1 Evaluation of UNDP DDR Pilot Project, 2004 - Draft Evaluation and Feasibility Assessment of Demobilization and Reintegration Pilot Project For UNDP, Somalia DRAFT REPORT December, 2004 2 Evaluation of UNDP DDR Pilot Project, 2004 - Draft TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents 2 Executive Summary 4 PART I 1. INTRODUCTION 5 1.1 Background “ “ “ 5 1.2 DDR in the Somali Context “ “ 7 1.3 Project Evaluation “ “ 7 1.4 The Pilot Project “ “ 8 2. EVALUATION FRAME WORK “ “ 8 2.1 Methodology “ “ “ 8 2.2 One-on-One Interviews “ “ 9 2.3 Focus Group Discussion “ “ 9 2.4 Profile of the Selected Districts “ 9 2.5 Constraint “ 10 2.6 Project Design “ “ 10 3. PROJECT ACTIVITIES “ “ 11 3.1 Selection Process “ “ 11 3.2 Community Mobilization “ “ 12 3.3 Collection Weapons “ “ 12 3.4 Training “ “ 13 4. IMPACT ASSESSMENT “ “ “ 14 4.1 Impact “ “ “ 14 4.2 Employment “ “ “ 15 4.3 Behavioral Changes “ “ “ 15 4.4 Contributing to security of the target areas 16 5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16 5.1 Recommendations “ “ 16 5.2 Conclusions “ “ 18 3 Evaluation of UNDP DDR Pilot Project, 2004 - Draft PART II 6. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT “ “ 21 6.1 Introduction “ “ 21 7. ELMAN PEACE CENTER “ “ “ 21 7.1 Background “ “ 21 7.2 Organizational objectives “ “ 22 7.3 Management Structures “ “ 22 7.4 Strength “ “ “ 22 7.5 Weakness “ “ “ 22 7.6 Assessment “ “ “ 24 8. SOMALI PEACE LINE “ “ 24 8.1 Background “ “ 24 8.2 Organizational Objectives “ 24 8.3 Main Activities “ “ 24 8.4 Training and workshops “ “ 24 8.5 Mediations “ “ “ 25 8.6 Human Rights Activities “ “ 25 8.7 Strength “ “ 25 8.8 Weakness “ “ “ “ 25 8.9 Assessment “ “ “ 25 9. SOMALI WOMEN’S VANGUARD FOR PEACE (HINNA) 9.1 Background “ “ 25 9.2 Organizational Objectives “ “ 26 9.3 Strength “ “ “ 26 9.4 Weakness “ “ “ “ 26 9.7 Assessment “ “ “ 26 10. RECOMMENDATION “ “ “ 26 11. JOWHAR FIELD ASSESSMENT “ “ 27 11.1 Brief Background “ “ 27 11.2 District Profile “ “ “ 27 11.2 Militia Groups “ “ “ 27 11.3 Local Capacities “ “ “ 27 11. ANNEXES 1. Tracer Study Participants 2. Questionnaires 3. Resources Consulted 4. Pictures 4 Evaluation of UNDP DDR Pilot Project, 2004 - Draft EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Disarmament, Demobilization and Re- SAACID, a local NGO, based in integration (DDR) is one of the most Mogadishu. urgent obstacle and challenge to peace- An evaluation conducted by the Center building in Somalia. The issue of DDR for Research & Dialogue (CRD), an is also of a major concern to the affiliate of WSP International, reveals international and regional community in that the project has overall achieved its different levels. Abundance of weapons intended objectives. 300 armed in the hands of the youth, who grew-up militiamen and women have directly in a culture of violence, escalates benefited from the training, 300 usable violence in Somalia. The armed youth guns were collected during the play an instrumental role inter-clan implementation period of the project. skirmishes that develop, some times, The removal of these guns has positively into wider inter-clan conflicts. The contributed to the local security of the absence of rule of law and order in selected district areas from which the Somalia and the presence of heavily armed militia groups were recruited armed interest groups ranging from from. About 29% of the graduates in political factions, business groups, the program have obtained an freelance militias and the Islamic Shari’a immediate employment opportunity courts all make the situation in Somalia after the completion of the project. unstable. Complex clan loyalties between Somalis and the scarcity of The availability of a number of host resources have further aggravated an trainers across the target areas has already volatile security situation in the facilitated in the creation of a short and country, particularly Mogadishu. long-term employment opportunities for the armed youth. The project has also Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, is impacted economically in the provision the epicentre of the Somali conflict, of limited incentives to host trainers and has the largest concentration of which allowed them to expand their armed groups in comparison to many services operations. Due to the other regions in Somalia. The city is widespread unemployment rate and the known to have been the most violent limited capacities of the host-trainers to and politically unstable city in the hire graduates, as permanent employees, country in which more than has reduced the level of employment for approximately 20,000 armed militia the graduates. Thus over 50% of the groups are currently involved in the graduates remain unemployed. Based on conflict. evaluation findings, there is potential that the unemployed number of In response to the need for a graduates may return to their old comprehensive DDR in Somalia, profession of carrying weapons for any particularly in the city of Mogadishu, the interest group that may need their UNDP/Somalia Programme has services. However, if the economic commissioned a community based DDR outlook of Somalia changes and the new Pilot Project intended to provide TFG establishes itself inside Somalia the training for 300 militia groups and skills of these graduates could be utilized remove light weapons, used by these by the government or the new business militias, from the streets of the city of ventures. Mogadishu. The pilot project was implemented in northern Mogadishu by The attitude of those unemployed graduates may also change and adapt to 5 Evaluation of UNDP DDR Pilot Project, 2004 - Draft the new environment. Majority of 1. INTRODUCTION participants interviewed trainees indicated that they have not participated in any form of formal education before 1.1 Background the training. The time frame accorded for the trainees, to acquire basic skills, In 1991, Somalia descended into a full- was not adequate. In order for this fledged inter-clan civil war that led to project to have a lasting impact in the the eventual collapse of all the national local communities, the training period state institutions. The country has need to be extended and the number of remained without an effective central trainees increased. government for over 14 years. Various heavily armed warlords, embedded in The armed militia groups have the capital city of Mogadishu, fought noticeable anti-social behaviour, violent over the control of key resources, port- and destructive manners that are not towns and the fertile lands between the socially acceptable within communities. Juba and Shabelle rivers. A short-lived They routinely practice some of the US-led military peacekeeping operation most violent and socially harmful acts in Somalia (UNOSOM) ended in a such as looting, rape, killing, burglary fiasco. Serious misjudgement and lack of and the use of drugs. Focus group coordination between the multi-national discussions conducted have revealed intervening forces in 1993 embroiled the that a majority of the participants have UN in an un-necessary war with one of indeed made some remarkable change the major factions in Mogadishu which towards violence. Families of the culminated in the killing of hundreds of program participants have reported that Somali civilians and tens of foreign there is less incidents of violence peacekeepers in Mogadishu. As a result, generated by the graduates, only 13% of the UN led multi-national peace-keeping the graduates have actually returned to forces had to eventually pull-out from their militia posts right after the Mogadishu on March 1995. The hasted completion of the program. departure of the multi-national peace- keepers from Mogadishu, Somalia has Throughout the implementation period, created the increase of the proliferation the project has faced number of of weapons into the country and the obstacles including security treat, logistic creation of new armed faction leaders. problems. The lack of properly thought planning and inadequate time frame In 2000, a Transitional National created a situation where many armed Government (TNG) was established militia groups were unable to get the following the outcome of a five months basic necessary skills or social support old peace talks held in the Djibouti town network to get employed. The process of Arta. The then new TNG, with was further complicated by security limited recognition from many threats in a number of areas where inter- countries, was faced with fierce armed clan conflict was dormant and periodic opposition from within the armed armed clashes have occurred before. At faction leaders in Mogadishu. The TNG times, some of the trainees were was unable to assert control over the tempted to re-join their militia groups. city of Mogadishu, and attempts to impose its authority outside the capital, has been aggressively frustrated by the armed warlords and a number of other factors. For over three years, clans and factions grouped under the umbrella of 6 Evaluation of UNDP DDR Pilot Project, 2004 - Draft the Somalia Restoration and internal revenues, among many other Reconciliation Council (SRRC) and things. The new TFG is required to Mogadishu based warlords have fought prove to the Somali population that a the TNG, resulting in a heightened revived state is not just an instrument of armed conflict in the southern and predatory accumulation, repression, central regions of Somalia with still the expropriation and clan hegemony but weapons proliferation levels not more of what needs to avoid all these withstanding. negative perceptions.1 One of the most important tasks awaiting the new TFG is After more than a dozen failed peace disarming thousands of armed militia processes, a National Reconciliation throughout the country particularly Conference was launched on Oct. 15, Mogadishu, the seat of the government. 2002 sponsored by the Inter- Governmental Authority on Disarmament, Demobilization and Development (IGAD). After two years Reintegration are arguably the most of a labyrinthine negotiations in complex issues to be faced by the new Mbagathi, Kenya, the NRC ended in the TFG of Somalia.