corbin, C.R.H. XIXe s., 1989. 2 Œuvres complètes, t. XII, Gallimard, Nrf, 1964, p. 107 et suiv. 3 Ni même d’ailleurs la future loi électorale du 15 mars 1849. Les mesures de campagne dépendent encore du droit commun. Voir Philippe Tanchoux, Les Procédures électorales en France, CHTS Histoire, 2004, p. 399.

8 Eric Anceau préalable. Cependant, il y a bien eu, au printemps 1848, campagne au sens où nous l’entendons aujourd’hui. Il s’agit même d’une première dans l’histoire de France. Depuis 1789, les élections législatives se sont en effet accompagnées de campagnes, mais dans le cadre d’un suffrage censitaire ou d’un scrutin à plusieurs degrés. Les seules à s’être déroulées au vote universel direct, les élections à la Convention nationale de septembre 1792, sont aussi les seules à ne pas avoir connu de campagne électorale, en raison de la guerre et du climat de pré-Terreur qui régnait alors. Cette « révolution électorale » s’inscrit dans la Révolution de 1848 et ne s’entend pas sans un retour sur la façon dont les Français d’alors, les élites, les urbains, mais aussi et surtout les ruraux, très majoritaires dans le pays, ont vécu les bouleversements du moment. Le détour nécessaire par le contexte très particulier de cette campagne permet de comprendre la manière dont les candidats se sont manifestés et ont été reconnus comme tels. C’est avec ce double éclairage qu’il faut lire la propagande qui a porté ces candidats jusqu’au scrutin. Cette recherche s’appuie sur des sources primaires : presse et Mémoires d’époque, professions de foi des candidats4, dossiers électoraux5, débats sur la validation des élections6, rapports sur les comptes du Gouvernement provisoire7. Elle doit aussi beaucoup à la multitude de monographies régionales, départementales et locales consacrées à la Deuxième République et en particulier à un siècle de recherches universitaires depuis la publication de la thèse de Marius Gossez sur le Nord8 jusqu’à la soutenance de celle de Laurent Le Gall sur le Morbihan9.

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Contextualiser la campagne électorale du printemps 1848 revient à prendre en compte trois éléments fondamentaux : la « révolution des urnes » qui s’est imposée dans les esprits puis dans les faits, la crise économique et sociale et ses conséquences, enfin le débat autour de la date des élections. Lors de la Révolution de Février 1848, l’adoption du suffrage universel direct apparaît évidente et n’est pas constestée, sauf par quelques isolés. Les républicains – et en particulier Ledru-Rollin – l’ont revendiquée avec force sous la

4 Celles de la collection de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France (B.n.F.) en Le64. 5 Archives Nationales C 1325 à 1329. 6 Moniteur Universel (M.U.) du 3 au 23 mai 1848. 7 Ils ont été présentés à la Constituante et à la Législative par Théodore Ducos et fournissent de précieuses indications sur la propagande gouvernementale. M.U. des 26 avril 1849 et 26 juin 1851. 8 Le Département du Nord sous la Seconde République (1848-1852), étude économique et politique, Lille, G. Leleu, 1904. 9 L’Électeur en campagnes. Une Seconde République dans le Finistère, thèse de doct. de l’Univ. Lyon 2, dir. J.-L. Mayaud, 2004.

La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 9 monarchie de Juillet dans des pétitions, des brochures, des articles de presse, des discours parlementaires, puis lors de la campagne des banquets. Les bonapartistes et un grand nombre de légitimistes y sont favorables de longue date. L’opposition dynastique à la monarchie de Juillet qui a ouvert la boîte de Pandore de la réforme peut difficilement l’attaquer. Quant à la majorité orléaniste, elle n’a plus voix au chapitre. Le 2 mars, le Gouvernement provisoire pose donc le principe. Le décret du 5 et l’instruction du 8 en règlent les modalités, en particulier pour l’élection d’une Assemblée nationale constituante qui doit se réunir sans tarder, car le Gouvernement provisoire a hérité le pouvoir de la rue et sa majorité n’entend pas l’usurper trop longtemps10. « Sont électeurs tous les Français âgés de 21 ans, résidant depuis six mois, et non judiciairement privés ou suspendus de l’exercice de leurs droits civiques », inclusivement des militaires, des Français d’Algérie et de ceux des colonies. Cette révolution unique au monde – puisque seuls les États- Unis utilisent alors le suffrage universel dans certains de leurs États – fait passer le corps électoral de 250 000 personnes à plus de 9 millions. Il s’agit d’élire une Constituante composée de 900 représentants du peuple d’au moins 25 ans et remplissant, pour le reste, les mêmes conditions que les électeurs, au scrutin majoritaire de liste non bloqué – le décompte des voix reste individuel – dans le cadre du département et au chef-lieu de canton. Dans l’esprit des auteurs du décret, Cormenin, Isambert et Marrast, il s’agit de rompre avec la pratique des monarchies censitaires des assemblées électorales délibérantes, mais aussi de soustraire l’électeur à l’influence des notables, en élargissant son horizon et donc de battre en brèche la politique de clocher et de coterie. Plus prosaïquement, il s’agit également de tenir compte du faible nombre de maires instruits et susceptibles de maîtriser la nouvelle procédure électorale. A moins que certains élus ne recueillent pas 2 000 voix, hypothèse hautement improbable compte tenu du gonflement du corps électoral, un seul tour doit se dérouler, le 9 avril, soit seulement un mois plus tard. Le délai ne peut matériellement être raccourci davantage car il faut, d’une part, que les nouvelles listes électorales soient dressées et, d’autre part, que les candidats se déterminent et se fassent connaître. Par contre, la campagne dont aucun texte ne précise ni la durée, ni la teneur, dispose de tout le temps compris entre la promulgation du décret et le

10 M.U. du 5 mars, p. 543, du 6, p. 549 et du 10 mars, Bulletin des lois, 1848, n° 7, p. 63 et suiv. et Comité national du Centenaire de 1848, Procès-verbaux du Gouvernement provisoire…, Imp. nationale, 1950, p. 35, 39 et suiv. et 51. Voir aussi Louis-Antoine Garnier-Pagès, Histoire de 1848, t. II, p. 2 et suiv., Paul Bastid, Un juriste pamphlétaire, Cormenin, précurseur et constituant de 1848, Paris, 1948, Alain Garrigou, « Le brouillon du suffrage universel. Archéologie du décret du 5 mars 1848 », Genèses, n° 6, décembre 1991, Pierre Rosanvallon, Le Sacre du citoyen, Gallimard, 1992, p. 284 et suiv., Raymond Huard, Le Suffrage universel en France (1848-1946), Aubier, 1991, p. 31 et suiv. et du même auteur, « L’organisation du suffrage universel sous la Seconde République », Serge Berstein et Odile Rudelle (dir.), Le Modèle républicain, PUF, 1992, p. 71-90.

10 Eric Anceau scrutin et peut revêtir toutes les formes imaginées par les candidats et leurs partisans dans la limite de leurs moyens et du respect de la loi. En apparence, le Gouvernement provisoire de 1848 est celui qui bénéficie, lors de son installation, de l’adhésion la plus complète des Français depuis le Consulat. C’est l’illusion lyrique de la réconciliation nationale. Cependant, il hérite d’un certain nombre de problèmes économiques et sociaux : revendication d’accession à la propriété, endettement paysan, question sociale liée à l’industrialisation, indocilité des populations face aux institutions fiscales et, plus largement, à la progression de l’État… La France sort avec peine d’une grave dépression économique et ses caisses sont vides. En outre, la Révolution a réveillé la lutte sociale et s’est accompagné de destructions de bureaux de contribution et de barrières d’octroi, de troubles forestiers, de pillages de châteaux et d’attaques d’usuriers, mais aussi de bris de machines, de violences contre les ouvriers étrangers, de saccages de couvents et d’ateliers faisant travailler des vieillards, des orphelins et des filles-mères et d’incendies de gares de chemins de fer qui sont accusés, les uns comme les autres, de concurrence déloyale. Elle provoque des revendications et suscite d’immenses espoirs, mais elle fait aussi fuir les capitaux et chuter la Bourse. Les faillites s’enchaînent et le chômage explose. Dès le 24 février, le Gouvernement provisoire a adopté un important train de mesures sociales : reconnaissance du droit au travail, création des ateliers nationaux et d’une Commission du gouvernement pour les travailleurs, abolition du marchandage, réduction de la durée journalière de travail… La majorité de ses membres estiment ne pas pouvoir en faire davantage. Face au désarroi financier, elle décide même, à l’initiative de Garnier-Pagès, de créer un nouvel impôt de 45 centimes additionnels par franc de contribution directe. La nouvelle est très mal accueillie dans les campagnes. Non seulement celles-ci s’estiment délaissées par le pouvoir, mais elles ont le sentiment de payer pour les travailleurs des villes qui ont davantage la possibilité de se faire entendre. Elles s’inquiètent de l’effervescence qui règne à Paris et d’une possible prise de pouvoir par les socialistes et les partageux. Le divorce entre la capitale et la province atteint un niveau inégalé jusque-là et qui s’accentue encore à l’approche des élections11. En effet, et c’est le troisième point qu’il nous faut souligner pour achever la présentation du contexte de la campagne, la plupart des républicains savent que ce sont les ruraux, très majoritaires dans la France de l’époque, qui feront l’élection. Ils ont conscience que les partisans de la République sont peu nombreux dans les villages et que les mesures qui viennent d’être adoptées les ont encore réduits. Ils craignent aussi l’influence des notables sur les paysans. Certes, le premier XIXe s. s’est caractérisé par une « descente de la politique vers les masses », selon

11 Comme Tocqueville le note avec justesse dans ses Souvenirs, ouv. cité, p. 108.

La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 11 l’expression de Maurice Agulhon12 et les élections municipales de la monarchie de Juillet ont éveillé les élites de la paysannerie à la politique, comme Christine Guionnet l’a montré, mais le phénomène demeure limité13. De nombreux républicains de la veille et amis sincères du nouveau régime comme Lamennais demandaient, dès le 27 février, des élections immédiates pour mettre à profit l’enthousiasme initial. Nous avons vu pourquoi il n’était matériellement pas possible de les organiser avant le 9 avril. Avec le mécontentement qui commence à monter des profondeurs du pays, des républicains avancés, des socialistes, des agitateurs de clubs réclament désormais un ajournement pour républicaniser la France. Le 7 mars, Blanqui apporte une pétition impérieuse au gouvernement : « L’élection immédiate de l’Assemblée nationale serait un danger pour la République. Depuis trente ans la contre-révolution parle seule à la France. La presse, bâillonnée par les lois fiscales, n’a pénétré que l’épiderme de la société. L’éducation des masses n’a été faite que par le seul enseignement oral, qui a toujours appartenu et qui appartient encore aux ennemis de la République. Les notabilités des factions vaincues, dans les campagnes principalement, frappent seules l’attention du peuple ; les hommes dévoués à la cause démocratique lui sont presque tous inconnus14. » Dans un premier temps, le Gouvernement ne fléchit pas, même si Louis Blanc et le ministre de l’Intérieur, Ledru-Rollin sont sensibles à ces arguments, au point que ce dernier laisse d’abord prêcher l’ajournement dans le Bulletin de la République, publication de son ministère destinée aux communes dont le premier numéro paraît le 13 mars. A l’initiative des clubs révolutionnaires et de Blanqui, une manifestation de 100 000 personnes vient déposer, le 17 mars, une nouvelle pétition pour un report des élections au 31 mai. Par ailleurs, la désignation populaire des officiers et des sous-officiers de la garde nationale de Paris a pris du retard et les deux consultations électorales ne peuvent se dérouler à trop peu de distance l’une de l’autre. Le Gouvernement décide donc de faire un geste, en repoussant les élections législatives aux 23 et 24 avril. Cette transaction ne satisfait personne. La date retenue coïncide avec Pâques et le Gouvernement qui ne s’en rend pas compte immédiatement, y voit finalement un « symbole de régénération sociale » et la maintient15. Cependant, une grande partie de la droite, à l’instar de Falloux, il voit une manœuvre pour écarter les catholiques du

12 Titre du chap. 6 de La République au village. Les population du Var de la Révolution à la Seconde République, Plon, 1970. 13 L’Apprentissage de la politique moderne. Les élections municipales sous la Monarchie de Juillet, L’Harmattan, 1997. 14 Cité par P. Bastid, Doctrines et institutions politiques de la Seconde République, Hachette, 1945, 1er vol., p. 171-172. 15 Décret du 26 mars. Procès-verbaux du Gouvernement provisoire…, ouv. cité, p. 101 et L.-A. Garnier-Pagès, ouv. cité, t. VII, p. 63 et suiv.

12 Eric Anceau scrutin16. Des pétitions affluent de la France entière contre cet ajournement. A l’inverse, l’extrême gauche pense que la mesure offre aux curés une ultime et solennelle occasion d’appeler à voter pour les candidats de la réaction. Elle multiplie les menaces. Le 15 avril, George Sand fait paraître dans le seizième Bulletin de la République un article qui échappe à la censure de Ledru-Rollin et qui annonce que le peuple n’admettra pas « une fausse représentation nationale »17 et, le lendemain, une autre démonstration populaire essaie d’obtenir un nouvel ajournement. Si cette tentative est vaine, elle est du plus mauvais effet en province et la Fête de la Fraternité du 20 avril, la plus imposante de ce type depuis la Fête de la Fédération du 14 juillet 1790, ne suffit pas à dissiper le malaise. Comme l’écrit le procureur général de Valence, Saint-Romme à son ministre de tutelle, alors que le scrutin doit s’ouvrir dans quelques heures à peine : « Rien n’est effrayant comme la rapidité avec laquelle s’affaiblit autour de nous l’enthousiasme républicain et se compromettent les élections18 ».

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Depuis début mars, les candidats se manifestent, font connaître leur programme et sont désignés ou écartés par les partis, selon de nouvelles procédures. Parallèlement le gouvernement essaie d’imposer ses propres choix. La décision que prennent les hommes de 1848 de se présenter ou non aux élections législatives d’avril doit s’examiner du triple point de vue des motivations politiques, professionnelles et individuelles. Dans leur immense majorité, les guizotistes contre lesquels la Révolution vient de s’effectuer décident de s’abstenir de toute participation19. Après avoir hésité et s’être concertés, les membres de l’ancien centre gauche et de l’ancienne gauche dynastique, les Thiers, Rémusat, Duvergier de Hauranne, Barrot font finalement le choix inverse, mais optent pour une participation individuelle20. L’attitude des bonapartistes est la même. Le prétendant, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, estime que son heure n’est pas venue et s’abstient21, cependant que certains de ses partisans ou de ses parents,

16 Comte de Falloux, Mémoires d’un royaliste, Didier, Perrin et Cie, 1888, t. I, p. 305. Voir aussi L.-A. Garnier-Pagès, ouv. cité, t. VII, p. 74. 17 Reproduit dans L.-A. Garnier-Pagès, ouv. cit., t. VIII, p. 210 et suiv. 18 Philippe Vigier, La Seconde République dans la région alpine. Étude politique et sociale, PUF, 1963, t. I, p. 219. 19 Pour la présentation la meilleure et la plus complète de l’attitude des partis, voir L.-A. Garnier- Pagès, ouv. cité, t. VIII, p. 226 et suiv. 20 Comte de Rémusat, Mémoires de ma vie, Plon, 1960, t. IV, p. 268. 21 Le comité fondé par Persigny recommande néanmoins le dépôt dans l’urne de bulletins en sa faveur, mot d’ordre qui est largement suivi en Charente-Inférieure et dans l’Yonne. Bernard Ménager, Les Napoléon du peuple, Aubier, 1988, p. 92.

La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 13 comme son cousin Napoléon-Jérôme, décident de tenter leur chance à titre personnel. Les légitimistes qui pratiquaient, pour la plupart d’entre eux, la politique des bras croisés sous le règne de Louis-Philippe sortent au contraire massivement de leur retraite pour entrer en campagne, occasion pour eux de défendre certains thèmes qui leurs sont chers, comme la décentralisation. Il en est de même des catholiques libéraux, organisés dès le 28 février en un Comité central pour la liberté religieuse à l’initiative de Montalembert. Tous ces hommes osent rarement se présenter sous l’étiquette des anciens partis et se donnent pour ralliés à la République, qu’ils le soient sincérement, par attentisme ou par pur calcul. De ce point de vue, leurs professions de foi sont éloquentes22. Ils y promeuvent des idées vagues et généreuses qui ne les distinguent en rien de leurs adversaires politiques d’hier : progrès, fraternité, amélioration du sort moral et matériel du plus grand nombre,… De ce fait, les républicains authentiques qui jugent nécessaire de se qualifier de républicains de la veille pour se distinguer de ces républicains du lendemain s’investissent largement dans la campagne. Quant aux socialistes, condamnés jusque-là, pour la plupart d’entre eux, à la clandestinité, ils sortent également de l’ombre pour faire entendre leurs voix et réclamer le droit au travail, l’intervention de l’État en matière économique ou encore l’abolition des armées permanentes. Cet investissement différent des partis dans la campagne explique l’abstention massive des fonctionnaires de la monarchie de Juillet et, à l’inverse, la participation sans précédent des avocats, des médecins et des journalistes, professions qui fournissent les cadres du parti républicain et qui étaient marginalement représentées lors des élections législatives en régime censitaire. La campagne se caractérise de ce point de vue par plusieurs autres spécificités et nouveautés. L’esprit romantique qui est en train de souffler en cette « époque triomphante de la phraséologie23 » met en avant les hommes de lettres. Ainsi, outre Lamartine, Hugo, Dumas père, Vigny, Balzac, Ponsard, Sue ou encore Alphonse Karr se présentent ou se laissent présenter. Les chefs du parti catholique et les évêques de France invitent les curés et les ecclésiastiques à se mêler au mouvement électoral, mais se divisent sur le fait de savoir s’ils doivent être candidats, comme ils en ont désormais la possibilité. Un grand nombre de prélats, de curés, de religieux, mais aussi de pasteurs passent finalement à l’acte. Pour leur part, les patrons de l’industrie et du commerce s’investissent dans une élection dont ils attendent beaucoup pour le rétablissement de l’ordre et la défense de leurs intérêts24. De leur côté, les ouvriers sont à la mode. « Chapeau bas devant la

22 Voir la collection de la B.n.F. en Le64. Garnier-Pagès nous en fournit aussi un intéressant florilège. Ouv. cité, t. VIII, p. 245 et suiv. 23 Pierre de La Gorce, Histoire de la Seconde République française, Plon, 1887, 3e éd. 1904, t. I, p. 211. 24 Éric Anceau, « Les industriels français face à l’avènement de la Deuxième République » dans Dominique Barjot et alii, Industrie et politique en Europe occidentale et aux États-Unis (XIXe-XXe s.), PUPS, 2006, p. 101-115.

14 Eric Anceau casquette ! A genoux devant l’ouvrier ! » dit un refrain du temps, au point que plusieurs bourgeois décident de se présenter devant les électeurs sous ce vocable. Ainsi, le journaliste parisien Théophile Thoré candidat dans les Deux-Sèvres se prétend « ouvrier de la pensée », « prolétaire intellectuel25 ». Une pièce de Labiche met même en scène un candidat gandin qui affirme : « Mon père était ouvrier, ouvrier notaire… ; moi-même, j’ai été ouvrier, ouvrier… référendaire à la Cour des Comptes26. » Cependant d’authentiques ouvriers font campagne, même s’il s’agit le plus souvent de travailleurs sortis du rang, devenus contremaîtres, théoriciens ou poètes, connus des élites et parfois récupérés par elles. En revanche, ce rite d’inclusion qu’est le suffrage universel ne permet pas encore aux paysans et aux femmes de se présenter. Dans les campagnes, ce sont, pour l’essentiel, des propriétaires et des agronomes auxquels s’ajoutent quelques riches cultivateurs qui le font. Quant aux femmes, beaucoup interviennent dans le débat, même si elles n’ont ni la possibilité de se faire élire, ni celle de voter. La féministe Eugénie Niboyet et son club ainsi que de nombreux républicains mettent en avant la candidature de George Sand que cette dernière refuse rapidement : « La femme étant sous la tutelle et dans la dépendance de l’homme par le mariage, il est absolument impossible qu’elle présente des garanties d’indépendance politique à moins de briser individuellement et au mépris des lois et des mœurs, cette tutelle que les mœurs et les lois consacrent. Il me paraît donc insensé, j’en demande pardon aux personnes de mon sexe qui ont cru devoir procédé ainsi, de commencer par où l’on doit finir, pour finir apparemment par où l’on eût dû commencer27 ». Au total, ces élections sans dépôt obligatoire de candidature et quasiment sans filtres légaux donnent libre cours à toutes les ambitions personnelles, y compris les plus fantaisistes. Un sourd-muet fait ainsi campagne à Paris pour que les infirmes disposent enfin d’une représentation parlementaire. Nombreux sont ceux qui en restent aux images des collèges restreints de la monarchie de Juillet, qui se laissent abuser par le seuil des 2 000 voix nécessaires pour se faire élire et qui pensent que la victoire se situera autour de ce chiffre28. De ce fait, les candidatures prolifèrent. Pierre Lévêque en a par exemple dénombrées 67 pour les 10 sièges à pourvoir en Côte-d’Or et 80 pour les 14 de Saône-et-Loire29. La Seine qui doit élire 34 représentants compte plus de 2 000 candidats. Cependant, seuls

25 Aux citoyens électeurs du département des Deux-Sèvres, Paris, 1848, B.n.F. 4° Le64 270. 26 Cité par G. Renard, La République de 1848, t. IX de l’Histoire socialiste de Jaurès, Rouff, s.d., p. 47. Dans Les Scrutins politiques en France de 1815 à 1962. Contestations et invalidations... (A. Colin, 1965, p. 36), Jean-Paul Charnay avance le chiffre de 21 bourgeois élus sous l’étiquette d’ouvriers, ce qui donne à penser qu’au bas mot, plusieurs dizaines d’autres se sont présentés ainsi. 27 G. Sand, Correspondange générale Classiques Garnier, t. VIII, 1971, p. 391-392 et p. 400 et suiv. 28 Voir Charles Seignobos, Histoire de la France contemporaine d’E. Lavisse, t. VI, La Révolution de 1848. Le Second Empire, Hachette, 1921, p. 75. 29 Une société en crise. La Bourgogne au milieu du XIXe s. (1846-1852), E.H.E.S.S., 1983, p. 92.

La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 15 les hommes appuyés par un comité ou par club et dont le nom se trouve sur une liste ont une chance de bien figurer. Dès la Révolution de Février, des clubs voient le jour à Paris, comme en province et entendent prendre part à la désignation des candidats. A l’extrême gauche, se constitue dans la capitale, le 20 mars, un Club des clubs qui envoie rapidement ses directives à la province30. A la droite légitimiste, le Club de l’Assemblée nationale agit de même31. En outre, au Comité central pour la liberté religieuse et à la Commission du Luxembourg qui s’invitent dans la campagne et proposent leurs propres listes de candidats, s’ajoutent bientôt des comités spécifiquement constitués en vue des élections dont le plus important est celui que fondent les républicains de gouvernement, le Comité central des élections générales ou Comité central des électeurs républicains du boulevard Bonne- Nouvelle, présidé par Recurt. Eux aussi recommandent leurs candidats à la province32. Il en est de même des groupes d’originaires installés à Paris, comme les maçons de la Marche qui tentent d’imposer Martin Nadaud, en Creuse33. Cette façon de procéder est généralement mal acceptée dans les départements34. Les notabilités locales de toutes nuances n’ont pas attendu de recevoir des directives de la capitale pour s’organiser, elles aussi, en comités. Des groupes d’intérêts ont également constitué leurs propres comités électoraux, comme celui des commerçants et industriels en Haute-Garonne ou celui des instituteurs dans le Bas-Rhin, moyen de promouvoir des revendications catégorielles, dans une proportion rarement atteinte jusque-là35. Chaque département compte en moyenne huit comités centraux et une multitude de comités locaux. Les différents partis tentent néanmoins d’arriver à des compromis. Ainsi les républicains modérés essaient, à l’initiative du Gouvernement, de constituer dans chaque département une structure pyramidale comprenant à la base des comités communaux, puis des comités de cantons et d’arrondissement et, au sommet, un comité central républicain, en liaison avec celui de la capitale. Idéalement, le choix des candidats doit être démocratique. Des listes de candidats à la candidature doivent ainsi remonter de la base au sommet avec audition des postulants et élection à tous les niveaux, avant composition de la liste définitive.

30 L.-A. Garnier-Pagès, ouv. cité, t. VII, p. 79. 31 Ibid., p. 104. 32 Éric Anceau, « L’échec des bleus du National et de leur projet de « république du centre » (1848-1849) » dans Sylvie Guillaume dir., Le Centrisme en France aux XIXe et XXe siècles : un échec, MSH Aquitaine, Pessac, 2005, p. 29-40. 33 Alain Corbin, Archaïsme et modernité en Limousin au XIXe s., 1845-1880, M. Rivière, 1975, t. II, p. 715. 34 Voir par exemple ce qu’en dit Laurent Le Gall pour le Morbihan, thèse citée, p. 143 et suiv. 35 Jacques Godechot et alii, La Révolution de 1848 à Toulouse et dans la Haute-Garonne, Toulouse, 1948, p. 206 et suiv. et François Igersheim, Politique et administration dans le Bas-Rhin (1848-1870), Strasbourg, P.U. Strasbourg, 1993, p. 101 et suiv.

16 Eric Anceau

La réalité est très éloignée de ce modèle, d’abord parce que la plupart des comités locaux entendent imposer des natifs, ensuite parce que les niveaux s’articulent mal, enfin et surtout, parce qu’une partie du Gouvernement, mais aussi des chefs de partis – certains grands notables, des évêques comme celui d’Angers36, des petits chefs républicains – refusent de jouer le jeu. Les monographies publiées depuis un siècle nous montrent combien cette réalité est complexe et dépend des contingences et des affinités locales. Qu’il nous suffise ici d’en donner quelques exemples. En dépit des directives parisiennes, les républicains modérés font souvent place sur leurs listes à des hommes des anciens partis qui se prétendent ralliés37. Dupin aîné, pourtant grande personnalité du régime déchu figure ainsi sur la liste républicaine de l’arrondissement de Château- Chinon38. Les légitimistes agissent de même, en admettant sur leurs propres listes des républicains modérés, par souci de conciliation ou par calcul, comme dans le Gard39. La popularité d’un Liechtenberger lui permet d’être placé en tête des sept principales listes du Bas-Rhin40. Il en est de même pour Lamartine, à la fois dans sa Saône-et-Loire natale et dans un grand nombre d’autres départements à travers la France. Cependant, comme Pierre Lévêque l’a montré, la situation de la Saône- et-Loire est radicalement différente de celle de la Côte-d’Or voisine où les tensions sont très vives entre les comités et leurs candidats respectifs41. Des contrastes similaires s’observent à travers toute la France, comme dans la région alpine, cas d’école étudié par François Rude et Philippe Vigier42. Dans quelques départements comme les Pyrénées-Orientales, les républicains – ici du « parti Arago » – apparaissent sûrs de leur fait, au point que la détermination des candidats ne posent aucun problème et que de campagne, il n’y a point43. Souvent, comme en Loir-et-Cher, républicains modérés et radicaux n’arrivent pas à s’entendre du fait de l’intransigeance de commissaires de la République rivaux. Deux listes concurrentes s’affrontent et la campagne est violente44.

36 André Houtin, « Le clergé et la noblesse d’Anjou aux élections à l’Assemblée constituante de 1848 » dans La Révolution de 1848, t. VIII, 1911-1912, en particulier p. 149-161 et p. 208-218. 37 É. Anceau, art. cité, p. 33. 38 Marcel Vigreux, Paysans et notables du Morvan au XIXe s., Château-Chinon, Académie du Morvan, 1987, p. 256. 39 Raymond Huard, La Préhistoire des partis, le mouvement républicain en Bas-Languedoc (1848- 1881), Presses de la F.N.S.P., 1982 et André-Jean Tudesq, Les Grands notables en France (1840- 1849),…, Bordeaux, Delmas, t. 2, p. 1056 et suiv. 40 F. Igersheim, ouv. cité, p. 101 et suiv. 41 Ouv. cité, p. 85. 42 F. Rude et alii, La Révolution de 1848 dans le département de l’Isère, Grenoble, 1949, p. 16 et P. Vigier, ouv. cité, t. I, p. 229 et suiv. 43 Peter Mac Phee, Les Semailles de la République dans les Pyrénées-Orientales, 1846-1852,…, Perpignan, Publ. de l’Olivier, 1996, p. 106-107. 44 Georges Dupeux, Aspects de l’histoire sociale et politique du Loir-et-Cher (1848-1914), Paris- La Haye, Mouton et Cie, 1962, p. 329 et suiv.

La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 17

En fait, dès l’origine, Ledru-Rollin a décidé de ne pas renoncer à la pratique de la candidature officielle, en usage sous les monarchies censitaires. Par ses circulaires des 8 et 12 mars, il a demandé aux agents de son administration d’éclairer les masses sur leurs intérêts, en d’autres termes de les inciter à élire des républicains de la veille. Commissaires et sous-commissaires de la République ont été invités à examiner « sévèrement les titres des candidats », à s’arrêter « à ceux- là seulement qui paraiss[ai]ent présenter le plus de garanties à l’opinion républicaine, le plus de chances de succès », pour faire du jour de l’élection « le triomphe de la révolution45 ». Cependant, nombre d’entre eux ont laissé la campagne se dérouler librement sans y intervenir d’aucune façon, alors que d’autres ont abusé des directives reçues pour révoquer municipalités et fonctionnaires suspects, pour composer eux-mêmes des listes de candidats où ils se sont placés en tête et pour essayer de les imposer autoritairement. De la France entière sont montées des critiques que Louis Blanc a relayé dans le conseil de gouvernement du 29 mars. Le ministre de l’Intérieur s’est défendu en parlant d’exagération et en évoquant les 24 commissaires généraux qu’il venait d’envoyer en province pour surveiller les commissaires et sous- commissaires ordinaires de 60 départements. Cependant, ces missi dominici, généralement plus avancés que leurs subordonnés n’ont pas eu la mission que leur a prêtée Ledru-Rollin. Ils ont été nommés pour stimuler les ardeurs. Devant de nouvelles plaintes, le conseil a décidé, le 1er avril, sur proposition de Louis Blanc, que Ledru-Rollin enverrait aux commissaires une circulaire pour leur enjoindre « de ne point user, dans l’intérêt de leur élection, d’une influence qui ne d[evai]t servir qu’à la consolidation de la République, et d’attendre, sans le provoquer, le vote des populations46 ». Cette directive qui n’a été que partiellement suivie, nous amène à évoquer les canaux et les formes de la propagande électorale. Sans être de parfaits inconnus, la majorité des candidats de 1848 souffrent néanmoins d’un déficit de notoriété, par rapport aux notables des régimes précédents. Comme l’affirme l’un d’entre eux : « L’homme qui se présente doit se faire connaître47 ». Le changement de régime et le passage au suffrage universel modifient l’échelle et la nature de la propagande et sont susceptibles d’entraîner une redistribution des cartes. Le printemps 1848 s’accompagne ainsi d’une révolution de papier. Comme sous les monarchies censitaires, les journaux sont l’un des vecteurs essentiels de la propagande électorale. Cependant, la Révolution qui a été préparée dans les rédactions du National et de La Réforme libère la presse et le nombre de titres

45 M.U. des 9 et 12 mars. 46 Procès-verbaux du Gouvernement provisoire…, ouv. cité, p. 122 et L.-A. Garnier-Pagès, ouv. cité, t. VIII, p. 219 et suiv. 47 Charles Charpentier à ses électeurs, Périgueux, 1848, B.n.F. 8° Le64 282.

18 Eric Anceau explose48. En quelques semaines, la capitale en voit naître près de 300 et la province autant. Les candidats du gouvernement peuvent compter sur le Bulletin de la République, sur le National et sur toute une floraison de titres dont beaucoup sont dus à l’initiative des commissaires et des sous-commissaires de la République. Cependant, chaque famille politique a ses propres journaux qui reproduisent les listes des comités dont ils se sentent les plus proches et qui invectivent parfois les adversaires. Le gouvernement et ses candidats sont d’abord l’objet des attaques de la presse socialiste. En effet, les journaux qui ont soutenu la monarchie de Juillet, comme Le Journal des Débats ou qui lui ont fait une opposition très modérée comme Le Siècle sont momentanément discrédités et se tiennent sur la réserve. Les bonapartistes sont encore très discrets, posture du prétendant oblige49. Quant à la légitimiste La Gazette de France, elle reste, durant plusieurs semaines, dans une prudente expectative. Par contre, de nouveaux titres conservateurs relèvent rapidement le gant : L’Assemblée Nationale d’Adrien de Lavalette, La Sentinelle d’Hippolyte de Mauduit, ainsi que de nombreuses feuilles de province50. Parallèlement une quantité inouïe de professions de foi, de circulaires, d’affiches et de brochures s’abat sur le pays. Elle émane de toutes les familles politiques qui présentent des candidats, mais principalement du gouvernement et de ses partisans. Les rapports de Théodore Ducos sur les comptes du Gouvernement provisoire nous permettent d’approcher cette propagande et de la chiffrer partiellement. C’est ainsi, par exemple, que les fonds secrets du ministère de l’Intérieur permettent au commissaire de la République du Morbihan de faire imprimer et distribuer 85 000 bulletins électoraux et 3 000 circulaires51. Par ailleurs, la correspondance de George Sand nous montre la collaboratrice de Ledru-Rollin écrivant à Agricol Perdiguier pour le prier de rédiger une brochure destinée à toucher les plus humbles électeurs52, pendant qu’elle multiplie elle- même les textes de propagande53. Quant aux débats sur la validation des élections54, ils nous donnent à voir quelques abus flagrants de pouvoir, en la matière : tel commissaire du Gouvernement interdisant la sortie d’un imprimé trop

48 Nous suivons ici, pour l’essentiel, Claude Bellanger et alii, Histoire générale de la presse française, t. II, De 1815 à 1871, P.U.F., 1969, p. 207 et suiv. 49 Robert Pimienta, La Propagande bonapartiste en 1848, E. Cornély, 1911, p. 36. 50 L.-A. Garnier-Pagès, ouv. cité, t. VII, p. 104. 51 M.U. des 26 avril 1849 et 26 juin 1851. 52 Ouv. cité, t. VIII, p. 366-367 et p. 375. Réapparaît à cette occasion le personnage de Blaise Bonnin, utilisé par elle, en novembre 1843, dans l’affaire de Fanchette. Cette figure de laboureur et d’adjoint au maire de commune rurale expose les problèmes aux paysans en termes simples et avec bon sens. 53 Lettres au peuple, Paroles de Blaise Bonnin aux bons citoyens, Histoire de la France écrite sous la dictée de Blaise Bonnin,… 54 M.U. du 3 au 23 mai 1848.

La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 19 virulent à l’encontre des républicains modérés ; tel sous-commissaire faisant mettre sous séquestre une presse qui tire les listes de candidats de l’opposition. Cependant, beaucoup de candidats savent que pour toucher des masses encore largement analphabètes, le recours à l’image et à la chanson est primordial. Ils font donc imprimer des gravures et diffuser des chansons dont l’une des plus célèbres, le Vote universel d’Eugène Pottier, met en garde l’électorat contre l’achat des voix : « Viendront des gueux en secret Marchander nos voix j’parie, Honte à celui qui s’vendrait : C’est un traître à la patrie55. »

1848 est bien aussi une révolution de la parole dont la campagne électorale devient le terrain privilégié. La Révolution de Février a accordé la liberté d’expression et de réunion et les candidats et leurs partisans mettent à profit tous les types de rassemblement : les foires et les marchés56, les assemblées de corps de métier ou encore de loges maçonniques57. Mais les trois grandes nouveautés de la campagne sont les réunions des clubs, les grandes assemblées publiques du type des meetings anglo-saxons et les séances des comités électoraux, en particulier celles au cours desquelles les candidats sont auditionnés. D’Alexis de Tocqueville constatant avec mépris que : « le pays commen(ce) à se couvrir de candidats ambulants, qui colport(ent) de tréteaux en tréteaux leurs protestations républicaines » à Louis Reybaud promenant son Jérôme Paturot de club en club à la recherche de la meilleure des Républiques, les notables raillent souvent cette nouvelle façon de procéder dont les radicaux usent et abusent, car ils n’ont pas d’influence naturelle sur les masses et souffrent d’un déficit de notoriété. Eux-mêmes n’entendent pas s’abaisser à ce genre de démonstration. Ils n’en ont théoriquement pas besoin car leurs ressources financières, leur influence sociale, l’habitude de mobiliser leur clientèle leur assurent une large audience. Dans ses Mémoires, Rémusat indique ainsi : « Ma position et ma politique n’étaient pas assez simples pour comporter des harangues sur la place publique. Je ne pensais que m’en rapporter à ma notabilité, à mes professions de foi, à ma correspondance, à l’action des comités locaux, des maires destitués, de mes anciens collègues du Conseil général, de tous les propriétaires alarmés58. » Il concède cependant que les relations entre le notable et les populations sont en train de changer lors de ces élections, y compris dans un arrondissement aussi peu

55 E. Pottier, Œuvres complètes réunies et présentées par Pierre Brochon, Maspéro, 1966, p. 48-49. 56 Voir par exemple Laurent Le Gall, thèse citée, en particulier p. 186 et suiv. 57 Particulièrement dans la Meurthe et la Haute-Vienne, selon André-Jean Tudesq, ouv. cité, t. 2, p. 1054. 58 Ouv. cité, t. IV, p. 283.

20 Eric Anceau politique que le sien, celui de Muret : « Nos communes rurales tout en restant paisibles, n’étaient pas cependant absolument étrangères au mouvement général. Sans y être préparés, sans y rien comprendre, les paysans savaient fort bien que l’événement qui venait de s’accomplir intéressait les pauvres, qu’ils allaient compter pour quelque chose et que leur condition devait être modifiée. (…) Mes relations avec nos ouvriers [agricoles] restaient bonnes, mais ce n’étaient plus les mêmes. Leur ton et le mien avaient changé59 ». Tocqueville lui-même décide de prendre la parole en public, en particulier lors de l’un de ces banquets patriotiques qui sont organisés dans la continuité de ceux des monarchies censitaires60. En outre, en ville, la donne est différente. Certains notables conservateurs se croient obligés de se rendre dans les clubs pour y prononcer des paroles démagogiques61. Le curé de Saint-Eustache, l’abbé Lacordaire ou Mgr Sibour, l’évêque de Digne, y présentent leur candidature62 et le commissaire de la République en poste à Marseille, Émile Ollivier, y combat celle de Thiers63. Il faut dire que les autorités civiles et religieuses donnent de la voix comme jamais64. Les maires sont invités par le ministre de l’Intérieur à rassembler tous les dimanches la garde nationale pour lui lire le Bulletin de la République et ceux qui y manquent encourent une dénonciation des facteurs65. Les instituteurs sont réunis par leur hiérarchie ou par les maires et sont incités à prêcher la bonne parole auprès de leurs élèves et des parents de ces derniers. Même si ni l’un ni l’autre n’ont finalement lieu, de grands rassemblements de campagne sont prévus l’un au champ de manœuvre de Saint-Maur par le maire de Paris et le ministre des Travaux publics, l’autre au Champ-de-Mars par les comités du Luxembourg et le Club des clubs66. De son côté, le clergé, encouragé par ses évêques, fait entrer la politique dans les églises, y compris lors du prône du dimanche de Pâques, juste avant le scrutin67. Maires et notables haranguent enfin les communautés

59 Ibid., p. 282-283. 60 Ouv. cité, p. 110 et suiv. 61 L.-A. Garnier-Pagès, ouv. cité, t. VIII, p. 215 et suiv. 62 Ibid., p. 266-267. 63 Victor Pierre, Histoire de la Deuxième République française, Plon et Cie, 1873, t. I, p. 227. 64 Deux articles d’Alfred Cobban sont ainsi très utiles : « Administrative pressure in the Election of the French Constituent Assembly, April 1848 », Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, n° 25, 1952, p. 133-159 et « The influence of the clergy and the « instituteurs primaires » in the election of the french constituant Assembly, april 1848 », English historical Review, 1942, p. 334-344. 65 George Sand, Correspondange générale, t. VIII, Classiques Garnier, 1971, p. 359. 66 Louis Blanc, Histoire de la Révolution de 1848, t. II, p. 52 et L.-A. Garnier-Pagès, t. VIII, p. 272 et suiv. 67 L.-A. Garnier-Pagès, ouv. cité, t. VIII, p. 264 et suiv. Voir aussi A. Cobban, « The influence… », art. cité, J. Godechot et alii, ouv. cité, p. 214 et suiv., M. Denis, Les Royalistes de la Mayenne et le monde moderne XIXe-XXe s., Rennes, 1977, p. 282, ainsi que la thèse de L. Le Gall, en particulier p. 129.

La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 21 villageoises, avant de les conduire au bureau de vote, à l’exemple de ce qui se passe à Tocqueville68. A l’occasion de cette campagne, des contacts directs et informels s’établissent aussi entre le candidat, ses agents et l’électeur. De nombreux candidats vont dans la rue, sur les marchés et dans les foires, voire au domicile des électeurs, pour serrer les mains et dialoguer avec eux69. De ce point de vue, les démocrates et les fils du peuple sont mieux armés que les notables traditionnels, tels les Bressans évoqués par Louis de Tricaud : « Répugnant à l’intrigue, ils allaient avec le rouge de l’embarras sur le front dans quelque pauvre maison où ils connaissaient une famille chrétienne, laborieuse, honnête et ils offraient leur liste. Ces noms pour la plupart étaient inconnus au paysan. Il fallait de longues explications… »70 Certains grands notables qui n’ont pas voulu se présenter jouent en revanche plus aisément de leur influence, en organisant des rencontres dans leurs salons, en écrivant à leurs clients ou en mettant leurs gens à la disposition des candidats qu’ils soutiennent71. Ces pratiques qui ont existé de tout temps changent d’ampleur avec le passage au suffrage universel. Outre les maires, les curés et les instituteurs, les juges de paix, les gendarmes, les gardes champêtres, les agents-voyers ou encore les colporteurs font du démarchage à domicile. Les différents comités électoraux délèguent certains de leurs membres dans les villages à fin de propagande72. Dans sa séance du 29 mars, le Club des clubs décide à son tour d’envoyer des « apôtres » en province, mais aussi en Algérie et aux armées, pour y propager les idées de la Révolution et pour encourager les électeurs à bien voter73. Ces hommes dont on a pu estimer le nombre à environ 300, bénéficient de l’appui de Ledru-Rollin et des fonds secrets du Gouvernement, mais doivent prétendre agir à titre personnel. De ce fait, il est impossible de proposer un bilan d’ensemble de leur activité et de leurs résultats. Quelques études nous montrent qu’ils sont en général rapidement percés au jour et repoussés, en raison de leurs harangues inadaptées au monde rural. Certains sont même victimes de charivaris74.

68 A. de Tocqueville, Souvenirs, t. XII, ouv. cité, p. 114. 69 Voir par exemple à ce sujet Jack Thomas, Le Temps des foires. Foires et marchés dans le Midi toulousain de la fin de l’Ancien Régime à 1914, Toulouse, PU du Mirail, 1993. 70 Histoire du département de l’Ain du 24 février au 20 décembre 1848, Bourg-en-Bresse, 1872, 141. 71 A.-J. Tudesq, ouv. cité, t. 2, en particulier p. 1061. 72 Sur ces aspects, voir par exemple P. Lévêque, ouv. cité, p. 97-99. 73 Sur les activités de propagande du Club dans la capitale, l’ouvrage fondamental est celui de Louis Chevalier, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris pendant la première moitié du XIXe s., Hachette, 1958. 74 Voir par exemple P. Lévêque, ouv. cité, p. 89 et Daniel Dayen, « Les délégués du Club des clubs et les élections d’avril 1848 dans la Creuse », Mémoires de la Société des sciences naturelles et archéologiques de la Creuse, t. 42, fascicule 3, 1986, p. 574-587.

22 Eric Anceau

Ces formes de pression électorale nous montrent que la campagne du printemps 1848 n’a pas été aussi idyllique que d’aucuns l’ont prétendu. Elle est émaillée d’une multitude de faits délictueux75. Si, à l’exception de la Lozère, elle n’est pas entachée d’affaires d’achats de voix comme le craignait Eugène Potier76, elle connaît, comme toutes les autres, son lot de rumeurs et de calomnies. Le Gouvernement provisoire est ainsi la cible des extrêmes qui dénoncent les chasses ministérielles, les réceptions scandaleuses des ministresses ou encore le fait que le duc de Rollin s’acoquine avec deux femmes de mauvaises mœurs, la Martine et la Marie. Mais les fraudes concernent surtout les bulletins de vote ou plutôt les billets, comme on dit alors. Comme il n’y a pas de dépôt obligatoire de candidatures, l’administration n’a pas imprimé de billets. Les électeurs ont donc la possibilité de confectionner et d’apporter les leurs le jour du scrutin. La tentation est grande d’en distribuer massivement, comme y procèdent par exemple les curés en Mayenne, dans le Morbihan, en Aveyron, en Lozère et dans le Doubs77. Elle l’est aussi, en retour, d’organiser des expéditions dans les campagnes pour enlever aux paysans les mauvais billets, comme le font les républicains autour de Limoges, d’Issoudun, de La Châtre, de Bourges, de Saint-Amand ou encore de Soissons78.

  

Quelques constations s’imposent pour conclure : - Le grand ébranlement qui vient de se produire et le contexte original des mois de mars-avril 1848 provoquent une confusion incroyable. La désignation des candidats est complexe et difficile, les programmes sont vagues et les listes finalement proposées se recoupent souvent. - Il n’en est pas moins vrai que cette grande première suscite la passion. La parole et l’écrit politiques jusque-là confisqués par une minorité connaissent une diffusion sans précédent, même si l’audience réelle se mesure mal.

75 Patrick Lagoueyte, « Apprentissage et incidents électoraux à l’aube du suffrage universel : le scrutin d’avril » dans Philippe Bourdin, Jean-Claude Caron et Mathias Bernard dir., L’Incident électoral de la Révolution française à la Ve République, Presses universitaires Blaise-Pascal, 2002, p. 101-119. 76 M.U. du 6 mai 1848, p. 956. 77 Pour la Mayenne, M. Denis, ouv. cité, p. 82, pour le Morbihan, M.U. du 6 mai 1848, p. 958, pour l’Aveyron, M.U. du 12 mai 1848, p. 1018, pour la Lozère, M.U. du 17 mai 1848, p. 1069, pour le Doubs, J.-L. Mayaud, Les Secondes Républiques du Doubs, Les Belles Lettres, 1986, p. 280. 78 C. Seignobos, ouv. cité, p. 79.

La campagne electorale française du printemps 1848 : une premiere revolutionnaire 23

- En résultent de multiples incidents, mais dont aucun n’est jugé suffisamment grave pour donner lieu à des invalidations lors de la vérification des pouvoirs des élus. Il faut dire que le seuil de tolérance est plus grand en raison du passage au suffrage universel, que l’immense majorité des observateurs sont agréablement surpris par le bon déroulement de la campagne au regard de leurs craintes initiales et que des désordres tragiques se produisent au lendemain du scrutin à Nîmes, à Nantes et surtout à Rouen et à Limoges, désordres qui monopolisent désormais l’attention.

L’intérêt constaté lors de la campagne se retrouve dans les urnes, puisque le taux de participation s’élève à 83,5 %. Quant à l’apprentissage de campagnes au suffrage universel, il se poursuit à l’occasion des législatives partielles de juin et de septembre, des municipales et des cantonales d’août et des présidentielles de décembre 1848, autre grande première de l’histoire de France79.

79 Voir à ce sujet A.-J. Tudesq, L’Élection présidentielle de Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, 10 décembre 1848, A. Colin, Kiosque, 1965 et M. Agulhon, « La Seconde République. Première élection au suffrage universel, 10 décembre 1848 » dans Léo Hamon et Guy Lobrichon (dir.), L’Élection du chef de l’État en France de Hugues Capet à nos jours, Beauchesne, 1988, p. 111-120.

24 Eric Anceau

Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 25

THE REVOLUTIONARY DOCTOR IBRAHIM THEMO IN ROMANIA

Lavinia Dacia GHEORGHE*

Abstract. Albanian, Turkish and Romanian, in the same time. Ibrahim Themo can be presented likewise. He was also a Balkan revolutionary, no matter his native country or the countries where he used to live. He was one of the „Young Tuks” leaders, who, through his entire activity served the interests of the three countries and his all three peoples: Albania, Turkey and Romania. In this article, we put under debate his activity in Romania, where he remarked himself not only as a fighter from here, in Turkey and Albania’s advantage, but also for the Muslim minority and the majority of Romanians in Dobruja, first as a senator in Romania’s Parliament, and as an ophtalmologist. This way, first we studied the biographical notebookd coming from his brother- in-law, the colonel in the Romanian army, Ahmet Mencşi, refering to Ibrahim Themo, rough copies of a volume which was not published; the Museum of National History and Archaeology Constanţa, holds in its patrimony these documents, included in the Collection „dr. Ibrahim Themo”, as far as we know the only „Themo archive” preserved in Romania.

Keywords: Ibrahim Themo, Macedonia, Albanian, Turkish and Romanian, „Young Turks”.

Some personalities’names have no borders. Their activity develops in almost entire world, for the interest of their country and people, generally, to the people benefit. Ibrahim Themo can be included in this category: native Albanian, Turkish by education and training, and Romanian by adoption. From this point of view, we can consider him as a Balkan native. However, through his entire activity he worked in the advantage of all his three countries and peoples: Albania, Turkey and Romania. In this article, we put under debate his activity in Romania, his adoption country, where he worked both as an ophtalmologist, as well as Turkish and Albanian revolutionary on Romanian land, wherefrom he coordinated the movement „Young Turks”, which he founded togehter with others. We have used for this subject mostly his biography written by his brother-in- law,colonel Ahmet Mencşi, in a lined notebook including 74 pages, a rough copy of a possible volume, with corrections and completions, in blue ink. We have also used another rough copy of the bibliography, from a 25 pages notebook without

* Dr. Muzeul de Istorie Naţională şi Arheologie, Constanţa.

26 Lavinia Dacia Gheorghe covers. Both documents are included in the „Collection dr. I. Themo” in the Museum of National History and Archaeology Constanţa.1

Ibrahim Ethem – the real name of doctor Ibrahim Themo – was born in March 1865, in Struga, south of Macedonia, in a family of Albanians who came from Mati, Albania2. After graduating the Medicine Military Highschool in Istanbul, he followed the the Faculty of Military Medicine „Gühane” in Istanbul in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, where he remarked himself for his revolutionary activity against the political regime and he was one of the founders of the organization Young Turks”3. After graduation (1892), he used to work in the hospital Haydarpaşa in Istanbul4. He was arrested for times for his ideas and activity against the regime.5 Ibrahim Ethem founded the revolutionary organization „Union and Progress”. This way, he got in touch with the Aromanian students in Istanbul, with whom he cooperated during his entire revolutionary activity. In the framework of the struggle for the autonomy of the Romanian Church and the liberation from the tutelage of the Greek Patriarchy in Istanbul, Ibrahim Ethem and the members of his organization hid the priest Haralambie Balamaci, who was member of the Romanian committee, from the Greeks’ fury.6 As he was involved in the liberation movement of the „Young Turks” in the Ottoman Empire and feeling the danger of some reprisals, in 1895, Ibrahim Ethem in 1895, Ibrahim Ethem found shelter in Constanţa. Thus, we appeal to Ibrahim Themo’s biography written by his brother-in- law, Ahmet Mencşi, wherefrom we cite a lot, as we present this biography as a document, as well: „ …he also decided to leave the country, finding shelter in one of the Balkan countries, wherefrom he could continue his activity and had freely correpondence both with his fellows of ideas from Turkey and Europe.Finally, he chose Romania, a neighbourhood country and daily in contact with those in Turkey. In that time, there were in Istambul existau 7 Aromaniaan students from Rumelia, with whom hebecame friends, and two of them joined the organization,

1 The text is written with blue ink and the corrections with a pencil, many times with a blunt end. There is the specific handwriting of an old man. Maybe, for this reason, I could not understand some of the words and I mention them by (?). 2 Agi-Amet Gemal, Dicţionarul personalităţilor turco-tătare din Romania, Ed. Metafora, Constanţa, 1999, p. 304. 3 Tahsin Gemil, Asociaţia din Romania a „Junilor Turkishi”, in „Anuarul Institutului de Istorie şi Arheologie «A.D. Xenopol»”, Iaşi, VII, 1970, p. 173- 195; Themo,, op. cit., 1939. 4 Ibrahim Themo, Ittihat Ve Terakki, Medgidia, 1939. 5 The Museum of National History and Archaeology Constanţa, The Storehouse of Contemporary- Modern-Middle Age History Ibrahim Themo collection (further on, MINAC, Themo collection), inv. 6338. 6 Ibrahim Themo, op. cit.

The revolutionary doctor Ibrahim Themo in Romania 27 too. When he met them, he presented them his situation and asked them to help him run away. They promissed him formaly thet they would help him. After that, he went to his friend Regeb Lakteş, where he left his documents and military uniform, he dressed as a civilian, and told him that he would receive something by the foreign post office in Istanbul and then he went ot the Aromanian students who saw theri relatives to the Romanian ship «Meteor» accosted in high seas, in front of the port „Şirehegi”, he got on the ship without any passport and without be seen by the Turkish policeman who was watching the ship. When, the ship went out Bosphorus, he went to a secure place, at the second class, where he had a ticket. The ship was caught that night by a terrible storm in the Black Sea, so he arrived that night after a delay of few hours. On the ship, as he had an agreement with a sailor, he chnged his Turkish cap with the sailor’s peacked cap and helped by the sailor he got off the land. This way, the distiguished patriot could reach Romania’s glorious land, on November 1st, 1885, at downs. From that moment, Romania was his adoptive country, towards which he was faithful and thankful until the last minute of his life. We must not forget that Themo, when leaving his country, he assumed the high mission to continue the fight until the victory. However, here, he did not forget the difficulties of his country enchained in slavery. Wherever he went, he had with him his country and his people sufferings. As a consequence, in the following pages. We are going to see how he could achieved the difficult task he had assumed, without any turning away from it. In the night when he arrived and got off in Constanţa port, ther was terrible blizzard and a severe cold. As no trains were circulating because of the snow, he stayed in Constanţa for three days. Then, he went to Bucharest. Here, having addresses given by his friends who helped him to escape, he presented to Dr. Nicolae Naciu, who was the partisan of the Ottoman State in that time. That was a good man and he helped him both to... he settled in a boarding highschool led by him, as Themo did not have any money. Mr. Naciu, who was philantropist and who helped all the emigrants who appealed to him, showed him as pecial consideration and supported him a lot by giving him money.. (…) In his memories, Themo said that Naciu used to be a good friend of the Turks, so every time, they spoke about them he used to say: «Oh, this Istambul leaders, who trust the Patriachy from Phanar! Since they came to Moldavia and Wallachia, the Phanariote rulers, sent by them and raised with the idea of Pahanariote propaganda, beside they troubled Romanians, they also disturbed Turkey’s political interests. The Phanar, that nest of intrigues stiil does an open propaganda agaisnt Turkey, by ecploiting the Christians’ faith». (…) Finally, Themo after attending for a year the lectures given by professor Manolescu, a famous Romanian doctor, specialized in eye diseases,in order to

28 Lavinia Dacia Gheorghe complte his ophtalmological training and learn the Romanian languag ; then, he needed the equivalence of his diploma by the direction of the sanitary service, by exam, he presented his application to the ministry of internal affairs, where he went with Mr. Naciu. However, Mr. Felix, who was the general director of the sanitary service, when reading the application, he gave it back saying: «This gentelman is Turkish. Until now, he have nor received any Turkish doctor.» Mr. Naciu, getting closer to hie ear, said: «I think that in science, especially medicine, there is no religion or nationality. I do not understand why you refuse a Musliman, as long as you receive hundreds of foreigners?». That time the newspapers in Bucharest used to write in a worried manner about the Armenians’ attack upon the Ottoman bank. The director: «Mr. Naciu, haven’t you read in the newpapers about the Turkish barbarian act after the Attack upon the Ottoman bank in Galaţi, when hundreds of Armenians were masacrated? I cannot accept a Turkish doctor to work in our country!» Naciu: «Yes, You can accep, Mr Director! At my turn, I regret to say I did not expect such an answer from you who are an educated man and have a high position. Please, tell me, what would we do if the Muslims in Dobruja revolt against our state?You know very well that, last week, our government asked the firemen to dispel the revolted people against the conservative party, who, thanks God, were Romanians? So, I cannot understand how corrcet would be to refuse a man of science for the reason he is a Muslim, mostly because he ran from the Turkish politics, he fouded a shelter in Romania, thinking honestly that he would serve the Muslim population in Dobruja.» When hearing htese words, the director gave up his ideas, and he sent the application ot the examinating committee. After two months, doctor Themo gave an exam and he got the approval to work as a doctor in Romania.7 As a consequence,doctor Ibrahim Themo, who feraless showed his poition against the Sultan, in the most diffiults years of the absolutist terror, when everyone was very scared, and he acted as one of the most skilful people who organized the movement and spread propaganda, fighting continuously and energically for the benefit of his country and people, calling all the intellectuals and workes, as well as all the patriots to unity and resolute fight gainst the absolutist domination, afte he got the right to work and being sure of a free life away from any danger, he began to think at his fellows in ideas and work, he was looking for them, he found them and began to write to them. From that moment, he increased his political activity he did not abandon even for a moment. His sent his firt letter to his friend Regeb Lakteş, where he left his clothes and uniform.This devoted young man, keeping his word, as soon as he received

7 In two years, Erhem became a Romanian citizen. Cf. Jeran Unver Nasrattinoglu, Ibrahim Themo şi Atatürk, in „Istoria comunităţii Albaniane din Romania”, vol. 1, Buc., 2002, p. 156. The aricle was taken over in „Anuarul Albanezul 40. Supliment al revistei „Albanezul”, 1995, p. 24-27.

The revolutionary doctor Ibrahim Themo in Romania 29 the first letter from Themo, he gave this letter to his trusted friends, establishing a connection between Themo with Istambul. So, that from now on, he had enough time to concentrate all his ardent spirit not only upon his sacred ideal which had to be fulfilled at any price, and for which he di not spare any effort or matwerial and moral sacrifice until he managed to achieve it. His friend of ideas began io write to him regularly, and getting him up-to- date with the events in Turkey and he hurried to answer rapidly with every ship who left Constanţa. He received from there heart-breaking news whodid harm to him and poisoned his heart. They communicated him that, after he left, the leaders arrested many people from the faculty and civilian schools for officers of all arms, poets, journalists, civilian clercks, workers, students from the seminary, some of the church leaders and stuffee them in the barrcaks from-Cîşla in Pera, were they were subjcted to a harsh interrogatory in front of the martial court, especially set for them. After the judgement, there were exiled to Tripolitania, with the ship Şeref, under the direct watch of Mustafa Paşa, seventy eight people of these sacrified friends. In the same time, friends and fellows of ideas as Abdullah Gevdet, Ishak Şukuti and other were banished on different islands. He had his heart broken and he began to help both financially and from moral point of view (?) and he managed to help him to flee to Egypt, and in 1898, (?) to move to Paris. Şukuti worked a lot from all point of views, writing articles to the newspapers which were published in Egypt, Paris, London, Geneva, Bruxelles and Italy. Thinking that now he must spend time doing nothing abroad, and that it was necessary to increse his activity, he began to search for all who could help him. First, he discovered his fellow of ideas, Şefik Bey, former director at a neswpaper, who took part at first meeting at the villa of the Albanian Aluş, who was Ottoman in Giurgiu. In a severe cold day, he went to him. Though he was an official, Şefik Bey, received him with great pleasure and offered him hospitality for three days. They discussed about the association.Themo told him that since he established closed connections with Istanbul, he did want to spend his time anymore doing nothing and he wanted to send a manifest, as soon as possible. Şefik accepted and he wrote immediatly a brochure with the title „movement”8. In Romania, as there were no Turkish newspaper, he went to Bulgaria, at Rusciuc, where there was published the newspaper Tuna, meaning „The Danube”. So, he croseed over the Danube with a boat in that severe cold, exposing himself to drwon and he reached to the tipography of the above mentioned newspaper. He was surprised to see there his former colleague Mustafa Regîp, who worked at (?) printing. Ragîp, seeing him, he was troubled and he expressed his astonishment and joy, saying: «Oh, your majesty». But Themo, pretending that he did not know

8 It is about the brochure Haraket (Mişcarea) – where he urges to the fight for changing the sultan Abdul Hamid’s regime.

30 Lavinia Dacia Gheorghe him, made him a sign discretly to understand that he should be silent. After he met the readctor, he gave him the manifest to study it and asked him to answer in the following day.Then, he went out, making a sign to Ragîp to follow him. Ragîp told himm, that the readctors, though, they were living in arather free country as Bulgaria was at that time, they avoid to raise the Turkish Sultan’s susceptiblity. Next day, he said to the redactors who he was, and little by little convinced them to join the association. The redactors asked him to wait until the brochure was published, as they were watched by the Turkish consulate and it was bad to hurry. However, in these days, there were very importnat events in Turkey. So, Themo was thinking to print as soon as possible the manifest and send it to the destination. Then, Mustafa Ragîp proposed him to take him along, declaring him that he would do everything possible to help him and he would publish the brochure if Themo can put at his disposal a litograph stone with the necessary material. When he came back to Giurgiu, he presented to Şefic Bey the situation in Bulgaria and that he spent the money with which he came, he asked for a small amount to go to Bucharest together with Ragîp and multiply the brochure with the stone. The consul was happy and advised him to go to Mr. Alfred Rustem, prim secreatry of the Ottoman Embassy in Bucharest, who were their partisan. And to speak him closely and to ask him to give him the necessary money in order to support the national interest. If Themo cold not give back the money, hewould give them back to Rustem. He met Mr. Alfred Rustem by Mr. Zak Levi, a Jewish who was translator from Turkish at the Romanian ministery of external affairs. Receiving 350 lei from him, he bought stone and they litographed 500 brochures (?) and they sent them to be spread in the entire Turkey, by his trusted people who received letters from him through the post offices from (?) Istanbul, Izmir, Salonic and Trebizonda. These days, the Persian Riza killed the Iran shah. The hero Riza woked in book shop in Istambul, and he met him by Şukiuti and for a long time he helped Themo a lot when he began to work for their association. Themo who received letters from Bucharest about Riza’s action, said that in the moment when this hero was hung, he said the following words «When my legs leave the land and my head goes to the skies, I see my country’s raise.» Using the shah assasinate,Themo sent a separate manifest about this event, in order to inpsire enthusiasm and activate the Turkish people. At the beginning of this manifest, there can be seen the following line: (…missing). Later on, he received the news that his trusted man Rageb Lakteş was exiled to Erzerum, where he suffered a lot seven years he spent there. Though, he worked a lot to help him he could not manage. In spite of all these, he continued to receive regularly letters with very important news. Some of these letters became histrical documents, and there could be found 2,000 of them in the decesed house. Before the war between 1916

The revolutionary doctor Ibrahim Themo in Romania 31 and1917 (?.) They were donated to the Albanian Embassy from Bucharest by my deceased siste Nafie Themo, in 1959. Further on, we reproduce some of them, in order to have an opinion about their content: (…missing). As one can see, from these letters’ content, it is obvious that doctor Ibrahim Themois the main element in the entire young turks movement, and even those against he fought cannot pass over this aspect, either the most envious of his friends, who wanted to put him in a shadow,in order to take his place. Finnaly, all of them capitulate in front of the huge work of this man who used to be an endless source of energy and skilful features, they recognize his merits and they honour him in a very high way.” The lieutenanat-colonel in the Ottoman Marine, Ali Riza Kârâmzade - political refugee in Romania - and Medgidia’s mayor, Kemâl Hagi Ahmet, helped him, between 1896 and 1897, to create numerous sections of the movement in Dobruja, and Ibrahim Themo was leading the committee. The committee included not only political refugees from Turkey, but also leaders of the local population, intellectulas and priests.9 Ibrahim Themo’s personality and actions represented a real threat for the Ottoman regime and sultans’ men tried many times to assassinate him. Once, they sent Kadri Bey, under the cover of Consul in Romania, to murder him. However, Ibrahim Themo convinced Kadri Bey „to join” his group and to settle in Romania. After many failures, there were also other manners to convince Themo to give up his fight. The Ottoman authorities acted not only against Themo himself, but also against his organization. The movement’s periodical „Sedai Millet” („The Nation’s Voice”) was published in that period, in Bucharest, and, on the 15th of December, 1897, there was opened an annonimus society led by Vasile M. Kogălniceanu, in order to publish this periodical. The publication fought against the absolutism in the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman authorities asked the Romanian government to forbid it. Under these circumstances, the activity of the organization „Young Turks” - including Themo’s activity developed in two directions: a legal and an illegal one.From the first point of view, Ibrahim Themo and his followers founded schools in Turkish in the Dobrujan seetlements – where they brought teachers with advanced views -, they urged population to send children to school and they mulitated for women emancipation. Illegally, they continued the political activity, spreading publications brought from abroad, giving conferences and bringing new members into the organization.10 The movement Mişcarea „Junilor Turkishi” was on the decline after 1900, when its leaders, Ahmed Riza and the prince Sabahaddin separated. The Committee in Dobruja and Bulgaria led by Ibrahim Themo continued its activity.

9 Ibrahim Themo, op. cit.; Mehmet Ali Ekrem, Din istoria turcilor dobrogeni, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 139-140. 10 Mehmet Ali Ekrem Ekrem, op. cit., p.141-142.

32 Lavinia Dacia Gheorghe

For his actions against the sultan, in 1901, dr. Themo was sentenced to death by a Turkish military court.11 In 1902, Themo resigned from the hospital in Medgidia and left for Paris, for a year, in order to train in medicine practice, but also to get in touch with the members of the organization „Young Turks”.12 In the same year, he participated in the capital of France, to the first congress of the Ottoman liberals, where he played an important role in organizing the event.13 In 1903, when he came back to Romania, dr. Ibrahim Themo was sent ot the hospital in Hârşova, town where he settled a school in Turkish language. In the same year, he was moved to Constanţa, where, beside the medical activity, he founded together with the Turkish Committe, „a Turkish secondary school for youngsters’ education”.14 He was elected vice-president of the Muslim Community.15 In 1906, he moved to Constanţa, where he worked in Anadalchioi district.16 În acelaşi an, Petru Vulcan îl prezenta astfel: „He is the only Muslim doctor in Constanţa county, where he used to be a district doctor for about ten years and he brought real services to the Muslim population, in spite of the fact that this population is fatalist and in case of sickenss or epidemic, people do not ask for medical help, and they either they go to the mullah or they resign. Doctor Themo managed to determine the Muslim population to come to him in case of need, through a paternal behaviour, as we know that the Muslim women prefer to die than to ask for a Christian doctor. Beside the medical support, doctor Temo managed to determine Muslims and Tartars to take hygiene into consideration. Specific features: he is a remarkable nationalist citizen and he dreams but Albania’s political emancipation, which he wants to be an empire..., if possible”.17 In Constanţa, he used to be one of the founders of the Albanian society Beshkimi” („Unirea”) - in 1906 -, society whose vice-president was for a time, playing an important role at the Congress in Bucharest.18 Under his influence, the Albanian Community in Dobruja diversified its cultural activity, and the Society

11 Dicţionar de personalităţi dobrogene, vol. 1, Ed. Ex Ponto, Constanţa, 2004, p. 291. 12 MINAC, Themo collection, inv. 6338. 13 There are two tendencies here: the majoritay one, having as main representative prince Sabaheddin, who militated for maintaing the connections with the European powers, following the idea that these powers will pressure the sultan to compell him to respect his own Constitution from December 1876 and t give rights to all subjects; the monoritary tendency was against the relationships with the foreigners and militated for organizing a Turkish party. Cf. Stavro Stendi, op. cit. 14 Ibrahim Themo, op. cit,, 1939. 15 MINAC, Themo collection, inv. 6338. 16 Tănase Bujduveanu, op.cit., p. 29. 17 Petru Vulcan, Albumul naţional al Dobrogei 1866-1877-1906, Tipografia Regală, Buc., 1906 18 Stavro Stendi, op. cit.

The revolutionary doctor Ibrahim Themo in Romania 33

„Beshkimi” elaborated, in 1910, its own rules.19 In 1905, The Albanian School „Lumina” was opened and Ibrahim Themo used to be the Council president.20 Under the circumstances of the political conditions in the Ottoman Empire and in the entire world, there was a congress organized by the movement „Young Turks”, between 27-29th December, 1907, with the participation of the Dobrujan delagation led by Ibrahim Themo. He supported the idea of a centralized Empire.21 In 1908, he gave a speech at a meeting of the Democrat Conservatory Party led by Tache Ionescu.22 The conclusion is that he was already participating to the poltical life in Romania. The „ Young Turks” victory in 1908 increased Ibrahim Themo’s activity. Ahmet Mencşi describes the development of the events:

„ NIAZI BEY’s MARCH” (…) The national assembly allows to bring to life his principles (Themo n.n.) which pleased him a lot. Themo who had connections with Niazi’s movement was waiting full of hope and worry the news from Albania, as they promissed to him that tey would wait for him at the Bulgarian’s border to go together to Istanbul, but this did not happen because Niazi rushed his march to (?). Hardly Themo came from Bulgaria, where he left to meet Niazi Bey and they arrived together in Istanbul, as they established before through their connection individuals. Certainly, he was disappointed, though he was pleased with the great achievement, not kowing for sure if the stranding of the meeting with the Bey, as the consequence of Niazi Bey’s bad intention or to the fact that the events rushed and he arrived too late. When this news came from Romania, we used to live in Anadalchioi, in my brother in law’s house, where a lot of people came with flags and shouting: Long live Dr. Themo! Long live the man who organized the young people, the revolution and who brought the liberty. Though I was scared, I did not leave him at all, and he was really very nervous so he could not speak. Finally, he people took him and gave him a ride to Constanţa and acclaimed him as the most important man. (…) In Constanţa, he gave a very enthusiatic speech near Ovid’s statue and he was applauded and interrupted all the time because of the ovations; he ended his sppech urging to fraternity and teaching that the liberty they gained shoud not be transformed in anarchy. The, all of them left for the Turkish consulate, where

19 Gelcu Maksutovici, Istoria comunităţii Albaniane din Romania, Ed. Kriterion, Buc., 1992, ă/55 20 Ismet Dermaku, Școala libaneză „Lumina” de la Constanţa (1905-1912), in „Anuarul Albanianul”, Bucharest, nr. 403, 1998. 21 Tănase Bujduveanu, op.cit., p. 33. 22 Stoica Lascu, Crearea şi activitatea organizaţiilor judeţene Constanţa ale partidelor politice (1908- 1916), in „Comunicări de istorie a Dobrogei”, 2, 1983, p. 187.

34 Lavinia Dacia Gheorghe the consul was scared that they would hatrm him; but Themo, after he assured him that nothing bad would happen, asked him to give a speech, to which he also answered and then they went to the banquet and I came back home. Since the day when the constitution was declared, there were coming telegrams for congratulating him, coming from the entire world, and through the telegrams from Istanbul they were calling him to come there as soon as possible… Next day, he began to prepare himself for leaving to Istambul. His sister was against this, but she couldn’t manage to convince him, so that night he left with the Romanian ship and I heard he was received very well, and after that there was his story in the pages... After short time, when he came back from there and he found about the Turkish government intervention to the Romanian government to send him for some time there as he was needed a lot his presence. When,the Romanian government approved this request, we all left for Constantinople. When our ship arrived closed to the port Galata, we saw a crowd of people who were waiting for him and cheered him for a long time.”

In Istanbul, he was proposed to be candidate for the Turkish Parliament. As they fight fellows insisted upon him to remain in Turkey, he came back to Constanţa, he resigned from the hospital and also he sold his house in Anadalchioi village - today district in Constanţa - and he left together with his family for Istanbul, where he was appointed the head of the city Sanitary Inspectorate, than, director of the Charity Institute.23 On January, 8th, there was organized a banquet in his honour, in Constanţa, on the occasion of his appointment by the Turkish government as a doctor in Pera district.24 As a consequence of the conflicts with the right wing of the government party, Ibrahim Themo, felt like was betrayed, so he resigned from the leadership team of the Charity Institute and the party, and, in 1909, he founded the Ottoman Democratic Party - with a programme to redress Turkey; this party activated in opposition with the „Young Turks” -, which would be united with the Party for Liberty and Solidarity.25 Disgusted by this „war”, Ibrahim Themo came back to Constanţa, in January 1911, where he received his former position.26 Ahmet Mencşi tells that Ibrahim Themo, „…in 1912, as a leader of a young Romanian team, he was sent to Constantinople, where he made miracles wiht the Romanian doctors, to whom, when he left, the Turks gave decorations and golden watch, as a sign of gratitude for the responsible way to make their duty and as beautiful memory.

23 Ibrahim Themo, op. cit. 24 Adrian Ilie, Valea Kara-Su în perioada secolelor XIV-XIX. Monografie istorică, Medgidia, 2008, p. 71; „Viitorul Dobrogei”, 1909 A, p. 3. 25 Jeran Unver Nasrattinoglu, op. cit., p. 157. 26 Ibrahim Themo, op. cit.

The revolutionary doctor Ibrahim Themo in Romania 35

In 1914, he was also sent to Albania, with a Romanian medical team and he did a lot of services to the wounded people, and mostly to the population who suffered from yellow feve, which brought death to them. During World War I 1914-1918, he was drafted as a doctor in the area of people coming from Moldavia, where he fought a lot with exanthemum fever, making good to the people in the hospital and also to the population in Moldavia, Dingeni region.” 27 In the biography written by Ahmed Mencşi, he said that Ibrahim Themo, „when coming back to the country, he joined the People’s party, which he considered to be democratic.He was elected senator, and on this occasion he gained for the veterinaries the title of doctor, he served this country, by convincing the population in Ada-Kaleh who was still under Turkish domination to request the island’s joining to Romania, and that was done immediatly after those inhabitants’ intervention who asked for the Romanian protection. When he settled in Dobruja and he saw the Muslim population for the first time, he was amazed by the the backward stateof this population who lived ain a much more civilized country than the country where he came from. He used to say they were so ignorant, savage and fanatic as one cannot imagine. They were stuffed with religious ideas wronly presented by the mullahs who did not know the Koran content or the religion; Turkish people avoided to get into contact with the Christians or to learn foreign languages, fact considerd the worst of the sins Women did not go to doctors at all, and not even to Christian women doctors, so thenew born children’s mortality. Women covered totally in order not to be seen but by their husbands and the closest relatives. From cultural point of view, they were near zero and they did not even want to learn as they did not respect education.The population did not trust the educated people who were few and whom they considered unfaithful. Though the Romanian state opened largely the primary and superior schools for them, they refused to go to attend them. Only few educated people allowed their children to go to school, where they were trained as well prepared officers. As Themo wanted to bring them on the right path, he was very patient and he did a continuous propaganda, working restless for changing this lamentable condition; in time, he managed to convince them to to go to the state schools and he managed to open schools for them in different parts in Dobruja, thus he contributed to the people education, progress and civilization. The Muslims in Constanţa, though they managed to put of the right path the educational problem by employing good and educated school masters in order to form the large school they had built, had but few school masters and educators in the Romanian schools, and one can say they were almost absent..

27 MINAC, Themo collection, f.n.

36 Lavinia Dacia Gheorghe

Both for completing this lack, and also to train the necessary school masters for Constanţa and Tulcea counties, in 1900, he went to Bucharest with a delegation of educated people and he intervened at the minister of Public Education and Cultes, where he gained the approval to move the Muslim Seminary „Gazi Ali Paşa” from Babadag, to Midjidia, which was situated in the cenre of Dobruja and had a lot of Musliman population, in the building with eight classrooms and bedrooms, which was raised by the local population donations and which he passed under the tate care under the name of „State Muslim Seminaryt”and he also changed its programme in a programme of educational school. When the Seminary was moved to Midjidia and the new programme with selected teachers was adopted, this religious school progressed step by step training school masters and mullahs in order to meet the population cultural needs in the entire Dobruja. Later on,in this school there were also trained mufties and cadies. In the same time, the Arabian and Persian languages were replaced to a great extent, and later on, there was also replaced the Turkish semitic alpahbet with the Latin one and thsi helped a lot the pupils’ progress. Then, the French language was also studied. As he wanted the population’s progress, he worked for 15 years as a teacher of hygiene in this small source of culture, through which he managed tat hsi students spread the hygiene and medical knowledge to the population and to urge them to trust Romanians, as they saved Turks’ lives.”28 He also raised a school for the Turkish girls with his own money and with money donated by Romanians. Şcoala îi purta numele. The school beared his name. As a senator, he intervened to the Ministry of Education and obtained year scholarships in the highschools in the country for some poor Moslim pupils originary from the four Dobrujan counties.29 Themo also managed the recognition of the title of doctor for the veterinary surgeons.30 In 1928, Ibrahim Themo was member in the Council of the „urban commune Medgidia”31, and, after six years, he used to be one of the members of the County Council of the People’s Party, president of the organization in Medgidia. In 1936, he participated to the Congress of the Medical Balkan Union in Istanbul, representing Romania.32 Ibrahim Themo founded periodicals, collaborated and supported publications, but he also published books both for education system and with political content. In 1915, he edited Conducătorul conversaţiunei în Româneşte şi

28 MINAC, Themo collection, f.n. 29 MINAC, Themo collection, inv. 6338; Ibrahim Themo, op. cit. 30 MINAC, Themo collection, inv. 6338. 31 Aurelia Lăpuşan, Ştefan Lăpuşan, op. cit.,, Constanţa, 1996, p. 191. 32 Jeran Unver Nasrattinoglu, op. cit., p. 157.

The revolutionary doctor Ibrahim Themo in Romania 37

Turceşte (Romanian-Turkish Conversation Book) and two volumes of the Turkish-Romanian Dictionary. In 1937, he wrote an interesting brochure dedicated to Kemal Atatürk, with the title Why I care for Atatürk?33. He also wrote medical works and numerous other publications, some of them with religious content. In 1939, he wrote in Turkish, My memories about the foundation of the Association Union and Progress and about my duties in the service of the country and of the national revolution. Medgidia, 1939.34 He died in 1945 and, according to the letter he left to be opened after his death, he was burried, in „a coffin lined with zinc sheet and covered by the flag of my adoptive country”, in the Muslim cemetery in Medgidia. He was accompanied, according to his wish „by my students whom I loved”. The same letter mentions his wish not to be organized „the ordinary funeral feast; I consider I did a lot of charity when I was alive:I cured people, generally free treatment for the blinds’ sight to which I restored their eyesight; I helped the people in need and I protected 23 orphans, who today are doctors, lawyers, officers, schoolmasters, workers etc. Instead of the funeral feast, where the rich people jostle their way to the front and the poor people are looking at them how they eat, I want that, for there days, you give to the needy people in the town, 100 fresh breads and a quarter kilo yellow cheese for each of them, precisely in the bakery”. His wish was fulfilled35 and it reveals a lot about the man who was Ibrahim Themo. He was Albanian, trained in an Ottomans school, he used to know the European ideas very well; he was Dobrujan by adoption and feeling, and he was not only involved activerly and with good results in the political life of the Empire Ottoman and Albania, as well, but he also marked in an important manner the Muslim life, culture and spiritualityin Romania, and mostly, in the province recently included into the Country, Dobruja.

33 Kristia Maksutovici, Confluenţe culturale româno/Albaniane, Ed. Kriterion, Buc., 1995, p. 149. 34 Gelcu Sefedin Maksutovici,op. cit., p. 335- 336. 35 MINAC, Themo collection, f.n. ; Gelcu Sefedin Maksutovici, op. cit., p. 335 Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 38 Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 39

PART TWO

1912-1913: The Balkan Wars

Leonida MOISE The Southeast European Context in the Period of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 41 Jipa ROTARU Involvement of Romania in the Second Balkan War - Retrospective Sketch - 49 Ion GIURCĂ The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 61 Costin SCURTU The Romanian Troops of Dobrudja in the Bulgarian Campaign of 1913 81 Ioana RIEBER Romania and Germany: Friends and Interests in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) 95 Enache TUŞA The Peace of Bucharest of 1913: Political Effects and Demographic Realities in Southern Dobrogea 109

40 Lavinia Dacia Gheorghe Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 41

THE SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN CONTEXT IN THE PERIOD OF THE BALKAN WARS, 1912-1913

Leonida MOISE

Abstract. Between 1912 and 1913, the Balkan Peninsula was affected by two wars, which are known in the region historiography, as well as in the public consciousness as the Balkan Wars. The process of ending the Ottoman domination over the states in that area generated a virulent campaign for clarifying the ethnic as well as territorial identity. Not involved in the First Balkan War, in 1912, Romania firmly imposed its point of view in the Second Balkan War, in 1913, after Bulgaria had surprisingly attacked its former allies. The Peace Treaty of Bucharest, masterfully led and concluded by Titu Maiorescu, the Romanian Prime Minister, laid the foundations for a balance of forces in the region. Romania became an important actor in the area because of his mediating role recognised by both the belligerents and the great powers.

Keywords: peace, war, conference, accord, diplomacy, alliance, armistice

One should search for the origins of the Balkan Wars in the years 1912-1913 in the situation occurred in the Balkan Peninsula in the late 19th century and early 20th century. The new independent states, emerged after 1878, were faced with particularly complex issues related to the fate of the territories still under Ottoman rule and to the drawing of borders. On the other hand, the states in the region were convinced that it was only together that they would get rid of the Turkish domination in Southeast Europe, despite their divergences, especially as far as splitting the liberated territories was concerned. Therefore, following negotiations between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, military treaties and alliances were concluded, which, in certain situations, such as the case of the Bulgarian-Serbian Treaty, had a secret annex stipulating that Serbia was bound to start a military intervention against Romania, if our country would have attacked Bulgaria, just as Bulgaria undertook to support Serbia in case of an Austro-Hungarian attack. The undeniable truth was that all states in the Balkans, including the Romanian one, located north of the Danube, had to reach an extremely sensitive goal, namely of accomplishing national unity, by getting back certain territories, which were part of the Ottoman and Austro-

 Phd. Dr., Hyperion University, Bucharest.

42 Leonida Moise

Hungarian Empires at that moment1. Another fact that also had to be taken into account was that the political evolution of the states in the region was influenced and most of the times determined by the position of the great powers, which had their own interests in the Balkans. For instance, after being defeated in 1866, losing the Italian possessions, and in order to survive, Austria-Hungary became a dual state, the area in which it was able to exert a big influence being Southeast Europe2. In its turn, Russia unreservedly backed Bulgaria and Serbia, going so far as to establish a Balkan alliance that would help it reach the straits. Romania was reluctant to the Balkan alliance of the three states and tried to keep normal relations with both the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire. The relations between our country and Greece were normal, improved by the meeting between the Romanian and Greek monarchs, during which a trade convention was signed. After the Turks in Dobrogea received compensations, Romania’s relations with the Ottoman Empire progressed significantly, also thanks to the decree of the Sultan in 1905, which granted Aromanians the same rights as the other nationalities. The ascending evolution of the relations between the two enabled the increase in the exchanges of visits at different levels and the signing of consular conventions. Our country’s relations with Serbia, although marked by the policy of assimilation of the Romanians in the Timoc-Morava area, were based on supporting Belgrade against the aggressive policy of Austria- Hungary3. Moreover, Romania embraced a benevolent attitude towards the neighbouring country, Bulgaria, the proclamation of independence of this state being received with great sympathy in our country, which recognised it before the great powers. Unfortunately, Bulgaria consistently carried a policy that was hostile to the Romanian state, believing that Dobrogea was integral part of the Bulgarian patrimony4. Under these circumstances, when Bulgaria’s tendency to expand its territory by attacking Turkey was obvious, and given that certain Bulgarian leaders pressed for reclaiming Dobrogea as well, Romania, in order to maintain the balance of forces in the region, demanded that the strategy of compensations should be applied, namely that our country should receive a territory up to the Rusciuk- Varna or the Silistra-Varna line. A series of events would complicate even more the situation in the Balkans. The Young Turks movement, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, in October 1918, the aggressive

1 Gheorghe Zbuchea, România şi războaiele balcanice, 1912-1913, pagini de istorie sud-est europeană, Editura Albatros, Bucureşti, 1999, pp. 43-44. 2 L. Raicu, V. Cristian, Gh. Platon (coord.), România în relaţiile internaţionale, 1699-1939, Editura Junimea, Iaşi, 1980, p. 305. 3 Gheorghe Zbuchea, op. cit, p. 21. 4 G. Dabija, Amintirile unui ataşat militar la Sofia, Bucureşti, 1936, p. 136.

The Southeast European Context in the Period of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 43 policy of the Dual Monarchy towards Serbia all generated an explosive situation in the Balkans, the general belief being that all the tension would eventually led to the outbreak of a war that would spread across the entire continent. The war waged by Italy against the Ottoman Empire for Tripolitania was the signal for the three Balkan states to start the attacks. Under these circumstances, Montenegro launched hostilities on 9 October 1912, and was joined, on 17 October, by the three allies. Even though the great powers were convinced that Turkey would win, the events unfolded favourably for the Balkan allies, which were successful on all fronts. Turkey called for the truce, which was signed on 3 December 1912. At the London Conference, which began on 17 December 1912, Romania submitted its applications for compensation, which included a settlement of the border with Bulgaria to the Black Sea and the incorporation of Silistra in the Romanian state. The Bulgarian delegation, headed by the President of the Sobranie (the National Assembly), Stoian Danev, tried to avoid making a serious commitment, saying that his answer was to be announced at the completion of negotiations with Turkey. Faced with the reluctance shown by Bulgarians, Romania changed its attitude and demanded the Turtucaia-Balcic line, and to prove that it was willing to take any action, including the military one, in order to achieve that goal, the Chamber of Deputies approved, on 30 December 1912, a loan of 151 million lei for the armed forces5. Moreover, according to our country’s diplomatic representative in London, Mişu, Bulgaria agreed only with a minor correction to the border with Romania, Silistra not being, in any event, the subject to the negotiations with the Romanian side. The intervention of Nicolae Filipescu during the Crown Council on 12 January 1913 shows how much it mattered for Romania’s image to obtain a favourable outcome in that matter: “The Romanians from Transilvania, from Basarabia, from Bucovina are watching us, if we are humiliated, all prestige falls”6. Romania’s position became radical on 9 January, when King Carol I informed the Bulgarian Government that the Bulgarian proposals could not be accepted and, given the situation, the Romanian military would be forced to occupy the Turtucaia-Balcic line. The dialogue between Ionel Brătianu and Titu Maiorescu is also interesting in this respect. When accused by Brătianu that Romania lost its train (allusion to the non-intervention in the First Balkan War), Maiorescu said: “You are wrong, Romania’s train is just arriving”7. Taking note of Romania’s intention to occupy the Turtucaia-Balcic line, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Berchtold assured the Romanian authorities that he would prevent any action that... “could make the establishment of good relations

5 Titu Maiorescu, România, Războaiele Balcanice şi Cadrilaterul, Editura Machiavelli, Bucureşti, 1995, p. 59. 6 Alexandru Marchiloman, Note politice, volumul I, p. 143. 7 Titu Maiorescu, op. cit., p. 114.

44 Leonida Moise between Romania and Bulgaria impossible”8. The fact that the intervention of Austria-Hungary in favour of Romania was mentioned, in case of a Serbian- Bulgarian attack, did not calm down the Bucharest leadership, as insistent calls for moderation and a number of warnings given to our country led to the idea that the Dual Monarchy was backing Bulgaria. The situation had become so clear that the pro-Bulgarian policy of the Viennese diplomacy, combined with the forced Hungarianisation of Romanians from Transilvania by the authorities in Budapest, made even King Carol I, an advocate for the Alliance with the Central Powers, believe what Marghiloman said, that in foreign policy we should be “courteous with Russia”9. Our country became close to Russia in the circumstances in which France supported the Romanian demands and tried to influence Russia to support Romania in its efforts10. Beyond the disputes with Bulgaria, on the issue of compensations, the Romanian Government was convinced that resolving the hardships of the situation of the Romanians in Transilvania could not be solved with Austria-Hungary, but with the support of France and Russia. Thus, the head of the Liberals, Ionel Brătianu, informed Blondel, French Minister in Bucharest, that “the day will come when the Austro-Hungarian establishment will collapse and the disparate elements that make it up will go to their aspirations”, and, in that moment, mentioned the Liberal leader, Romania should be able to “receive our brothers in Transilvania without anyone opposing it and to this end we can benefit from Russia’s support”11. The one to best notice Romania’s strategic importance in the geopolitical plans of Austria-Hungary was the heir to the throne of the Dual Monarchy, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who, in a letter to the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, pointed out: “Thank God that you are also of the opinion that, first of all, Romania should be helped. Romania and its brilliant King are for us, after Germany, the most important ally and it must be aware of our friendship right now, in that we will do everything to fulfil its wishes. Bulgaria and its totally fake and frivolous King are not close to us, they are far from us and our interests and come a long, long after Romania... I am confident that Your Excellency will solve this problem in a particular way and will use everything to strengthen Romania and to link it to us even more, for now and for the future”12. In reality, Count Berchtold wanted to support Romania and Bulgaria at the same time, the great dilemma of Austria-Hungary being that the interests of both

8 Călin-Radu Ancuţa, Arhiducele Franz Ferdinand şi rolul său în relaţiile româno-austro-ungare, Fundaţia pentru democraţie şi educaţie politică, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 202. 9 Ibid, p. 203. 10 C. Nuţu, România în anii neutralităţii (1914-1916), Editura Ştiinţifică, Bucureşti, 1972, p. 65. 11 Ştefan Pascu, Făurirea statului naţional unitar român, 1918, Editura Academiei, Bucureşti, 1983, p. 325. 12 Călin-Radu Ancuţa, op. cit., pp. 204-205.

The Southeast European Context in the Period of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 45 countries were irreconcilable and could not support one of them without harming the other’s interests. In his turn, Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the Great General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces, expressed his confusion regarding this issue: “How could the Monarchy deal with this dilemma? Austria cannot go against Bulgaria with... Serbia, but it cannot go against Romania with Bulgaria...”13. Eventually, Austria-Hungary supported the interests of Bulgaria, something that did not go unnoticed by Romania, and that was the very reason why our country sought another solution to achieve its national objectives. Because there were fears regarding the alliance with Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria tried to reopen negotiations with Romania, to resolve the disputes in question. The rigid position of Bulgarian diplomats made it impossible for progress to be made in terms of border changes. Noting that the great powers were not interested in settling the Romanian demands and not even in preventing a conflict between Romania and Bulgaria, Romanian Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu urged Bulgaria to respond promptly and effectively and, if he did not receive a convenient offer, he threatened that the Romanian state would resort to the military solution to fulfil its objectives. The firmness of the Romanian government led to the signing, on 29 January 1913, of a protocol in which the two countries presented their views. The dissatisfaction of the Romanian representatives to the Bulgarian offer prompted further talks. With all the evidence of the non-involvement of Austria-Hungary in Romania’s pressing problems, even though the Romanian Kingdom was the ally of the great power, King Carol I agreed to extend the Treaty of Alliance with the Dual Monarchy in early February. After the signing of the Treaty, on 5 February 1913, by Prince Fürstenberg, Minister of Austria-Hungary in Bucharest, and Romanian Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu, King Carol I told the head of the Romanian Government to postpone sending the Treaty for ratification to Emperor Franz Joseph, because in the event of the coming to power of the Liberals, Ion Brătianu would certainly not agree to extend the Treaty, because of the Dual Monarchy did not support Romania in the disputes with Bulgaria14. Despite the fact that both the ambassador and the military attaché of Austria- Hungary in Romania repeatedly pointed out in Vienna that it was likely that our country would distance itself from Austria-Hungary and Germany, those who were in charge of the foreign policy of the two great powers were misled by the resigning of the treaty of alliance, hoping that Romania would still remain in the influence area of the Central Powers.

13 A. Oţetea, D. Berindei, N. Fotino, C. Mureşan, Le situation internationale et la politique étrengére de l'Autriche, Editura Academiei, Bucureşti, 1965, p. 226. 14 Călin Radu-Ancuţa, op. cit, p. 207.

46 Leonida Moise

Nicolae Iorga noted at that time: “For us it can be said that the issue of Transilvania is being discussed across the Danube” and anticipated that over the Danube: “will start the war against the Austrian will”15. In turn, Take Ionescu rather eloquently expressed the state of mind of Romanian politicians: “we go through Bulgaria to get to Transilvania”16. As the tension between Romania and Bulgaria increased and there was no hope that the situation would calm down, the six great powers held a conference of ambassadors at St. Petersburg in late March with a mission to establish the new Romanian-Bulgarian border17. The Austro-Hungarian representative, Count Thur, argued that Romania should receive Silistra, but pleaded for Bulgaria to receive Thessaloniki as a compensation for the loss of Silistra. The attempts made by Austrian ambassador to give Bulgaria, at first, Thessaloniki and then the islands of Thasos and Samatraca were rejected by the German ambassador, because Germany wanted to attract Greece in the Triple Alliance, the country being, from the point of view of the German state, more important than Bulgaria. Although the Central Powers supported Romania to meet its claims, virtually, besides Silistra, the border was not rectified in the Mangalia area, a territory that would have allowed the construction of a military port at the Black Sea. Practically, at the end of the conference in St. Petersburg, the compensations demanded by Romania were not resolved, our southern border remaining vulnerable18. The dissatisfaction of Romanian authorities was suggestively presented by P.P. Carp in the Parliament19: “This is ridiculous. Not even the size of my Ţibăneşti estate”. To respect the historical truth, we must recognise that Germany was more active in supporting the Romanian rights as compared with Austria-Hungary, which, through the voice of its foreign minister, Count Berchtold, was trying to show that Bulgaria was a counterweight against Serbia, and regarding Romania he displayed an unrealistic optimism, believing that our country would not distance itself from the Central Powers because of the more pronounced support for Bulgaria20. In contrast with the views of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, the military attaché of the Dual Monarchy in Bucharest sent a not at all reassuring message for Vienna regarding the anti-Bulgarian and anti-Austrian feelings of the

15 Nicolae Iorga, Sub trei regi. Istoria unei lupte pentru un ideal moral şi naţional, Bucureşti, 1932, p. 153. 16 Take Ionescu, Amintiri, Bucureşti, 1923, p. 25. 17 Călin Radu-Ancuţa, op. cit, p. 212. 18 Gheorghe Zbuchea, op. cit., p. 93 19 Titu Maiorescu, op. cit., p. 104. 20 Călin-Radu Ancuţa, op. cit., p. 215.

The Southeast European Context in the Period of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 47

Romanians, which were clearly growing: “The King cannot oppose this trend and, for reasons of self-defence, he is moving away from the Dual Monarchy”21. His conclusion was that in the event of a confrontation between Bulgaria and Serbia, Romania would undoubtedly attack Bulgaria. On 29 June, without following diplomatic usages, Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece, triggering the Second Balkan War. This prompted Count Berchtold to change his attitude and to propose to the heir to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, to take a position in favour of Romania. Delighted, Franz Ferdinand replied the next day to the Austro- Hungarian Foreign Minister: “As you know, I have always been against this pampering and encouragement of Bulgaria... Let me talk to you with all my friendliness... I would have made this change sooner, when the first signs of this unpleasant alienation of Romania were felt... Romania is a vital condition for our Monarchy. Alongside Romania and Germany, we will defy the whole world, and especially Russia. By embracing a pro-Bulgarian policy, we alienated Germany and upset Romania and we will sit alone at the end, between two chairs to the ground”22. The heir to the throne estimated correctly that a Great Romania was helpful for the Austria-Hungary and criticised the Hungarian chauvinism whenever he could. It is no less true that France wanted an armed intervention of Romania in Bulgaria, after the country had attacked Serbia. In this regard, the Minister of France in Bucharest said: “We are very close to winning the game for so long engaged between Austria and us, for the Romanian public opinion is undoubtedly favourable to us currently. All the efforts of the French diplomacy must be further directed towards maintaining Romania in the dispositions so favourable to the French interests in this part of Europe”23. Being in a critical situation, Bulgaria demanded help from Vienna, believing that only the Dual Monarchy could save it. In such circumstances, the Austro- Hungarian Foreign Minister considered it appropriate to support Bulgaria in those hard times, because in this way, in the future, the Bulgarian foreign policy would favour the Central Powers. Finally, Bulgaria sought an alliance with Austria-Hungary and stated its willingness to restart negotiations with Romania, in order to regulate their dispute. Being in a state of collapse, as a result of the military defeat, Bulgaria was forced to seek truce, which was accepted by Romania and, at the request of our country, by Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. Certainly, Romania did not seek the

21 Ibid, p. 216. 22 Călin-Radu Ancuţa, op. cit., p. 217. 23 Vasile Vesea, România şi Franţa la începutul secolului al XX-lea (1900-1916), Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1975, p. 46.

48 Leonida Moise eradication of the Bulgarian state, but the achievement and maintaining of a balance in the Balkans, which could be manage very well by our country, given the prestige obtained from the military campaign24. The Peace Conference that took place in Bucureşti between 30 July and 10 August, chaired by Titu Maiorescu, the Romanian Prime Minister, was concluded with a Treaty signed by the parties involved, in the last day of the Conference25. During negotiations, it was decided that Macedonia would be split between Serbia and Greece and Southern Dobrogea would be given to Romania on the line: “from the Danube, beyond Turtucaia, to reach the Black Sea, in the south of Ekrene”26. When the future borders were discussed, there were disagreements that were eventually settled. Heated discussions were held between the great powers when the question arose regarding the Macedonian port Cavalla. Germany and France were in favour of giving the port Cavalla to Greece, hoping that the country would enter under their area of influence, while Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy, for the same strategic reasons, opted for Bulgaria to get the port27. The Peace of Bucharest had a considerable international echo, because it diminished a hotbed of tension that could have destabilised the region and showed that Romania was a political and military force capable of guaranteeing the status quo in the region28. From the perspective of territorial rectifications, Romania emerged strengthened, being able to secure its southern border and thus develop an adequate naval force. The Peace of Bucharest was also the signal for the separation from the Central Powers, Romania being concerned with adopting that strategy that would enable it to deal with the situation of Romanians across the border, especially those from Transilvania, Banat and Bucovina. Last but not least, we must not overlook the decisive contribution of Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu to the success of the Conference of Bucharest, about whom King Carol I said he was a great politician, like Mihail Kogălniceanu.

24 Călin-Radu Ancuţa, op. cit., p. 27. 25 Titu Maiorescu, op. cit., pp. 140-150. 26 The Peace Treaty, article 2, p. 234. 27 Russia backed Bulgaria, in order to get in the way of Greece’s access to the Dardanelles and to support the economic development of Bulgaria. 28 Gheorghe Zbuchea, op. cit., pp. 230-245. Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 49

INVOLVEMENT OF ROMANIA IN THE SECOND BALKAN WAR - RETROSPECTIVE SKETCH -

Jipa ROTARU*

Abstract. Second Balkan War and Peace of Bucharest in 1913, sanctioned the implementation of a new reality Southeastern Europe, drawing a new map geopolitical region map unchanged to this day, and Romania had a decisive role, representing a real important negotiator and guarantor of peace in the region, which up to these events was considered "powder keg " of Europe.

Keywords: Balkans, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Operations, Stages, Talks, Truce, Peace from Bucharest

In a complex european geopolitic situation, the beginning of the twentieth century bought with it, in the Balkan Peninsula and beyound, the end of the so called phenomenon, named in modern hystory “Oriental issue”. Began with the siege of Vienna in 1863, with deep roots earlier (see last Romanian resistance against Otoman oppresion), the problem of the so called “sick” and of the legacy of “the dying man” of Europe, the Otoman Empire, found its end in the secound decade of the twentieth century. Against the beckground of intensification battle of oppressed Balkan people for liberation and independence: Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, Montenegris, Albanians, or Romanians and “young Turks revolution” the disappearance of the Otoman Empire and liquidation of political domination of the state sultans in South-Eastern Europe became imminent.1 To achieve this goal, the peoples of the peninsula had also to deal with two regional wars, remained in history as "the Balkan wars". The first of these, held in September 1912 - May 1913, had as protagonists, on one hand, a Balkan alliance, comprised of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro supported by Russia, and on the other hand, the government in Istanbul, which inherited the former Ottoman Empire. With independence from the Ottoman Empire, proclaimed since 1877, having direct problems in dispute with Turkey, Romania by Titu government, expressed neutrality towards this first Balkan War, provided that no territorial changes likely to produce affect the

* Member of Academy of Romanian Scientists. 1 Buzatu Gheorghe, Romania and the Balkan wars. From 1912 to 1913. Pages Southeast European History, Albatros Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p. 6.

50 Jipa Rotaru historic rights and interests of all the peoples of the Balkans, and as long as none of the states involved in the conflict does not threaten the security of Romania and not trying to establish hegemony in region.2 In this sense, the opening of Parliament in the fall of 1912, King Charles I emphasize his message: “Romania, her willingness to help locate war, neutrality towards the warring states of the Balkan Peninsula, but watching attentively conducting numerous events that touch our state interests”.3 With superior military forces, Balkan bloc succeeded in a short time span of only six weeks to crush the main Ottoman forces in Europe and to release most of the Balkan peninsula except for adjoining space Istanbulului.4 As is known, on 16 December 1912 at the London peace talks began between the four Balkan states and Turkey, and the next day to open embassies Conference of the Great Powers (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Russia, France and England). After extensive debate, the often sterile, given the divergent interests of the Great Powers at May 30, 1913 peace was signed in London, which ended the First Balkan War and sanctioned the removal of Ottoman domination in South - Eastern Europe, but created a new outbreak of war, the deepening animosity between the Balkan states, former allies, determined by Serb military condominium on the Bulgarian- Greek Macedonia, under strict supervision of the Great Puteri.5 Romanian government, in turn, even if kept neutrality throughout the conflict opportunity, demanding a revision of the Great Powers border Dobrogea after direct negotiations with Bulgaria had failed and obtaining the signature Petersburg Protocol of April 26 to May 9, 1913 from Bulgaria, Silistra, with a surrounding area 3 Km.6 With more acute tension in the relations between former allies in the First Balkan War, due to the hegemonic tendencies of Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria and his generals in the Balkans began to feel again the gunpowder in the air. Droughts negotiations are of course controlled by the Great Powers, Russia and Austria- Hungary in particular, signed secret diplomatic treaties, intensify consultations, Member, former allies are threatening each other, expecting only if the ignition fuse. Gordian knot of disputes between former allies was the question of historical

2 Romanian Commission for Military History Center for Research of History and Theory, Romanian People's Military History Treaty ('TEC...), Vol, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988, p. 264. 3 Debate of Deputies in 1912 ordinary session 1, session of 26 November 1912. 4 S.M. Sophocles, A History of Greece, Thesshaloniki, 1916, p. 351, cited in Nicholas Ciachir, History of the peoples of South-East Europe in the modern era (1789-1923), Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1987, p. 333. 5 Nicolae Chiachir, op.cit., p. 334. 6 Central Historical National Archives (ANIC) Royal House fund, file 16 (1912), F.11-12, file 12 (1913), f.1 et seq.

Involvement of Romania in the Second Balkan War 51

Macedonia desired by all three countries neighboring states and became the target of trends “imperial” of Ferdinand, Tsar of Bulgaria. It wanted the restoration of the Empire and the Empire of Tsar Samuel of old Constantinople Basileus. None of the rulers of the time did not think the issue of creating a legitimate alternative Macedonian state, independent or even autonomous such as was natural, given the motives which are held the first Balkan war. Instead, we performed a triple division of the territory of Macedonia, action in historical perspective, it remains clear that the dispute today between hegemonic neighboring states. In such a charged atmosphere, the Romanian government launched the Great Powers famous memo declaring that if a new war in the Balkans, Romania will not be neutral, but will act as required by its interests : a strategic southern border Dobrogea to facilitate the safety of good neighborly relations with a state that has proven several times that commitments and treaties, a Balkan equilibrium, so that Bulgaria does not become too high by crushing Serbia, which reduces Romania will not ever allow, ensuring proper formal and the peaceful development of the Romanian population from the territories which shares alies.7 In front of Bulgaria's ambitions to impose its hegemony in the Balkans, with the backing of more active support of Austria-Hungary, Serbia and Greece allied, ending on 19 May / 1 June 1913 defense treaty which, on the one hand, regulating their interests in Macedonia, on the other hand, if their mutual assured unite attack bulgar.8 Basically, in this moment, the alliance of the Balkan states fought together for the liberation from Turkish domination in the first war no more. Fully prove increasingly frequent and daily clashes between armed outposts three Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian. In these circumstances, Tsar Ferdinand decided by arms Macedonian conflict and thus primarily Europe and Russia, is made with a fait accompli. Since June 20 Bulgarian monarch, as Supreme Commander, underestimating other belligerents Balkan forces and relying on the support of Austria- Hungary and Germany, ordered the mobilization of the army. On 28 June, by order of General Savov, the Fourth Army was to attack without a declaration of war, achieving surprise, Serb troops concentrated Bregalnica River and Second Army of the Greek troops Salonicului.9 Both orders were executed the morning of 30 June, when the Bulgarian fourth Army forces supported by major Army III ( about 120,000 soldiers) of the offensive on a broad front, from sources Bregalniţei to Vardar. Simultaneously, a

7 General I. Atanasiu, “The rise of teh country” 1913 campaign in Bulgaria, Cluj, Institute of Graphic Arts, Publishing and Bookstore Book of Romanian SA, 1925, p. 13. 8 Ministries Etrangéres des Affaires (Greece). Documents diplomatiques 1913-1917. Traite d'alliance Greek Serbia. German-Bulgarian Invasion en Macédoine (hereinafter Doc. dipl...), Athenes, 1917, p. 5-7. 9 Gh. Zbughea, op.cit., P. 65, see also Treaty..., p. 273.

52 Jipa Rotaru second Bulgarian army with a strength of about 60,000 troops, went on the offensive in the way Struniţei against the Greek army (90,000 soldiers). He also ordered the concentration Bulgarian Army Take the Belogradchik and preparing an offensive on the city of Nis, Serbian forces to isolate the Belgrade area of the main forces concentrated in Macedonia. Begins the second Balkan War. Along rivers and Zletovska Bregalnica fierce fighting took place during 8 days (June 30 to July 7). The losses of the two belligerents in this campaign have surpassed the total loss figure by then the entire Balkan War, rising to fifth in each parts forces.10 After a temporary victory of the Bulgarian Army, achieving surprise, the front pierced Serbian army launched a strong counter-offensive which resulted in the end of the eight days of fighting, the rejection of the Bulgarian army on the old border line between the two states. The defeat of the Bulgarian army and other operational directions provoked a strong political crisis, culminating in the fall of S. Danev Government on 15 July. New political and military leadership in Sofia decided to restore it difficult military situation created by a strategic defensive front Serbs and the concentration of large forces to stop the advance of the Greek army in Macedonia and will resume ofensive.11 Meanwhile, during the 30 days less than the actual fighting on several fronts, generalized war in the Balkans, with three original belligerents, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, coming on line in combat Montenegro, Romania and Turkey. At the outbreak of the Second Balkan War (June 30, 1913) Romania is engaged in a major diplomatic effort to solve the problem Quadrilaterall, which consists in embedding the Romanian Dobrogea city of Silistra, “key Dobrogea” how long publication name, taken from body of the country and once in 1877 Bulgaria retaliation from Russia, because Romania has resisted abduction southern Bessarabia again. How endorsed personalities of the Romanian political and public life such as Ionel Brătianu, P.P. Carp, Nicolae Iorga, Titu, Take Ionescu, Vasile Pârvan, Mihael R. Sturdza, Titulescu, A.D. Xenopol others, decide on rostrum of parliament or the press in connection with the matter era Dobrogea frontier in this regard, since 1912 a series of events being organized public12 that requires military action south. “The problem Silistra” was included in the political agenda of the European powers. In London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Paris or Berlin to discuss intensively Romanian claims for or against the Silistra. In London, the commission of Charles I, Tache Ionescu and even hire N. Mişu diplomatic negotiations for supporting Romanian thesis. Furthermore, on 16 January 1913 in the capital Albion sign a protocol record actually divergent position of the two countries, the two major problems of Romanian interests in the Balkans,

10 Treaty..., p. 273. 11 Gh. Zbughea, op.cit. 12 View publications: Age, events, opinion, future, order, truth, Evening and so on, in the last months of 1912 and first in 1913.

Involvement of Romania in the Second Balkan War 53

Dobrogea and Aromanian. Citing internal pressure (“Land of the lost patience”), Titu tried to resume bilateral negotiations to resolve all contentious issues. Lack of interest led to the failure of the Bulgarian side approach and taking the initiative by the Great Powers. Based on the statement submitted to the Romanian government in the six European chapters on dispute Romania and Bulgaria, Romania claimed that "a boundary line having a starting point a few miles west of Silistra, thus covering the city and going to Balchik on Sea Black".13 It was organized a conference of foreign ministers of the Great Powers, with the participation of Bulgaria and Romania in St. Petersburg on January 18, 1913, led by Russian plenipotenţialul, Sazonov. With the exception of the representative of Great Britain, all other representatives of the European powers contended Romania. After extensive debate, the delegates were admitted and Romanian and Bulgarian D.Ghica and S. Danev, which lasted several weeks, reached on 9 May at the signing of the Protocol mediation, which was to be kept secret until the conclusion of peace with Turks. The document is made public, causing a vivid manifestation of adhesion at most Romanians discussion and approval by the House and Senate in mid-May. Three of the four articles of the protocol approved by Parliament aimed at resolving the border issue favorable Romanian Dobrogea state and an article of the Aromanian Problem.14 Based on the protocol was established by the governments of the two countries, a joint commission on border demarcation, fortifications and compensation. From the Bulgarian side, the commission consisted of gender. Papricov, Lt. Col. Stanciova and four deputies. From Romanian, gen. I. Culcer, col. C. Cristescu, mr. G.A. Dabija, diplomat A.E. Lahovary, deputies D. Neniţescu, N. Ciucu, P. Grecianu.15 Commission met on Silistra and has started work on board the royal boat “Stefan cel Mare” on 8 June 1913.16 Completely different interpretation problem the term “3 km around” is about the limitation of protocol mediation for incorporation Silistra Romanian Dobrogea and 3 km. around, and gave birth to live long controversy, from different interpretations of the term, the idea of measuring the Bulgarians approaching 5 km, starting in the center and Romanian, the fortifications surrounding the city. At its meeting of 18 June, the Joint Committee decided to transfer the proceedings to Russe, closer to the two capitals, and the next hearing was set for June 22. Meanwhile broke the Second Balkan

13 Gh. Zbughea, op.cit., p. 171. 14 Les eveniments de la Peninsula Balcanique. L’action de la Roumanie. 20 septembrie 2923 – 2 aout 1913, Bucureşti 1913, p. 98-100. 15 Doc. dipl..., p. 104. 16 Ibid., p. 115.

54 Jipa Rotaru

War Committee meeting totally suspendate.17 The damage of relations between Bulgaria and its former allies, bellicose tendencies of Tsar Ferdinand and more extensive involvement of the Great Powers in the Balkan Peninsula on one side or the other side of the barricades that knocks war against their own interests, to which was added the suspension proceedings of the joint Romanian-Bulgarian, Romanian state however created a very special situation, imposing and a much more vigorous and determined. Encouraged by France, which grasping his role in the Balkans, which might play Romania, Titu advised to get out of neutral, Charles decreed on June 20 Romanian military mobilization. Case mobilization was received with great enthusiasm by the Romanian public opinion, especially that the action was perceived as directly opposite Romanian monarchy policy, supporters of the Bulgarian Tsar multiethnic hegemonic tendencies and oppressing the Romanians of Transylvania and Bukovina. Here's how it describes in his memoirs mood engulfed the entire Romanian nation from ruler to sandals, gen. I. Atanasiu: “The day was declared mobilize our country romanianhood all I could say, went into celebration. … Targoviste, a bunch of young people see a flag printing Negoescu door, tears it out and now with the symbol of the country, can I speak, who is their soul to speak, have someone to listen. In a flash stick posters on walls, announcing that the Romanian nation in debt and start this minute, Romanism was revived, ACI and everywhere he lives, says. Young cluster sits in gardens, bring placards on which is written: «Down Bulgaria, Romanian army» live, it is clear that the country's military will now talk and talk fully and manfully /... / It forms a column through songs «On our flag» and «Awake, Romanian», recalled to the new life and those that barely shimmered a bit of hope for a better fate, hard Romanism”.18 Take Ionescu in his memoirs wrote: "Romania's action signifies the first step of our emancipation from the yoke of Austria-Hungary, and Romania was to strengthen the prestige of the great ideal of the union, and about our soldiers in the summer of 1913 in Bulgaria in November «to reach Transylvania» express one of these profound truths that Budapest could not guess it”,19 2 and over the years, Gh. Brătianu record “ deep sense of mobilization of 1913 explains not for the few km 2 of Quadrilateral, but especially because it was, after all pass the time, the first manifestation of the Romanian armed forces who crossed the Danube as he could one day pass and the Carpathians”.20 After early July has recalled its minister at Sofia, the Romanian government has ordered the Romanian army crossing the Danube in order to “establish peace”.

17 Ibid., p. 148. 18 General I. Atanasiu, op.cit., p. 12. 19 Take Ionescu, Souvenirs, Paris, 1919, p. 29-30; apud: The Treaty..., p. 275. 20 Gh. I. Brătianu, Origin and formation of Romanian unity, Bucharest, 1942, p. 102.

Involvement of Romania in the Second Balkan War 55

However, through a diplomatic note diplomatic representatives abroad were notified that Romania does not pursue a policy of conquest, shall consider only the government in Sofia counteract the temptation to establish a military hegemony in the Balkans and Bulgaria tsarist speedy restoration of peace in the region. From a beginning should be noted that the passage of the Danube and Romanian military intervention in the Balkans, in times when fights between other belligerents were in full swing, had a decisive role in the final solution and end military operations. Operational plan drawn up by the General Staff under the direct leadership of General Alexander Averescu and approved by King Charles I, was called " Hypothesis no. 1a 'and concentrating provide the Romanian army along the Danube and in Dobrogea in a very short time, in order to trigger a vigorous offensive forces south river side.21 All military operations after executing mobilization, concentration and strategic cover and then the passage of the Danube, were to take place in two directions: the main one to Sofia, to put an end to the war and as soon as the second secondary “small Quadrilateral” in the direction Rusciuc–Varna. To accomplish this mission, the function and arrangement of Bulgarian troops, the General Staff decided to form two groups: the first group the main army operation was placed under the command of Prince Ferdinand, empowered “commander in chief”, assisted by the Chief of Staff, General Al.Averescu and have four army corps composing 10 infantry divisions and two cavalry and will concentrate mainly in the southern Oltenia, Bechet - ship line - Siliştioara - Izlaz, and the two Corps of Dobrogea, division under General John Culcer concentrated between the Danube and the Great army 5th Corps consisted of three divisions infanterie.22 Livestock Romanian army mobilized amounted to a total of 509 820 people (more than 6% of the population), of which 8693 were oficers23. He surprised most observers rapidity with which military mobilization was performed in its entirety Romanian army mobilized being only 8 days after the declaration of mobilization of the positions set, which at that time constituted a European premiere. Concentration of districts is left Danube and units of the Romanian army would cross the Danube on the bridge of ships from Siliştioara (ship) or port and using monitors to Bechet in front Rahovei operation started at dawn 2 July and then submit to the Sofia - Plovdiv along the river gorge Isker and occupy the Balkan mountains, the Bulgarian forces to prevent the junction of the Vidin-

21 The ANIC, fond Royal Family, file nr. 2/1913 at f. 2-12 is the document “Guidance memorandum regarding Romanian military operations that would occur if Serbo-Bulgarian conflict” prepared by General Al. Averescu. 22 Romanian Military Archives (hereafter AMR) fund General Headquarters, file nr. 34/1913, F. 6 and later. 23 The Treaty..., p. 276.

56 Jipa Rotaru

Timoc with those inside to Sofia. After a smooth crossing of the Danube, during submission to gorge Balkans occurred and the first clashes with Bulgarian troops. These were recorded in the village district lentils, on 5 July and were consumed between subunits of the 1st Cavalry Division with isolated groups of Bulgarian troops. A Bulgarian brigade, commanded by General Siracov surrendered entirely to the 2nd Cavalry Division at Ferdinandovo, 6 july.24 In a very short time, the Romanian army in the Balkans gorge forced many districts. Orhan was conquered town 25 km north-east of Sofia by the brave troopers of the 2nd Division on 6 July, and the next day 1st Army Corps, entered the town of Vratsa, he took control. Thus ending a successful first phase of the Romanian military campaign in Bulgaria. Romanian Army had taken control gorges, preventing a possible organization of the Balkan Bulgarian and set their bulk resistance forces and Etropole Zlatila step up to the Danube. Next step was to be done forcing the mountains and the plateau is the capital of Sofia. On 9 July, by order of the General Staff, began crossing the Balkans, following the occupation of the Bulgarian capital to run in the last stage of the battle through a series of offensive actions on major access routes: a) Ferdinandovo-Bercovici-Sofia; b) Sofia-Orhan; c) Zlatitsa-Sofia. Sofia occupation due to end on July 14, the 22nd day of the declaration of mobilization. Forcing Balkans besides eased decisive action towards Sofia, on the other hand helped improve Greek and Serbian armies, who are fiercely opposed to the whole bulk of Bulgarian forces. During the action to fill Sofia, some Romanian units reached up to 12 km. the capital, at the July 10, King Charles I gave the order to stop the advance of the Romanian army, some units even have to come back too close to Sofia positions already filled. He ordered troops to occupy new positions, for a longer period and fulfilling tasks and restore peace in the territory of Bulgaria. Redeployment of forces in those days was imposed as a result of reporting among troops of the first cases of cholera contamination from the local population. Simultaneously, Charles addressed the sovereign Serbia, Montenegro and Greece have they cease military operations and peace negotiations. Basically, the Romanian front, from July 11 to 12 was setting truce while fighting elsewhere lesser extent, were also held between troops Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek, up to July 17, 1913. In parallel with the Army warfare operations on the main direction in the south, along the body of Dobrogea secondary operations since the morning of June 28 made no great effort, mandated to take control of border territory Balchik Turtucaia - line, including the city Balcic.25 The first city - Silistra was taken from the first day without any resistance by a mixed detachment commander col. I. Simionescu. Simultaneously, other forces

24 A.M.R., M.C.G. background, file nr. 34/1913, f. 9-10. 25 The Treaty..., p. 281.

Involvement of Romania in the Second Balkan War 57 have been forced march in the Quadrilateral, acting offensively toward Turtucaia 9th Division and 10th Division to Bazargic. Quadrilateral whole passed in a few days under Romanian military authority, established garrisons in Silistra, Balchik, Bazargic, Turtucaia, Curtbunar and Bairamdede village. By order of King Charles I, on July 7 in the Quadrilateral Romanian troops in garrisons were directed to Sumla to perform safety - CFŞumla transport in Sofia, Varna and Sumla - Rusciuc Bazargic - Varna road. Romanian army's military action south of the Danube Bulgaria unable to put give continue operations against its neighbors. In early July, Tsar Ferdinand addressed a telegram to King Charles I, asking him to stop military operations and to conclude a separate peace, hoping that achieving neutrality Romania may continue to struggle with Serbia and Greece, as was advised by the Vienna. Convinced of the need for speedy restoration of peace in the Balkans, thus preventing a direct interference of the Great Powers, Titu opposed separate peace, calling for a truce to be part general all warring states. Steps taken by Charles capitals of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria have prevailed in a first stage in Nis, met military representatives of five states to determine the terms of the armistice and decided on the Peace Conference. From Romania participated: General C. Coandă, col. And Lt. Col. C. Cristescu, H. Cihoski. As for other matters of political, territorial and so on, so the non-military character, was set at NIS agreement to be debated in the Peace Conference to be held later in Bucharest. Choosing the Romanian capital of belligerents to conduct peace negotiations, have special meanings: on the one hand represent prestige enjoyed by our country in the Balkan Peninsula as a result of intense diplomatic activity, and military intervention to restore balance and peace and, on the other hand, provide remote maintenance to the interests of the great powers of the Balkan strictly given to the consequences of their interference in the internal affairs of states where small and medium Peninsula. Under the leadership of Prime Minister of Romania, Titu, in 17/ 30 July 1913 opened Peace Conference in Bucharest, which were represented the five warring states at the highest level through their heads guvern.26 As a first action absolutely necessary for proper functioning of the Conference, signed a truce in four articles, the cessation of military actions on all fronts for five days, extended indefinitely until the signing of the peace treaty, this truce as the Nis was not sufficiently definite. It is interesting to note the style adopted during the conference, this time paying most bilateral discussions between delegates and plenary sessions very short time, they resumed to sign the minutes of a conference secretariat. As far as we are concerned, the Romanian delegation provided advice to all other delegations own issues of interest raised by representatives of Bulgaria, Greece

26 N. Iorga, parliamentary speeches. 1907-1917, Bucharest, 1981, p. 21.

58 Jipa Rotaru and Serbia, being as expected, those relating to frontier Dobrogea and future situation of the Aromanian ethnicity three Balkan countries. Sunday, July 28 / August 10, 1913 was signed in Bucharest Peace Treaty between Romania, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other hand27 Treaty contained 10 articles and a secret protocol. Most urgent problem for the Romanian state, Quadrilateral and found solution in Article 2 of the Treaty, which recognized the new Romanian-Bulgarian border, the Danube near the village Turksmil (10 km. Upstream Turtucaia ) plateau cut Killi Radial and ends in the Black Sea, south of the village Ekren at 252 m elevation, a joint committee to finalize the field following. Romanian territory since the time of Mircea the Old mastered the entire Dobrogea, having an area of 8371 km2 and a population of 300,000 inhabitants,at the time most Turkish- Tatar.28 In the same article there was an obligation stipulated that in two years the Bulgarian government to demolish all the fortifications of the border with Romania, and the other articles stated that the Bulgarian army was to be demobilized and allied troops to leave Romanian Bulgarian territory two weeks demobilization of the Bulgarian Army. Article 9 provides grabnicul Instead, after ratification of prisoners of war. Formal exchange of instruments of ratification was made in Sinaia, in 17/ 30 August 1913. Aromanian issue was resolved to ensuring the autonomy of schools and churches in the Balkan Aromanian (especially Macedonia) by bilateral agreements during the course of the Peace Conference between Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. Once ratified the Peace Treaty by all belligerents, the Romanian army made its last mission in the Balkan War, the evacuation of the territory of Bulgaria. The operation commenced on August 4/17 troops lasted for two weeks, with some loss (about 1,000 deaths ) caused by the cholera epidemic, was targeted three sectors crossing the Danube: Rahova- Bechet; Nikopole - Turnu Magurele and Šištovica - Zimnicea. With the necessary preventive measures due to the cholera epidemic and ensure marches August 31 / September 13, 1913, the Romanian army barracks are already home being demobilized. A full summary of lessons on the Romanian military campaign of 1913 in Bulgaria was made later by General Alexander Averescu, with regard to his “General Report on the operations of the army to withdraw the declaration of mobilization and Danube”29, but the most realistic assessment related to this important moment in the history of the Kingdom of Romania and his army, we

27 Le traite de Paix de Bukarest, du 28 juillet / 10 août 1913, précédé des protocoles de la conference, Bucarest, 1913. 28 The Treaty..., p. 282. 29 View A.M.R., fund M.C.G. (949/DMCE), Case No. 61, Vol, f. 1-24.

Involvement of Romania in the Second Balkan War 59 speak of notes “44 days in Bulgaria”, published in 1928 by Michael Sadoveanu participant in the campaign army lieutenant Romanian side of the Danube. “It was a written order somewhere in the stars, the blood of children of this country to be spared for a greater cause. No blood was shed - and our experience was quite prosaic appearance. However, mobilizing 500,000 people in a few days is something worthy of attention. In two weeks I was part of the vanguard climbed atop the Balkans to 1500 m height above the cannon arms wearing precipice. In a lightning march violated Bulgarian land and fratricidal war in the peninsula had to stop. It was a huge effort of an army. Dozens of advancing infantry regiments fiercely mountains in the distance the great dawn of a July heat frightening lands burned by drought and lack of water - tens and hundreds of thousand people trampling e mail after mail in weight ucigătoarea unharmed often hungry, always thirsty... This time our army had the mission to make great and to endure long marches, because the population was declared sacred neighboring kingdom. Long and painful march I 've found it... I hand an instant feeling that I flew. This fierce shot before suddenly decided the peace. Bulgaria was caught before it had time to turn his face towards us. How well has said, our army to fulfill its mission on foot. It's a rare thing as I do not know if it was ever seen in history... I think your feet bleeding, eyes and mouths parched extinct and all the rigors of discipline will have written their heroic page in the history of our country. Responsibility Austria ( " diligent broker ") was because of the Balkan învrăjbirii of War. Romanian share of Austria's Balkan plans collapsed. In a few days, fury Balkan wars and massacres cruntele, endless wailing of the people shall be terminated and peace rainbow shines the sky tame. Regarded as an epilogue to the Balkan war, our military action rises to its true value. It's actually a great soldierly. And then it raises real peasant our soldier who endured hard marches, thirst, hunger, cholera and all the rigors of discipline, to fulfill a mission... Soldier of my country has not robbed and raped n. A wounded deer wool endured as springs, while other nations soldiers wallow in blood and tears of the innocent. I reached out to steal and cut. In a harsh discipline passed before Balkans and returned with them and the back and everywhere, a great scourge. By suffering and patience of heroism amounted to a civilized nation.” As a general conclusion, it should be noted that the Second Balkan War and Peace of Bucharest in 1913, sanctioned the implementation of a new reality Southeastern Europe, drawing a new map geopolitical region map unchanged to this day, and Romania had a decisive role, representing a real important negotiator and guarantor of peace in the region, which up to these events was considered “powder keg” of Europe.

60 Jipa Rotaru Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 61

THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE SECOND BALKAN WAR

Ion GIURCĂ*

Abstract: The Balkan Wars took place as a final episode of the Oriental Problem. Until the start of the war, the Ottoman Empire still owend in the Balkans a continuous strip of territories, between the Blak Sea and the Adriatic Sea. In 1913, The Second Balkan War breaks out, during whom Serbia teams up with Greece against Bulgaria, in order to stand out against Bulgaria’s pretenses. Within this context, Romania’s entrance in the war against Bulgaria was going to stop hostilities and prepare the Treaty of Bucharest. Romania’s entry into the war was a decision Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu, approved by King Carol I. The Romanian Armed Force campaig plan states that the military action should take place in two theatres of operation. Immediately after sining the peace treaty, the Ministry of War issued the Instructions relating to demobilisation .

Keywords: Balkan War, military, Romanian, General Staff, crisis, frontier, armistice, neutrality, meeting, operation, government, conference, Danube

The early twentieth century was marked by political and military instability in the Balkan Peninsula, against a background of certain events that brought Bulgaria into the European spotlight because of its hegemonic tendencies that got manifest soon after the Bulgarian state became independent. That state of affairs affected peace south of the Danube, having undesirable consequences for neighbouring countries, Romania included. After completing the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, the Romanian-Bulgarian relations were only apparently cordial, even if the neighbour south of the Danube was a state with limited sovereignty, being still under the control of the Ottoman Porte. The Peace Treaty of San Stefano, through its provisions referring to the territories that had to return to Bulgaria, in agreement with the idea deliberately promoted by Tsarist Russia, persisted in the geopolitical thinking of the political and military leaders in Sofia, so the territorial claims at the expense of neighbour states were constant until 1912, when the First Balkan War broke out. The Romanian-Bulgarian relations were dominated by the claims on Dobrogea, intensified after 1908, when Bulgaria gained independence, formulated

* Professor Dr, Hyperion University, Bucharest.

62 Ion Giurcă informally but obvious to any observer of the politics promoted by Sofia1, as well as by the treatment of the Romanians and the Aromanians on the territory under its administration. King Carol I and the leaders in Bucureşti supported the political aspirations and the efforts made by the governments in Sofia, especially to gain independence and to have the independent state acknowledged, but viewed with some suspicion the benevolent and friendly statements that were made to the Romanian leadership on various occasions. The development of the military body in Bulgaria, the anti-Romanian propaganda relating to Dobrogea as well as the cultivation by Sofia of special relations with Russia, which continued to pose as the protector of the Christian peoples in the Balkans, prompted the political and military decision-makers in Bucureşti to consider the risks to national defence and to take the necessary measures to reject an attack from Bulgaria. Against a background of a favourable situation for Bulgaria, which gained the state independence in 1908, the Romanian Great General Staff, concerned about the political and military attitude of the new sovereign state south of the Danube, developed a project on operations, entitled “Report on the Concentration of the Romanian Armed Forces in the Event of a War with Bulgaria”2. Based on the available information and on the military and political assessments relating to Bulgaria, in the above-mentioned document it was shown that it paid special attention to strengthening and developing its military power; it attached importance to the exaltation of nationalism, by promoting and maintaining the belief that Bulgaria would have historical and ethnic rights over some territories in the composition of other states; by its rigid and provocative position, Bulgaria prepared intensively to be able to derive as important as possible benefits from the political and military complications that might arise in the Balkan Peninsula. Two years later, the Romanian Great General Staff developed a project on operations in the event of a war with Bulgaria, called “Hypothesis C”3, where it was stated that “a Romanian- Bulgarian war may be admitted for many reasons but especially because Bulgaria tends to enlarge its territory in the Balkan Peninsula to become the leading state”4. Unlike the “Report” in 1908, according to “Hypothesis C”, in the view of the Romanian Great General Staff the war with Bulgaria had to be offensive as far as Romania was concerned. It was estimated that, seeking the unification of all the Bulgarians in the former Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria intended to create an issue of

1 More details in Ion Crînguş, Ion Giurcă, Cedarea şi evacuarea Cadrilaterului în anul 1940, Editura Conphis, Râmnicu Vâlcea, 2010, pp. 19-33. 2 Romanian Military Archives (RMA), the Great General Staff Collection, Operations 3rd Section, file no. 23/1908, pp. 20-23. 3 Ibidem, file no. 28/1910, pp. 1-8. 4 Ibidem, p. 1.

The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 63

Dobrogea in its relations with Romania, an issue similar to that of Alsace and Lorraine. Therefore, Romania should take appropriate measures to avoid surprise, not to find itself in the situation of France in 1870. To counter Bulgaria, it was important to seize strategic initiative. Although it was appreciated that the objective pursued by the Bulgarian armed forces was Dobrogea, Romanian military planners projected our armed forces concentration in Oltenia, their crossing the Danube in the Corabia area, and their heading directly for Sofia, which resulted in avoiding any Bulgarian offensive in Dobrogea and the conduct of military operations on the national territory. “Hypothesis C” was a realistic, courageous and achievable plan under the conditions of an alliance with another Balkan state. It could be Serbia or the Ottoman Empire, although Romania rejected the Ottoman Porte proposals to conclude an alliance with this state against Bulgaria on several occasions. “Hypothesis C” was the document that remained in force until the summer of 1913, when Romania entered the war against Bulgaria. Until the outbreak of the First Balkan War, in 1912, the Romanian-Bulgarian relations were not likely to create a favourable climate in many areas, although the main concern of the government in Sofia was the removal of the Ottoman influence and presence in the Balkans, which, according to the ideas promoted in Bulgaria, had to be reduced to the dimension of the influence and presence Constantinople enjoyed in the mid fifteenth century. The major event in the early twentieth century in Europe was the so-called “Balkan crisis”, reflected in the conduct of the two wars in which Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and the Ottoman Empire engaged. The political crisis in the Ottoman Empire, which started with the “Young Turk” Revolution, was an opportunity for Italy to attack the Porte possessions in North Africa and the Middle East. Thus broke out the Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912), seen by Italian nationalists as “Italy’s return to Ancient Rome’s Mediterranean policy”5. Trying to grasp an opportunity, Bulgaria took the necessary steps for a military cooperation with Italy against the Ottoman Empire, action rejected by the government in Rome “not to turn that war into a European war”6. Determined to go to war against the Ottomans with the support of Russia, Bulgaria managed to draw Serbia, Montenegro and Greece into a political alliance that was concluded on 29 February/13 March 1912, followed by the four countries signing a military agreement on 29 June/12 July the same year7. Broken out on 5/18 October 1912, the First Balkan War was marked by a rapid success of the allies against the Ottoman Empire, which determined the Porte to sign an armistice with Bulgaria on 20 November/3 December, while the armies of Greece and Montenegro

5 Nicolae Ciachir, Istoria popoarelor din sud-estul Europei în epoca modernă, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1987, p. 328. 6 Ibidem, p. 329. 7 Colonel George G. Garoiescu, Războaiele balcanice 1912-1913, Tipografia Centrului de Instrucţie al Infanteriei, Sfântu Gheorghe, 1935, p. 8.

64 Ion Giurcă continued the offensive against the Turkish forces in Ianina and Scutari. The conclusion of the armistice by Bulgaria highlighted the disunity within the alliance, a trend that remained visible in the next period. Bulgaria and its allies started the war against the Ottoman Empire being assured, by the Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu, of the fact that Romania did not have an alliance with the government in Istanbul, and that it “will maintain strict neutrality as there will be no territorial changes”8. Romania’s position on the war that foreshadowed was made known to the Turkish ambassador in Bucureşti, Sefa Bey, on 20 September/1 October 1912, as follows: “As for our attitude in relation to the complications that may occur in the Balkans, we are decided to maintain neutrality for the time being”9. Even before the war broke out, Bucureşti became the hub of the Balkan politics. The representatives of Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria informed the Romanian Prime Minister about the progress and the position of the governments they represented, while exploring Romania’s attitude towards a possible conflict. At the meeting between the Romanian Prime Minister and the Bulgarian ambassador to Bucureşti – Kalinkov, on 16/29 October 1912, occasion on which the Romanian official was presented the note verbale relating to Bulgaria breaking out the war, Titu Maiorescu said that “within the limits of the Treaty of Berlin, Romania’s neutrality is natural. If there are territorial changes in the Balkans, Romania will have its say on it”10. The conduct of war and especially the danger of a direct attack on Istanbul determined the great European powers intervention to settle the conflict in the Balkan Peninsula. Acknowledging the role of Romania in the geopolitics of the Balkans, on 22 October/4 November 1912, the Russian ambassador informed the Romanian Prime Minister about their intention11: the Turkish dominion in Europe reduced to Istanbul and surrounding area, including Adrianople; the division of the western part of the territory ruled by the Ottomans between the four Balkan countries; as compensation for Romania, Dobrogea’s frontier rectification. The desperate situation facing the Ottoman government and the danger of the Bulgarians entering Istanbul resulted in the Ottoman authorities sending to Bucureşti a request like that of Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia after the second defeat of the tsarist troops before Pleven. The message of the Turkish government stated, inter alia, “the Romanian government is asked to employ all means to prevent the Bulgarians from entering Constantinople”12. Romania’s position relating to possible frontier changes in the Balkans was made known to the

8 Central National Historical Archives (CNHA), the Royal House Collection, file no. 16/1912, p. 1; Titu Maiorescu, op. cit., p. 161. 9 Ibidem. 10 Ibidem, p. 163. 11 Ibidem, p. 164. 12 Ibidem.

The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 65

Russian ambassador in Bucureşti, who was fully involved in the crisis south of the Danube, during a meeting he had with the Romanian Prime Minister on 27 October/9 November 1912. Titu Maiorescu said that the Romanian-Bulgarian frontier rectification had to be the result of the agreement between the two countries and the initiative should belong to the government in Sofia, as the initiator of the war against the Ottomans. On that occasion, the Romanian party expressed its territorial claims for the first time: “…friendly and confidentially, I can say that our border rectification in Southern Dobrogea should contain a line from Turtucaia to the Black Sea, on this side of Varna”13. At the suggestion of Russia, the President of the Bulgarian Parliament visited Bucureşti on 26 November/9 December 1912, occasion on which the situation in the Balkans was discussed and the Romanian-Bulgarian future relations were analysed. After promising that “the Aromanians living in the regions annexed by the Bulgarians after the peace with Turkey will be allowed to use their language in their schools and churches and to have the own episcopate”14, demands that were systematically rejected after 1878, the Bulgarian official addressed the issue of territory at present and in the future. With obvious lack of sincerity, but with apparent firmness, given by imposing the armistice on the Ottoman Empire, he stated, as noted by Titu Maiorescu in a report to the king, that “no serious Bulgarian thinks of taking Dobrogea, that there are good neighbourly relations between the two countries and therefore there can be neither compensation nor strategic line for Romania... In conclusion, we can consider the frontier rectification, which can have a good moral effect for both countries, but, in this regard, Bulgaria cannot admit, for example, to cede Silistra”15. Without clearly expressing Romania’s claims relating to the rectification of Dobrogea borders, Titu Maiorescu firmly stated the idea that “Any frontier rectification should start with Silistra annexation by Romania”16. The meeting between the two officials ended without any concrete result, the problems having to be discussed in London where, on 3/16 December 1912, the Peace Conference began to put an end to the First Balkan War. At the conference, Romania was represented, if needed, by Ambassador Nicolae Mişu. Although there was the idea of Romania’s participation in a meeting of ambassadors, along with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, France and England, it did not materialise. However, the new Romanian Minister in London received precise instructions regarding the requirements of the government in Bucureşti related to the conditions of peace that was expected to be concluded. The basic idea was that “Romania should obtain a boundary line that goes from the Danube to the Black Sea, drawn as

13 Ibidem, p. 165. 14 Ibidem, p. 166. 15 Ibidem 16 Ibidem

66 Ion Giurcă south as possible from the present border”17. Three days later, on 18/31 December 1912, the Romanian ambassador to London was sent from Bucureşti the message that “a border line starting west of Turtucaia and getting south of Ekrene, with or without Dobrici”18 had to be negotiated with the Bulgarian party. The talks in London between the Bulgarian and the Romanian delegations did not lead to any result, the Bulgarian party maintaining the view expressed in the talks in Bucureşti. Under the pressure from the European powers, the government in Sofia expressed, on 28 December 1912/10 January 1913, “the ardent desire of Bulgaria that it should conclude an agreement with Romania, in the broadest sense possible, able to guarantee the interest and dignity of the two states”19. Somehow irritated by the delay in the Romanian-Bulgarian talks in London, Titu Maiorescu asked the Romanian ambassador, on 12/25 January 1913, to resume the talks with the representative of Bulgaria relating to setting the border between the two states, considering the following requirements: “maximum Turtucaia, Dobrici, Balcic, minimum Silistra, Balcic, without Dobrici”20. Following talks, in the coming days, on 16/29 January 1913, a Protocol between Romania and Bulgaria was concluded. The core issue of the Protocol, the territorial one, was not regulated to meet the Romanian requirements, Sofia’s delegate stating that “the Bulgarian delegation considers that the latter request – a real cession of territory meant to deal a fatal blow to the friendly relations between the two kingdoms – cannot be taken into consideration”21. The Bulgarian party delay in signing an agreement on the frontier rectification, as demanded by Titu Maiorescu, caused some nervousness and hurry in Bucureşti, in the context in which, in London, on 17/30 January 1913, the Peace Conference was interrupted. Notable in this regard is the telegram sent to Romania’s ambassador to Sofia by the Prime Minister, in which it was shown that: “We have to put an end to it immediately. Any delay worsens the situation.... Please insist on immediate resolution. The country has lost patience. Any day delay aggravates the situation”22. Bulgaria’s reserved attitude may have been determined by Russia’s encouragement. This statement is based on a declaration made by a Russian official, according to which “Russia can never admit that Romania could inflict violence on Bulgaria”23. The failure in the Romanian-Bulgarian talks generated the idea of mediating the dispute by the European powers. Launched by England, until 5/18 February 1913 the proposal was taken up by the majority of the European states engaged in solving the Balkan crisis. In this context, the

17 Ibidem, p. 170. 18 Ibidem, p. 175. 19 Ibidem, p. 182. 20 Ibidem, p. 185. 21 Apud, Titu Maiorescu, op. cit., p. 184. 22 Ibidem, p. 190. 23 Ibidem, p. 207.

The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 67

Romanian government accepted mediation in the territorial dispute with Bulgaria by the six European powers, proposing Petersburg as the place where the talks were to be held. On 15/28 February the Romanian government sent the “Romanian Government Memorandum on the dispute between Romania and Bulgaria” to the capitals of the six great European powers as well as to their representatives in Bucureşti, London, and St. Petersburg, providing historical, demographic, military and other arguments to support its claims. The European powers Ambassadors Conference was held in St. Petersburg between 18/31 March and 26 April/9 May 1913, ending by concluding a Protocol which, inter alia, stipulated that “Silistra has to belong to Romania… Bulgaria consents to give autonomy to the Koutsovlachian schools and churches that are to be found on the Bulgarian territories as long as these schools are attended by Koutsovlachian children, and to allow the establishment of a bishopric for the same Koutsovlachs, these cultural institutions being subsidised by the Romanian government under the supervision of the Bulgarian government”24. The spring of 1913 was marked by tense relations between Bulgaria and its former allies, which was made known to the government in Bucureşti by the representatives of Greece and Serbia. After the Petersburg Protocol was ratified by the Romanian Parliament, on 16/29 May, the commissions to implement its provisions were set up by Royal Decree no. 4075/1913. The provisions referred to: the border demarcation around Silistra, the compensation awarded to the inhabitants who would emigrate in the area of Silistra, the delimitation of the Bulgarian fortifications. The developments in the spring of 1913 prevented the commissions from accomplishing the assigned tasks as a new crisis that could degenerate into an armed conflict was likely to arise starting in June. The good knowledge of the situation in the Balkans and the anticipation of the developments determined the Romanian government to notify all its legations, on 23 May/3 June 1913, sending them a circular note in which it was shown, inter alia, that “the possible aggravation of the situation in the Balkans could not leave Romania indifferent”25. In the same vein, during a meeting with the Austria-Hungary ambassador to Bucureşti, Prince of Fürstenberg, Titu Maiorescu said that “if war broke out between the Balkan allies, Romania would mobilise immediately and would firstly occupy the Turtucaia – Balcic line, which we intend to maintain permanently”26. Bulgaria was warned about this situation, on 13/26 June 1913, at the suggestion of the Minister of Russia in Bucureşti, who had repeatedly warned the government in Sofia not to start war against the Greeks and the Serbs. Despite all the received warnings, as a result of the disagreements between the allies on the division of the territory liberated from the Ottoman rule, on 16/29 June 1913, Bulgaria carried out a surprise attack on Serbia, thus triggering the Second Balkan War. It was a suicidal

24 Ibidem, pp. 207-208. 25 Ibidem, p. 211. 26 CNHA, the Royal House Collection, file no. 16/1912, p. 37.

68 Ion Giurcă action of Bulgaria, which overestimated its potential and relied, without having the necessary guarantees, on the support of Austria-Hungary and Germany, which were reserved as far as Serbia ascent in the Balkans was concerned. Initially, Serbia and Greece, and then Montenegro and Romania (27 June/10 July 1913) declared war and launched military operations against Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire took Adrianople back. Romania’s entry into the war was a decision of the Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu, approved by King Carol I, who, on 20 June/3 July 1913 signed Royal Decree no. 4751 on the mobilisation of the Romanian Armed Forces, action that started on the night of 22/23 June – 5/6 July 1913, in compliance with the rules of mobilisation. The mobilisation decision was well received by the population, as proved by the popular demonstrations that took place in Bucureşti and other cities of the country and by the response above expectations of the mobilisable personnel to the order issued and transmitted using the existing means, as it was stipulated by the Great General Staff plan. 1897-1911 contingents and reservists were mobilised, as well as 1895-1896 militia contingents that received special orders. Mobilised commands and large units, in the operational forces, sedentary troops, and territorial troops, mobilised 8 693 officers and 500 400 troops (non- commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and soldiers), of whom in the actions south of the Danube and the Quadrilateral participated: in the main theatre of operations – called in the epoch “in Bulgaria” – 6 180 officers, 272 400 troops, having 514 cannons, 262 machine guns and 89 650 horses; in the secondary theatre of operations – “the Quadrilateral” – 1 310 officers, 71 000 troops, having 128 cannons, 60 machine guns and 23 900 horses. The general comments on the armed forces mobilisation, in the media of the time or in some official documents, revived in the years to come by those who wrote on this subject, were laudatory, mainly referring to the active and reserve large units and units. From the “General Report on the Armed Forces Operations since Declaring Mobilisation up to Crossing the Danube Back”, prepared by General Alexandru Averescu on 23 August/5 September 1913, it resulted that: “Great shortcomings emerged while mobilising all the necessary ancillary services, particularly ammunition columns, artillery stocks, subsistence columns and various sanitary formations, because of excessive centralisation. Requisitions also left much to be desired, in terms of time but especially order. The support provided by administrative authorities was less effective in some parts and therefore, in order to have no time lag in mobilisation, expeditious procedures were resorted to, which, of course, gave rise to arbitrary acts”27. Mobilisation was performed safely as a result of the measures taken to cover the southern frontier of the country on the Danube, executed with the forces

27 RMA, the Great General Headquarters (GGH) Collection, file no. 61/1913, pp. 1-2.

The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 69 assigned for this purpose by the 1st, 2nd and 5th Army Corps. Between Turnu Severin and the confluence of the Olt and the Danube, the 1st Army Corps assigned 6 active battalions, 3 militia battalions, 7 squadrons and an artillery battery, the 2nd Army Corps introduced into the disposition, between the Olt River and Lake Greaca, 4 active battalions, 4 squadrons and 2 artillery batteries. The 5th Army Corps had the mission to take part in covering the southern frontier between Lake Greaca and the Black Sea with 6 active battalions, 2 territorial battalions and 2 artillery batteries. The forces intended for covering observed the south bank of the Danube permanently and reported the situation in the area of responsibility daily. Later on, they got into the disposition of the units they belonged to and acted in the established directions and districts. Given the fact that there were no large-scale military confrontations, which would have required large consumption of ammunition, food, feed and other necessary materials, and that the losses generated by fighting were not important, the effects of the reported shortcomings were minor, noticed only by those who had a complete picture of the military system operation at war, as well as by those who were aware of the responsibility associated with the positions they filled. The concentration of the operational forces and of the sedentary troops in the established areas was performed in compliance with the plans for mobilisation and transport, by rail and on the Danube, using mobilised or requisitioned means of transport, as well as on foot. It was considered a real success, which surprised even the organisers, but especially the Bulgarian political and military analysts. The rapidity of the operational forces mobilisation and concentration resulted in timely covering the country’s southern frontier, a prerequisite for the establishment of task forces to conduct military actions in Bulgaria, in compliance with the plan for operations prepared by the Great General Staff, updated and implemented by the Great General Headquarters, the head of which was appointed Crown Prince Ferdinand, while the chief of the Great General Staff was General Alexandru Averescu. The Romanian Armed Forces campaign plan states that the military actions should take place in two theatres of operations, situated at a distance of several hundred miles, to meet the political and military objective of war: the military defeat of Bulgaria and the occupation of the claimed territory in southern Dobrogea, as a strategic safety measure for the area between the Danube and the Black Sea. In line with this concept, the main group of forces and assets (the 1st and 4th Army Corps, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions, and the 1st and 2nd Reserve Divisions) were concentrated in the area Corabia – Turnu Măgurele, and the secondary group (the 5th Army Corps and the 3rd Reserve Division) in the district Cernavodă, Medgidia, Murfatlar. The main group of forces had to cross the Danube in Bechet – Rahova as well as in Corabia – Ghingen sectors, on the pontoon bridge in the former sector and by river vessels in the latter sector. On

70 Ion Giurcă

1/14 July 1913, in Corabia and Bechet were concentrated the 1st Army Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Reserve Division, the 7th and the 13th Infantry Brigades, all able to start crossing the Danube. The first subunits crossed the Danube on 2/15 July 1913, in the morning, in Bechet – Rahova sector by river vessels, while in Corabia the pontoon bridge started to be installed. The bridge was completed after 7 hours and 30 minutes, which allowed the passage of the first units until the evening of the same day. The next day, the Danube was crossed, event that was attended by King Carol I, who “inspected the troops that crossed the Danube at Măgura – Ghighen, and then got to Bechet by monitor to see how the Danube was crossed by vessels there”28. When the political and military preparations for Romania’s entering the war against Bulgaria were completed, on 27 June/10 July 1917, Titu Maiorescu, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the consent of King Carol I, sent to the Bulgarian government, through the agency of the Romanian Minister Plenipotentiary to Sofia, as well as to all the Romanian legations, to be brought to the attention of the states in which they were accredited, the following telegram: “the Romanian Government has warned the Bulgarian Government about the fact that if the Balkan allies were in the state of war, Romania could not preserve the attitude of reserve it has imposed in the interest of peace, and it might see itself forced into action. The Bulgarian Government has not considered necessary to reply to that communication; on the contrary and unfortunately, the war broke out first by the Bulgarian surprise attacks against the Serbian troops, even without observing the basic rules of previous notifications that at least would have proved the respect for international conventions and practices. Faced with this situation, the Romanian Government has ordered the armed forces to enter Bulgaria”29. In this context, the Romanian Great General Headquarters implemented the campaign plan by giving the necessary orders to the directly subordinate army corps and divisions to initiate the preparatory operations for the forces in the composition of the main group, which were to act in the west of Bulgaria towards Sofia, to cross the Danube. The massive passage of the Danube was scheduled for the period 4/17 – 8/21 July, when the four army corps troops had to finish the concentration in the districts established south of the Danube, while advancing in the set directions towards the passes of the Central and Western Balkans, and then towards Sofia. The Romanian troops’ entry into Bulgaria was preceded by the transmission, employing various means, of a Proclamation to the Bulgarian population, written in the Romanian and Bulgarian languages, to show the aim of their presence there: “The Romanian Armed Forces overstepped the boundaries of Bulgaria, only

28 Ibidem, p. 5. 29 Apud, Titu Maiorescu, România, războaiele balcanice şi Cadrilaterul, Editura Machiaveli, Bucureşti, 1995, pp. 218-219.

The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 71 forced by circumstances, and not out of hostility towards the Bulgarian people. Our goal is to put an end to a state of affairs that is dangerous for all the neighbouring countries of Bulgaria, and exerts pressure even on the Bulgarian population. If we are forced to employ weapons to achieve this goal, the peaceful populations do not have to be worried at all. The Romanian soldier is not only brave but also disciplined, and he will be gentle and kind to people in villages and cities, for whose liberation he shed his blood so generously in 1877 alongside the brave Russian army. Therefore, people should perform their daily activities, fully confident that the Romanian soldiers will not harm or trouble anyone”30. In the same context, on 5/18 July 1913, the Army Corps General and Prince of Romania, Ferdinand, as Commander-in-Chief of the operational armed forces, signed Order of the day no. 162, stating: “Soldiers. We have crossed the Danube in Bulgaria so that, through your bravery, you can compel the Bulgarian military to respect the others rights which they now disrespect. Do not forget that 36 years ago your fathers shed their blood for the liberation of the Bulgarian people and so you cannot have hatred for it. The population in the villages and towns, as it does not take up arms and quietly performs daily activities, should see your kindness and goodness in every respect. Prove to those that have the eyes on you today that the braver you are in the face of those who stand in your way having weapons in their hands, the gentler you are with those unarmed”31. The Romanian troops advanced cautiously between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains following two directions. As they did not encounter a powerful enemy, determined to put up strong resistance, they managed to rapidly move forward, the vanguard being mainly the cavalry divisions or the cavalry units of infantry divisions. The occupation of Pleven and Orhanie opened penetration routes in the mountainous region of Bulgaria in the following directions: Ferdinand, Bercoviţa, Sofia; Orhanie, Sofia; Zlatiţa, Sofia. On 9/22 July began the preparations to get into the mountainous area, and the next day began the advance, planned in detail for each and every day until 14/27 July, when the vanguards had to get through to the Sofia Valley. The political and military developments in the theatres of operations south of the Danube determined King Carol I to order that “the reconnaissance cavalry troops should not get out of the gorges under any circumstances, and the 1st Army Corps, which was in the most advanced position in the direction of motion and whose penetration in the gorges with the 1st Division was unknown at the Great General Headquarters, was especially prescribed not to force the gorges until the day before most of the troops got there, i.e. on 13 July”32. On 11/24 July 1913, King Carol I ordered a halt until new orders were received. However, taking into account that the vanguards of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th corps were moving in the

30 RMA, the GGH Collection, file no. 16/1913, p. 22. 31 Ibidem, file no. 21/1913, p. 33. 32 Ibidem, file no. 61/1913, p. 10.

72 Ion Giurcă established directions, it was decided that they could continue the march, “allowing the army corps to dispose the troops so that they could station for quite a long time”33. The operational needs related to the troops stationing, the safety measures that were specific to the Romanian Armed Forces general and special situation, the large units logistics requirements, and especially the cholera outbreak forced the troops to continually move up until 17/30 July, when the armistice was concluded on the fronts in the Balkan Peninsula. Throughout this period, in the main theatre of operations, there were only few and low-intensity clashes between the Romanian and the Bulgarian troops, having a magnitude that was somewhat lower than it was presented in the epoch, with battles that did not exceeded the level of cavalry and infantry subunits. The Romanian military historiography records and presents in detail the battles of some subunits of the 1st Cavalry Division in Liuţa and Borovici, where acted the 1st and 2nd squadrons in the 2nd Roşiori Regiment and the 2nd Artillery Battalion in the 7th Roşiori Regiment, actions that resulted in capturing a Bulgarian brigade in Ferdinandovo, as well as the actions of some subunits of the 2nd Cavalry Division in Praveţ and Lojane34. The clashes resulted in deaths, injuries and troops and materials seizures on both sides, the Bulgarian troops being forced to withdraw from several localities in the area of action of the 1st Cavalry Division vanguards. In the theatre of operations in Dobrogea acted the 5th Army Corps, having in composition the 9th and 10th Infantry Divisions, subordinating the 3rd Reserve Division, which had the mission “to occupy the territory in Bulgarian Dobrogea to the south of Turtucaia – Balcic line”35. According to the received orders, the 5th Army Corps Commander took the necessary measures to occupy Silistra on 28 June 1913/11 July 1913. Then, the 9th Infantry Division had to advance towards Turtucaia and the 10th Infantry Division to Dobrici. By 30 June/13 July 1913 the two divisions vanguards advanced up to the established alignment, without encountering any resistance, and by 8/21 July the entire Quadrilateral was under the units of the two divisions control. In the following days reconnaissance actions were organised south of the established stop line, which resulted in the loss of two soldiers who were shot dead by the Bulgarian patrols. A suicide case was registered, for reasons that were unclear at that time. The 5th Army Corps was the only large unit that was not affected by the epidemic of cholera, as it acted outside the contaminated area. For 15/28 July 1913, the Great General Headquarters, under the orders of King Carol I, ordered measures for the prolonged troops stationing in the areas where they were and “the Cavalry Divisions and the 1st and 4th Army Corps could push detachments forward to secure the mountain passes, if not strongly defended

33 Ibidem. 34 Colonel George G. Garoiescu, op. cit., pp. 130-136. 35 Ibidem, p. 22.

The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 73 by the Bulgarians, but no more than the opposite edge of the passes”36. On that day, in the units of the 1st and the 2nd Army Corps, several confirmed cases of cholera were reported, marking the onset of the epidemic that created havoc for the Romanian troops in the following days, resulting in a large number of illnesses and deaths. On 17/30 July 1913, during the Peace Conference in Bucureşti, the present military delegates signed the proceedings in which the conditions for the suspension of hostilities were reformulated, in compliance with the decisions made during the Conference that stipulated: “a demarcation line will be set at an equal distance from the outpost lines on the day of 18/31 July at noon. This line will be marked by white flags; the suspension of arms will last for 5 days starting on 18/31 July at noon, Central European Time; the movement of troops and supplies of any kind will not be prevented behind the outpost lines; the belligerents shall notify each other of the present stipulations, in order to cease hostilities simultaneously; the provisions of art. 40 and 41 of the convention on the laws and customs of war on land shall be applied”37. Following the proceedings of the conference, on 18/31 July 1913, the Ministry of War issued Order no. 80 according to which “Each and every reconnaissance detachment has to be withdrawn behind the outpost line, line that cannot be passed under any circumstances”38. The temporary suspension of military operations, converted, on 25 July/7 August, in an armistice with no time limit until the signing of the peace treaty allowed the Ministry of War, the Great General Headquarters, and the Armed Forces Health Service to focus their efforts on combating the epidemic of cholera, adopting measures that ultimately proved effective. On 28 July/10 August 1913, the Peace Treaty39 was signed in Bucureşti, an event that was brought to the attention of the Great General Headquarters and of all the units in the theatres of operations in Bulgaria. As far as the military actions of the signatory states were concerned the Treaty stipulated Bulgaria’s obligation to demobilise the armed forces starting on the day that followed the conclusion of peace, the beginning of evacuation of the Bulgarian territory immediately after the demobilisation of the former enemy state armed forces, which had to be completed within 15 days. Moreover, the Romanian Armed Forces had to be stationed on the demarcation line marked out by the following localities: Şistov, Lovcea, Turski, Isvor, Glozene, Zlatiţa, Mircovo, Araba, Konak, Orchania, Mezdra, Vrata, Bercoviţa, Lom, Dunăre40. The signing of the peace treaty was an opportunity for the political and military leadership of the country to send messages to the Bulgarian population,

36 RMA, the GGH Collection, file no. 58/1913, p.109. 37 Ibidem, p. 116. 38 Ibidem, p. 117. 39 Apud Titu Maiorescu, op. cit., pp. 232-239. 40 Ibidem, p. 236.

74 Ion Giurcă the Romanian armed forces, and the troops on the demarcation line, in compliance with the requirements arising from the document signed by the parties and with the realities in the area of military operations, even if the actions had been suspended. Thus, on 28 July/10 August 1913 Prince Ferdinand signed a Proclamation addressed to the Bulgarian population, urging it “to refrain from hostile impulses against the Romanian troops, and informing the public that the most severe measures will be taken against the perpetrators and accomplices, making responsible for any attack also those who could have stopped it but they did not”41. The next day, the Chief of the General Staff for Operations, issued a Publication addressed to the inhabitants of the territory where the Romanian armed forces acted, inviting them that “in case they have any complaint, irrespective of its nature, they have to submit it to the Bulgarian local administration as soon as possible. The Bulgarian administrative authorities are requested to communicate the complaints they might receive to the closest troop commander, no later than 5 August”42. On 31 July/13 August King Carol I issued a High Order of the Day to the Army, which read: “You have gone cheerfully and confidently on the battlefield, leaving your fields, determined to face all the dangers of war manfully. Many of your comrades have fallen victim to fatal illnesses across the Danube. My heart bleeds for the tragic loss of them. You have reached the crest of the mountains of Bulgaria at a speed that exceeds all expectations. Your presence here has imposed peace without bloodshed, has enlarged our country by adding an important piece of land to strengthen its border, and has made Romania worthy of note. Soon you will be able to return to your homes highly contented that you have done your duty and you have written one of the most important pages in the history of your Motherland. Thank you from the bottom of my heart. TO MY DEAR ARMY I WILL ALWAYS GIVE MY PATERNAL LOVE”43. According to the Peace Treaty of Bucureşti, on 2/15 August 1913, the Great General Headquarters issued the Operations Order no. 115, on the evacuation of the territory of Western Bulgaria, stipulating the following aspects44: the schedule of crossing the Danube by the troops on the bridges from Zimnicea and Turnu Măgurele, as well as of the transhipment from Rahova to Bechet; the schedule of the march from the districts of disposition to the crossing points; the rules to be observed during the marches; the general and specific hygiene measures as there were outbreaks of infection and a large number of soldiers infected with Vibrio cholerae, and so on.

41 RMA, the GGH Collection, file no. 16, p.186. 42 Ibidem, p. 204. 43 RMA, the GGH Collection, file no. 21/1913, p.14. 44 Ibidem, file no. 16, p. 142.

The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 75

The deployment of the units and large units to the crossing sectors established by the Operations Order no. 115 started on 4/17 August 1913, being a continuous, generally well planned, managed, and coordinated action. However, it was disturbed to some extent by the condition of the units that were contaminated with Vibrio cholerae, having many patients who were quartered in the so-called medical observation areas from Zimnicea, Turnu Măgurele, and Bechet, established by the Ministry of War through the agency of the Armed Forces Health Service, leading to a series of disputes between the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff, given the fact that: “Then the Health Service intervened asking that troops should be stopped after crossing the Danube to be examined. This disposition caused true disturbance, without even being implemented. Undeniably, measures had to be taken. However, it was not at all necessary to revolutionise the entire deconcentration plan based on the opinion of the doctors charged with combating cholera from the beginning, doctors Cantacuzino and Babeş”45. The dispute was amplified by a letter sent by Eliza Brătianu, the wife of I. I. C. Brătianu, to King Carol I on 6/19 August 1913, informing about some serious cases among the troops stationed in medical observation areas46, which subsequently proved exaggerated, amplifying the tension between C. Hârjeu – the Minister of War and General Alexandru Averescu on the execution of the activities intended for the units withdrawing to the garrisons they belonged to. It was necessary the presence of King Carol I in Zimnicea and Turnu Măgurele, on 15/28 and 16/29 August, to calm the spirits. The decision was that the troops should leave the medical observation areas as fast as possible and they should be sent to the garrisons they belonged to in the shortest time possible. A review of withdrawal plans and a better collaboration between the doctors in the Armed Forces Health Service and the officers in the General Staff resulted in putting an end to the Romanian troops presence in the areas of medical observation, considering 22 August/4 September 1913 as the end of the Romanian military campaign in the summer of that year. On that day Prince Ferdinand signed Order of the Day no. 16, which stated: “Soldiers. When leaving the position of commander-in-chief of military operations, it is my moral obligation to express my deep and vivid gratitude to the officers, NCOs and troops. You return home, some of you to your garrisons and others to your peace time jobs, all of you having the feeling that you have done your duty diligently and have helped the country to become larger in the eyes of the entire world. By the enthusiasm you have shown during mobilisation, by your power of resistance and your abnegation during the difficult and long marches, by the discipline you have shown throughout the campaign, you have proven worthy of the trust your high and great Captain and King has placed in you. The comradely and sacrificial

45 RMA, the GGH Collection, file no. 61/1913, pp. 20-21. 46 CNHA, the Royal House Collection, file no. 7/1913, p. 3.

76 Ion Giurcă behaviour while facing the severe and cruel disease that has been contracted by many of you and put an end to so many lives full of hope provides you with a new right to the love and respect of your superiors. The memory of these victims will always remain in our hearts. Soldiers. I am parting from you today expressing my deep gratitude for the time spent with you, gratitude grounded in the strong bonds of love and trust that unite us in our beautiful army”47. Immediately after signing the peace treaty, the Ministry of War issued the Instructions relating to demobilisation48, action that was to take place after the arrival of the units and commands in the garrisons they belonged to, including three distinct activities: taking back the equipment from troops, giving back or selling the requisitions of all kinds, transporting those demobilised in their places of residence. The way the three activities were to be performed was detailed or stipulated in the regulations that had to be considered. Under the High Decree no. 5141 on 30 July/12 August 1913, demobilisation started on 31 July/13 August 1913, the first units being the sedentary ones or those that did not leave the deployment garrisons, followed by the units that were part of the operational armed forces. No general deadline was imposed for demobilisation because of the specific situation of the units. However, it was desirable that the activities should be performed as quickly as possible, taking into account the costs generated by maintaining a large number of troops under arms, as well as the need of labour force in all sectors of the economy, especially in agriculture. A special case was represented by the 5th Army Corps in Dobrogea, which had to leave certain forces in the Quadrilateral, as specified by higher orders, and certain contingents that had been mobilised. Thus, in the territory incorporated into Romania, in accordance with the peace treaty, had to be deployed and installed in garrisons: the 35th Regiment “Matei Basarab” with two battalions in Dobrici and one battalion in Balcic, the 9th Battalion in Kurtbunar, the 40th Regiment “Călugăreni” with two battalions in Turtucaia and the 5th Roşiori Regiment with two squadrons in Dobrici and Kurtbunar. The other units of the 5th Army Corps had to return to the garrisons they belonged to while the logistic and the health service structures were to disband. The Second Balkan War had an element of absolute novelty, namely the participation of aviation in the conduct of operations in all the phases of the conflict, which represented a good opportunity to test the human and material potential of the service that was newly established in the Romanian Armed Forces, thanks to the concerns in this regard of the Ministry of War as well as of the engineering and flight school that had already distinguished itself in the domestic and international activities involving powered aircraft.

47 RMA, the GGH Collection, file no. 58/1913, p. 216. 48 Ibidem, file no. 59/1913, pp. 6-7.

The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 77

According to the plan drawn up by the Great General Staff, the “war air squadron” was mobilised, consisting of 4 squadrons from the Military Flight School and the Air League, each of the two structures forming a section that was heterogeneous in terms of the types of aircraft, flight performance, and the training of pilots and other personnel. The 1st Section included the personnel and the assets of the Military Flight School, having an active and a reserve squadron, the positions being filled by: 6 pilot officers, a civilian pilot employed under contract by the Ministry of War, namely engineer Aurel Vlaicu, a civil servant, and 33 conscripts, who operated five planes (Farman, Bristol, Vlaicu II), two cars and two trucks. The Air League mobilised 3 active and 1 reserve squadrons as well as 14 active and reserve officers, a military pilot, a civilian one, and 9 conscripts, having available 13 aircraft of various types, and the material resources necessary for the transport, installation, and shelter the aircraft49. During the war the aviation squadrons were deployed to Siliştioara, Lukovit and Telis, from where they carried out the assigned missions, namely the observation of the Bulgarian land and troops and the execution of aerial reconnaissance by pilots, and in some cases, by officers in the land forces. Although at that time there were laudatory appraisals of the actions of the Romanian aviation in war, military analysts were more reserved. Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Alexandru Anastasiu, Head of the 4th Section Transport in the Armed Forces General Staff, considered that: “Neither the Air League, except the 1st Squadron having Lieutenant Capşa and Soldier Poli Vass as pilots, nor the military flying assets could meet the service requirements”50. The same officer who prepared a report about the place and role of aviation in war, perhaps too demanding and subjective, appreciated that “almost all officers, more dilettante than professional, enthusiastic and passionate pilots, were professionally untrained and emotionally unaccustomed to the sacrifice entailed by servicing as pilots or observers. Hence some lack of confidence, timidity, and fear while executing risky, audacious, military flights”51. Regardless of the assessments, one thing is certain. Romania was among the few countries in the world that had specialists in aviation at that time. Moreover, it had military aviation that successfully fulfilled a part of the assigned tasks, having created the prerequisites for the development of this armed forces service in the years that followed. Navy had a very important contribution in all the phases of the war, participating in it with consistent material and human resources. During the mobilisation it was established the Navy Headquarters, consisting of: the Navy Command, whose Commander was Rear Admiral Eustaţiu Sebastian; the Staff Service, led by Captain Spiropol Ioan; Artillery Service – Commander Ciuchi

49 RMA, the GGH Collection, file no. 69, pp. 100-109. 50 Ibidem, p. 103. 51 Ibidem, p. 104.

78 Ion Giurcă

Constantin; Machinery Inspectorate – Ştefănescu Constantin; Health Service – Dr Ciomac Mardar; Quartermaster Service – Major Budeanu Alexandru52. Of the two structures of the Navy, in the operations in the summer of 1913 were employed the forces and assets of the Danube Division, commanded by Captain Poienaru Dumitru. The Division had in its composition the following: monitors “I.C. Brătianu”, “Lascăr Catargiu”, “Alexandru Lahovari”, “Mihail Kogălniceanu”; Galaţi – Tulcea – Sulina Region with torpedo boats “Năluca”, “Zborul” and “Zmeul”, gunboat “Alexandru cel Bun”, boat “Prut”; Cernavodă - Feteşti Region with gunboats “Griviţa”, “Bistriţa”, “Olt”, “Siret”, motorboats “Teleorman”, “Trotuş”, “Vedea”, “Argeş”; Transport Service with tug “Măcin”, torpedo-boat destroyer “România”, motorboats “Smârdan”, “Rahova”, “Opanez”53. Subordinate to the Danube Division Commander were also the requisitioned vessels belonging to the Romanian Inland Navigation and the Hydraulic Service “Mihai Viteazul”, “Basarab”, “Alexandru cel Bun”, “Măgurele” and ship “România”, as well as other river equipment having different destinations. During the mobilisation and concentration of troops, the crossing of the Danube (in both directions), the military operations, the return of the troops to the country, and the demobilisation, the forces and assets of the Danube Division accomplished various missions including: the river transport of the units and subunits from/in the garrisons of residence, in/from the areas of concentration, the crossing from one bank of the Danube to the other of the troops of the 1st Army Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 1st Reserve Division, the participation in the construction, protection and defence of the bridges over the Danube at Siliştioara – Măgura and Turnu Măgurele – Nikopol; the crossing over the Danube of the railway rolling stock used to transport troops and supplies for the units logistical support; health care services for the wounded and the sick on the hospital ship; the provision of all the river transportation service needs generated by operational requirements, including for the high officials of the state, the safeguard of the crossing areas of the Danube on both banks, the defence of the crossing points and the port areas on both banks of the river and many other missions54. The actions and activities of the Danube Division forces proved to be of great utility for the military operations, contributing to the overall success of the war waged by Romania in 1913. The war was managed by the General Staff, whose head was Prince Ferdinand. Thus the campaign in the summer of 1913 was a good opportunity for him to prepare for the future position as head of state and the armed forces, position in which he proved to be highly successful during the National

52RMA, the GGH Collection, file no. 43/1913, p. 87. 53 Ibidem, pp. 90-98. 54 Captain Dr Marian Moşneagu, Marina Militară Română în Campania anului 1913, in Revista de istorie militară, no. 3-4, 2013.

The Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War 79

Reunification War. Yet the leadership role in the military operations was played by General Alexandru Averescu, the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, directly involved in all the actions and activities from the first day of mobilisation up to the completion of demobilisation and the transition of all the armed forces units to the state of peace. Although the rules of the war management were clearly stated, King Carol I and the Minister of War encroached on the Great General Headquarters activity, which resulted in certain malfunction in the conduct of ongoing actions, as well as in certain animosity between the military leaders, felt by the operating personnel in the great military echelons. Although the war was more a show of military force without employing great battles, the Romanian Armed Forces suffered heavy losses, caused primarily by the inability to properly manage the epidemic of cholera that affected an important part of the troops. There were more than 1 100 people who died of cholera (General C. N. Hârjeu noted on 17/30 August 1913 that “Until now we have had about 1 200 dead people in the armed forces and 200 victims of cholera in the country”55). The great number of cases of cholera was evidence for the low capacity of the armed forces health service to prevent and act effectively to combat the disease. The service did not act timely, did not have sufficient means of intervention, sometimes taking ineffective measures thus being in contradiction with the General Staff planners with regard to the overall conduct of combat operations, the evacuation of Bulgaria, and the withdrawal to the garrisons of residence. The deficiencies occurred during the Romanian military campaign, more or less officially presented at that time or later, although in the fall of 1913 a real campaign against some military leaders and some military services was launched in the media, were overshadowed by the praise given to the royal family, the political class in power at the time, and formally to everyone who participated or was involved in the war. The war contributed to strengthening Romania’s European reputation and praise was fully expressed. It was an opportunity to test the military potential of the country, the armed forces leadership ability, the morale of active and mobilised troops, and all Romanians response to a major crisis situation. Flaws and deficiencies in many areas were identified, correct conclusions were drawn, and remedial actions were ordered and taken in accordance with the existing or allocated financial resources. The war was a warning sign for the country’s political and military leadership, who understood that the state of affairs had to be improved, especially as the situation in Europe was becoming increasingly complex and unpredictable given the geopolitical and geostrategic developments. After the completion of all the activities in connection with the Romanian Armed Forces participation in the war, a series of measures were adopted meant

55 General C. N. Hârjeu, Studii critice şi militare, vol. I, Editura Librăriei Stănciulescu, Bucureşti, 1921, p. 45.

80 Ion Giurcă to express gratitude to those who were mobilised, fought, and died for their country in the summer of 1913. Through High Decree no. 6247, “Avântul “Ţării” commemorative medal was established, which “will be awarded to all the military and those assimilated into the military, irrespective of the rank, who took part in the campaign of 1913, who augmented or who were attached or employed with different assignments to the troops or the military services. The medal will be also awarded to the civil servants and the persons who, not directly belonging to the armed forces, were called to actually and permanently perform their duty alongside the Romanian Armed Forces. This category also included the civilian doctors who carried out their activity in ambulances and hospitals, nursing homes, and the persons who helped to nurse the sick and the wounded”56. During 1913 and 1914 the medal was awarded to the participants in ceremonials that were different from case to case, depending on the organisational and social context of those to whom it was awarded. The memory of those who fell on the battlefield was honoured in the years that followed by erecting military commemorative works in Bucureşti and other localities all over the country, the most representative one being “Avântul Ţării” monument in the capital city, in Valter Mărăcineanu Square, inaugurated in 1921. Romania’s participation in the Second Balkan War remains a milestone in the country’s political and military history in the early twentieth century, whose effects were visible in the Romanian-Bulgarian relations, especially between 1916 and 1940, when the border issue between the two neighbouring countries got important again. Romania’s involvement in the war south of the Danube was, given the geopolitical and geostrategic conditions in the summer of 1913, an objective necessity stemming from the need to put an end to a conflict that was not desired, nor even by the European powers, although there were acute contradictions between them, as the Balkan states were of major interest to the states belonging to the two political-military alliances that consolidated their position in Europe.

56 Monitorul oficial, no 49, 11 November 1913, p. 655. Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 81

THE ROMANIAN TROOPS OF DOBRUDJA IN THE BULGARIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1913

Costin SCURTU*

Abstract. Relationships with Bulgaria have been encumbered by a series of ambitions on the Sofia government’s side, which came in contradiction with Romanian interests. The situation would worsen in the Balkan Peninsula as Bulgaria started the Second Balkan War on June 16/29, 1913. New army reorganizations were undertaken in 1912-1913. On the secondary direction of the military operations theatre, since June 27/ July 10 1913, the Army Corps of Dobrudja has advanced – with the fleet’s support, until June 30/July 13 – into the claimed territory between the frontier established in 1878 and Turtucaia – Balcic line, including the town of Bazargic (the small Quadrilateral). On the main direction Sofia, operations started on July 2/15; until July 6/19, Romanian forces were about 25 km away from the capital of Bulgaria. While Dobrudjan troops were returning to the peace garrisons, Interior Minister Take Ionescu sent Dobrudja local authorities a telegram demanding “immediate measures to dress towns and villages. Let us show our gratitude towards H.M. the King, the army and the government through great public manifestations. Romania proudly steps out of this war, with an increased territory and admiration on all of Europe’s behalf”.

Keywords: The Second Balkan War, the Army Corps in Dobrudja, Balkan Peninsula, military garrisons, the frontier in the South of Dobrudja.

Throughout the 30 years since the Dobrudja Active Division founding in 1879, February 22, the Dobrudjan ground forces have known a remarkable organizational evolution as well as an infrastructure enabling the military system’s well-functioning, according to political orientation and the Romanian national aspirations. The Romanian army’s evolution aligned with a tense European background due to the great powers’ arming and arms races. By 1908, the entire infantry structure had been made permanent, outing shifts in the active service. Based on that year’s newly elaborated law regarding army reorganization, certain changes were brought upon the organizational structure of the army. Active duty for all marching units was reduced to 2 years. Infantry brigade teams were made up of two active regiments and 1 or 2 spare units. The infantry division came with 2 infantry brigades, 1 riflemen unit, 1 artillery brigade, troops and auxiliary services, while the army division had 2-3 infantry divisions, 1-2 cavalry brigades, 1 pioneer battalion, 1 telegraph company, troops and auxiliary services. In 1909,

* Muzeul Militar Național, Filiala Constanța.

82 Costin Scurtu every infantry regiment was attributed a machine-gun division consisting in 3 pieces each1. In Bulgaria, the neighbouring country, during the first years of the 20th century, the quantity of purchased war material was “just enough to guarantee efforts of arming no less than 18 divisons”2. By the end of the 20th century’s first decade, King Charles I defined his policy as one aiming to “maintain a balance of powers in the Balkans by using armed force, when necessary, against any authority attempting to disrupt it”3. Just in case any military conflict would have erupted in the Balkan area past 1910, Romania was believed to be better off remaining neutral and carefully observing the course of events, especially since, in December 1909, Bulgaria had concluded a secret military convention with Russia, by means of which the tsar engaged in supporting Bulgaria’s territorial claims upon Romanian Dobrudja4. The First Balkan War began in the fall of 19125. Romania decided to not get involved and refused to enact levy, as a de facto proof of its neutral policy. As Turkey came close to surrendering, Romania started deploying a sustained diplomatic activity, with a well-determined purpose: in case any territorial changes affected the Balkan region, a resumption of the 1878 discussions regarding the southern frontier of the Romanian state, ensuring greater geostrategic protection in an area struck with particularly frequent military conflicts, appeared as inevitable6. A November 9, 1912 report from Prime-minister Titu Maiorescu to King Charles I spoke for itself: “As soon as all of the general dispositions in the Treaty of Berlin are eliminated, the legitimacy of our imposed Dobrudjan border will also disappear, thus demanding a new regulation. We would want this regulation to be made amicably between Romania and Bulgaria and we are actually

1 Infanteria Română – 180 de ani –, Bucureşti, Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei Publishing House, 2010, p. 22. 2 Arhivele Militare Române (furthermore cited as A.M.R.), fond 948, file nr. 14, nr. crt. 22, f. 22. 3 Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale (furthermore cited as A.N.I.C.), fond Anglia, roll 252, F.D. 3 71/1912, f. 3. English Minister Conyngham Greene to External Affairs Minister Grey, in the December 31, 1910 report. 4 Constantin Tudor, Administraţia românească în Cadrilater, Călărași, AGORA Publishing House, 2005, p. 50-51. 5 In 1912, 100 years away from the Russian annexation of Bessarabia, this is what Halippa wrote concerning Romania’s lack of interest towards the brothers from across the Prut: “This indifference towards Bessarabia makes us think and suspect that the Romanian people only exalt and lend a helping hand occasionally, as a mere reassurance, leaving aside our situation in everyday life... And should that be true, there is no point in deluding oneself into hopeless dreams”. See Onisifor Ghibu, De la Basarabia rusească la Basarabia românească, Bucharest, “Semne” Publishing House, 1997, p. 71. Apud. Viaţa Românească, I, 1912, p. 409. 6 The endowment, training, coordination and insuring of the army troops fell upon this Infantry Inspectorate, which came into being in 1912.

The Romanian Troops of Dobrudja in the Bulgarian Campaign of 1913 83 expecting the initiative to be made on behalf of Bulgaria, given that it was the latter which had started the war against Turkey. Out of sheer consideration towards the King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, we wish to avoid any kind of pressure on this matter. However, on a friendly and confidential note, I may state that adjusting our border south of Dobrudja should comprise a boundary line from Turtucaia up to the Black Sea, on the hither side of Varna”7. The main goal was to obtain a direct negotiation between Romania and Bulgaria so as to correct Dobrudja’s south frontier8. Faced with a definite refusal from Stoian Danev, the Bulgarian representative in conversations, N. Mişu messaged Bucharest on January 2, 1913: “Bulgaria finds itself in the position where it can only allow a small correction of the Dobrudjan southern frontier, which would mean turning the current devious border into a straight line”9. Conversations between Bucharest and Sofia came to an end with no results. After several appointments, the maximum concession accepted by the Bulgarian state targeted the assignation of the Silistra fortress along with a 3 km belt surrounding it. Bucharest regarded this solution as insufficient. Under these circumstances, Romania warned it would have to take control over the Turtucaia-Balchik line, which got the Great Powers to touch Bulgaria up about recommencing negotiations and coming down with a more reconciliatory attitude. However, the January 23, 1913 Ottoman coup d’état led to the Balkan relapse of military hostilities, which consequently stopped the Romanian- Bulgarian negotiations in London. Both N. Mişu and S. Danev signed a protocol nonetheless, which merely recorded each of the co-signers’ point of view10. On the basis of the High Decree no. 4609, the Romanian state initiated conscription June 20/July 3 1913, raising an army in the first day – June 23rd /July 6th 1913, at 24.00 hours. The public opinion favoured military intervention, hence enthusiastically receiving news of a possible intervention in the Balkan conflict. N. Iorga refers to loud and “violent manifestations”, challenges, “preparations of rally hot heads, bellicose resolutions, outbreaks and threats”. In that event, at 10 p.m., general Ion Culcer, Commander of the 5th Army Corps, sent the 34th regiment infantry in Constanţa a copy of the telegraphic command no. 328 regarding the army levy that the Division General Constantin

7 Cartea Verde, Documente diplomatice. Evenimentele din Peninsula Balcanică. Acţiunea României, septembrie 1912 - august 1913, Bucharest, Minerva Publishing House, 1913, p. 13; see also Stoica Lascu, Din istoria Dobrogei de Sud în cadrul României întregite(1913-1940), in “Revista istorică”, tome VI, nr. 11-12/1995, p. 963. Constantin Tudor, op. cit., p. 50-110. 8 Ileana Bulz, Relaţiile anglo-române între anii 1880-1914, in “Diplomaţie şi diplomaţi români”, vol. II, Focşani, D.M. Press Publishing, 2002, p. 132. 9 Cartea Verde. Documente diplomatice, op. cit., p. 27. 10 Constantin Tudor, op. cit., pp. 58-68.

84 Costin Scurtu

N. Hârjeu, War minister, had sent11. Based on the High Decree no. 4609, armies ought to be prepared starting June 23 CY. All people are being called upon, contingent groups as well as reserves from 1911 to 1901 included, and all of those with individual call-up addresses or bearing a particular mobilization duty within the contingent groups from 1900 to 1895 included […]”12. Out of 3.332 troop members in the Constanţa regiment, they found 166 soldiers with incomplete training, all of which were from the contingent or reserve groups and had taken turns in performing the active service13. A series of malfunctions were to appear while carrying out the mobilization command within the regiment. “Soldiers’ accoutrement was slow because only three companies could take items from the storage facility at a time, using the three existent access ways. It took no less than 96 (ninety-six) hours to hand in all of the necessary items, having the companies hand in the parade supplies to the depot afterwards, since these were meant to mobilize other reserve units. […] The regiment had both operative and enough weaponry and ammunition. There was a shortcoming of 493 revolvers, which were then replaced with Md.79s14 […]. Item repurchase was performed as follows: one of the officers made an evaluation of where the necessary items could be found and a repurchase command, containing all the needed supplies and the places to find them, was sent to the City Hall; consequently, the City Mayor along with the authorized officer performed the repurchase as well as issuing the advices of delivery”15. On the other hand, the June 21/July 4, 1913 circular command regulated the telegraph-postal military service. According to the 14th article of the standing order, at wartime, the mobilized clerks were considered the army’s civil servants, bearing positions that fit hierarchic military ranks. Art. 23 provided that pay and other rights of the conscripted be determined according to the law and the army’s payment regulations; their rights were to be paid by the Quartermaster Corps affiliated with the telegraph-postal service. Inferior clerks and officials from the postal services were to receive a daily allowance for food consisting in 75 cents a day, provided for master sergeants as

11 General Constantin Hârjeu held the position of Minister of War from October 14, 1912 to January 3,1914; respectively March 6, 1918 to October 23, 1918. 12 A.M.R., fond C.R.I.,file nr. 809, f. 80-81. 13 Idem, fond 2272. file nr. 17, Dare de seamă asupra mobilizării de la 23 iunie la 10 august 1913, f. 2. 14 Austrian-made, Martini-Henry system infantry rifle, with simple or double-trailed carriage,md. 1879 A, cal 11,43 mm. Apud Infanteria Română – 180 de ani –, op. cit., p. 256. 15 The Constanţa regiment repurchased 12 carriages, 221 horses and 49 pairs of harness, „having given no name of their rightful owners, no register number, no clue whatsoever about who they belonged to so that at least the animals could eventually be returned to the proprietors”. AMR, fond nr. 2272, file nr. 17, f. 1, verso.

The Romanian Troops of Dobrudja in the Bulgarian Campaign of 1913 85 rate no. 14 in the Pay Standing order annex. Those receiving a soldier’s substantive pay were to be given an equipment bonus only in case they had been effectively mobilized and taken part in the active lot16. During the five days that the mobilization needed to be complete, the troop was served warm meals, as the instructions called for. Food supplies came from providers in times of peace, while bread came from the army’s store house. Alimentation was guaranteed along the transfer to the to the area where troops would gather, in accordance with the 5th Army Corpus order no. 115 of 191317. As far as the mobilized unit’s state of mind was concerned, it appeared that “Upon observing the call-up rush, the enthusiasm shown in the face of the presentation and the joy as they left their families, barracks and towns behind so as to join the war, one could say not even the deepest connoisseur of the Romanian soldier’s spirit would have expected such a high morale”18. In the first assembling day, 1200 people from the completion and reserve units were passed out to 1st Infantry Brigade, as this was the first subunit with complete supplies. The 1st Infantry Brigade, along with Section 1, marched to Caraomer via Topraisar on June 24 (OS) at 10 p.m., whilst the 2nd and 3rd Infantry battalions, together with the 2nd and 3rd machine-gun sections, started marching June 27, also at 10 a.m. On June 24/July 7, 1913, at 9 a.m., a religious service was held in the Regiment’s courtyard, in the presence of the unit’s officers, honouring the departure of the first battalion. As soon as the religious service ended, Rădulescu, the garrison’s clergyman, addressed the soldiers and spoke of the Romanian ancestors and forefathers’ bravery, advising that they too do their bit in defending the nation. The 34th Infantry Regiment commander also took the floor, emphasizing for the soldiers in the 1st Infantry Battalion just how much “trust His Majesty the King and their Nation puts in them, as they are the first ones being sent off to confront the enemy and demanding that they abundantly respond to this trust”19. At 10 a.m., after all of these allocutions came to an end, the 1st Infantry Battalion “exited the barrack’s gate as the crowd cheered, all flocked along Mangalia St.”20. In Constanţa, on June 27/ July 10, 1913, at 16:00, with respect to the mobilization instructions, the entire regiment in town gathered in the field near the 9th Călăraşi Regiment, where priest Rădulescu performed a religious service once

16 Idem, fond nr. 2272, file nr. 5, f. 35-36. 17 “The 34th Infantry Regiment, n.n. – only had one intake of war bread and canned meat, which was distributed to people in burlap sacks, while the second intake was completed with market- bought bacon and cheese”. Idem, fond nr. 2272, file nr. 17, f. 1, verso. 18 Ibidem, f. 2. 19 Ibidem. 20 Ibidem.

86 Costin Scurtu more. What came next was a speech from Colonel Ioan Dragalina, commander of the 29th Brigade, who expressed his deep regrets about having to “say goodbye to the officers and members of the 34th Regiment’s, whom he had worked with for two years and was confident would make the Romanian army utterly proud21. At 18.30, the regiment returned to its barracks, where the 2nd and 3rd infantry battalions, along with their subunits and formations, received the departure order. At 19.30, “after the officers and the unit had dinner and made some last-minute preparations, the regiment left the barracks’ premises and traversed Stefan cel Mare St., acclaimed by the crowds and heading for Cobadin via Hasidorluc”22. The troops marched by foot and reached Cobadin on June 28 /July 11, at 13.30. The next day, at 6 a.m, they continued marching through Caraclar (nowadays Coroana) and Ghiuvanlia so as to get to Caraomer (nowadays known as Negru Vodă), at 14.3023. The marching progressed under optimal circumstances. Septimiu Sfintescu24 was a medical student in Germany and came back to Romania to serve as a soldier in the Medical Corps. „Only military trains were in circulation from Vârciorova. We arrived at 02:00, but had to make several stops until 16:00 because of the numerous people that had been called to arms. I got to Slatina at 4 p.m. and then home. On Thursday afternoon, I reported to the regiment, where I was introduced to Major Dr. Dimitriu, sub-lieutenant Dumitrescu and Călărăşanu, and chief pharmacist Schwenck. I was given my brand new green soldier uniform by the 1st company; I remember thinking how much I would have liked to stay in that position, that of a soldier, working on the ambulance for a living, not wasting one bit of my strength by having to walk or carry the chatterbox on my back. I spent the night sewing, adjusting my uniform; I hadn’t received a rifle, a bayonet or a cross insignia, which is what every healthcare member needed”25.

21 Ibidem, f. 2, verso. 22 Ibidem. 23 According to the general census of December 19/January 1, 1913, in Dobrudja, this is how building materials of houses in rural settlements were classified: 13.3% masonry; 10.1% wood; 75.2% wattle and daub, ferule, loam, unburnt brick; 1.4% other materials. In Tulcea county, homes were built as follows: 2.2% masonry; 13.6% wood; 81.7% wattle and daub, ferule, loam or unburnt brick and 1.5% others. Constanţa county had lodging made of 21.5 masonry; 7.3 wood; 70.0% wattle and daub, ferule, loam, unburnt brick; 1.2% others. Apud. Victor Axenciuc, Evoluţia economică a României. Cercetări statistico - istorice, 1859-1947, Vol. I. Industria, Bucharest, Editura Academiei Române, 1992, pp. 311-312. 24 Septimiu Sfinţescu would later live the life of a sub-lieutenant medical officer during the 1916 war, both in the Dobrudja campaign as well as when he had to drop back all on his own, by foot, for several weeks, all the way from Bucharest to his unit in Focşani, much to the surprise of all of those who believed he had ducked-out and went to Germany. He became seriously ill with typhus as he managed a camp fever clinic near Adjud. 25 „Thursday, July 3, Bonn am Rhein. In the morning, at 7, on my way to Frauen-Klinik, I see the following message: Bucharest 2 Juli 1913. His Majesty King Charles I signed the order for the

The Romanian Troops of Dobrudja in the Bulgarian Campaign of 1913 87

The Dobrudja Corpus – embodying the secondary forces of the Romanian offence under the rule of Division general Ioan Culcer – was made up the 5th army Corpus, with the 9th and 10th Infantry divisions, the 3rd reserve unit and the 31st mixed infantry brigade, centralized in the Cernavodă-Constanţa area. This unit had been ordered to occupy the so-called “Quadrilateral”. The 9th infantry division had to march south on the Cernavodă-Turtucaia route, while the 10th division had to cover the Medgidia-Bazargic line26. The General Staff disposed that Dobrudja’s southern frontier be ensured by the military units dislocated in the area, enforced by peace officer and ranger units, subservient to the headquarters responsible for defending the borders. The fourth zone, between Ostrov and Ilanlâc (nowadays Vama Veche), in the Caraomer region (today known as Negru-Vodă), from Haidarchioi (currently Vânători) to Daulchioi (currently Darabani), with the central quarter in Caraomer, comprised the guarding units of the 1st battalion in the 34th infantry regiment in Constanţa, and arrived in Caraomer on June 25/July 7, 1913, followed by the 3rd and 4th Squadrons in the 5th Roşiori regiment27. Romania signalized the Great Powers about not staying detached in case a new conflict would appear in the area. On June 26/ July 8, 1913, the Russian office of state in Bucharest told the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs that “Bulgarians wouldn’t hear of any moderation, they were in fact ready to start the war against Serbians and Greeks alike”28. As head of the conservative Government and with consent from King Charles I, Titu Maiorescu chose to settle differences with Bulgaria via military action29. This is what a daily newspaper in Dobrudja wrote in the month of October, 1912: “The adjustment of our borders south of Dobrudja, […] offering protection to our fellow citizens in Macedonia, these are our current

mobilization of the entire army”. „The telegram was seen by German people too, which is why, during classes, I had been asked about going to war. Other Romanian fellows must have seen it too: Ion Cristescu (medical school), Dim. Popescu and Arbore (agronomics), Costin Stoicescu (law), Emil Panaitescu (history), Ion Dumitrescu (law-agronomics), Leon Burada etc.”. http://www.itcnet.ro/history/archive/mi1998/current8/mi40.htm 26 Just 18 days after the mobilization date, the Romanian army, along with its primary offensive forces, came as close as 20 km away from Sofia and 10 km away from Filippol, crossing the Balkan mountains and achieving the desired merging with the Greek army. 27 Jipa Rotaru, Leonida Moise, Ion Giurcă, Costin Scurtu, Divizia 9 Mărăşeşti. 120 de ani de la înfiinţare (1879-1999), Bucharest, Punct Publishing House, 1999, Divizia 9 „Mărăşeşti”. 120 de ani, p. 17. 28 Ion I. Nistor, Recuperarea Cadrilaterului, in „Analele Dobrogei”, Year XIX, nr. II/1938, p. 152; see also Dumitru Preda, România şi războaiele balcanice, in „Magazin istoric”, Year XXVII, nr. 7/1993, p. 52. 29 Ion Alexandrescu, Ion Bulei, Ion Mamina, Ioan Scurtu, Enciclopedia de Istorie a României, Bucureşti, Meronia Publishing House, 2000, p. 103.

88 Costin Scurtu considerations, which we shall demand at any cost, with support from the 400.000 bayonets ready to perform their duty to this country!”30. The situation within the Balkan Peninsula worsened by the day. Bulgaria triggered the beginning of the Second Balkan War on June 16/29, 1913. On June 27/July 10, Romania declared war to Bulgaria. Written by Titu Maiorescu, as President to the Board of Councils, the declaration of war ended with the following statement: “The government ordered its army to penetrate into Bulgaria”. Titu Maiorescu left for the General Staff, where he found Prince Ferdinand. As soon as General Alexandru Averescu, the Chief of Joint Staff31, guaranteed that units in Dobrudja were prepared, the declaration of war dispatch was sent to Sofia32. Faced with the Bulgarian government’s refusal to put an end to hostilities, Romania launched military operations June 27/July 10, 1913. These were based on the General Al. Averescu’s plans elaborated throughout the first semester of 1913 (Hypothesis I bis); they mapped out an offensive approach via two strategic directions in the south of the Danube. On the 37th of June/10th of July, 1913, the Dobrudjan Corpus on the secondary direction started advancing with support from the flotilla, continuing to do so until June 30/July 13, when it took control over the claimed territory between the 1878-established border and the Turtucaia-Balchik line, including the town of Bazargic (improperly deemed as the small Quadrilateral). The Romanian army had been set in motion at such fast pace, that it took the Bulgarian quarter by surprise, since they believed it would have taken at least 14 days to prepare the troops. Romania had called in 509.820 people, amounting to 6% of the country’s population. The Romanian army started passing over the Danube on the 2nd/25th of July, 1913, aided by the river monitors. Events alternated quickly. The advanced units of the 5th army Corpus, led by general Culcer, occupied Turtucaia, Dobrich and Balchik on the 30th of June; Rusciuk, Varna and Sumla followed eight days later. In spite of being numerically inferior, one cavalry division (disposing of 3000 cavalrymen), receiving orders from general Bogdan, seized an entire Bulgarian brigade. This rather bodacious action indirectly deterred Bulgarian soldiers, who believed they had to deal with some undoubtedly high-calibre forces; this consequently led to the decomposition of the Bulgarian 1st Army, that general Kutincev was in charge of. The rest of the army crossed over the Danube through Corabia. As far as the Sofia main course was

30 I. Bentoiu, Războiul din Balcani şi compensaţiile noastre, in „Conservatorul Constanţei”, year IV, nr. 30 Oct. 28, 1912, pp. 2-3. 31 General Alexandru Averescu was the Chief of Joint Staff from November 18/December 1, 1911 to December 2/15, 1913. 32 Alexandru Marghiloman, Note politice, România şi războiale balcanice (1912-1913), Volume 1, Bucharest, Scripta Publishing House, 1993, p. 112.

The Romanian Troops of Dobrudja in the Bulgarian Campaign of 1913 89 concerned, operations were set off July 2/15, 1913; by July 6/19, Romanian units had almost reached the Bulgarian capital, as they were just 25 km away. On the 28th of June/11th of July, 1913, forces centralized in Dobrudja, having received army fire support from the ”Al. Lahovari” monitor, went past the old frontier and took up Silistra, having met with no opposition. That same morning, King Charles I received the following telegram from general C.N. Hârjeu, the Minister of War: ”I must respectfully bring into notice that, as of this morning at 11:00, Silistra fortress fell under King Charles I’s rule”33. Yet another contemporary document described the events taking place in Silistra the day it became engaged by Romanian troops: “At this exact moment (11:00 - n. ns.), the popular fortress of Silistra belongs to Romania. The 1st Squadron proceeded immediately in effectively occupying the base. 250 weapons and 200 cartridge cases found in the garrison were seized. The commander of the Silistra Garrison, a Bulgarian major finding himself in the barracks, was left sword less. Romanians took control over the telegraph office and a series of posts were sent on the Medjidie-Tabia and Kalipetrova forts. The regiment’s commander immediately sent notice to the General Culcer, the Ostrov Corpus army Commander, regarding the military occupation of Silistra fortress at 11:00. At 2 p.m., when the Minister of War, together with Mr. Nicolae Filipescu, former Minister of War, General Culcer, General Istrati, General Văleanu, Secretary to the Minister of War, Major Balif, the Minister’s aide-de-camp, the commander of the 5th Regiment in Roşiori presented the situation at that point and was ordered to assemble all notable fellows from Silistra to the town hall, so as to let them know that, as of that day onward, Silistra was under the direct rule of His Majesty King Charles I”34. Having the Minister of War, General C.N. Hârjeu as well as Nicolae Filipescu, Prince Ferdinand’s personal representative witness the event was meant to emphasize just how strategically important this area in the south of the Danube actually became at that moment in Romanian history. Upon welcoming France and Germany’s ministers, Premier Titu Maiorescu explained onto them that... “We stepped onto Bulgarian ground for two main reasons: 1) to make sure we had a strategic border in Dobrudja, that is Turtucaia (some kilometres westward)- Dobrich-Balchik, seeing as how international conventions have no meaning to Bulgarians, who had basically attacked their own allies and 2) to really represent an integrating part of the treaty meant to readjust the territorial division that comes along with the allies defeating the Turks”35. Transferring the frontier in the south of Dobrudja on the Turtucaia-Dobrich- Balchik line was performed by the surveillance squad at the break of dawn on

33 Ibidem, p. 113. 34 I.T. Ghica, Luarea Silistrei, Bucharest, 1915, pp. 134-135. 35 Titu Maiorescu, România, războaiele balcanice şi Cadrilaterul, Ed. Machiavelli, Bucharest, 1995, p. 134.

90 Costin Scurtu

June 28/ July 14, 1913. They were going to advance all along the 4th sector, except for the troops in front of Silistra. But there was a surprise awaiting the Romanian army as it entered the town of Silistra without firing one shot. In a memoir about how the Romanian Army’s Secret Services institution was created, Mihail Moruzov wrote: “Up until the 1913 Balkan war, our army had not benefited from any so-called information services”. “That is when people first thought of creating such an institution”. Under several circumstances, Mihail Moruzov and Gheorghe Cristescu equally emphasized the lack of efficiency when it came to the secret information apparatus within the 2nd Section of the General Staff36. That being said, the Quadrilateral passed under Romanian command, which quickly started applying all sorts of defence mechanisms throughout the territory, so as to prevent any Bulgarian units from concentrating in the area37. Romanian troops received provisions from temporarily established storehouses, through direct purchases or regional requisitions. Money and goods represented the means of payment, based on how both sides established prices and in accordance with the law of corrections38. At the border, troops in Dobrudja gathered in company lines by battalions, organized in linear columns. The regiments’ commanders addressed the soldiers, asserting the importance of the moment. The 34th infantry Regiment was told that the Romanian army stepped into the “territory known as the Quadrilateral39, in order to once again take up the land that was once our own. As soon as the elocution ended, music started playing, and the entire regiment as it was crossed the border shouting Hooray! On the way to the frontier, throughout the march, the biker division and the 8th Company served as safety units. Once they crossed the border, the bikers and the 8th Company advanced to create the spearhead force. Meanwhile, the rest of the regiment stopped until all subdivisions reached the appropriately distanced positions”40.

36 Cristian Troncotă, op. cit., p. 40. 37 Dumitru Preda, Acţiunea armatei române în cel de al doilea război balcanic, in „Istoria militară a poporului român”, vol. V, Bucureşti, Editura Militară, 1988, p. 289. 38 Divizia 9 „Mărăşeşti”. 120 de ani, op. cit., p. 20. 39 The Quadrilateral is the Romanian name for the southern part of Dobrudja, which is in Bulgaria and bears the Danube as a NW limitation, Beli Lom and Kamchiya rivers in the south and the Black Sea in the East. In the summer of 1946, the Peace Conference in Paris received a memoir on behalf of the Association for Dislodged People in Southern Dobrudja (the Quadrilateral). Former deputy Teodor Belu signed the memoir, which protested against the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, dating from September 7, 1940 (Craiova). This is what the memoir said about the territory (back then known as the Quadrilateral) which had then been handed over to Bulgaria: “The term Quadrilateral, referring to southern Dobrudja, is not a geographic expression. It pertained to the XIXth century military cartography and, during the Russian-Turkish battles, it designated the vast military grounds between Silistra - Rusciuk - Kaliakra – Varna fortresses, which approximately marked a quadrangle”. Constantin Tudor, op. cit., p. 18. Apud Memoire sur la Dobroudja du Sud (Quadriletere), Bucureşti, 1946, p. 7 (in the manuscript within the Academy Library, under III 465807). 40 A.M.R., fond 2272, file nr. 17, f. 4.

The Romanian Troops of Dobrudja in the Bulgarian Campaign of 1913 91

Here is what reserve lieutenant Constantin M. Ionescu, who took part in the events, declared in February, 1914: “I felt pleased to have o taste of the national pride one experienced upon entering Silistra on the first day of pursuit, along with the Ist battalion of the “Matei Basarab” 35th Infantry Regiment that I was in, joined by other units as well 5th Regiment of Roşiori and the 23rd Infantry Regiment; the next day, we had to take the outposts together with the 3rd company at Kalipetrovo, which prevailed in Silistra, and then, after going through several villages, we quartered in Balbunar, that was situated 45 km west of Turtucaia; from here on, having traversed other villages, we quartered in Dobrich, the most important town to be found on the former Turkish Pazargik; when we reached the beautiful port on the Silver Coast, Balchik, we were disbanded”41. According to most testimonies thereupon, most of the territory’s Muslim inhabitants believed that the Romanian troops entering the Quadrilateral and taking control over the citadel was a good thing. These people welcomed Romanian soldiers “with unspeakable enthusiasm, as they regarded our brave soldiers as saviours”42. One leading article in the Constanţa edition of ”România Mare” referred to the subject as follows: ”With the exception of Bulgarian people, why have all the other nations inside the New Dobrudja taken so much joy in the fact that Romanians had occupied the region? How come they greeted our troops with bread and salt, celebrating their arrival as if they were in fact liberators, who brought along the possibility of living a better life, completely different from what they had to put up with under Bulgarian rule? Why is that, now?”43. The 1st infantry Battalion in the 34th infantry Regiment, under Mihai Popescu’s command, which was in Caraomer at that point, crossed the frontier and attacked the Bulgarian ranger platoon, taking some of the soldiers as prisoners of war. The battalion continued advancing up to Ghelengic, where it stayed until the hostilities ended, taking some safety measures towards Bazargic. The 2nd and 3rd infantry battalions, commanded by majors Petre Golescu and Vasile Voiculescu respectively, passed over the border as well44. Within the 9th infantry Division, the 34th ”Constanţa” infantry Regiment represented the division’s reserve. In order to organize the occupied grounds, adjutant General Ion Istrati, commander of the 9th infantry Division, released a manifesto that said:

41 Constantin Tudor, op. cit., p. 73. Apud „România Mare”, Year I, nr. 7/February 1914. 42 I.N. Roman, Drepturile, sacrificiile şi munca noastră în Dobrogea faţă de pretenţiile bulgarilor asupra ei, Iaşi, 1918, p. 51. 43 Constantin Tudor, op. cit., p. 74. Apud „România Mare”, Year I, nr. 4/25.12.1913. If the fact that Romania was seen as a liberator by the Islamist population, which constituted a majority in the Quadrilateral, is a historical truth, it is equally true that most of the Bulgarian people showed hostility towards Romanian administration. 44 A.M.R., fond C.R.I., file nr. 809, f. 80-81.

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”Everybody should know that severe measures have been taken so that the occupation units rightfully respect each of the replacement’s belongings and individuality. Also, it should be mentioned that the population ought to pay respect to the army and avoid any kind of misunderstanding or conflict that might come up, since there will be no discrimination based on either religion or nationality”45. The proclamation was written in Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish and displayed in all of the villages or small towns the division was responsible for. We would also like to recall the fact that, on the 20th of June, 1913, the 10th infantry Division was ordered to mobilize its manpower and take part in the Second Balkan War. Dislocation towards Bulgaria started July 1, 1913. Balchik, Dobrich and Turtucaia were taken over on the 5th of July, 1913. The division returned to the country via Silistra in August that same year. Around the same time, on July 5/18, Bulgaria’s tsar – Ferdinand I of Saxa Coburg-Gotha would send King Charles I of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen a telegram soliciting the hold-up of Romanian troops. On July 6/19, 1913, the Bulgarian Government, given the pressure of the military events and advised by the Great Powers, sent the Romanian Prime minister a notice, offering to ”give in to Romania the Bulgarian territory situated in the north-east of the line ranging from Turtucaia to Balchik”. In exchange, he demanded that any military action be ceased and troops draw back from beyond the Danube and the Turtucaia- Balchik limitation. In addition to this, Romania was asked to declare neutrality towards the continuation of the Balkan conflict, but also when it came to any future regulation of the territorial differences in the area46. The Romanian army hoped to end hostilities as soon as possible, so that balance would once again dominate the Balkans. Bulgaria would sign truce on the 17th/30th of July, 1913. The armistice was made official between Romania and Bulgaria on July 18/August 1, 191347. The 5th Army Corpus commandment ordered all military structures under its rule to suspend any military actions and to consolidate the healthcare line, especially since the cholera epidemic was laying waste on the Bulgarian territory by mid-July. The moment the Quadrilateral was

45 Divizia 9 „Mărăşeşti”.120 de ani, op. cit., p. 21. 46 Ion I. Nistor, op. cit., p. 155. 47 Regulamentul privitor la legile şi obiceiurile războiului pe pământ, Haga, October 18, 1907. Section II, Ostilităţile, Chapter V, Armistiţiul, Art. 36. The armistice interrupts war operations by means of a mutual accord between belligerent sides. Having no fixed duration meant that both sides could re-engage in war operations at any time, as long as the ennemy is given notice at the right time, according to the truce’s conditions. Art. 37. The armistice can be either general or local. The first stipulates that all war actions must stop on the belligerent sides. The second refers to ending hostilities for some of the belligerent units in a limited area. Art. 38. The armistice has to be officially announced and just in time for the appropriate authorities and troops to take notice. Hostilities end as soon as notice is taken or upon the agreed date.

The Romanian Troops of Dobrudja in the Bulgarian Campaign of 1913 93 annexed, there were doctors working in both Silistra and Dobrich, in charge of a series of medical centres led by healthcare specialists in the most important villages and towns. There in clinics in most part of the towns and there were actual ”lazarets” in Silistra, Dobrich and Turtucaia”48. The 9th and 10th infantry Divisions took the necessary healthcare measures south-west of the Turtucaia - Dobrich- Balchik line. Military healthcare specialists were ordered to check on every settlement where Romanian troops had quartered. Captain Radu R. Rosetti, the 12th infantry Company commander of the 34th infantry Regiment noticed how the correspondence service for the (mobilized) army men and their families had very low performance during the campaign; in fact, there was a ”total lack of remedies, bandages or fasciae, as well as surgical instruments in the 10th Division and 34th Constanţa Regiment of Bulgaria back in 1913”49. Professor Dr. Grigore Cantacuzino would later conclude that, given the amount of difficulties at the time, the cholera epidemic had spread throughout the entire region surrounding the Danube except for the Quadrilateral.50. When in the Romanian Parliament, Nicolae Iorga said that: ”Dobrudja had gradually formed an aggregate, which unfortunately disintegrated back in 1878 and was once again put together in 1913”, and that ”it meant an unhoped for settling of Romania’s political and military hegemony, which is none other than a consequence of the ethnic value combined with the cultural rise of the Romanian people”51.

48 Constantin Tudor, op. cit., p. 84. 49 General Radu R. Rosetti, op. cit., pp. 66-67. 50 See the more detailed Costin Scurtu, Studii privind Serviciul sanitar militar român în perioada 1900-1916, in the New Series, Year VII, Muzeul de Istorie Naţională şi Arheologie Constanţa, Constanţa, 2002, pp. 138-139. 51 N. Iorga, Discursuri parlamentare, vol. I, Second part, Bucharest, ”Bucovina” Publishing House I.E. Toronţiu, 1939, p. 183.

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Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 95

ROMANIA AND GERMANY: FRIENDS AND INTERESTS IN THE BALKAN WARS (1912-1913)

Ioana RIEBER

Abstract. In the second half of the 19th century German-Romanian relations became tighter and tighter, a consequence of both a prince of the Hohenzollern dynasty being accepted to lead Romania (1866) and by Romania joining the Triple Alliance (1883). The relationship between the two countries was also visible during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), when the German Chancellery supported Bucharest's territorial claims. There was a great need of an ally, as Austria-Hungary was backing Bulgaria. If the Vienna seemed to be obsessed with Serbia, Berlin did not want Romania to get separated from the Central Powers.

Keywords: Balkan Wars, territorial claims, the Peace of Bucharest, the Balkan „powder keg”, economic interests, national interests.

In 1913, the Bucharest peace treaty was concluded following the Balkan Wars. It represents an important moment because it is the confirmation of the international status that Romania enjoyed at that moment. The impact on the public opinion was quite strong. Clemenceanu wrote in „L’Homme libre”: “Starting now, Romania distinguishes itself as a moral power as well as a military power in front of Europe.”1 General Herjeu also commented, “What grand days we are living! Thank God that He helped me see my country elevated so high.”2 In order for Bucharest to become the place where the negotiations were to take place and the peace treaty was to be signed, Romania needed support from the Great Powers. In order to achieve this objective, the German chancellery proved to be an extremely important endorser of King Carol I. It was not accidental, as Bucharest enjoyed the support of Berlin throughout the progression of the conflict. Romania’s participation in the Balkan Wars was dictated by its geostrategic position and by its national interests at that moment, as the war broke out in its immediate vicinity. Romanian diplomacy knew how to play its hand very well indeed.

 Teacher at the National College “Gheorghe Lazăr”, Bucharest. 1 Herjeu C. N., Studii critce şi militare, Din învăţămintele războaielor din 1013 şi 1916-1918, Bucureşti, Editura Librăriei „Stănciulescu”, 1921, p. 40. 2 Ibidem.

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The dissensions in the area stemmed from a much earlier period than the year 1912, in the context in which small peoples were trying to create their national states. The least content were the Serbs because they had been constrained to accept Bosnia’s and Herzegovina’s annexation by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1909.3 Under these circumstances, they directed their attention to the territories inhabited by their co-nationals and which were part of the Ottoman Empire. Bulgaria wanted to complete its 1908 success, when, united with Rumelia, it had proclaimed itself a kingdom by the annexation of some Macedonian territories, while Greece, which had a more active foreign policy, after the government was taken over by Venizelos, had its own territorial aspirations. Each state wanted to rebuild what they believed was their territorial unity which had been affected by the Ottoman conquests. The fact that the Ottoman Empire no longer existed created new opportunities. The intentions of the three governments were facilitated by the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish war in 1911. As a result of this war, not only did the Ottoman Empire have to cede Tripolitania and Cyrenaica,4 but it also lost the military capabilities to defend its territories. Italy started the war because it wanted to expand its territory and colonies, just as Germany did. Even so, at the level of international relations, attacking Turkey was not an inspired move because Turkey was one of the countries that had signed the Treaty of Berlin, which guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the Hague Conventions. The conflict did nothing more than light the fuse which exploded the Balkan Powder Keg. The war, or rather the two Balkan wars, which reopened fresh wounds, seemed full of ill omens.5 The intention to start a conflict between the states in the area did not go unnoticed by the Great Powers. The most interested were, according to tradition, Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which supported different peoples according to their interests. The tsar was dissatisfied because in 1909, he had had to ratify the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria without any receiving any compensation. The same event had made the Italians discontent. Despite being members of the Axis powers, Italy had secretly made a pact with Russia at Racconigi in 1909 directed against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The two parties agreed to protect

3 With regard to the interests of Austria-Hungary for Serbia and Montenegro, see The State Archives, RDG Microfilm Fund, II Handelspolitische Abteilung; Aktenbetreffend die Mobilmachung der Balkanstaaten, Balkankrieg, Band 1, Handel nr. 557, roll 74, frame 149, The Report of the German Embassy in Viena, 28 October, 1912. 4 Istoria românilor, vol. VII, tom II, De la independenţă la Marea Unire (1878-1918), comp. Gheorghe Platon, Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, p. 280. 5 F.-G. Dreyfus, A Jourcin, P. Thibault, P. Milza, Larousse, Istoria universală, vol. III, Evoluţia lumii contemporane, Bucureşti, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 2006, p. 229.

Romania and Germany: Friends and Interests in the Balkan Wars 97 the status quo in the Balkans and to follow a joint policy in all political matters concerning the Balkans. While Italy promised to support Russian interests in the Bosporus Strait, Russia promised to support Italy’s expansion plans in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.6 The tsar tried to retaliate in South-Eastern Europe, taking advantage of the circumstances created by the Italo-Turkish War. In the spring of 1912, he secretly negotiated with the Balkans League (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro) considering that the moment was favorable to settle his accounts with Turkey, while it was being attacked by Italy. The League attacked Turkey, situation in which Turkey quickly concluded its hostilities against Italy, as it had to defend its territory against four simultaneous concentric attacks7. On 8th October 1912, Montenegro declared war on Turkey followed by Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece on 17-18 October.8 The Bulgarians applied the decisive blows and reached the outskirts of Constantinople. But their military advances were stopped by the German mission, which was reorganizing the Turkish military at that time. The German officers mobilized the townspeople and improvised defense lines on the Catalza hills that had served for centuries as Constantinople’s ramparts. And the situation was reversed: on 17th November, the Bulgarian assault waves were dispersed by the barbed wire networks and the machinegun fire. The world became unsettled by the efficiency of the triad (T+ BW +M) – trenches, barbed wire and machineguns, which knocked down an entire victorious army. A new problem had appeared, whose solution could not yet be envisaged by any on the major states.9 Diplomatic interventions were needed for Germany to partially withdraw the support given to the Turkish military. Finally, the large number of the allies led to the Turks’ defeat. The Greeks took over Salonika, the Bulgarians almost arrived at Constantinople, the Serbs invaded from the Adriatic Sea. On 3rd November, the Turkish government was forced to demand peace and it asked the Great Powers to intervene as mediators.10 They were happy to answer the request and they organized a conference in London, but their baneful passions were reawakened. Russia did not want a Bulgarian Constantinople and least of all a Greek one, while Austria saw its Drang nach Osten action blocked. During a truce, Great Britain gathered, the

6 Klein Fritz, Deutschland von 1897/98 bis 1917 (Deutschland in der Periode des Imperialismus bis zur Grossen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution), VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1963, p. 200. 7 Istoria românilor, vol. VII, tom II, De la independenţă la Marea Unire (1878-1918), comp. Gheorghe Platon, p. 280. 8 Klein Fritz, op. cit, p. 236. 9 F.-G. Dreyfus, et.al., op. cit., p. 229. 10 Klein Fritz, op. cit., pp. 236-237.

98 Ioana Rieber great and small powers in London, since discussing these problems had become urgent. The conference’s goal was to settle the differences between the Great Powers interested in the Balkans’ fate. The only goal was to replace the Berlin arrangement with the London one.11 As a result of the discussions “Austro-Hungary managed to circumscribe Serbia to its territory by creating an Albanian Principality which then constituted the favorite topic for the songwriters of the time. Russia, which erroneously considered that it had regained its strength, made use of threats once more, when an unusual event broke the peace a month after it had been signed: Bulgaria, exasperated that it had not obtained either Constantinople or Salonika, surprise attacked its Serbian and Greek allies. It was one of those rare examples when Machiavellianism did not win: a concentrated attack by the Serbians, Greeks and Turks (who had left the tranches) as well as the Romanians (who had given up neutrality) quickly ended the melodramatic traitor! Consequently, the Bucharest Treaty (11th August 1913) left in Sofia as well as in Belgrade grudges that would soon become manifest.”12 The result of the Balkan Wars was mainly a significant change in the power balance because of the Serbian triumph, the Austrian-Italian rivalry and the fact that few noticed, namely that Romania participated in the war on the side of the enemies of the Central Powers. The Second Balkan War weakened the Triple Alliance which did not manage to regain its balance. The Balkan Wars represent the prelude to the First World War, as the problems between the Austro- Hungarian Empire and Serbia had not been solved.13 An important role was played in these wars by Germany and Romania. Unlike Romania, whose contribution was visible, Germany’s role is not stressed enough, although it was behind the Austro-Hungarian policy, and had quite a big influence on the decisions made in Bucharest. Moreover, “the Kaiser’s diplomacy became central for European peace” and it is precisely this diplomacy that was meant to be “Europe’s hammer and not the anvil”14, that generated the First World War. The Germany of the Bucharest Peace in 1913 was the Germany of the Weltpolitik, a Germany destined by Kaiser Wilhelm II to become a world power. This type of politics started in 1897 and the consequences were visible until the second half of the 20th century. At the end of the 19th century, this type of policy was based on at least two realities: politically, Bismark’s ability had won and the German state was formed not around Austria, but Prussia, beyond the calculations of the diplomats of the

11 Topor Claudiu-Lucian, Germania, România şi Războaiele Balcanice, Iaşi, Editura Universităţii „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2008, p. 116. 12 F.-G. Dreyfus, et. al., op. cit., p. 282. 13 Klein Fritz, op. cit., pp. 241-242. 14 Kissinger Henry, Diplomaţia, Bucureşti, Editura ALL, 2007, p. 144.

Romania and Germany: Friends and Interests in the Balkan Wars 99 time, and economically, the German industry experienced unprecedented growth. Both realities created new necessities and obligations. The answer to the political necessities, in an era when imperialism was simply flourishing, was to try and expand foreign influence and to form a powerful colonial empire, fashioned after Great Britain’s example. Economically, the development of the German industry required the acquisition of raw materials from outside Europe, for good prices so that German merchandise, renowned for their quality, could compete with similar products on a free market. Moreover, outlets were to be expanded and thus the economy forced the politicians to adopt the measures necessary for the German state to grow. The most obvious problem of implementing the Weltpolitik was that the world had already been divided into areas of influence, just as the colonial domains had been divided. Historical experience had proven that war was an easy way of reconfiguring the world map, but in order for this reconfiguration to take place to Germany’s advantage, it had to prove its power. Under the circumstances in which the political factor had decided, and the economy allowed for it, the power of the new state implied the formation of proficient armed forces. The Weltpolitik was linked to the development of the naval fleet, which generated British discontent. The result did not measure up to the expectations, although German influence extended in Latin America, China and the Near East.15 In Kissinger’s opinion, German diplomats made mistakes that led to the “extraordinary upheaval and reorganization of the alliances.” So that, if in 1898, France and England were on the verge of declaring war on each other, and the Russians and the British experienced animosities throughout the 19th century, under the impact of “insistent and threatening German diplomacy”, Great Britain, France and Russia ended up on the same side of the barricade.16 On the other hand, Klein Fritz claims that at the end of 1909, one could easily notice the Germany and Austro-Hungary’s isolation in foreign policy.17 This was reason enough to lead to a greater closeness between the two Powers, as their interests were no longer divergent, not even with respect to the Balkans. Analyzing the situation in the region, the German diplomat Radowitz wrote to king Wilhelm I, “With respect to Germany’s attitude to Greece, there are the best intentions to help this Christian kingdom to expand, if this can be accomplished without a war. Except for this, the Christian and civilizing elements, which unlike the Turks, are deeply rooted in the Greeks, makes the latter form, together with the Albanians and the Romanians, the great majority of the non-

15 Fischer Fritz, Krieg der Illusionen, Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914, Dusseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1969, pp. 417-418. 16 Kissinger Henry, op. cit. p. 145. 17 Klein Fritz, op. cit., p. 200.

100 Ioana Rieber

Slavic population in the Balkan peninsula and the counterweight against Pan- Slavism. Last, but not least, there is the danger, for Eastern Europe, and not through Russian but through revolutionary power, that Slavic populations could come as far as Bohemia or Illyria.”18 With respect to its relations with Romania, Germany’s interests are manifest both at a political and at an economic level. At a political level, Romania’s influence grew once Carol of Hohenzollern became the king of independent Romania and joined the Triple Alliance. At an economic level, German businessmen and bankers gradually got involved in economic activities, which is why when the Balkan Wars started, Berlin started paying close attention to the changes in commerce, industry and agriculture.19 For the period 1880-1890, Ficher Fritz noticed an increase in the number of securities bought by the German banks, their investments focusing especially on the railway and oil industry. In 1903, the German Bank together with Vienna Bank founded the Oil Company “Steaua Română.” In 1897, the General Romanian Bank had been set up, the first bank with German capital in Romania which was involved in the oil industry. The German bank had ambitious goals in the oil industry, meaning that it tried to obtain as many concessions as possible to form a dominant German market, to the detriment of English-American companies. 20 The gain was great as by 1908, 40.8% of the total investments in the oil industry in Romania were made up of German capital.21 On the financial market, the German banks, competing with the French banks that were approved by the Romanian government, were extremely sensitive to the Romanian securities “business”. However, when there was a drop in the value of the securities in 1913, the Romanian government asked for financial assistance from France, but as the conditions imposed by the French would have led to a confrontation with Germany, the Romanian government gave up French assistance and placed securities in Germany, especially for political reasons. Wishing to push aside the French competition, the German bankers took quite high risks by giving long-term credits, not only in Romania, but also in the other Balkan states.

18 Die Grosse Politik Der Europäischen Kabinette Die grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914: Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, im Auftrage des Auswärtigen Amtes, vol. IV, herausgegeben von Lepsius Johannes, Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Thimme Friedrich, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik und Geschichte M.B.H. in Berlin W 8, p. 19, Letter dated 7th November 1880, addressed by Radowitz to king Wilhelm I. 19 The State Archives, RDG Microfilm Fund, II Handelspolitische Abteilung; Aktenbetreffend die Mobilmachung der Balkanstaaten, Balkankrieg, Band 1, Handel nr. 557, roll 74, frame 89, Note from the State Secretary of The Ministry Of Internal Affairs, Berlin, 4 October, 1912. 20 Fischer Fritz, op. cit., p. 418. 21 Topor Claudiu -Lucian, op. cit., p. 57.

Romania and Germany: Friends and Interests in the Balkan Wars 101

A domain on interest for Germany was the sale of armament. On the Romanian market, Krupp and Schneider-Creusot competed and both were supported by the government. Berlin’s efforts to get involved as much as possible in the Romanian economy were quite high, because for Bucharest the relations with France took priority, as France was the representative of Entente’s interests in the area. Fischer Fritz also notices that, although from a financial point of view Romania needed to place some securities in Germany, Bucharest still enjoyed special attention from Paris. Collaboration with firms such as Krupp, Rheinischei, Mauser Rottweil or Deutsche Bank, as well as the effort made by Wilhelm II, King Carol I, prince Ferdinand, the conservative minister Petre Carp were useless as the interests related to the Romanians in Transylvania and the connections with France kept Romania close to Entente.22 The discrepancy between the sympathies manifested by a king of German descent and a political class oriented towards Paris were reflected at the level of the military alliances. The fact that at that time Romania joined, even if for objective reasons, the Triple Alliance (1883) was a gesture that went against national will. Otherwise, we could not explain why King Carol I kept secret what should have been a great achievement for independent Romania. The draft of the treaty was perfected during Carol I’s visit to Berlin to participate in a family event.23 In peace times, this alliance did not seem to bring any real prejudices to the state’s interests, but in war time, the situation changed dramatically and the decision makers in Germany and Romania were aware of this fact. It is obvious from all the documents sent during the Balkan Wars that Berlin’s objective was to keep Bucharest within the Triple Alliance. The interest was so great that Germany interceded with Austria asking it not to favor Bulgaria to the detriment of Romania and with Hungary, asking it to be more conciliatory with the Romanians in Transylvania. King Wilhelm II personally asked the Hungarian minister Tisza for concessions and reforms to the benefit of Romanians in Transylvania. Moreover, a clarification of the relations between Romania and Austro-Hungary was called for so that the latter would not be forced to leave the alliance. The German ambassador to Vienna in December 1913, V. Tschirschky, advised the banks to give out another loan to Romania so that it would become interested in the Triple Alliance through its “wallet” too.24 The outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912 led to a focus of the German decision makers’ attention on the conflict area. This was evaluated not only from

22 Fischer Fritz, op. cit., pp. 418-419. 23 Scurtu Ioan, Contribuţii privind viaţa politică din România, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1988, p. 115. 24 Fischer Fritz, op. cit., pp. 418-419.

102 Ioana Rieber the point of view of ensuing geopolitical changes or from a military point of view, but also economically. In a report from 1912, the measures called for by the war were discussed with direct reference to commerce. In this respect, restrictions on imports and exports are taken into consideration as well as the Romanian state’s need for supplies. In the financial sector, an increase of taxes and measures in the banking system as well as transportation were expected.25 In another report, dated 7 October 1912, it is made clear that the Balkan War should and did not affect the business community in Moldova. Romania does not seem to experience any financial complications, but there are some reservations concerning the extension of big loans.26 Analyzing the Romanian-German political relations during the Balkan Wars we can see they are only normal given that king Carol I belonged to a German dynasty. It is also true that they bore a special imprint due to the personality of the Romanian monarch. His priority was to defend the national interests of the Romanian state which proved to be quite complicated in a military alliance with Austro-Hungary, the then-ruler of a traditionally Romanian territory. Concerning the attitude of the Romanians in the kingdom with respect to Austro-Hungary, the German general Waldthausen reported on 27 December 1912, “Two of the speakers gave a militant speech, the third, the chauvinistic university professor Iorga, the leader of the nationalists, lamented the way Romanians in Bucovina and Hungary are treated and demanded the Austro- Hungarian monarchy respect his Romanian brethren’s rights. He also pleaded for educating Romanians and for Romanian peasants’ rights.”27

In 1913, Germany tried to be the link between Romania and the Triple Alliance. The efforts made to this end were not negligible as on the one hand the Romanians in Transylvania were asking for support from the Mother country, and on the other Austro-Hungary supported Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars. Bucharest could not have been pleased by the policy of the Vienna Court because, as early as 1878, Romania had claimed back territories that were under Bulgarian rule as a result of some provisions nonconforming with the Berlin Treaty. With respect to this issue, Carol I negotiated with the Central Powers, “[a]s a result of the negotiations [so that Romania could join the Triple Alliance],

25 The State Archives, RDG Microfilm Fund, II Handelspolitische Abteilung; Aktenbetreffend die Mobilmachung der Balkanstaaten, Balkankrieg, Band 1, Handel nr. 557, roll 74, frame 89, Note from the State Secretary of The Ministry Of Internal Affairs, Berlin, 4 October 1912. 26 Idem, Frame 105, Report of the German Consulate in Iaşi, 7 October 1912. 27 The State Archives, RDG Microfilm Fund, Sachs. Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, Aussenmi- nisterium, nr. 1884, roll 87, frame 112, Report of the Saxon Legation in Bucharest signed by General Waldthausen, Bucharest, 27 December 1912.

Romania and Germany: Friends and Interests in the Balkan Wars 103 the German diplomacy also assured Romania with respect to possible transformations in the Balkans.” In Berlin’s opinion, in the case of a conflict, Romanian should keep “its guns ready”. In case Bulgaria extended its territory into Macedonia, Romania was going to occupy the territory which bordered on the south with the Rusciuk-Varna line.28 The outbreak of the first Balkan War led to an increase in diplomatic interest for Romania. In a report addressed to the king, dated 20 September/1 October 1912, Titu Maiorescu, the President of the Minister Council, informed that he had been visited by the Turkish minister Sefa-bey and by the Bulgarian minister Kalinkov. Both wanted to ascertain Romania’s interests, as Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece were getting ready for war.29 Romania announced that it wanted to maintain its neutrality but if “territorial changes would occur in the Balkans (…) it would have its say.”30 In a meeting that Carol I had with the president of the National Assembly of Bulgaria, Stojan Petrov Danew, the latter “talked to the king about the friendship and even the gratitude that Bulgaria has for Romania [and] the king asked him not to speak along those lines, as in the country nobody believes that, and that first there should be a sign of friendship on Bulgaria’s side. His majesty explained to Mr. Danew how border problems had developed and explained that he wants to have a friendly relation with Bulgaria and does not need compensation, but a restoration of the borders.” The Bulgarian diplomat tried to shirk the accusation replying that the problem of the borders could not be understood by the members of the Assembly. The king’s reply was firm, “this is why statesmen exist, and there are plenty who are capable, such as Mr. Danew, to explain the situation to the House.”31 The Romanian government would have liked to preserve the status quo in the area, which is why it spoke against conflicts that could alter it, and maintained a position of neutrality. Even during the Italo-Turkish war, Romania sought, in partnership with the diplomacy of the Central Powers, to try to appease the conflict and to limit its consequences for the Ottoman Empire, and consequently for the situation in the Balkans.32

28 GP, 18/1, p. 137 Kiderlen-Wachter către Bulow, 1 februarie 1901, apud Istoria românilor, vol. VII, tom II, De la independenţă la Marea Unire (1878-1918), comp. Gheorghe Platon, p. 273. 29 Maiorescu Titu, România, Războaiele Balcanice şi Cadrilaterul, Editura Machiavelli, Bucharest, 1995, p. 161; Cartea Verde, Documente diplomatice secrete, Titu Maiorescu's Report, from 20 September/1 October 1912, addressed to King Carol I. 30 Ibidem, Titu Maiorescu's Report, from 16/29 October 1912, addressed to King Carol I. 31 Ibidem. 32 Istoria românilor, vol. VII, part II, De la independenţă la Marea Unire (1878-1918), comp. Gheorghe Platon, p. 281.

104 Ioana Rieber

Once the conflict had started, the map of Southern Europe started to change. The moment was considered good for Romania to attain its goals, “once the provisions of the Berlin treaty were set aside completely, and implicitly the legitimation of our Dobrudja borders imposed by that treaty. However, amiably and confidentially, I can say that rectifying our border south of Dobrudja must contain a line from Turtucaia to the Black sea, beyond Varna.”33 To this end, Romanian diplomats looked for support from their allies, Austro-Hungary and Germany. Its hopes, however, were not completely well- founded as Vienna continued to support Sofia. One positive aspect was that there was disagreement between Germany and Austro-Hungary, as Berlin found Romanian claims justified. The German interest is manifest in the discussions between general Waldthausen and King Carol I in December 1912. On this occasion, the monarch expressed his opinion regarding the events in the Balkans, mentioning that Romania never considered joining the Balkan Alliance, as the conditions for this were unknown as was the opinion of the Alliance leaders. Romania was prepared even to sign a treaty with Bulgaria in these conditions: the borders had to be specified, Danube crossing had to be permitted, as well as Romanian help for Vlachs’ churches and schools.34 The problem of Romanians outside national borders was also raised by Romania during the London Conference. Finally, not all discussions regarding the demarcation of Albania’s southern border reached their conclusion, as Romania, supported by Austro-Hungary, would have liked that the villages inhabited by Vlachs in the Gorica (Goriza) and the Pind Mountains regions to become part of Albania, while Germany wanted them to become part of Greece.35 Carol I informed Waldhausen that Romania would not remain quiet if the Albanian problem were not satisfactorily solved.36 Given that the London stipulations failed to satisfy all parties involved, the Conference of the Ambassadors in St Petersburg took place between the 18th/31st March – 26th April/9th May 1913. The works of the conference provided to be, more than once, the stage for the clashes between the two political and military rival blocs, Entente and Central Powers.

33 Maiorescu Titu, op. cit., p. 165, Report from 27 October /9 November 1912, addressed to King Carol I. 34 The State Archives, RDG Microfilm Fund, Sachs. Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, Aussenmi- nisterium, nr. 1884, roll 87, frame 112, Report of the Saxon Legation in Bucharest signed by General Waldthausen, Bucharest, 27 December 1912. 35 Topor Claudiu –Lucian, op. cit., p. 165. 36 The State Archives, RDG Microfilm Fund, Sachs. Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, Aussenmi- nisterium, nr. 1884, roll 87, frame 112, Report of the Saxon Legation in Bucharest signed by General Waldthausen, Bucharest, 27 December 1912.

Romania and Germany: Friends and Interests in the Balkan Wars 105

During the conference, "all powers concurred with Silistra being ceded to Romania; however, whereas Germany agreed to that without any reservations, the other great powers seeked not to alienate Bulgaria while satisfying Romania's requirements."37 Romania enjoyed the support of its allies. In this respect, Friederich von Pourtalès, the German Ambassador in Petersburg, declared within the above- mentioned context that the Romanian demands are legitimate due to its strategic needs; Silistra, controlled by Bulgaria, would constitute an attack base directed against Dobrogea, for which the Bulgarian claims are well known. For this reason, and in order to establish peaceful relations between the two countries, it seemed more natural to deprive Bulgaria of an offensive weapon in favor of Romania, where it would play only a defensive part.38 The discussions within the conference were greatly prolonged. Bulgaria was dissatisfied with the decisions agreed upon, thus, failing to issue a declaration of war, it attacks its former allies on the 17/30th June. The lack of a declaration of war led to some confusion. To clarify things, on 19th June/ 2nd July, 1913, Maiorescu sent a memorandum to the Romanian Legations in Sofia, Athens and Belgrade, asking the diplomats to discover if the governments they are accredited to deem the war between allies as having actually started.39 The answers he received were positive, and the consequences, as expected. On 27th June/ 10th July, 1913, the Romanian Royal Legation in Sofia is tasked with communicating the declaration of war to the Bulgarian Royal government: "The Romanian government has warned the Bulgarian government in due time that, provided the Balkan allies were at war, Romania could not keep the neutrality we have imposed on ourselves for the sake of peace, and we might see ourselves forced to join the action."40 Joining the war against Bulgaria leads to a certain cooling of relations with the Vienna Court and implicitly to the separation of Romania from the Central Powers. Bucharest could not accept the adversity of Austria-Hungary towards Serbia and their sympathy for the Bulgarian cause. The emperor, however, seemed to fear so much the menace of a strong Serbian state forming and then affiliating itself to Russia that he no longer took into account the danger the alliance with Romania was put in.

37 Istoria românilor, vol. VII, tom II, De la independenţă la Marea Unire (1878-1918), comp. Gheorghe Platon, pp. 181-184. 38 Gheţău Florin, Protocolul de la Sankt Petersburg (1913), Editura Virtual, 2011, p. 16. 39 Maiorescu Titu, op. cit., p. 217, Circular Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Romanian Legations in Sofia, Athens and Belgrade, Bucharest, 19 June/2 July 1913. 40 Ibidem, p. 218, Telegram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Romania's Ministry Plenipotentiary in Sofia, Bucharest, 27 June/10 July 1913.

106 Ioana Rieber

Germany also didn't want Russian influence in the Balkans to increase, but they acted in two different directions: they hoped to balance it by means of a strong coalition of Balkan states other than those of Slavic origin (Greece, Romania and Turkey),41 and, on the other hand, in 1913, they agreed, again, to reorganize the Turkish army. The German military mission was placed under the command of General Liman von Sanders, who took command at Constantinople. Russia was irritated as it feared German control of the Bosphorus.42 Meanwhile, the German Chancellery was trying to save, and, if possible, to increase the number of member states of the Triple Alliance. Aware of the influence they had on King Carol I, they tried to persuade him to help bring Greece to the Central Powers. But they wished that Greece would join the Alliance indirectly, through a treaty signed with Romania. On the other hand, Athens, together with Belgrade, were trying to involve Bucharest in the Second Balkan War. "The Greeks used the German influence in Romania, and Serbia used the tradition of good relations between the two nations, whose traditional enmity could have no different target than Austria-Hungary."43 Beyond all these attempts, the reality is that the decision makers in Bucharest believed that the war would bring the issue of Dobrogea to an end. Maiorescu summarizes very well the reasons Romanian troops entered Bulgaria: "1. to ensure that this time our Dobrogea is granted a military border, that is, Turtucaia-Dobrici-Balcic... 2. to participate in the Treaty that will regulate the division of territories conquered from the Turks..."44 The deployment of the operations was prepared with great care, and the favorable external context meant that the troops did not meet with any resistance, as General Herjeu tells: "10th July The Bulgarian Tsar asks King Carol I to hasten the peace and convince the other armies to cease hostilities. Our army now controls the exits south of the Balkans... M.S. decided to warn the governments of Serbia and Greece - the latter more recalcitrant - that if they do not receive the favorable conditions offered to them, Romania will sign a separate peace treaty. 11th July The Bulgarian Army is stuck... our political interests demand we don't let Bulgaria be struck the final blow. By order of the King, the answer given to the Serbian army was that the Romanian army will not take part in the attack of Vidin, nor will it cooperate with the Northern Serbian army …

41 Wolfgang J Mommsen, Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik. Die Aussenpolitk des deutschen Reiches 1870 bis 1914, Verlag Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, 1993, pp. 260-261, apud Topor Claudiu-Lucian, op. cit., p.182. 42 Kissinger Henry, op. cit., p. 169. 43 Topor Claudiu-Lucian, op. cit., pp. 162-163. 44 Maiorescu Titu, op. cit., pp. 219-220, Titu Maiorescu's report to His Majesty the King, Bucharest, 28 June/11 July 1913.

Romania and Germany: Friends and Interests in the Balkan Wars 107

15th July The situation is getting clearer now, Romania is recognized today as the arbiter of the bloody conflict among the Balkan peoples. Her resolute and swift action and the arrival of the Romanian army on the plain of Sofia have compelled Bulgaria to entrust its fate to Romania, which is now recognized throughout Europe as the rightful arbiter." 45 And indeed, between the 17/29th July – 28th July/ 10th August 1913, the works of the Peace Conference started in Bucharest. The choice of setting was the recognition of Romania's European status and the role it played in bringing the conflict to an end. The German diplomats highly praised the Romanian state: "What a special twist it was that His Majesty, your King, could take part in ending the Balkan crisis, a role that he could not undertake from the beginning for reasons that are known to us. Romania is greater today than ever. It became an arbiter in the Balkan Peninsula and it will certainly not give up this position. This time it achieved what many had done wrong." 46 On the other hand, Germany's support did not go unnoticed. In a reply to a diplomatic report it was written: "I thanked the German Government for the appreciation they showed for our policy... Our King (Carol I a/n) is very satisfied with the valuable help that Germany extended to our political action in these difficult circumstances." 47

The year 1913 ended without the emergence of a new conflict. The situation in the Balkans improved "France and Germany have granted only a weak support to their allies, which averted the breaking out of a general war." 48 Unfortunately the situation was only partially resolved. Serbia and Austria continued to be discontent. For the time being, King Wilhelm II contributed to lowering the war fever, stating that the Treaty of Bucharest is satisfactory. "And yet, from his mighty empire rose, louder and louder, Nietzschean howls of violence and threat...There were however many theoreticians of the Pan- Germanism and the Machtpolitik, of the policy of force, whose formulas of cold aggression brought no smiles to people's faces. Actions came after words…: in 1912 and 1913 huge additional loans were granted to the budgets of the navy … and of the field armies."49 In 1914 the first great world war broke out…

45 Herjeu C. N., op. cit., pp. 17-35. 46 The State Archives, Royal House Fund, File no. 51/1913, Copy of His Excellency General Field Marshal von der Goltz's letter to Romania's attaché in Berlin, 7 August 1913. 47 The National Archives, Royal House Fund, File no. 59/1913, Reply to Beldiman's Report, Bucharest, 23/5 August 1913. 48 Milza Pierre, Berstein Serge, Istoria secolului XX, vol I, 1900-1945, Sfârşitul „lumii europene”, Editura ALL, Bucharest, 1998, p. 64. 49 F.-G. Dreyfus, et al., op. cit., p. 282.

108 Ioana Rieber Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 109

THE PEACE OF BUCHAREST OF 1913: POLITICAL EFFECTS AND DEMOGRAPHIC REALITIES IN SOUTHERN DOBROGEA

Enache TUŞA*

Abstract. In the wake of the 1913 war, Southern Dobrogea became important for the Romanian state for two reasons. On the one hand, the territory constituted the new homeland of the Aromanians from the Balkans, who were now settling in Southern Dobrogea due to border reconfigurations in the wake of the Balkan Wars. On the other, this region was strategically placed for the project of relocation and land endowment of the Romanians from densely populated regions of the Kingdom. Romania was intent on imposing a new type of political culture in the Cadrilater with the aid of Aromanians, who would thus acculturate its various ethnicities

Keywords: Balkan War, the Treaty of Bucharest of August 1913, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Turkey, Romania, Southern Dobrogea

In the aftermath of the Balkan War of 1912–1913 the region of Dobrogea expanded to the south by including new territory as stipulated by the Treaty of Bucharest of August 1913. This territory, which would be named Southern Dobrogea, was predominantly inhabited by Bulgarians and Muslims, but some Romanians also lived here, namely at and around Silistra. Yet there was more to Romania’s involvement in the Balkan events. When in 1883 Romania joined the Triple Alliance, she thereby secured her security and protection should a conflict arise with a powerful neighbour. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the 20th century the process of de-nationalisation by the Hungarian state, which Vienna could not, or would not, inhibit, made Romania move away from the Triple Alliance and towards the Entente. In effect, Romania’s participation in the Balkan War, and especially her signing of the Peace Treaty of Bucharest, meant effectively Romania’s breakup with the Triple Alliance, which would be declared officially during the Crown Council of Peleş held in August 1914. Unsurprisingly, historian Nicolae Iorga wrote in 1913: “Across the Danube, our soldiers are commencing the liberation of Transylvania”.1

* Prof. Dr. Universitatea Ovidius, Constanța. 1 Nicolae Iorga, Acțiunea militară a României cu ostașii noștri [Romania’s Military Action with Our Soldiers], Editura Societății Neamul Românesc, Vălenii de Munte, 1913, p.39. See also Titu

110 Enache Tuşa

The Romanian state watched particularly intensely the territorial alterations that occurred in the above-mentioned area. When the Treaty of Bucharest was signed in August 1913 in the aftermath of the Third Balkan War, this actually denoted that Romania was becoming an influential actor in the region, as the very choice of the place for signing the treaty pointed out.2 The Peace of 1913 annexed a new territory to Romania, which was named Southern Dobrogea or Cadrilater 7,780 km2 in total area, it numbered nearly 280,000 inhabitants, “mostly Turks and other peoples, with the Bulgarians barely around 100,000”.3 Yet G. Murgoci may have got his figures wrong, Ion Bitoleanu has argued recently; the latter historian’s research of contemporary data counts 136,000 (48%) Turks and Tatars, and 121,800 (43%) Bulgarians.4 Bitoleanu further contends that statistics may obscure other data, which nevertheless can be regarded as irrelevant in the absence of scientific proof. The Bulgarian state enforced steady Bulgarian settling in Southern Dobrogea, which was similar to the process enforced by the Romanian state in the northern region of Dobrogea annexed to Romania after 1878. In a paper published in 1940, Petre P. Panaitescu maintains that the settling of Bulgarians in Southern Dobrogea had occurred relatively recently: within 35 years, the Bulgarians had settled in villages formerly

Maiorescu, România, Războaiele Balcanice și Cadrilaterul [Romania, the Balkan Wars, and the Cadrilater], Editura Machiavelli, București, 1995, p. 36. 2 Yet the position of the signing countries was different. Bound as they were by a treaty, Greece, Serbia amd Montenegro were thereby joined in a political and military alliance. On the contrary, Romania had participated in the events without having signed any formal treaty and therefore enjoyed free rein, which only made her role as arbiter all the easier while also bringing about the other states’ acknowledgement of her pre-eminent role also as a military factor, not just a political one. Once assembled around the treaty table, the victorious allies were determined to do anything in their power to prevent or at least avoid the intervention of the great powers, especially considering the unfortunate consequences of a past rife in decisions taken without the approval of the south-eastern European states. Here are the delegates attending the Conference for Peace. The Romanian delegation included Titu Maiorescu, chair of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Alexandru Marghiloman, Minister of the Exchequer; Take Ionescu, Minister of the Interior; C.G. Dissescu, Minister of Education and Cults; General Constantin Coandă, Inspector General of artillery; Col. Constantin Cristescu, deputy Commanding Officer of Army Staff. Save for Bulgaria, whose head of delegation was Dimiter Toncef, Minister of the Exchequer, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro has as their heads of delegation prime-ministers: respectively Elephteros Venizelos for Greece, Nicola Pasici for Serbia, and General Ianco Vukotici for Montenegro; see Gheorghe ZBUCHEA, România şi războaiele balcanice 1912-1913. Pagini de istorie sud-est europeană [Romania and the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Pages of South-Eastern European History], Editura Albatros, Bucureşti, 1999, p.230. 3 George Murgoci, Țara Nouă. Dobrogea Sudică și Deliormanul [The New Country: Southern Dobrogea and Deliorman], București, 1913, p. 82. 4 Adrian Rădulescu, Ion Bitoleanu, Istoria Dobrogei [History of Dobrogea], Editura Ex Ponto, Constanța, 1998, p.380.

The Peace of Bucharest of 1913: Political Effects and Demographic Realities in Southern Dobrogea 111 inhabited by the Turks.5 When Southern Dobrogea was surrendered to Romania, the main concern of the Romanian state was to rebalance the demographics of the region. The newly annexed territory was barely inhabited by Romanians due to the intertwined effects of the Ottoman policy to colonize it with Muslim settlers for three years and, after 1878, of the Bulgarian Principality’s policy to colonize it with Bulgarians.6 In the wake of the 1913 war, Southern Dobrogea became important for the Romanian state for two reasons. On the one hand, the territory constituted the new homeland of the Aromanians from the Balkans,7 who were now settling in Southern Dobrogea due to border reconfigurations in the wake of the Balkan Wars. On the other, this region was strategically placed for the project of relocation and land endowment of the Romanians from densely populated regions of the Kingdom.8 Romania was intent on imposing a new type of political culture in the Cadrilater with the aid of Aromanians, who would thus acculturate its various ethnicities. More recently, however, various historians have claimed that although the contemporaries contended that the process of Aromanian colonization in the Cadrilater resulted in the establishment of a strong Romanian community there, in fact reality was somewhat different insofar as aromanians had already trickled within Romanian territories. There is no denying that during their history the Aromanians underwent a complex settling experience due to the border alterations in the Balkans in the wake of the three Balkan Wars between 1912 and 1913. Romania was directly interested in the Balkans since she claimed a large region inhabited by a Romanian population (especially Aromanians), which was crucial to organizing the 1913 Peace Conference in Bucharest.9 Although regarded as being of strategic import, the new reconfigurations of the southern

5 Petre P. Panaitescu, Originea Populației din Dobrogea Nouă [The Origins of the Inhabitants of New Dobrogea], Editura Casei Școalelor, București, p.102. 6 Adrian Rădulescu, Ion Bitoleanu, op.cit., p.432. 7 Ibidem. 8 Ibidem. 9 The proceedings of the Peace Conference of Bucharest followed the template of the Congress of Berlin, and commenced on 30 July 1913. The Conference would prove to be special as regards both the global regulation of Balkan issues and the development of relations between Romania and any one of the other south-eastern European states. The Treaty assigned Southern Dobrogea to Romania. Article II of the Treaty stipulates the southern Dobrogea border should run thus: from the Danube, following 15 km west of Turtucaia, from Turski-Smil village to South Turtucaia, then running to 12 km south of Bazargic up to the Black Sea, around 8 km south of Ecrene (Kranevo), to a spot which dominated the Balchik area, totalling an area of around 7,500 km2. The protocol was signed by Gen. Constantin Coandă, Col. Gheorghe Christescu, Gen. Ficev and Lt. col. Stanciov; Gheorghe Zbuchea, [Romania and the Balkan Wars 1912–1913], p.281. See also Constantin Tudor, Administrația românească în Cadrilater [The Romanian Administration of the Cadrilater, 1913-1940], Ed. Agora, Călărași, 2005, p. 81.

112 Enache Tuşa border did not improve Romania’s position with respect to guaranteeing security in the region. The act itself was regarded as a classic territorial annexation which, although the contemporary politicians attempted to vindicate, put a terrible strain on the relations between Bulgaria and Romania in the interwar period. With regard to this, a historian of Dobrogea writes: “the inclusion of the Cadrilater into the Romanian state brought about more trouble than benefits, such as the attacks of the Bulgarian comitagis, the issue of Aromanian settlement, subversive communist organizations, and especially the straining of the relations with Bulgaria, as well as the two tragic moments of 1916 and 1940”.10 The Romanian authorities therefore found it expedient at the time (in 1913) to colonize the new territory with Romanians from the Kingdom and especially with Aromanians from the Balkans. The Romanian politicians had already persuaded King Charles I that the rationale for the Aromanian settlement in Southern Dobrogea was the acculturation of its Bulgarian and Muslim (Turkish and Tatar) population. In turn, this process of assimilation would have secured the territory’s socio-political allegiance to the Romanian state, according to the foremost Romanian politicians. Thus, Petre P. Carp contended that any discussion of territorial compensation should also take into account the Aromanian issue: “we have an ideal to pursue in the Balkans, viz. a nation equal to us, enjoying equal political rights, whose condition as the abode of 400,000 persons should not serve as compensation”.11 In the wake of the First World War, nearly 2 million Aromanians were divided among five neighbouring states of Romania and two ones situated further away in the Balkans. The fate of these Aromanian groups, most of which lived in their homeland, in the neighbouring countries was a major preoccupation of the Romanian state. Within the frame of the treaty signed in Bucharest in 1913, the rights of Aromanians were stipulated in a note concerning the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Titu Maiorescu, and his Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian counterparts, respectively E. K. Venizelos, Nicola Pasici and Dimitri Toncev.12 The note stipulated expressly that “Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia consent to grant the autonomy of schools and churches of the Cutzovlachs residing in Greek, Bulgarian or Serbian territories, and moreover to permit the establishment of an episcopate for the Cutzovlachs on provision that the Romanian government sponsors, under the jurisdiction of the aforementioned states, such existing or future cultural institutions”.13

10 Adrian Rădulescu, Ion Bitoleanu, op.cit., p.383. 11 Gheorghe Zbuchea, România și războaiele balcanice, 1912-1913 [Romania and the Balkan Wars 1912–1913], p.132. 12 Nicolas Trifon, Aromânii pretutindeni și nicăieri [The Aromanians Everywhere and Nowhere], trans. from the French by Adrian Ciubotaru. Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2012, p. 318. 13 Vasile Diamandi Aminceanul, Românii din Peninsula Balcanică [The Romanians from the Balkan Peninsula], București, 1938, p 138.

The Peace of Bucharest of 1913: Political Effects and Demographic Realities in Southern Dobrogea 113

On July 1917, the Aromanian leaders convened a general assembly which was attended by the delegates of all Romanian localities in Macedonia. The assembly proclaimed their independence and the establishment of a national state under the protectorship of Italy. Soon, however, the Italian armies withdrew from the Pindus Mountains, and the Greek authorities started chasing all Aromanian nationalists, who therefore took refuge to Albania and Italy in order to escape Greek persecution. After the armistice, the Macedo-Romanians petitioned the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, gathered in Paris for the Peace Conference, to request the establishment of an independent state, united with Albania. Their request met with disfavour; nor was it supported by Romania either. Under the rule of four Balkan states, the Aromanians experienced a condition far worse than under the Ottoman rule. Thus, Yugoslavia refused to abide by the terms of the Peace Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, which granted educational and religious autonomy to Aromanians living in Serbian Macedonia. While the Peace of Bucharest (1913) would be inscribed in the Aromanian collective imagination as „a great national catastrophe”,14 the year 1913 itself turned out to be the climax of the so-called Oriental issue, with the division of the territories that used to be under the Ottoman Empire, now the “sick person” of Europe. In 1912–1913 the “Balkan crisis” haunted the chancelleries of the Great Powers to such an extent that finding an urgent solution to it became an issue on the agenda of all diplomats. With its military contribution to Greece and Serbia’s war against Bulgaria, Romania not only aided in curtailing the latter’s exaggerated pretence but also benefitted from the outcome by annexing the Cadrilater. The Bulgarians would deem it a grave act of territorial depredation, nothing short of a “national catastrophe”, which would fuel serious friction between the two states. Yet with the signing of the Peace of Bucharest on 10 August 1913 certain border reconfigurations occurred such as had not been envisaged by the Romanian political leaders. Ion I.C. Brătianu articulated his concern in a diplomatic letter of 17 January 1914 sent to Romania’s representantives abroad, thus: “the affairs of Macedonia in particular constitute a constant concern for us, insofar as they relate to the interests of an important segment of population of Romanian stock.... Greece has consented to grant the Aromanians within her territories the autonomy of school and church. Moreover, the Greek state permits the establishment of an episcopate for the self-same Romanians, to sponsor, under its supervision, their present and future institutions”.15 On 25 July 1917 the representatives of the Aromanians from the Pindus and Zagor sent from Samarina a telegram to Ion I.C. Brătianu, stating that: “to affirm its Latinity, the Romanian population can claim greater rights than any other nation, and its defence should

14 Nicolas Trifon, op.cit., p. 317. 15 Vasile Th. Muși, Un deceniu de colonizare în Dobrogea Nouă, 1925-1935 [A Decade of Settlement in New Dobrogea, 1925-1935], Societatea de Cultură Macedo-Română, București 1936, p.13.

114 Enache Tuşa be accomplished in full collaboration and agreement by the Romanians from Dacia and Transylvania who have never forgotten their brothers from Macedonia, Epirus, Thrace and the other Balkan regions”.16 In the wake of the war between Turkey and Greece, the Peace of Lausanne stipulated an ethnic exchange between the Greeks in Asia Minor and the Turks in Greece. This exchange of populations resulted in great demographical unbalance in the Balkans, which would reconfigure the region’s ethnic map. Thus, as many as 1,500,500 Greeks settled back in Greece, which led to an agrarian reform conducive to the expropriation of all lands. While the ethnic makeup of Greece was thus rebalanced in favour of the Greeks, it also placed “a great burden on a country with limited resources”.17 Furthermore, as their condition worsened in a country which favoured and protected its own ethnic population, the Aromanians turned to Romania for help. As all the peoples that wanted to establish their national states at the time, once they had earned their autonomy from various empires, practised “ethnic cleansing”, the phenomenon of population relocation or transfer had a very real ring to it. About 10,000 Aromanians emigrated from Greece to Romania. Nor only were there religious dissimilarities between the Greeks and Turks, but they also differed mentally and psychologically, which, among others, meant that each people tried to assert its superiority over the other one. However, when the Greek army was defeated in the Asian part of Turkey, the latter sought revenge to such an extent that it rippled from the political to the social and the demographic. By virtue of the Peace of Lausanne, then, Turkey evicted the Greek population from Asia Minor with hardly anything from what they had gained in a lifetime of work. The Greek exodus was described by many contemporaries, yet we have preferred a description as it appears in a passage from Vasile Muşi in a study on the settlement of Dobrogea: “In the aftermath of their defeat in the Turkish war, the Greeks had to flee Asia Minor. All Christians had to flee from Asia. And how did they do so? Barely clad, famished, with their only hope in Christ. Dozens of boats sailed across the sea. In the harbours of Pireus and Thessalonika and everywhere else sirens whistled, sailors cried to the top of their voices, skippers yelled orders, while the Greek refugees marched to the shore in long files, pale, saddened, dirty and hungry. Distressing and demoralizing spectacle indeed. As many as 1,500,000 Greek refugees swarmed like locusts into a defeated, demoralized, impoverished Greece. The refugees landed from their boats like from a wasps’ nest. One could read suffering and despair on their faces, distress and tears in their eyes. They had left behind –

16 Ibidem, p.14. 17 Theodor Capidan, Sărăcăcianii. Studii asupra unei populațiuni românești grecizate [The Saracaciani: A Study of a Grecified Romanian Population], in Documente Românești - IV, București, 1924-1926, pp. 925-928.

The Peace of Bucharest of 1913: Political Effects and Demographic Realities in Southern Dobrogea 115 beyond the seas – their millenary past, their altars, graves, homes and wealth.”18 Yet to this picture should be added the fact that the Greeks had set out to take over the Aromanians’ lands and gains. Thus, hotels, houses and estates were taken over abusively, and prosperous towns and markets were flooded by crowds of Greek refugees. The Aromanians were despoiled ruthlessly, their homes were seized by force and their households expropriated in the absence of any legal order. Those who lodged complaints with the Greek authorities or tried to protest against such abuse received the answer: “Salvaging the nation reigns supreme [of course, the Greek nation]. The nation is us... whoever dislikes this, let them depart!”.19 Such words had sounded like an ultimatum ever since the arrival of the Greek refugees in the Balkans, which persuaded the Aromanian leaders that they had to act, since such adversities were not going to be short-lived, but would plague their people for a long while. We have tried to show so far all the reasons which determined the Aromanians to answer the summons of the Romanian authorities and settle in Southern Dobrogea. There existed, moreover, logistic imperatives20 which did not allow the Aromanians to live in the Balkans any longer. Population density in the two counties of Southern Dobogea, namely Durostor and Caliacra, was the lowest in Romania at the time.21 Besides, the authorities were aware that the Aromanian groups, forming as they did a community of Romanian culture, could be urged to settle in the Cadrilater and thus acculturate the local Turk, Tatar and Bulgarian populations. The Romanian politicians of the time wished to alter the ethnic configuration of Southern Dobrogea by colonizing it with Romanian population from historical Romanian regions (such as Oltenia and Moldavia) yet also with Aromanians who could no longer live in the Balkans. The Aromanians were

18 Vasile Th. Muși, op.cit., p.15. 19 Cătălin Negoiţă, Țara uitată. Cadrilaterul în timpul administrației românești 1913-1940 [The Forlorn Country: The Cadrilater during the Romanian Administration, 1913-1940], Editura Fundației Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 2008, p.417. See also by the same author, Între Stânga şi Dreapta. Comunism, irredentism şi legionarism în Cadrilater 1913-1940 [Between the Left and the Right: Communism, Irredentism and the Legion in the Cadrilater, 1913-1940], Editura Fundaţiei Scrisul Românesc, Craiova, 2009, p.119. 20 These imperatives concerned: a) the return of the Greeks from Asia Minor to the Balkans, then inhabited predominantly by Aromanians; b) border reconfiguration of the states newly emerged after 1919–1920; and c) the incidents Aromanians had with the Bulgarians and Greeks in the regions both parties disputed. 21 A historian who has studied Southern Dobrogea notes a few figures that can give us an ethnic picture of this region in the interwar period. According to the 1930 census, the counties of Caliacra and Durostor had respectively 166,911 and 211,431 inhabitants. The Romanians in the Cadrilater were 22.6% in Durostor and 19% in Caliacra of the entire population; the Muslim population continued, therefore, to be the majority in Southern Dobrogea in 1930; Cătălin Negoiţă, Țara Uitată. Cadrilaterul în timpul administrației românești 1913-1940 [The Forlorn Country: The Cadrilater during the Romanian Administration, 1913-1940], p. 276.

116 Enache Tuşa interested to live in regions where socio-political arrangements would not disrupt their patriarchal lifestyle. Within the Romanian state, they could maintain unaltered their culture, traditions and political views they had held in relation to the Romanian system. Unfortunately, the politics of colonization was misapplied, as no conditions necessary for such political and social process were met. Furthermore, despite their early favourable intentions, the Romanian authorities did not answer the petitions for supplementary financial support of the administrative institutions created in the region.22 Limited financial resources, therefore, did not permit any steady development in the region. Furthermore, the Great Depression of 1929–1933 also had negative repercussions on the evolution of Romanan political ethos not also due to inflation but especially due to the underfinancing of the logistics meant to support the contemporary institutional culture in Southern Dobrogea. What is more, after the early administrative organization of the region, the Romanian authorities delayed the implementation of coherent political policies and measures which would conceivably have been conducive to a more efficient presence of the Romanian administration in Southern Dobrogea.23 In 1935 the lawyer Vasile Th. Muşi, who had been directly involved in the settling process, wrote thus: “A truly new age commenced for them at that very moment; a national and political ideal became outlined most clearly; a stable home welcomed them in a motherland grounded in the very eternity of the Romanian people from which they had been torn and to which, after long trials and tribulations, they could finally return – redeemed.” After protracted tentative attempts of the Romanian authorities, Aromanians arrived in Southern Dobrogea, in a country which certain authors in the age deemed the Aromanians’ homeland yet which was unappealing to them either emotionally or economically.24 Constantly looked upon as strangers by the Romanians they lived side by side with, as well as regarded with hostility by the resident Bulgarians and Muslims, the Aromanians were deeply neglected or treated injustly with respect to their socio-economic concerns. Accordingly, they continued to live in closed communities and refused to mingle with the Romanians, whom they deemed untrustworthy, false and over-revelling individuals.25 Not only didn’t anything they had been promised come true on their

22 Direcția Județeană Constanța a Arhivelor Naționale, fond - Rezidența Ținutului Marea (National Archives, Constanța County Branch; fund: Inhabitants of the Black Sea Region), file no. 10/1940, f. 13-15. 23 Constantin Tudor, Administrația Românească în Cadrilater (1913-1940) [The Romanian Administration of the Cadrilater, 1913-1940], pp.153-157. 24 Mihail A. Blenche, Românii de peste hotare (Românii din Bulgaria) – martie 1938 [Romanians Abroad: The Romanians from Bulgaria], Arhivele M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944. România, vol. 497 – Lucrări și referate 1929-1943, f. 367. 25 Ovid Țopa, Românii de peste hotare și minoritățile noastre [The Romanians Abroad and Our Minorities], Fond 71/1920-1940, România, vol. 497 – Lucrări și referate 1929-1943, f. 157-158.

The Peace of Bucharest of 1913: Political Effects and Demographic Realities in Southern Dobrogea 117 arrival in Southern Dobrogea, but their life there turned out to be shot through with hardships. They settled in the Cadrilater in several stages between 1925 and 1935, as they considered Romania to be their country too. Among their set of moral values featured large commitment, industriousness, steadfastness, dignity and honour. Yet the Aromanians were also credulous, which did hardly benefit them under the circumstances.26 Even Nicolae Iorga, who had been actively involved in the colonization process, acknowledged to a certain extent the failure of the Romanian authorities. With respect to the Cadrilater, Iorga wrote: “In New Dobrogea our duty as a national party would be to support the Macedonians, who represent such an interesting segment of the Romanian people; these people have contributed proportionately enormously to our national civilization; they are individuals who are, as you know, much more capable than us; there is not one of their numbers who would manage under any circumstances; they are the creators of culture across the Balkans; and yet we have uprooted these people from their homes, have shipped them to Romania, have made agriculturists where they were none, have made them townspeople where they were none – we have somewhat messed with their hopes.”27 The Aromanian settling of Southern Dobrogea failed in the sense that certain planned policies were not observed. While the idea of Aromanian colonization was originally a purely political strategy, in practice it turned out to be an interplay of party politics and partisanships.28 The failure was also due in part to the ambition of the political leaders to cultivate in Southern Dobrogea a national idea based on the necessity to acculturate the local Bulgarian and Turkish-Tatar population; the acculturation process failed, however, since the two major ethnic groups (Bulgarians and Muslims) opposed strong resistance. In the absence of a coherent strategy, the Romanian state had to constantly wage a guerrilla war against the comitagi gangs, yet also against the communist factions which millitated for the separation of the entire region of Dobrogea from Romania and its inclusion into a future Balkan republic of communist orientation.29 The answer of the Romanian politicians to the challenge of the Bulgarian comitagis was a policy of Aromanian (as well as Romanian) colonization. If the Romanian settlers coming from the Kingdom, frightened by the comitagi raids, ended up fleeing the

26 Maria Bedivan, Pe urmele unui colonist aromân [In the Footsteps of a Macedo-Romanian Settler], Editura Semne, București, 2003, p. 28. 27 Nicolae Iorga, Peninsula Balcanică [The Balkan Peninsula], revistă lunară politico-literară, an VII nr. 1-2, ianuarie-februarie, 1929. 28 Ioan Vlădescu, Cadrilaterul, ce este și ce ar trebui să fie, naționalizarea și colonizarea lui [The Cadrilater: What Its Nationalization and Colonization Is and What It Should Be], Tipografia Dobrogea Jună, Constanța, 1927, p.57. 29 Cătălin Negoiţă, Între Stânga și Dreapta.Comunism, Iredentism și Legionarism în Cadrilater, 1913-1940 [Between the Left and the Right: Communism, Irredentism and the Legion in the Cadrilater, 1913-1940], p.15.

118 Enache Tuşa

Cadrilater, the Aromanians stood steady: they organized themselves and fought the danger, as they had been used to do for centuries. They had formerly fought to defend their territory, be it in Albania, Macedonia or Greece; now they were fighting for the cause of the Romanian state in a region where the authorities had failed to establish social and political order despite the deployment of large numbers of geandarmes and police forces as well as two army divisions. Thus ends an episode in Aromanian history, which many regard as a political and identitary failure since it had not been planned pragmatically and was not supported by consistent logistics and resources.

The Peace of Bucharest of 1913: Political Effects and Demographic Realities in Southern Dobrogea 119

Monarhii celor cinci state balcanice semnatare ale Tratatului de Pace de la Bucureşti. În mijloc Regele Carol I al României alături de Regele Gheorghe al Greciei; Regele Petru al Serbiei; Regele Nicolae al Muntenegrului; Ţarul Ferdinand de Coburg al Bulgariei. Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 120

PART THREE

Recenzii, Note (Reviews)

Alin Spânu, Serviciul de informaţii al României în Războiul de Întregire Naţională (1916-1920), Bucureşti, Editura Militară, 2012, 318 p. (Gavriil Preda) 123

Generalul adjutant Paul (Pavel) Teodorescu (1888-1981) - vocaţia creativităţii, coord. prof. univ. dr. Valentin Ciorbea, PS. dr. Emilian Lovişteanu, comandor dr. Marian Moşneagu, Constanţa, Editura Ex Ponto, 439 p. (Valentin Ciorbea) 126

The Peace of Bucharest of 1913: Political Effects and Demographic Realities in Southern Dobrogea 121 Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archeology ISSN 2067-5682 Volume 5, Number 4/2013 122

Volumul cuprinde 42 de studii ştiinţifice prezentate la sesiunea care a fost dedicată comemorării celor 200 de ani de la anexarea Basarabiei de către Imperiul ţarist. Dintre acestea, 31 s-au referit la subiectul sesiunii, 4 au abordat personalitatea lui Barbu Catargiu, primul premier al României moderne, asasinat în funcţie şi înmormântat în biserica din Maia-Catargi, iar 7 au avut subiecte militare sau geopolitice, incitante şi interesante în acelaşi timp. În deschidere, prefaţa este semnată de c-dor. prof. univ. dr. Jipa Rotaru, Cuvântul înainte de primarul localităţii-gazdă, Marian Zamfir, după care urmează In memoriam – Gheorghe Buzatu, semnat de cel care i-a fost coleg de breaslă, prieten şi confident, Jipa Rotaru. Evocarea, tristă şi marcată de ideea pierderii unui mare istoric şi mare patriot, menţionează, printre altele: „Plecase dintre noi aşa cum l-am ştiut, discret şi modest, la masa de lucru, pe care nu o părăsise nici acum, la câţiva ani buni după pensionare. Conducându-l pe ultimul drum, ochii nu mai aveau lacrimi, ar sufletul îndurerat era cutremurat de indignarea pentru superficialitatea şi lipsa de interes a autorităţilor faţă de acest colos al istoriografiei contemporane. (…) A venit vremea să pregătim şi a noua sesiune Maia-Catargi şi atunci ne-am şters lacrimile şi într-un ultim gest de omagiu şi recunoştinţă am decis ca aceasta să-i fie dedicată în întregime, iar spre cinstea memoriei sale, în volumul al şaselea al Retrăirilor istorice în veacul XXI un prim capitol să-l consacrăm în întregime amintirii MENTORULUI SPIRITUAL ŞI PRIETENULUI NOSTRU, al tuturor celor ce ne întâlnim la Maia-Catargi,

Reviews 123 inegalabilul GHEORGHE BUZATU. Adio, prieten drag şi adevărat camarad! Dumnezeu să te odihnească în pace şi ţărâna să-ţi fie uşoară!” Dintre studiile dedicate Basarabiei le menţionăm pe cele semnate de Gheorghe Buzatu, Războaiele dintre turci şi ruşi din perspectiva unei realităţi geopolitice incontestabile: românii sunt prea aproape de Rusia şi prea departe de Dumnezeu, chestor prof. univ. dr. Vlad Barbu, Organizarea politică a Basarabiei în timpul stăpânirii ruse (1812-1918), prof. dr. Ştefan Grigorescu, Guvernatorii Basarabiei (1812-1856), Alin Spânu, Colonelul Vladimir Sachelarie – organizatorul Serviciului de informaţii în infrastructura feroviară, prof. univ. dr. Ion Giurcă, drd. Daniel Bar, Refugiaţi evrei în Basarabia în perioada interbelică, col. dr. Petrişor Florea, prof. dr. Cornel Ţucă, Structuri militare basarabene în Arhivele Militare Române (1919-1944), col. dr. Mircea Tănase, Basarabia – comoară şi povară în biografia a doi dintre cei mai remarcabili paraşutişti români: căpitan Mihai Ţanţu şi general Grigore Baştan, Delia Roxana Cornea, Activitatea în exil a Asociaţiei Pro Basarabia şi Bucovina şi Aurel Corduneanu, Implicaţiile conflictului transnistrean în stabilirea politicilor de securitate regională. Cele 11 studii care au abordat personalitatea lui Barbu Catargiu şi subiecte geopolitice au fost, de asemenea, actuale şi pertinente. Le semnalăm pe cele semnate: Zoe Bratu, Asasinarea lui Barbu Catargiu, Costin Scurtu, Apărarea credinţei ortodoxe române în Primul Război Mondial, Iulian Chiţu-Sinescu, Propaganda antiromânească dusă de autorităţile ungare în perioada 1940-1941, reflectată în documentele Serviciului Special de Informaţii, şi prof. univ. dr. Leonida Moise, Federaţia Rusă în geopolitica mondială.

Alin Spânu

124 Reviews

Alin Spânu, Serviciul de informaţii al României în Războiul de Întregire Naţională (1916-1920), Bucureşti,

Editura Militară, 2012, 318 p.

Lucrarea scrisă de Alin Spânu este una de tip monografic şi include evoluţia elementelor constitutive, cadrul legislativ, operaţiunile executate, realizările şi eşecurile înregistrate, personalităţi etc. referitoare la serviciul de informaţii al României din perioada 1916-19120, fiind prima abordare de acest fel în istoriografia din ţara noastră. Autorul a elaborat mai multe studii şi comunicări ştiinţifice referitoare la serviciile speciale, remarcându-se printr-o foarte bună teză de doctorat consacrată istoriei serviciilor de informaţii române din perioada 1919- 1945, pe care a publicat-o în anul 2010. În elaborarea monografiei, Alin Spânu a pornit de la câteva ipoteze: 1. statele din cele două tabere beligerante – atât Antanta, cât şi Puterile Centrale – s-au angajat într-un dur război „invizibil“ pe teritoriul românesc; 2. România a avut un loc şi un rol bine definit sub raport informativ/contrainformativ pe frontul „invizibil“; 3. care era gradul de pregătire al serviciilor speciale din România pentru a face faţă confruntării cu serviciile de informaţii adverse, de la începerea războiului mondial şi până în primii ani după Marea Unire. Prezentarea procesului de constituire şi funcţionare a structurilor informativ- contrainformativ române de la Alexandru Ioan Cuza şi până la începerea Primului Război Mondial a oferit autorului suportul în baza căruia a demonstrat scopul

Reviews 125 lucrării: serviciul de informaţii al României din anii 1914-1920 a fost capabil să se opună serviciilor speciale din statele adverse acţiunilor de făurire a României întregite. Volumul este construit cronologic şi evidenţiază continuitatea acţiunilor informative/contrainformative în perioada analizată, în pofida asimetriei de forţe, cu focalizare pe etape, acţiuni şi personalităţi. Intrarea României în război alături de armatele Antantei nu a reprezentat o schimbare de profil, ci o continuitate a acţiunilor informative-contrainformative desfăşurate de structurile specializate româneşti, separat sau împreună cu aliaţii săi militari. Schiţa propusă de Alin Spânu pentru anii 1916-1917 vizează succese informative şi eşecuri decizionale, adaptarea structurilor informative la condiţiile de război, colaborarea informativă cu aliaţii, constituirea şi funcţionarea serviciului de siguranţă româno-rus, apariţia unui nou pericol: bolşevismul, conflicte personale şi impactul lor asupra eficienţei acţiunilor etc. Anul 1918 a fost pentru România, în opinia lui Alin Spânu, o trecere „în trei etape, de la agonie la extaz“. Ca urmare, autorul a considerat util să insiste atât asupra performanţelor informative, cât şi asupra eşecurilor înregistrate, a lacunelor şi slăbiciunilor de ordin uman şi organizatoric, asupra încercărilor la care au fost supuse structurile de informaţii şi contrainformaţii române în anul respectiv. Autorul abordează, pentru prima dată în istoriografia română, problematica bolşevismului, ca ameninţare asimetrică la adresa siguranţei statului român, fiind evaluată drept cea mai agresivă dintre toate celelalte mişcări politice, revizioniste şi şovine antiromâneşti. Analiza activităţii desfăşurate de structurile de informaţii ale statului român în anii 1919-1920 a demonstrat potenţialul acestora de a asigura un flux continuu de informaţii privind acţiunile adversarilor actelor de unire de la Chişinău, Cernăuţi şi Alba, concomitent cu desfăşurarea unor acţiuni de contraspionaj dintre cele mai eficiente. Acţiunile agresive organizate împotriva României întregite, deşi au cunoscut o mare diversitate de forme de manifestare, au avut ca obiectiv comun destabilizarea ordinii interne din statul român. Alin Spânu demonstrează, cu argumentele realităţii istorice, faptul că bolşevismul s-a conturat, încă de la cucerirea puterii politice în Rusia, ca o ameninţare asimetrică pentru România, a cărei agresivitate a luat forme tot mai violente, culminând cu atentatul din Senatul român din 8 decembrie 1920. Convins de faptul că acţiunile informative/ contrainformative de mare valoare depind de profesionalismul, patriotismul, de calitatea umană existentă în aceste structuri, este adus în prim-plan colonelul Nicolae Condeescu, şef al serviciului de informaţii al armatei în anii 1916-1918, unul dintre fondatorii intelligence-ului românesc. Cercetarea realizată de Alin Spânu demonstrează faptul că un serviciu informativ/contrainformativ profesionist se construieşte în timp, cu discernământ şi patriotism, iar utilitatea sa a fost pe deplin validată de contribuţia adusă la realizarea idealului naţional, făurirea României întregite. Autorul refuză o

126 Reviews abordare de tip hagiografic a acţiunilor serviciului de informaţii al României din perioada analizată, dar se impunea o mai clară evidenţiere a neajunsurilor şi eşecurilor înregistrate, mai ales a celor din prima parte a războiului. În ansamblu, lucrarea publicată de Alin Spânu rămâne o contribuţie substanţială, un reper viabil într-o tematică incitantă în istoriografie, scrisă într-o exemplară dovadă de solidaritate profesională şi de înţelegere aparte faţă de comunitatea „ecumenică“ a serviciilor speciale. Autorul analizează dezinvolt şi pertinent, acrib şi doct în formă şi fond, un teritoriu încă puţin cunoscut şi furnizează cercetării istoriografice date şi elemente inedite, concis şi unitar, inclusiv prin conţinutul anexelor, contribuind la o mai bună înţelegere de către cercetătorii români a perioadei Primului Război Mondial.

Gavriil Preda

Reviews 127

La 28 iunie 2013 s-au împlinit 125 de ani de la naşterea generalului Paul (Pavel) Teodorescu, personalitate de elită a Armatei României. Ofiţer cu rezultate excepţionale în actul de comandă, participant la al Doilea Război Balcanic, la Primul Război Mondial, profesor şi director al Şcolii Superioare de Război, iniţiator al construcţiei campusului învăţământului superior militar, diplomat, subsecretar de stat la Ministerul Apărării Naţionale, ministrul Aerului şi Marinei, co-fondator după 1918 al noii doctrine militare a României, considerat al treilea ctitor al Mânăstirii Dintr-un Lemn care a devenit din decembrie 1939, la demersurile sale, Sfânt locaş de rugăciune şi pomenire pentru marinari şi aviatori, membru corespondent al Academiei Române şi membru titular al Academiei Oamenilor de Ştiinţă sunt principalele repere al cv-ului ilustrului general. În colaborare cu PS. Emilian Lovişteanu, episcopul vicar al Arhiepiscopiei Râmnicului, comandor dr. Marian Moşneagu, director al Serviciului Istoric al Armatei şi maica stavroforă Emanuela Oprea, stareţă, am purces la recuperarea şi promovarea personalităţii ilustrului general. În cadrul simpozionului Istorie, Spiritualitate şi Eroism, organizat pe 21 octombrie 2011 la Arhiepiscopia Râmnicului, generalul Paul (Pavel) Teodorescu a fost omagiat public într-o manifestare ştiinţifică de înaltă ţinută. Continuând proiectul de recuperare şi aducere a personalităţii sale în atenţia şi cunoaşterea generaţiilor se astăzi, la 21 iunie 2013 la Aşezământul „Pastoral- Cultural Sfântul Ierarh Calinic” de la Arhiepiscopia Râmnicului s-a organizat o

128 Reviews sesiune ştiinţifică în cadrul căreia s-a lansat volumul Generalul adjutant Paul (Pavel) Teodorescu (1888-1981) - vocaţia creativităţii, Editura ExPonto, Constanţa, 439 p. (coord. prof. univ. dr. Valentin Ciorbea, PS. dr. Emilian Lovişteanu, comandor dr. Marian Moşneagu). După Argument, semnat de prof. univ. dr. Valentin Ciorbea, lucrarea se deschide cu secţiunea I - Omagii, în care s-au inclus paginile semnate în onoarea generalul Paul (Pavel) Teodorescu de general-locotenent Teodor Frunzeti, comandant (rector) al Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I”, viceamiral dr. Aurel Popa, şeful Statului Major al Forţelor Navale, general-locotenent dr. Fănică Cîrnu, şeful Statului Major al Forţelor Aeriene şi PS. dr. Emilian Lovişteanu pentru Arhiepiscopia Râmnicului. A doua secţiune a lucrării - Generalul Paul (Pavel) Teodorescu în viziunea cercetătorilor şi lumina izvoarelor istorice – s-a constituit din contribuţiile unor reputaţi cercetători şi istorici care s-au aplecat asupra vieţii şi activităţii generalului. Au semnat studii şi articole Petre Otu, Aurel Pentelescu, Valentin Marin, Stoica Lascu, Felicia Ţucă, Cornel Ţucă, Ion Giurcă, Luminiţa Giurgiu, Teodora Giurgiu, Marian Moşneagu, Andreea Atanasiu-Croitoru, Alin Spânu şi, cu voia dumneavoastră, şi semnatarul rândurilor de faţă. Secţiunea a III-a – Addenda reuneşte 16 documente referitoare la diverse aspecte ale activităţii lui Paul Teodorescu din arhiva Mânăstirii Dintr-un Lemn şi arhiva personală a generalului depuse în Camera memorială ce i s-a amenajat în Sfântul locaş. Volumul se încheie cu un set de imagini fotografice ale ofiţerului şi generalului Paul (Pavel) Teodorescu, ale bisericuţei de lemn, mormântul său, a lucrărilor făcute în complexul monahal, plăcilor comemorative ale marinarilor şi aviatorilor, însemnele Marinei şi Aviaţiei, instantanee din cadrul simpozionului desfăşurat în 21 noiembrie 2013. Pe 28 iunie 2013 la Mânăstirea Dintr-un Lemn s-a desfăşurat slujba de pomenire la mormântul generalului oficiată de PS. dr. Emilian Lovişteanu, un sobor de preoţi şi corul Patriarhiei Române. Delegaţii ale Statului Major al Forţelor Navale, ale Statului Major al Forţelor Aeriene şi un pluton al Regimentului de Gardă au depus coroane şi jerbe la mormântul generalului. Pentru promovarea personalităţii generalului prin strădaniile domnului general-locotenent prof. univ. dr. Teodor Frunzeti pe 1 octombrie 2013 în holul Aulei Universităţii de Apărare „Carol I” s-a dezvelit bustul generalului. Personalitatea generalului a fost promovată la Muzeul Marinei Române, la Muzeul Unirii din Focşani, în cadrul celei de-a IX-a Sesiuni de comunicări ştiinţifice „Retrăiri istorice în veacul XXI” organizată de domnul comandor dr. Jipa Rotaru la Maia în zilele de 6-7 septembrie 2013.

Valentin Ciorbea

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