The NGO Safety Office Issue: 26 May 16th — 31st 2009

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY South Region 2-5 Consistent with the “Operation Narsat” intent to target ‘high ranking officials’ of the Govern- Central Region 6-8 ment, attacks on district and provincial level figures remained prominent this period. Western Region 9-11 Operations targeted, with varying degrees of success, three provincial governors (Kunduz/ WIA, Paktika/KIA, Khost/Nil); three district police chiefs (Kunduz/WIA, Kandahar/ x 2 Northern Region 11-13 WIA); one town mayor (Dilaram, Nimroz) and one district governor (Faizabad). A tentative count of similar operations so far this year reveals attacks on, at least, at the province level, 6 Eastern Region 14-17 governors, 3 chief of police, 2 mayors and 5 council members and, at the district level, 6 ANSO Info Page 18 governors, 10 chief of police, 2 mayors and 3 district administrators. These figures, and the geographic spread of targets, would indicate the clear and consistent application of the ‘Nasrat’ targeting statement so far with the preferred command and con- YOU NEED TO KNOW trol target being a district chief of police, presumably for his vulnerability and local power. • AOG are systematically In a follow up investigation to the murder of the chief of police (Herat) ANP targeting district and have made six arrests this period while elsewhere in the province a BBIED targeted the provincial leaders across administration centre. the country Also this period, Provincial Council members were abducted (Kunduz & Ghazni) and am- bushed (Kabul & Khost) in what were likely local political maneuvers, while anti-election • No substantial impact statements were made in Wardak (threat letter) and Kunduz (at a mosque). yet of US force increase More than six Afghan civilians were beheaded this period, including a 14 year old boy • Ongoing instability in (Paktya) indicating a serious AOG informant problem. An additional five ANA officers Khost and Badghis were reportedly beheaded after surrendering to AOG in Gormach (Badghis) The anticipated assault on Lashkar Gah (Helmand) failed to materialize, reportedly due to a well placed IMF assassination, while combined IMF/ANA forces recovered 120 suicide vests from a house. Threat reports about the large assault on LG remain frequent. ANSO is supported by Khost city remains tense following the May 12 attack with civilian deaths ongoing as a result of IED’s , inaccurate AOG rocket fire and IMF escalation of force shootings meanwhile AOG continue their campaign against clinics, looting resources but rarely harming staff. The capitol, Kabul, remained quiet although AOG intent was demonstrated by ANP recov- ery of two vehicles packed with explosives in the city and rockets ready to fire in Paghman.

NGO DATA & TRENDS All seven NGO incidents this period were some NGO Security Incidents Per Month, 2009

variation on an armed robbery with just three 17 being assessed as being conducted by AOG and 15 15 15 two of these being the clinic lootings in Khost 11 (May 19 &20). Overall incident rates remain at 10 ‘normal’ levels (see right) and fatalities and abduc- tions are trending substantially lower than the Jan 5 5 -May period of 2008. Restriction of field move- 0 ment is the most direct cause of improvement. JAN FEB MAR APR MAY THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 2 GHAZNI This Report Period 1 100

Just prior to this reporting pe- 80 riod,12 May in Sultan Bagh, AOG orchestrating ambushes, , 12 men, armed kidnappings, etc. along High- 60 with RPGs and AK-47s, ab- way 1. Additionally, abductions 40 in the district have spiked ac- ducted an INGO national staff 20 member as he was travelling cording to ANSO records that date from 2006, indicating that 0 through the area in a private JAN FEB MAR APR MAY this is the fifth abduction of taxi. After blindfolding the vic- AOG ACG tim, he was transported to a the year, already surpassing the private residence, probably be- record high of four abductions tween Sultan Bagh and Sharan during a reporting year. Signifi- District, in Paktika. The perpe- cant to note, though, this is the trators, who demonstrated that first abduction of NGO staff in gained information on the victim’s inten- they were familiar with the vic- the district, with other victims tion to travel from a staff member inside tim and his association with the in 2009 consisting of ANA, the INGO so that they could utilise the said INGO, treated the staff AWCC staff, road construction ‘shock of capture’ to ensure that the victim member cordially, offering him staff, and a civilian. While the would give an honest account of the inci- tea and questioning him about exact actors behind the inci- dent in question. an instance of impropriety that dent remain unknown, because NGOs should expect conditions to dete- the armed group asserted took of the general area, weaponry riorate further in the province and note place within the INGO. The involved, and detailed informa- that large movements of AOGs into abductors ultimately released tion necessary to abduct the Ghazni, Ab Band, and Qarabagh districts. the victim after four hours of victim while en route, it is likely Besides the abovementioned develop- detention and apologised for that the perpetrators were ments, AOG are adhering to conducting the matter. AOG members intent upon close-range ambushes of IMF/ANSF pa- conducting a ‘moral investiga- trols and logistical convoys, rolling assassi- Andar District continues to be tion’ to gain further informa- dominated by AOG, with nations while on motorbikes, and utilising tion on the accused instance of IEDs to frustrate security forces. Lastly, impropriety. Conversely, while suicide attacks continue to be an additional KEY THREATS & CONCERNS less likely, it is possible that the option, with five BBIED attackers dying in !" Abduction actors were relatives of the per- an accidental detonation in Waghaz Dis- !" Collateral damage from IED or son who may have been convoy ambushes trict on the 16th. It is thus likely that AOG slighted in the purported im- !" Rocket/RPG attacks will continue to employ suicide attacks propriety, and they may have against District Centres and ANSF/IMF.

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 1 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 Activity in Nimroz during this reporting period was dominated 80 by AOG attacks upon ANP posts in Chahar Burjak, Chakhansur, 60 Khash Rod, Dilaram, and Kang districts, and a 4.5 hour assault on an ANP patrol in Chahar Burjak. Additionally, AOG success- 40 fully ambushed the Dilaram Mayor, wounding him on 21 May. 20

NGOs should expect the conflict to maintain typical levels in the 0 province, with the exception of possible SVBIEDs being utilised JAN FEB MAR APR MAY

against ANP posts to increase the lethality of AOG attacks. AOG ACG THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 4 KANDAHAR 100 This Report Period 0 Inside the province, Kandahar 80 City led the period with 29 inci- AOGs persisted in their at- 60 dents, including IED discover- tempts to target GoA person- 40 ies in Districts 2, 5, 7, and 8, a alities with the 19 May 20 VBIED discovery in District 1, SVBIED attack on the Ar- 0 and successful IED strikes in ghandab Chief of Police (CoP). Districts 4 and 7. Besides the Although AOG were unsuc- typical attacks on ANSF, assas- cessful in their attempt to kill AOG ACG sinations of perceived GoA/ the CoP, at least two ANP IMF collaborators, attacks on were killed and an additional but causing no damage. Also, on 21 May construction company staff, ten wounded. And in probable in District 9 of Kandahar City, ANP ar- and continual ANP discoveries efforts to further disillusion rested an ANP official that was transport- of weapons caches, a few inci- Arghandab residents by high- ing 139 antipersonnel mines, illuminating dents stood out from the fore. lighting ANSFs’ inability to the complicity of ANP in AOG opera- prevent AOG operations, two tions, especially in the smuggling of mate- IED strikes occurred—one on rial. In conclusion, NGOs should not ex- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS 19 May and the other on 21 pect any significant gains in addressing !" Roadside IEDs May—with the former destroy- insecurity throughout the province, and !" Collateral damage from AOG- ing a school in Babarano, and ANP clashes AOG continue to demonstrate the perva- the latter detonating in the vi- !" BBIED/SVBIED attacks sive nature of the opposition and lack of cinity of the Shahenano school, any substantive GoA writ.

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 Zabul witnessed an increase in 80 the number of IED incidents Also of concern, a group of 12 60 suicide BBIED attackers is said in almost every district of the 40 to have already deployed into province, and ANSO South 20 . continues to receive reports of 0 additional IED threats. In this This group is allegedly led by JAN FEB MAR APR MAY period, 35 AOG under a local two local commanders and is commander have reportedly planning to orchestrate suicide AOG ACG infiltrated into Shekan, Mizan attacks in Kabul. District, to split into The incidents that have oc- neighbouring districts and to curred during the course of the target IMF/ANSF convoys most recent week confirm the and establishments with IEDs credibility of these threats on motorbikes. while also demonstrating their operations due to the continual se- AOGs’ capability to produce verity of local IED incidents. Unfortu- high IMF and ANSF casualties nately for NGOs in the province, this KEY THREATS & CONCERNS throughout the province. IED campaign is expected to continue !" Roadside IEDs According to further informa- increasing due to the AOGs’ correct per- !" Attacks on ANP ception that it is their most successful !" BBIED/VBIED attacks tion, a very small number of NGOs in the province ceased armed tactic against IMF and ANSF. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 2 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 NGOs should heed indications 80 that AOG may be concentrat- naar who were responsible for ing efforts on infiltrating the IED operations. Ahead of infil- 60 district of Tirin Kot, despite tration we are likely to see ef- 40 the obvious IMF presence. In- forts to intimidate and control 20 formation that supports this the otherwise resistant popula- 0 assessment includes the 16 May tion and develop local intelli- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY revelation that AOG estab- gence capability. Typical meth- AOG ACG lished a governing commission ods of intimidation will include in the town to coordinate ac- executions of collaborators and tivities; the 20 May solicitation attacks on non-security re- for local financial contributions sources (NGO, radio stations, schools etc). report that eleven civilians were killed in by a commander in Sad Murda; Khas Uruzgan during an IMF/ANSF op- and IMF reported killing of NGOs should also be attentive eration and airstrike will likely draw the ire two AOG commanders in Chi- to local attitudes in Khas of locals. Additionally, IMF assert that Uruzgan. As is well known, the IED and suicide attacks in the areas of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS district had seen a heavy AOG Mirabad, Kakarak, and Khorma are an !" AOG opposition to NGO op- influence in the past, with IMF erations increasing threat. While the IED threat is now asserting that inroads have ubiquitous, AOG checkpoints are also a !" IEDs been made to clear the urban !" Suicide attacks rising concern, as well as clashes between centre; however, the 22 May AOG and local opponents in Charchino.

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 100 This Report Period 0 An AOG threat letter (17 May) 80 in Sharan District stated that for their credibility 60 seeking or receiving assistance Still, Paktika is afflicted by tra- 40 from an NGO or attending ditional AOG operations, in- 20 school would be punished and cluding abductions. On 29 May 0 that multiple main routes origi- in , four nating from Jani Khail, Khair engineers—two Pakistanis and Kot, Mest, Yah Khail, and two Afghanis—involved in in- AOG ACG Mash Khail had been mined. specting mobile phone anten- Despite this apparent warning nae were abducted, along with cluding contractors and those suspected when two men were kidnapped their driver. of being informants, and other civilians while in Sharan (25 May) to Although this only marks the that may take a stand against AOG. conduct vaccinations AOG second ANSO-recorded kid- treated them fairly and released Three such individuals were abducted napping in the district since and later beheaded May 23. them when villagers vouched December 2006, when five MRRD staff were abducted, So far this year has experi- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS abduction remains a chief con- enced the highest abduction rate—three !" IED cern. Province-wide, AOG ab- that have so far been reported for May— !" Abduction ductions have focused on per- due to AOG check posts that have been !" Collateral from AOG and ceived IMF collaborators, in- enacted to search for persons of interest. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 1 HELMAND This Report Period 0 100 IMF and ANSF conducted a ual consternation of IMF civil- 80 four day operation in Nad Ali 60 District, namely in Marja area, ian casualties, there are reports 40 during the reporting period. of about 20 civilian deaths. The operation commenced on These purported casualties may 20 19 May due to multiple reports again draw negative attention 0 of a considerable AOG force towards IMF plans to increase JAN FEB MAR APR MAY deploying to the district. Re- troop deployments, especially AOG ACG portedly, the AOG was plan- because anecdotal local report- ning to infiltrate Lashkar Gah ing asserts that ANSF actually City and strike against all did not participate in the op- prominent GoA facilities. The eration and a large number of dent. Outside of Nad Ali, the districts of operation consequently led to local establishments were de- Khanashin, Baghran, Washer, Dishu, and the reported deaths of more stroyed and families displaced. Nawzad are also believed to be under than 100 AOG members and a Not all local reporting agrees strong AOG influence. Additionally, past substantial quantity of narcot- that IMF reacted inordinately, experience has shown short-term IMF and ics—125 tons—being inter- though, suggesting that the de- ANSF operations, such as the one in Nad cepted and destroyed. Approxi- stroyed local shops were in- Ali, tend to actually destabilise an area in- mately, 120 BBIEDs were also volved in the distribution of stead of leading to greater security. With reported to have been captured narcotics by serving as an this, AOGs continued to actively assert by IMF and ANSF during the ‘outlet’ in which middlemen their presence in response to previous and operation. And despite contin- would purchase the narcotics recent successes by ANSF and IMF forces, for transport to neighbouring and these AOG operations are increasing KEY THREATS & CONCERNS countries. An element of ob- the risks for NGO staff. Accordingly, !" Roadside IEDs servation that may support this NGOs are advised to minimize contact !" Collateral damage from AOG- latter suspicion is that, to date, with IMF and ANSF and to keep a safe IMF/ANSF clashes there have been no public out- distance from them during movements, !" Significant AOG threat cries in response to the inci- even in well-perceived secure areas.

Countrywide AOG Initiated Attacks per Month, 2009

700

600 575 533 521 500

400 388 381

300

200

100

0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents KABUL Year to Date 6 KABUL 50 This Report Period 1 For the year to date, ACG inci- 40 dents have shown a reversal of thermore, the demands on the 30 the downward trend witnessed ANSF for the actual election 20 in 2008. Last year, criminal in- period will further detract from 10 cidents declined by 16% in the the crime fighting capabilities 0 first five months of the year, of the police. In the latest re- however for 2009, this figure porting period, another armed has shown a complete turn- robbery was recorded against a AOG ACG around with a 64% rise in re- local NGO staff member. On ported criminal incidents 22 May, the individual was re- across . Al- turning home in a car at ap- AOG initiated incidents grew 110% in though improved reporting proximately 11:00hrs and was 2008 and increased a further 45% in may be a factor to consider, the stopped by four armed men in 2009. increasing focus of the ANSF Police District 5. He was then Surobi, representing approximately one on AOG activity is likely the subsequently robbed of his sixth of AOG incidents in Kabul Prov- primary reason for the increase possessions and severely ince for the year was the location of a in criminality. beaten. It should be noted that high profile reported attempted assassi- the robbery was not related to nation of the Afghan President’s brother, The trend is likely to continue the individual’s employment as the ANSF remain focused Ahmad Wali Karzai. The attack, occur- and occurred in an area which ring on 18 May, took place in the Abre- on AOG activity in the lead up is known to possess both an to the election in August. Fur- shom Area along the Kabul to ACG and AOG presence. In Highway and killed one of Karzai’s contrast to the volatility in the bodyguards. If, as is most likely, the at- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ACG incident figures, AOG tack was aimed at the president’s !" Complex attacks against high activity across the province has profile targets brother, the incident lends further sup- shown a consistent increase in !" Armed Criminal Groups port to the notion that AOG are able to the last three years. For the pe- !" Abductions conduct sophisticated attacks with well riod January to May, overall sourced intelligence.

NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40 With attention largely focused 30 form of attack and again the on the effects of more ‘boots 20 on the ground’ in the East and risk to NGO can be mitigated 10 South of the country, the ex- by keeping well clear 0 tended supply lines and convoy (up to 200m) away from such convoys. Although the number movements will likely supply AOG ACG AOG with an increasingly tar- of IED attacks is comparable get rich environment, which to the same period in 2008, the dead; further IED attacks in Bagram on could significantly affect the increasing frequency of attacks April 13 and Jabalussaraj on 11 May dam- security of the roads around in the past month may suggest aged a private truck and left two IMF Bagram Airbase. Standoff at- the beginning of a new trend in wounded respectively. Most recently on tacks against IMF and ANSF the following months. An IED 26 May, three IMF and at least three civil- convoys, in the form of IEDs, attack in Dih Sabz, Kabul, on ians were killed in a SVBIED attack on an are likely to be the favoured 20 May left two IMF soldiers IMF convoy in Mahmud Raqi District. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 0 50 Baraki Barak, Muhammad 40

Agha, continue to be from IEDs planted by AOG 30

the most hostile environments along district roads. For the 20

in Logar with IED attacks and month of May alone, there 10 ambushes, mainly directed at were eleven discoveries of 0 IMF and ANSF, being the IEDs along district roads in the most frequently used tactics by province, with an additional AOG. The main risk to NGO two premature detonations. An AOG ACG operations remains collateral IED also struck a civilian vehi- exposure to IMF/ANSF and cle on 14 May, killing the occu- on 26 May, which killed AOG engagements as well as pants and wounding two others thirteen AOG, including a reported three close by. A further IED strike foreigners, as well as two civilians. The KEY THREATS & CONCERNS against an IMF convoy was relative remoteness of the location was !" Abduction recorded, which left no casual- perhaps a contributing factor in the lack of !" Spread of attacks to schools or ties. The issue of civilian casu- other non security-related tar- an immediate local backlash in the form of gets alties remains an issue in the demonstrations as has been previously !" Collateral damage from attacks province following an airstrike seen in Muhammad Agha and Puli Alam. in the Saikh Qala Area of

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 0 WARDAK 50 This Report Period 0 For the year-to-date Wardak 40 has seen an 82% increase in to secure the Kabul to Ghazi 30 highway against both standoff AOG initiated attacks from the 20 previous year. The attacks, and close range attacks by AOG, combined there have 10 however, are largely confined 0 to the districts of Saydabad been five standoff and six close (42%), Maydan Shahr (15%), range attacks in Jaghatu, Jalrez, Jaghatu (15%) and Chaki Saydabad and Nirk in the last AOG ACG (13%). The capital of Wardak, two weeks. The road remains Maydan Shahr, has witnessed a extremely dangerous and the IMF and other international representa- comparative drop in the num- status is unlikely to change in tives who are not seen as impartial in the ber of AOG incidents from the coming weeks and months. current context should, where possible, 22% of the total in 2008 to Separately, preliminary report- be avoided. Unfortunately, perceptions slightly less than 15% in 2009 - ing suggests that recent state- of NGO in the public discourse are eas- due largely to introduction of ments made by the US Special ily shaped by AOG elements and lead to new IMF and the roll out of Representative to Afghanistan a misunderstanding of the nature of the APPF. Although intensive and Pakistan may have led to a NGO activities. A facile causal link with efforts are being made by IMF hardening of attitudes towards the international military presence and NGO in both Wardak and the GoA can have a severely detrimental Logar. Additional information effect on NGO operations and indeed KEY THREATS & CONCERNS is currently being sought, how- the safety of their staff. Virtually the sole !" Abduction !" Collateral damage from rocket ever, in the meantime, so as to method to rebut misperceptions of parti- and IED attacks not contribute to perceptions ality, as is broadly practiced, is to !" Use of terror tactics of NGO as being military strengthen community relations and ‘informants’, meetings with clearly articulate their mandate THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40 An SVBIED which rammed an IMF convoy near the border attack took place is one of the 30 with Parwan in the Puli Sayad main thoroughfares for civilian 20 Area of Mahmudi Raqi on 26 and military traffic heading 10 from Bagram to Kapisa as well May served to illustrate the 0 reach of AOG in the province as further north to Panjshir. and quickly dispelled any no- What is perhaps surprising is that attacks of this nature are tion that AOG activities were AOG ACG uniquely confined to the dis- not more frequent, considering tricts of Alasay, Nijrab and Ta- its importance as a transit route left five wounded, three critically. IMF gab. The attacks left three IMF to the east of the province defused a further device in the area the and at least another three civil- where there remains a signifi- following day. At present there is no in- ians dead, with many more cant IMF presence. AOG ac- formation to suggest that the latest wounded. The area where the tivity in their traditional strong- SVBIED attack is the start of a concerted hold of Tagab remains limited effort to attack either IMF or ANSF in due to the intensive IMF op- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the comparatively passive west of the erations of the last few months province. In light of the recent attack, and !" Collateral damage from attacks and the establishment of FOBs on police and security forces, indeed throughout the country, NGO are in the area; the exception to !" Spread of attacks to schools or advised to maintain a significant distance other non security targets this being an IED strike on an from IMF and ANSF convoys. IMF convoy on 18 May which

NGO Incidents DAYKONDI + Year to Date 1 50 DAYKONDI This Report Period 0 40 Daykondi remains relatively quiet in the last reporting period Nili, or NGO operations. The 30 period leading up to the elec- following a kidnapping threat 20 tion may engender a less per- issued by a former AOG com- 10 mander in late April. Reports missive environment for NGO continue to emerge concerning if the political machinations of 0 AOG penetration of the prov- the province debark from the ince from Uruzgan as well as a purely political and evolve into similar established AOG pres- a more overt struggle for pa- AOG ACG ence in the district of Khadir. tronage. However, beyond the As yet, the presence of AOG recent kidnapping threat, possi- has not been translated into a bly as a manoeuvre to gain lo- cal leverage, there have been no BAMYAN direct threat against the capital, 50 further incidents of this nature. 40

AOG activity in Bamyan (right) 30 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS is largely limited to the Ghan- 20 !" High AOG infiltration in Kiti, dak Valley in and Gizrab, and Kajran 10 !" demonstrate anti-government Low security presence through- 0 out the province sentiment in pockets of the !" Clashes between AOG and the northeast of the province. local population AOG ACG THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 1 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 According to numerous re- 40 ports, the situation in Badghis thirty AOG and wounded an 30 is especially dire, with AOGs additional twenty was appar- 20 utilising it as a western bastion ently conducted after the am- 10 to demonstrate their intent to bush of an IMF convoy that 0 destabilise all regions. Since the resulted in three dead IMF sol- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY diers. While many may argue denoted ANSF and IMF AOG ACG ‘Operation Toofan’ (Operation that the AOG initiative in the west is meant largely to spread Storm) began in Murghab and AOG for propaganda purposes, one sees Ghormach districts around 17 thin ANSF and IMF, the un- confirmed 29 May ambush of continual strife throughout the province. May, continual clashes have AOGs are also clearly following through in occurred. Confrontations are ANA that led to the surrender of more than thirty ANA that their threats to emplace antitank mines in especially severe in Murghab the province, demonstrated in the 26 May District, where IMF have con- were eventually executed, with purportedly five ANA officers mine attack that killed an ANP in Qadis ducted multiple airstrikes in District, the 24 May ANP discovery of support of beleaguered Afghan being beheaded and more than twenty-five enlisted being shot twelve antitank mines that were placed forces. For example, a 30 May along the Qala-e Naw – Murghab Road, airstrike that purportedly killed dead, was likely conducted to draw publicity and intimidate and the 18 May multiple mine strike on an KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANSF and locals. Although ANA convoy in Murghab District. In light !" Prevalent Insecurity casualty numbers in the above- of rising threats in the province, continual !" Collateral damage from AOG- mentioned incidents are likely monitoring of operational thresholds and ANSF/IMF clashes embellished and spread attention toward countering probable per- !" Mining of roads amongst the local populace by vasive mining of roads are crucial.

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Despite the recent attention 40 that Farah has drawn for the May report that over one hun- 30 civilian casualties, extant secu- dred AOG were preparing to 20 rity vacuum and impending attack the 10 new IMF deployments AOG Centre, as well as the 28 May 0 continue to operate freely. report that a BBIED attacker JAN FEB MAR APR MAY was active in the same district, AOG ACG The majority of AOG assaults seeking to target ANSF/IMF. are lacklustre and ineffective with only attacks in Bala Baluk Although reporting of AOG (30/31 May) causing notable movements have been some- ANP casualties. what lacking in credibility in the past, recent reports of While most attacks appear only AOG migrations have been to seek to reinforce their pres- validated by multiple parties numbers are limited, they are attempting to ence, one should note the 26 and are now often manifesting challenge AOG in limited engagements, themselves in directly related for example, in the 30 May clash in Pusht KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Rod that reportedly led to twelve AOG !" Highway banditry attacks upon urban centres. Additionally, although ANSF fatalities. THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 1 GHOR This Report Period 1 50 The second NGO incident of 40 face the gamut of issues that the year in Ghor occurred on 30 confronts Afghanistan: crime, 19 May in , 20 governance, and conflict. With when three gunmen assaulted 10 this, reported AOG activity an INGO national staff mem- 0 ber. The incident was clearly only contributed a small share JAN FEB MAR APR MAY of incidents, minus one con- criminal in nature, though, with AOG ACG the gunmen robbing the victim tinuing development. As ini- of cash and a motorcycle and tially reported by ANSF, a large assaulting him after he resisted. group of AOG—estimated at While there are no further de- fifty members—appeared to be tails to help ascertain the level strategically moving from the The latest peripheral reporting suggests, of planning that may have went south to strike at the Taywara however, that locals rebuffed the AOG, into the robbery, the victim District Centre. And at the causing it to seek refuge in the mountains was travelling to the area for a time of this report’s writing, of Kuishakh. In conclusion, many may scheduled meeting. Ghor, as estimates had increased to ap- look to why the southern AOG front has furthered by the abovemen- proximately 150 AOG. Addi- taken such a particular interest in the area, tioned incident, continues to tionally, after conducting an and while it may not be exactly clear, it is attack on an ANP post in likely a result of inadequate ANSF pres- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Kuishakh, in the said district, ence, the prevalence of crime, the prov- !" Abduction the group had moved further ince’s proximity to AOG safe havens in !" Prevalent security vacuum into the district—to Chardar— the south, and an AOG desire to widen the !" AOG assaults on ANSF while still reportedly posturing theatre of operations, which will further to assault the District Centre. exasperate ANSF and IMF resources.

NGO Incidents caused by AOG, Year to Date 2009 NGO Incidents caused by ACG, Year to Date 2009

Beatings, 2 Armed Attacks , 3 Searches, 3 Threats, 2 IED/Explosives, 6 Armed Attacks , 5 Threats, 10 Arson, 4 Armed Abduction, 12 Robbery, 12

Countrywide NGO Incidents by Type and Cause to May 27th 2009 THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents HERAT Year to Date 7 HERAT 50 This Report Period 1 Zinda Jan District experienced 40 the road and had a vehicle two incidents of concern to 30 NGOs. First, on 25 May three staged close to them. When the convoy approached, the gun- 20 gunmen in a vehicle ap- 10 proached an NGO car and at- men engaged the lead vehicle, but it proceeded out of the kill 0 tempted to steal it. After realis- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY ing that they were not able to zone, incurring no casualties; AOG ACG steal the vehicle, they stole per- however, the team’s second sonal items from inside the car vehicle, carrying armed guards, stopped and engaged the gun- and took the vehicle’s battery. to the provincial capital, allowing any per- Although this was only the sec- men. In the end, the team in- curred four fatalities within the petrator to easily designate an ambush ond NGO-related incident to point and time frame. Another important occur in the district—the first second vehicle before the gun- men departed the area in their development occurred on 26 May when incident involved AOG torch- IMF and ANSF began an operation in the ing an NGO ambulance and vehicle towards Islam Qala, ignoring the team’s remaining area of the Sabzak Pass, coordinating ef- equipment on 23 February forts from Badghis and Herat provinces to 2009—it was indicative of later vehicle. Because of the area of the attack and the nature of the envelop a large AOG that had migrated to AOG hostilities to come. Thus, the area and conducted ambushes, check- the 28 May ambush of an inter- team’s work, it is likely that the perpetrators were AOG; con- points, abductions, etc. Information sug- national demining team as they gests that the operation is still ongoing, were transiting through Zinda versely, it is possible that it was orchestrated by a local com- and NGOs should expect it to persist for Jan District on the Islam Qala - some time. Additionally, one should note Herat Road marked the second petitor, even a competing PSC. Illustrating why NGOs should ubiquitous threats, such as the 29 May serious incident. The demining BBIED attack that occurred against the team’s two vehicle convoy avoid setting patterns in their movements, also, the team Guzara District Centre and the 18 May came under fire from gunmen torching of a girls’ school in Gulran Dis- that were emplaced parallel to conducted regular movements on Thursdays, when it returned trict.

NGO Incidents SAR-E-PUL Year to Date 3 SAR!E!PUL This Report Period 0 50 An SAF attack on a GoA vehi- 40 cle in the remote and usually of much of the province and 30 tranquil district of Kohistanat the limited nature of GoA 20 serves as a reminder that AOG presence or reporting mean 10 attempts to expand presence in that NGOs should develop a 0 this area should not be consid- high degree of specific situ- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY ational awareness before ven- ered dormant. The remoteness AOG ACG turing into new areas. Addi- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tionally previous ANA opera- into custody or the underlying issues being !" Expanding AOG presence tions have resulted in scattered addressed which contributed to a growth !" Lack of GoA presence AOGs to more remote envi- in AOG activity in the first place, particu- !" Criminal activity rons but have not resulted in larly in the western district of Sayyad. many AOG having been taken THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ Year to Date 4 KUNDUZ 50 This Report Period 1 Incidents in Kunduz, both 40 NGO-related and otherwise, In the former case, the staff 30 have continued apace with pat- were stopped by mobile AOG 20 members (possessing motorcy- terns in targeting and tactics 10 cles). This echoes another inci- following on previous trends. 0 AOG-initiated attacks contin- dent wherein an IO employee JAN FEB MAR APR MAY ued to target GoA and ANSF was beseeched to stop their with an RCIED found before work; the threat in either case AOG ACG detonation, and attacks on po- is not so much actual but im- lice and a GoA official. An- plied by the situation and the other spate of NGO-related target or person which comes the employee’s arguments or the reaction incidents also served to high- into contact with the AOG of the assembled bystanders) to guarantee light the unique dynamics of element. The latter case of de- the safety of the NGO, effectively putting this relatively volatile province. tention is revealing for two rea- their credibility on the line in the event that In one instance, NGO staff sons; it indicates increasing similar incidents were to befall the NGO. were questioned incidentally by boldness on the part of AOGs The fact that the NGO in question was AOG members and managed (despite the fact that it hap- subjected to numerous incidents over the to escape detection and con- pened in the relatively volatile intervening period indicates a relatively low tinue on their route. In an- district of Chahar Darra) be- level of coordination or institutional mem- other instance NGO staff were cause detention requires a ory on the part of AOG groups, and indi- detained and released by an higher degree of support and cates that locally based AOGs are acting AOG. Both incidents under- infrastructure than a simple separately for the intents and purposes of line two things about Kunduz; interdiction or threat; and it NGO-level security planning. It is impor- the pervasive attempts of shows that AOGs do not oper- tant to note however, that such incidents AOGs to maintain and expand ate unopposed in this environ- probably do not hurt AOGs’ credibility in presence, and the crucial role ment. The AOG were forced that they happened in different localities of NGO acceptance strategies. to agree (or at least accept) the are would not likely be associated by locals detainee’s explanation that his with guarantees of security elsewhere. Al- organisation was providing a though NGOs strive to be neutral, they KEY THREATS & CONCERNS valuable service and one ac- remain important actors in their environ- !" AOG attempts to expand pres- knowledged to be so. A similar ments, and being perceived generally as a ence incident occurred last year Western or pro-Western phenomenon, are !" Attacks of ANSF, GoA, IMF where an AOG encountered a likely to continue to be focal points in !" Threats against NGO and IO staff guard from the same NGO AOGs attempts to gain legitimacy and po- and were persuaded (either by litical capital.

NGO Incidents IED was planted (and discovered) based SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 on political considerations remains un- This Report Period 0 Reporting from Samangan re- known. Samangan has previously been mains limited due to little activ- ing the present reporting pe- subject to high-profile political protest, ity of any sort. Incidents dur- riod all took place in Aybak, which has disrupted traffic along the main the most significant of which highway from Mazari Sharif to Puli KEY THREATS & CONCERNS was an apparent attempt to Khumri, and such rivalries are likely to !" Criminal activity in remote areas plant IEDs near a school. continue to play out in the run up to elec- !" Political rivalries Whether the school was actu- tions. (Tracker on next page under Farayab) ally targeted by spoilers or the THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents FARAYAB Year to Date 2 FARYAB This Report Period 0 50 40 Faryab remains an area in taken the form of IEDs em- 30 which AOGs are trying to ex- placed in culverts under the 20 ert and expand presence, par- newly constructed ring road. 10 ticularly in the western districts Previously attempts to emplace of Qaysar and Almar and in the 0 IEDs in this area had failed JAN FEB MAR APR MAY areas north of Maymana in because they were reported by Shirin Tagab and Dawlatabad. the locals. Although a cause AOG ACG Favourite AOG targets for concern, such IED em- throughout the province re- placements are not likely to main ANSF and, when possi- SAMANGAN target NGOs due to the scar- 50 ble, IMF. In the west such at- city of resources and opportu- tacks have focused on police 40 nities for AOGs, unless an 30 checkpoints and convoys while NGO would choose to make north of Meymana, they have 20 use of high-profile transporta- 10

tion. A separate incident in 0 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Qaysar resulted in the arrest of JAN FEB MAR APR MAY

!" AOG activity north of May- a local man for allegedly extort- AOG ACG mana ing illegal taxes from people on !" Attacks targeting ANSF and behalf of AOGs. IMF

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 1 TAKHAR This Report Period 1 50 40 News from Takhar is domi- been scared away by the com- nated by two items, one a con- 30 pound’s guards it is important 20 firmed case of criminal activity to note that ACG was armed 10 directly targeting an NGO and and that it is inadvisable for the other consisting of what is 0 NGO staff to resist such tres- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY largely speculation concerning passes in the interest of giving AOG activities. The former up property to maintain life AOG ACG incident took place in the his- and limb. Various other re- torically sedate town and dis- ports indicate some sort of trict of Rustaq and constituted heightened AOG activity (or derstood to be in an early stage of develop- an attempt by a local criminal the threats which this may rep- ment, with concrete results not amounting group to rob valuables from resent) for the province and, to more than a few public night letters dis- the NGOs’ compound. While while they should not be dis- couraging participation in upcoming elec- the aggressors appear to have counted, cannot be independ- tions and a few possibly unrelated inci- ently confirmed either. It is dents targeting police. Reports of AOG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS possible that AOGs and their movements will continue to be the subject !" Increased AOG activity associated networks are trying of further investigation by ANSO, and !" Increased criminal activity to expand presence in Takhar, should serve as a reminder to NGOs to but this would have to be un- constantly review and update their SOPs. THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 7 KUNAR 200 This Report Period 0 Security in Kunar during the 150 second part of May has been should they be pursued by se- 100 marked by several discernable curity forces. Four other ab- trends. Direct fire attacks con- ductions took place during the 50 reporting period. Three of the tinued with RPG and small 0 arms fire being directed against incidents took place in Chapa security force locations, typi- Dara and involved a total of cally small checkpoints and ob- eight people being taken by AOG ACG servation positions, and occa- AOG between 16-23 May. In sionally against patrols and re- every case all those taken were supply convoys. In common released unharmed within 36 to a halt, so AOG stepped up the appli- with the start of the month, hours. The fourth incident oc- cation of indirect fire in the province. approximately half of these curred in Wata Pur on 22 May Attacks on Mano Gai and Sirkanay Dis- attacks took place in the district and the individual concerned is trict Centres on 16 and 17 May missed of Mano Gai. Outside Mano still unaccounted for. The pre- their targets and caused no casualties. Gai, an engagement that oc- vious week a corpse found in More attacks followed over the next curred in Wata Pur early in the Wata Pur had a note attached few days, with multiple projectiles being morning of 30 May gives some to it claiming the deceased was launched on occasions and almost all indication of how security a security forces informant. missing their targets. An attack against forces are continuing to push With a number of similar inci- an ANA/IMF base in Kandagal, Mano into the province’s most con- dents occurring elsewhere in Gai injured a locally employed labourer tested areas. An attack on an the region, it may be that the on 20 May, and one of the eight rockets ANP patrol resulted in injuries victim of the 22 May abduction that were fired at and missed the ANP being sustained by at least three was taken with the intent to HQ in Wata Pur on 19 May caused inju- of the patrol members and saw commit a similar act. ries to the occupant of a house that it a further two of their col- The use of IED in Kunar con- hit. leagues taken by the attackers. tinues to be limited, of four The most prominent use of indirect fire As was seen earlier in the incidents in this period two occurred in and around Asadabad on 27 month, AOG in the province were attacks against a school in May and came after a day that had seen will abduct those they are at- Wata Pur, a third caused dam- IMF airstrikes attack AOG withdrawing tacking in the hope that it will age to a new ANP building in towards the Pakistan border having assist them negotiate an escape Marawara, while the fourth, conducted attacks around the city. Two and the only device that caused separate attacks each fired 3-4 rockets KEY THREATS & CONCERNS casualties, detonated against a towards the city on the afternoon of 27 !" Abduction – especially in construction company vehicle May. Various locations around Asada- Chapa Dara in Chawkay on 17 May, injur- bad and the village of Chaghan were hit !" Indirect fire around Sirkanay ing the driver. There was no by the rockets, at least one person died and Asadabad reported use of IED after 17 !" AOG-Security Force clashes and upwards of ten were injured. May. As the use of IED came

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NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 7 KHOST This Report Period 2 50 In common with the last two 40 reporting periods, NGO oper- being a device that caused casualties when it detonated 30 ated clinics in Khost have again 20 been subjected to violence dur- prematurely. In total IED in the province killed seven peo- 10 ing the second half of May. On 0 the night of 19 May a clinic in ple and injured at least 15 dur- Nadir Shah Kot was destroyed ing this period, seven of whom were civilians not connected to in a fire set by AOG, who then AOG ACG made their way to a private any clear target. The period residence where some clinic concluded with the use of an property had been stored for under-vehicle IED to kill a more were injured in attack that initial re- safekeeping. On arriving at the candidate for provincial council ports suggested may have been launched residence those present were elections who was leaving a from within Pakistan, approximately 20km threatened and clinic property, gathering at a mosque in Khost away. including a generator, was City on 28 May. The majority An attempted abduction was foiled by the taken by the armed group. The of IED use was in Khost City intervention of passers-by in Khost City following night a similarly sized and district, with individual on 19 May, but an international engineer AOG entered and ransacked a incidents occurring in Bak, working on the construction of GOA fa- clinic in Tere Zayi, stealing a Tere Zayi, Tani and Nadir cilities was taken by AOG in the City on range of equipment and furni- Shah Kot. 28 May and is still unaccounted for. ture before leaving the site oth- Indirect fire was used to a lim- In common with activity in other parts of erwise undamaged. ited extent by AOG early in the the Region and country, AOG claimed re- With a total of 19 reported in- reporting period with attacks sponsibility for the death of a man accused cidents, IED continue to be against the District Centres of of working for the security forces killed in the preferred method of attack Tere Zayi and Sabari on 16 Nadir Shah Kot on 19 May. May having little effect, in con- for AOG in Khost. Seven of Anticipated public protest at the escalation trast to an attack directed these incidents were detona- of force shooting of a local businessman in against FOB Salerno, on the tions against targets, an eighth Khost City on 26 May failed to materialise, outskirts of Khost City the pre- which is even more noteworthy when it is vious afternoon. Overshooting considered that there have been at least KEY THREATS & CONCERNS their target by 3km, three large four other accidental shootings involving !" AOG robbery of NGO assets calibre rockets landed close to IMF or ANSF in and around the City since !" IED & SV/BBIED attacks a village mosque where five mid-March. !" Abduction people leaving Friday prayers were killed and at least nine

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NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 4 NANGAHAR This Report Period 1 50 The high level of criminality morning of 18 May when an 40 and violence experienced in the 30 province aside from that which ANA soldier pursuing a long- 20 can be attributed to AOG, was standing family dispute killed 3 10 illustrated when a NGO oper- shopkeepers and injured an- ating in Lal Pur received other in Zone #4 of the City. 0 threats from a local personality Almost immediately traders across the city were forming not content with the allocation AOG ACG of resources in a development into groups before attempting project. The resolution of the to march on the Governor’s dispute was in sight at the end Office. Direct intervention by device that detonated on an approach to a of May due to close coopera- the Chief of Police and then bridge, killing one of the patrol and caus- tion with the local population the Governor eventually pro- ing severe injuries to another. All of the and their recognised represen- vided some satisfaction to remaining devices were found and re- tatives. A further illustration of those who were gathering and moved by security forces and it seems rea- the potential for disorder in the the situation was calmed by the sonable to assume that the receipt of infor- province, and Jalalabad in par- early afternoon. The use of mation from the public plays some part in ticular, was provided on the IED in the province continues this high level of IED finds. Reinforcing at a similar level to that in the the impression that public information is first part of the month with 11 adding pressure to AOG operations, was KEY THREATS & CONCERNS reported incidents. Two of the beheading of a Mullah in Khogyani on !" AOG prevalence in southern these involved detonations districts the night of 22-23 May and the distribution against targets and one caused !" IED on approaches to all DAC of a night letter in Chaparhar during 16 casualties. An ANP patrol in !" SV/BBIED around Jalalabad May that specifically warned local Maleks Goshta was attacked with a against cooperation with GOA.

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 Sporadic AOG activity contin- 40 ues in Laghman as do security those routes had seemed to be a 30 force operations intended to significant AOG objective. Dur- 20 constrain it. However, May has ing this period there have been 10 seen no reported IED activity three short attacks on security 0 on the roads through the Alish- forces on Route 1 in Qarghayi, ing and Alingar Valleys, in con- two of which occurred during AOG ACG trast to almost every other re- mid-morning, complicating porting period since last sum- route planning for those who AOG withdrew from the engagement after mer, when the disruption of continue to use the road for approximately an hour. In Alishing on 23 travel between Kabul-Jalalabad. May the beheaded body of a man was During the early hours of 30 found along with a note warning against KEY THREATS & CONCERNS May Mehtarlam jail was attacked cooperation with GOA and IMF, demon- !" Security Force-AOG clashes for the second time this month. strating that while little other AOG activity on Route 1 has been reported in Alishing recently, it is !" Abduction north of Alishing & Being at an increased state of Alingar readiness since the earlier attack likely to be due to lack of munitions and !" IED in Mehtarlam on 15 May, local ANSF and security force prevalence rather than AOG IMF responded quickly, and absence. THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 0 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 The limited reporting from 40 Nuristan during this period riod of time on 16 May without 30 any casualties being caused or continues to show AOG oper- 20 sustained. In the west of the ating in both the east and the 10 province two members of an west of the province. The joint 0 ANA/IMF base at Kamo in AOG were killed in Nurgaram Kamdesh was again attacked in the early hours of 17 May with direct fire for a short pe- when an IED they were at- tempting to place detonated AOG ACG prematurely. This incident may KEY THREATS & CONCERNS have also contributed to the months AOG from Nurgaram have often !" Abduction lack of IED activity in the moved down the valley, typically placing !" Security Force-AOG clashes northern part of the Alishing IED and occasionally holding vehicle !" IED on main routes valley in Laghman. In recent checkpoints along the main road north of Alishing.

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 1 PAKTYA 50 This Report Period 0 This reporting period in Paktya 40 killed approximately 20 AOG has been characterised by an 30 members. IED incidents were increased tempo in security 20 forces operations that have at- reported on 6 occasions across the province, detonating against 10 tacked AOG in the district of 0 Schwak in particular on both targets twice. In both of these 16 and 26 May. The latter op- instances the targets were road eration concluded with an air- construction vehicles, in Gardez strike that is reported to have on 16 May and in Chamkani on AOG ACG 26 May. Two people died in the Gardez explosion and seven casualties. The beheaded body of a teenage boy was found in Jani Khel on 27 May and KEY THREATS & CONCERNS were injured in Chamkani. Lim- was accompanied by AOG warnings !" Abduction on Gardez-Khost ited direct fire attacks were con- road ducted against private security against cooperation with GOA and IMF, !" Security Force-AOG clashes in and IMF targets in Wuza reflecting similar incidents that have oc- Schwak curred elsewhere in the Region during this !" SV/BBIED in Gardez Zudran and Schwak on 16 and 28 May but did not inflict any period.

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CONTACT ANSO

ANSO online www.afgnso.org MISSING ANSO is hosted by Deutsche Welthungerhilfe This report ANSO CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) could not provide Phil Priestley - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 analysis for the prov- Mukhtar Hussain - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 inces of:

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Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707-474-135 ANSO ACRONYMS

IMF-International Military COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Forces / AOG-Armed Opposi- Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 tion Groups / GOA-Government Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 of Afghanistan / ACG-Armed Chona Bollos - [email protected] - 0797 093 073 Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANP-Afghan Ali Riazi - [email protected] - 0797 414 100 National Police / IED- Improvised Exploding Device / AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- nade / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne JAWZJAN BALKH KUNDUZ Improvised Exploding Device / BADAKSHAN

PRP-Previous Reporting Period SAMANGAN / ANBP-Afghan National Border FARYAB BAGHLAN Police / SAF-Small Arms Fire / BADGHIS PARWAN NDS-National Directorate of BAMYAN KABUL Security (intelligence) / PSC- WARDAK HERAT NANGAHAR GHOR Private Security Company / DC- DAYKUNDI District Centre GHAZNI KHOST

URUZGAN FARAH ZABUL PAKTIKA NGO Incidents Reported Jan 1st – May 13th 2009 HELMAND = Threat, Abduction, NIMROZ KANDAHAR Robbery = Small arms, IED, RPG, Arson = Death Occurred