CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2012 Issue 98 REPORT 16‐31 May 2012 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-4 As of the end of May, AOG activity vol- distribution, the AOG tactical portfolio 5-10 Northern Region umes this year stayed 40% below the vol- remains relatively consistent. Opposition Western Region 11-12 umes for the same actor and period in 2011 activity remains driven by conventional (for the comparison of AOG activity vol- attacks (SAF, RPG, etc), followed by IED Eastern Region 13-16 umes, see graph on p. 20). Nonetheless, and indirect fire (rocket, mortar, etc). This AOG incidents exhibited a 32% increase month, close range attacks constituted Southern Region 17-21 between May and April, displaying a pro- 61%, of all AOG attacks, IED strikes 29% 22 ANSO Info Page portionate growth well in line with the and indirect fire 10%. Although present, trends established last year and in 2010. suicide and complex attacks did not repre- Whereas the opposition activity in 2010 sent any significant proportion in terms of HIGHLIGHTS culminated with the parliamentary elections volumes, but continue to be used as a force in September, 2011 did not include any multiplier in the battlefield, in assassination AOG mobility in such milestone and the conflict reached its campaigns or as pure ‘statement attacks’ in Ghazni peak in July after a very intensive late- urban areas, where the conflict engage- spring and early-summer campaign. A ments increasingly converge. Potential for com- steep growth between May and June is also plex attacks in ur- Casualty figures also highlight the ongoing to be expected this year, although the ban centers importance of IED deployment in the op- AOG activity volumes will remain well position campaign. This month, IEDs NGO abduction in below the intensity of the conflict in 2011 caused 51% of all IMF and ANSF casual- Badakhshan and possibly also lower than the volumes in ties (corresponding to 386 out of 752 per- 2010. sonnel injured or killed), followed by con- As the opposition campaign intensifies, ventional attacks (38%), complex and/or the shift in regional distribution of AOG suicide attacks (6%), ending with indirect attacks from South to East, identified dur- fire attacks (5%). For IMF forces alone, ANSO is supported by ing the first quarter of this year, slowly tilts 68% of all casualties this month resulted back to the former region. This month from IED blasts, leaving the road-side de- concluded with South returning to the fore vices the most effective AOG method of with 38% of all AOG attacks in 2012, fol- attack while also one which regularly causes lowed by East with 36% and West with the highest toll of civilian casualties, as 11%, the latter region maintaining its posi- demonstrated with 47 civilians killed in tion as the main ‘diversion’ front outside IED attacks this month alone. the two core theatres. The robust growth With the conflict season beginning in ear- in the Southern Region is in part due to the nest, the composition of NGO incidents upscale in Ghazni, which experienced 159 also shifted towards conflict related causes, AOG attacks this month. Obviously, the as witnessed this cycle with 3 AOG initiat- announcement of Operation al-Farooq also ed incidents (Badakhshan, Ghor, Kunar), 2 triggered AOG activity in the established authored by ANSF-IMF (Nangarhar, Ka- hotspots elsewhere, such as in Kapisa and bul) with only one linked to a local com- Parwan in Central and Kunduz in North. munity issue (Nangarhar) and the absence Unlike the activity volumes and territorial of income-oriented crime. ANSO is a project of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), a registered charity in England & Wales no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737 THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 C ENTRAL REGION ABUL NGO Incidents KABUL K Year to Date 5 50 This Report Period 1 An outlier case of an IMF force 40 protection shooting was recorded Overall, ANSF authored 32 out of 30 in the early morning of the 24th in 35 incidents this cycle. A discern- 20 Karte Parwan, PD 4, where an able shift on ANSF side occurred 10 NGO member drove too close to with conflict related arrests and 0 an IMF convoy. The incident weapons seizures (14 cases) pre- passed without serious conse- vailing over criminal and drug- quences for the NGO staff be- related cases (12 and 4 respective- sides damage to his vehicle, but ly). NDS disrupted AOG opera- KABUL AOG KABUL Crime serves as a reminder of the risks tions in Kabul City, Bagrami and with an NDS seizure of two BBIED vests in a of inadvertent driving near securi- Paghman, including the intercep- hideout in Charkh Ab, Bagrami, on the 17th. ty convoys. To their credit, the tion of an approximate 360 kg of Meanwhile, AOG in Surobi authored an in- IMF managed to significantly re- explosives during transit in the conclusive direct attack on an ANA convoy on duce these types of escalations in vicinity of the Kabul International the Gogamunda section of the highway, but the last two years in Kabul, albeit Airport in PD 9 (’KAIA Cir- were more successful in deterring ANSF eradi- the threat of unwanted escala- cle’/Hawa Shenasi). That high- cation teams from accessing the areas under tions, incl. at ANSF checkpoints, profile AOG attacks continue to poppy cultivation in the north of the district. remains a reality to be addressed feature in the security landscape in in NGO movement SOPs. the capital was further underlined NGO Incidents KAPISA K APISA Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 Robust ANSF-IMF operations in the key conflict areas in Tagab 75 in 2012. Whereas it can be 30 (such as Anar Joy and Qorghal) reasonably argued that the opposi- 20 tion activity remains driven by the did little to prevent increased mo- 10 expanding ANSF presence, the bility of opposition fighters who 0 authored 12 out of 14 incidents. level of AOG mobility provides AOG activity converged on the strong evidence as to the overall road network in Tagab, Alasay failure of ANSF and IMF to con- and the adjacent parts of Nijrab trol key terrain in the southern KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime (Afghaniya Valley) and Mahmudi districts. To what extent the on- Nijrab this cycle, outline the fact that the secu- Raqi (Shukhi) and encompassed going conflict surge impacts the rity handover in Kapisa is dominated by exter- primarily direct attacks, followed civilians is evidenced with 27 con- nal realities and disregards the situation on the by IED deployment and indirect firmed civilian fatalities since the ground. Another crucial component of the fire. beginning of this year, a propor- tionate increase to 44 civilians current IMF-ANSF strategy, the ALP, remains In terms of AOG activity levels, killed over 12 months last year. ridden with local rivalries and factionalism, a May surpassed January as the The inclusion of the entire prov- prospect that tilts the tactical advantage further most kinetic month so far this onto the side of the opposition. While the year. The yearly comparison is ince into the up-coming third tranche of the transition and the ALP factional tensions, present mainly in even more story-telling since Nijrab, have passed without major escalations AOG activity volumes this year withdrawal of French combat troops by the end of this year, so far, it is worth noting that the IEA expan- denote an 83% increase compared sion in Tagab and Alasay in 2008-9 took ad- to the same period last year, from reconfirmed during French Presi- dent’s visit to the IMF base in vantage of very similar cleavages among local 41 attacks in January-May 2011 to armed factions there. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents W ARDAK Year to Date 1 WARDAK 50 This Report Period 0 This cycle, in line with long stand- 40 ing trends, the majority of escala- helicopter crashed, due to a tech- 30 nical problem in Nirkh, killing tions continued to occur along 20 main roads. The Saydabad sec- two IMF soldiers. 10 tion of the Kabul-Ghazni High- Over May, the volume of AOG way saw an effective IED strike activities—in line with seasonal 0 on a PSC vehicle (injuring two trends—continued its steady rise. PSC guards), while in Maydan Nevertheless, this volume remains WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime Shahr, AOG carried out a close- significantly below the levels rec- orded during 2011, marking a range attack against an ANA con- Under these conditions, the current stabiliza- drop from 138 attacks attributed voy transiting along the Kabul – tion actually includes a struggle for influence to the opposition between January Bamyan Highway (causing injuries and resources among local leaders rather than to two ANA soldiers). Although and May 2011, to the current 49 a consolidation of the GOA presence. The for the same period this year. demonstrating a notable decline fragile character of such developments is best Although it may be argued that from the PRP, AOG direct at- seen with the ALP process which, in key AOG the AOG concentration on the tacks remained the most notable districts such as Chaki Wardak and Saydabad, of the reporting period, with five eastern border provinces draws struggles with high levels of attrition and in- significant resources from the cases affecting Maydan Shahr (as consistencies in the staffing, in particular with AOG pool, which would have above), Jaghatu and Jalrez, alt- regard to the inclusion of non-local fighters otherwise been allocated for their hough only two were IED-related into the program despite the evident efforts of (both effective strikes).