The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 10 September 1st to 15th 2008 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 While the overall suicide at- 5 SUICIDE ATTACKS (Country Cumulative Totals) Northern Region tack volumes are down 25 Eastern Region 6 (30%) this year in compari- son to 2007, changes in the 20 Western Region 9 methods of deployment, tar- 15 Southern Region 10 geting patterns, as well as efficacy, have all been wit- 10 13 ANSO Info Page nessed in relation to such 5 attacks reported this year. The efficacy of suicide at- 0 tacks in regards to casualty JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG YOU NEED TO KNOW yields has increased, primarily 2006 2007 2008 due to the chosen target sites • Increased frequency of (as in the Indian Embassy BBIED attacks in popula- tack vectors. Using a com- seen most commonly in tion centers and “dog fight” bombings in bination of small arms fire the Eastern and Southern Kabul and Kandahar) and and/or multiple bombers Regions, allow follow on • Prevalence of AOG the resultant high civilian against high profile GoA attackers to gain access checkpoints along main casualties. and security force installa- into the facility itself, caus- roads In regards to deployment tions, AOG have attempted ing a greater casualty yield • Prevailing abduction/ patterns, suicide attacks are to increase the likelihood of in the target population. kidnapping threat being used more “surgically”, tactical success. These and in unison with other at- types of combined attacks, ANSO is supported by NGO DATA & TRENDS NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS-REGIONAL DATA NORTH CENTRAL 24% 32% WEST 14% EAST SOUTH 16% 14% CENTRAL EAST SOUTH WEST NORTH Though the overall NGO direct incident volume is up this year, the geographic distribu- tion patterns have remained largely unchanged as 2008 has developed. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 16 35 This Report Period 0 30 AOG incidents remained high 25 during this reporting period. trict 8 warning the locals to refrain 20 Most common were rockets at- from supporting the GoA and for 15 tacks on Kabul city, attacks on GoA employees to quit their jobs; 10 ANP check posts, and IED. the murder of the chief judge of 5 the Narcotics Tribunal; and an 0 There were several incidents of JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG RPG attack on a mine dog train- intimidation and terror tactics ing site; as well as the recent assas- AOG ACG targeting government and/or sination of the Governor of Logar NGO: These included the circula- in Paghman District. Taken in the (including the possibility of NGO) to continue. tion of letters in Kabul city, Dis- context of the overall security Threat traffic warning of potential suicide and/ situation in and around the city, or high profile attacks has been frequent and KEY THREATS & CONCERNS NGO can expect such threats consistent therefore threat of spectacular or !"IED/Suicide attacks against “soft” targets related to high profile attacks should be considered ac- !"Rocket attacks the government and/or govern- tive. !"Abductions ment-affiliated organisations NGO Incidents WARDAK WARDAK Year to Date 6 50 This Report Period 0 The security situation in Wardak 40 Province has not changed signifi- IMF checkpoints and convoys, 30 cantly since the last reporting pe- and AOG check points on the 20 main Kabul-Ghazni road. riod. During this reporting period 10 most of the incidents were DAC The threat of abduction in War- 0 attacks, roadside IED explosions, dak remains extremely high, most JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG attacks and ambushes on ANSF/ recently this was evidenced on 7 September when two international AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS engineers and four escort guards Wardak Province is currently assessed as a !"Abduction of a construction company were high risk province, especially Saydabad, Nirkh, !"Overall instability kidnapped in Saydabad District while enroute to their work site. Jalriz, and Chack districts. NGO operations !"Ongoing clashes between AOG and travel in Wardak are not advised. and security forces NGO Incidents DAYKONDI 10 DAYKUNDI Year to Date 2 This Report Period 1 8 In Sangtakht District, a gunman threatened the head of local NGO existed, so this does not seem to 6 and told him to close the office. be indicative of a broader threat 4 to NGO and the NGO has con- We do not have information to 2 indicate the motive for the threat. tinued since its activities. 0 Local elders intervened and re- Security reporting from Daykundi JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG portedly solved whatever problem remains limited. Anecdotal report- ing from Nili, Kijran, and Gizab AOG ACG suggest an increase in AOG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS movement and activities. AOG ity for unexpected migrations into other areas !"Minimal security presence have relative freedom of move- should be taken into consideration when plan- !"AOG freedom of movement ment facilitated by the limited ning activities. security presence and the possibil- THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 5 10 This Report Period 0 Parwan experiences periodic 8 manifested in IED, rocket, and AOG incidents throughout the 6 RPG attacks targeting security province, and is likely experienc- 4 ing an increased AOG presence in forces, with the Districts of Ba- 2 recent months. This is typically gram, Shinwari, and Kohi Safi all reporting either rocket or RPG 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG attacks during this period. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The road to Bamyan through Ba- AOG ACG !"IED gram, Chahrikar, Shinwari districts !"Attacks against security forces of should be considered a poten- However, so far this month no such incidents tial risk area for IED attacks. have been recorded. NGO Incidents BAMYAN BAMYAN Year to Date 2 10 This Report Period 0 Bamyan mostly remains quiet and 8 appears operational for NGO, (Kamard and Shibar) may be in- 6 though travelling to the province creasingly risky as evidenced by an 4 IED attack on an NGO vehicle from Kabul through the northeast 2 last month and the 4 September 0 discovery of a mine in the Shikary JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Valley of Shibar District. !"Banditry The threat of highway robbery is AOG ACG !"IED/Mines low but notable in Bamyan. In !"Likely AOG presence in Shibar Panjab District during this period, on the 4th of September and two trucks and a and Kahmard armed robbers robbed a mini-van mini-van on the 12th. NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 7 30 This Report Period 0 A considerable AOG presence and a proven willingness to attack tack military/security contracted 20 NGO make Logar unsafe for vehicles and logistical convoys. NGO operations and travel. Also common are the establish- 10 ment of AOG temporary check The Porak/Kolangar area of Puli points along the main roads with 0 Alam remains especially risky for JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG the intent of searching vehicles abduction or terror tactics as for passengers that may have AOG in the area continue to at- AOG ACG NGO or GoA links. ANSO recommends the complete suspension KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The Districts of Baraki Barak, of road travel by international or local staff !"AOG checkpoints along main Kharwar, and Charkh are also routes reported to effectively be under that might be identified as having an NGO !"Abduction Taliban control. link. TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT: Please review Page 12 of this edition for upcoming NGO training opportunities in October at ANSO. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4 NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 There have been no significant 15 uncertain and unstable for NGO, changes in the overall threat envi- 10 ronment compared to recent re- with Tagab, Alasay, and Nijrab ports. The general security situa- remaining the most volatile areas. 5 Mahmud Raqi remains vulnerable tion in Kapisa Province remains 0 to periodic—typically late night— JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS attacks on the DAC, with the !"DAC attacks most recent occurring on 12 Sep- AOG ACG !"Collateral damage from clashes/air tember. strikes NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 8 This Report Period 1 20 The situation in Kunduz has not 15 changed qualitatively from that of has emerged that AOGs have the last report, but important formed into ‘neighbourhood 10 trends have emerged in both the watch’ patrols of 20-25 people 5 who appear sporadically in villages organisation and distribution of 0 AOG elements. in Kunduz province (north and JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG west of the city again) and also on In this period incident distribution the eastern fringes of Chahar AOG ACG has continued to shift away from Darra and in Dashti Archi. While the south and east of Kunduz City they are armed, their main interest and sponsored by the same source that sup- into the north and west. This consists of making speeches in the ports other kinds of more violent anti- consists of a broad swathe of ter- village mosques against the gov- government agitation. ritory running from Chahar Darra ernment and those who support District west of the city to the In sum, the area of the AOG patrols bears a it. One such group was involved districts along the Amu River, lot of resemblance to the area where there has in a verbal exchange with an primarily Dashti Archi and Imam been a more general surfacing of agitation NGO staff, which led to the Sahib.