The NGO Safety Office Issue: 10 September 1st to 15th 2008

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 While the overall suicide at- 5 SUICIDE ATTACKS (Country Cumulative Totals) Northern Region tack volumes are down 25 Eastern Region 6 (30%) this year in compari- son to 2007, changes in the 20 Western Region 9 methods of deployment, tar- 15 Southern Region 10 geting patterns, as well as efficacy, have all been wit- 10 13 ANSO Info Page nessed in relation to such 5 attacks reported this year. The efficacy of suicide at- 0 tacks in regards to casualty JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG YOU NEED TO KNOW yields has increased, primarily 2006 2007 2008 due to the chosen target sites • Increased frequency of (as in the Indian Embassy BBIED attacks in popula- tack vectors. Using a com- seen most commonly in tion centers and “dog fight” bombings in bination of small arms fire the Eastern and Southern Kabul and Kandahar) and and/or multiple bombers Regions, allow follow on • Prevalence of AOG the resultant high civilian against high profile GoA attackers to gain access checkpoints along main casualties. and security force installa- into the facility itself, caus- roads In regards to deployment tions, AOG have attempted ing a greater casualty yield • Prevailing abduction/ patterns, suicide attacks are to increase the likelihood of in the target population. kidnapping threat being used more “surgically”, tactical success. These and in unison with other at- types of combined attacks,

ANSO is supported by NGO DATA & TRENDS

NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS-REGIONAL DATA NORTH CENTRAL 24% 32%

WEST 14% EAST SOUTH 16% 14%

CENTRAL EAST SOUTH WEST NORTH

Though the overall NGO direct incident volume is up this year, the geographic distribu- tion patterns have remained largely unchanged as 2008 has developed. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 16 35 This Report Period 0 30 AOG incidents remained high 25 during this reporting period. trict 8 warning the locals to refrain 20 Most common were rockets at- from supporting the GoA and for 15 tacks on Kabul city, attacks on GoA employees to quit their jobs; 10 ANP check posts, and IED. the murder of the chief judge of 5 the Narcotics Tribunal; and an 0 There were several incidents of JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG RPG attack on a mine dog train- intimidation and terror tactics ing site; as well as the recent assas- AOG ACG targeting government and/or sination of the Governor of Logar NGO: These included the circula- in . Taken in the (including the possibility of NGO) to continue. tion of letters in Kabul city, Dis- context of the overall security Threat traffic warning of potential suicide and/ situation in and around the city, or high profile attacks has been frequent and KEY THREATS & CONCERNS NGO can expect such threats consistent therefore threat of spectacular or !"IED/Suicide attacks against “soft” targets related to high profile attacks should be considered ac- !"Rocket attacks the government and/or govern- tive. !"Abductions ment-affiliated organisations

NGO Incidents WARDAK

WARDAK Year to Date 6 50 This Report Period 0 The security situation in Wardak 40 Province has not changed signifi- IMF checkpoints and convoys, 30 cantly since the last reporting pe- and AOG check points on the 20 main Kabul-Ghazni road. riod. During this reporting period 10

most of the incidents were DAC The threat of abduction in War- 0 attacks, roadside IED explosions, dak remains extremely high, most JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG attacks and ambushes on ANSF/ recently this was evidenced on 7 September when two international AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS engineers and four escort guards Wardak Province is currently assessed as a !"Abduction of a construction company were high risk province, especially Saydabad, Nirkh, !"Overall instability kidnapped in while enroute to their work site. Jalriz, and Chack districts. NGO operations !"Ongoing clashes between AOG and travel in Wardak are not advised. and security forces

NGO Incidents DAYKONDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 2 10

This Report Period 1 8 In Sangtakht District, a gunman threatened the head of local NGO existed, so this does not seem to 6 and told him to close the office. be indicative of a broader threat 4 to NGO and the NGO has con- We do not have information to 2 indicate the motive for the threat. tinued since its activities. 0 Local elders intervened and re- Security reporting from Daykundi JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG portedly solved whatever problem remains limited. Anecdotal report- ing from Nili, Kijran, and Gizab AOG ACG suggest an increase in AOG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS movement and activities. AOG ity for unexpected migrations into other areas !"Minimal security presence have relative freedom of move- should be taken into consideration when plan- !"AOG freedom of movement ment facilitated by the limited ning activities. security presence and the possibil- THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 5 10 This Report Period 0 Parwan experiences periodic 8 manifested in IED, rocket, and AOG incidents throughout the 6 RPG attacks targeting security province, and is likely experienc- 4 ing an increased AOG presence in forces, with the Districts of Ba- 2 recent months. This is typically gram, Shinwari, and Kohi Safi all reporting either rocket or RPG 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG attacks during this period. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The road to Bamyan through Ba- AOG ACG !"IED gram, Chahrikar, Shinwari districts !"Attacks against security forces of should be considered a poten- However, so far this month no such incidents tial risk area for IED attacks. have been recorded.

NGO Incidents BAMYAN

BAMYAN Year to Date 2 10 This Report Period 0 Bamyan mostly remains quiet and 8 appears operational for NGO, (Kamard and Shibar) may be in- 6 though travelling to the province creasingly risky as evidenced by an 4 IED attack on an NGO vehicle from Kabul through the northeast 2 last month and the 4 September 0 discovery of a mine in the Shikary JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Valley of . !"Banditry The threat of highway robbery is AOG ACG !"IED/Mines low but notable in Bamyan. In !"Likely AOG presence in Shibar Panjab District during this period, on the 4th of September and two trucks and a and Kahmard armed robbers robbed a mini-van mini-van on the 12th.

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 7 30 This Report Period 0 A considerable AOG presence and a proven willingness to attack tack military/security contracted 20 NGO make Logar unsafe for vehicles and logistical convoys. NGO operations and travel. Also common are the establish- 10 ment of AOG temporary check The Porak/Kolangar area of Puli points along the main roads with 0 Alam remains especially risky for JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG the intent of searching vehicles abduction or terror tactics as for passengers that may have AOG in the area continue to at- AOG ACG NGO or GoA links. ANSO recommends the complete suspension KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The Districts of Baraki Barak, of road travel by international or local staff !"AOG checkpoints along main Kharwar, and Charkh are also routes reported to effectively be under that might be identified as having an NGO !"Abduction Taliban control. link.

TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT: Please review Page 12 of this edition for upcoming NGO training opportunities in October at ANSO. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 There have been no significant 15 uncertain and unstable for NGO, changes in the overall threat envi- 10 ronment compared to recent re- with Tagab, Alasay, and Nijrab ports. The general security situa- remaining the most volatile areas. 5 Mahmud Raqi remains vulnerable tion in remains 0 to periodic—typically late night— JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS attacks on the DAC, with the !"DAC attacks most recent occurring on 12 Sep- AOG ACG !"Collateral damage from clashes/air tember. strikes

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 8 This Report Period 1 20 The situation in Kunduz has not 15 changed qualitatively from that of has emerged that AOGs have the last report, but important formed into ‘neighbourhood 10 trends have emerged in both the watch’ patrols of 20-25 people 5 who appear sporadically in villages organisation and distribution of 0 AOG elements. in (north and JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG west of the city again) and also on In this period incident distribution the eastern fringes of Chahar AOG ACG has continued to shift away from Darra and in Dashti Archi. While the south and east of Kunduz City they are armed, their main interest and sponsored by the same source that sup- into the north and west. This consists of making speeches in the ports other kinds of more violent anti- consists of a broad swathe of ter- village mosques against the gov- government agitation. ritory running from Chahar Darra ernment and those who support District west of the city to the In sum, the area of the AOG patrols bears a it. One such group was involved districts along the Amu River, lot of resemblance to the area where there has in a verbal exchange with an primarily Dashti Archi and Imam been a more general surfacing of agitation NGO staff, which led to the Sahib. Qal’ai Zal, which is usually against NSP. These groups are new in that AOG patrol giving assurances very quiet, also saw one attack on they are not hit-and-run, but interested in mak- that they would not disturb the a police checkpoint. This shift in ing themselves known to the population. This NGO in question. Although the vector may be a result of the re- is the first time AOGs in the field in Kunduz specifics of this particular incident cent IMF presence east and south have put on a public face, which shows both a are ambiguous in their implica- of the city and of the additional degree of confidence and an exposure to ac- tions (it would be positive if capacity it aimed to build within countability. Whatever the inclinations of the AOGs engaged in an open non- the ANSF, but it is too early to patrol, they seem to have come to the obvious violent persuasion of their views say whether it will remain part of conclusion that harming something that has a and also listened to reason in the a more long-term shift. The inci- direct benefit on people’s livelihoods (as in the course of deliberation), the fact dents which did take place were case of the NGO facility) would entail a loss of remains that locals are frightened not out of character for the prov- legitimacy. Nevertheless, it is also important of them and the story that quickly ince, consisting of SAF and IED to recognise that public patrols are likely the gained currency was that that of attacks. flip-side of AOGs’ masked hit-and-run teams an abduction rather than a verbal and that they are being coordinated in tandem. Regarding AOG organisation, it confrontation. Some of the AOG NGOs have to try their utmost to pursue ac- members in patrols show a predi- ceptance within the communities where they KEY THREATS & CONCERNS lection for violence (suggesting are operating but also understand that such !"IED kidnapping will be likely in the acceptance may ultimately not suffice in the !"AOG patrols future) and they are reported and greater context of Kunduz. !"Abduction threat widely believed to be organised THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents FARYAB FARYAB Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 10 The number of overall incidents 8 in Faryab has decreased in August ince is which bor- 6 of this year in comparison to the ders Ghormach in Badghis prov- 4 preceding two, and it appears ince. Aside from the Salang road, 2 Qaysar represents the only other 0 likely that September will follow JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG this same downwards trend. easily accessible approach to the There is some margin for error northern provinces of Afghani- AOG ACG though, thanks to the province’s stan for persons and materiel. relative remoteness and the resul- The most important incident oc- tive and accordingly much-maligned (by tant problems in reporting. The curring in the recent reporting AOGs) NSP made them more tempting tar- area of most concern in the prov- period is the kidnap of two CDC gets, or that ACG money is funding AOG en- members from Qaysar for appar- terprises. Elsewhere in the province rumors of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ently economic reasons. Even if kidnapping (all disproved or unconfirmed) ransom is the proximate cause of !"Increased AOG activity in Qaysar have mixed with a significant number of road- the kidnapping, it can not be ruled !"Kidnapping side attacks on ANSF to add to an environ- out that the CDC members’ in- ment of general concern amongst NGO. !"IED volvement in the relatively effec-

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 8 20 This Report Period 0 While Balkh has been more stable 15 than in previous months, it is still these areas SAF attacks on ANP, noteworthy in that certain regions political intrigue, and large drug 10 of it plays host to a steady stream seizures remain common while 5 of incidents. The centre of gravity the rest of the province remains almost without incident. August 0 for incidents remains the Chimtal JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG and Chaharbulak Districts. In is the most active month of the year in terms of incidents in AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Balkh. While the number of inci- !"AOG attacks on GoA and ANSF dents in Balkh this year (31) is in 2006 (29). Likewise, the type of incidents significantly higher than last year’s seen has also not varied significantly in the last !"Criminal activity (7), it is about even with that seen three years.

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN BAGHLAN Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 10 Baghlan remains one of the most 8 serially stable provinces in the robbed in Khinjan District, and an 6 country, due to the combination ANP patrol was ambushed in re- 4 mote . 2 of inaccessibility (save by the 0 Salang road) and strategic impor- Baghlan is a mountainous prov- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG tance. No reports have recently ince consisting of a number of emerged concerning any immedi- remote and unconnected regions AOG ACG ate threats to the area but a few which is transacted by the vital incidents do highlight underlying and closely watched Salang high- cate that residents have little understanding of tensions. On the main Salang way. The areas surrounding this what the government due to their limited inter- road a commercial vehicle was main route are usually little docu- action with it and as a result harbour little sup- mented or reported upon, and port for same. Similar reports have also noted KEY THREATS & CONCERNS every valley is host to its own po- tensions in isolated locales between the various religious sects, though nowhere has any of this !"Criminality in remote areas litical ecology. Reports from Tala-va-Birfak, for example, indi- translated into open hostility. THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents KUNAR

KUNAR Year to Date 4 80 This Report Period 0 70 The level and intensity of AOG 60 initiated attacks continues at the district. Another rocket attack in 50 the same district missed its in- 40 high level experienced in August, 30 with 27 such incidents in this re- tended target and caused injuries 20 to two children. As usual, a large 10 porting period. There have been 0 numerous attacks against ANP number of incidents have oc- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG and IMF/ANA locations, mostly curred in Pech, with over half of involving small arms fire as well as those reported for the province AOG ACG the use of heavy weapons. Several occurring in this district during have involved the use of rockets this reporting period. this high level, the advice issued by ANSO ER in indirect fire attacks, including Four IED incidents were reported during August remains valid, that international the launch of 15 rockets against in Kunar, the same number as staff should limit their movements to Asada- an IMF base in Pech (Mano Gai) reported in August. One of these bad city and the main Jalalabad – Asadabad was a device found and defused, highway. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS another was a device that deto- If there is an increase in the use of IEDs in the !"Clashes between AOG and secu- nated prematurely and killed the province, movement will be further restricted rity forces AOG placing it. and NGOs are advised to consider possible !"Indirect fire attacks While AOG activity continues at mitigating measures before that stage is reached.

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN LAGHMAN Year to Date 3 20 This Report Period 0 With 5 AOG initiated incidents in 15 Laghman in this reporting period, In Mihtarlam attacks against ANP the downward trend in incident occurred on two successive days. 10 Early in the reporting period numbers seen during August is 5 continuing into September. equipment belonging to a road construction company in Alingar 0 The nature of AOG activity has JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG was damaged and 3 IEDs were been similar to that in other prov- found on the road leading to the AOG ACG inces in the region, with attacks or district centre. attempted attacks occurring on which lasted approximately 2 hours. District Centres, ANP locations, In Alishing AOG engaged an IMF and road construction works. helicopter with small arms fire, While the number of reported incidents is low, killing a member of the IMF and the distribution of incidents in or close to dis- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS forcing the aircraft to make an trict centres on routes north from Jalalabad !"IED along routes to DAC emergency landing. Two days later again reinforces the importance of minimising !"Indirect fire attacks against DAC AOG attacked an IMF location in road travel and wherever possible avoiding the same district in an engagement district centres.

EASTERN REGION NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS 2008

PAKTYA

NURISTAN

NANGAHAR

LAGHMAN

KUNAR

KHOST

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1213 141516 1718 1920 THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents KHOST KHOST Year to Date 5 40 This Report Period 0

This reporting period witnessed a 30 drop in the intensity and fre- Sabari. All the incidents reported quency of AOG related incidents have taken place in districts that 20 regularly witness AOG activity, from 15 to 7 reported serious inci- 10 dents in the province. Of these, 5 namely Sabari, Nadir Shar Kot, and Khost City. Since the begin- 0 were related to IED detonations JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG or finds. The non-IED incidents ning of August 08, more than half were an AOG small arms attack of the 58 reported incidents in the AOG ACG on an ANP CP in Nadir Shar Kot province have taken place in these District Centre and a firefight be- three districts. of several sub-contractors present during the tween IMF/ANP and AOG in In addition to these AOG activi- robbery was taken against his will by the per- ties, in Khost City on the evening petrators. Of note, the incident site in is close KEY THREATS & CONCERNS of 14 Sep 08 a project site of an proximity to multiple well guarded premises of other international organisations. This incident !"IED on main routes international organisation was reinforces the value of basic access control and !"Decreasing AOG activity level subjected to a robbery. Equip- ment valued at over $30,000 was building security measures. taken during the robbery and one

NGO Incidents NANGAHAR NANGARHAR Year to Date 4 This Report Period 2 35 Attacks against District Centres 30 and the use of IEDs against road minor injuries. 25 traffic have been the main fea- In the central district of 20 15 tures of AOG activity in Nan- Chaparhar an IED explosion in 10 garhar this reporting period. the early hours of 10 Sep 08 5 caused no significant damage and 0 District Centres in the southern JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG districts of Achin, Dih Bala, Dur had no apparent target. Elsewhere Baba all came under some form in the district later that day an AOG ACG of AOG attack. The attack against IED placed in the road detonated of the three IED incidents in Nangarhar were Dur Baba is noteworthy for its and injured the national employee premature detonations. In this reporting pe- duration of approximately 2 hours of an INGO driving his private riod, as well as the incidents in Chaparhar, from 0100hrs on 12 Sep 08. Dur- vehicle. The IED had been placed there was an IED attack against IMF in ing the attack an NGO office in a section of the road that was Khogyani and a find of 3 IEDs in Shinwar. (which is located next to the being repaired or resurfaced DAC) suffered collateral damage which was likely targeting the road Reports of AOG infiltration continue, particu- which resulted in two national construction efforts. These ef- larly in Dur Baba and Khogyani where an IMF employees of an NGO sustaining forts are a common target of such supply convoy was attacked at the start of the activities in the area, furthered by reporting period. the fact that property and material Intimidation against people working with the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS belonging to an organisation international community has continued with !"Attacks against DAC working on road construction in the circulation of a night letter in Jalalabad, and !"Increased use of IED the same area was damaged in reports of specific threats against UN staff and !"Attacks against road construction another attack in the same area on those employed on construction projects per- efforts the same day. During August two sist. THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents NURISTAN

NURISTAN Year to Date 3 15 This Report Period 2 13 Two incidents in Kamdesh saw 11 INGO staff directly involved in searched a vehicle making a deliv- 9 AOG initiated actions. On 05 ery to the same clinic. As well as 7 the driver, a national member of 5 September approximately 30 3 AOG broke into and looted an staff and a representative from the 1 company making the delivery -1 INGO clinic. On leaving the JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG clinic the AOG abducted a female were in the vehicle. The INGO national member of staff whose staff member, a doctor, was al- AOG ACG whereabouts are still not known. lowed to remain at the scene while Two days later AOG stopped and the AOG took away the vehicle situation in Nuristan is limited, the incidents and other two people. The next outlined above give an indication to the high KEY THREATS & CONCERNS day one of these people was re- level of AOG activity in the province. Interna- !"Abduction/kidnapping leased. The vehicle and third per- tional staff are strongly advised not to travel to !"Security force/AOG clashes son are still unaccounted for. the area and wherever possible local staff While information on the security should be employed in NGO facilities.

NGO Incidents PAKTYA PAKTYA Year to Date 1 40 This Report Period 0 Serious incidents have occurred 30 both occasions and 29 vehicles across the province during this 20 reporting period. The geographi- being destroyed in the attack in cal spread and range of incident . The same day saw 10 a brief attack on the DAC in types highlights the unpredictabil- 0 ity of the security situation as well Wuza Zadran and an attack on an JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG as the capacity of AOG operating ANP CP in Gardez. Schwak DAC in the area. was attacked earlier in the report- AOG ACG ing period, and Jaji Aryoub and IMF supply convoys were at- Jaji DACs were also both targeted against AOG in Jani Khel on 09 Sep malfunc- tacked twice in one day in differ- in rocket attacks. tioned and landed in a populated area, killing 2 ent parts of the province, with civilians. A number of people were also in- convoy escorts sustaining fatalities IEDs were found and defused in jured, and property damaged in the incident on several districts including a VBIED recovered in the Khost included two mosques. While there was no KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Bridge area of Gardez. IED ex- report of any significant public demonstrations !"Indirect fire attacks against DC plosions occurred in Zurmat and resulting from this incident, as mentioned in !"Introduction of VBIED devices Gardez districts. Clashes between the previous report, this type of occurrence will likely increase anti-IMF feeling and the !"IED ANP/IMF and AOG also oc- curred. A missile fired by IMF possibility of civil unrest.

Total AOG Initiated Attacks per Month - 2008 (Close Range + Indirect Fire + Suicide Attacks)

700 634 600 602 571 500 463 400

300 301 318 218 200 189 100

0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 9 20 This Report Period 1 The traditional division of labour 15 bling aspect of kidnapping trends in between ACGs 10 (the city) and AOGs (the country- is the lack of information regard- side) shows some signs of break- ing many of the incidents. Mem- 5 bers of wealthy families are cur- ing down. This can be seen in the 0 escalation and scope of ACG rently the most common targets JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG (due to their ability to pay ran- methods and the expanded range AOG ACG of AOG activities. soms), and either out of embar- rassment or fear for the victims, An example of how ACG have the vicinity of, the Herat metropolitan area. A they tend not to contact the police escalated their tactics is demon- suicide bomber detonated near an ISAF con- but instead attempt to secure re- strated in the recent use of an voy in the southern suburbs of the city, in lease through other channels. IED in a crowded area of town Pashtun Zarghun (east of the city) an AOG This fact greatly hinders the ability (also near to important govern- attacked the office of a local NGO with a gre- to track and analyze the scope of ment buildings) to settle a nade, and most boldly of all a number of rock- the threat, though at this time it is “personal dispute”. ACGs are ets (though small, poorly aimed, and causing assessed that kidnapping does not also making common use of kid- no damage) were fired at the airport from a pose a direct threat to the NGO nappings and extortion. A trou- location inside the city. community as the kidnappers are primarily motivated by financial Given that increasing amounts of rural Herat KEY THREATS & CONCERNS gain and attempt to maintain as are slowly becoming more unstable (especially !"Expanding geographic range of low a profile as possible. south of the city), NGOs should complete a AOG activity threat to benefit analysis of their activities out- !"Escalation of AOG activity Three recent incidents show side of Herat City as well as review their pre- AOG’s increased operational !"Criminality sent security procedures and protocols. range, all occurring within, or in

NGO Incidents BADGHIS BADGHIS Year to Date 0

This Report Period 0 20 Badghis appears as the reflection of to its east, AOGs with a desire to influence 15 with the majority of recent inci- the balance of power in the north. 10 dents having occurred in its two Reports of AOG activity are ex- 5 ceedingly common in these dis- easternmost districts, Murghab 0 and Ghormach. As mentioned in tricts—one such report indicated JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG the Faryab analysis, these two that a large number of armed provinces form a strategic corri- fighters were poised to take over a AOG ACG dor that is a vital consideration for village. Whether or not all such reports are true, it remains that text of this province were the rare use of ISAF KEY THREATS & CONCERNS they are in common circulation airstrikes on AOG elements and the growing !"AOG activity in Gormach and suggesting that there is at least discontent with the Governor (accused of cor- Murghab some level of AOG infiltration ruption and incompetence) which is finding !"Demonstrations and activity in the area. Other expression in large demonstrations in the pro- salient issues in the security con- vincial capital, Qal’ai Naw.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR

KANDAHAR Year to Date 11 100 This Report Period 0 The most significant incident to 80 occur during this reporting period Also of significance was the attack 60 was the suicide attack against a against the ANP HQ located in 40 UN convoy in the District of Spin District 1 of Kandahar City on the 20 Boldak. While those staff affected 7th of September. In this attack, 0 were involved in the polio vacci- two BBIED devices were de- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG nation program, a program that ployed, one to facilitate access generally enjoys the acquiescence into the facility and the second AOG ACG of the Taliban, it is unlikely that, detonating within the facility itself. at least at the level in which the Besides causing a significant num- and Zaranj (as well as Herat in the West) in attacker operated, this knowledge ber of ANP and civilian casualties, which suicide attackers were utilised against would have been known or under- this bold attack occurred during ANSF targets in population centers. While stood. At present it is unclear if mid-day in the middle of Kanda- overall suicide attack numbers are down in this incident represents an isolated har City, both being factors which comparison to last year (please refer to chart “tactical” level decision, or one highlight the ability of AOG to provided on page 1), the efficacy of these in that has a broader implication for infiltrate, plan, and execute within regards to both casualty yields and success the International Community the city limits. While this fact has rates are increased. Suicide attacks are being overall. been previously reported and is used more surgically, and in unison with other firmly established at this time, it attack vectors, to ensure tactical success. It is nonetheless illustrates an escala- likely that these types of attacks (either multi- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tion in both AOG tactics and ple bomber or conjoined tactics) will continue !"Increased suicide attack threat confidence. due the success rates incurred. As such, !"Continued instability along Hwy 1 This attack was mirrored in vari- ANSO advises NGO to continue limiting their !"IED ous other provinces within the presence at, or in the vicinity of, high profile SR, including Helmand, Zabul, security force and GoA facilities.

NGO Incidents ZABUL ZABUL Year to Date 2 This Report Period 0 40

The steady decline in the number 30 of security incidents that began in and volatile. August has been furthered in Sep- Five IED detonations were re- 20 tember, particularly since the out- ported targeting ANP/ANA/IMF 10

set of Ramadan, though this has and a civilian Town Ace type ve- 0 been attributed in reports indicat- hicle, killing 6 occupants of the JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG ing that AOG elements are limit- vehicle and 2 others being ing their activities both in scale wounded. The majority of these AOG ACG and scope during this month. IEDs attacks were undertaken in While only 13 AOG related inci- the Naw Bahar District, an area As with other areas of the SR, there has also dents have been reported during that has been previously assessed been an increase in regards to suicide attack this reporting period, this prov- as stable. Recent reports received activity, with a failed attempt reported during ince is still assessed as unstable indicate that a significant number this period as well as further report indicating of AOGs are also migrating from other such attackers present and active within this area intent on joining other Qalat City. While this threat bears no direct KEY THREATS & CONCERNS implication to NGO safety, staff should be !"Attacks along Hwy 1 AOG elements in order to engage in actions along the main Kanda- cognizant of it and avoid high profile target !"AOG presence in Naw Bahar har-Kabul main route (Hwy 1). areas in order the limit the risk of collateral !"Decreasing AOG activity level involvement in an incident. THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents NIMROZ NIMROZ Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 As indicated in the previous re- 15 attackers ability to gain access into port regarding the reports of an 10 increased AOG presence and op- the facility grounds. erational focus in Zaranj, and the There was a second BBIED at- 5 subsequent assessment that this tack during this reporting period, 0 would likely be translated into this one occurring in the Khash JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG suicide attacks against high profile Rod District on the 11th of Sep- GoA targets, there was a suicide tember. Further information AOG ACG attack against an NDS facility on from this incident indicated that the 6th of September. This attack the target was an ANP convoy likely temporary, has an impact on NGO resulted in numerous casualties despite what was initially reported. safety as they occurred (as in the Zaranj inci- dent) in the primary population centres or re- and of primary concern was the This sudden increase in suicide sulted in numerous civilian casualties. attack activity mirrors incidents KEY THREATS & CONCERNS reported during this period from ANSO SR advises continued avoidance of !"Suicide attacks other provinces in the SR, includ- high profile target facilities in order to mini- !"Instability in Khash Rod ing Kandahar, Helmand, and Za- mise the risk of collateral involvement in such !"Increasing AOG activity level bul. This sudden upsurge, while an incident.

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA PAKTIKA Year to Date 1

This Report Period 0 45 Of primary concern for NGO 35 operating in this area were the with such connections are subse- 25 recent reports of AOG check- quently abducted, primarily for 15 points being established along the ransoming purposes, though exe- Sharan-Ghazni main road. The cution for intimidation reasons or 5 reports elaborate that multiple the failure to pay ransom should -5 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG checkpoints have/had been estab- not be discounted. lished and those manning these Further to this, there were three AOG ACG were vigilantly searching for those separate instances of arson com- with GoA connections. As with mitted against vehicles at an AOG something that is common throughout the SR. other similar occurrences, those checkpoint along the same route, As such, NGO are advised to exercise extreme though the reasons for this remain caution when planning road missions along KEY THREATS & CONCERNS unknown at this time. this road. Thorough trip planning, the “sterilisation” of travelling staff, as well as the !"AOG checkpoints This marks the first confirmed establishment of a cover story are all recom- !"Attacks against logistical convoys instance of AOG checkpoints mended in order to mitigate this threat. being utilised within Paktika,

SOUTHERN REGION DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS

ZABUL URUZGAN PAKTIKA NIMROZ KANDAHAR HELMAND GHAZNI

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11121314 15161718 1920 THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents HELMAND HELMAND Year to Date 0 70 This Report Period 0 60 ISAF and ANSF operations are 50 presently ongoing in the Nada Ali these areas are reported to have 40 nonetheless maintained their op- 30 District with intentions of ex- 20 panding the scope of these into erational capacity and tempo as 10 the Districts of Nawa and Garm- seen in the numerous indirect fire 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG ser. As a result, AOG forces have and IED attacks against ANSF continued to suffer significant and IMF installations and ele- casualties by ISAF air, with a par- ments across the province. AOG ACG ticular incident resulting in the The failed BBIED attack in Lash- killing of 52 AOGs, including 2 kar Gah City highlights the ongo- the political, criminal, and conflict elements high ranking Taliban command- ing nature of this threat, though which would likely result in a further erosion ers. The gathering was said to the ANP stationed in the target of governance and stability overall. This inci- have been assembled with the area quickly identified and neutral- dent also marks the 5th BBIED attack within intent of splitting the force into ized the threat. In this case there the city for 2008, and considering the increased smaller cells for deployment in to are some indicators that this at- level of such suicide attacks throughout the SR the neighboring districts of Ka- tack marked a blending of both recently, it is likely to continue being a threat jaki. Despite this, AOG elements AOG tactical as well as an inter- within this population centre for the immedi- in necine conflict goal, though the ate future. NGO are advised continued avoid- full nature and scope of this is not ance of high profile target facilities and ele- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS fully understood at this time. De- ments. !"Ongoing military operations spite this lack of information, it The Kandahar – Lashkar Gah main route still !"Significant AOG presence does suggest that as the conflict in remains at high risk for roadside IED, AOG throughout the province this province matures, there will mobile checkpoints, as well as attacks against !"Instability along Hwy 1 be an increasing blend between high profile convoys.

UPCOMING SECURITY TRAINING AT ANSO

The following NGO security related training courses will be offered at ANSO (in Kabul) during October by the Centre for Safety and Development (CSD) and the Armadillo Group.

October 6-8 2008: Basic Safety and Security Course (by CSD) October 7-9 2008: Security Management Course-Country Level (by CSD) October 21-22 2008: Field First Aid (Armadillo) October 23-24 2008: Personal Security and Safety (Armadillo) October 28-November 1 2008: Security and Safety Management (Armadillo)

NGO are encouraged to register early as places are limited to ensure quality of learning. For more information regarding these courses please contact CSD and Armadillo directly:

Centre for Safety and Development www.centreforsafety.org Email: [email protected]

The Armadillo Group www.armadillo-group.co.uk Email: [email protected] THE AFGHANISTAN NGO OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING

This report ANSO CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) could not provide ANSO is hosted by Blake Kehler - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe analysis for the prov- Hedayatullah - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 inces of:

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) !" Panjshir Scott Bohlinger - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Firoz Fahez - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 !" Ghor To Register with ANSO !" Farah contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) !" Samangan [email protected] Chris Hansen - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 !" Jawzjan Khisrow Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 !" Badakhshan !" Sar-e-Pul ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) !" Takhar Board. If you have any Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 414 100 !" Ghazni feedback, good or bad, let Mohammadi - [email protected] - 0700 300 730 them know on: !" Uruzgan [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) Vacant - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 This is because we Najma Fazly - [email protected] - 0799 446 820 do not know enough ANSO ACRONYMS about the area to

comment on the sig- IMF-International Military COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Forces / AOG-Armed Oppo- Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 nificance of the inci- sition Groups / GOA- Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 dents occurring Government of Afghanistan Chona Bollos - [email protected] - 0797-093-073 there. / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan Na- tional Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED- TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT Improvised Exploding De- vice / AEF-Afghan Eradica- tion Forces / RPG-Rocket UPCOMING SECURITY TRAINING AT ANSO Propelled Grenade / IDF- Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- The Centre for Safety and Development (CSD) and the Armadillo Group will be vised Exploding Device / conducting various NGO security related courses at ANSO during October. PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan Na- Please see page 12 for more details. tional Border Police / SAF- Small Arms Fire / NDS- National Directorate of Se- NGO are encouraged to register early if interested as places are limited to ensure the curity (intelligence) / PSC- quality of learning. Private Security Company / DC-District Centre