Coping with Surplus Weapons: a Priority for Conversion Research and Policy

brief 3 Coping with Surplus Weapons: A Priority for Conversion Research and Policy

June 95 Brief 3

Contents About the Authors

Zusammenfassung Maria Bowers is a research German Summary 4 associate at the Stockholm Interna- tional Peace Research Institute Foreword 5 (SIPRI).

Edward J. Laurance and Edward J. Laurance is Professor of Herbert Wulf International Policy Studies and Introduction: Associate Director of the Program Coping with Surplus Weapons for Nonproliferation Studies at the Systems: A Priority for Conversion Monterey Institute of International Research and Policy 6 Studies (MIIS) in California.

Susanne Kopte und Peter Wilke Susanne Kopte is a researcher Researching Surplus Weapons: associated with Greenpeace in Guidelines, Methods and Topics 11 Germany. In 1995, she is a visiting researcher with the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Maria Bowers participating in BICC projects on The Disposal of Surplus surplus weapons. Chemical Weapons 16 Jordi Molas-Gallart is a researcher Jordi Molas-Gallert at the Science Policy Research Unit Disposal of Surplus Missiles: at the University of Sussex, UK. Technical Difficulties and Commercial Interest 23 Otfried Nassauer is the Director of BITS, the Berlin Information Edward J. Laurance Centre for Transatlantic Security. Surplus Light Weapons as a Conversion Problem: Dr. Peter Wilke, a specialist on the Unique characteristics and conversion problems of Germany solutions 31 and the former Soviet Union, since 1995 he is a visiting researcher at Otfried Nassauer the Monterey Institute of Interna- Surplus—The NVA's Heritage 37 tional Studies, participating in the BICC project on surplus weapons.

Dr. Herbert Wulf is the Director of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). He has previously served as project leader of the SIPRI research project on arms transfers and arms production and is a consultant to the UN Center for Disarmament Affairs.

Cover Illustration: Vladimír Rencín

2 B·I·C·C brief 3 Coping with Surplus Weapons: A Priority for Conversion Research and Policy Edited by Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf

June 95 B·I·C·C 3 Brief 3

Zusammen-

Vernichtung in den nächsten Jahren fassung anstehen, werden die technischen Möglichkeiten und Schwierigkeiten auf dem Weg zur Verwirklichung der Chemiewaffenkonventionen German Summary beschrieben. Rakten werden in einem weiteren Kapitel als besonde- rer Fall besprochen, weil Rakten Aufgrund von Abrüstungsverträgen anderer militärischer Geräte ist sehr häufig sowohl militärisch als wie START und KSE, durch die sicherlich die kostengünstigste auch zivil nutzbar sind und daher im Beendigung von Kriegen und Möglichkeit eines Staates, sich Falle von Rüstungskontroll- und Friedensverträgen oder wegen der überschüssiger Waffen zu entledigen. Abrüstungsverträgen der besonderen Kürzungen in den Militärhaushalten Man spart nicht nur die ansonsten Kontrolle bedürfen. Da die Raketen werden viele Waffen aus dem aufzubringenden Kosten für Ver- für zivile Zwecke oft wirtschaftlich Inventar der Armee ausgemustert. schrottung, sondern erzielt sorgar interessant sind und sie militärisch Einige Waffenkategorien (konventio- Einnahmen. Doch ist der politische als moderene Waffensysteme gelten, nelle Waffensysteme in Europa) Preis hoch, wenn der Abbau militä- fehlt häufig die Bereitschaft zur werden in starkem Umfang redu- rischer Potentiale in einer Region Verschrottung dieser Systeme. Ein ziert, andere Kategorien (so die mit dem Anheizen des Rüstungs- besonderes Problem verursachen die Chemiewaffen) werden komplett wettlaufs in anderen Regionen riesigen Überschußbestände leichter abgerüstet. Erst in den letzten Jahren erkauft wird. Die Gefahren für den Waffen; es sind die Waffen, die am ist die Frage "wohin mit den über- Frieden sind offensichtlich, wenn häufigsten in Kriegen und Konflik- schüssigen Waffen?" zu einem kurzsichtig angelegte Politik, den ten eingesetzt werden und deren ernsten Problem und damit zu einer bequemsten Weg zur "Entsorgung" Verbleib und Transfer schwer zu Konversionsaufgabe größeren der überschüssigen Waffen wählt. kontrollieren ist. Durch das Ende Umfangs geworden. des Kalten Krieges und die Beendi- Das BICC hat in Kooperation mit gung einer Reihe von Kriegen in Bislang ist das gesamte Ausmaß der dem Monterey Institute for Entwicklungsländern (besonders in bereits aufgehäuften Überschuß- Insternational Studies ein Afrika) sind große Bestände der bestände und die in den nächsten Forschungsprojekt zu dieser Thema- Kleinwaffen verfügbar geworden. Es Jahren möglicherweise zusätzlich tik initiiert und im November 1994 bedarf koordinierter Maßnahmen auszumusternden Waffen nicht ein Expertengespräch in New York der internationalen Völkergemeinde genau bekannt. Die Regierungen der durchgeführt. Die dort vorgestellten (einschließlich "gun-buy-back"- USA, Westeuropas, Rußlands und Papiere sind in diesem brief veröf- Programmen), um diese Waffen- anderer CIS-Länder verkaufen, fentlicht. Im ersten Kapitel wird das bestände zu kontrollieren. Schließ- verschenken oder leasen beträchtli- Konzept zur empirischen Erfassung lich wird in einer Fallstudie nachge- che Mengen konvenventioneller sowie der Gründe zur Entstehung zeichnet, wie das Erbe der Waffen Waffensysteme. Vor allem im von der "überschüssigen Waffen- der Nationalen Volksarmee der Bereich der Kleinwaffen sind erhebli- beständen" entfaltet. In weiteren ehemaligen DDR verwendet wur- che Bestände frei geworden, deren Kapiteln werden verschiedene den. Immerhin handelte es sich um Verbleib oft ungewiß ist und die Waffenkategorien untersucht. In mehr als 2300 Kampfpanzer, 390 zum Teil in Kriegs- und Konflikt- einem Beitrag über Chemiewaffen, Kampfflugzeuge, regionen exportiert werden. die nach der verabschiedeten, aber 69 Schiffe und riesige Mengen noch nicht ratifizierten Chemie- Munition, Lastwagen usw. Die Die Regierungen verfügen über eine waffenkonvention komplett zur Waffen wurden teils verschrottet, ein Reihe von Möglichkeiten, die großer Teil wurde auch exportiert. Überschußbestände abzubauen: einlagern, exportieren, verschrotten, verrosten lassen, für zivile Zwecke verwenden oder konvertieren usw. Die verschiedenen Strategien zur Entsorgung, Verschrottung oder Verwertung der Überschußbestände haben unterschiedliche Konsequen- zen. Der Export der Waffen und

4 B·I·C·C Foreword

Foreword

During 1994, the Monterey Institute develop and communicate to a of International Studies (MIIS) and general audience the magnitude of the Bonn International Center for the problem and the dangers—both Conversion (BICC) focused some of potential and real—to the economic their research on surplus weapons. well-being and security of states and BICC and MIIS have started a long- their citizens. Second, they serve as a term research and policy analysis set of guidelines for researchers who project intended to contribute two- will document the size and location fold to addressing and hopefully of surplus weapons stocks. The solving the problem of surplus papers also present concepts and weapons. The project will produce a theoretical constructs that may be global overview of existing and utilized in order to describe and potential future surplus weapons, explain the growth of surplus which requires an intensive empir- weapons and the negative economic, ical research input. Further, it will military, social and political conse- contribute to the design of new quences. Third, they initiate the policies (including policy imple- process of selecting a research agenda mentation) primarily to avoid the based on specific weapons types, transfer of such weapons into disarmament agreements, and specif- conflicts, but also to identify other ic regions of the world where surplus (technical and political) means of weapons present a significant responsibly reducing the surplus. conversion challenge. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the The papers in this volume were papers introduce the subject to the presented at a workshop at the Joyce policymaking community at the Mertz-Gilmore Foundation in local, regional, national and inter- November 1994 in New York and national levels. It is here that the are the result of that effort.1 These research findings must be applied if papers have several purposes. First, the negative consequences of surplus they serve as an introduction to the weapons are to be ameliorated and subject of surplus weapons as a eventually eliminated. dimension of the overall conversion effort in the post-Cold War period. Since this is a new topic for research and policymaking, it is necessary to

1 Grants from the Joyce Mertz-Gilmore Foundation and the Volkswagen Foundation made this work possible.

B·I·C·C 5 Brief 3

Introduction:

quantities; and the stockpiling of Coping with equipment after the end of a long- lasting conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been stolen or illicitly Surplus Weapons transferred into Sudan and Somalia. The experiences of the past few years also show that the whole range of Systems: weapons (from sophisticated nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to all types of conventional A Priority for weapons) are being made redundant and may thus become available to Conversion interested parties. Different methods of handling surplus weapons may be applied:

Research and Mothballing of weapons is the simplest method, although these weapons are often kept without Policy appropriate protection against theft. Furthermore, stored weapons may be employed again. by stockpiling of surplus weapons is The export of obsolete weapons is Edward J. Laurance and widely apparent, especially since the the cheapest but most dangerous Herbert Wulf end of the East-West conflict and the method of eliminating super- dissolution of the Soviet Union. fluous weapons. Large quantities The program of the Bonn Inter- At the same time there are consid- are still for sale today. national Center for Conversion erable surplus stocks of weapons in Allowing the weapons to become (BICC) tries to facilitate the process other regions of the world, such as obsolete over time is a practical of conversion by focusing primarily Central America, Africa, and Asia. consequence of technical and on six conversion areas: reallocation economic difficulties rather than a of the financial resources of the A cursory analysis of the existence of chosen policy. It involves eco- military sector to non-military surplus stocks of weapons illustrates logical hazards, and the tempt- purposes; reorientation of military various causes that led to stock- ation to export these weapons for research and development (R&D) piling: international disarmament economic benefits remains. for non-military purposes; down- agreements, unilateral disarmament, The destruction of weapons is sizing defense industrial over- the cessation of hostilities, financial technically feasible, although not capacities and reducing dependencies constraints on defense budgets, and without costs and ecological on arms production; demobilization the modernization of armed forces hazards. Disabling weapons—as of armed forces; military base clo- and replacement of its equipment. provided for in treaties—is usually sures; and surplus weapons systems. possible within a short span of Experiences in different regions have time and at limited costs. What is These areas indicate that, in proven how problematic the costly, time consuming and tech- addressing the issue of conversion, a management of such surplus nically complex is the final high priority should be attached to weapons can be: to mention only disposal of weapons and their the problem of surplus weapons three recent examples, the CFE components. (weapons that are no longer con- agreement led to cascading of surplus Converting weapons or other sidered of importance in the armed weapons into exports; the equip- military equipment for civilian forces of a nation). In contrast to ment of the former East German use is the most constructive some of the other areas, only limited armed forces (NVA) was partly approach but is limited in scope. research and political action has been dismantled but also exported in great Reuse for civilian purposes is directed at solving the problems possible only for a limited num- associated with surplus weapons. ber of military equipment cate- The existence and increasing gories (such as radar, satellites, helicopters and trucks). The limitations are the result of

6 B·I·C·C Introduction

specific and demanding military The dangers for peace, security and An obvious first step in this project performances of weapon systems the environment of such haphazard is the gathering of empirical data. that are too inefficient, hence policies are obvious. Arms bazaars, The authors have provided the costly. smuggling and other illegal methods necessary list of indicators to gener- In rare cases ‘demilitarized’ of trade, dumping of surplus ate data on surplus weapons; when weapons might even serve for weapons, and environmental degrad- aggregated, this list will form the other military purposes—for ation are all indicators of a growing basic material for a surplus weapons example, as simulators, targets or problem requiring the attention of atlas. The research design also ad- exhibits. governments, NGOs, and research dresses the critical question of caus- institutions equipped with technical ality—why are surpluses created in As a general rule one may predict expertise. the first place? The ultimate goal of that the two most desirable methods, the project, the design and execution namely conversion and scrapping of Research Design of policies to alleviate the problems weapons, will either be very limited created by surplus weapons, cannot in scope or will require substantial The first paper in this collection is be achieved without addressing the amounts of investment, although an attempt to develop a compre- causes. reclamation of raw materials is feas- hensive list of the concepts and ible—as has been proven in the case questions which make up the larger The guidelines of the authors are of munitions. research effort. In this piece, the comprehensive and designed to be authors tackle the difficult question applicable to all types of weapons in Since surplus weapons are a new of how to define a surplus, a remind- all regions. While these guidelines phenomenon, not even the magni- er that this problem is as political as hold for most major conventional tude of existing and potential future any other on the conversion agenda weapons—the biggest problem docu- surplus is known for all categories of —one must initially answer the age- mented to this point—it is clear that weapons. In most cases, govern- old question of “how much is certain commodities create special ments confronted with the issue enough?” As they point out, to the challenges for conversion. With that have followed a muddling-through extent that uncertainty and fears of in mind, several of the following policy in which all of the above- future threats still dominate national papers deal with specific types of mentioned methods of managing the agendas, states will be reluctant to weapons. surplus have been tried. part with those weapons that an out- sider, operating under different assumptions and perceptions, may deem surplus.

The large inventories of equipment for example, are donating or the U.S. will increasingly find itself that U.S., European, and Russian leasing capital ships to a number of called upon to act as world forces no longer need, and cannot countries. The Germans are policeman, or at least referee. But afford to maintain in inventory, putting inherited East German such a policy is easier to enunciate have had a significant impact on equipment on the market. Defense than to carry out in practice. the current international defense industries in arms suppliers market. Some of this equipment is countries are concerned that the Source: Strategic Assessment 1995, finding its way into international availability of such excess U.S. Security Challenges in markets at bargain prices. This equipment displaces potential Transition, Institute for National phenomenon began as a result of orders for new equipment, or at Strategic Studies, S. 142 the Conventional Forces in Europe least depresses prices and decreases (CFE) agreement, which limited the bargaining leverage of sellers. major platforms for all countries Obviously, the U.S. would like to west of the Urals. As a result, a limit the ability of agressive cascade of older equipment from countries to obtain weapons, wealthier countries to poorer particularly if U.S. forces might countries is underway. The end of one day have to deal with those the Cold War has accelerated this countries. This is all the more trend. important in today's world, where The U.S. and European countries,

B·I·C·C 7 Brief 3

Central Estimates for Plutonium and HEU in Unsafeguarded Inventories in Tons (1994)a)

Total weapon Weapon-grade Total HEU HEU in grade plutonium plutonium in inventory active inventory operational weapons weapons Russia 125 50 1000 230 United States 110 33 700 160 France 6 2 15 7.5 United Kingdom 2.6 0.8 13 3 China 3 1.8 15 7 Israel 0.35 0.3 — — India 0.36 0.3 — — Pakistan — — 0.2 ?

TOTAL 230 90 1940 410

Notes: a) Estimates of inventories were made in a number of cases. For details, see original source.

Source: Reprinted from Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson, and Marvin Miller, “A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material,” International Security, Winter 1994/95 (Vol. 19, No. 3), p. 167

Weapons-Specific is the presence of a nuclear nonpro- This collection addresses other cate- Concerns and Issues liferation regime—a Nonprolifer- gories of weapons with specific char- ation Treaty (NPT) and an inter- acteristics. Thus, chemical weapons national organization dedicated to have their own set of peculiarities Although this collection of papers policing fissile materials, the Inter- that shape policies designed to alle- does not address nuclear weapons national Atomic Energy Agency viate the surplus. As with nuclear surplus, it is a multi-dimensional (IAEA). For example, it is illegal to weapons, a nonproliferation regime problem which is of political con- export nuclear weapons and the is emerging, based on the newly cern at the highest level—e.g., the transfer of fissile materials is tightly signed Chemical Weapons Con- nuclear heritage of the former Soviet controlled at the international level. vention (CWC). Unlike nuclear Union. Foremost is the issue of what Unlike conventional weapons, there weapons, all chemical weapons have to do with surplus fissile material— is an international legal framework been outlawed, which at least in plutonium and highly enriched ura- within which solutions may be theory makes the issue of surplus nium. According to a recent study, developed. Another issue unique to somewhat simpler. Exporting sur- large amounts of surplus weapon- these weapons—the surplus of nuc- plus is less of a concern, not only grade material are released during the lear scientists who, lacking other because it is now illegal but also be- process of eliminating the tens of alternatives, have the potential to sell cause it is rather easy to produce thousands of nuclear warheads. their ‘surplus’ services to the highest- such weapons. Since under the CWC bidding would-be nuclear state— all existing chemical weapons are to The dangers and highly technical must be addressed. be destroyed, this will be the prin- solutions to this problem make it cipal focus of research and policy one which requires special treat- development. ment. An additional unique feature of the surplus nuclear weapons issue

8 B·I·C·C Introduction

UK goes up for sale former Royal Navy Type 21 frigates Directorate of Sales (Disposals) to Pakistan, four minesweepers to recently hosted teams of intersted The UK MoD's Defence Sales Bangladesh and, in November, four observers from the USA, Belgium, Agency is being viewed Broadsword class Type 22 Batch 1 Spain, Singapore, Czech Republik internationally as a role for frigates and three River class and Russia, all aiming to establish or selling surplus military minesweepers to Brazil, DSA sales improve their own disposals sales equipment. are beginning to expand. Next on organizations along similar lines to the auctionblock are the RN's four the MoD operation. The sale of surplus military Upholder class SSKs with Canada equipment has become big buisness tipped as the likely customer. Source: Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. for the UK MoD's disposals According to DSAofficials, the 23, No. 5 (4.02.95) organization, the Defence Sales success of the UK's military disposal Agency (DSA). With successes last sales agency cn be gauged by the year including the export of six extent for foreign interest in the organization. The former

Missiles have been singled out for state does not have a surplus, by international market has been special treatment for several reasons. whatever definition used. Finally, flooded with very cheap, hard-to- First, in signing the 1987 agreement missiles are unique in that they can detect, and lethal light weapons. The to establish the Missile Technology be used as space launch vehicles ending of wars not associated with Control Regime, the major prod- (SLVs), a civilian purpose that has the Cold War has also contributed ucers of missiles recognized that great economic potential, at least in significantly to this surplus, which although missiles are delivery sys- the eyes of the states concerned. has found its way into all of the tems for nuclear weapons, they are bloody ethnic conflicts now raging. not covered under the nuclear non- Light weapons also have unique Because of the low cost, size, avail- proliferation regime. Second, their features that significantly affect the ability, and lack of accountability of characteristics—e.g., high speed and development of solutions. In one these weapons, solutions other than no known defense—make them a sense these weapons are the opposite those used for larger weapons will be particularly destabilizing commod- of nuclear weapons, in that a single necessary. Some of these might in- ity, as was seen most recently in the one cannot compare with a nuclear clude increased publicity of negative Gulf War. This quality makes them weapon in destructive power. Yet it consequences to develop norms a highly sought commodity in the is light weapons that throughout the against their use (e.g., the campaign international arms market, thus gen- Cold War—and even more so today to ban anti-personnel land mines), erating a disincentive to dismantle or —were responsible for most of the buy-back programs, transparency destroy them. Missiles also have a killing of both combatants and civil- regimes at the regional level, the potentially dangerous capability to ians. Due to a breakdown of export development of consultative mech- be ‘mixed and matched’—creating a controls in the former Soviet Union anisms, and the further development disincentive to destroy such weapons and the concomitant continued of disarmament schemes as part of if they can be dismantled and used production of light weapons, the United Nations peacekeeping for another purpose for which a operations.

B·I·C·C 9 Brief 3

Conventional arms constitute the and partly integrated into the West majority of surplus stocks in most German armed forces. The last paper countries. For example, experience in this collection details what has of the CFE arms reduction in Eur- happened to the NVA material over ope and the results of unification in the last four years. It is a case study Germany provide an interesting encompassing all the above methods empirical basis for the implement- for handling surplus weapons that ation of policies regarding surplus may be applied. weapons. In the German case, the weaponry of a complete army (the former East German Nationale Volksarmee, NVA) in 1990 became surplus, including more than 2,300 battle tanks, 390 fighter aircraft and 69 fighting ships. These conventional weapons were partly scrapped, but also exported—thus adding to the flow of internationally traded arms—

Belgium initiates 3-year sell-off

Belgium is to sell large quantities of armour and artillery over the next three years, officials in Brussels have confirmed. Reducing in size from a corps to a reinforced division, the Belgian Army is divesting itself of the following equipment:

202 Leopard 1 MBTs (keeping 132); 54 Gepard 35 mm selfpropelled anti-aircraft guns (keeping none); 319 CVR(T) family SFVs (keeping 339) 60 M109A2/A3 155mm howitzers (keeping 108); 11 Alouette II liaison helicopters (keeping 33); 10 Epervier reconnaissance drones (keeping 20); 5 M48 bridgelaying tanks (keeping 9); 12 Matenin mine laying systems (keeping 15); 34 107 mm mortars (keeping 90; 24 HAWK SAM launchers (retaining none).

These weapons will be sold in government-to-government contracts, while in some cases the original manufacturer may play an intermediary role. Proceeds will be used exclusively to pay for new defence procurements.

Source: Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 23, No. 4 (28.01.95)

10 B·I·C·C research design

Researching

the emergence of surplus weapons. Surplus Weapons: The overall objective is to collect material for a world-wide disarmament and conversion atlas, which Guidelines, will give an up-to-date overview of Guidelines, surplus weapon stocks and disarmament agreements, as well as an assessment of conversion which has Methods already transpired.

The question of varying practical andTopics approaches to disarmament related to surpluses completes this analysis. The aim is to describe the surplus of weapons in each particular case, in by criteria for necessary stocks. Since an international, national and region- Susanne Kopte Susanne Kopte security doctrines vary widely— al context, and then evaluate the and Peter Wilke and Peter Wilke between a conservative security economic costs and the technical policy and a peace utopia—any defin- problems, leading finally to policy Developing a ition of stocks as surplus will always recommendations. be controversial. Therefore an framework for appropriate starting point is a discus- research on surplus sion of possible criteria for defining Definition of surplus: weapons surplus weapons. This exercise can- which criteria are not be avoided, since documenting meaningful? The existence of surplus weapons, existing surplus stocks, their types defined as those which are no longer and their regional distribution, will Without some semblance of a needed in the national context for be a central task prior to analysis and consensus on what ‘surplus’ means, maintaining or securing peace (state policy implementation. This categor- its elimination in a specific context is of non-war), is widely accepted. The ization is necessarily multi- not likely. For example, a definition end of the East-West conflict and the dimensional, taking into account the of surplus that includes only break-down of Soviet hegemony has origin of the weapons involved, weapons systems eliminated due to led to a systematic decline in defense conflict categories, regional distrib- international agreements is not ade- budgets and inventories of equip- ution, weapon categories and disarm- quate. Weapons must be discussed in ment, especially in Europe. At the ament effects. the context of military capacities, same time, there are considerable e.g., not only weapons stocks but stocks of unnecessary weapons in Having described and documented also arms production capacities. The other regions of the world, created surplus weapons, one must assess the criterion for defining a surplus must with the cessation of fighting or possible explanations for surplus be laid down openly, and must diff- abatement of wars not necessarily stocks. The solutions put forth to erentiate between surplus and neces- associated with the Cold War. In deal with surplus weapons—the dis- sary military capacities. The crite- Central America, Africa, Asia and armament steps inclusive of destroy- rion for defining a surplus must be the Far East, the stock of weapons is ing the weapons—will depend critic- laid down openly, and must diff- often higher than that needed for ally on how they became surplus in erentiate between surplus and neces- national security, if one assumes the the first place. The surplus of sary military capacities. adequacy of a defensive doctrine. nuclear-armed intercontinental International disarmament agree- weapons in the United States and When seeking a useful analytical ments and economic realities have Russia can hardly be compared with definition of military surplus, three increasingly led to a reduction of a possible surplus of small arms and general levels should be distin- national arsenals since 1990, with light infantry weapons after cease- guished: further reductions to follow over the fires and the resolution of conflicts next ten years. in the Far East and Africa. In a surplus of military capacities— essence, the approach can be des- soldiers, weapon systems and What are surplus weapons? How can cribed as a stock and flow analysis. military facilities they be defined? The characteriz- The stock analysis concentrates on ation of military capacities and the question of how much surplus a surplus of weapons and equip- weapon stocks as surplus presup- exists, while the flow analysis ment poses that there are normative reports the causes of and reasons for

B·I·C·C 11 Brief 3

a surplus of industrial capacities ment), is now too much. Even in surplus (for example, they can be for weapon production the course of this very restricted exported or new security doctrines surplus term, a considerable can emerge). This approach is also a The initial decision must therefore world-wide surplus of weapons, starting point for an investigation of determine which of these analytical soldiers, military infrastructure regional distribution patterns of levels to apply when defining a sur- and weapon production capacities surplus. plus. In designing specific disarma- does exist. ment requirements, it seems most The acceptance of official govern- useful to use the wider definition, On the other hand, the surplus mental statistics does not mean that a which takes into account overall concept could be considerably critical analysis cannot be carried out military capacities including: expanded and only recognize for concrete cases, which might military-used infrastructure, soldiers, those capacities which are legit- show at least the possibility of a diff- weapon systems, industrial capacities imate and seem to be necessary erent assessment regarding the for the production of weapons, and for a defensive security policy. In chances for disarmament. One out- servicing and maintenance capacities. this case, the problems of eval- come of research in this area may uation increase, and logically, so well be the development of a middle The question remains: for the eval- do the stocks defined as surplus. way between official statistics and a uation of military capacities (and for totally independent definition of particular weapons), who defines— Because the above definitional surplus stocks. and by what criteria—which capac- dilemma is political in nature with ities (weapons) are surplus and no no obvious solution, practicality How does a surplus of longer needed? The answer to this demands the use of a relatively military capacities “how much is enough?” question empirical concept of surplus, one depends on complex evaluations of restricted to weapons and direct and weapons arise? security policy and possible threats, military capacities. This means which fluctuate over time. Objective soldiers and military infrastructure A first look at military surplus and evaluation criteria do not normally will normally not be taken into weapon stocks generated by disarm- exist. In military worst-case think- account. Industrial, research and ament reveals different causes and ing, absurd dangers are taken into development capacities will only be starting points for surplus weapons. account. For example, the military utilized to the extent they are neces- An analysis of the reasons for sur- armaments competition in the East- sary for the use of weapons or the plus is therefore necessary. Basically, West conflict created accepted scen- understanding of the development of surplus results from the following arios and possible courses of war that surplus. situations: unilateral or international encouraged the belief that, in terms (at least bilateral) disarmament of the military, one can never have The basic surplus concept used here initiatives; the end of a war or enough. This security logic led to a is mainly descriptive and distin- limited regional conflict; a modern- well-documented, excessive buildup guishes between a stock and a flow ization decision; and/or financial of stocks in all categories of analysis. The stock analysis is neces- constraints on defense budgets. weapons, a buildup that has now sarily normative and depends on the created the need for sensible and valuation issues raised above. It One hypothesis is that only practical approaches to a build- accepts governments as the surplus- surplus resulting from spectacular down. defining authority. The flow analysis changes (e.g., the end of an army— supplements the stock analysis with such as that of East Germany— The spectrum of possible definitions a description of causes. This is neces- resulting from the end of the Cold is set by two extremes: sary, both for understanding the War) can force actual conversion different phases (production of and disarmament strategies. All On the one hand, the definition weapons, being fit for duty, cause of cases below this level are dealt with can be based strictly on disarma- surplus, use or reduction of surplus) by such cost-minimizing or profit- ment agreements and national and to show that weapons must not making strategies as mothballing or military definitions. Surplus is always remain in the status of weapon exports, producing finan- then that part of military capac- cial as well as political profit. The ities and weapons which, when generation of surplus, of course, compared to the previous state depends to a large extent on the (before the disarmament agree- various national laws and export regulations as well as provisions in disarmament treaties requiring destruction of weapons.

12 B·I·C·C research design

Case studies on disarmament and purposes, presently stockpiled, in- also be found in Western Europe and conversion comparing the phenom- tended for export, intended for civil the United States, which may lead to enon of decommissioning old- use (conversion), or intended for major problems as well. fashioned systems (e.g., MIG fighter scrapping; (2) military goods in the aircraft of the NVA) while simul- stock of the armed forces no longer In addition to these problems pro- taneously modernizing (e.g., pur- militarily usable or forbidden by duced by the East-West conflict, chasing the Eurofighter 2000), illus- disarmament agreements, intended other regional surplus cases exist in trate that disarmament is not a linear for scrapping/destruction or the Third World, and tendencies to trend of arms reduction. intended for civil use; (3) weapons continue arming exist in some parts partly destroyed in wars, mines left of the world. A critical question is Surplus weapons— behind, and other ‘remnants of the extent of the relationship how many and wars;’ (4) weapons captured in wars between the regional reduction of which will not be used in national surplus (by export) and a resulting where? armed forces; (5) military goods increase of military capacities in The stock analysis being stored or used illegally, and other countries. not officially part of the stock of the The quantity and distribution of armed forces; and (6) newly pro- The stock analysis should focus on surplus weapons is the central point duced goods which have not been the following regions: of attention for disarmament and sold. conversion policy. The stock anal- the CIS—because of the START ysis includes all nations and produces Regional distribution agreements, the chemical weapons profile of existing weapon stocks. convention, a strong stockpiling The overview lists weapon systems A preliminary assessment of regional policy in the past and regional and their regional distribution, and distribution patterns demonstrates changes in stationing forces sets the research and policy agenda. that high surpluses occur most fre- Important are several factors: quently in the industrial countries. the United States—because of Further, the purely quantitative START, the chemical weapons criteria for registration and weapon stocks of the former War- convention and a rapid modern- counting saw Pact states seem to be higher ization policy than those of the West. Concur- presentation methods (diagrams, rently, these Eastern states are under- Europe—because of CFE graphs, etc.) going a crisis in economic trans- formation. As a result, they continue Germany—due to the unification grade of differentiation (according to produce armaments and increase and the end of the NVA to type of weapons) the level of surplus weapons; the arms production capacities appear regions of recent war and con- surplus potential (possible twice as heavy in Eastern Europe flict—Central America, Southern ‘disarmament reserves’) and the former Soviet Union than in Africa (Angola, Mozambique), Western Europe. It should be noted Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Afghani- weapon production capacities and that such regional concentrations can stan, Cambodia, Vietnam, etc. the resulting ‘oversupply’ of weapons, research and develop- captured weapons, especially in ment capacities. Israel and Vietnam (very old), the United States (smaller numbers The stock analysis should take into from Iraq, Grenada, etc.), account the number and quality of Southern Africa (Angola) weapons in the various categories remaining after the surplus is weapons produced for stock- declared and determined. This means piling, especially in Central and providing information on specific Eastern Europe categories: (1) military goods in the stock of the armed forces declared as surplus but still usable for military

B·I·C·C 13 Brief 3

Suggestions for a flow analysis of In addition to the purely quantita- surplus stocks tive documentation of surplus stocks, a flow analysis may be made —preferably in case studies—analyzing the origin of surplus. One initially assumes that the acquisition of weapons (by production or import) does not necessarily lead to a surplus, but to a use of these weapons as planned (situation A).

By analyzing surplus in a flow analysis, one may then distinguish several factors:

Causes of surplus (situation B): removal from service because of wear and tear, but generally usable; removal from service for technological reasons, i.e., because of modernization; removal from service due to changes of doctrine; removal from service because of unilateral disarmament; reduction in inventory because of agreements; disposal of used weapons (very often in war regions) because the costs of continuing to use them are too high (i.e., mines, US weapons after the Gulf War); capturing of weapons during wars which do not fit into domestic armed forces; and/or excess created by over-purchasing and stockpiling of weapons.

Usage of surplus (situation C1): sending usable surplus to A as exports, thus starting the cycle again; sending to surplus stocks at B; taking from surplus stocks by sending weapons back to A (in the case of a crisis), B because of age, or C; civil use; and/or scrapping or destroying them (situation C2).

14 B·I·C·C research design

Viewing surplus as a flow variable The stages of the flow analysis are weapons and armament capacities? instead of simply a stock variable has also suitable for a regional study. The possibilities are strongly influ- many analytical advantages. It Referring again to the Figure, A (as enced by the available technical and becomes obvious that surplus is a production) normally and prefer- economic means; an evaluation of temporary phenomenon, depending ably takes place in the industrial cases of surplus will enable the ela- on such factors as a doctrine encour- countries; B (build-up of surplus boration of technical solutions and aging stockpiling of old weapon stocks) initially occurs primarily in economic costs. goods (especially in the former the industrial countries, then—after Soviet Army, but common to all export—in Third World countries; Research Questions armed forces); agreements on C occurs in the industrial coun- destruction/reduction over a period tries, mainly in the former Soviet In conclusion, a set of key questions of time; the financial background of Union, because there is minimal emerge to guide research in the area the armed forces—the more money use for the surplus, especially in of surplus weapons. it possesses, the faster it will be mod- the Third World countries. ernized and a surplus created, the What is defined as surplus? easier old equipment can be sold, and Exports of surplus weapons gener- the more money is available for ally occurs between the North and What problems exist with carrying out expensive destruction; South, with areas of crisis and war national (official) figures? and the state of the international as major customers. weapons market in general (i.e., demand for used weapons). How many surplus stocks do exist? Second, it becomes apparent that the same good (weapon) can go through From surplus to Of what is the surplus composed? more than one phase of surplus and disarmament: non-surplus. For example, through what capacities are Where does the surplus exist? export the process becomes circular when a state acquires surplus equip- necessary for How does the surplus arise? ment (A). However, surplus may disarmament? also be created in the course of What economic and What factors determine disarma- changing threat perceptions, where technical problems ment and conversion options? weapons once declared surplus will be used again. This was the philo- arise? What strategies for handling sur- sophy behind the high weapon plus exist? stocks of the Soviet Army. Goods As can be seen by the variety of res- which are ‘civilianized’ may theor- ponses to surplus weapons, it is For what economic and technical etically be used again for military certainly possible that a surplus problems (arising in the course of purposes (for example, trucks in the (military capacities) remains and is surplus) must solutions be found? situation of a crisis). only reduced to a small extent. In what cases does surplus turn into What is the legal framework con- disarmament? In these cases, are Third, the relationship between new cerning contracts and laws—both there similarities in the forms of production and the removal of international disarmament agree- weapons from service—for example, behavior? If so, such an analysis has ments and their provisions for the direct relevance in designing con- because of technical developments or destruction of weapons as well as version strategies and policies. export interests—has become clear. national export regulations? In France, Mirage-3s are taken out of stock and exported in favor of After identifying and counting sur- Rafales. In the United States, the plus stocks, one must ascertain the suggestion has been made to export disarmament capacities necessary for the older F-16s in order to finance coping with these problems. What newer models. strategies exist for the stockpiling, destruction and conversion of

B·I·C·C 15 Brief 3

The Disposal of

In essence, the CWC places all chem- Surplus Chemical ical weapons in the class of surplus weapons. Moreover, it prohibits commonly used destruction tech- Weapons niques, namely dumping in any Weapons body of water, land burial and open- pit burning. Former methods of dis- posing of surplus chemical weapons by stocks are thus no longer an option Maria Bowers today. The CWC mandates a deadline for the destruction of all chem- Introduction The CWC defines ”Old Chemical ical weapons of no later than ten Weapons” as ”(a) Chemical years after the CWC enters into It is somewhat misleading to con- weapons which were produced force. This deadline may be extended sider chemical weapons within the before 1925; or (b) Chemical by five years in special circum- context of surplus weapons stocks in weapons produced in the period stances, upon approval of the Conf- the post-Cold War era. This is due to between 1925 and 1946 that have erence of States Parties to the CWC. the January 1993 signing of The deteriorated to such extent that Convention on the Prohibition of the they can no longer be used as It is a challenge to discover methods Development, Production, Stockpiling chemical weapons.” The CWC of disposal that are ecologically safe and Use of Chemical Weapons and on defines ”Abandoned Chemical and acceptable to both governments their Destruction, commonly referred Weapons” as ”Chemical weapons, and the local population where to as the Chemical Weapons Con- including old chemical weapons, chemical weapons are currently vention (CWC). Unlike the nuclear abandoned by a State after 1 stored. The difficult task often gives Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), January 1925 on the territory of rise to controversy and heated the CWC is non-discriminatory; all another State without consent of debates. The following discussion the participants have the same rights the latter.” will provide a brief overview of the and obligations. The conclusion of technical, political, environmental the CWC was a true landmark and economic problems nations face achievement in the field of disarma- in the destruction of surplus chem- ment, in that it bans not only the ical weapons stocks. production, stockpiling, develop- The international organization that ment and use of chemical weapons, will oversee the implementation of Properties of but also the retention and transfer the CWC is the Organisation for the Chemical Agents and (sale) of chemical weapons. The Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Munitions CWC also calls for the destruction (OPCW) located in The Hague, the of all chemical weapons owned or Netherlands. As of fall 1994, 158 In order to grasp the problems asso- possessed by states parties, and countries had signed the CWC and ciated with the destruction of requires the destruction of all old 16 had ratified it. It will enter into chemical weapons, it is necessary to and abandoned chemical weapons. force upon the 65th ratification, an recognize that not all chemical event which is likely to occur in the weapons or chemical weapons agents not-so-distant future. Most major (the poisonous substance inside a states are party to the agreement; the chemical weapon) are the same. two countries with the largest stock- These differences must be perceived, piles of chemical weapons today, the as different destruction techniques United States and Russia, are signa- are more or less suitable depending tories. Nevertheless, there are a upon the agent involved and number of countries that are not whether or not that agent is weapon- signatories, some of which are likely ized. possessors of chemical weapons. Although several Arab states have stated that they refuse to sign the CWC until Israel signs the NPT, there remains a possibility that these states will eventually join the CWC.

16 B·I·C·C chemical weapons

The CWC considers bulk agents— Nerve agents are the most lethal of Psychological agents impair ration- chemical agents that are not the chemical agents. Chemically, al thinking in humans. Large weaponized—as chemical weapons, nerve agents belong to the group doses can be lethal. LSD and BZ which therefore must be destroyed of organo-phosphorus compounds, are the most well known psych- in accordance with the CWC. A along with many modern pest- ological agents. chemical agent is considered to be a icides. Once a person comes in bulk agent when it is stored in a contact with a nerve agent— Another method of chemical agent tank, drum or other container that is whether through inhalation, classification is whether they are not suitable for battlefield employ- ingestion or contact with the skin persistent or non-persistent . Persist- ment. In most cases, it is much easier —the toxic properties of the agent ency is used to describe how long an to destroy a chemical agent when it begin to take effect. area remains contaminated at a level is in bulk than when it is in a muni- of toxicity dangerous to humans tion. The destruction and disposal of Blister agents, or vesicants, are less after a chemical agent has been weaponized agents presents a variety toxic than nerve agents, but can employed. Thus, an agent is said to of problems. Chemical agents are be deadly nonetheless. The most be persistent if the area in which it considered to be weaponized when common blister agents are mus- was used remains contaminated for they are in a munition, whether it be tard agents, first developed as a about a day or more. On the other a bomb, mortar round, artillery chemical weapon in World War I. hand, a non-persistent or volatile shell, grenade, mine or any other Blister agents react on humans by agent disperses quickly, sometimes dispersal mechanism. The risks destroying tissue, causing burns in a matter of minutes or hours. involved in destruction are and blisters when they come into Lewisite, tearing agents, Sarin, heightened if the chemical is in a contact with the skin and damage Tabun and Soman are non-persistent munition; a fused munition has an to internal organs if inhaled or agents. To make a non-persistent increased possibility of exploding ingested—sometimes resulting in agent persistent, thickeners can be during the destruction process or death. added. As a result of the additional during transport to a destruction chemical additive, it becomes more site. Blood agents are lethal and block complicated to destroy the agent by the flow of oxygen to the blood, certain means. There are literally thousands of causing oxygen starvation of body chemical substances that are poison- tissues, termed anoxia. Cyanogen A further definition helpful in ous to humans. Over the last chloride and hydrogen cyanide understanding the properties of century, however, only about 70 are blood agents. chemical weapons is that of binary different chemical agents have been weapons. Binary chemical weapons used in the manufacture of chemical Choking agents attack the respira- are those in which two, separate, weapons (Compton, 1992). Only the tory system, and they can be relatively non-toxic chemicals are most common agents will be lethal. One of the most common addressed in this study. There are a choking agents is chlorine, which number of ways to classify chemical was the first chemical agent used agents based on their specific prop- in World War I. erties. When the average person thinks about chemical weapons, the Harassing agents are usually not first image that usually comes to lethal unless inhaled in large mind is poison gas. Chemical war- quantities. Harassing agents can fare agents, however, can be found in be further broken down into a variety of forms besides gas, tearing, sneezing or vomiting including liquid, solid or aerosol agents. Many of these agents were (suspended particle). developed in World War I and are obsolete today, while others (such as CS, commonly called tear gas) are used by modern police forces for riot control.

B·I·C·C 17 Brief 3

located in the same munition. Upon In 1991, for example, real estate Buried munitions also pose problems firing the munition, the seal separ- developers unearthed a number of environmentally. Once the muni- ating the two chemicals breaks, World War I chemical munitions tions begin to corrode and leak, the allowing the chemicals to mix in buried in Washington, DC. The agents can contaminate the flight and creating a chemical agent. munitions were extremely surrounding soil and even get into corroded—some were still fused and water sources. The extent of contam- Former Methods of it was not clear what agents they ination depends on the volatility of Destruction contained. Munitions of that age the agent, and while some agents and condition are very unstable, and breakdown and become non-toxic great care had to be taken in their quickly, others remain in the soil for There have been methods of destroy- removal. There were no records of longer periods of time. As a result of ing surplus chemical weapons for what agents were in the munitions; heightened environmental awareness almost as long as there have been indeed, there was no record of the in today’s world, buried munitions chemical weapons. Historically, munitions burial there. The area was are now often unearthed inten- chemical weapons fell into the cate- evacuated during the clean up and no tionally, in order to be disposed of gory of surplus for a variety of one was injured, but the real estate in an environmentally safe manner. reasons. Many chemical weapons value of the area understandably were confiscated and destroyed at dropped. This single incident is Sea dumping of chemical munitions the end of wars, most notably those illustrative of a number of incidents is another method of disposal that in the arsenals of Japan and Ger- that have occurred in various coun- has caused a number of problems. many at the end of World War II tries where chemical munitions have Every ocean, from the Indian to the and those owned by Iraq at the end been disposed of by burial. Arctic, has been a dumping ground of the 1990 Gulf War. Chemical for thousands of tons of chemical weapons were also disposed of when According to the CWC, chemical weapons. Major dumping oper- their technology became obsolete, munitions that were buried before ations, many in very deep water, due to the development of newer 1 January 1977 do not have to be took place after World War II when and more toxic agents. Also, as destroyed, if they stay buried. the allies disposed of large quantities chemical munitions are filled with Once the munitions are unearthed, of Japanese and German chemical chemicals that sometimes have a be it intentionally or by accident, weapons, as well as large surplus corrosive effect on the shell, usa- they are defined as chemical stocks of their own. Some argue that bility of chemical weapons may weapons and must be destroyed. there is no danger when chemical decrease more rapidly than that of This precept of the CWC could munitions are dumped in very deep conventional weapons. Leaking lead to costly results for a number water, and a number of studies chemical munitions were also elim- of countries, in that land burial conducted corroborate this view. inated, as they could not be used was a common method of disposal These deep water dumpings have, without the threat of injury to one’s of chemical stockpiles that were for the most part, not caused own forces. deployed on foreign territory. If incident. Other dumping operations, these buried munitions are un- however, occurred in relatively Previously the most common dis- earthed today, they will likely shallow water in the Baltic Sea and posal methods for chemical weapons come under the category of off the coast of Japan. In both of were land burial, sea dumping, abandoned chemical weapons and these regions, dumped chemical detonation (firing or exploding the legal and financial responsibility weapons caused serious problems for munitions) and open-pit burning. for their destruction will fall on the fishing industry. Fishermen in These methods may have been the abandoning state, if the aban- the Baltic and off the coast of Japan thought to be quite clever at the doning state can be established. If still haul old chemical weapons up in time (out of sight, out of mind), but the abandoning state cannot be their nets, and are sometimes their danger has since become identified, the responsibility for exposed to still-active agents. Certain starkly apparent. destruction must be assumed by areas have been marked off limits to the State Party. In such cases, the State Party may request assistance from the OPCW.

18 B·I·C·C chemical weapons

fishing vessels for fear of future Today, not only the CWC, but also Destruction Methods incidents. In addition, sea-dumped the London Convention on sea of Today chemical munitions do not always dumping prohibits this method of stay in the sea, and a number of disposal. Thus, even if it can be countries—including France, proven that sea dumping in deep There are two major confirmed technologies for destroying chemical Australia and Poland, to name a water is a safe method of disposal, it weapons acceptable under the CWC few—have had chemical munitions is no longer an option due to these wash up on their beaches. There two conventions. limits today, incineration and chemical degradation. However, there are have also been unconfirmed reports dozens of alternative technologies, that chunks of polymerized mustard Destruction by open-pit burning and have washed up on beaches in the detonation have also had their share and the number is growing. Baltic region. of problems. In some historical There are many variants of the cases, when a large quantity of muni- Sea-dumped chemical munitions tions was destroyed in one place, not incineration process which have proven to be environmentally and react differently in water depending all of the weapons detonated; addi- technologically sound. Germany has on the agent they contain. The tionally, lax monitoring of the oper- munition shell may break open ations allowed unexploded muni- built an incineration facility near the city of Munster, to destroy old during the dumping operation or tions to remain at the site. chemical weapons and contaminated may corrode over time, allowing the Furthermore, the toxic effluents agent to leak out. Nerve agents and released into the atmosphere by soil left over from World War I and World War II chemical weapon many other agents hydrolyze, or these methods of destruction exceed stockpiles in the area. The success break down and dissolve once they most national limits imposed by come into contact with water, and environmental legislation. Thus, and safety rates of this facility are very high. The United States has also are therefore rendered harmless in a national environmental legislation chosen incineration as its destruction relatively short amount of time. often prohibits these procedures. Mustard, however, is insoluble in However, in other cases, detonation method of choice, terming it ‘Base- line Incineration Technology.’ water. When mustard comes into remains the only viable option for Although the US incineration pro- contact with water the surface oxi- destruction of certain chemical dizes, forming a skin or protective munitions. Some munitions deter- cess is not identical to other incineration technologies—such as those shell around the agent, which iorate to such a point that they used by Germany or Canada—it is remains active inside. Most injuries cannot be moved without extreme that have occurred when fishermen danger of accidental detonation, similar. For the purposes of this study, the US Baseline method is the come into contact with sea-dumped making it wiser to destroy the most worthy of further explanation, chemical munitions have resulted munition in place. This was true of from mustard. Iraq’s chemical weapons, and the in that it is the proposed method of destruction for a very large number method of detonation termed of chemical weapons, namely the Dumping has occurred not only in instantaneous thermodegredation— oceans, but also in lakes, ponds and involving the generation of a full-air entire US chemical weapon arsenal. rivers (such as the Mississippi River). explosion around the munition—was Under the Baseline incineration This practice was less frequent than used. Under this technique, muni- ocean dumping, but may be even tions were placed upon a tray of fuel process, chemical weapons are first taken to the demilitarization facility, more dangerous—these areas are oil and sharpel charges. The resulting where the chemical agent is removed often closer to population centers, fireball generated such an intense making contamination of the water heat that any contamination from from the munitions or bulk containers by automated equipment. supply a real possibility. the munition was vaporized. One This puts the workers at the demili- may also use a large amount of high The impact of sea-dumped chemical explosives to achieve the same effect. tarization plant at a very low risk of contamination. There are basically munitions on marine life is still a four products that result from the matter of debate. For the most part studies have been inconclusive, but demilitarization process: chemical agents; explosives and propellants; some have determined that it is best contaminated metal parts and to leave most sea-dumped chemical munitions where they lie, rather containers (i.e. shells and drums); and dunnage (potentially contam- than trying to recover them for re- inated packaging materials). These disposal. Nevertheless, chemical munitions sea dumped in shallow four products or ‘streams’ are then fed into incinerators. The agent is water will remain an environmental problem for some time to come.

B·I·C·C 19 Brief 3

initially collected in storage tanks variant of chemical degradation less harmful agents entails mixing and then fed into an incinerator that technology consists of detonating the agent with concrete, thereby burns the agent at 2700° F (1482°C). the entire chemical munition in a rendering it unusable. Some of the The effluents from this incinerator tank containing a solution, simul- more interesting proposals for the proceed to a second incinerator, or taneously neutralizing the agent and destruction of chemical agents afterburner, which ensures the parts. Other technologies allow for include using underground nuclear destruction of any trace amounts of removal of certain elements for re- explosions and air dropping muni- the agent that may remain from the use in industry. tions into active volcanoes. first incineration process. The effluents from the afterburner pass There is a large group of other The Chemical through a pollution abatement sys- destruction technologies in various Weapons Destruction tem which cools the flue gas, scrubs states of research and development. the acid gases and removes any par- These technologies are only listed Challenge ticulate matter. The result is less briefly here, as some of the toxic than effluents released from the methods are highly technical and a While the technologies for destroy- average commercial chemical plant full explanation would go beyond ing chemical weapons do exist, in or found above an expressway in Los the scope of this study (US practice there are many factors that Angeles during rush hour. As for the National Research Council, 1993; may come into conflict when the other three ‘streams,’ a thick-walled US Office of Technology Assess- destruction process is carried out. rotary kiln is used to incinerate the ment, July 1992; Picardi, Johnston The issues that must be considered explosives, a roller hearth furnace and Stringer, 1991; Lohs, Lundin include the high costs of destruction, for the metal parts, and a stationary and Stock, 1990). Some methods safety, and environmental, legal and furnace for the dunnage. The result- involve converting the chemical political factors. ing solids pass through a pollution agents into combustible gases abatement system and the now which are then burned and pro- Certain methods of destruction relatively harmless materials are cessed through a pollution abate- obviously have a greater impact on disposed of in an environmentally ment system. Three examples of the environment than others. Past safe manner. potential methods of converting destruction practices have shown the the agents into combustible gases problems that can be encountered Chemical degradation (or chemical are a molten metal process, stream when environmental concerns are neutralization) technologies also take reforming gasification and a plasma not addressed. Therefore destruction many different forms. There are a arc process. Other methods cur- methods must be thoroughly veri- number of chemicals, namely alkalis rently under consideration propose fied before they are adopted. Never- and oxidants, which reduce and oxidation of neutralized or par- theless, many chemical weapons often negate the toxicity of chemical tially neutralized agents, including stockpiled today need to be agents. One method is to feed the biological oxidation, electro- destroyed as quickly as possible as chemical agent into an aqueous solu- chemical oxidation, wet air oxi- they become increasingly unstable tion where the reactive chemicals are dation and supercritical water with age. Although environmentalist given time to neutralize the agent. oxidation. Biological treatment groups have legitimate concerns that Munition parts and containers can methods are being studied carefully the weapons be disposed of in an also be immersed in the solution and as a way of decontaminating soil environmentally safe manner, decontaminated. In many cases the that has been polluted by chemical weapons experts generally agree that resulting product of the chemical agents. A destruction method it is environmentally much more degradation process—hydrolysate—is which has been used with certain dangerous for the weapons to remain relatively non-toxic and may be in storage for the additional years eliminated by incineration, sea dis- required to develop alternative posal or concentration into a solid methods of destruction. form followed by deposit in land fills. Chemical degradation is often more practical than other destruction methods when agents are stored in bulk, as the process may be quicker than other methods. One

20 B·I·C·C chemical weapons

Safety must also be carefully actual danger of transporting these try. Understandably, the thought of considered in the destruction of munitions, many of which have aged earning hard currency in this time of chemical weapons. This entails considerably, and in part to the state economic crisis in Russia makes the precautions and regulations that legislation that often prevents transit extraction method extremely protect not only employees working across state lines of such dangerous attractive. Unfortunately, the pro- in the destruction facility, but also materials. The US stockpile chiefly posed extraction method is slow, the civilian population surrounding consists of munitions and bulk con- expensive and relatively inefficient in the facility. Highly sensitive mon- tainers with VX, Sarin or mustard destroying the toxicity of the agents. itoring equipment must be used in agents. The original 1985 cost estim- In addition, the process produces order to ensure there is no leakage of ate for the destruction of the US toxic waste that is a disposal prob- toxic agents. chemical weapon stockpile was US lem in itself. Furthermore, it is $1.7 billion. Today, the estimated questionable if the large quantities of The United States claims it has cost of destruction is about US $9 arsenic produced would be sold. 12,000 tons of chemical agents in billion and growing. munitions and another 19,000 tons Russia cannot destroy its stockpile in bulk storage. Russia, the sole in- This expense could expand consid- within the time allotted by the heritor of the former Soviet Union’s erably if the government is forced by CWC without outside assistance. chemical weapon stockpile, officially public opinion and special interest The United States pledged US $55 reports its stockpile to be 40,000 groups to study methods of destruc- million in destruction assistance to tons. These two countries are the tion other than incineration. This is Russia in 1993. Germany has only signatories to the CWC that a strong possibility—Greenpeace promised sizable monetary and tech- have admitted to possessing chemical strongly opposes incineration as a nical contributions to the Russian weapons. In 1994, the United means of disposal and has a very chemical weapons destruction effort, Nations Special Commission on Iraq vocal lobby presenting its case. In while other countries have also (UNSCOM) declared that Iraqi addition, many local activist groups pledged assistance. When one con- chemical weapons capabilities had in the areas surrounding current US siders the cost of the US destruction been destroyed, leaving Iraq with no storage facilities are opposed to the program, however, these outside surplus (or any) chemical weapons Baseline incineration method. The contributions fall short of the sums stocks. The destruction of Iraq’s amount of money that would have needed for Russia to destroy its chemical weapons arsenal and pro- to be allocated to the research and chemical weapons arsenal. duction facilities was relatively rapid, testing of alternative methods is and the process added to the know- great, but many of these groups Other countries have the costly ledge of how to manage the destruc- believe that the additional cost problem of destroying old or aban- tion of captured chemical weapons would be offset by what they per- doned chemical munitions. Japan stocks in the future. Nonetheless, a ceive as the reduced risks of rejecting abandoned a large number of chem- large number of old and abandoned the incineration method. ical weapons in China in the 1940s chemical weapons exist in a number and now, according to the CWC, of countries. The total amount of Russia, on the other hand, has no Japan must pay for the destruction chemical weapons and old and aban- large scale destruction facility in and cleanup of these weapons. Many doned chemical weapons that must operation. Russia does have a mobile other countries abandoned or be destroyed worldwide is daunting. destruction facility called ‘Kuasi,’ improperly disposed of chemical which was constructed to destroy weapons on former territories and The United States currently operates leaking and defective munitions, but colonies. The bilateral negotiations two incineration destruction facil- this method is not feasible for the between the territorial state and the ities. One is located at Tooele, Utah, destruction of large quantities of abandoning state in such cases are by with over 40 percent of the US chemical agents. Russia is still con- no means an easy task, and include chemical weapons stockpile. The sidering a number of alternative such issues as costs and whether or second facility is on Johnston Atoll, methods of destruction. The coun- not the munitions should be about 600 miles southwest of try is showing great interest in those destroyed in place or returned to the Hawaii. The United States plans to destruction technologies which country from which they originated. build destruction facilities at the enable the retrieval of certain chem- seven other locations in the contin- icals in the agents, such as arsenic ental United States where chemical from Lewisite—an agent which agents are presently stored. The Russia possesses in large quantities. arrangement of US destruction and Arsenic is extremely expensive on storage facilities is due in part to the the world market (about $2000–3000 per kilogram) and is used in the microchip and semiconductor indus-

B·I·C·C 21 Brief 3

One must also consider the threat Once the CWC enters into force, the References of proliferation when it comes to OPCW will be responsible for the reducing arsenals. In the case of verification of destruction of chem- Compton, James A.F. 1992. chemical weapons, the threat of ical weapons stockpiles. States Military Chemical and Biological proliferation is much smaller than parties must declare their chemical Agents: Chemical and Toxicological that of nuclear or conventional weapons storage and destruction Properties. West Bloomfield, NJ: weapons. This is true for several facilities. Inspection teams from the Telford Press. reasons. First of all, many of the OPCW will continually monitor chemical weapons of today’s these facilities until the weapons Lohs, Karlheinz, S.J. Lundin and arsenals are aging and dangerous to contained therein have been Thomas Stock. 1990. The transport. Second, it would be destroyed. Destruction of Chemical Weapons cheaper in most cases for a country and Chemical Warfare Agents. desiring chemical weapons to pro- The destruction of chemical weapon Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI. duce them than to try to buy them stocks is neither an easy task nor a on the illegal arms trade market. new issue. The long history of Picardi, Alfred, Paul Johnston Third, the quantity of chemical destruction—nearly 100 years, or as and Ruth Stringer. 1991. Alternati- weapons needed to pose a signif- long as chemical weapons have ve Technologies for the icant threat is large, especially existed—has resulted in the high Detoxification of Chemical when compared to nuclear degree of sophistication of many Weapons: An Information weapons. An illegal transfer of a modern destruction techniques. Document. Prepared for significant quantity of chemical Nations have learned from their past Greenpeace International, May weapons would be very difficult to mistakes, sometimes painfully. They hide. Finally, a country would not have realized that safety and environ- US National Research Council. want to import chemical weapons mental concerns cannot be ignored. 1993. Alternative Technologies for unless it had a sufficient chemical the Destruction of Chemical Agents protection gear and training for its The completion of destruction will and Munitions. 10 June. own forces, a costly undertaking. be a great achievement, the first rela- Unfortunately, virtually every tively universal destruction of an US Office of Technology country has the technology to entire category of weapons of mass Assessment. 1992. Disposal of produce some of the simple agents destruction found in today’s Chemical Weapons: Alternative used during World War I. In sum, arsenals. Unfortunately, the non- Technologies. July. if a country really wants a chemical participation of some chemical weapons arsenal, it would be easier weapon possessor states in the CWC to build one itself rather than to implies the world may not be entire- import stocks. ly free of chemical weapons. One may hope, however, that these countries will eventually participate in the CWC, bringing about the long sought-after world without chemical weapons.

22 B·I·C·C missiles

Disposal of compelled) to dismantle their missiles and missile production facil- Surplus Missiles: ities, a series of similar problems will arise. Technical Nevertheless, the direct technical Technical problems emerging through the process of dismantlement are not the only dilemmas to be faced. This Difficulties and paper argues that there are two major reasons why supervision poses peculiar problems in the missile Commercial field: (1) the ‘modularity’ of missile systems means that subsystems and components can often be applied Interests with relative ease to other missiles for which they were not initially designed; and (2) many missile sub- systems, components, and even the whole delivery system may have by civil applications. Two principal Jordi Molas-Gallart attack, each side responded by practical consequences follow: threatening the other side’s silos Introduction with increasingly accurate missiles; Special care must be taken to pre- the only defense possible became vent diversion of components and Missiles are one of the key defense making the launchers more difficult sub-systems back into new missile systems dominating the tactical and to strike (through silo hardening and systems. strategic arena since World War II, missile mobility measures) and the and have therefore acquired great proliferation of missiles and missile Countries may lay legitimate political and military significance. launchers to multiply the targets claims to retain components, sub- The capability of hitting military confronting the enemy. This led to systems, and production facilities and civilian targets from long ‘stand- ever-larger stocks of increasingly for civilian use. off’ distances makes them extremely accurate nuclear missiles and harder- attractive delivery mechanisms for to-hit missile launchers (either in This paper will focus on long-range both conventional and mass destruc- submarines, hardened silos or mobile missiles. The Missile Technology tion weapons. This is especially the launchers). Control Regime (MTCR) targets case for ballistic missiles, against systems with ranges over 300 kilo- which no effective defenses have yet Dismantling a portion of these meters, and it is these that are the been developed. Even old, unsoph- systems under such arms reduction main subject of today’s proliferation isticated, inaccurate and relatively agreements as START and INF did concerns. Most systems over this cheap systems can still seriously highlight some of the problems the range are ballistic missiles, but threaten large civilian targets when disposal of missiles may cause. Most modern long-range cruise missiles are armed with nuclear or chemical war- apparent were the logistic and tech- also capable of reaching targets at heads. nical difficulties implicit in the distances beyond the MTCR limit. necessity of destroying such large The problems posed by the disposal At the cutting edge of ballistic stocks of weapons, as well as the en- of smaller, shorter-range tactical missiles technological development, suing economic costs. The problems missiles—often designed for use the effects of the non-existence of of disposal of surplus missiles are not against single major weapons plat- effective countermeasures against limited to the destruction of the forms (like anti-ship, surface-to-air, ballistic missiles led to a peculiar large, sophisticated arsenals of the and air-to-air missiles)—will not be kind of technological race: instead of superpowers. Proliferation of discussed here in detail. Nonetheless, observing the traditional measure- medium-range missile systems, it should be noted that certain char- countermeasure dynamics among usually based on mature 1950s and acteristics of ‘big’ missiles, including competing military systems, ballistic 1960s technologies, is increasingly their modularity, are shared by their missiles in the opposing NATO and becoming a matter of international smaller siblings. At the same time, Warsaw Pact blocks became the tar- concern. Whenever countries with there are no significant qualitative get of each other. Instead of develop- medium- and long-range missile leaps setting MTCR-controlled ing counter-measures against missile procurement decide (or are missiles in a category apart from

B·I·C·C 23 Brief 3

other, shorter-range systems—the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (or destroying the Condor missile 300 kilometer boundary is, from the nuclear, chemical and biological would obliterate Argentinean capa- technological point of view, an arbi- weapons) and conventional arms is bilities in the field of satellite trary one. Components from con- ill suited for categorizing missile sys- launchers. US experts insisted that ventional missiles that, thus far, have tems. In addition to housing several the Condor-2 could not be trans- not raised much of a proliferation dual-use components, missiles are formed into a SLV. Eventually, the concern may be applied to more peculiar in that their duality extends Condor missiles were destroyed (in powerful systems, or may help a to the major sub-systems (rocket Spain) and the production and developing industry construct stages) and eventually to the whole research facilities were apparently longer-range missiles. Similarly, it is system. Compare this to main battle dismantled. possible to improve or modify sys- tanks or fighter aircraft—they may tems so that their range and payload have dual-use components, but they Although Argentina ultimately grow into the ‘proliferation concern’ are almost useless for civilian applic- yielded to US pressure, it is not a area. Therefore, although we will ations. foregone conclusion that, in the concentrate on long-range missiles, future, countries that have embarked our discussion will refer occasionally The dual-use character of missile on long-range ballistic missile devel- to the implications for missile dis- systems has important implications opment and production will agree to posal of the technological contin- for their disposal. Because missiles the missiles’ destruction; rather, they uum across different kinds of can easily be turned into Space may try to follow the example of the missiles. Launch Vehicles (SLVs), countries big superpowers. Both the United dismantling their missile forces States and the countries of the Missile modularity: may feel entitled to resist the des- former Soviet Union (FSU) have Implications for truction of the delivery vehicle, carefully studied the possibilities of arguing that it can be put to profit- recycling the missiles to be destroyed missile disposal able civilian uses. These issues have under the START treaty, and have historically emerged in most of the used recycled missiles as boosters for Interchangeable payloads: The limited instances in which coun- space-launch vehicles. The Soviet missile as a multiple-use tries have embarked upon the Union often utilized withdrawn SS-5 system process of missile dismantlement. and SS-6 missiles as space boosters. The US Department of Defense has It is common for authors and policy- Two examples will illustrate the also used converted ICBMs (Titan II) makers dealing with proliferation problems that must be faced. The in this way, and routinely transfers problems to bundle together long- first is related to an alleged contra- missile stages and components to range missiles with weapons of mass vention of the START Treaty when SLVs. Thus, most of the sounding destruction. The MTCR arose from the former Soviet Union launched at rockets used by NASA include the concern raised by nuclear prolif- least one SS-19 missile using encoded components from one or more sur- eration: denying the means of deliv- telemetry, an operation explicitly plus missiles and most rockets used ering nuclear warheads at long forbidden by the START Treaty. by the DoD to launch research distances was seen as a further tool Responding to US questions on the experiments into space incorporate to control and reduce the dangers incident, Russia claimed the launch motors from missiles. posed by nuclear proliferation. Yet aimed at testing space launch capa- there is an obvious and important bility. The second example refers to At the same time, the START difference between missiles and the vociferous domestic opposition Treaty explicitly allows the use of nuclear, chemical and biological that accompanied the dismantlement missiles to deliver payloads into the weapons—missiles are delivery of the never-completed Argentinean upper atmosphere. Such a con- vehicles and are therefore able to Condor 2 missile program. In May version of an ICBM into a SLV must carry, with few modifications, a 1991 the Argentinean Defense be publicly announced, but this variety of payloads, including con- Minister stated his intention to ventional warheads and weapons of “deactivate, dismantle, reconvert mass destruction as well as non- and/or render unusable” the Condor military payloads. A consequence of 2 missile. Although he urged that the this flexibility is that missiles do not whole project (personnel and fit easily into weapon categories. materials) be transferred to the space Specifically, the distinction between research program (Milavnews, June 1991, p.2), opposition politicians criticized the Government’s decision. Prominent among their arguments was the contention that

24 B·I·C·C missiles

obligation does not extend to the If verifying the final use of a missile More implications of missile details of the procedure—although is difficult, the problem of missile modularity: Missiles as ‘mix certain controls and locational production facilities is even and match’ systems constraints apply. Such converted thornier. A missile production missiles are counted as ‘non- facility also provides a techno- It is often possible to interchange the deployed missiles’ (NDMs). START logical base for the production of sub-systems of a missile with relative does not establish any limits on the space launch vehicles; therefore, ease, without restructuring the number of NDMs that may be missile plants cannot be considered whole design of the missile. The retained by the signatories, with the as specialized military production modularity of missiles extends far exception of converted MX missiles. facilities. Under these circum- beyond their capacity to accom- stances, any definition of weapon modate different kinds of payloads. The United States, with its sizable surplus which includes arms pro- Thus, it is possible to mix stages space industry, views the potential duction capacity becomes extreme- from different missiles, creating new recycling of large numbers of mis- ly difficult—if not impossible—to power plants from the same com- siles with mixed feelings. As Ralph implement. Any country that has mon rocket. For instance, the first M. Hall, chairman of the Sub- invested substantially in such facil- stage of the Soviet SS-25 inter- committee on Space of the US ities will be very reluctant to continental missile is almost identical House of Representatives, put it: dismantle them. The reputation of to the first stage of the intermediate the aerospace sector as a high- range SS-20 missile. As the SS-25 "At first glance the removal of a technology field generating multi- missile was not covered by the INF thousand or so strategic missiles from ple spin-offs for the rest of the treaty such similarity appeared to our arsenal appears to be an oppor- economy has often encouraged some observers to be undermining tunity to, so-called, beat the swords countries to enter it. It is under- the validity of the whole treaty (US into ploughshares by using these rockets standable that countries consider- Congress, Senate, 1986, p. 112). in our space program. A deeper look at ing their entrance in the missile- Sharing common stage rockets is also the issue shows that while these missiles space field now regard with customary in smaller tactical may turn out to be very useful, we skepticism US literature which missiles; for example, the French- must also be very careful that use of argues the development of space designed Aster surface-to-air missile these missiles by the US Government, launch capabilities does not make has two variants (Aster15 and or their release outside the Govern- any economic sense for newcomers Aster30) with different ranges (maxi- ment as surplus assets, does not harm to the field (Chow, 1993). mums of 15 and 30 kilometers, commercial companies or discourage respectively) and different boosters, private investments in new launch One must therefore expect that but common second stages. Such vehicles" (US Congress, House, developing countries will try to interchangeability is even more 1992, p.1). retain their missile-capable research common in other major subsystems, and production facilities, even after such as guidance sets. The seeker for In the FSU, economic hardships they have withdrawn from missile the short-range surface-to-air AS30 seem to be making the recycling of production. Some authors have missile was planned to equip the old missiles more of an attractive argued in favor of a regime similar to ASMP-C long-range (400 kilometer) proposition despite the already large that of the Treaty on the Non- cruise missile, a French project aerospace industrial base. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which is basically a conventional (NPT) (Nolan, 1991). This regime version of the nuclear-armed ASMP. Mixed feelings are less likely in would promote and assist research In its anti-ship version, the ASMP-C countries with less-developed aero- on launch and space technologies would sport another final guidance space production infrastructures. among member countries in ex- assembly, a radar seeker shared this The dual-use nature of missile sys- change for guarantees that these tech- time with the MICA air-to-air tems is bound to fuel attempts by nologies would not be diverted to missile and the Kormoran anti-ship countries with fledgling ballistic military use; to this end, a system of cruise missile. Materials like fuel are missile forces pending withdrawal to safeguards and intrusive inspections common to a wide range of missiles; keep missiles as civilian systems. would have to be established. thus, both the surface-to-air SA-2 Nonproliferation policies will have missile and the SCUDs use the same to deal with this potential strategy type of fuel. This coincidence has led within the framework of a missile to problems for UN inspectors in conversion program, possibly Iraq, as Iraq claimed its continued through final-use verification fuel production to be for SA-2 measures. missiles rather than the forbidden SCUDs.

B·I·C·C 25 Brief 3

Not only is there a commonality of Two principal sets of problems 1992, p. A7). A similar strategy sub-systems and components across result. First, because isolated com- would not be possible with a fighter missile systems with very different ponents can be matched to other aircraft. ranges and technical characteristics, missiles, it becomes necessary to but there are also many components accurately track the final destin- Such a diversion or hiding of with dual military-civilian application of the individual sub-systems component parts during the process ations. ‘Dual-use’ extends even to or parts from converted or disabled of disposal becomes more relevant in some very specialized sub-systems; missiles. Second, because a missile’s the missile field than in other for instance, Inertial Guidance Sys- major sub-systems can be rear- weapons systems. This was illus- tems may be applied both to missiles ranged in different ways, it trated by the series of events follow- and to civil aeronautic applications. becomes very difficult to isolate ing the decision to dismantle the In fact, there are cases of gyro tech- classes of missiles for the purposes Argentinean Condor II missile. nologies developed initially for of arms control, export control Because components can be stripped ballistic missiles that have been and arms reduction. down and matched to other systems, applied to Inertial Navigation Sys- the destination of some of the tems for transport aircraft (Hughes The importance of components Condor’s most important com- and Mecham, 1991). ponents raised considerable concern The interchangeability of missile (Wolfsthal, 1993). The missile was Because of such modular design, new sub-systems allows relatively easy shipped to Spain where it was dis- missiles may be developed by upgrades through the addition of assembled, the missile body was ‘mixing and matching’ different sub- single, new components into an crushed and the propellant was sent systems, many of which are ex- existing missile design or system. If to the United States for disposal. tracted from earlier missiles. Indeed, controlled components then become Special interest was raised by the it is difficult to find a single missile available, potential proliferators may Condor guidance sets allegedly lost whose major sub-systems have all incorporate such components into in the process. Although Argentina been purposely developed and built. their systems to obtain performance claimed the missile lacked this essen- It is easier to modify a missile by increases or assemble additional sys- tial part, there have been persistent changing some of its major sub- tems. It is even conceivable to build rumors in the press that the com- systems and components than it is to a whole missile by reassembling its ponents either remained in Argen- interchange major sub-systems in component parts. When a SS-20 (one tina or ended up in Spanish hands. other complex weapons systems. In of the missiles to be destroyed under This incident demonstrated both the a fighter aircraft or a main battle the INF agreement) of mysterious difficulty and the importance of con- tank, the substitution of a major sub- origin appeared in 1993 in a military trolling missile components in any system usually requires major adjust- parade in the republic of Chechnya, missile disposal process. ments in the rest of the platform; the one possible explanation proposed platform is the result of a finely was that the missile had been The obstacles involved in mon- balanced combination of sub-systems reassembled from components by itoring the final destination of which may be upset if altered even Chechen missile technicians (Moscow missile components will increase in slightly. It is our hypothesis here News, 17 September 1993, quoted in cases where the number of missiles that, in contrast, missiles are more IMP database at MIIS). to be destroyed is high. Neverthe- adaptable—it is often possible to less, even when dealing with a few substitute a major sub-system with- Although this may appear far- missiles as in the Condor case, the out introducing significant changes fetched, it is nevertheless possible for destination of some components in the rest of the weapon. If this countries with a certain degree of may be highly contentious—partic- hypothesis holds true, the mod- technological capacity to rebuild ularly because of the dual ularity and ‘mix and match’ char- missiles from their component parts (military-civilian) use of most acter of missile systems may be or by using ‘recycled’ components. missile components. A country can perceived as a peculiarity with imp- This makes verification of missile claim a legitimate right to keep ortant implications for the disposal destruction difficult, and provides some of the missile components and conversion of missile systems. reluctant participants in missile and sub-systems for civilian use. reduction agreements a range of Although such application may opportunities to dodge their oblig- initially be verifiable, future uses of ations. It has been suggested that, these components will be much after the Gulf War, the Iraqis dis- more difficult to control. assembled a number of missiles and hid the main components in separate sites (Washington Times, 11 June

26 B·I·C·C missiles

Defining missile classes: support structures, including pro- to accompany an INF-like global where are the limits? duction and repair facilities. Yet missile treaty (Bailey, 1991). As a because few, if any, facilities are consequence of technological Another consequence of modularity limited to the manufacture and continuity, surplus reduction meas- is the emergence of patterns of support of such a particular class of ures in one area of missile produc- gradual change in missile develop- missiles, the elimination of support tion affect the capabilities in the ment and production: it is possible structures will refer only to those other missile fields; therefore a to match existing designs with newly facilities specifically planned to pro- coherent and comprehensive acquired sub-systems, thus im- vide direct support for deployed approach to the study of missile sur- proving and/or modifying the initial missiles as is explained in article 11 plus problems is required. performance characteristics of the of the Memorandum of Understan- system. It then becomes difficult to ding accompanying the INF Treaty. The Missile ‘system’ straight-jacket missiles into separate In other words, the INF Treaty does groups. A missile type can be trans- not affect production capabilities— Thus far we have implicitly referred formed into a different use, as the the industrial infrastructure of to missiles as powered, unmanned, South Koreans transformed their missile production is unlikely to be guided projectiles, and have not US-supplier Nike SAMs into surface- affected by such an agreement. considered the whole missile system, to-surface missiles. This capacity is which includes launchers, radar, and not limited to countries with a rela- In short, the technological testing and support equipment. tively strong industrial base; some continuity linking different kinds of have claimed that Azerbaijan trans- missiles makes it difficult if not im- The missile ‘system’ reproduces formed SA-5 Gammon SAMs into possible to clearly ‘frame in’ missile the modular characteristics of the ballistic surface-to-surface missile to types to be controlled or dismantled, missile projectile. For instance, it is be used against Armenia (Beaver, and—even more important—pro- often possible to launch different 1993). Other missile types continue duction facilities will usually be kinds of missiles from the same to be adapted for applications diff- exempted from any attempt at reg- platform, thus sharing surveillance, erent from those initially intended— ulating the deployment of certain tracking and targeting systems. the AMRAAM air-to-air missile is categories of missiles. This becomes Launchers are often designed to be being converted into a SAM system more relevant in the context of pro- able to eject different kinds of for use by the Norwegian armed posals to extend the INF Treaty to a missiles, and missiles can be adapt- forces, and British Aerospace has just world-wide agreement. Such a meas- ed to be launched from different offered a new air-to-surface anti-tank ure would provide a tool to control platforms. As a consequence, any missile derived from its ASRAAM missile deployment, but it would missile that has reached some air-to-air system. not be effective in the regulation of degree of success will soon appear missile production facilities. in several versions capable of being This poses several complications for Although such production facilities launched from a variety of plat- non-proliferation policies and any may remain underemployed, most forms. A platform able to launch concerted attempt to dismantle countries will strive to maintain missiles may therefore increase its certain categories of missile systems. them—both as insurance against capabilities just by improving the Because different combinations of future eventualities and as industrial missiles it carries, and the perform- payload, motor stages, propellant, capacities that may be used in the ance of old missiles may be en- and guidance systems will result in production of unregulated missiles hanced by better platform-based different missile specifications, any and for civilian applications. This is surveillance and guidance equip- attempt at fencing off missile groups one of the reasons why the proposal ment. To sum up, the ‘mix and is apt to be disputed. In addition, the of an international space agency match’ process we have described prohibition of development and pro- (modeled on the IAEA) monitoring for the missile extends to the duction of certain missile types is the use of space technologies has whole missile system, including likely to have limited influence. For been advanced as a possible measure command and control systems, example, the INF Treaty prohibits launchers and support equipment. the production or flight testing of intermediate-range missiles, stages, or launchers of such missiles; further, it requires the elimination of all

B·I·C·C 27 Brief 3

All missile-related arms control Dismantling missiles: Decay: rockets do not age well agreements deal with both missiles Technical difficulties and their launchers and support It is quite safe to leave a tank to rust. equipment. Although this situation The elimination of a tank surplus A question of sheer numbers is unavoidable, the variety of system does not have to be subjected to configurations (real and potential) excessive time pressures; if budgetary Some missiles that have been or may creates serious headaches for arms or industrial constraints impose a negotiators dealing with missile be the object of disposal have been slow pace of weapons destruction, produced and deployed in large issues. Whenever a surplus of mis- the major problem will be the numbers. The missile as a guided siles exists, so likely will a surplus of management of large stocks of launchers and support equipment. projectile (rather that the whole sys- rusting tanks awaiting disposal. In tem including launching facilities) Because of system modularity, any the case of missiles the problem is has even equaled munitions at times: measures aimed at identifying and much more involved. Insufficient reducing a missile surplus must affect because they are dispensable, they maintenance of both solid and liquid are often mass-manufactured and the complete missile systems, multi- rockets and propellants may lead to many can be fired from a single plying the problems discussed above. nasty outcomes. Liquid propellants First, countries may strive to retain launcher-system. Although this is are notoriously difficult to handle; especially true for smaller tactical launchers capable of launching they are usually stored close to missiles, even large ballistic systems missiles not affected by arms control launching sites to enable a rapid agreements, or may argue that a have at times been produced and filling of the missile tanks prior to deployed in large numbers. A notice- surplus in missiles is not translated launch. Proper (and expensive) main- able example can be found in the into a similar surplus in launchers. tenance of the fuel tanks is required Second, the process of disposal must proliferation of SCUD missiles— whether or not the system is oper- different sources estimate that include both missiles and launchers, ational. Thus, waiting for disposal is between 5,000 and 10,000 SCUDs thus increasing the dismantlement in itself costly. If proper mainten- targets. In the limited missile dis- have been produced, mainly in the ance procedures are not followed, former Soviet Union but also in posal experience, launchers have such problems as rusting fuel tanks such countries as Egypt, Iraq, North often posed their own problems; for (liquid fuels are highly corrosive) instance, it was claimed that the Korea and Iran. Although this is an and leaks may make the dismantle- extreme case, the sheer number of Iraqis were welding together pre- ment process more hazardous as well missiles produced and deployed may viously destroyed missile launchers. as expensive. present too great a challenge to the organizations that must dismantle a This section has dealt with disposal The principal problem for solid rather complex and dangerous muni- problems arising mainly from a propellants arises from the deterior- peculiar structural characteristic of tion. Furthermore, as demonstrated ation of the propellant grain. To in the FSU, the contraction or missile systems which we have des- keep the missile operational, it is downright elimination of missile cribed as modularity. Although all necessary to apply a schedule of weapon systems will display certain research and production facilities rocket maintenance procedures, and may paradoxically reduce the coun- modular elements, missiles present at certain intervals the whole rocket try’s capacity to dismantle these an extreme case of modular flex- motor must be recast. In the absence ibility. Countries and organizations weapons systems. The case of of proper maintenance, not only missiles shows how the goals of directly involved in missile dis- may the engine become unreliable weapons dismantlement and of mantlement must also address tech- and eventually unusable (not much nical difficulties that may emerge reduction of weapons production of a problem if we are talking of capabilities may conflict. These during the process of disposal once ‘withdrawn’ systems), but also its difficulties are compounded by other an agreement has been reached on dismantlement may become more the reduction of missile surplus, and technical problems that make dis- hazardous. Although the propellant posal increasingly difficult if not certain operational procedures have grain may be recycled, extraction tackled with some speed. been established. from the rocket is a dangerous operation that requires specialized personnel and facilities.

28 B·I·C·C missiles

Environmental issues and “impractical and unreasonable” by Conclusions: handling difficulties US sources, was triggered by Questions for Ukrainian misgivings about the final The environmental problems caused destination of the systems Ukraine further research by missile disposal or recycling orig- was transferring to Russia for inate for the most part in missile disposal (Washington Times, 11 June This paper has distinguished two propellants. In particular, some 1992, p.A7). principal groups of problems liquid propellants—the heptyl (used associated with missile disposal and in Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 missiles), Transport problems recycling: the organizational for example—are highly contaminant difficulties derived from the special and notoriously difficult to handle. Because rockets and propellants are modular and dual-use nature of most Even the gas released upon a missile very dangerous to handle, missiles missile-related technologies, and the launch is highly toxic, and the un- often must be transported to special direct technical problems that arise burned fuel contained in the spent facilities for their dismantlement. during the dismantlement process. first stage falling back to Earth could Adequate precautions must be taken While the former affect most missile contaminate the area within a five for transport, as it was demonstrated sub-systems and components, the kilometer radius. Therefore, by the transfer of the Argentinean latter concern primarily the rocket destroying missiles by launching Condor 2 missiles to Spain for motor and propellants. The tech- them would cause serious contam- dismantlement. In February 1993, 14 nical difficulties involved in the ination over large areas (FBIS, 1992). engines and 30 fuselages were trans- process of rocket dismantlement and No safe method for heptyl destruc- ported by land from their base and disposal have attracted the most tion has been developed—in the Falda del Carmen to the Navy’s port press attention, but we have argued former Soviet Union, the fuel of Bahía San Blas, and from there here that the nature of missile tech- (which with time becomes unusable) were shipped to Spain. The neces- nology presents a set of organiza- was drained for distillation and then sary precautions taken resulted in a tional difficulties that must be reused, but it remains unclear how slow travel speed. The paramount addressed. heptyl fuel will be stored after dis- issue was avoiding frictional move- posal (FBIS, 1992). Solid propellants ment that could cause the engines’ It is important that any missile are also dangerous to recycle (which sealant to overheat (Olmo y Losada, disposal initiative heed the legitimate may involve recasting) or dismantle. 1993). concerns of industrializing countries over their ability to develop capa- Such technical difficulties impose Problems have also surfaced during bilities in the aerospace sector. As a strict requirements on the facilities the transport of liquid rocket consequence, further study of missile used for missile disposal. The tech- engines. While transporting a liquid surplus assessment and disposal must nical capabilities required for the rocket to a base in Krasnoyarsk for be accompanied by an understanding dismantlement of rockets are very dismantlement and recycling, a of the local conditions for the devel- similar to those required for their train’s temperature control systems opment of a domestic aerospace production. This leads to the afore- failed to operate. Although this industry (specifically of space launch mentioned effect of reduction of failure could have caused the casing capabilities) and must address the missile production capacities simul- seals to break and the heptyl fuel to control of dual-use, missile-related taneously reducing the potential for leak, Russian sources denied that a technologies. weapons disposal. At the same time, leak or a rumored explosion ever countries maintaining missiles but occurred. Be that as it may, both This paper has also argued that there lacking an adequate industrial infra- cases illustrate the difficulties of is a technological continuity—and structure for their disposal may have transporting both liquid and solid therefore a certain technological to transfer them to other countries missile rockets. commonality—among different to be dismantled. A government kinds of missiles. Although subject may resist attempts to transfer ‘their’ to different production dynamics, missiles abroad, however; an exam- medium- and long-range ballistic ple is provided by the Ukrainian missiles and their smaller relatives demand to dismantle nuclear missiles share some common technologies, (including warheads) on its own components and general character- territory. Such a demand, labeled as istics (especially their modular character). Although most attention

B·I·C·C 29 Brief 3

has thus far been directed towards References ”Saddam Said to Play Hide-And- relatively large ballistic missiles, the Seek with Scud Missiles.” [1992]. proliferation of smaller tactical Bailey, Kathleen C. 1991. ”Can Washington Times. 11 June, p.A7. missiles will have to be addressed. As Missile Proliferation Be Reversed?” small tactical missiles become more Orbis. Winter, pp.5–14. ”Ukraine, Reversal on Nukes attractive to both armies and para- Praised.” [1992]. Washington Times. military groups, their proliferation Beaver, Paul. 1993. ”Flash Points 15 April, p.A7. will likely gain relevance as a polit- Update.” Jane’s Defence Weekly. 6 ical problem. Small, tactical missiles February, p.15. US Congress. House. Committee can pose substantial threats to all on Science, Space and Technology. kinds of targets, from ‘soft’ objec- Chow, Brian G. 1993. Emerging 1991. Impact of START Agreements tives in terror campaigns to sophist- National Space Launch Programs. and Other Industry Incentives on icated weapons platforms. For Economics and Safeguards. Rand Commercial Space Markets. 105th instance, there has already been Corporation, R-4179-USDP. Congress, 31 July. some concern over the implications of cruise missile proliferation and the Hughes, David and Michael US Congress. Senate. Committee chances that shorter-range anti-ship Mecham. 1991. ”Delco Resonator on Armed Services. 1986. NATO cruise missiles may soon become Gyro Key to New Inertial Sys- Defenses and the INF Treaty. Part 3. vehicles for the long-range delivery tems.” Aviation Week & Space 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 3, 14, of mass-destruction weapons. Even Technology. 30 September, p.48. 16 February. smaller systems, such as Stinger man- portable SAMs, have recently posed International Missile Proliferation Wolfsthal, Jon B. 1993. ”Argentina serious proliferation concerns. As (IMP). Database maintained by the Ships Condor Missiles for revealed by the distribution of Monterey Institute of International Destruction, Joins MTCR.” Arms Stinger missiles among the Afghan Studies (MIIS). Control Today. April, p.24. forces, even unsophisticated armies can use the new systems to Milavnews. 1991. June, p.2. devastating effect—a fact that will not pass unnoticed elsewhere in the Miller, Roger, Mike Hobday, world. Thierry Leroux-Demers, and Xavier Olleros. 1993. ”Innovation Once the genie is out of the bottle, in Complex Systems Industries: little can be done to prevent the The Case of Flight Simulation.” systems’ spread to ‘undesirable’ Unpublished Paper. hands. In short, the study of strategies to deal with surplus weapons “Missile Fuel Leaks Will Spell must be extended beyond the ‘Catastrophe.’” [1992]. FBIS. present concentration on larger, FBIS-SOV-92-059. long-range, mostly ballistic systems to small tactical missiles, and must Nolan, Janne E. 1991. Trappings of consider the technological contin- Power. Ballistic Missiles in the Third uity among the different kinds of World. Washington, DC: The missiles. Brookings Institution.

Olmo y Losada, J. 1993. ”Condor 2 To Be Shipped to Spain for Dismantling.” Proliferation Issues. 15 January, p.13.

30 B·I·C·C light weapons

Surplus Light

finding itself with surplus stocks Weapons as a of light weapons. Europe, China and many developing countries find these weapons surplus, given Conversion the end of the Cold War. These Conversion weapons are usually not considered as surplus needing to be scrapped. On the contrary, given Problem: Unique the long life of some of these light weapons, they are a heavily traded commodity. As many have characteristics pointed out, these weapons have not been the subject of formal post-Cold War concern (e.g., and solutions CFE, the UN Register) and have found their way into the hands of legitimate and illegitimate arms dealers throughout the world. A by case which illustrates this reality is Edward J. Laurance2 While it is clear from all accounts the conflict in Rwanda (Human that there has been a reduction in Rights Watch, 1994; Goose and The rise of surplus arms trade in major conventional Smyth, 1994). light weapons weapons since the end of the Cold The breakup of Yugoslavia and War, there are some obvious reasons ethnic conflicts in the FSU are why there is an increase in the ex- indicative of the loss of control by One of the newer commodities to be port of light weapons. This is a sub- made surplus is the category increas- major powers over these conflicts. ject worthy of separate treatment, ingly referred to as light weapons. Despite the major powers increas- but a summary of key factors is ingly turning to the UN as their By all accounts, the export of sur- important in developing appropriate plus light weapons—small arms, land replacement, the long-dormant measures for dealing with this type mines, mortars, man-portable UN is not yet equipped to con- of surplus commodity. missiles—has increased significantly trol either the outbreak, conduct in the post-Cold War era (Karp, or termination of most of these The disintegration of the former 1993; Karp, 1994; The Economist, conflicts. The surplus of light Soviet Union (FSU) has resulted weapons, whose export was con- 1994). The end of the Cold War has in the sudden availability of unleashed ethnic conflicts long dor- trolled by private parties, had massive amounts of new and sur- mant and controlled by the logic of little difficulty finding its way plus light weapons. This is due to into zones of ethnic and regional the Cold War and the concept of the military nature of the former client states. Ironically, this growth conflict. These conflicts do not Soviet industrial base, the collapse in the export of surplus light need the high-technology of export control systems in the weapons so dominant in the Cold weapons, and the accompanying neg- FSU, and their need for hard ative consequences, is made increas- War arms trade. While some of currency. In 1991 and 1992 it is ingly visible due to the greater use of the more repugnant atrocities generally agreed that a brisk trade were committed by tanks and UN peacekeeping and peacemaking in light weapons existed in Russia, operations, which bring along with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia and them mass media coverage. It has other countries where light always been the case that in armed weapons manufacturing facilities conflict it is the light weapons which were prominent, and was uncon- do most of the killing, and there can trolled by any central govern- be no question that an escalating ment. Exporters included number of such weapons are getting 2 This analysis is based on Edward J. commanders of army units and into the hands of an increasing num- Laurance, "Addressing the Negative plant managers who were sud- ber of soldiers, paramilitary forces, Consequences of Light Weapons denly faced with no money to pay Trafficking: Opportunities for non-state actors and civilians their troops or workers. Given a Transparency and Restraint," in Lethal involved in ethnic conflicts which market for these commodities and Commerce, The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, ed. Jeffrey will not be resolved for a long time no governmental controls, the to come. Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. proliferation was significant and Reed (Cambridge, MA: American unreported. Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), The FSU is not the only country pp. 140-157.

B·I·C·C 31 Brief 3

heavy mortars, most were Second, these weapons are not very Consequences of promulgated using lighter expensive, especially given the trends the surplus and weapons which went undetected noted above regarding their avail- both by governments and by the ability. This means that many more subsequent export of news media covering these con- types of participants can be and are light weapons flicts. active in the trade. During the Cold War, private arms dealers were all It is now clear that private dealers Finally, the world economic but non-existent (Laurance, 1992). abound and have a huge surplus to system is transforming into one Based on the most cursory reading of market. In such an environment characterized by both more the defense trade literature and on there is little risk of political conse- legitimate free trade and the media coverage of conflicts in which quences for either the supplier development of illicit networks weapons are supposedly embargoed, (assuming it is a state) or a recipient. that foster the trade in light that is clearly not the case now. The embargo on the former Yugo- weapons as well as in drugs and Additionally, the low cost of these slavia is a case in point. True, the laundered money. weapons means that the current arms being imported into and used methods set up to track financial in this region have a clear impact on The unique nature of flows for illegal drug and gun deals the conflict. There is periodic pres- light weapons are proving inadequate. As a result sure on the combatants to move financial transactions are open to less weapons out of range of certain loca- scrutiny by independent analysts and The growing quantity of the surplus tions. But since there are multiple non-governmental organizations sources of these imported weapons, and subsequent export of light such as SIPRI, which track and to date the suppliers have escaped weapons, as indicated above, creates publicize the arms trade. Such organ- significant challenges to the control suffering any negative consequences. izations are basically unable to per- The political consequences are of its negative consequences. Equally form the valuable function of trans- diffused to a point where a focus on important in devising mechanisms to parency when it comes to this class deal with surplus light weapons are the importing of these weapons has of weapons. drawn minimal attention. qualitative factors, such as the characteristics of this trade and the nature of the commodities involved. In the post-Iraq environment, where wars are fought with mainly light First, light implies small and less weapons, linkages between arms visible, meaning that satellites are inadequate for detection and veri- buildups and military consequences are much harder to depict. The fication. This also signifies that mon- former Yugoslavia again provides a itoring and control efforts by national governmental officials, from good illustration. Small arms and mines are so plentiful that their con- desk officers down to customs offi- trol would seem to have little effect. cials, is inherently more demanding, whether it is part of a conversion For larger weapons such as mortars and tanks, actions by the UN peace- effort or one involving export con- keeping forces to control their use trols. This creates a situation where, even if states do begin to practice indicates that a linkage does exist between the arms themselves and cooperative security in the post-Cold military consequences. However, War era, the implementation phase of their arms control and conversion when such weapons are indigenously produced—as is the case with the policies may be seriously hampered Bosnian Serbs—it is difficult to by an inherent inability to verify the stocks or exports, even on the part develop any kind of control or restraint instruments. of national governments. The challenge for any multilateral control schemes would be even greater. The case of light weapons reveals minimal economic consequences, due to low prices and great availability. Although the human casualties in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia are often cited— between 100,000 and 200,000—rarely do we see an economic cost cited, especially one directly related to the

32 B·I·C·C light weapons

conduct of the war. This is due to transfer of light weapons, this may It should also be noted that gun buy- the fact that conducting such con- be difficult to achieve even at the back programs exist outside the flicts with light weapons and little in national level, although many states United States, and these programs the way of sophisticated infra- have well-established norms against also need to be evaluated. For exam- structure is cheap, in direct contrast the possession of and trade in these ple, many recent peacekeeping oper- to the Gulf War, which was very types of weapons. But as noted ations have experimented with this expensive to conduct (about $100 above, the surfeit of such weapons in approach. Nicaragua implemented billion by some estimates). The arms the aftermath of the Cold War such a program—although it has not suppliers to Iraq could relate their makes the problem at a minimum been very successful—as have the US behavior directly to an economic regional in nature and more likely forces in Haiti. This approach has cost, not to mention the significant international. The COCOM solu- great potential, especially in conjunc- losses they incurred in arms trans- tion, that of exporting expertise and tion with the promotion of norms ferred to Iraq for which they did not assistance to states in developing against the possession and use of this receive payment. Such economic export control systems, seems much class of weapons. consequences create pressure for more daunting in the case of light arms control, a pressure rarely there weapons. Transparency when wars are fought with light weapons. The campaign led by human rights The first step in making light and development NGOs to ban anti- weapons transparent might be On the other hand, with the surge in personnel land mines serves as an adding them, especially land mines, light weapons traffic and the increase excellent example of what can be into the current United Nations in conflicts featuring clear abuses of done to establish such a norm Register of Conventional Arms. The human rights, humanitarian conse- (Human Rights Watch, 1993). In this European Union has formally called quences have gained more attention. age of Internet and CNN, much for the integration of land mine data The most notable case is that of anti- more could be done to change world into the Register, as has the Under personnel land mines. The United opinion regarding the negative con- Secretary-General for Humanitarian States has placed a ban on the export sequences of trade in light weapons. Affairs of the United Nations. of these systems and has led the way The key is to emphasize specific However, the 1994 group of experts in the United Nations for an inter- negative consequences—in an age of tasked with the expansion of the national ban. increasingly brutal ethnic conflicts, a Register chose not to recommend blanket ban on weapons perceived to such an inclusion. A first look at some be needed by recipients for survival solutions is a non-starter. "The Group recognized the terrible suffering, injuries and deaths caused by Gun Buy-Back Programs the misuse of anti-personnel mines, but Creation of an International felt that the Register was not the appro- Norm on Negative With the growth of a norm against priate mechanism to deal with this Consequences the unlimited possession of guns in problem. The Register is designed as a the United States, especially semi- confidence-building measure to contri- As can be seen in the long debate on automatic and automatic weapons, it bute to the efforts aimed at preventing gun control in the United States, has been possible to begin experi- destabilizing accumulations of major nothing happens as long as the menting with so called gun ‘buy- conventional weapons beyond the ‘recipients’ can make the argument back’ programs. The idea is to get quantity needed for legitimate self- that possession of such weapons adds citizens to sell their guns to local or defense. The Group’s view was that the to stability and is defensive in state authorities, which then destroy issue of anti-personnel mines is largely nature. I would submit that the legis- them. As with any new approach one of international legal regulation" lation outlawing semi-automatic some programs have been successful (United Nation General Assembly, weapons in many states in the and others have failed. For example, 1994). United States occurred only when a some failures occurred (i.e., few guns majority of the public concluded were turned in) because the govern- that the guns themselves were a ment price was far below that of the major factor in the killings taking black market. Nevertheless, enough place. In regard to the international of these programs have been conducted to make a program evaluation imperative, in order to produce policy-relevant theory which may further develop this solution.

B·I·C·C 33 Brief 3

It is important to consider the take advantage of the breakthrough "differences in security environments rationale for transparency in these achieved by the Register and develop and concerns of states in various types of armaments. In the case of a similar system for land mines and regions . . . The Group noted the prob- the seven categories currently other light weapons. If it was lem of some types of conventional covered by the Register—major possible to concentrate on one weapons, including small arms, not conventional arms—a consensus weapon system at a time—such as covered by the categories of the Regi- existed that they are potentially man-portable air defense missiles, in ster, is referred to by some states as one destabilizing in a regional conflict which emphasizing the terrorist of the reasons for the lack of particip- context. A critical aspect is that the threat eventually led to a norm ation. The Group considered that such Register focuses mainly on one against their transfer—transparency a specific problem should primarily be type of negative consequence or measures would naturally follow. addressed among states in the regions effect of excessive arms accumu- or subregions concerned" (United lations—the outbreak of armed A third approach to transparency is Nations General Assembly, 1994). conflict across international bor- that of regional registers. From the ders. The Register is in essence a beginning of the Register exercise in Whatever transparency approach is ‘Never another Iraq’ tool. It is also February 1992 it was clear to the adopted, it will be much harder to a confidence-building mechanism. member states of the panel that areas put into practice than the current The key to including any addi- such as Africa would be marginal to UN Register, which has proven tional systems to the UN Register the effort, largely because of the troublesome for many states. Agree- will be to demonstrate that land weapons categories. Smaller and ing to register land mine and mortar mines or other types of light lighter weapons do matter. NGOs production and exports will be a weapons meet these criteria. and academic analysts may play an major and arduous political feat. important role as these regional Implementation will be even more No other ‘light’ weapons were dis- registers develop, since they are difficult, especially given the well- cussed by the Group for inclusion in often in a good position to observe documented lack of national control the UN Register. This does not the negative consequences. There is over these light weapons. mean there are no cases where accu- already some movement in the mulations of light weapons can be regional register area. The OAS has a destabilizing. The Human Rights proposal on the table to set up a Watch study on Rwanda is an excel- Latin American register, and the idea lent example of just such a situation. has come up in ASEAN deliber- Creating a register for certain light Rather, the point is that the UN ations. The 1994 Group report on weapons where a norm against Register is universal in scope and it the UN Register contains an entire their production, use or transfer will be difficult to make the case that section entitled “Regional Aspects,” has been established (e.g., anti- light weapons inter alia can be which concludes that participation personnel land mines) but cannot destabilizing. It may be possible to varied significantly by region due to: be implemented may be worse include such weapons if the Register than no register at all. The political evolves into regional variants. forces at work against transparency are significant and they will seize A better approach to transparency upon any such failures to invoke will be to utilize international the “I told you so” theorem. This transparency instruments other than is one of the reasons that some of the UN Register. If the UN Register the states involved in the UN continues to develop, it will have Register exercise have moved so paved the way for such efforts. In slowly, although others simply the case of land mines, there exists an think the idea of transparency and agreed-upon but moribund national security don’t mix very Convention on Prohibitions or well. Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Protocol II deals directly with land mines and is currently being exam- ined by a UN group of experts for possible revision and strengthening. The essence of this approach is to

34 B·I·C·C light weapons

Using the Data Develop Consultative Increase the Role of That Have Been Made Mechanisms the UN in micro- Transparent As for light weapons, if a trans- disarmament parency mechanism can be devel- Pressure by NGOs on National oped, it would provide the impetus While it is clear that the United Governments for states to air grievances when States has backed off from its initial negative consequences can be deter- enthusiasm for using the United Now that the Gulf War has moved mined. In this regard transparency Nations to solve international secur- conventional weapons compara- may go beyond registration of ity problems, it and the other major tively to the forefront of the inter- weapons to include development of powers certainly have the national agenda, both national and an ‘incidents’ register, especially competence to improve the United international NGOs concerned with when it comes to land mines. Nations’ capabilities in this area. In the negative consequences of the those cases where the United arms trade are called upon to step up Activists trying to shape national Nations has been involved, there has their pressure on national policy. and international agendas need a been an increasing emphasis on the Much of this pressure will be in the readily available database to role of the guns themselves as a cause form of gathering and publicizing employ when faced with the of the conflict and a major factor in the data on these negative conse- inevitable challenge: “guns don’t its termination. In the war in El quences that have become more kill people, people kill people.” If Salvador, the conflict settlement available in the post-Cold War global those favoring control of light included a disarmament component system. The land mine campaign weapons cannot bring forth sup- which has helped considerably in serves as a good example—the infor- porting examples—and lots of preventing a reoccurrence of the mation on casualties to innocent them—little can be accomplished. level of conflict which raged for a civilians is simply not available to What is needed is not a database of decade. In contrast, the war in governments. It comes as no surprise weapons exports and imports, as in Angola continued for a long time— that these NGOs have played a the case of the UN Register. despite UN involvement and cease- major role in influencing policy not Rather, the policymakers need to fires—because such a disarmament only in the United States but also in be constantly shown, in case after component has not been imple- the United Nations. The issue of case, how accumulations and mis- mented. The UN Secretary-General human rights serves as a good anal- use of light weapons may have and his Under Secretary-General for ogy. For valid reasons, most of the serious negative consequences. Political Affairs Marrack Goulding data on human rights abuses went have increasingly tied the trans- unreported for many years. States parency of the UN Register to its guilty of such abuses had no interest use in preventive diplomacy. If in revealing such information. transparency measures can be Therefore most of the action on the developed for mines and other light international human rights front was weapons, a more active United due to pressure from NGOs such as Nations may be more effective. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Conversely, a more active United International. In the case of light Nations will create a demand for weapons and their consequences, transparency, since it is unlikely that NGOs can increasingly focus on the any sort of UN intelligence agency weapons themselves. Continued will be developed soon. access by the media to the ongoing ethnic conflicts will be critical to this effort.

B·I·C·C 35 Brief 3

The United Nations’ Secretary- Although evidence is still being References General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has accumulated for the buy-back called for control of light weapons programs utilized in Haiti by the “The Covert Arms Trade.” [1994]. under the term ‘micro-disarmament’ United States under United Nations The Economist. 12 February, p.21– (United Nations, 1995). In micro- auspices and in other international 23. disarmament the targets of the cases, such programs have been used policies used are individuals and in US cities for many years. Faced Karp, Aaron. 1993. “Arming small groups, not states or well- with social and economic situations Ethnic Conflict.” Arms Control organized sub-national military not unlike those of developing coun- Today. 8–13 September. groups normally associated with the tries in post-civil war environments, traditional disarmament character- gun buy-back programs have accel- Karp, Aaron. 1994. “The Arms izing many UN operations. Dealing .erated in popularity, and much has Trade Revolution: The Major with such situations requires an been learned about how they work Impact of Small Arms.” The integrated, multi-method strategy and why they fail. Washington Quarterly. 17:4, pp. employing a variety of policy 65–77. approaches which address not only the root economic and social causes Goose, Stephen D. and Frank of the violence, but also the weapons Smyth. 1994. “Arming Genocide which raise the costs in economic in Rwanda.” Foreign Affairs. and human terms. Human Rights Watch. 1994. Typically countries employ a range Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade of techniques to control the negative and Human Rights Abuses in the consequences of excessive weapons Rwanda. January. in the hands of their citizens. These first include improving the overall Human Rights Watch and security of the country through Physicians for Human Rights. strengthening police forces, norm- 1993. Land Mines: A Deadly Legacy. ally a part of most traditional dis- (Human Rights Watch and armament to end civil wars. Im- Physicians for Human Rights). proving security is the best approach since it decreases the citizens’ need to Laurance, Edward J. 1992. illegally arm themselves. In many “Political Implications of Illegal post-Cold War cases, however, the Arms Exports from the United sources of instability have caused States.” Political Science Quarterly. crime and violence to rise faster than Fall, p.503. the development of such security forces. As a result, states have had to United Nations General Assembly. focus on the weapons themselves, by 1994. Report on the Continuing enacting weapons registration laws, Operation of the United Nations imposing penalties for the unauth- Register of Conventional Arms and orized possession of weapons, and in its Further Development. Report of some cases targeting individuals and the Secretary General. August. groups for forceful seizure of illegal weapons. United Nations. 1995. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. Position Paper of the Secretary-General. January.

36 B·I·C·C NVA

An Army Defining the Size of Surplus—The the NVA Heritage

The answer to the fundamental NVA’s Heritage question of how much and what exactly the Bundeswehr inherited from the NVA is surprising: although both armed forces were by equipment under 44 last-minute ‘German’ armies—thus reflecting a Otfried Nassauer3 contracts with foreign governments specific understanding about the and international arms traders for necessity for bureaucratic correct- extremely low prices between Introduction ness—there seem to be no reliable or August and October 1990, by argu- conclusive books of record. It is ing that many of these systems might The fall of the Berlin wall and the therefore impossible to compile a be incorporated into the armed succeeding German reunification left comprehensive set of data on how forces of the unified Germany. the Federal Republic of Germany’s many of which systems and items However, soon after reunification Bundeswehr with an additional, were available on 3 October 1990, increasing amounts of former East inherited army, the former East when the Bundeswehr officially took German weapon systems and mili- German National Peoples Army command over the former NVA. tary equipment came to be seen as a (NVA). The personnel, infra- Developing a clear understanding of ‘surplus’ no longer necessary for the structure, weapons, ammunition and the destiny of many of the inherited Bundeswehr. all other types of equipment of the weapons has also proven to be ex- former East German armed forces— tremely difficult. supplemented by weaponry former- Today the net results have become visible: except for a few weapon sys- ly owned by the East German While some of differences have been tems which will be used for a short Intelligence and internal Security sufficiently explained in open or period of time—24 modern Mig-29 Services (Stasi), the border troops closed sessions of parliament, it is fighter aircraft and larger quantities and other armed units—ended up highly unlikely that this is true for of low-tech, general purpose equip- under Bundeswehr ownership, all—the Bundeswehr has argued that ment—all of the former NVA stock- custody and responsibility. Later, this task would be too complicated piles became surplus. the stocks of the East German arms and time consuming. In principle, trade company ‘IMES’ . Thus inter difficulties in keeping a clear record This paper looks into several aspects alia more than 20,000 additional sub- for transportable items may be of the NVA case: machine guns came under Bundes- imagined due to the circumstances wehr custody about one year after under which bookkeepers had to unification (Deutscher Bundestag, the availability and reliability of work after reunification (i.e., lack of Document 12/1448, p.21). data about the NVA—i.e., the size experienced and specialized per- of the heritage sonnel, layoffs in personnel, sub- The Bundeswehr halted attempts of stantial relocations, exports, sales the newly elected democratic Ger- the system of decision-making and constant changes); nevertheless, man Democratic Republic (GDR) concerning the future of NVA there are good reasons for a more government to sell large quantities of equipment skeptical approach. Most of the these weapons, ammunition and excuses for mistakes in accounting the exports from surplus stocks for transportable goods are not reasonable for immobile items. The the German obligations under the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) CFE Treaty. provided parliament with varying 3 This article reflects data as available in late figures regarding the total number of 1994, i.e., as of 31 December 1993. The The paper presents an overview by installations it took over in the author is especially indebted to a number of concentrating on the major cate- former GDR—between May 1991 jounalists and research colleagues who gories of weapons and military and May 1994 inter alia the follow- allowed him to analyse materials they used equipment. It looks at weapon sys- for their stories. Among them, colleagues of ing figures were given officially: Der Spiegel, Berliner Zeitung and Süddeutsche tems rather than military dual-use 2,250, 3,320, 2,280, 2,235 and 2,288. Zeitung were especially helpful. Research equipment, and on weapons Other aspects support a skeptical colleagues Erich Schmidt-Eenboom and exported or scrapped rather than point of view; although the MoD Hans-Joachim Gießmann, who authored a those destined for static displays at produces regular reports for parlia- major book on the NVA in transition (Das exhibitions. unliebsame Erbe, Baden-Baden, 1992), also ment on NVA military equipment, provided substantial assistance.

B·I·C·C 37 Brief 3

it has not yet succeeded in producing for purposes of operational foreign military items to Israel, including them in a standard format that policy. two complete Schilka ZSU 23/4 air allows detailed comparison. From defense systems declared to be the author’s point of view, an inten- This situation is due in part to a lack ‘agricultural machines.’ In the tional lack of transparency exists. of political control over the armed aftermath of parliamentary invest- Even with extensive sources avail- forces during the unification process. igations, many other exports came able, therefore, there will be no clear The German Bundestag only lately to parliamentary attention (Deut- and comprehensive set of data from decided to execute tougher control scher Bundestag, 2 December 1991). which to start, when investigating over the administration’s decisions As a consequence the Ministry of the fate of surplus weapons from the and behavior with respect to the Defense was tasked in spring 1992 to former GDR stockpiles. former NVA equipment. Other regularly report on its activities with topics were perceived as more im- respect to the former NVA Indeed, the differences between the portant by the newly elected parlia- equipment. available data are large enough to mentarians during most of 1991. encourage much speculation, includ- More detailed parliamentary control ing assumptions about stocks not was executed only when in October justified, illegally exported or used 1991 the Hamburg harbor police seized a clandestine delivery of 14

“Going out of US $100,000 per copy; Mig-21s and MAWIA GmbH, one business sales” of the Mig-23s; 58 BM-21 and 100 RM-70 demilitarized ship, later illegally rocket launchers; 5,000 Sagger AT exported to Guinea former GDR missiles for US $800 each; 1,200 T-55 for US $10,000 per copy; 200 Königsberg-Foundation, DM 1.5 In several last-minute contracts, T-72 MBTs for US $200,000 each million for three L-410 transport signed as late as 1–2 October aircraft 1990, huge amounts of weapon Beij-MA Military District systems were sold by the GDR (Belgium), DM 62.5 million, to The two large contracts with arms Ministry of Disarmament and include inter alia 32 Mi-24 heli- traders included a paragraph Defense at very low prices. copters for DM 300,000 per copy; allowing both sides to withdraw 100 T-72 tanks for DM 180,000 per from their obligations if the neces- Major contracts included: copy; 9mm pistols for DM 10 per sary official licenses, allowances, copy including ammunition; light etc. could not be gained; thus, it is MoD of Poland, DM 207.9 machine guns for DM 75 per copy; likely no actual transfers have been million, to include 2700 Fagott RPG-18 light assault weapons for made. Whether and to what extent AT-missiles; 11 Mig-29s; 152mm DM 85 each; 100,000 anti- the contracts with Poland and ammunition; air-to-air missiles, personnel mines for DM 25 each Hungary were fulfilled is not etc. publicly known. OEG SUMER Handels- und MoD of Hungary, approxi- Service Gesellschaft, different Sources: mately DM 100 million, to contracts regarding NBC equip- Letter by which the Bundeswehr’s include 200 T-72 MBTs for DM ment and decontamination liaison group at the GDR Ministry of 180,000 each; 130,000 AT mines materials for export to Saudi Disarmament and Defense asked to for DM 10 each; 50,000 AK-74 Arabia (export licensed by FRG) withhold the systems listed in an submachine guns for DM 60 Annex from the GDR’s list of each; and many other weapons as Harlacher small arms and weapons for sale: Bundesministerium well as spare parts ammunition for DM 317,746 der Verteidigung/Ministerium für Abrüstung und Verteidigung (DDR), CIC International Ltd (USA), Heckler & Koch ammunition for 6 September 1990; Vielain, 1991; DM 275.5 million or US $349 DM 144,700 Bauer, 1993, p. IV.2-1; author’s million, to include 3 ships archives. project 151 for US $10 million ALTKAM (USSR), DM 498,420 per copy; 12 ships project 205 for for vehicles

38 B·I·C·C NVA

Estimated Holdings of the NVA

Main Battle Tanks 2,342 ACV/IFV 6,639 Artillery 2,465 Helicopters (attack) 87 Fighter Aircraft (incl. L-39 trainer) 394 Fighting Ships 69 Vehicles (incl. trailers) 100,000 Fire Arms ca 1,200,000 Ammunition (metric tons) ca 300,000

Source: Deutscher Bundestag, 11 May 1992, pp. 5+. For details, see Annex 1.

Bookkeeping argued inter alia that the NVA The data published by the FRG normally updated its listing every government and given to German The GDR Ministry of Defense two years; the latest completed Parliament committees from both and Disarmament maintained a update occurred in 1987, and there- sources differ widely. Detailed list of weapon systems and major fore did not contain more recent comparisons between the figures items held by the NVA. After changes. The 1989 update was also reveal differences between data taking possession, the Bundes- allegedly canceled due to the polit- published from the new Bundes- wehr argued repeatedly that this ical developments. Parts of the wehr system at different times. listing was by no means correct NVA list available to the author Astonishingly enough, the new or complete since the NVA did and representing a 30 June 1990 Bundeswehr accounting system not keep reliable statistics on its printout from the GDR MoD figures have been corrected in holdings. Surprisingly the computer system, however, clearly many cases and in that way came Bundeswehr never referred to an show that an update including much closer to the original NVA extensive database of the former many 1989–1990 changes must figures (see Annexes 1 and 2). NVA, which was run at the have been accomplished by the GDR MoD and contained data NVA. A comparison with the list on the NVA military installa- reprinted by the German MoD in tions and their local weapon and 1992 reveals that the reprinted equipment stockpiles. version lists data of 1989 and 1990 Sources: origin without attributing them to Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungs- A new computerized accounting a post-1987 entry . Both listings ausschuß, 19 December 1991, p.19; and management system for a reflect the same totals for most or Wehrdienst 1303/1992, p.2; Deut- broader range of items was estab- all systems listed in both. The scher Bundestag, Document 12/ lished by the Bundeswehr, but major difference between the two 2026; Deutscher Bundestag, no comprehensive comparison of sources is that the printout in the Document 12/2026, Attachment 1; both accounting systems has author’s archive lists the weapon printout from the GDR’s MoD been published. Nevertheless, in systems by age, thus establishing computer, 30 June 1990. January 1992 the Bundeswehr re- when they were added to the NVA printed large parts of the former inventory. Additions to inventory NVA listing and preliminary fig- up to 1990 are listed. Thus, the ures on the differences between argument that no update was made this list and the new accounting since 1987 cannot be accepted. system. In trying to explain these differences, the Bundeswehr

B·I·C·C 39 Brief 3

Decisionmaking vehicles and 95 percent of the artil- humanitarian aid programs System Regarding lery systems and mortars—were decided to be in excess early in the takeover by the government- the Future of process. About 80 percent of the controlled company VEBEG for NVA Weapons and non-weapon systems and major scrapping or selling after partial or Materials types of equipment were similarly complete demilitarization resolved as early as 1991. Additional During the early months after weapons and materials from cate- takeover by the Bundeswehr for reunification, the Bundeswehr laid gories 1 and 2 have since been technical intelligence purposes primary emphasis on ensuring recategorized to category 3. Among control over the NVA’s material the weapons first considered for use use by the Bundeswehr as live heritage. Thousands of major with the Bundeswehr were the D-30 targets on training sites weapons and thousands of tons of howitzers, the RM-70 missile equipment were relocated and launchers, the BTR-70 APCs and use as static displays in national as brought under a more centralized, others. They were recategorized, as well as foreign exhibitions easier-to-guard storage system. were 892 BMP-1, 2 SAM systems (Wehrdienst, 15 November 1993, Thousands of military installations— SA-5, 163,039 AK 74 submachine pp.2–3). often containing weapons, ammuni- guns, 24 Mi-24 helicopters and many tions or other dangerous goods—had others (Schulte, 1990, p. 873; Deut- Special interest was immediately to be guarded, despite a serious lack scher Bundestag, 11 May 1992, p.5). given to those categories of weapons of personnel. Although recent official figures on subject to the CFE regulations which and how much of the former (Hartmann, et al., 1992; Zellner, Because of the amount of weapons NVA equipment is still in use are 1994; Crawford, 1991; Institute for and items to be handled, the Bundes- unavailable, it is no longer very Defense and Disarmament Studies). wehr established a specific selection much. In addition to those argu- The CFE Treaty, signed November system to make decisions about the ments used in public for phasing out 1990 in Paris, continued to be applic- future of these items. Three different most NVA weapon systems (depen- able in the new political situation categories of items were created: dence on Russian spares, incompat- when Germany accepted all limit- ibility with German technical ations for the unified Germany that Category 1: service with the standards, etc.) one argument may were originally intended for West Bundeswehr for the foreseeable have also contributed to these Germany. This decision made Ger- future decisions: the more weapons from many the country with the second the NVA the Bundeswehr continued largest obligations for reductions to operate, the more NVA specialists Category 2: further evaluation or under the treaty. Nevertheless, the it would have to continue to continued interim service with treaty allowed each signatory a employ. the Bundeswehr period of time for corrections to its original notification figures. It Category 3 weapons and materials Category 3: immediately in excess allowed the earmarking of Treaty were collected and stored in special Limited Equipment (TLEs) as depots. They have been used for one intended for export according to A typical example of a category 1 the following purposes: weapon is the modern Mig-29 fighter Article III regulations. Some types of aircraft, which the Bundeswehr will TLEs could also be recategorized service with another German under the treaty regulations by use beyond the year 2000. Other Federal Ministry, e.g. the examples are two Tupolev aircraft making specific changes to their Ministry of Interior converted into the German ‘Open construction. As the CFE Treaty Skies’ airplane. The Mi-24 attack entered into force no earlier than helicopters and Mi-8 transport heli- service with the new Länder or November 1992, there was sufficient community authorities to copters are good examples of cate- time to use those provisions that strengthen the buildup of infra- gory 2 material that was further used allowed reductions to the costs asso- or evaluated and is or will be retired structure ciated with fulfilling the signatories from service. The bulk of the major obligations to scrap weapon systems. weapon systems—e.g., all other export sales from government to There was also sufficient time to fighter and fighter bomber aircraft, government export treaty-limited weapons. 98 percent of the main battle tanks, Indeed, German government offi- 95 percent of the armored cavalry foreign military aid programs cials informed members of parliament that exports would become technical intelligence exchange programs

40 B·I·C·C NVA

more difficult after ratification five new Länder for several years, consensus was reached—the sooner (Deutscher Bundestag, September only a few small or experimental reductions of these surplus stocks 1991, pp.12+). Comparing Ger- facilities were available to imme- took place, the lower the costs of many’s 1990 assumptions about how diately start the destruction of mili- handling the NVA’s heritage would many TLEs it would have to scrap tary equipment. During the time be. It was simply cheaper and faster with those given since shows that necessary to build up specialized to transport a weapon to another Germany has taken advantage of facilities, only small amounts of the country that paid for the transfer these regulations—it will have to most dangerous types of ammuni- and maybe even for the weapon, destroy much less weapons than it tions and weapons could be than to first pay for storing it and had assumed in 1990. destroyed, e.g., liquid fuel missile then for destroying it. types. The bulk of all weapons and Exports became a major means of equipment had to be guarded and To help the Bundeswehr win time ridding the Bundeswehr of the stored. For months this caused for its military tasks, a newly estab- NVA’s heritage. A number of fac- serious complications for the lished subsidiary of the government- tors contributed to this develop- Bundeswehr; they tried to owned company VEBEG, the ment. When the Bundeswehr took implement a centralized and cate- MSDG (Material-Service-Depot- command of the NVA, no special- gorized storage system, but soon it Gesellschaft), was assigned with ized dismantling facilities were was argued that these tasks would guarding and operating those depots available to immediately begin to divert the armed forces for years in which material was awaiting destroy NVA weapons, ammuni- from their normal defense, training delivery for future in-country use, tions and toxic materials in accord- and military tasks. An informal export or destruction. ance with environmental regulations. Although many environmental laws were suspended in the

German Exports of Major Weapon Systems 1992-93 (according to origin)

Category 1992–93 FRG FRG GDR Percentage Type of GDR Exports Systems surplus surplus GDR Weapon Systems Included MBT 382 243 242 139 36.4 T-72, T-55

ACV/IFV 525 278 187 247 47.0 BMP-1, BTR- 60/70, MT-LB, PTS*

Artillery 459 — — 459 100.0 SPH 122 and 152mm

Attack Helicopters 2 1 — 1 50.0 Mi-24

Combat Su-22,Mig- Aircraft 106 93 93 13 12.3 21/23

* This ACV/IFV was not identified clearly; although no equipment of West German origin is known to be designated PTS, it is accounted for in the NVA share.

This table also makes clear that most of the exports from Bundeswehr stocks are surplus weapons. The tanks exported were Leopard 1s, the aircraft were Alpha Jets and F-4 Phantoms, and the 187 IFVs were M-113s.

Source: United Nations General Assembly, 1992 and 1993.

B·I·C·C 41 Brief 3

Exports them were NATO allies Belgium, tary equipment in order to avoid Denmark, France, Greece, Turkey, increasing political pressure from its Exports from former NVA stocks the United Kingdom and the United allies. This compensation strategy largely contribute to Germany’s States as well as Italy, Spain, Canada proved to be costly, totaling some rank as the second (or third) most and Holland. A wide range of non- DM 17–18 billion, or roughly US important supplier of major weapon NATO countries from Europe and $10 billion at the time (Wehrdienst, systems according to the 1992 and other parts of the world was listed as 1258/1991, p.1). NVA equipment, at 1993 UN Registers of Conventional well: Finland, Austria, Switzerland, cost estimated by the German Arms. Substantial numbers of Sweden, Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, government, made up a significant weapon systems as well as other Romania, Hungary, the USSR, part. This policy largely contributed military items have been exported. Egypt, Algeria, Botswana, Ecuador, to early and major exports of NVA Israel, India, Saudi Arabia, Peru, weapons. The Commander of the In general, the rules for handling Tunisia, Singapore and many others Bundeswehr Command East at the excess Bundeswehr items had to be (Bundesministerium der Verteidi- time, Jörg Schönbohm, later wrote: applied for all surplus items of the gung, Parlamentarischer Staatssekre- “I have witnessed former NVA former NVA; no special regulations tär, 21 November 1991). soldiers to be laid off by 1st of were created with respect to German January 1991, working over the arms trade and export laws (Heyden, Exports to the Gulf Christmas Holidays of 1990, to 1990, p.62). Indeed, during a meeting War Allies ensure that material for our allies of the German Federal Security operating in the Persian Gulf could be provided timely” (Schönbohm, Council on 27 February 1991, it was Preparations for the Gulf War partly 1992, p.43). decided that all exports should be coincided with the process of Ger- handled in accordance with normal man reunification. Since Iraqi forces While the United States received a West German procedures as well as operated mainly Soviet types of mili- the 1982 political guidelines for arms wide range of weapons for technical tary equipment, the United States, evaluation and larger numbers of exports (Deutscher Bundestag, 2 the United Kingdom and—outside of different trucks, logistics and medical December 1991, p.26). The seizure the Gulf alliance—Israel approached of the covert delivery to Israel led on supplies for operational purposes, the German government early on for France obtained mine clearance and 23 December 1991 to a policy within various types of military equipment mine laying equipment. Egypt the MoD of tighter control of the with which they might be confront- political leadership (Wehrdienst, secured 30 NBC reconnaissance ed. Requests were mainly driven by vehicles and a 250-ton spares package 1300/1992, p.II). ‘technical intelligence’ needs, i.e., in October 1992 (Deutscher Bundes- testing and evaluation purposes. Nevertheless, the process of tag, Document 12/1999, p.15). Israel Therefore only small numbers of received NBC decontamination preparing for these deliveries had individual systems were necessary. started much earlier. Only two days equipment, firefighting equipment after the March 1990 elections in the and other dual-use supplies. Turkey Germany, because of internal policy was the only country that showed former GDR—which brought a reasons and constitutional problems, interest in obtaining substantial CDU-led Eastern German govern- could not contribute troops to the ment into power—a meeting took numbers and a wider range of actual war. It therefore decided to give weapon systems. Supplies to Turkey place within the West German financial support and to supply mili- Ministry of Defense to discuss when ultimately led to the necessity of and with whom the inherited mili- similar deliveries to Greece, thus tary equipment would be shared. creating a new military aid program for both countries (see extra section Many countries made requests for below). former NVA equipment; some of them did so even before reunification. In November 1991, a list was published naming a total of 44 countries that had requested NVA weapons (not including requests for humanitarian aid purposes). Among

42 B·I·C·C Examples of NVA-Equipment Delivered to the Gulf-War Allies*

Type of Equipment Designation Number Recipient Delivered* Country

Engineering Equipment T 130 25 USA Trucks Tatra 813 8x8 151 USA Trucks Tatra 815 6x8 208 USA Trucks Tatra 815 8x8 62 USA Trucks (POL) Tatra 815 CAPL 16 104 USA

Trucks (POL) Tatra 815 CA 18 17 USA Trucks Tatra 815 VI 129 USA Trailers for Tatra 815 VI —- 128 USA Trucks (POL, 5,000 l) Ural 48 USA Trucks Maintenance Ural 375C 48 USA

Heavy Load Trailers P 50 and P 80 189 USA Trailer (Water) 220 USA Trailer (POL) 294 USA Medical Cars LO 2002 A/C 47 USA Trucks with Showers W50 LA/A/C 604 USA

Water Bottles 18,000 USA Containers (20 ft.) 724 USA Tents (8x15 m) 200 USA NBC protection masks 100,000 USA Mine Clearance Equip. KMT 5 10 FR

Mine Clearance Equip. KMT 6M 2 10 FR Mine Laying Equip. MLG 60M 4 FR Trucks Tatra 815 6x6 40 CSFR Heavy Load Trailers P50/80 40 CSFR NBC equipment various Israel SPW-40 NBC rec. veh. 30 Egypt Spares Package 250 tons spares 1 Egypt

* This table is deliberately incomplete, as it does not include exports covered in other sections. Excluded are deliveries to the United States for testing and evaluation as well as for training purposes; deliveries to Turkey; and deliveries for technical intelligence purposes to Israel. Israel also requested other NVA equipment but detailed and official figures are not publicly known.

Source: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 22 February 1991.

B·I·C·C 43 Brief 3

Exports for Technical Israel (Deutscher Bundestag, 2 From what is known about exports, Intelligence December 1991; Deutscher Bundes- loans and deliveries for technical tag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 10 intelligence purposes, a few con- December 1991; Kolbow/ clusions may be drawn. Former NVA weapons were given as Stoltenberg, 1992) was one of the loans or as gifts to foreign countries first countries to informally show Much of the equipment requested for technical intelligence, i.e., testing interest in NVA equipment. Based and received by the United States, and evaluation purposes. These types on a 1967 general agreement and France, the United Kingdom and of exports were said to be limited to case-by-case cooperation between the Israel was identical. All countries the NATO countries and Israel. armed forces of Israel, the German were obviously looking for a Other countries—”several Arab Bundeswehr and the two countries’ number of the same items, which countries”—may also have benefited foreign intelligence services, this seem not to have been well from such exports (Deutscher type of cooperation already had known to the Western world. Bundestag, 2 December 1991, p.5). some practice. Historically, the FRG Ship-to-ship missiles of the P21 While such deliveries were imple- had benefited greatly from cooper- and P22 ‘Styx’ types are good mented on a regular basis according ation, since Israel had provided the examples, as are modern air-to-air to agreed NATO guidelines with the FRG with some complete major missiles. United States, the United Kingdom weapon systems captured during the and France, each delivery to Israel wars in the Near East, including an There was some reluctance in the was decided on a case-by-case basis AA-2 air-to-air missile and a BMP-2. (for details, see Annex 4). FRG about giving Israel complete The German side did not have much weapon systems or large numbers hardware to give in return. Even of the same item, while the The deliveries of former NVA before the unification date, however, equipment to the United States are United Kingdom and the United the Israeli military attaché in Bonn States obtained complete major somewhat unique in this context. had tabled preliminary requests for weapons if requested. On the one hand, they covered a weapon systems of interest to the broader number of types of equip- Mossad and the Israeli armed forces. ment than deliveries to any other Israel and the United States both In mid-1991, the Israeli list contained were obviously interested in land- country. In fact, the United States is 274 positions, of which the German the only country that received large mine technologies used by the government had fulfilled some 68 numbers of complete major weapon NVA. positions by December 1991 and was systems. On the other hand, the preparing to fulfill an unknown United States is the only country Only the United States looked number of additional ones (it had that received substantial numbers of into many major weapons sys- also turned down an unknown num- tems, such as different types of weapons from the former NVA for ber of wishes). The weapons seized training purposes. The US military aircraft (Su-22M4, Mig-23 and in Hamburg (14 positions) were maintains complete ‘red flag’ units, Mig-29), different tanks or a finally delivered in October 1992. complete fighting ship, such as the equipped with Soviet/Russian Examples of deliveries to Israel can weapons, in order to conduct its Tarantul class missile corvette. be found in Annex 4. military training as realistically as The United States also seems to be the only country with the possible. The opportunity to equip While in public it was argued that these units with more modern equip- resources necessary to operate these deliveries occurred as part of ment from NVA stocks was not complete ‘red flag’ type military the German Gulf War effort and as units. passed up. It can not be clearly deter- part of the normal, intra-alliance mined in all cases whether deliveries cooperation, one possible additional of NVA equipment to the United From what is known publicly, motive must be mentioned. With the recipient countries appear to States served technical intelligence or Germany no longer a front-line state training purposes. have had only limited interest in and thus having significantly less- electronic counter-measure valuable COMINT, ELINT and (ECM) or electronic counter- According to official statements, other intelligence information to Israel is the only country outside of counter-measure (ECCM) equip- share, transferring relatively mod- NATO participating in this ment from NVA stocks. This is ern, Eastern-style weaponry and either due to the assumption that exchange; several clandestine oper- equipment from NVA stocks was ations were set up by the West Ger- these items were not very capable clearly a possibility for interim man Foreign Intelligence Service to or is an indication that relevant compensation. secretly transport NVA weapons to information has been withheld Israel in cooperation with the from the public for secrecy Mossad. reasons.

44 B·I·C·C NVA

Since cooperation in technical ammunition were also delivered. In to destroy older TLEs of the same intelligence is normally subject to addition, both countries received category to meet its treaty commit- intense secrecy, the seizure of the other military equipment. Parts I ments. Since not all these limits were Hamburg weapons for Israel caused and II of Annex 3 show the major met prior to the cascading, this investigations that allowed a first exports from NVA stocks; in addi- process could lead to substantial glimpse of German practices as well tion, major deliveries from Bundes- increases in national holdings in as of some of its partners’ behaviors wehr surplus stocks within the same some cases. in this field. To the author’s know- aid package are listed in parts III and ledge, this case is unique. The size IV of that annex. Deliveries to both countries are and the wide range of the deliveries accompanied by the risk of fueling discussed during the investigations Both countries are the major recip- an arms race among poor NATO clearly raise the question of whether ients of military aid within NATO. allies, who have a wide range of more transparency in this field could They are seen by their allies as im- potentially conflicting interests make a unique contribution to confi- portant factors of stability in the (Aegis, Cyprus, Balkans) and whose dence building. Eastern Mediterranean and with governments have regularly used respect to the Muslim world— foreign policy disputes to overcome Arming Allies and Volker Rühe, the German Minister internal difficulties. Therefore the Fueling a Regional of Defense, has argued, ”since the main suppliers, Germany and the end of the east-west confrontation United States, both apply a policy in Conflict Turkey and Greece are growing into which delivered equipment is care- the role of stabilizing regional fully divided between Greece and Turkey and Greece are among the powers bordering crisis areas” Turkey on a proportional basis. largest recipients of former NVA (Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 7 weapon systems. As noted above, March 1994)—and they have received The supply of huge amounts of supplies to these two countries substantial amounts of surplus small weapons and ammunition to originated from the Turkish requests weapons for decades. German mili- Turkey may well contribute to in the Gulf War context. Both coun- tary aid programs for Turkey totaled Turkey’s war in the Kurdish tries contracted for new, large, mili- DM 6.243 billion for the 1964–1994 provinces as well as to severe human tary aid packages (Materialhilfe III), timeframe; German programs in rights violations. While the German consisting of a wide mixture of sur- support of Greece totaled DM 2.572 government argues that Turkey plus NVA and Bundeswehr weapons billion (Bundesministerium der committed itself to not using these to be delivered until 1994/1995. Verteidigung, RüT II 1, 5 October weapons for purposes other than Thus, these programs became rather 1991; Wehrdienst, 13/1993, p.2). NATO defense, the Turkish govern- independent from the Gulf War. ment has repeatedly pointed out that While deliveries before the ratific- fighting the Kurdish PKK guerrilla is Greece received inter alia 21,675 ation of the CFE Treaty were nor- well within the common tasks of all RPG-18, more than 7,000 guided mal military exports, later transfers NATO countries, since they agreed anti-tank missiles, 3 OSA air defense had to be made under the treaty to cooperate in fighting terrorism. missile systems (12 launchers with provisions which allow ‘cascading.’ 924 missiles), 306 ZSU23 air defense Within this program, the more Although the bilateral treaties guns, 501 BMP-1 armored personnel modern armed forces with troops between Turkey and Germany on carriers plus 158 RM-70 rocket deployed at the former Central the military aid programs clearly launchers (including some 205,000 Front—i.e., in Germany—are allow- state that Turkey is not authorized rockets). At one point the country, ed to transfer substantial amounts of to re-export weapons received from pressed by its debts, had to delay destined-to-be-destroyed equipment Germany without Germany’s deliveries as it could no longer pay to the countries at NATO’s flanks, written approval (Bundesministeri- for the transport (Deutscher Bundes- thus modernizing the equipment um der Verteidigung, RüZII 2, 11 tag, 21 January 1994, p.12). standard of their allies within the November 1993; Bundesministerium agreed equipment limits for these der Verteidigung/Ministerium für Deliveries to Turkey are similarly countries. If these deliveries cause Nationale Verteidigung der Repu- impressive: 4,996 RPG-7 light assault the recipient country to exceed the blik Türkei, 1994, Art. 7, para. 2.), it weapons were exported together agreed holdings in a CFE category, is possible that Turkey supplied with 197,139 rounds of ammunition; the respective country is also obliged Iraqi Kurds with small arms from 303,934 Kalashnikov rifles with at former NVA stockpiles. least 83 million rounds of ammunition, more than 2,500 machine guns, and 300 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers including large stocks of

B·I·C·C 45 Brief 3

Conversations of the author with lot of 90 vehicles to follow. The Despite the process of demilitariz- humanitarian relief workers, who choice was allegedly made on the ation, on four ships the launchers for worked in Iraqi Kurdistan for several basis of the conditions Germany had modern air-defense missiles were years, led to the conclusion that offered. The Swedish arms industry ‘accidentally’ left aboard, and a 5,000 AK-47s in use with Kurdish militias would participate in the tank pro- ton spares and ammunition package in Northern Iraq originate from duction, and Germany would buy accompanied the deal.The Indo- NVA stocks. NVA ammunition also additional equipment from Sweden. nesian government also decided to has turned up with Northern Iraq Finally—but never directly men- order three new submarines from Kurdish units. It cannot completely tioned—Sweden contracted for cheap the German company, Howaldt be excluded that Turkey also used surplus weapons of German origin as Deutsche Werk AG, that normally deliveries from the former NVA well. Sweden had already gained an cooperates with Ferrostahl when stocks to covertly supply Azerbaijan additional 160 ex-German Leopard 2 selling submarines abroad. in its conflicts with Armenia. tanks (out of 200) under a favorable contract in 1994. Roughly 800 of the Similarly, both Turkey and Greece Exports to promote NVA’s MB-LT multi-purpose are long-established and well-known exports armored vehicles to the country for customers of the FRG’s arms indus- an extraordinarily low price; Sweden tries, especially naval industries. will also receive spares from the Several of the exports of NVA cannibalization of 228 2S1 self- The massive exports from German equipment were intertwined with propelled howitzers (Björck, 1994, surplus stocks are somewhat double- procurement programs of the p.268; Bundesministerium der edged from a German arms industry recipient country from German Verteidigung, 6 April 1994; Foss, perspective. While the German arms industry. Sweden and Indo- 1995, p.13). government on the one hand is a nesia serve as examples. cheap competitor for its own arms Indonesia is another example—39 industries, it also supports the In 1994, the German arms industry former East German Navy vessels export sales of German industries won a major competition. Sweden, were sold to Indonesia by January with cheap, additional equipment. searching for its future main battle 1993 in a deal very controversial for Sometimes this surplus equipment tank, evaluated the newest versions human rights reasons. The remark- needs to be upgraded or brought up of the German Leopard 2, the US ably low price of some US $13 mil- to the recipient country’s technol- M1A2 Abrams, the French Leclerc lion for all these ships was accomp- ogy standards by German companies and the British Challenger tanks. anied by a commitment to partial before delivery (Heckmann, 1989, After a lengthy process Sweden demilitarization and refurbishment pp.49-50). From an industry pers- finally contracted with German in a German yard—at a cost of US pective, deliveries of very modern industry for 120 new production $314 million—and the German equipment may also be perceived as tanks for DM 1.2 billion (Wehrdienst company Ferrostahl training 1660 creating a need for next-generation 4/1994, p.3), with a possible second Indonesian naval soldiers. The weaponry by the German Bundes- World Bank criticized the deal, wehr earlier than otherwise anticip- noting that the total costs of the ated. project for Indonesia would be even higher, since remilitarization of the Examples of additional exports are ships at an Indonesian yard would given in combination with exports cost another $339 million. The supporting actual sales in Annex 5. Indonesian yard itself had to be modernized for that purpose at the expense of approximately US $119 million and a new harbor had to be built for US $179 million for operating the ships (Deutscher Bundes- tag, Document 12/6512; Wehr- technik, June 1993; Ziller, 1994; Dudde, 1994; Der Spiegel, 27 Septem- ber 1993; Dauth, 1993; Dohnany, 1993; Schmalz, 1992).

46 B·I·C·C NVA

Spare parts deliveries (selection) Turkey, Greece, Sweden, Denmark and Norway; RF-4 aircraft to Greece * 38 spare tubes AK-230 (30mm naval air defense gun) and Turkey; Alpha Jets to Portugal) * 51 tubes AK-725 (naval AD-gun) have also been used to further reduce * 3 30mm AD-guns AK-230 A the number of weapon systems to be * 2 30mm AD-guns training destroyed. As no intention exists to * 2 30mm AD-guns AK-230 B operate the additional weapon sys- * 7320 link for 30mm ammunition tems allowed and therefore even * 44 spare tubes AK-725 more former West German weapon * 34 spare tubes AK 230 systems are destined for surplus—of * 3 gun mounts for 30mm AK-230 A some 2054 Leopard 1, 2124 Leopard * 2 gun mounts for 30mm AK-230 B 2 and 648 M48A2G tanks available to the Bundeswehr in 1991, it will need only 672 Leopard 1 and 1712 Leopard 2 tanks for the new Army Source: Marinekommando Rostock, 1993, p.3. Structure Five (without war reserve stocks) (Bundesrepublik Deutsch- land, 1994, Attachment 7)—the Ger- man government may store at least some valuable surplus NVA equipment for possible future export and Exports for together with the trucks has primarily scrapped older NVA Humanitarian Aid transporting it, simply because the weapons in each category to meet its costs of destruction for the trucks commitments. Originally the according to German laws would be Large parts of the dual-purpose destruction of substantial numbers relatively high. equipment of the NVA have been of modern GDR equipment had exported for civilian or human- been planned (Wehrdienst, 1322/ itarian use. Trucks, maintenance CFE Obligations 1992, p.4). equipment, clothes, telecommunications or medical and NBC equip- Reductions in Treaty Limited Combat aircraft serve as a good ment, food and tents have been Equipment under the CFE cate- example. Under CFE, Germany had delivered since 1990. A wide range of gories are occurring through both to scrap about 140 aircraft and con- countries requested and received export and destruction. Thus, the tracted with a subsidiary of DASA, former NVA equipment as human- unified Germany continues to fulfill Elbe-Flugzeugwerke in Dresden. itarian aid—most of the successor its treaty obligations. By the end of The destruction has since then been states of the former Soviet Union 1993 it was expected that all completed. All aircraft destroyed plus 34 other countries and hundreds weapons to be dismantled could be were older Mig-21 models; not one of organizations from the private scrapped before 16 November 1995, Mig-23, Su-22 or even Mig-29 has sector were listed by the German the deadline by which the CFE sig- been scheduled for destruction. At government in answering parlia- natory countries are committed to the end of 1993, 24 Mig-29s were mentary questions during 1991 and completing their reductions. kept in service with the Bundeswehr, 1992 (Bundesministerium der while more than 139 aircraft were Verteidigung, Parlamentarischer CFE limits would have allowed the either scheduled for export or Staatssekretär, 21 November 1991). unified Germany to keep some addi- awaiting a decision. These included In addition to the positive aspects, it tional TLEs, since the stocks in the most of the later-production Mig-21s must be mentioned that in some former West Germany were below as well as all available Mig-23s and cases humanitarian aid was delivered the upper limits allowed for aircraft SU-22 fighter bombers. and attack helicopters. Some last- minute exports and recategorizations contributed to reduced needs for expensive destruction as well. It is not officially known whether exports of former West German TLEs (e.g., Leopard tanks to

B·I·C·C 47 Brief 3

The same procedure can be demon- CFE, it is possible that a decision to Some weapon systems may be used strated in other areas. CFE oblig- retain some older Western equip- as targets on Bundeswehr training ations are met by destroying the ment and instead destroy Eastern ranges. In some cases, this will affect older systems first: T-54s and T-55s technology weapons has been made. substantial numbers; for example, instead of T-72s; BTR-152s, BTR-40s 104 T-72 MBTs, 86 PT-76s and 50 and BTR-50s instead of BMP-1s or 2S1 self-propelled howitzers were BMP-2s; 120mm mortars HM and Other Methods of allocated for use as live targets by the HD-30 howitzers instead of the Demilitarization end of 1993 (Bundesministerium der more capable HD-20, 2S3, RM-70 or Verteidigung, 6 April 1994, p.13). BM-21 rocket launchers. It is not yet known wether these more modern Some TLEs from the former NVA have been rendered useless in other systems will be dismantled later. The ways. During the early months of Ammunition NVA’s Mi-24 attack helicopters will also not be scrapped but probably reunification, a number of major weapon systems were converted into Roughly 300,000 tons of ammuni- exported, since there is no commit- firefighting equipment and other tion were inherited from the NVA ment to destroy them under CFE by the Bundeswehr. While govern- limits (Zellner, 1994; Bundesministe- heavy duty civil machinery in former GDR armaments industry facil- ment and media reports concentrate rium der Verteidigung, 6 April 1994; ities for testing purposes. Several on successful new technologies for Wehrdienst 3/1994, p.4). aircraft, tanks and other types of dismantling ammunition, analysis equipment have been demilitarized shows that at least one-third and One reason for the decision to scrap for static display in exhibitions in maybe more than 40 percent of the the older technology systems may former NVA’s ammunition stocks have been the lower expense; Germany and other countries (Wehrdienst 13/1993 p.3; Bundes- have already been exported or are another reason surely was that ministerium der Verteidigung, 6 designated for export. The muni- newer technology weapons are easier tions available at the time of unif- to sell. Thus, only relatively small April 1994, p.13). This includes individual sales to private collec- ication were listed by the NVA as numbers of TLEs with higher mili- tions, as well. belonging to the categories in the tary value may have to be destroyed table below. during the final stages of the destruction period. Consequently the The future of roughly 280,000 tons budget proposal for 1995 contains a of ammunition had to be decided. reduced allocation of DM 219 mil- The larger portion of this ammuni- lion for CFE destructions (Deut- tion has been dismantled, while the scher Bundestag, Document 13/50, smaller part has been exported—as a Einzelplan 14, p.105; Wehrdienst 17/ general rule, exports took place in 1994, p.1). combination with deliveries of the weapons for which the ammunition While it is not yet clear whether was intended. Examples of such inheriting the NVA has led to a deliveries can be found throughout restructuring of Germany’s plans to the tables and annexes of this paper. reduce its stockpiles according to Not listed in these tables are the exports of ammunition (e.g., torpedoes) to Sweden, where they

48 B·I·C·C NVA

CFE Related Destruction of Weapon Systems (1993)

CFE Holdings Holdings Reduction CFE Limit Scrapped by Remarks Category notified notified Commitment for FRG 31 December 1990 1992 calculated notified* 1993**

MBT 7,000 7,170 3,004 2,834 4,166 956 / 1,432 959 additional (2,834) MBTs contracted

ACV/IFV 8,920 9,099 5,653 5,304 3,446 2,074/ 2,087 2014 additional (5,474) ACV/IFVs contracted

Artillery 4,602 4,735 2,030 2,006 2,705 814 / 842 290 additional (1,897) contracted

Attack 258 256 — — 306 — Helicopter

Aircraft 1,018 1,040 140 140 900 140 / 140 140 Mig-21, (118) none contracted

* Notified reduction commitments are given in two ways a) as reported by Hartmann (1994) b) as calculated by the author by comparing holdings in 1990 and FRG limits. The latter is shown in brackets.

** It is astonishing that two widely different sets of figures were given to Parliament in early 1994 about the numbers of weapons destroyed by the end of 1993: Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 6 April 1994 is in direct contradiction to Deutscher Bundestag, 8 February 1994, p.3. The figure for tanks in that letter was corrected in April 1994. These data are different from those listed by Crawford, 1991. The official figures from the Bundeswehr with respect to CFE-related equipment to be destroyed have been reduced several times. See: Ulrich Weiser, Head of the German MoD’s Planning Staff, quoted in Defense News (25 March 1991, p.61), as saying that “4,500 main battle tanks, 6,000 armored vehicles, 50 armed helicopters and 150 combat aircraft will have to be destroyed.” Additional sources: Hartmann, et al., 1992, p.397; Frank, 1992, p.31, Hartmann, et al, 1994, p 598.

B·I·C·C 49 Brief 3

were destroyed at Swedish Ord- Ammunition Stocks of the NVA nance, since environmental regulations did not allow Germany to do so domestically within acceptable costs (Wehrtechnik, 21 October Category of Ammunition Types Metric Tons 1991, pp. 1–3). Army By 31 December 1993 a total of Small Arms Ammunition 92 58,600 60,500 tons had been exported, while Artillery/Grenade Launchers 87 52,900 109,100 tons had been destroyed. An Rocket Launchers 6 23,600 additional 57,400 tons were awaiting AD-guns and SP-AD guns 17 21,800 export, while 54,100 tons were Tanks, AFV, IFV 63 66,000 awaiting destruction. No explan- AT-Weapons 12 18,000 ation is given for the difference of Guided AT-Missiles 8 1,500 300 tons from the estimated total Short Range AD-Missiles 4 500 (Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidi- Hand Grenades 9 8,000 gungsausschuß, 6 April 1994, pp. 11- Engineer Ammunition 66 16,000 12; Annex 5). 850,000 AT-mines 500,000 Directional Mines The ammunition disposal is expected Additional munitions & parts 25 3,000 to be finished by the end of 1995. Since, for security reasons, the Air and Air Defense Forces Bundeswehr does not intend to 1080 Air Defense Missiles 3 4,378 transport other countries’ surplus 17,564 Air-to-Air Missiles 10 2,429 ammunitions to the new facilities for 711 Air-to-Surface Missiles 7 406 ammunition disposal built in the five 177,346 Air-to-Surface Rockets 8 1,656 new Länder, it intends to help the Bombs 15 1,290 companies who developed these Ammunition for Aircraft Guns 5 886 techniques to aggressively market their unique capabilities in other Naval Forces countries. Naval Arty/Naval AD-guns 5 2,909 Naval Mines 6 2,208 Depth Bombs 2 1,785 Costs and Revenues Large explosives/Torpedoes/Parts 5 685

The income from sales of weapons Pyrotechnical Ammunition from former NVA stocks are used to Signals/Light 68 6,000 finance the defense budget and Smoke/Fog 9 898 especially the dismantling process, which was expected to cost about Total 295,430 DM 1.5 billion. According to 1994 figures the Bundeswehr predicted the earnings from sales would total Sources: Machon, 1991, p.38; Heckmann, 1990, p.76. While the Bundeswehr first used roughly DM 1.5 billion by 1997. As figures significantly lower than the NVA numbers (Preißler, 1991), it returned to the the process of ridding the Bundes- NVA estimates and continues to use them. In some cases, the Bundeswehr estimated the wehr of NVA equipment is sched- ammunition heritage to be even larger, i.e., 350,000 tons. See: Erbe, 1991, p.413. uled to end in 1996, this is also the estimate for the overall total. In addition to category 1 weapon systems, the Bundeswehr initially intended to use about 30,000, then 16,400, metric tons of NVA ammunition. This figure was reduced to approximately 14,000 tons. No lower figure has since been given publicly, although the number of NVA weapon systems in Bundeswehr use has been consistently reduced.

50 B·I·C·C NVA

The German MoD hopes to finish managing the NVA’s heritage by the end of 1996. In 1994, several initiatives were begun to make this a realistic date. Whole storage sites containing old NVA equipment have been offered to civil industries willing to empty them and scrap the rest of the equipment still available. Companies accepting these offers Estimated Earnings from Selling NVA Equip- will receive the infrastructure plus ment guards paid by the government for (Official estimate for 1990–1997) the time in which they commit themselves to emptying a site.

From a Bundeswehr perspective, Year Income from Sales (in DM) there is another good reason for speeding up the process of managing 1990–1993 595,100,000 the NVA’s heritage. The Bundes- 1994 535,300,000* wehr already must prepare itself for 1995 278,300,000* the next round of reductions of 1996 92,100,000* weapons and equipment in service. 1997 16,000,000* In the post-Cold War era, its manpower has been reduced to 370,000 Total 1,516,800,000* soldiers; a reduction to 340,000 has been decided and further cuts— possibly to less than 300,000 sol- * Estimate. diers—will have to be made during the next years if no significant Sources: Wehrdienst 13/1994, p.4; Wehrdienst 17/1994, p. 1. At the end of 1993, DM increases in the defense budget are 903 million had been spent (DM 170 million for storage and safeguarding; DM 733 decided. Constant pressure exists on million for destruction). In the budget for 1995, the estimated costs for destruction of the defense budget, leading to the weapons have been reduced by DM 209 million to DM 178 million, because of reduced investments share falling from a needs to scrap weapons and equipment. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, FüS IV 2, Cold War third of the budget to a 1994, p.5. The figures given by the Bundeswehr for 1990 to 1993 sales are contradictory, fifth under current conditions. With since in another document (Wehrdienst, 13/1994, p.4) the total given was only DM 338 new reductions, substantial numbers million for the same period. of weapon systems will again become available as surplus weapons. The reduced Bundeswehr will no longer need them, and has neither the manpower to operate nor the money to stockpile and maintain them for long periods. They will therefore fuel the surplus weapons market.

B·I·C·C 51 Brief 3

References Bundesministerium der Verteidi- ______. Document 12/1448. gung/Ministerium für Abrüstung Bonn. “Ausbildung für Indonesiens und Verteidigung (DDR). 1990. Marine in Neustadt/Holstein.” “Schreiben an Generalleutnant ______. Document 12/1820. [1993]. Wehrtechnik. June. Ullmann vom 6.9.1990.” In: Waffen- Bonn. December 1991. systeme/Gerät/Versorgungsartikel. Bauer, Harald. 1993. “Kleinwaffen Strausberg. 6 September. ______. Document 12/1999. und Munition.” Berlin. Mimeo. Bonn. Bundesministerium der Verteidi- “Billiger Rasierer.” [1993]. Der gung/Ministerium für Nationale ______. Document 12/2026. Spiegel. 27 September. Verteidigung der Republik Türkei. Bonn. 31 January 1992. 1994. Abkommen über unentgeltli- Björck, Anders. 1994. “Rüstungs- che Lieferung von Ausrüstungs- ______. Document 13/50. Bonn. kooperation: Wichtig für Schwe- material der Bundeswehr (Material- Attachment Einzelplan 14 (Defense den.” Europäische Sicherheit. June, hilfe III). Bonn. Budget). p.268. Bundesrepublik Deutschland. ______. 1994. Kurzprotokoll Buindesminister der Verteidigung 1994. Jährlicher Informationsaus- der 24. Sitzung des Unterausschusses 1994. Brief an den Vorsitzenden des tausch über Verteidigungsplanung Streitkräfte in den neuen Bundeslän- Verteidigungsausschusses, Dr. Fritz Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn. dern. Bonn. 21 January. Wittmann. Bonn. 7 March. Attachment 7. ______. 1991. Protokoll der 5. Bundesministerium der Verteidi- “Bundeswehr erneut in Verruf.” Sitzung des Unterausschusses gung. 1991. Abgabe von Material [1992]. Berliner Zeitung. Streitkräftefragen in den neuen im Zusammenhang mit der Golf- 17 January. Bundesländern am 2.9.1991. Bonn. krise. Bonn. 22 February. September. Casdorf, Stefan Andreas. 1992. ______. 1994. Antwort auf die “Indonesien erhält 39 Schiffe der ______. 1994. Unterausschuß mündliche Anfrage 1 des Abg. DDR-Marine.” Süddeutsche Zei- ‘Streitkräftefragen in den neuen Norbert Gansel (SPD) vom 8.4.1994. tung. 24 July. Bundesländern,’ 7. Bericht an den Bonn. 15 April. Verteidigungsausschuß. Bonn. 2 Crawford, Dorn. 1991 (updated April. ______. 1994. Bericht der Bundes- 1993). Conventional Armed Forces regierung über den Fortgang der Ver- in Europe (CFE)—An Overview of ______. 1992. Unterausschuß wertung von früherem NVA Mater- Key Treaty Elements. Bethesda: US- ‘Streitkräftefragen in den neuen ial. Bonn. 6 April. Army Concept Analysis Agency. Bundesländern,’ Sekretariat: Zahlen- angaben Bundeswehr in den neuen Bundesministerium der Verteidi- Dauth, Jürgen. 1993. “Billige Bundesländern. Bonn. 11 May. gung. FüS IV 2. 1994. Statistik Schiffe werden teurer.” Süddeutsche Bundeswehr in den neuen Bundes- Zeitung. 13 July. Deutscher Bundestag. Verteidigungs- ländern. Bonn. May. ausschuß. 1994. Bericht der Bundesre- Deutscher Bundestag. 1993. gierung über den Fortgang der Bundesministerium der Verteidi- Document 12/6512. Bonn. Verwertung von früherem NVA- gung. Parlamentarischer Staatsse- 28 December. Material. Bonn. 6 April. kretär. 1991. Brief an Gernot Erler (MdB). Bonn. 21 November. ______. 1994. Antwort des ______. 1991. Bericht zur Lage der Bundesministeriums der Verteidi- Bundeswehr in den neuen Bundeslän- Bundesministerium der Verteidi- gung auf die schriftliche Anfrage der dern. Bonn. 19 December. gung. RüT II 1. 1991. Deutsche Abg. Katrin Fuchs vom 21.1.1994. Verteidigungshilfen/ Unterstüt- Bonn. 8 February, p.3. ______. 1991. Fragen und Antwor- zungsleistungen für Griechenland, ten zum Bericht zur Überlassung von Portugal, Türkei. Bonn. 5 October. ______. 1991. Bericht der Wehrmaterial aus Beständen der Bundesregierung zur Überlassung ehemaligen NVA an Israel zum Zweck Bundesministerium der Verteidi- von Wehrmaterial aus Beständen der der technischen Auswertung vom gung. RüZ II 2. 1993. Schreiben betr. ehemaligen NVA an Israel zur 2.12.1991. Bonn. 10 December. Weitergabe von Rüstungsgütern der technischen Auswertung. Bonn. Bundeswehr durch die Türkei an 2 December. andere Staaten. Bonn. 11 November.

52 B·I·C·C NVA

Deutscher Bundestag. Verteidigungs- Heyden, Joachim. 1990. “Tech- Schibli, Peter. 1992. “Die Bundes- ausschuß. Unterausschuß ‘Streitkräfte- nisch-Wirtschaftliche Aspekte der wehr wird zum Waffenhändler.” fragen in den neuen Bundeländern,’ Ausrüstung und Neuordnung Baseler Zeitung. 29 July. Protokoll der 18. Sitzung. Bonn. gesamtdeutscher Streitkräfte.” Wehrtechnik. November, p.62. Schmalz, Peter. 1992. “Kriegsmari- Dohnany, Johannes V. 1993. “Kor- ne im Schlußverkauf.” Die Welt. vetten für Djakarta.” Die Woche. 18 Kolbow/Stoltenberg. 1992. Ques- 25 February. February. tions asked by Walter Kolbow on 23 January and answers provided Schönbohm, Jörg. 1992. “Deutsche Dudde, Lars-Martin. 1994. “Verirrte by Secretary of Defense kommen zu Deutschen.” In Dieter Torpedos.” Die Woche. 20 January. Stoltenberg on 10 February. Farwick. Ein Staat—Eine Armee. Frankfurt/Bonn. Erbe, Jürgen. 1991. “Entsorgung von Machon, Christian. 1991. “Die Wehrmaterial.” Soldat und Technik. ehemalige NVA und die Konver- Schulte, Heinz. 1990. “NVA June. sion- eine abschließende Zusam- equipment to be scrapped.” Jane’s menfassung.” Mediatus. Special Defence Weekly. 3 November. Feldmayer, Karl. 1992. “Kampf- Edition 1 (based on NVA schiffe für Indonesien.” Frankfurter databases). Thielbeer, S. 1992. “Deutsch- Allgemeine Zeitung. 24 July. finnisches Waffengeschäft.” Marinekommando Rostock. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Foss, Christopher. 1995. “Ex- 1993. Schreiben an die MSDG- 13 June. German Leopards delivered to Außenstelle Peenenünde. March. Sweden.” Jane’s Defence Weekly. Vol. United Nations General Assembly. 23, No. 1, p.13. Ministerium für Nationale 1992 . UN Register of Conventional Verteidigung (DDR)/MAV. Arms. Report of the Secretary- Frank, Hans. 1992. “Vernichtung 1990. “Auskunftsangaben über General. Reports from Germany. von Wehrmaterial nach den Bestim- die Nationale Volksarmee, Stand mungen des KSE-Vertrages.” Jahr- 1.1.1990.” Material für den Vielain, Heinz. 1991. “Dubiose buch für Wehrtechnik. Koblenz. Vol. Runden Tisch Militärreform beim Geschäfte von Offizieren der 21. Verteidigungsministerium der NVA.” Welt am Sonntag. 27 July. DDR. Berlin. Gießmann, Hans Joachim. 1992. Das Wehrdienst. Vol. 1990-1994. unliebsame Erbe. Baden-Baden. Mierzwa, Roland. 1993. “Rüstungshandel der Bundesrepu- Zellner, Wolfgang. 1994. Die Goldbach, J. 1990. “Bericht über blik nach dem zweiten Golf- Verhandlungen über konventionelle Abrüstung und Konversion am krieg.” Probleme des Friedens. Streitkräfte in Europa. Baden- Runden Tisch Militärreform.” April, pp. 59-69. Baden. Forschung für den Frieden. January. Ministerium für Abrüstung und Ziller, Peter. 1994. “Bonn trägt bei Hartmann, Rüdiger, et al. 1992. Verteidigung (DDR). 1990. Rüstungsexport hohes Risiko.” Kommentar zum Vertrag über Ausdruck aus der Datenbank des Frankfurter Rundschau. konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Ministeriums. Strausberg, 30 June. 16 February. Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft 3 pages (author’s archive). und Politik. March, SWP-S-375. Computer printouts from the “NVA-Waffen zur UNO.” [1994]. German MoD, dated 6 December Hartmann, Rüdiger, et al. Der Der Spiegel. 29/1994. 1991: “Golfkrieg/Ausbildung” and Vertrag über konventionelle Streit- “Technische Auswertung.” kräfte in Europa. Baden-Baden. Opall, Barbara. 1991. “German Aid Archives of a journalist colleague. to Israel Includes Two Dolphin Heckmann, Erhart. 1990. Subs.” Defense News. 25 February. “Munitionsentsorgung bei der NVA.” Wehrtechnik. October. Preißler, Ingo. 1991. “Stoltenbergs Rechnekünstler rüsten ab.” Berliner ______. 1989. “NATO- Zeitung. 18 November. Verteidigungshilfe—auch Hilfe für die deutsche Industrie.” Wehr- Scheuer, Thomas. 1992. “Schalcks technik. May. dubiosae Dreiecksbeziehungen.” Die Tageszeitung. 25 April.

B·I·C·C 53 Brief 3

Annex 1

Main Equipment of the NVA—West and East German Accounting Differences

Type of Equipment GDR listing FRG listing Difference Remarks

Tanks MBT T-72 549 551 + 2 FRG numbers vary* MBT T-55/T-55A 1,480 1,589 + 109 FRG numbers vary, partially explained MBT T-54 193 198 + 5 FRG numbers vary

Armored and Armed Vehicles AFV BMP-1 1,112 1,133 + 21 FRG numbers vary AFV BMP-2 24 24 APC SPW 40P 299 APC SPW 40P2 1,579 1,158 - 421 FRG numbers vary, partially explained APC SPW 50 PK 199 154 - 45 partially explained APC SPW 60 PA/PB 1,468 1,455 - 11 FRG numbers vary APC SPW 70 1,266 1,254 - 12 APC SPW 152 W1/K 759 717 - 42 FRG numbers vary AFV PT 76 120 142 + 22 FRG numbers vary ARV BRM1 K 15 10 - 5 FRG numbers vary Arm. multi-purpose veh. MT-LB 529

Artillery Systems Cannon 85mm 225 180 - 45 Cannon 100mm 267 255 - 12 Cannon 130mm 175 137 - 38 Howitzer 122mm M-30 407 405 - 2 FRG numbers vary Howitzer 122mm D-30 395 394 - 1 FRG numbers vary Howitzer cannon 152 mm D-20 137 137 SPH SFL 2S1 122mm 374 372 - 2 FRG numbers vary SPH SFL 2S3 152mm 96 95 - 1 Rocket launcher RM-70 265 261 - 4 FRG numbers vary Rocket launcher BM-21 58 59 + 1 Missile launcher LUNA 48 69 + 21 Missile launcher Totschka 8 Missile launcher SS-23 —- —- four with 24 msl Msl transport vehicle Totschka 26 Msl transport vehicle LUNA M 94 Grenade launcher 82mm 491 479 - 12 Grenade launcher 120mm/SANI 291 296 + 5 FRG numbers vary

54 B·I·C·C Annex

Air-Defense Systems

Launcher SM-65 Dwina 48 eight complexes Launcher SM-90 Wolchow 174 30 complexes Launcher 5P71/73 Newa 40 ten complexes Launcher 5P72 S-200 24 two complexes Launcher 5P85 S-300 12 one complex Launcher ‘Krug’ 42 Launcher ‘Kub’ 107 Launcher ‘OSA-AK’ 41 Msl transport vehicle ‘Krug’ 240 Msl transport vehicle ‘Kub’ 219 Msl transport vehicle ‘OSA-AK’ 42 Portable SAM - Strela-2 1,896 Portable SAM IGLA 75 75 ZU 23 mm twin AD-gun 924 ZSU 23/4 Schilka AD-gun 128 99 - 29

Anti-Tank Systems

AT missile launch vehicle 9P110 48 AT missile launch vehicle 9P122 54 50 - 4 AT missile launch vehicle 9 P133 156 169 + 13 AT missile launch vehicle 9P148 52 48 - 4 AT missile launcher for FAGOT 419 393 - 28 AT missile launcher for METIS 31 20 - 11

Light Arms see Appendix 2

Helicopters Mi-24 attack helicopter 51 51 Mi-8 TB armed helicopter 36 n.a. (see below) Mi-14 PL special helicopter 8 8 (Haze) Mi-14 BT special helicopter 6 6 (Haze) Mi-9 special helicopter 8 8 Mi-2 transport helicopter 25 25 Mi-8 transport helicopter 54 93 + 3 FRG counts all Mi-8 here

B·I·C·C 55 Brief 3

Aircraft Mig-21 251 251 Mig-23 47 45 - 2 difference explained Mig-29 24 24 Mig-23 BN 18 18 SU-22 54 54 L-39 training aircraft 52 52 AN-2 transport aircraft 18 n.a. AN-26 transport aircraft 12 12 L-410 transport aircraft 12 12 TU-134 transport aircraft 3 3 TU-154 transport aircraft 2 2 IL-62 transport aircraft 3 3 Z-43 aircraft 12 n.a.

Naval Weapon Systems Koni Class frigate (1159) 3 3 OSA missile corvette (205) 12 12 Tarantul missile corvette (1241) 5 5 Balcom 10 missile boats (151) 1 3 + 2 difference explained Kondor I minesweeper/ 1 + 1 difference patrol boats explained Kondor II minesweeper (89.2) 20 20

* Indicates that at different times, different figures for the holdings of this item have been given by the Bundeswehr.

Sources: Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/2026, 1992, Annex 1; Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/1820, 1991; Wehrdienst 41/ 1993, p.4; Ministerium für Abrüstung und Verteidigung (der DDR), 1990 (author’s archive). Where no figure for the Bundeswehr accounting system is listed, the author could not find one.

‘Small Firearms’ are a good example January 1992. Because the holdings obtainment during the ongoing pro- of the confusion about data, which of these weapons were not very cess of bringing in stocks from other consists of two parts: large, Bundeswehr totals also were armed groupings in the GDR— around 1.2 million. totaling some 518,220 weapons 1. The Definition Problem according to GDR definitions— NVA and GDR figures calculating West German Heckler & Koch sub- which did not allow a complete fig- small firearms probably include AK- machine guns, machine guns and ure for small firearms to exist within 47s, AK-74s, 9mm pistols, the sniper sniper rifles illegally exported to the the NVA before the Bundeswehr and automatic rifles plus the ma- GDR do not appear in either defin- takeover started. It may have been as chine guns, and thus roughly total ition. This also appears to be true for low as about 700,000 weapons, but it 1.2 million weapons at the beginning a small number of submachine guns, may have been much higher, be- of 1990—i.e., at a time when the pro- ‘Skorpion,’ which were mentioned tween 1 and 1.2 million weapons. cess of bringing stocks from outside when taken into Bundeswehr stocks. the NVA into NVA custody was The Bundeswehr/FRG figures may ongoing. 2. The Accounting Problem also be completely artificial, since Neither the NVA nor the Bundes- the accounting was accomplished FRG and Bundeswehr figures wehr figures used publicly may be during the process of scrapping and include in addition the AGS-17 viewed as reliable. The problem with exporting these weapons—this gives grenade launcher and the 40mm the NVA figures is related to their the Bundeswehr complete freedom LAW RPG-7, but for unknown to list or not list weapons without reasons list the sniper rifle only until supervising control. To make the

56 B·I·C·C Annex

Annex 2 Small Firearms in NVA Stockpile

Light Arms GDR FRG 1992 Difference FRG 1994 Remarks

Machine guns 42,526 40,991 - 1,535 55,575

Sniper rifles 1,749 1,509 - 240 n.a. listed by FRG only in1992

Submachine gun 705,032 731,050 + 25,988 783,217 FRG numbers 7.62mm AK-47 vary

Submachine gun 163,039 163,039 171,925 5.45 mm AK-74

Pistol 9mm 267,125 270,681 + 3,556 266,537 diff. caused by FRG

Automatic rifle 3,518 3,862 + 344 4,279

Automatic grenade 184 173 - 11 651 launcher AGS-17

Light assault 26,526 26,346 - 180 22,032 weapons RPG 7

LAW RPG 18 n.a. n.a.

problem worse, even the Bundes- a minimum of 303,934 AK-47s has exports—for example, another 2,500 wehr figures given after the process been exported to Turkey heavy machine guns for Turkey of scrapping and exporting weapons were under consideration and were was completed are inconclusive, and a minimum of 4,996 RPG-7s has at least partially delivered by the end contradict other Bundeswehr reports been exported to Turkey of March 1994. about exports. Thus, the Bundes- wehr figures are likely not trust- a minimum of 2,491 light machine The minimum number of small fire- worthy as well. According to the guns has been exported to Turkey arms in NVA stockpiles was there- final figures published by the fore about 1.3 million; the highest Bundeswehr in 1994, the unified 100,000 AK-47s have been possible figure may have been Germany had scrapped 891,217 small exported to Finland. around 1.7 million. firearms, retained 4,784 and exported another 408,215 weapons of this This already adds up to more than Sources: Goldbach, 1990, p.124f.; category (according to the FRG 411,000 small fire arms exported, Ministerium für Nationale definitions). But after cross-checking excluding lower numbers that were Verteidigung(DDR)/MAV, 1990; with the individual exports reported exported to many other countries as Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/ officially beforehand, this figure well as additional substantial 2026, 1992; Bundesministerium der proves to be too low: Verteidigung, RüZ II,2, 1994; Deut- scher Bundestag, Verteidigungs- ausschuß, 6 April 1994; Scheuer, 1992.

B·I·C·C 57 Brief 3

Annex 3 NVA equipment delivered to Greece and Turkey Part I: NVA Equipment Exported to Turkey

Type of Equipment Designation Number Planned Number Delivered*

Light MGs 2,500 2,491 Ammunition for Light MG 132,000,000 ? Field hospital 3 3 Light assault weapons RPG-7 12,000; later 5,000 4,996 Ammunition for RPG 7 250,000 197,139

APC BTR/SPW-60 PB 300 300 Ammunition 14.5mm for BTR-60 cannon 30,000,000 4,993,228 Ammunition 7.62mm for BTR-60 MG 30,000,000 30,000,000 Machine pistols Kalashnikov 256,125 303,934 Ammunition for Kal. M-43 100,000,000 83,000,000

Heavy MGs 2,500 222 Ammunition for Heavy MG 132,000,000 23,878,000 Mine clearance equip. KMT-5 20 20 RPG-18 100,000 one delivery canceled Trucks (ac fuel) Tatra 815 CA 15 50 Trucks (ac fuel) Tatra 815 CA 16 100 Decontamination equip. Various Trucks (fire bdes) Tatra 38

Steel helmets 500,000 500,000 Trucks Tatra 800 perhaps canceled Trucks (POL) Tatra 148 CA-17 30 perhaps canceled Missiles unnamed 100 Bombs with fuz unnamed 100

Equipment, other various small incl. 5 SAMs, etc. Trucks POL Tatra 100 Mine laying equip. (mech) 3 unknown Tank transporter Ural 4320 C 90 unknown Field hospitals 3 unknown

Bridging equipment 3 unknown

* Examples for deliveries listed for October 1990 until March, early April 1994

58 B·I·C·C Annex

Part II: NVA Equipment Exported to Greece

Type of Equipment Designation Number Planned Number Delivered*

Search and Rescue Boat RSB 5 5 River engineer boats BMK-103 M 4 4 AD-gun 23mm ZU-23 316 306 Ammunition 23mm 8,000,000 8,000,000 Ammunition 23 mm 4,500,000 294,928

Self-propelled AD guns ZSU 23/4 120 unclear whether canceled or 72 delivered ACV BMP-1 500 501 Ammunition 73mm three types 200,000 140,000 Rocket launcher RM-70 150 158 Ammunition 122mm for RM-70 200,000 205,000

Air defense msl systems OSA-AK 3 3 (with 12 launchers) AD-missiles 9 K-33 M2 408, later more 924 and 3 LAW RPG-18 21,500 21,675 AT-missiles 9 M-111 and 11,500 7,051 9 M-111M Ammunition 7.62mm M-39 and 40,000,000 5,473,712 M-43

Ammunition 7.62mm M-39 16,210,228 16,210,228 Light trucks UAZ 469 B 2,000 292 Trucks (POL) Tatra 815 CA 20 Trucks Ural D 375 1,000 MT-LB unknown at least 1

Multi-purpose towing veh. ABPC 500 probably canceled Bridging equipment Ribbon 8 Electrical generators GAB-2, 200 GAD-40 etc. Field kitchens 650 Camouflage nets different types 230,000 114,357

NBC-protection masks 260,000 260,000 Trucks LO 2002 A 56 56 Additional equipment different types small small

* Examples of deliveries listed for October 1990 until March/April 1994

B·I·C·C 59 Brief 3

Bundeswehr equipment delivered to Greece and Turkey

Part III: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Turkey

Type of Equipment Designation Number Planned Number Delivered*

Air defense guns 20mm twin gun 300 300 Ammunition AD gun 20mm 1 DM-81 4,000 4,000 Ammunition AD gun 20mm 4 DM-101 16,000 16,000 Steel helmets 500,000 500,000 (NVA?) Main battle tanks Leopard 1 85 + 85 170

APC M-113 350 + 137 537 Bridge-laying tanks M-48 10 + 10 20 Engineer tanks M-48 A2G1 20 20 ARV tanks M-88 20 20 Ammunition 105mm DM-23 KE 100,000 100,000

Ammunition 105mm DM-456 HEAT 15,000 15,000 Surface to Air Missiles Redeye 300 300 Howitzers 203mm M110 131 131 Ammunition 203mm HE 30,000 30,000 Ammunition 203mm Bomblet 9,900 9,900

Ammunition 175mm DM-12 and DM-21 68,004 68,004 AA-missiles Sidewinder AIM 9B 1,000 1,000 Ammunition 40mm for L70 DM-28 138,000 138,000 Ammunition 40mm for L70 DM-31 257,000 257,000 AD guns L-70 260 260

RPV-systems CL-89 unspecified unspecified Aircraft RF-4 46 46

* Examples for Deliveries listed for October 1990 until April 1994

60 B·I·C·C Annex

Part IV: Surplus FRG Equipment Exported to Greece

Type of Equipment Designation Number Planned Number Delivered*

Support ship Class 701 1 1 Landing boats Class 521 11 11 Landing boats Class 520 2 2 Harbor tug Class 723 5 5 Torpedo recovery vessel Class 430 2 2 (plus 2 delivered earlier)

Tetis Class corvettes Class 420 5 5 FPB Class 148 2 2 Machine gun MG-3 75 75 AD guns 20mm 20mm twin gun 546 546 Ammunition 20mm DM-101 1,092,000 1,092,000

Ammunition 20mm DM-81 1,092,000 1,092,000 Aircraft RF-4 E 20 (plus 7 20 (plus 7 in spares) in spares) Aircraft F-104 G 12 (plus 12 (plus more earlier) more earlier) Naval mines DM-21/DM-39 n.a. 150 Machine guns MG-3 and MG-3 A1 675 675

Howitzers M-110 (203mm) 88 72 Main battle tanks Leopard 1 GR2 75 75 ARV M-88 25 25 Tank (bridging) 10 10 APC M-113 200 200 Camouflage nets different types 230,000 114,357

* Examples of deliveries listed for October 1990 until April 1994

Sources: Bundesministerium der Verteidung, 15 April 1994, Attachment (an older version of this computer printout from the MoD, dating from 2 December 1993, was used to check the reliability); Wehrdienst 1315/1992 pp. 2-4; Wehrdienst 28/1993, p.4; Wehrdienst 13/1993, p.2; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 22 February 1991.

B·I·C·C 61 Brief 3

Annex 4 Examples of NVA Deliveries for Technical Intelligence, Testing and Evaluation Purposes

Type of Equipment Number Year Recipient Remarks Delivered

AT-missiles and launchers about 20 n.a. France different types, partly on vehicles, delivery intended Small fire arms different types SS-missile Frog-7 2 France intended for delivery Telecommunications equip. various France probably delivered IFF-Systems SRZO-2 3 1990 Israel SSM P-15 1 1990 Israel SSM P-21 1 1990 Israel SSM P-22 1 1990 Israel Air-to-air missiles 7 or 8 1990 Israel AA-8, AA-10a and b, AA-11 and AA-7 were available Air-to-surface missiles 6 1990 Israel likely CH-25ML, MR; CH-29L,T and CH-58Ä were available Radar for Mig-29 1 1990 Israel returned in 1991 SAM SA-5 Seeker 1 1990 Israel (warhead) SAM SA-13 3 1990 Israel likely to have included launcher vehicle Spares T-72 tank 1990/1991 Israel FROG-7 warheads n.a. 1990 Israel two types available Mine clearance Israel EMT-7 and KMT-6 equip. most likely included Range finders 3 Israel Laser recon. 1 Israel system LPR-1 Radar ‘Big Fred’ 1 1990 or 1991 Israel AT-missiles 15 1991 Israel AT-3,-4 and 5 available SA-16 Israel launcher and missiles AP- and AT-mines ca 100 1991 Israel

Spares Mig-23 1 1991 Israel included engine, ext. tanks Torpedo SAET 40 2 1991 Israel ECM-Pod 1 1991 Israel SA-6 reconnaissance 1 1991/1992 Israel intercepted in + fire control Hamburg SA-6 launch vehicle 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Long track radar P40 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) adv. ECCM sys. AD-gun ZSU 23/4 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Schilka maintenance 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) vehicle

62 B·I·C·C Annex

Truck KRAZ 214 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Truck KRAZ B-255 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg; msl trsp. veh. P21 P22 and missiles ?) Truck Zil 157 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) msl trsp. veh. P15 Truck Zil 131 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) msl trsp. veh. P15 Truck GAZ 66 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Light truck UAZ 469 2 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Spares for BMP-2 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Spares for BMP-1 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Chaff and flares launcher 1 1991/1992 Israel (Hamburg) Mine clearance equip. EMT-7 2 1990 UK AT-missiles 1991 UK AT-4 and AT-7 Small arms 27 1991 UK different types Fighterbomber SU-22 M4 1 1991 UK SSM P21 with seeker warhead 1 1991 UK SSM P22 with seeker warhead 1 1991 UK Missile launcher RUBESH 1 1991 UK Torpedo SAET-40 2 1991 UK Naval mines 1991 UK different types Chaff and flare dispenser PK-16 1 1991 UK AD-gun AK-630 1 1991 UK SSM P-15 1 1991 UK Fighter bomber Mig-23BN 1 1992 UK SSM P21/P22 1 1992 NL one each Torpedo SAET-40 1 1992 NL FROG-7 SS-missile system 1 1992 USA launcher, four msl, two warheads Mine clearance equip. KMT-6 1 1991 USA Mine clearance equip. EMT-7 2 1991 USA Funkstörgranate DZW 90 12 1991 USA different types AP-mines PMP-2 192 1991 USA AT-mines TM-46 120 1991 USA AT-mines TM-62 M 128 1991 USA AT-mines TM-62 P3 112 1991 USA SA-13 missile 6 1991 USA SA-8 missile 12 1991 USA Battlefield surv. radar 1RL232 1 1991 USA Acc. measurem. sys. AZK-5 1 1991 USA AAM AA-8 1 1990 USA AAM AA-10 1 1990 USA

B·I·C·C 63 Brief 3

AAM AA-11 2 1990/1991 USA AAM AA-7 Guidance 1 1991 USA Mig-29 fighter ac. 1 1991 USA returned Mig-29 engines 2 1991 USA Mig-29 pilot helmet 1 1991 USA Spares package for SU-22 1 1991 USA SSM P21 with seeker warhead 1 1991 USA SSM P22 with seeker warhead 1 1991 USA SAM SA-5 missiles ? ? USA planned ASM CH-25 3 1990 USA three types ASM CH-29 2 1990 USA two types ASM CH-58 6 1991 USA ASM CH-25 2 1991 USA Tarantul Class corvette 1 1991 USA MI-14 Haze helicopter 2 1991 USA Naval ASW version Naval mines 11 1992 USA different types AD-gun AK-630 1 1992 USA Torpedo SAET 40 2 1992 USA Chaff and flare dispenser PK-16 1 1992 USA

Note: Most deliveries to Israel listed here are widely confirmed; additional Israeli requests have been approved since the end of 1991; probably additional deliveries not listed have been taking place. All deliveries to Israel are loans. Information on France is somewhat uncertain since parliament was informed only during preparations for delivery. UK information seems to be solid although more may have been supplied; US information is probably reliable.

Sources: Deutscher Bundestag, 2 December 1991; Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, 10 December 1991; Kolbow/Stoltenberg, 1992; Gießmann, 1992, pp. 235-237; notes by journalist colleagues cross-checked by interviews with members of parliament and their researchers. UK and US information is mainly based on two detailed computer printouts (archives of a journalist colleague), German MoD, 6 December 1991; also, United Nations General Assembly, 1992 and 1993.

64 B·I·C·C Annex

Examples of Deliveries to the United States for Training Purposes

Type of Equipment Number Year Remarks

T-72 MBT 59 1991 T-72 MBT 27 1993 T-55 MBT 11 1991 BMP-1 AFV 19 1991 BMP-2 AFV 15 1991 BMP 2 1993 MB-LT 14 1991 MTP-LB 3 1991 BTR-70 5 1991 BTR-70 2 1993 BTR-60 PB 3 1991 BTR-50 PK 1 1991 BTR-40 P2 2 1991 BTR-40 with 9 P148 AT-system 5 1991 122mm howitzer D-30 1 1991 152mm howitzer D-20 2 1991 SPH 2S1 5 1991 SPH 2S1 6 1993 SPH 2S3 5 1991 SPH 2S3 4 1993 RM-70 MRL 2 1991 BM-21 MRL 4 1991 AKLPz BRDM-1K 2 1991 BM-24 2 1991 100mm canon (AT) 7 1991 Mig-23 ML/MLD aircraft 5 1991 Mig 23 9 1993 SU-22 M4 aircraft 2 1991 Su-22 2 1993 Mi-24 helicopters 2 1991 Mi-24 1 1992 SAM 9M33M3 72 1991 SAM launcher 9A 338 12 1991 120mm grenade launcher 1 1991 Ammunitions small 1991 100mm, 125mm, 122mm, various versions Trucks 1991 various Guided missiles 182 1992 various, not specified, NVA possibly

Note: Officially most of these deliveries have been categorized as being intended “for training purposes.” It may be assumed that they have served technical intelligence purposes as well. They represent NVA army equipment otherwise not listed in the technical intelligence context. In addition, some items listed here have been exported in such small amounts that they may have been used for technical intelligence purposes but probably not for training purposes.

Sources: United Nations General Assembly, 1992 and 1993; Wehrdienst 13/1993, p.4; Berliner Zeitung, 17 January 1992; computer printout from the German MoD, “Ausbildung,” 6 December 1991 (archives of a jounalist colleage); Der Spiegel 47/991, p.26; Gießmann, 1992, p.236.

B·I·C·C 65 Brief 3

Annex 5 Examples of Additional Exports from NVA Stocks

Type of Equipment Number Year Recipient Remarks

Spares from SPH 2S1 228 1994/5 Sweden MB-LT Armored 809 ? 1992-?? Sweden 5 in 1992,

Personnel Carrier 9 in 1993 T-72 MBT 5 1992 Sweden BMP-1 5 1993 Sweden planned A/S- missiles S5 8 1992 Sweden item not clearly identified T-72 MBT 8 1992 Canada T-72 MBT 1 1992 Belgium T-55 MBT 1 1992 Belgium BMP-1 1 1992 Belgium BTR-70 1 1992 Belgium SPH 122mm 2 1992 Belgium Mig-21 1 1992 Belgium Mig-23 1 1992 Belgium Parchim Class 16 1993/94 Indonesia FROSCH I class 12 1993/94 Indonesia landing ships FROSCH II class 2 1993/94 Indonesia supply ships Kondor-II Class miners 9 1993/94 Indonesia Spares and 5,000 1993-95 Indonesia only incomplete ammunition (tons) details known, fitting with ships Electrical generators 75 1994/95 Indonesia Field kitchens 150 1994/95 Indonesia Kondor Class 1 1991/92 Guinea demilitarized; details details deal Kondor-II Class 4 1991/2 Uruguay without weapon systems Tug (unspecified) 1 1991 Uruguay Piast Class 1 1991 Uruguay MI-24 attack helicopters 30-40 1995/6 Hungary planned Medical equipment n.a. 1992 Hungary for 3 co. PTS 6 1993 Hungary Bremse Class CPB 2 1992 Malta BGS stocks; corruption investigated Kondor-I Class coastal 4 1992 Tunisia BGS stocks patrol boat Bremse Class CPB 5 1992 Tunisia BGS stocks Kondor-I Class CPB 2 1992 Malta BGS stocks; corruption investigated SAB-12 Class CPB 5 1992 Cyprus BGS stocks Bremse Class CPB 2 1992 Jordan BGS stocks OSA Class 6 1993 Estonia partially demilitarized

66 B·I·C·C Annex

Kondor-I Class 2 1993 Estonia partially demilitarized* OSA Class 3 1993 Lithuania partially demilitarized Kondor-I Class 1 1993 Lithuania partially demilitarized Kondor-II Class 2 1993 Latvia partially demilitarized OSA Class 3 1993 Latvia partially demilitarized OSA and Kondor 4 1993 Lithuania intended Trucks 200 1992/3 Estonia Trucks 200 1992/3 Latvia Trucks 200 1993 Lithuania possibly not all delivered L-410 transport 2 1992/3 Estonia aircraft L-410 transport 2 1993 Latvia aircraft L-410 transport 2 1993 Lithuania aircraft Trucks 9,000 1992 CIS i.e., Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan

AK-47 Kalashnikovs 100,000 Finland

MBT T-72 100 1991/2 Finland Artillery 447 1993 Finland incl. 218 HD-30 howitzers

BMP-1 110 1993 Finland MB-LT 3 1992 Finland Ammunition 46,000 + Finland tons BTR -70 149 + 149 U N for UNPROFOR AK-74 1 1991 NL AK-47 1 1991 NL AK-74 1 1991 Spain with 50 rounds ammunition AK-47 1 1991 Spain with 50 rounds ammunition KM-46 130mm 92 1994/5 GR/US/ not clear from mortar FI/SW source,possibly Finland,planned Iljuschin -62 3 1993 Egypt private businessman

Sources: Deutscher Bundestag, Document 12/1820, 1991; Deutscher Bundestag, 21 January 1994, p.12; Feldmayer, 1992; Schibli, 1992; Casdorf, 1992; Der Spiegel 29/1994, p.16; Gießmann, 1992, pp. 211-248; Mierzwa, 1993, pp. 59-69; Thielbeer, 1992. Deutscher Bundestag, Verteidigungsausschuß, Unterausschuß ‘Streitkräftefragen in den neuen Bundesländern,’ Protokoll der 18. Sitzung. pp.8+.

B·I·C·C 67 Brief 3

68 B·I·C·C BICC

brief 5: publications Mersie Ejigu, Transnational Develop- ment Associates, Study on the Size, Structure and Demobilization of Armed Forces in Africa BICC series such as report, brief and report 2: paper are published either in English Nicola Mögel, Thomas Sachse und report 4: (with a German summary) or in Hans-Henning Schröder, Chancen Keith Cunningham and Andreas German (with an English summary). und Probleme der Rüstungskonversion Klemmer, Restructuring the U.S. in der Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Military Bases in Germany: Scope, brief 1: Staaten: Konversionsprofile ausgewähl- Impacts and Opportunities Ksenia Gonchar, ter Regionen - Nizhnij Novgorod, Yevgeny Kuznetsov and Republik Udmurtien, Ekaterinenburg, report 5: Alexander Ozhegov, Republik Belarus (Problems and Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and Conversion of the Post-Soviet Defense Prospects of Defense Conversion in the Herbert Wulf (eds.), The BICC Panel Industry: Implications for Russian Commonwealth of Independent States: on the World Social Summit Economic Development, Conversion Profiles of Selected February 1995 Regions—Nizhnii Novgorod, report 6: Udmurtiya, Yekaterinburg, and Petra Opitz, Die Konversion der brief 2: Belarus), March 1995 russischen Rüstungsindustrie- Krisen- Anke Habich, Werner Voß und management, Eine vergleichende Peter Wilke, Abhängigkeit der report 3: Studie der Regionen St. Petersburg und Werften im Ostseeraum von der Joseph DiChiaro III, Conversion of Novosibirsk (Conversion of the Rüstungsproduktion (Dependence of the Defense Industry in Russia and Russian Defense Industry - Crisis Shipyards in the Baltic Sea Region on Eastern Europe, Proceedings of the Management- A comparative Study on Defense Production), March 1995 BICC/CISAC Workshop on the Regions of St. Petersburg and Conversion, 10-13 August 1994 Novosibirsk) brief 3: Edward J. Laurance and paper 1: Herbert Wulf (eds.), Coping with Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and Surplus Weapons Systems: A Priority Herbert Wulf, Demilitarization and for Conversion Research, May 1995 Conversion, World Social Summit, Copenhagen, March1995 report 1: Edward J. Laurance and paper 2: Herbert Wulf, with the assistance of Andreas Klemmer, United Nations Joseph DiChiaro III, Conversion and publications related to the subject of the Integration of Economic and Conversion: An annotated Security Dimensions, January 1995 Bibliography, April 1995 forthcoming:

brief 4: Kees Kingma and Vanessa Sayers (eds.), Demobilization in the Horn of Africa, workshop proceedings (co- publihed with IRG), June 1995

B·I·C·C 69