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THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 26 May 16th — 31st 2009 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY South Region 2-5 Consistent with the “Operation Narsat” intent to target ‘high ranking officials’ of the Govern- Central Region 6-8 ment, attacks on district and provincial level figures remained prominent this period. Western Region 9-11 Operations targeted, with varying degrees of success, three provincial governors (Kunduz/ WIA, Paktika/KIA, Khost/Nil); three district police chiefs (Kunduz/WIA, Kandahar/ x 2 Northern Region 11-13 WIA); one town mayor (Dilaram, Nimroz) and one district governor (Faizabad). A tentative count of similar operations so far this year reveals attacks on, at least, at the province level, 6 Eastern Region 14-17 governors, 3 chief of police, 2 mayors and 5 council members and, at the district level, 6 ANSO Info Page 18 governors, 10 chief of police, 2 mayors and 3 district administrators. These figures, and the geographic spread of targets, would indicate the clear and consistent application of the ‘Nasrat’ targeting statement so far with the preferred command and con- YOU NEED TO KNOW trol target being a district chief of police, presumably for his vulnerability and local power. • AOG are systematically In a follow up investigation to the murder of the Kushk district chief of police (Herat) ANP targeting district and have made six arrests this period while elsewhere in the province a BBIED targeted the provincial leaders across Guzara district administration centre. the country Also this period, Provincial Council members were abducted (Kunduz & Ghazni) and am- bushed (Kabul & Khost) in what were likely local political maneuvers, while anti-election • No substantial impact statements were made in Wardak (threat letter) and Kunduz (at a mosque). yet of US force increase More than six Afghan civilians were beheaded this period, including a 14 year old boy • Ongoing instability in (Paktya) indicating a serious AOG informant problem. An additional five ANA officers Khost and Badghis were reportedly beheaded after surrendering to AOG in Gormach (Badghis) The anticipated assault on Lashkar Gah (Helmand) failed to materialize, reportedly due to a well placed IMF assassination, while combined IMF/ANA forces recovered 120 suicide vests from a house. Threat reports about the large assault on LG remain frequent. ANSO is supported by Khost city remains tense following the May 12 attack with civilian deaths ongoing as a result of IED’s , inaccurate AOG rocket fire and IMF escalation of force shootings meanwhile AOG continue their campaign against clinics, looting resources but rarely harming staff. The capitol, Kabul, remained quiet although AOG intent was demonstrated by ANP recov- ery of two vehicles packed with explosives in the city and rockets ready to fire in Paghman. NGO DATA & TRENDS All seven NGO incidents this period were some NGO Security Incidents Per Month, 2009 variation on an armed robbery with just three 17 being assessed as being conducted by AOG and 15 15 15 two of these being the clinic lootings in Khost 11 (May 19 &20). Overall incident rates remain at 10 ‘normal’ levels (see right) and fatalities and abduc- tions are trending substantially lower than the Jan 5 5 -May period of 2008. Restriction of field move- 0 ment is the most direct cause of improvement. JAN FEB MAR APR MAY THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 2 GHAZNI This Report Period 1 100 Just prior to this reporting pe- 80 riod,12 May in Sultan Bagh, AOG orchestrating ambushes, Andar District, 12 men, armed kidnappings, etc. along High- 60 with RPGs and AK-47s, ab- way 1. Additionally, abductions 40 in the district have spiked ac- ducted an INGO national staff 20 member as he was travelling cording to ANSO records that date from 2006, indicating that 0 through the area in a private JAN FEB MAR APR MAY this is the fifth abduction of taxi. After blindfolding the vic- AOG ACG tim, he was transported to a the year, already surpassing the private residence, probably be- record high of four abductions tween Sultan Bagh and Sharan during a reporting year. Signifi- District, in Paktika. The perpe- cant to note, though, this is the trators, who demonstrated that first abduction of NGO staff in gained information on the victim’s inten- they were familiar with the vic- the district, with other victims tion to travel from a staff member inside tim and his association with the in 2009 consisting of ANA, the INGO so that they could utilise the said INGO, treated the staff AWCC staff, road construction ‘shock of capture’ to ensure that the victim member cordially, offering him staff, and a civilian. While the would give an honest account of the inci- tea and questioning him about exact actors behind the inci- dent in question. an instance of impropriety that dent remain unknown, because NGOs should expect conditions to dete- the armed group asserted took of the general area, weaponry riorate further in the province and note place within the INGO. The involved, and detailed informa- that large movements of AOGs into abductors ultimately released tion necessary to abduct the Ghazni, Ab Band, and Qarabagh districts. the victim after four hours of victim while en route, it is likely Besides the abovementioned develop- detention and apologised for that the perpetrators were ments, AOG are adhering to conducting the matter. AOG members intent upon close-range ambushes of IMF/ANSF pa- conducting a ‘moral investiga- trols and logistical convoys, rolling assassi- Andar District continues to be tion’ to gain further informa- dominated by AOG, with nations while on motorbikes, and utilising tion on the accused instance of IEDs to frustrate security forces. Lastly, impropriety. Conversely, while suicide attacks continue to be an additional KEY THREATS & CONCERNS less likely, it is possible that the option, with five BBIED attackers dying in !" Abduction actors were relatives of the per- an accidental detonation in Waghaz Dis- !" Collateral damage from IED or son who may have been convoy ambushes trict on the 16th. It is thus likely that AOG slighted in the purported im- !" Rocket/RPG attacks will continue to employ suicide attacks propriety, and they may have against District Centres and ANSF/IMF. NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 1 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 Activity in Nimroz during this reporting period was dominated 80 by AOG attacks upon ANP posts in Chahar Burjak, Chakhansur, 60 Khash Rod, Dilaram, and Kang districts, and a 4.5 hour assault on an ANP patrol in Chahar Burjak. Additionally, AOG success- 40 fully ambushed the Dilaram Mayor, wounding him on 21 May. 20 NGOs should expect the conflict to maintain typical levels in the 0 province, with the exception of possible SVBIEDs being utilised JAN FEB MAR APR MAY against ANP posts to increase the lethality of AOG attacks. AOG ACG THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 4 KANDAHAR 100 This Report Period 0 Inside the province, Kandahar 80 City led the period with 29 inci- AOGs persisted in their at- 60 dents, including IED discover- tempts to target GoA person- 40 ies in Districts 2, 5, 7, and 8, a alities with the 19 May 20 VBIED discovery in District 1, SVBIED attack on the Ar- 0 and successful IED strikes in ghandab Chief of Police (CoP). Districts 4 and 7. Besides the Although AOG were unsuc- typical attacks on ANSF, assas- cessful in their attempt to kill AOG ACG sinations of perceived GoA/ the CoP, at least two ANP IMF collaborators, attacks on were killed and an additional but causing no damage. Also, on 21 May construction company staff, ten wounded. And in probable in District 9 of Kandahar City, ANP ar- and continual ANP discoveries efforts to further disillusion rested an ANP official that was transport- of weapons caches, a few inci- Arghandab residents by high- ing 139 antipersonnel mines, illuminating dents stood out from the fore. lighting ANSFs’ inability to the complicity of ANP in AOG opera- prevent AOG operations, two tions, especially in the smuggling of mate- IED strikes occurred—one on rial. In conclusion, NGOs should not ex- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS 19 May and the other on 21 pect any significant gains in addressing !" Roadside IEDs May—with the former destroy- insecurity throughout the province, and !" Collateral damage from AOG- ing a school in Babarano, and ANP clashes AOG continue to demonstrate the perva- the latter detonating in the vi- !" BBIED/SVBIED attacks sive nature of the opposition and lack of cinity of the Shahenano school, any substantive GoA writ. NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 Zabul witnessed an increase in 80 the number of IED incidents Also of concern, a group of 12 60 suicide BBIED attackers is said in almost every district of the 40 to have already deployed into province, and ANSO South 20 Naw Bahar District. continues to receive reports of 0 additional IED threats. In this This group is allegedly led by JAN FEB MAR APR MAY period, 35 AOG under a local two local commanders and is commander have reportedly planning to orchestrate suicide AOG ACG infiltrated into Shekan, Mizan attacks in Kabul. District, to split into The incidents that have oc- neighbouring districts and to curred during the course of the target IMF/ANSF convoys most recent week confirm the and establishments with IEDs credibility of these threats on motorbikes.
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