A COÎiîPAEISOIî OF EîæRGENCE AND VALUE AS DETEm-IINAETS OF SELECTIVE PERCEPTION

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements L?or the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

by

■WîLl.IAîi Hi LYIE, Jr., B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University 1953

Approved by: AGElTOv/IiSDGI.iESTS

The writer wishes to express his sincere appreciation to the many people who contributed, to the completion of this research. Special thanks are due to Dr. George A, Kelly for stimule.tion, adiûce, encour­ agement and guidance; to Dr. Robert J, wherry and Mr, huderick H, Bare for assistance in the statistical analysis; to Dr. Delos D. Wickens,

Miss Dleanor Schmidt, Dr. Emily Stogdill, Hiss Margaret Dunaway, and the staff of instructors in the elementary psychology classes for assistance in obtaining subjects; to Mr. Hurry Benimoff, Mr, J, Paul

Smith, and Mrs, Roderick Bare for assistance in the preliminary steps of the problem; to Mr. Richard M, Lundy, Mr. Lewis G, Lyle, and Mr.

Donald J, Shoemaker for assistance in statistical computation; to

Mr. Charles T. Baker for recording the word list; to Miss Tony Stiegely and Miss Pauline wickiser for clerical assistance; to members of the research team of Dr. George A, Kelly whose constructive criticism

contrihuted to the design of the problem; and finally, to my wife

Shirley who was a constant source of help in every phase of the study.

Her generous assistance, encouragement, and selflessness made the com­ pletion of this problem possible.

¥. H. L.

- IX — TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER Pag©

I HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION...... 1 In'fcroduc’bion ...... 1 Set and Attention as Forerunners of "projective Perception” .... 1 Aimrenoss of the Subject’s Contribution ..... 3 Extension of the Concept of Attitude ...... 4 Attitude and the Unconscious ...... 5 Recent Views on Projective Perception ...... 7 Areas of Research on Projective Perception . . . 9 Summary...... 11

II PERSONAL VALUES, WORD FREQUENCY, AND PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS...... 16 Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception...... « ...... 16 Perceptual Selectivity...... 20 Tliford Frequency and Visual Duration Thresholds . . 25 Personal Construct Theory...... 27 An Attempted Interpretation of the Results from the Studies on Perceptual Selectivity within Personal Construct Theory...... 34

III STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY...... 43 Introduction...... 43 Statement of the Problem. . . 43 Msthodology...... 52 Choosing the Group Dimensions...... 52 Selection of the Related W o r d s ...... 61 The Nfeitching Procedure...... 63 The Experimental Procedure...... 69 Measure of Etuergence...... 69 The Measure of Accuracy of Usage of the Dimension Related Words...... 72 Subject...... 76 Hypotheses to be Tested...... 76 Group Hypotheses to be T e s t e d ...... 77 Hypothesis G-1 ...... 78 Hypothesis G-2...... 79 Hypothesis G-3...... 79 Hypothesis G-4...... 79 Hypothesis G-5...... ‘80 Hypothesis G-6...... 80 Hypothesis G-7...... 81

- iii - TABLE OP COÎÎTEIJTS (cont.)

GîIAPTER Page

III (cont.) Svaimary Statement with Regard to the Group ^pothesisu ...... 81 IndiTidual Hypotheses to he Tested...... 82 Hypothesis I-l...... 83 Hypothesis 1-2...... 83 Hypothesis 1-3...... 84 S u m m a r y ...... 85

IV RESULTS AND DISCUSSION...... 86 Introduction...... 86 Results of the Group Predictions ...... 88 Hypothesis G - 1 ...... 88 Hypothesis G-2...... 93 ^rpothesis G-3...... 94 Hypothesis G-4...... - ...... 95 Hypothesis G -5...... 96 Hypothesis G-6...... 97 Hypothesis G-7...... 99 Summary and Discussion...... 100 Cont. Group Results . 103 Facto:' lysis of the Relationships between thi Aj; 'ays of Accuracy Sc o r e s ...... 105 Faccn. One...... 107 Factor T"wo...... 107 Factor Three ...... 107 Factor Four...... 108 Factor Five...... 108 S'ummary...... 110 Resu7i.ts on Individual Ifypotheses ...... Ill Hypotheses I-l ...... 112 Hypotheses 1-2...... 113 Hypotheses 1- 3 ...... 116 Summary...... 116

V THE REPLICATION— RE8UI.T8 AND DISCUSSION...... 119 Introduction...... 119 The Dimension Related W o r d s ...... 119 The Role Construct Repertory T e s t ...... • 122 Subjects...... 128 Group Hypotheses...... 129 Hypotheses G-1 ...... 129 Hypotheses G-2 ...... 132

- iv - TABLE OF COOTEi'ITS (cont.)

CHAPTER Page

V (cont.) Hypothesis G—3...... 133 Hypothesis G«4...... 154 Hypothesis G-5...... 155 Hypothesis G-6* ...... 135 Hypothesis G-7 ...... * ...... 156 Discussion and Sunanary of Group Results . . . 137 Results on Individual l^ypotheses...... 141 Hypotheses I - l ...... 143 Hypotheses 1-2...... 144: Hypothesis 1-3...... 145 Summary and Discussion...... 146 Implications for Personal Construct Dimension. . 152

TI SUMMARY AHD CONCLUSIONS...... 156 Introduction...... « ...... 156 Personal Construct Theory...... 158 The Problem ...... 159 Results...... 162

APPENDIX A - Forms Used in the Selection of the Dimensions...... 167

APPENDIX B - Forms used in the Selection of the Dimension Related Words ...... 171

APPENDIX C - Forma Used in the Collection of the Experimental d a t a ...... 178

APPENDIX D - Forms Used in the Collection of Data in the Repltication Experiment...... 186

AUTOBIOGRAPHY...... 192 LIST OF TABLES

TABLE Page

1 HYPGTHSTICAL VISUAL DURATION THRESHOLDS FOR SUBJECTS A AITD B...... 46

2 WORDS USED TO DESCRIBE LIES) PEOPLE, THEIR MOST FREQUENT SYNOIOMS, ADD MOST FREQUENT ANïOimïS...... 55

3 WORDS USED TO DESCRIBE DISLIKED PEOPLE, THEIR MOST FREQUENT SYNONYMS Aim MOST FSEQUEOT A N T O i m B ...... 55

4 FREQUENCY OF USAGE OF CONSTRUCTS AS DESCRIPTIONS OF LIES) AND DISLIKED PEOPIE AND THEIR MOST FREQUENT ANTONYNB, ...... 57

5 CONSTRUCTS GROUPED THROUGH RELATING SYNONYMS AND ANTONYLB. 59

6 WORDS JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE CHEERFUL-SAD DIMENSION . 64

7 WORDS JUDGED T O BE RELATED TO THE BROADiaNDED-NARROTJMlimED D L ΠN 8 I 0 N ...... 65

8 WORI^ JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE SINCERE-INSINCERE DIMENSION...... 66

9 WORDS JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE REFINED-VULGAR DimmiON 67

10 DIFFICULTY LEVEL, CLARITY, AND THORNDIKE-LGRGE FREQUENCY FOR EACH OF THE EIGHT CATEGORIES USED...... 68

11 THE FOUR DIMENSIONS USED AND CLASSIFICATION OF THE EIGHT TERiS...... 78

12 MEANS AND OTHER DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE EIGHT CATEGORIES U S E D ...... 90

13 TABLE OF INTERCORRELATIONS FOR THE EIGHT CATEGORIES OF ACCURACY S C O R E S ...... 90

14 THE t's FOR THE DIFFERENCE BETVESN EACH CATEGORY AND BACH OTHER CATEGORY...... 92

15 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES, RESULTS, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH DIFFERENCES IN CLARITY MIGHT HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULTS . . 102

— V I — LIST OF TABLES (cozit.)

TABLE Page

16 MEAN ACCURACY SCORES FOR THE CONTROL GROUP OF THE EIGHT CATEGORIES (U-49) . 104

17 ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS, FINAL RESIDUAL TABLE, AND INTERCORRELATIONS OF THE ACCURACY SCORES ...... 106

18 OBSERVED FEEQUENCIÎS OF USAGE OF THE POSITIVELY VALUED AND IŒGATIVELY VALUED CATEGORIES...... 114

19 FREQUENCY OF APPLICATION OF EACH CATEGORY TO EACH ROLE TITLE...... 115

20 MEAN AND SIGMAS OF TEE TWO MEASURES USED TO MATCH WORDS FOR EACH OF THE EIGHT CATEGORIES...... = 122

21 WORDS JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE CHEERFUL-SAD DHvtENSION . 12S

22 WORDS JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE BROADMINDED- NARROWinNDED DIMENSION...... 124

23 WORDS JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE SINCERE-IÎÏSINGERE CATEGORY...... 125

24 WORDS JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE RBFIIŒD-VULGAR CATEGORY...... 126

25 THE t's, o. AND m-m FOR THE COMPARISON OF ACCURACY SCORES ON ^ C H CATEGORY YHTH EACH OTHER CATEGORY...... 151

26 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH OF THE EIGHT CATEGORIES. . 132

27 PREDICTIONS AND OUTCOMES FOR THE GROUP HYPOTHESES...... 138

28 OBSERVED AND THEORETICAL FREQUENCIES OF USAGE OF THE PCBITIVELY AND IŒGATIVELY VALUS) POLES OF THE DIMENSIONS AND RESULTING CHE SQUARE...... 147

29 DmCRIPTIVB STATISTICS FOR THE CATEGORIES CONSIDERED IN TERI£S OF BOTH EMERGENCE AND VALUE...... 148

- TXi - CHAPTSS I

HISTOEICAÎ. II^EODTJCÏIOÎJ

Introduction

For a groat many years the study of perception "was the study of sensory function. The primary attempt "was to reveal the extent to

■which sensory mechanisms were "stimulus bound.” As a result maxi'mum attention ■was given to the structure of the human organism. Similarities between individuals ■were sought rather than differences and experimental conditions "were so arranged that individual differences were minimized.

As Bruner and Postman (ll) have pointed out, the attention of the sub­

ject -was taken for granted; though, of course, the subject ims so

situated that extraneous stimuli vrere largely ruled out. That such an

approach was successful goes almost ■without saj^ing. The area of sensory

function is today regarded by many as the area of psychology which has been best explored and about ivhich most is knotim.

Set and Attention as Forerunners of "Projective Perception”

There have been dissenters from such an approach, however, almost

since the beginning of the exploration of the area of classical psycho­

physics. Exner as early as 1873 noted that a preparation for response

reduced reaction times.^ The concept of attention had also been under

^Woodworth, R. S,, Experimental Psychology. îïe'w forks Henry Holt and CoB^any» p. 305. discussion by Muller ■who ivrobe his doctoral dissertation on sensory 1 2 attention. Von Kries ’ in 1895 wrote comprehensively on set or

"EinstellunK" and the topics of set and attention continued to •wax and

■nano as subjects of controversies until 1901. At this time a group of ? men from the Wurzburg school, namely, Watt, Ach, Orth, and Benussi, began to report a series of studies in -which they described states which they felt could not properly be referred to as sensations, images, or feelings and which they referred to as the "lay" or "condition of con­

sciousness." Woodworth states (52) "Another real achievement of the

introspeoti've study of thinking v/as the extension of the concept of

"Elnstellung" or set from reaction time and the comparison of weights

to the process of thinking" (p. 790). This -was in regard to Watt’s

study of the process of controlled association which "mas dons in 1905.

Tichener in 1909 translated the original German term "Bewusstseinslagen"

as "conscious attitudes«"^ Other terms relating to the contribution of

the subject to the experimental situation appeared as it became evident

that the sot of Bins tel lung of the subject could be changed by instruc­

tion. The concepts of "awareness" (Ach), "Anfgabe” (Watt), "determin­

ing tendency" (Ach) have their origin at this time.^ The result of the

introduction of such concepts led to the great controversy over the

^Boring, E. G., A History of Experimental Psychology. Few %ork: Appleton-Century Crofts Company, 1950. Second edition, p. 373. ^Wood-worth, op. cit., p. 794. g Boring, op. cit., pp. 401-410. ^Woodworth, 0£. cit., p. 789. 5 Boring, op. cit., pp. 401-410. question of "imageless thought.”

■fiiwnreness of the Sub.jects Contribution

The developmenb of such concepts as those mentioned ahove called attention to the fact that, regardless of the experimental conditions, the subject himself exercises some control over the things he sees, hears, and feels. At least part of Tichener's emphasis on training for introspection tto,s an attempt to circumvent this unkno’wing contribution of the subject to his introspective reports.^ In the light of such thinking the subject could no longer be viewed as an automaton which responded mechanically to the stimuli acting upon him but had to be viewed as responding or refusing to respond to those stimuli volition- ally. Such an approach further suggested that the "determining tendency” of the subject might be a more long standing tendency on his part rather than being limited to the experimental situation*

Bartlett (l) stated in 1916 that perception was not passive and that "there i s always some discrimination or selection.” The persis­ tence of particular attitudes as a characteristic of the organism began to receive attention by Gibson (17) in 1929 and Bartlett in

1932 (2). Gibson (17), in studying changes in immediate reproduction, stated "The typos of change here observed may all be explained, it is believed, b y the supposition that the experience of the individual has brought into exS.stence certain habitual modes of perception, and that these perceptual habits, rather than the laws of configurations, condi­

1 Ibid., p. 419, tion the changes oosorved.” Bartlett (2) refers to "affective attitudes"

and describes then as "predispositions to response" on the part of an individual (p. 206). The atatenents and undoubtedly others began to

enphasize the more enduring aspects of attitude which cxnvently would

fall under the heading of personality.

Extension of the Concept of Attitude

It was with the advent of these types of studies that the interest

in social perceptions came into bein;:. Earlier studies were largely with tools and techniques which grew out of physiology and physics.

These wore most available and, of course, were first used. As essays

in memory, rejaembering, etc., were published new techniques and methods

began to be developed which opened new areas of study. % n ' s social

nature became a matter of concern and methods were developed which

allowed its study. Techniques of experimental and statistical control

increased in scope and man began to be ez^lored in the light of his total

capacities rather than his isolated ones. Increasing interest in "social

perceptions" of the individual developed#

The early studies on attitude were the result of attempts to draw

parallels between the manner in which set and attention operated in

more limited situations to influence experimental results and the manner

in vhich attitudes, more global in nature, operated in the larger con­

text. As evidence increased it began to seem likely that the orien­

tation of a given i ndividual had a more pervasive influence than had

originally been thought. Consequently, the manner in which a more general

attitude on the part of an individual could affect his performance under rather specific and limited situations began to be iirrestigated.

Concurrently "with tvork on attitudes, attention and set, studies i?ere conducted under the aegis of Gestalt psychology» The emphasis here T%s

on the lack of variance between organisms «nH they attempted to attribute changes in sensory focus to changing aspects of the stimulus configura­ tion. Yfoodworth (S2) found himself not in accord with thf ir thinking and stated that "the Gestalt psychologists and others have made it seem that any such explanatory use of the concept of attention amounts to invoking a deus ex machina when one ought to look for causes in the dynamic structure of the field itself." (p. 684)

Up to this time as 'sldtkin (Sl) has indicated,

...approaches used in the study of perception have tradi­ tionally been of two kinds. In one sort of approach the explanation of perceptual experiences has been sought in the structure of the prevailing field. In the other-, the emphasis has been upon the operation of the sense organs and associated neural structures mediating the simulus as well as upon the accumulated effects of the person’s past experiences with the stimulus. Hecently on the basis both of specific experimental findings and of general theoretical consideration, there has been a ques­ tioning of these two approaches, especially because of their failure to consider the role of motivational factors in perception.

Attitude and the Unconscious

The first view of attitude was in regard to its conscious aspects.

This followed logically the findings of the Wurzburg school. With the

attention of Bartlett (2) in the work on remembering which began in the

early part of this century of Sorachach (42) and his use of ink blots,

of Freud (iS) and his renewed emphasis upon the "unconscious" following 2 Hsrbarb’s earlier formulation of the concept, and of Tfoodtvorth; atti­ tude began, to be studied at its lonrer levels of arrareness as an aspect of porsonalitj’’. The increased attention to the problems of psychosis led to increased research on the projective nature of perception.

3vidence began to gather in regard to the directive nature of such atti­ tudes or perceptions until it -began to be obvious that certain of these studies laid the Gestalt vieiv open to question. Werner (43) states

The last tvro decades have witnessed a shift in the status of perception within psychology as a ?jhole« This shift is primarily due to the gro?dng recognition of what one might call the projective nature of per­ ception, or, to use Gardner Murphy’s formulation, to the recognition that ’’the perceived world pattern mirrors the organized need pattern vrnthin.” The expan­ sion of the problem of perception from the splendidly- isolated az"ea of classical psychophysics -to the areas of social and personality dynamics necessitates a re­ formulation of the theoretical framework within -which perception is to be conceived*

Zlsin and Schlssinger (22) indicate a feeling that

...in the careful research on seeing, hearing, feeling, the soeer, the hearer, the feeler are someho-w obscured or lost. The person himself, the pivot of s.ll these sensations, the source and root of motives wliose in­ fluences are sought, is ignored as a determinant of his own perceptual beha-vior. If then a theory of perception -would respect the integration of the person, it must deal -with the integration of perception, for iwe ass-ume "tziat each response system, including perception, repre­ sents the person’s -unity. Perceptual organization in this vie-w is the counterpart of personali-by organisation, g-nr our higher order cons-ûructs must respect this prin­ ciple. . . Obviously- ws consider q-uite incomplete -tht; visTTpoint in research which ass-ames sensory processes to os so completely stable, so autochthonous that they are li-tble influenced by the innd of person in vrhich they are studied.

Boring, op. cit., p. 256. The current problem is stated by TiTemer and Wapner (49) in these terms Î

It is also characteristic that in a widely accepted theory a number of facts might not be covered because they are considered peripheral to the yia-i-n body of explainable data. These so-called peripheral facts through a shift in emphasis may suddenly become crucial and may force a re­ vision of theory.

Tvemer and llfapner make clear that such a shift may be developing in perceptual theory«. They credit clinical psychologists and others doing applied work with introducing problems which traditional theory is hard pressed to handle. They state,

...such a shift can be noted today with respect to the projective characteristics of perception. That percep­ tion may mirror emotions of the individual’s motivations has been acknowledged for a long time within and outside of psychology. Experimental psychology looked on thp problems of projective perception because of its ccmplox- ity and its experimental unmanageabi 1 ity as unfit for scientific analysis. Though philosophers and theoretical psychologists have been intrigued by this problem for a long time, it was mainly the success of clinical psychol­ ogists using perception as a diagnostic tool which brought this problem of projective perception into the center of interest.

ïîhile the ’’success” of the clinicians has been and is still being sub­ jected to questioning there seems to be little doubt that the concern of clinically oriented people in this area has led to a focusing of interest on the problem of social perception.

Recent Views on Projective Perception

]%ny of the studies which have dra\nn attention in this area were designed primarily as a means of studying the degree to which transient motivational states affected perception. For the most part the clini­ cians, particularly those who were emotionally involved in the use of the 8

Rorschach, test, had felt that projectiTe perception revealed only the more enduring aspects of perception. It Tvas their feeling that the per­ ception of the individual to ambiguous stimuli vias not affected by- transient motivational states such as hunger, fear, frustration, and suggestibility. However, it is the type of studies done by Coffin (iS),

Rotter and Rodnick (43), S. IT. Sanford (44) and McClelland and Atkinson

(27) tdiich, while disabusing clinicians of their faith in the inherent reliability and validity of projective techniques, has been most diffi­ cult for classical perceptual theory to encompass. That is, these types of studies which indicate that hunger, suggestion, and frustz-ation can alter perceptual response are difficult for either classical percep­ tual theory or clinically trained people who feel that projective tests reveal the "core" of personality to integrate Tnithout some modification in their thinking.

Bruner and Postman (lO) have referred to the opposing points of view (i.e.. Gestalt versus pro j ecti-pe perception) as the "Formalists” and the "Functionalists.” In their terms the Formalists "are primarily concerned with perception in and of itself, -without primary regard for the manner in which perception is imbedded in the other ongoing activi­ ties of the perceiver” tnhile the Functionalists ha-ve as their primary concern.

The manner in which perceptual functioning is imbed­ ded in and interacts with other forms of psychological functioning. Perception is viewed as an instrumental activity... .For a full understanding of the perceptual process it i s necessary to vary not only the physical stimulus and the sensory states of the organism, but also those central conditions, motives, predispositions, past learnings -svhich have largely remained outside the formal limits of the perceptual system* This statement attracted attention in 1949 although Bartlett (2) some twenty years earlier had stated.

The experiments repeatedly demonstrate that temperament, interests and attitudes often direct the content of per­ ceiving. The cautious and the rash, the student and the mfl-n of affairs, the subject doubting and the subject confi­ dent never perceive alike, though they may all be faced by e:m.ctly the same situation so far as external features go. (p. 53)

This seems to be a rather direct expression of the part that the indivi­ dual plays in shaping perceptions. At the risk of digressing it might be useful to point out that Bartlett (2) vierved perception as consisting of two phases. He states, "Perception isa function of (a) sensory pattern..., and (b) of psychological orientation or attitude." (p. 193)

This is an interesting parallel to a recent statement by Levitt (25) in regard to cognition and perception. Levitt would assign the term per­ ception to the first phase described by Bartlett and cognition to

Bartlett’s second phase. There is an implication here, of course, that part of the recent controversy is due to vagueness of definition.

Areas of Research on Projective Perception

There has been a growing body of research dealing with the contri­ bution that the individual makes in the perception of stimuli. Hockberg and Gleitman (19) as well as Postman and Bruner (l$ express the feeling that the empirical phenomenon of projective perception is reasonably well established though it appears that Lucnins (26) does not find himself in agreement, at least with those studies reported by Postman and Bi-uner. The research completed has fallen into roughly four areas.

The first of these is that group of studies which has emphasized 1 0 the influence of phj'-siological states on perception. This might be referred to as the "effect of primary needs" on perception. KcGlelland

Atkinson (27) have indicated that the number of food related res­ ponses in their escperimental situation is related to degree of food d 6privation. R. IT. Sanford (44) found that children gave twice the number of food responses when tested before a meal as vdien tested after it. Other studies by iHles (34) and Franklin et ^ (IS) have indicated more d:rastic changes. Beach has summarized other evidence on the effects of changes in body chemistry on perception (s). He states

"...the evidence leaves no doubt that the behavior of men and other animals is powerfully affected by chemical changes within the body"

(p. 79).

A second area deals with the influence of social attitudes and personal values on perception. Studies in this area include those of

Bruner and Postman and their co-workers (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 29,

30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41), Bartlett (l, 2), Cowan and Beier (14), Lazarus and Erickson (24), and others, ^t is with this area that the study is most concerned and the studies mentioned with which we are concerned here will be discussed in more detail at a later point.

Past association with the stimulus material as a major determin­

ant of perception has been a third area of study. The work of Solomon

and Howes (20, 21, 45) typifies this type of study which seems largely to be a special case of the application of iiarbe’s law. The approach which is emphasized by this paper is somewhat related to this approach

as imll as to that of Postman and Bruner. 1 1

The final area should perhaps not be classified under projective perception though it certainly related to the other studies in the sense of "responses ts-hich are belovr the level of ai^areness" of the subject.

This is the series of studies by the Clark Chiversity group on a

"sensory-tonic" theory of perception. TTemer and T/Tapnsr and their associates have indicated that body tonus has marked effect on perceptual response. Their emphasis is on the "state of the organism as an integral part of a perceptual event" (46, 47, 46, 4S, 50).

Summary

The current interest in projective perception rather than being the "Ivew Look," as it has been described, seems rather to be a re­ arousal of interest in problems ■with vrhich psychology has interested itself sporadically almost since the beginning of psychology as a separate body of science. This renevred interest has been influenced by recent attempts to broaden the scope of the application of psycholog­ ical knowledge in order to deal with the problem of personality in some of its pathological manifestations, as Tjell as by the develop­ ment of ezperimental and applied techniques vfhlch submit themselves to more adequate experimental control# The contribution which the indi­ vidual makes as an idiosyncratic response to the physical stimuli which are presented to him is an area which is of primary interest to clin­ ical psychologists at the present time, since individual prediction in clinical work demands a knowledge of this unique contribution that the individual makes in his response to these stimuli# 1 2

HEFESSSC3S TO CHAPTER I

1. Bajrtlott, F. C., "An. Experimental Study of Some Problems of Perceiving and Imaging," Brit. J. Psychol», 1916, 8, 222-66.

2. , Remembering. Hew York: %.cmillan Company, 1932.

3. Beach., Frank A., Chapter 3 in Blake, R. R. end Ramsey, G. T., Perception: An Approach to Personality. How York: Ronald Press, 1951*

4. Boring, E. G. History of Experimental Psychology. Hew York: Appleton Century Crofts and Company, 1950. Revised Edition.

5. Bruner, J. S., "Perceptual Theory and the Rorschach Test," J. of Personality. 1948, 17, 157-168.

6. Bruner, J. S., Chapter 5 in Blake, R. R. and Ramsey, G. V. Perception: An Approach to Personality. Hew York: Ronald Press, 1951*

7. Bruner, J. S. and Goodman, C. G., "Value and Heed as Organizing Factors in Perception,” J. of Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1947, 42, 43-44.

8. Bruner, J. S., and Postman, L., "Tension and Tension Release as Organising Factors in Perception," J. of Personality. 1947, 15, 300-308.

S. Bruner, J. S., and Postman, L., "Emotional Selectivity in Per­ ception and Reaction,” J. of Personality. 1947, 16, 69-77.

10. Bruner, J. S. and Postman, L., "Perception, Cognition and Behavior," J. of Personality. 1949, 18, 14-31.

11. Bruner, J. 3. and Postman, L., "On the Perception, of Incongruity, a Paradim," J. of Personality, 1949, IS, 206, 223.

12. Bruner, J. S., Postman, L,, and Rodniques, J., "Expectation and the Perception of Color," Am. J. of Psychol., 1951, 64, 216-227.

15. Coffin, T. E., "Some Conditions of Suggestion and Suggestibility,” Psychol. Monogr., 1941, 53, Ho. 4, Chapt. IT*

14. Cawan, Emory L., and Beier, Ernest G., "The Influence of Threat Expectancy* on Perception," J . of Personality, 1950, 19, 85-95.

15. Franklin, J. C., Schiele, B. C., Brozek, J,, and Keys, A., "Observations on Human Behavior in Experimental Semistarvation fl.Tid Rehabilitation," J. of Clinical Psychol. 1948, 4, 28-45. 15

16. Freud, Sigmund, traaisla-fced and edited by A. Brill. The Basic TiTritings of Sigmund Freud. Hevr York: 'Modem. librarj'-, 1958.

17. Gibson, J. J, , The Reproduction of Visually Perceived Forms. J. Ex. Psychol. 1929, 12, 1-39.

18. , ”A Critical Seview of the Concept of Set in Contemporary Sxperimental sychology, " Psych. Bull., 1941, 38, 781-817.

19. Hockberg, J . S., and Gleitman, E., "ToTjard a Eeformulation of the Perception-Motivation Dichotomy,” J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 180-191.

20. Howes, D. E., and Solomon, E. L., "a Ho te on M-Ginnies’ Emotionality and Perceptual Defense,” Psych. Eev., 1949, 56, 244-251.

21. Howes, D. H., and Solomon, E. L,, "Visual Duration Threshold as a Function of 7«brd-Probability, " J. of Ex. ■‘^sychol. 1951, 41, 401-410,

22. Klein, G. S., and Schleisinger, E., "Tvhere is the Perceiver in Perceptual Theory," J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 32-47.

23. Lambert, W. '«7., Solomon, E. L „ and TJatson, P. D., "Reinforcement and Extinction as Factors in Size Estimation," J. of Eic. Psychol. 1949, 39, 637-641.

24. Lazarus, E. S., and Erickson, C. 'u., "Personality Dynamics in Auditory Perception," J. of Personality, 1951, 19, 471-482.

25. Levett, S. B., "Cognitive Distortion and Ego Involvement," J. of Personality, 1950, 19, 212-221.

26. Luchins, A. S., "On an Approach to Social Perception," J. of Personality, 1950, 19, 64-85.

27. McClelland, D. C., and Atkinson, J. “J"., "The Projective Expression of Heeds: I. The Effect of Different Intensities of the Hunger Drive on Perception," J. of Psychol. 1948, 25, 205-222.

28. McClelland, D. C., and Liberman, A. M., "The Effect of Heed for Achievement on Recognition of Heed Related Hords," J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 236-251.

29. McGinnies, E. M., "Saotionality and Perceptual Defense," Psych. Rev., 1949, 56, 244-251.

30. , "Personal Values as Determinants of Word Association," of Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1950, 45, 25-36. 14 ol. ilcGicrdes, E. ÎJ,, and Adornetto, J*., ’’Perceptual Defense in No ma l and Schizophrenic Observance,” J. of Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1952, 47, 833-838.

52. IvIcGinnies, E. H., and Boi-rles, IT., "Personal Values as Determinants of Perceptual Fixation,” J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 224-235.

53. ZioGinnies, E. il., and Sherman, H., ”Generalization of Perceptual Defense,” J. of Abn. and Soc. ^sychol., 1952, 47, 81-85.

54. Dales, 17. R., "The Sex Expression of ilen Living on a Lorre red nutritional Diet,” J. S. and I-ental Diseases, 1919, 49, 208-224.

55. Postman, L., Bronson, TTanda C., and Gropper, G. L., ”Is There a ■iDechanism. of Perceptual Defense?” J. of Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1953, 48, 215-285.

56. Postman, L,, and Brorm, D. S., "The Perceptual Consequences of Success and Failure,” J. of Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1952; 47, 213-222.

37. Postman, L., and Bruner, J. S., "Perception under Stress,” Psych. Rev., 1948, 55, 314-323.

38. Postman, L., and Bruner, J. S., "Multiplicity of Set as a Determin­ ant of Perceptual Reorganization,” G. of Ex. Psychol., 1949, 39, 509-377.

59. Postman, L., Bruner, G. S., and icGinnies, E. II., "Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception,” G« of Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1948, 48, 124-154.

40. Postman, L., Bruner, G. S., and V a l k , R. D., "The Perception of Error,” Brit. G. of Psychol., 1951, 42, 1-10.

41. Postman, L., and L.eytham., G., "Perceptual Sensitivity and the imbivalence of Stimuli,” G . of Personality, 1951, 19, 3 9 0 - 4 0 5 .

42. Rorschach, H., Psychodiagnostics : A Diagnostic Test Based on Perception. (Tran, by P. Lamkan and 3. ^^ranenburg/ . Bern: Hans Suber, 1 9 4 2 . lieu Fork- Grune and Statton, 1 9 4 3 .

43. Rotter, G. B., and Rodnick, "A Study of the Reactions to Bbcperi­ ment all y P^''‘’:xced Frustration,” Psrrch. Bull., 1 9 4 0 , 37, 577-582.

44. Sanford, R. F., "The Effects of Abstinence from Food upon Imaginai Processes,” G . of Psychol., 1952, 2, 129-36.

45. Solomon, R. L., and Hotras, 3. H., "Vord Frequency, Personal Values, and Visual Duration Thresholds," Psych. Revierr, 1351, 58, 256-70. 15

46. Tïapner, S., YJerner, H», and Chandler, A., "Ezperiments on Sensory-Tonic Field Theory of Perception: I. Effect of Extraneous Stiinulation on the Visual PercQjjtion of Yerfcicality, ” J. Es. Psychol. 1951, 42, 341-546.

47. Tv’apner, S., "vTemer, H., and übrant, R. B., "Ezcperiments on Sensory- Tonic Field Theory of Perception: III. Effect of Body Rotation on the Visual Perception of Vertioality.’* J. of Exp. Psychol. 1951, 42, 351-358.

48. ■yfeaTer, H,, ’’Introductory Renarks,” J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 2-5.

49. ITemer, S., and TJapner, S., "Sensory-Tonic Field Theory of Per­ ception,” J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 88-107.

50. 'iTemer, S., Tfapner, S., and Chandler, E. A., ”Bsperiments on Sensory-Tonic Field Theory of Perception: II. Effect of Supported and Unsupported Tilt of the Body on the Visual Per­ ception of Vertioality,” J. of Ex. Psychol., 1951, 42, 346-351.

51. Tc-lkin, H, Hi, "The Rature and Importance of Individual Differences in Perception,” J. of Personality, 1949, IB, 145-170.

52. '«Toodworth, R. S., Expérimental Psychology. Rew Eork* Penry Holt and Company, 1938, CHAPTER II

PSESOHAL VALUES, WORD FREQUEHCY, AHD PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS

Personal Values as Selecbive Factors in Percepoion

B r m e r has stomcarized studies on this topic in the Tolume edited by Blake and Ramsey (4). In general, there seems to he agreement that there is considerable Tari ability in visual duration thresholds of words for a given individual and that the thresholds for different

groupings of words are related to personal values.

The current work in this area appears to have begun with Postman,

Bruner, and IbGinnies* paper on personal values as selective factors in perception (32). Two earlier papers, however, on tension and tension

release (ô) and on emotional selectivity (?) form an integral part of

the viewpoint. These papers i^present initial attempts to formulate

concepts to explain the results of previous studies on value end need

as organizers of perception (s). It is not with the result of these

studies with which we wish to take issue as much as with the ezplana-

tion of them.

The studies themselves have largely been done in laboratory situ­

ations where even though ambiguity is increased it is considerably

below that generally experienced by an individual in his daily affairs.

Bruner takes note of this and says (4),

It -m-igbt be better to say that there are limits im­ posed by stimulus factors which reduce the effect of past experience and present needs almost to zero when one works with rather simple stimuli. I insist, however, that most complex perception, particularly in our social

— 16 — 17

lives, is dependeni: upon the integrs.tion of information of a far less reliable kind than we normally provide in a tachistoscope at rapid exposure. (p. 135j li'5.tkin (38) is in apparent agreement here and states, "In other words, personal factors are most likely to play a determining role in percep­ tion when broad significant complexly integrated perceptual experiences are involved."

That past experience has great effect on the shaping of attitudes is a widely accepted principle. Considerable work in the clinical area has been devoted to demonstrating that the individual is slave to his past. Adherence to such a principle, however, leaves little room for optimism for, after all, the past cannot be undone. More recent work, however, lias begun to demonstrate that subsequent experi­ ences may be affected by these attitudes and that the individual’s orientation plays an important part in determining which experiences he will allow to affect him either favorably or adversely. Postman and

Bruner’s recent work has been concerned primarily with demonstrating the manner in which the individual shapes his experience. More speci­ fically their research has been concerned with the demonstration of principles which determine what shall be perceived and hence experienced.

From their research the principles of selective sensitization, selective vigilance, perceptual defense and value resonance have arisen as an explanation of the differences in the way that a subject*s visual duration thresholds are affected by personal values.

To account for the fact that words related to high value areas tend to have low visual duration thresholds when presented tachistoscopioally 18

the concept of selective sensitisation has been developed (52). The sub­

ject is believed to be sensitized to stinuli which are acceptable and.

the resnlt is a lowered visual duration threshold. Perceptual defense

is the converse of this. It is invoked to account for the fact that words related to areas of low value tend to have higher visual duration

thresholds. The use of these two concepts clearly implies a linear

relationship between value and duration threshold which has not been

found and which has led to the inclusion of the concept of selective

vigilance.

In certain of their studies Bruner and Postman have found that

words related to low value areas had thresholds I'shich approached those

of words related to h i ^ value areas (?). In accounting for this Bruner

and Postman state.

We now find sensitization in the presence of ’danger­ ous’ stimulus objects. The words comprising the slow reaction-fast recognition group were almost uniformly linked with prevailing taboos. One may cite as examples the following: penis, crime, bitch, dream, anger, fairy (male subject), death, and fight. There is for some sub­ jects, then, a critical degree of emotionality beyond which perceptual defense does not operate. Once this critical degree of emotionality has been exceeded the ’dangerous’ stimulus is met with utmost alertness and speed. Elsewhere we have described this sensitisation to tension producing stimulus objects as selective vigi­ lance. . . . It is clear . . . that some subjects are prone to respond vigilantly others defensively.

Value resonance as a concept was developed to account for the fact

that the presolution hypotheses of subjects tended most frequently to

relate to their areas of highest value. ^Clelland and liberman (26),

however, in their study on need achievement and need related wnrds

found more contravaluant hypotheses, or guesses prior to recognition, in 19 the h x ^ need group in addition to more covaluant tvords» The finding here of frequent use of -mords of contrary meaning, as Trell as those of similar meaning, hears an interesting relationship to the present problem, -which follcws a line of thinking -mhich ivould expect just such contravaluant guesses.

Bruner and Pos-fcman have subsTimod their concepts under the general title of "percep-bual selectivity.” They have indicated in an early summary of their work (9) that the concepts are offered in -fche spirit of illustration (p. 95). Hovrever, -mhile it -mas perhaps their intension to leave these concepts at the level of illustra-bion, it is clear that others have not been so inclined. The concept of perceptual defense has found -nide acceptance, particularly among those -mho are psycho- analytically oriented, and a number of studies have been conducted both supporting and attacking the concept. Among these are the s-budies of

McGinnies and Adometto (28), HcGinnies (26), McGinnies and Sherman (29),

Eriksen (13, 14, 15), Lazarus, Eriksen and Fonda (23), supporting the

concept; and articles and studies by Howes and Soloman (19), Howie (21),

Adfl.TTiR and Bro-vm (l), Bitterman and Khiffin (2), Pos-bman and Leytham

(35), Pos-tman, Bronson, and Gropper (sl). Co-man and Beier (12) and

others in criticism of the concept. Pos-tman* s presence in the latter

list is perhaps an a-ttempt to ins-ure that the concept stays at the

level of illustration. Other studies have been conducted in the spirit

of supporting or not supporting Bruner and Pos-tman’s thinking, in the

larger context that needs and values are related to speed of recogni­

tion (18, 36). 2 0

It is not our purpose to criticize the studies xvhich have been conducted in support of these concepts. Luchins (25) has ably per­ formed this task. Ehren though L

In spite of the apparent inconsistency in interpretation from one study to another, for example, the use of both selective vigilance and perceptual defense to explain opposed reactions to the same words, it seemed to this writer that certain of Postman and Bruner’s concepts were supported inconsistently not because of their lack of reality as em­ pirical phenomena, but rather because of the inteipretation. These were the concepts of defense, sensitization, resonance, and vigilance.

It is with these concepts that ive will concern ourselves.

Perceptual Selectivity

In one of Bruner’s and Postman’s earlier statements (s) sensi­ tization is considered to have two aspects: one of which was construc­ tion, the other, defense. The first was conceived as leading to

-maximum sensitivity, the other, minimum: sensitivity. In other formu­

lations, however, sensitization has come to refer, at least operation­

ally, to lowered thresholds for acceptable stimuli and defense to

lengthened recognition time for unacceptable stimuli (32) . Their study

on cersonal values as selective factors in perception supports their 2 1 thinking lîràen visxial stimuli are used (32) as does the study of

Yaaderplas and Blake vri-th. auditory stimuli (36). In both, studies ■words related to -value had thresholds related to their ranking in value cate­ gories.

In certain other studies, ho-wever* the hypothesized relationship did not hold. In a study of -word association times and visual d-uration thresholds certain of the -words -which should have produced higher than average thresholds act-ually produced lower thresholds (7 ). Bruner and

Postman noted that -these -were -words -which -were generally taboo. The concept of select!-ve -vigilance -which had been introduced in an earlier

study (s) -was re-invoked to account for those results.

Peculiarly enough the thing -which they did not expect to find -with

regard to sensitization they did find in an earlier s-tudy with respect to accentuation (s). In this study they state, "Value, -whether

positive or negati-ve, leads "to perceptual accentuation... ..Apparently that

-which is important to the subject looms larger in perception." Having

noted this, nonetheless, they go on to s-tato that "we have demons-krated

that negative values can be positively accentuated. It is conceivable,

nonetheless, that certain kinds of negative symbols may lead not to

positi-ve b-ut to negative accentuation or no accen-fcuation at all." It

seems apparent that -they were not prepared to find positive accentuation

of negati-ve s-timuli or low visual duration thresholds for threatening

stimuli or else where not prepared to accept such findings.

In the majority of their s-tudies the authors have related sensi-

-tiza-tion to high values though they hçve not al"ways done so. In a re- 2 2 vaew of perceptual theory and the Rorschach test (s) Bruner states

"That is seen most vividly, given rough comparability on the stimulus

side, ■will be that thich is most relevant to the perceiver.” S©re personal relevance is regarded as of greater importance than high value,

hi -berms of Personal Construct Theory this -would be a more adequate

statement than their later statements relating high value to sensitiza­

tion. In yet another earlier study on tension and tension release (6), before value fsas introduced, they state, "In any given situation, the

organism singles out -what it considers to be the most relevant aspects—

relevant to adaptation in the si-fcuation," The crux of the si-tuation

seems to lie in a problem -which they discuss in a later paper (lO) on

percep-tion, cognition, and behavior in 1949. It is their feeling at

this time that

...indeed as these experiments continue, it becomes appar­ ent that -under certain conditions size accentuation is a function not of positive value as such but of ’degree of personal relevance’.. .The very term personal rele-vance is itself some-i'diat difficult to render into operational terms.

In -rie-w of their later -work, it seems that they resolved this difficulty

by deciding that -what represented "high value" for the subject -was that

-which for him was most "personally relevant." In Personal Construct

Theory "personal rele-pance" is somo-wfaat less diffic-ult to define opera-

-bionally as we -will indicate below-. However, one additional concept

remains to be introduced, that of value resonance.

In the course of tachistoscopic presentation of their material

Bruner and Pos-tman (9) indicate that their subjects -were asked to "tell

us everything you see or think you see, even if it’s only a guess” ^S). 25

These "guesses" were referred to as "pre-recognition h j ' p o t h e s e s V a l u e resonance makes use of these hypotheses and the prediction is made that

..•given insufficient stimulus material out of -mhich to fashion a ’sure’ perception, the person, in his attempt to perceive, falls back upon his needs and wishes, lets himself be Singestellt by his interests...If there should be ambiguous objects, ones whose interest-arousing cap­ acity is not evident, the person will attempt to organize them, in a manner congruent with his prevailing set. (p. 88)

Operationally value resonance is defined by the occurrence of pre-recogni­ tion hypotheses that are related to areas of interest which are high for the subject (a.e. c évaluant). They find it somewhat more difficult to explain tdiy the prerecognition hypotheses of low value words do not also resonate in value. They state (9),

...the case of contravaluant hypotheses is more diffi­ cult to explain. As to the facts, words representing low value areas are reliably more often responded to with cont ravaluant hypotheses and, at the same time their recognition requires greater than average time. (p. 88)

Bruner and Postman (9) relate this behavior to the principle of per-

cepfi.Jal defense stating that the occurrence of c ont ravaluant pre-recog­ nition hypotheses (guesses m t h contrary meaning) is a result of the

subject’s unconscious attempt to avoid recognition of threatening

words (9, p. so). Certain of these contravaluant pre-recognition

hypotheses, if not all of them, would be expected in terms of Personal

Construct Theory. The rationale for this as for "personal relevance"

vdll be presented below.

Vanderplas and Blake (36) discuss the problem of personal relevance

ir somewhat similar terms, arriving at about the same decision as 24 as Postman and Bruner. They take the view that

First, value orientation creates within the individual a framework of meaning which in turn serves to focus the perceptual mechanism more sharply on stimuli which are associated Td.th high value areas than on other kinds of stimulus material. This sharpened focus in turn lowers the perceptual threshold for value associated stimuli. Conversely, in low value areas the uncrystallized focus of meaning appears to raise the perceptual threshold for stimuli associated with such low value areas.

Secondly, value orientation creates within the indivi­ dual a greater familiarity (associative frequency) with value associated stimuli than with other kinds of material. This familiarity in its turn serves to lovrer perceptual threshold for the more familiar stimuli in greater proportion than for non-familiar stimulus laatejr- ial. On the other hand, the perceptual threshold for material idiich is not value associated, and therefore unfamiliar, will be raised.

Though Vanderplas and Blake give consideration to the frequency of usage of words for a subject as would Solomon and nowes (35), it is clear from their statement that they do not conceive of areas which have low value or negative connotation for the subject as being personally relevant. Thus ^associative frequency” affects only words having high value for the subject.

In summary, sensitization refers to the fact tiiat highly valued vrords tend to have low visual duration thresholds. Defense refers to

the finding of higk visual duration thresholds for inimical or innocuous words and contravaluant pre-recognition hypotheses for lovr value cate­

gories. Vigilance is used to describe the behavior of subjects with

regard to certain of the "threatening” stimuli, that is, sensitization

to words which ordinarily would be expected t o be responded to defensive­

ly. Resonance describes the tendency of subjects to give words related

in value to hi^ly valued categories. 25

Trprd Frequency and Visual Dura^blon Thresholds

SoloE.cE. and Ho^res (l9, 20, 3S) in a series of receEt papers offer an alteinatiTe explanatioE of the results ■nhich Bruner, Postiaan and

LbGiEEies find. They state in a later paper (oS) after an initial con­ troversy that ’’so-called ’perceptual phenomena ’ can some tines be de­ duced directly froE the relationship betr/een certain kno7jn properties of the optical and instructional situation in trhich those responses occurred." They make the more general statement that "any variable that is a general property of linguistic responses must also be a property of any perceptual concept that is based upon these responses." Their specific interest is in the frequency of occurrency of a Trord in the

English language and its relationship to visual duration thresholds.

In explaining. Postman, Bruner and I^Ginnies’ results they state (SS),

Ifow let us assume that high valuation of a given area of interest is associs. ::ed tvith a positive deviation from the mean frequencies TÙth which words in that area occur in general usage. This assumption simply means that people who are highly interested in a subject generally use words associated Tjith that subject more often than people who have no special interest in the subject.••

This assumption, coupled with the experimental find­ ing that an increase in the frequency of words is accom­ panied by a decrease in their duration thresholds, permits us to deduce the results.. .without having to postulate the two mechanisms of perceptual selectivity and perceptual defense. Sigh value rank is correlated with a relatively high positive deviation from general word usage— i.e., with irelatively frequent use of a word. Frequency of use of a word is inversely related to the word s visual dur­ ation threshold, hence, the inverse relation between visual duration threshold and value rank.

The data which Solomon and Howes present support thoir contention that visual duSation threshold is affected by the frequency of appearance

of that word as measured by the Thorndike Lorge list. It is interesting 26 to note also that through picking subjects who show extrene deviation in interest they are able to offer support to the hypothesis which they criticise. They suggest, hoTrever, that "It is also apparent from our results that the shift in duration threshold correlated ivith differ­ ences in personal values is quite small, and is probably more difficult to obtain than the earlier data of Postman, Bruner and iicGinnies would indicate." Solomon and Howes also suggest in the same paper that even where personal value is shown to operate that this may mean nothing more than that the subject uses these words with greater personal frequency than that which occurs in the general population. That is, personal value would be equal to higji frequency of personal usage. The import­ ance of emotionality as an influence in the experimental situation is denied, although the authors indicate that "this does not mean that we consider ‘emotional’ determinants unimpoitant to the analysis of language behavior. Baotional factors undoubtedly operate to an import­ ant extent in the building of word frequencies in a given life history."

It is quite clear from the reported studies of their work that no

consideration is given to meaning of the words which are used. Insofar as meaning is concerned the words presented might just as well be

geometric designs. Heither does the Thorndike Lorge word count take meaning into consideration. Surely the vjord "stable," for example, has quite different frequencies in its varied meanings. Until the

meaning of a word for a given subject is taken into consideration

"emotionality" may be shown to have little influence on recognition.

Once meaning is considered, however, (and particularly idiosjoicratic 27

Heazdng) it seems unlikely that a consideration of "emotional behavior" can long be avoided.

Personal Construct Theory

in attempt m i l be made to view results of work in the area of perceptual selectivity or projective perception in terms of Personal

Construct Theory. This point of view represents an approach to person­

ality currently being developed by Zelly (22) and members of his research team at The Ohio State University. Before predictions can be compared, however, some preliminary structxiring must be accomplished. Kelly's

point of view might well have been called "personal value theory" but his reasons for not so calling it will be obvious in what follows.

Kelly’s basic postulate proceeds from the point of.view that

individual man, no less than the scientist, is interested in prediction

of events with which he is most concerned. This postulate is stated

as follows: "A person’s psychological processes evolve toward x’lha.t

he construes to be an optimal anticipation of events." (22, 29) In

order to make the predictions that he must make each individual is then

considered to have developed certain individual ways of making order

out of chaos which surrounds him. As Kelly states (22),

ihn looks at his world through transparent patterns or templets which he attempts to fit over the realities of which the world is composed...without such patterns the world appears as such an undifferentiated homo­ geneity that man is unable to make any sense out of it. Svan a poor fit is more helpful than nothing at all. Lot us call these patterns that are tentatively ’tried on for size’ constructs (p. 3). 28

It is apparent in vÆiat Kelly says that "personal roleTance” is zneasTorahle in terns of these individual conceptualizations. The constructs viiich the individual uses are highly personalized versions of his experience.

VieTzed in such a manner they Tnould not be expected to be identical in meaning to those that another individual used since they trould not en­ compass the same experience. Others, notably Lecky (24) and Rogers (34) have called attention to the importance of vierring the individual’s experience through his eyes rather than through the therapist’s. Kelly does not mean to imply that there is no similarity betrreen the construc­ tions of different individuals. The culture in rmich tve live as a national group as well as that in rnich we live as a member of a regional group, of a family, group, of a vocational group, etc., give us certain e::periences in common. To the extent that our experiences and our con­ struing of these experiences duplicate those of others, the constructs which we use as personalized versions of reality Tri.ll be similar, Kelly takes note of this in his Commonality Corallary, "To the extent that

one person employs the same construction of expeidence as another he may

duplicate the other person’s psychological processes" (22, 47). In

short, common experiences may mean similarity of constructs developed

for dealing with these experiences. It should be noted at this point, however, that few individuals would view a given experience completely in the same manner unless they likewise shared a background of common

experiences construed in the same manner. Identical twins have long

been used in psychological research because of both genetic similarity

and environmental similarity though primary interest has been in manipu- 29 latizig the eKvûrorcaeirb in order to dxTrulge information ahotrfc the limits of genetic determination. But to paraphrase TB-lliam. James’ "oell knoTjn illustration, e v e n the expeidential environment of twins is not iden­ tical since the environment of each contains the other. Personal con­ structs, then, fhile alloT.ving for great personal variability are expected to have certain flavors of meaning vjhich become more alike as the experiences and constructions of those experiences of the individuals concerned become more similar.

The process of putting constructs "to work" Kelly refers to as

"construing." It is here that this orientation makes a somewhat rare departure. As ?och states (30),

It is interesting at this point to note that nowhere in the literature to date is there evidence of a recog­ nition that the perception of similarities logically and inevitably implies the simultaneous perception of dif­ ferences, i.e., that it is impossible to see two or more things as alike in some way without thereby also at least implying a difference betræen them and something else. It seems reasonable to guess that this failure to note a necessary duality to the process of concept formation is both a cause and an effect of the particular methods which have been employed in studying the process. Furthermore, the early mooring of concept formation in a psychology of consciousness probably also has something to do with it; if, by reason of the experimental criteria for the attain­ ment of a concept or of the instructions given to the sub­ jects, perceptions of similarities are the only data recorded, it stands to reason that the simultaneous per­ ception of differences remain unverbalized, or even "uncon­ scious" (p. 21)s

Differentiation is regarded as an integral part of the conceptual procsss.

As Kelly (22) notes,

...a construct is a way in tdiich two things are seen as being alike and yet different from others... In its simplest context a construct is a way in which two things are alike yet different from a third. Construing involves so

simultaneous differentiation and generalization. (?. 32)

±a additional facet of construing is its lack of equiTalence -vîith. verbal femulation. Constructs are assuned to exist even ■where they

cannot be verbalized.

Construing is not to be confounded -with, verbal for­ mulation. A person’s behavior may be based upon many interlocking equi'valence-difference patterns -which are never cammunicated in symbolic speech (22, p. 32).

It is not unlikely that a major portion of the constructs which an

individ'ual uses are no-c ’’-word bound," though for our present purposes

TTO -will concern ourselves m t h those constructs -which are used at

higher levels of awareness and -which have some communicability.

Since construing involves both general!za-kion and differentiation

it utilizes both ’^constructs" and ’’contrasts.” The term ’’construct

is used to refer to the events -which are seen as similar and "contrast”

to the events from idiich they differ. The "personal construct” is

viewed as being dimensional in nature. 'Which of the "two terms used to

describe the dimension is construct and -which is contrast depends

largely upon the context from -which the "personal construct” is

elicited; assuming, of course, that the individual is equally free to

invoke either. In certain circumstances, ho-wever, partic-ularly -where

value considera-bions are being made, and like-wise -where high value is

attached to one end of the dimension, only one term may be freely used

by the individual. The contrast may be clearly differentiated and

verbally formulated or differentiated and not verbally formulated, but

not verbalized. Freud (l7), of course, has made much use of the Ox

"latency" of certain behaviors except that the non-verbalized end of the dimension is relegated to the "unconscious and the process is described as "inaction formation" (p. 626). 13bre recently Frenkel-3jrunsT/ich (16) has called attention to the extremely close relationship betvreen a set of behavior and their opposites. She states

Rigidity and chaos seem on theoretical grounds as "well as on empirical grounds closer related than one may ass"ume from a purely phenomenological vie-npoint. . .apparent opposites,..may be psychologically closer together and more apt to combine "with each other in the same subject than any of them "vrould "with an intermediate position along the same scale...One of the characteristics of the perception centered outlook of most personality psychologies based upon cognitive categories is that they tend to ignore this fact.

Fronke 1-3runsTO.ck and Freud, hor/ever, are speaking in terms of exter­ nally imposed dimensions. Personal Construct Theory does take into account the opposition of sets of behaviours but gives major consider­ ation to the fact that such constellations of beha"viors are grouped by the individual himself.

The fact that one end of a "personal construct dimension" is not verbalized is thus no indication that there is not a symbol for a meaningful set of behaviors vjfaioh contrast "with those that are verbalized.

These contrasting behaviors may be vievred as being at different levels of

aimreness. That is, they may be clearly differentiated, but not verbally

formulated and hence can not verbally be communicated; or they may be

clearly differentiated and verbally formulated but not verbally com­ municated; or, finally, they may be differentiated, verbally formulated

and verbally expressed. TTe are assuming at the present time that the

expression bears some relationship to the degree of verbal formulation

so that the construct vrhich is most frequently expressed by a person is 32 assumed to be the most clearly formulated by him. This Tiill -work to disadvantage of our predictions if, for example, the individual chooses to invoke one end more frequently than the other though both are equally vrell formulated verbally.

It has been mentioned earlier that a construct in its simplest contest includes only three elements; two which are alike and one which is unlike. Z&ost constructs are probably much more complex than this.

Zelly refers to constructs as being either "permeable" or "impermeable" in terms of vjhether or not they will admit new elements. Thus the more permeable a construct the more apt it is to have increasing com­ plexity. Kelly states, "A construct or an aspect of one’s construction system is called permeable if it is so constituted that new experiences or new events can be discriminatively added to those -vdiich it already embraces" (22, p. 6l). The elements i-jhich arw to be construed and used by the individual for prediction are events rather than objects.

Since these constructs are developed by the individual for inter and intra-personal use the events are the behaviors of himself and others.

In regard to this, Kelly states (22),

7Jhile not essential for the development of this limited theory, it is wholly consistent with our basic assumption regarding the nature of psychological sub­ ject matter to consider events rather than objects to be the stuff out of whi.ch a person’s environment is made. The notion of events goes well with the notion of prediction; it makes more sense to speak of pre­ dicting or anticipating events than to speak of pre­ dicting objects (p. 31).

Qae last point remains to be described before we can proceed to the task of attempting to resolve some of the contradictory results

regarding projective perception. This is the notion of the emergent 53 and implicit nature of the poles of "personal construct dimensions.”

It i7as noted earlier that one end of a construct dimension may be more readily invoked by an individual. For the purposes of this study ne have chosen to call the end of the dimension —hich is most readily invoked the "emergent” end of the dimension and the end that is less readily invoked the "implicit” end. This says nothing about the verbal formulation of the dimension or the poles of the dimension. An indi­ vidual may use the dimension efficiently vrnthout ever verbalising either end. Foch states (so),

...it is likely that avrareness occurs only under such special conditions as therapy and mhile serving as an experimental subject (p. 28).

and at another point.

The person majr or may not be av/are of the content of his constructs.; the means by nhich he arrives at them and the fact that he uses his constructs adaptively (p. 28).

As a matter of fact, the process of eliciting symbols for the

constructs that an individual uses is frequently seen to have thera­

peutic benefits. That determines ■whether one end or the other of a

dimension is emergent can only, at present, be a matter of conjecture.

It seems unlikely that the end of the dimension -which emerges is neces­

sarily associated -with h i ^ value. In the -writer’s experience many

individuals verbalize constructions "where negatively valued behaviors

are emphasized; for example, "critical” versus "non-critical." It

seems more likely that the context of the behaviors from -which the

personal construct dimension arose determine -mere the similarities

are seen, -whe-ther or not "value” is called into consideration. S4

In sigmaarizingj an individual makes sense out of his psychological

environnent through a process of construing. Tliis construing is accom­

plished through the use of personal constructs iThich are "personalized

versions of reality” (22, p. 91). A construct for an individual implies

"both a likeness and a difference; n.*®.*» the process of construing is one

of simultaneous differentiation and generalization. Thus a personal

construct is dimensional in nature, or tvo ended, and acts as a control

on the individual’s behavior as ivell as a means of predicting the be­ havior of those around him. The construct itself is a symbol which

stands for the behaviors 'diich it subsumes ivhich are called "elements."

These elements may or may not be verbally formulated and may differ in

levels of ai'jareness. Finally, the poles of the dimension may differ

in degree of use and degree of awareness# Those which have the higher

frequency of usage will be referred to as "emergent" ends and their

contrasts as the "implicit" ends#

Aa Attempted Interpretation of the Results from the Studies on Perceptual Selectivity within Personal Construct Theory

Let us now see how Personal Construct Theory would handle the

data resulting from Bruner and Postman’s work. It will be remembered

that the concept of selective sensitization ivas invoked to account for

the fact that words wiiich are related to areas of h i ^ value have low

visual duration thresholds. Perceptual defense was called into play

to account for high visual duration thresholds found when low value area

words are used. Findings here, however, have not been consistent and

some subjects have been found to show low visusi duration thresholds to 55 vrords from.low value areas. The concept of selective vigilance has been invoked to account for these results. Value resonance is used to explain the fact that words similar in value to the high valued word being shown tachistoscopically frequently appear as pre-recognition hypotheses.

The tivD concepts of perceptual defense and selective vigilance are, of course, contradictory without the use of the additional concept of

"critical degree of emotionality." 3ven with the use of this concept no individual prediction is possible. The best that can be said (?) is that "There is for some subjects, then, a critical degree of emotionality beyond which perceptual defense does not operate. Once this critical degree of emotionality has been exceeded the ’dangerous' stimulus is met ivith utmost alertness and speed."

It seems likely from our orientation tîiat both selective vigilance and selective sensitisation represent the same phenomenon with such differences as exist between them being artifloats of the experimental situation. The response is the same for both, quick perception of the stimulus vrords. In an earlier quotation Bruner and Postman (9) have stated, "TShat is seen is, first of all. a selection from a near infini­ tude of potential stimuli. The stimulus adequacy or potential of the environment is too great for an organism to perceive everything" (p. 83).

If we paraphrase this statement we might say that what is seen from the near infinitude of potential stimuli are those things which relate to the constructs and the contrasts of the subjects "personal construct dimensions." The dimensions which the subject uses determine what will 36 be personally relevazit to that subject. It may not be personally relevant to another. Since the personal construct dimension includes both the construct and the contrast (i.e., is bipolar) on some occasions the contrast may describe behavior "nhich for the subject has negative valence. Certainly this should not mean that the individual refuses to recognize this beha-vior. Eor need it mean that he is

"selectively vigilant" to this behavior. It may simply mean that both ends of the dimension describe beha-vior the observance of "which the subject has found useful in his prediction of others.

~!e have earlier called attention to the extremely personal nat'ore of construct dimensions. Just as the contract itself has personal meaning so may the discrimination that it malces have individual mean­ ing. It follows from our point of vie"w that tiTo people do not neces­ sarily mean the same thing "vvhen they say that a third person is

"friendly." Also, they may describe the same behavior and yet use different symbols for that behavior; one^ for example, using the term,

"genial" ins "bead. In addition, they may differ further still in that they compare the behaviors in "vvhich they are interested "with quite different contrasts. That is, for one subject, even though both may use the same word, "friendly," on the similarities end, the contrast may be "indifferent" for one, "while for the other the opposite is

"antagonistic." If an indi"vidual responds selectively to the even"ts surrounding him, _i.e_«* construes only part of all "that goes on, then that part which he does not respond to, from another person’s point of view, may be responded to defensively. So for the two persons mentioned above each might be regarded as responding defensively to the 37 other’s contrast, -sshile actually the terns simply represent areas in

Tiiich they are not interested.

This is not to say that individuals do not withhold response to concepts Tshich have negative social value. As Ho-wes and Solomon (19) suggest and as TJhittacker et al. (S7) have demonstrated, what fre­ quently passes for perceptual defense may actually he no more than response suppression. CoTran and Beier (l2) in replicating an experi­ ment by McGinnies (27) found that Tshen subjects were alerted to threat

(taboo words) there -was no significant difference betvTeen the response times to the tlireat words and that to the neutral words. They also interpret their results in terms of "conscious inhibition." ^et the fact remains that both Cov^an and Beier (12) and Solomon and Haines (35) find trends in their data which support Postman, Bramer and McGinnies* general findings of a relationship between value and duration thres­ hold. In terms of Kelly’s theory it seems likoly that this is largely a matter of differences in the extent of verbal formulation, as vra.s discussed earlier, with the emergent ends of the personal construct dimensions being more adequately verbally formulated than the implicit ends.

Value resonance or the seeing of words related in value to the word being presented tachistoscopically is readily explained in terms of Kelly’s theory by the substitution of "elements" or words related to these elements for the symbol being presented. Since a personal

construct involves both generalization and differentiation the occur­

rence of c ont ravaluant words or words that have opposite meaning is to 38 to be expected. As Adams and Broim (l) have suggested, "a militant atheist may be very interested in religion though harboring little

Talue fbr religious beliefs or experience." Thus it vrould not be sur­ prising to find -words contrary in value being given for words which have either positive or negati-ve social connotation. Furthermore, this could not be expected to be consistent from subject to subject since the "contrasts" for each of them vrould be different and since the personalized version for each -would be different.

The foregoing discussion is intended to be only a general statement of the manner in -which Personal Construct Theory might handle the find­ ings of Pos-tman and Bruner. More specific comparisons -will be made

-with regard to the statement of the problem. It is hoped that this point of vie-w -will allow- predictions to be made and confirmed -which are not explainable in -terms of their thinking alone*

Soloman and Howes (oS) have offered an alternate explanation to that of Pos-tman, Bruner, and -^Ginnies(32) and McGinnies (2?). They

find that frequency of usage of the words in the general population

contributes to a greater portion of the variance in vis-ual duration threshold than does high personal value. They further suggest -that if

-we were able to obtain individual measures of the frequency of usage of

a given vrord that -wo migh make indi-vid-ual prediction among reactions

to -the same vrord by different subjects. That is, the subject -mho used

the -word most frequently -would have the lowest vis-ual d-uration thres­

hold -while the subject -who used it least frequently ’would have the

highest. Visual d-ura-tmon threshold, then, is merely the correlate of 39 personal faniliarity m t h the stimilxis pattern being presented, leaning of the word presented is ruled out as an factor and the iverd presented might just as -well have been a genoetrical pattern. The present writer has no quarrel with such a prediction at the level that the prediction is made. '.Then the meaning associated v/ith the words pre­ sented is considered, however, it seems unlikely that frequency of appearance can count for a major portion of the variance in duration thresholds.

lûere frequency of usage says nothing about the range of behaviors

subsumed by a ivord when the word represents the construct of an individual. It says nothing about the extent of verbal formulation

or the nature of the behavior which is contrasted with the vmrd pre­

sented. The value which the subject attaches to the word cannot be accounted for by the frequency measure. Frequency is an important measure and contributes a limited amount of information but there is a wealth of information beyond this which needs to be considered.

EEFS2EÎCSS FOR CHAPTER II

1. Adams, Joe, and Brown, Donald R., "Values, Word Frequencies, and I'erception," I*sych. Rev., 1953, 60, 50-55.

2. Bitterman, H, S., and Khiffin, C. W., "Hanifest Anxiety and Perceptual Defense," J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1953, 4:8, 248-253*

3. Bruner, J. S. "Perceptual Theory and the Rorschach Test," J. of Personality, 1948, 17, 157-158.

4. Bruner, S., Chapter 5 in Blake, R. R., and Ramsey, G. T., "Perception: An Approach to Personality. Hew 'fork: Ronald Press, 1951. 40

5. Bnaner, J. 3., and Goodman, C. G., "Yalue and îleed as Organizing Factors in Perception,” J. of Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1947, 42, 53-44.

6. Bruner, J. S., and Postman, L,, "Tension and Tension Release as Organizing Factors in Perception," J. of Personality, 1947, 15, 300-30S.

7. Bruner, J. S., and Postman, L., "Emotional Selectivity in Per­ ception and Reaction," J. of Personality, 1947, 13, 69-77.

8. Bruner, J. S., and Postman, L., "Symnolic Y&lue as an Organizing Factor in Perception," J. Soc. Psychol., 1948, 27, 203-20 8.

9. Bruner, J. S,- and Postman, L., "An Approach, to Social Perception." In Tf. Dennis (Sd.), Current Trends in So dal Psychology. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg ^ress, 1948.

10. Bruner, J. S., and Postman, L., "Perception, Cognition, and Behavior," J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 14, 31.

11. Bruner, U. S., and Postman, L., "On the Perception of Incongruity, a Paradim," J. of Personality, 1949, IS, 206-223.

12. Cowan, E. L., Beier, E. G., "The Influence of ’Threat’ Expectancy on Perception," J. of Personality, 1950, 19, 85-95.

13. Eriksen, C. U., "Some Implications for TAT Interpretation Arising from Reed and Perception Experiments," o. of Personality, 1950, 19, 282-289.

14. Eriksen, C. '.T., "Perceptual Defense as a Function of Unacceptable Reeds," J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1951, 46, 557-564.

15. Eriksen, C. IT., "Defense Against Ego Threat in Remory and Perception," J. of Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1952, 47, 230-236.

16. Frenkel-Brunsvick. Else, "Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional Yariable," J. of Personality, 1949, IS, 103-143.

17. Freud, Sigmund. The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud translated and edited by A. A. Brill. Ue'T York: M o d e m library, 1938.

18. Haigh, G., and Fiske, D. V.'., "Corroboration of Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception," J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1952, 47, 394-399.

19. Horres, D. H., and Solomon, R. L., "A Rote on RcGinnies’ Emotion­ ality and Perceptual Defense." Psych. Rev., 1949, 56, 244-251.

20. Ho-v-res, D. E., and Solomon, R. L., "visual Duration Threshold as a Function of '.Tord Probability, " J. of Exp. Psychol., 1951, 41, 401-410. 41

21. Eoivie» I>uncan, -erceptual Defense, ^ sych. Rev., 1952, 59, 308-515.

22. Kelly, George A. The ?s:,^chological Construction of Life. Knp-ub- lished mannscript, 1953.

25. Lazarus, K. S., Srikin, C. ., and Fonda, C. ?., ’‘Personality Dynamics and Aaditory; î'erceptual Récognition," d. of ^Personality, 1950, IS, 471-483,

24. Lecky, Prescott. Soif-Consistency', A Theory of Rerscnality; edited and interpreted oy Frederick C. Thome. Ke™ Kork: I s l a n d Press, 1951, second edition.

25. Luchins, A. S., ”C'n an Approach to Social Perception,” I . of Personality

26. McClelland, D. G ., and Liberman, A. k., "The Effect of Deed for Achievement on Recognition of Heed Related ’-lords,” J . of Personality, 1949, 13, 235-241.

27. KcGinnies, 2. 11., "Emotionality and Perceptual Defense,” Psych. Rev., 1949, 55, 244-251. '

28. kcOinnies, E. 11., and Adometto, J., "Perceptual Defense in Kormal and in Schizophrenic Obsorvence," J. of Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1952, 47, 833-838.

29. kcGinnies, 2. 11., and Sherman, n., "Generalization of Perceptual Defense," J. of Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1952, 47, 81-85.

30. Poch, Suzanne, A Study of Changes in Personal Constructs as Related to Interpersonal ■‘’'rediction and Its Outcomes. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1952.

51. Postman, Bronson, T-'anda C ., and Gropper, G. L.^ "-s There a ■^chanism of -Perceptual Defense," <1. Abn. Soc. Psycho 1., 1953, 43, 215-225.

32. Postman, L., Bruner, J. S., and 1-lcGinnies, 2. Li., "Personal "Values as Selective Factors in Perception," C. of Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1948, 43, 142-154.

53. Postman, L., and Leytham, G., "Perceptual Sensitivity and the Aabivalence of Stimuli," J. of Personality, 1951, 19, 390-405.

54. Rogers, Carl R. Counseling and Psychotherapy. Herr York: Houghton Ivlifflin Company, 1942.

35. Solomon, R. L,, and Ho’ves, D. H., "Vford Frequency, Perscnal Values, and Visual Duration," Psych. Rev., 1951, 53, 256-270. 42

36. Yandenplas, J. i'., and Blake, ?.. "Selective Sensitization in Auditor^" -^orception," J , o f Personality, 1949, IS, 252-266.

57. ".kittaker, 3dna k., Gilchrist, J. C., and Fischer, «^ean IT., "Perceptual Defense or Besponse Suppression," J. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1952, 47, 732-754.

32. T.itkin, n. A., "The Eature and importance of Individual Differences in Perception,” J. of Personality, 1949, IS, 145-170. CHAPTER III

STATH3HT OF THE PR05LEH AHD HSTHODOLOCY

ïrréroduction

In the p:reviou5 chapter the three orientations in vdiich -re are interested were described and a general statenent of the nanner in whi-ch Personal Construct Theory (l) night deal vriLth the results of a particular group of studies on projective perception -«vas nade. In this cnapter the nanner in which a specific problen could be handled iid.ll be described and the net hod devised for testing it ivill be outlined. It

Td.ll be our intention here to denonstrate that selective sensitization and selective vigilance are manifestations of the sane phenomenon, degree of relevance to an individual's "personal construct system"; that perceptual defense is an artifact of the experimental situation; and that word frequency alone is not a sufficient explanation for the results. Value resonance as a concept cannot be tested in the present design though, if positive results are obtained, the occurrence of con­ travaluant pre-recognition hypotheses would be a logical prediction because of the nature of the "personal construct dimension."

Statement of the Problem

To be more specific about the type of prediction ive might maize let us taxe an example. Let us assume that we are presenting only three words to a given subject (a ) by means of tachistoscopic exposure. These words are : "Honest," "evasive," and "crooked." If we ask the subject to rank these terms in order of the degree to which he values them he

— ■43 — AA vâll undou'b'bedly rank honest first and the t’-TO additional t o m s either second or third. If -we then present the three ?rords to him tachistos- copically Bruner and Postman (s) vrould predict that in terms of sensi­ tisation "Iionest” rrould have a lorr visual duration threshold since it has the highest value for the subject. The other tiTO mords mould be expected to have thresholds related to their ranking. Since both of them mould be of lorn value and have higher thresholds than the mord vith greater value the subjedt vjould then be described as reacting defensively to them. If either of the remaining tvvo mords proved to have visual duration thresholds idaich approached that of the highest ranloed mord then the subject mould be described as being selectively vigilant since the critical degree of emotionality for that subject had been exceeded.

The pre-recognition hypotheses of the subject mould be expected to be covaluant vrnth the area of high value, i.e., "honest." Solomon and homes (5) orould simply predict that the visual duration thresholds of the three mords Trould be related to the frequency mith mhich they appeared in the vocabulary of the general population. Ho prediction could be made mith regard to personal frequency of usage unless some individual measure of the individual's usage of the three iTords mas obtained.

In terms of personal construct theory another type of prediction mould be made. Those terms mhich related most closely to the subject’s personal construct dimensions Trould be predicted to have the lo:vBst

Tisual duration thresholds or responded to Tmth the greatest accuracy.

This mould be either "honest" and "evasive" or "honest" and "crooked" 45

depending upon vrMeh tæls the opposite for that subject. That is, the subject TToulà be sensitized to both and ivhich tvro he would be sensitive tc could b e determined. As far as vigilance is concerned the subject would be seen as vigilant to both or sensitive to both, hhich tern could be used would be iinmaterial. ^t would sinply be a natter of iThether or not the words presented to the subject outlined dinensions which he could personally construe. In addition another type of prediction could be made vdiich could not be nade in terns of

Postman and Brurer’s thinlring when the concept of emergence is taken into consideration. This would require a minor adaptation of method^ however. If we increase our ÎT of subjects to two and obtain from these two subjects (a * 3 ) a measure of the end of the dimension '.waich is most frequently invoked (i.e., emergent) the prediction might be made that the end of the dimension which is emergent for that subject ivould be the end vdiere his greatest accuracy would be revealed.

The relationships among the visual duration thresholds for the three words for each of the t?ro subjects might appear as presented in the diagram in Table 1 in terms of the rationale presented below. 46

TABI3 1

iTfPOîHBTICAL YISüAl DURATIOIT THR33Z0LDS FOR SUBJECTS A A3TD B

Visual Duration Threshold______Honest_____ Evasive_____ Crooked Low

Average

Hi Sn

In. the case of Subject A, if "honest-evasive” outlined his "personal construct dimension" and "honest" was the emergent end of tliat dimension then avDuld expect "honest" to have the lorrest visual duration thres­ hold; "evasive,” the next lowest; and "crooked” the highest. If, for subject B, "honest-crooked'* outlined his "personal construct dimension" and "crooked" was the emergent term, we would expect "crooked” to have the lowest visual duration; "honest," the next lovrest; and "evasive" the highest. If the ends of these "personal construct dimensions” vrare used with equal frequency (i.e., are equally emergent,' then vre would expect no difference in visual duration thresholds beiwmen the two words which outlined the dimension for each subject. For each subject, however, these two would be higher than the third. Both subjects might still say

tloat they ranked honesty above evasiveness or crookedness. The factor

of high or low value would not be seen as necessarily contributing any­ thing to prediction. 47

If TTO extend o'or group of rrords to build three groups of related vrords, one group relating to "honesty," another to "evasiveness" and a third to "crookedness" -ms vrould further expect that the group of rrords related to the emergent end of an individual’s personal construct dimension mould, as a group, reveal the loT/est visual deviation thres­ holds, even though individually they viere used no more frequently by hi- than certain mords related to the implicit end of the dimension.

The increased accuracy on this group of mords rrould be expected to occur as a result of the relatedness of their meaning to the emergent terms.

Still another prediction mi'jht be made using a list of mords having negative value only. One, among the negatively valued mords, those mords nhich are most closely related in meaning to the dimensions v.hich a given subject uses mould have the lo'.TOst threshold. Tmo, among those vrords, all of mhich are related to the subjects personal construct dimensions, those mords related in meaning to emergent ends of dimen­ sions vrould have the lomest thresholds. In effect, vje mould have described mhich of the mords have negative value the subject rmuld be vigilant tom-ard. Further, vib mould have predicted mhich from the group of 'Tords to mhich the subject responded vigilantly he mould have res­ ponded to still more vigilantly. That is, among these terms having negative connotation those terms mhich both related to a subjects personal dimensions and are emergent mould be responded to most quickly; those mhich related to the subject’s personal dimensions but mere implicit mould be responded to ne:ct most quickly; and those mhich did not relate to his dimensions mould be responded to least quickly. The same 48 sort of prediction TTould be nade tyhen using a group of words all having positive connotation. In the case of the words having positive conno­ tation, however. Postman and Bruner rrould invoke "sensitization” rather than "vigilance" as an explanatory concept. Tihen the negatively valued words are used the words requiring the longest exposure before recognition might be described as vrords to which the subject was defensive. To us, however, it would seem no more illogical to refer to the words having positive connotation but high visual duration thres­ holds as revealing "perceptual defense" than were the words negative in value. It iTOuld seem, rather, that in neither case would the concept of defense be necessary. A better explanation, it seems, would be that the subject simply does not construe the area of behavior circumscribed by the words which reveal high visual duration thresholds. They have no personal meaning to him and do not deal with behaviors which allow him efficient prediction.

The preceding discussion, of course, assumes that the subject is willing to verbalize his percepts. Som.e subjects certainly -itouIû not be willing to verbalize concepts having negative value but the higher visual duration thresholds in these cases might better be attributed to response suppression than to "unconscious resistance or blockage."

To test our predictions using the tachistoscopie methods utilized by previous researchers in this area or to follow the revised method as briefly described above seemed to involve problems which would be exceedingly difficult to surmount, llo adequate method presently exists within Personal Construct Theory to measure the extent of the verbal formulation of an individual’s construct system. Secondly, the 49 theory assunies personal construct dimensions to exist at varying levels of aTra.reness and the fact that the subject is unable to verbalize a construct does not necessarily mean that he does not have a construct for dealing with behavior in a particular area, or that he would be tin- willing to verbalize it if it were verbally formulated. Third, using the reports of the subject as to the relatedness of the words contained in his vocabulary would be an extremely subjective measure as vrell as requiring exhaustive measurement of that vocabulary, and yet some such similar measure must be used if we are to consider the relatedness of words used by the subject.

The problem was resolved by using a variation of the method briefly described earlier: That is, of choosing words which would outline di liens ions and then building groups of words rnich were in turn related to the ends of the dimensions. It seemed that group dimensions would prove to be useful, if a few assumptions were mads. First, it must be assumed that groups, as do individuals, have codes of conduct. This would hardly need to be an assumption since the sociological literature is replete with examples of group mores, group codes of conduct, group patterns of behavior, etc. Secondly, it would need to be assumed that these group dimensions, as we have chosen to call them, have some personal relevance for members of that group. Finally, it must be assumed that individual subjects find some of the group dimensions mean­ ingful and others non-meaningful. That we are saying by maxing these assumptions would seem to be this. Groups, as do individuals, find certain behaviors more meaningful than others and perhaps leading to 50 nore efficient prediction* -nithin the group. That is, the group as an entity, sees certain beha-vior on the part of individual meiibers of the group as being desirable and other beha-viors as being undesirable*

Certain other behaviors are seen as being irrelevant to group inter­ relationships .

A religious group, for enample, approves of certain behavior on the part of members of the grotro as being evidence of concurrence -with the religious values of the group. Certain other behaviors are seen as evidence of lack of concurrence and are disapproved of. Specific members of that group, if they desire to retain membership or at least membership in good standing, need in turn to concur in their approval

of the behaviors in question, at least for the major part. If they are in agreement -with most they may p re suitably feel free to be in dis­ agreement Tj-ith some. In short, for a specific group, most members of the group approve of most of the behaviors Tôiich the group sees as

desirable, in turn reserving the right to reject some vhich they per­

sonally disapprove of, or perhaps even adding some. This might be

described as a process of group identification though identification is tangential to our present interests.

If Tre are able to choose dimensions from a group, then -we might verbally formulate the dimensions through clustering words -which re­

late -fco the ends of the dimensions -which the group sees as meaningful,

and then measure indi-ridual response to those -words in terms of the

group’s formulation. Personal rele-vance of some of the dimensions

could be determined by obtaining a separate measure of the extent to 51

■ff hich the Trords "mhich syrnbolize the dinensions are used. That is, if the individual uses "with great frequency terns vrhich outline dimensions

Tiiich the group has established as useful "me rrould assume that he means the same thing that the group means rmen he uses them. The more frequently he uses the dimension the greater likelihood that he mâll s'obsume the same behaviors. Those dimensions mhich he does not use frequently mould be seen as ha"ving li"fctle personal relevance and hence little meaning. The verbal symbols used are not seen as mere form patterns but as symbols mhich carry a host of other implications.

Frequent usage of the terms would imply concurrence with the group’s dimensions and an understanding of the behaviors which the group clusters under these verbal symbols as wall as perhaps an incorporation of the construct into one’s own conceptual framework.

The preceding discussion describes our position in some detail.

The assumptions -.Tiiich it seemed necessary to make ire re deemed to be reasonable ones. The experimental problem resulting provides a test for some of the ass’umptions. Others 7Jhich feme, a more basic part of the assumptive structure are not testable in the present problem though if positive results are obtained some indirect support is indicated.

In summary, the present problem is an attempt to investigate some aspects of ’’personal constz*uct dimensions” through using an indirect measure. By choosing group dimensions of behavior and determining the personal relevance of these dimensions for specific individuals we hope to be able to illustrate some of the ramifications of (l) fre­ quency of usage of a "personal construct dimension” and (2) the fre­ quency with which one pole of the dimension is used in preference to 52 the other. Horo specifically, the problea is an attempt to determine if frequency of usage of a '’personal construct dimension” or the pole of a dimension means clear delineation of the area subsumed by that dimension or pole. The follotiing section -,7ill outline the manner in

-which the problem m s investigated.

Methodology

Choosing the Group Dimensions

The revised group form, of holly’s hole Construct Sspertory Test

(hereafter referred to as the HC2T) 'vas administered to trro elementary psychology classes. A copy of this test and the instructions is provided in Appendix A, p.i65 • %t is essentially a concept formation tost vhich requires the subject to build concepts using people as

objects of comparison. The subject is required to simultaneously

compare and contrast individuals using a minimum content of three individuals. The individuals named are in response to ” role titles”

or descriptions of individuals assumed to be important in the lives of most individuals in our culture. The list includes parents, siblings, peers of the some and opposite sen, authority figures, and value

figures, i.e., an ethical person, a successful person, etc. nineteen

such descriptions are included. These titles are arranged in tvrenty- two groups of three. Thus there are trrenty-tmo opportunities for

constructs to be elicited, that is, turenty-tiTO chances for the indivi­

dual to use concepts tviiich he finds personally useful in describing important people in his environment. The test t / s . s administered during the regular class hours and tiro hours rrere required to complete the 55

adrri.iiistrs.tion.

Since the class was composed predominantly of females the pro­ tocols of the four male subjects mho completed the test vrere removed along with six others ihich vrere not usable because of misunderstand­ ing of the instructions. Thirty-one usable protocols remained. All of the concepts used by the thirty-one subjects wero listed and the number of times any concept vra.s used by more than one subject was tabulated. In all, there are some 532 opportunities for constructs to be given with 682 contrasts • Since the primary interest was in des­ cribing behaviors rather than the absence of them, all words which implied the absence of some characteristic rather than the presence of it vrere removed from the list. This included such iTords as "not liked,”

"dishonest, " "unnatural," "unfriendly,” etc. This is in line with our thinking tliat a given group positively values some behaviors and negatively values others. That is, the emphasis is on doing one thing which is approved end doing another tiling which is disapproved. In addition, words were removed from the list which resulted from the compounding of good or bad with a single word such as "good matured” and "bad matured." Des'criptive concepts such as "people I vrent to school with" or "both school teachers" were also removed from the list.

After the removal of words of this type, 257 vrords remained. Of these

127 had been used by tvro or more of the 31 females. The remaining 138 words were used by only one of the subjects. These vrere used in a second instrument.

The 127 words were given to a second group of subjects with the 54 follomng instructions: (l) give a syncnyn of the rrord; (2J give an antonym of the word; (o) rate yourself on a five-point scale; (4) choose five words descriptive of most of your friends; and (s) choose five words descriptive of people you like least. This instrument is presented in Appendix A, p. 1 6 9 • The 130 words which met our restric­ tions but which were not used by more than one person were attached to the list for the subjects to use as possible synonyms or antonyms. The completion of this instrument proved to be an exceedingly arduous task, and only 42 of them were returned from the 65 that være administered.

All of the subjects on this occasion ‘vere females and all were allowed to complete the "test" anonymously*

The number of times each of the 127 vrords vra.s used was tabulated on tun lists. One list was composed of werds which were used to describe liked people; the other, disliked people. All protocols which were returned were used, provided any portion of them was acceptable. All the vrords from each list which vrere used 1.96 sigmas above the mean frequency of usage ivere taken from the list and a tabulation of the synonyms said antonyms used was completed. There was no overlap betvreen the two lists. That is, none of the vrords vrhich were used to describe liked persons were also used to describe disliked persons. In all,

51 words from the list were used to describe liked people and 66 to describe disliked people. Ten vrords were not used. These vrerds des­ cribing friends which vrere used with significantly’ above mean frequency, their most frequent synonyms and antonyms are presented in Table 2; those which described disliked people in Table 3* oo

TàBlE 2

’ÏCSDS USED TO DESCHIBE LIKED PEOPLE, THEIS LOST ESEQUEî'îT SYim iTBS, AJ3 MOST F2EQUEUT ASTOEYMS

Description Freq. Siynonym Freq. Aatonyn _ Freq. 1. Active 15 energetic 9 inactive 20 lively 9 2. Friendly 13 likeable 9 unfriendly 18 5. Broadminded 10 openminded 8 narr o'JüEinde d 37 4. Faithful 8 loyal 21 unfaithful 24 5. Cheerful 8 happy 30 sad 22 6. Sincere 8 honest 10 insincere 21 T rust Tjor thy 7 honest 14 dishonest 6 S. natural 7 ■unaffected 8 ■uxmat-ural 18 S. Intelligent* 6 smart 26 stupid 17 ignorant 17

LMan 1.77 Signa 2.65

"?roqu3nc2' not significant at less than .05

TABLE 5

WORDS USED TO DESCRIBE DISLII3D PEOPLE, THEIR MOST FRS^UEIH SYHOHYiS M D MOST FREqUEKT AKT01ÎYÎ3

Description Freq. Synonym Freo . Antonym Freq. ]. TTarro-Rminded 16 prejudiced 8 broadminded 45 biased 8 2. Conceited 16 egotistical 14 humble 7 3. Bossy 16 dominating 10 folloTrer 11 4. Vulgar 13 •uncouth 19 refined 7 5. Affected 13 false 5 natural 17 6. Biased 11 prejudiced 8 •unbiased 16 7. Snooty 9 snobbish 14 friendly 29 8. Ignorant* 7 stupid 20 smart 15

Mean 1.80 Sigma 3.44 "Erequency not significant at less than .05 56

From, these tivo lists of words a second instrument was oijiilt along lines similar to the first. These minor changes were made : (l) Half of the words appeared first on one list and second on the other; (2) the word "friends" wns changed to a request for the choice of words

-•±ich describe "people you like." Othem'rise, the instructions '.vere the same for the two instruments. The list of words used here included the fifteen words used ïâth significant frequency, two vrords which vrore used with frequency that approached the .05 level of confidence where each vra.s the contrast to the other, and the remaining words which were most frequent synon^mas and antonyms of these words. In all this list ivas composed of 29 vrords. This second specially built instrument is presented in Appendix A, p. lyo.

This second instrument ivas administered to 65 female under­ graduates enrolled in elementary psychology courses. At this point, however, our interest was in dimensions rather than in specific words, and determining the significance of the frequency of their usage ivas not applicable. The number of times each vrord was used as a descrip­ tion of liked and of disliked people is presented in Table 4 together

'.n.th the most frequent antonym.

It will bo noted that in only four cases of the twenty-nine do most frequent opposites appear which are not contained in the list. These are the words smart, dishonest, affected, and follower. Thus a measure of the frequency of usage of the contrasts of the remaining inventy-five words is available. In effect, there are from this list fourteen possible dimensions which could be used, at least there are fourteen 5 7

TABLE 4

F2EQLEÎTCY OF USAGE OF COITSTSUCTS AS DESCHIFTIOUS OF L If3D Aim DISLIKED PEOPLE Aim THEIR HOST FSEQUSITT AMTOirflS

Freq. of use Freq. of use as a descrip­ "with regard tion of liked to disliked Doscri'D’tioii oerson person Antonym Freq. 1 . Active 20 0 inactive 61 2 . Affected 0 24 unaffected 37 5. Biased 0 9 unoiased 56 4. Bossy 0 30 f ollo-wer 27 5. Broadminded 43 0 narr ofcminded 74 6 . Cheerful 54 0 sad 46 7 • Conceited 0 51 humble 36 8 . Dishonest 0 45 honest 85 9. Faithful 27 0 unfaithful 70 1 0 . Folloiver 0 1 leader 73 1 1 . Friendly 62 0 unfriendly 49 1 2 . Evahble 6 1 conceited 28 13. Ignorant 0 8 intelligent 49 14. Inactive 0 2 active 76 15. Insincere 0 54 sincerê 75 15. Intelligent 38 0 ignorant 44 17 * l^atural 51 0 unnatural 51 IS. Harroi’sminded 0 38 broadminded 67 IS. Refined 14 0 vulgar 35 2 0 . Sad 0 2 happy 30 2 1 . Sincere 68 0 insincere 68 2 2 . Smart 0 0 dumb 42 23. Snooty 0 38 friendly 49 24. Trustworthy 41 0 dishonest 31 25. Dhhiased 0 1 biased 63 26. Unfaithful 0 23 faithful 73 27. Unfriendly 0 32 friendly 75 28. Unnatural 0 19 natural 72 2S. Vulgar 0 46 refined 52 58

pairs of opposites. Hoi>rever, there is one instance where a word is the nost frequent opposite for two words. ’’Friendly" is given as the nost

frequent opposite for both "unfriendly" and "snooty." Since it seemed

likely that some additional overlap existed the lists of synonyms and antonyms for each of the t%venty-nine words iTore compared. As a result words were grouped which seemed to overlap ivith one another, that is,

which seemed to be describing the same behaviors. There would be little

question for example in relating "smart" and "intelligent" as descrip­ tions of behavior. These were grouped as presented in Table 5.

Since it is our desire to demonstrate that it is the frequency with ivhich the poles of a personal construct dimension are used that is

of major importance rather than vhether the terms have high value or low value, the problem at this point is to choose dimensions which will contra.st value and frequency (or emergence as we have chosen to refer to this personal frequency’). Consequently, four dimensions were used, each for the reason given:

1. Cheerful-sa\d-chosen because the term describing posi­ tively valued behaviors (i.e., liked people; is fre­ quently used and the contrasting word is not frequently used as a description of disliked people. Also, the frequency of usage of cheerful approximates that of vulgar.

2. Refined-vulgar— chosen because the terms describing negative behavior is a frequent description of dis­ liked people while the contrast is not frequently used as a description of liked people.

3. Sincere-insincere— chosen because both the construct and its contrast are frequently used and because the dimension is used with more than double the frequency of the fourth dimension. TABLE 5

CONSTRUCTS GROUPED TIUIOUGII REMTING SYNONYLIS MID ANTONYIffl

Describe Liked Describe Dis­ Total Fr oquency Group People Freq. liked People Freq. Positive Negative 1. Friendly 62 unfriendly 32 62 70 It 62 snooty 38

2. Natural 51 unnatural 19 Humble 6 conceited 51 57 70 ““ -- affected 24

3. Intelligent 38 ignorant 8 38 8

4. Active 20 inactive 2 20 2

5, Faithful 27 unfaithful 23 Sincere 68 insincere 54 136 122 Trust\TOrthy 41 dishonest 45 6, Cheerful 54 sad 2 54 2

7. Broadminded 43 narrowminded 38 44 47 Unbiased 1 biased 9 8. Refined 14 Vulgar 46 14 46 9. Follower 1 bossy 30 1 30

g 60

4. 3roacmlnded~iiarroTOrD.nd.ed— chosen because the construct and the contrast are used -rvith approninately eoual xrequency. In addition, chosen because the frequencies of the poles of this dirsnsion are approninately equal to the frequency of the "Tulgar" category

'•'.hat l’ire have at this point is four diirnnsions vrhich vre can presunie to have sons personal relevance to the dinensions ?hich fenale college undergraduates use in describing their associates. There are six energent (i.e., frequently used) vrords and tiTo 'vhich are inplicit (i.e., infrequently used). Three of the emergent and one of the implicit

TTords describe positively valued behavior and an equal number describe negatively valued behavior. Four of the emergent vrords are used vrith approxinately equal frequency rdiile tvro are used vrith frequencies more than double that of the other four. The implicit vrords are used vrlth approzcimately equal frequency though "refined" is used somevhat more frequently than vrould be desired. These eight vrords are considered to represent or symbolize groups of behaviors. At this point vre do not

Incvr just vrhat these behaviors are. '.Te do hnovr that four of them describe behaviors vciich are more frequently attributed to liked people so it seems reasonably safe to assume that these are behaviors vrhich have positive value and that the remaining four, since they describe the behavior of disliked people, have negative value. The next step in the process "uto-s the choice of vrords to relate to our eight specially chosen vords, or eight categories as ive vdll refer to them. 61

Selection of the Related ïfords

It seemed desirable to avoid making arbitrary judgments about the

•srords related to these eight categories. From a Personal Construct point of view all we can. say at this point is that we have the verbal symbols for the poles of four dimensions. If wo regard female under­ graduates as having certain standards of behavior which are peculiar to them as a group we can expect these terms to symbolize behaviors which might have only limited relationship to the general meaning of these words for the total population when the age, sex, college, and educa­ tional level restrictions are removed. Consequently, it seemed most desirable to allow peers^ to choose the words which would ultimately be related to these categories. Some vrords were already available since the initial work in selecting the dimensions required the use of synonyms and antonyms. These were used where applicable and the list of words for each category was extended through the use of a standard thesaurus

(4 ). In all, forty-two words were chosen for each category.

These 336 words^ were then given to fifty female undergraduates with instructions to assign each word to one of the eight categoiies if they know the word and thought that it was related to any one of the categories© If they did not know the meaning of the word or did not think that it was related to any of the categories they were to assign it to the "other” column. The forms used in this stage of the

1 Actually 337 words were used, one word being included erroneously so iziat 43 words were used for the insincere category© 6 2 problem are preseabed in Appendix B, p. 1 7 2 . The frequency -with, vdiich. each of the 336 "words was assigned to each of the eight categories -mas tabulated and those "words Tsere remoTcd from the list -which did not sho"w clear agreement on a single category. Ho "word m s chosen as sho"w- ing agreement -which did not have double the frequency in one category as compared "ivi"th any one of the remaining categories. This list m s composed of 264 -words. The Tfords on "which there "was agreement "are presented in Appendix B, p. lyh . A measure of the difficul"by of each

-word was then determined. This measure of difficulty took into consid­ eration only "iiihe"ther or not the student judges assigned a word to any one of the eight categories. It "was computed by determining the per­ centage of the group assigning a -word to anything except the "other" category. If 2 0 of our judges assigned a -word to the "other" cat ego ry the difficul-ty level was 60.

At this time the Thomdike-Lorge frequency (6 ) -was determined for each of the 264 "words so that the categories could be matched for both difficulty level and Thomdike-Lorge frequency. The Thomdike-Lorge measure "takes into consideration only the frequency with "which a particular sequence of lo"tters appears in a selected sample of printed material. The particular meaning in context is not taken into consid­ eration. The measure of difficul-ty level is our attempt to equalize the group of words still more exactly than only Thomdike-Lorge frequency

"would allow, particularly since it is our desire to have subjects make differential responses to the "words rather than the single response of pronouncing the word as soon as it is recognized. As it later appeared. 63 a third measure trould have alIor.’ed even closer matching of the words and would have led to clarification of the results. This led to a replica­ tion of the experimental group with this additional control and some other minor changes in presentation. This -will be more fully discussed in a later description of the replication experiment*

The ?iatchine Procedure

The major limitation on the number of words which could be included in each of the eight categories was the fact that the judges showed clear agreement on only 22 of the 42 words assigned to the "broadminded” category. Thus, if matched words were to be used this would set a maximum, for each of the remaining seven categories. The procedure used in matoliing was as follows t

A word was chosen from the "broadminded” category, and its dif­ ficulty level and Thomdike-Iorge frequency determined. Then, one word was chosen from each of the remaining seven categories which approached, as closely as possible, both the level of difficulty and frequency measure. This procedure was followed until 21 of the 22 words from the "broadminded” category were used. Then the twenty-second irord was added and the mean difficulty level and mean frequency computed.

ITords were then added to and subtracted from the remaining seven categories until their means approached that of the first category.

The words used, their difficulty level, and frequency of usage are presented in Tables 6 through 9. The third measure which we have chosen to call "clarity” is also presented in these tables though it was not used in the present matching procedure. The clarity scores 64

TABLE 6

IWEDS JUDGED TO BE BELATED TO THE GHESBFUL-SAD DIHSUSIOU

© 1 0

4-1 44-^ 44 o n 1 1“ ® y i t o o © -P o o O O -H O t4 © -H S 44 U *4 i k k g g. fa0 44 u) fab 44 W eJ O O Category O ft Category © r-i X u iS O Q O •en 54 a g Q O E-i 54 Cheerful Sad 1, Anus lag 66 1 0 0 12 1 . Bitter 63 77 A «^ni-raated 60 66 4 2 . Complaining 59 59 44 3. Blissful 76 84 2 3. Dejected 84 95 4 4. Buoyant 58 79 2 4. Doleful 62 87 5 5. Capricious 17 88 1 5. Doimcast 80 86 5 6 . Carefree 82 73 A 6 . Flat 36 50 A 7. Cute 53 73 5 7. Joyless 92 96 1 8 . Elated 74 97 1 8 . Melancholy 94 94 16 9. Enchanting 58 62 3 9. Miserable 84 88 27 10. Fun 92 10 0 A 1 0 . Morose 51 93 3 11. Genial 64 68 9 1 1 . Pained 53 85 AA 12. Glad 88 1 0 0 AA 1 2 . PensiTo 32 63 5 13. Happy 96 100 AA 13. Pessimistic 62 65 1 14. Hearty 72 83 18 14. Bemorseful 72 92 1 15. Jocular 34 94 1 15. Sober 62 52 29 16. Jaunty 42 100 1 16. Solemn 64 83 20 17. Joking 78 1 0 0 32 17. Sore 48 65 38 18. I&rtbful 70 94 2 18. Sullen 60 97 13 19. Playful 80 1 0 0 5 19. Sulky 64 84 3 20. Sollicking 66 88 1 2 0 . Tearful 89 93 3 21. Funny 8 6 1 0 0 2 2 1 . Unpleasant 73 50 15 2 2 . Tivacious 64 89 2 2 2 . Worried 64 94 A

Mean 67.09 88.09 18.32 65.82 79.45 2 1 . 8 6 Sigma 18.57 12.50 29.61 16.30 15.97 24.39 65

TABLE 7

VroSDS JUDGED TO BE BELATED TO THE BBOADHBBED-IfARBOVjMIimED DE32TSI0ÎT

o o kf o o , >> - 3 Oh +> 44 O r4 4h ° >> i § 5 g o o O -P «a

Ifean 65.36 70.05 21.59 65.14 74.14 20,55 Sigma 18.17 18.38 27.73 14.96 14.30 24.47 66

TABLE 8

WOKDS JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE SIUGERE-IESIÎTCEHE DIlüBSSIOIT

o O o 0 t-:) >s 1 1 SH 43 4-1 o k, <4 ^ o O I—t o ^ © O Ai ?> >a •H a •H o O O +> © o o © § o •H © -rt A s © *H :3 k 4-1 U U u cr 2 1 Î CJ* W cS o © hO cs o © •t-î © 1-1 -C u O © r4 2 --- Q.- . . . a a a o E-c ------______Sincere Insincere 1, Accountable 48 77 1 1 . Changing 72 56 AA 2. Careful 55 54 A 2 . Confusing 33 50 25 3. Conscientious 83 56 5 3. Counterfeit 65 69 7 4. Consistent 63 74 7 4. Crooked 78 61 18 5. Dependable 90 93 3 5. Deceitful 86 84 4 3. Enduring 50 60 4 6 . Deceiring 94 87 33 7. Frank 78 74 32 7. Deceptive 82 10 0 1 8 , Honorable 72 75 30 8 . Disloyal 88 93 2 9. Just 70 57 AA 9. Evasive 52 73 1 10, Liable 41 71 11 1 0 . False 86 95 A 11. Loyal 88 95 2 2 1 1 . Indefinite 49 74 5 1 2 . IHndful 56 64 4 1 2 . Irresponsible 62 84 3 13, Hoble 46 81 A 13. %glectful 69 59 49 14. Reliable 94 94 10 14. Sneaky 71 62 10 15. Sound 54 65 AA 15. Superficial 58 86 6 13. Stable 64 78 39 16. Suspicious 57 64 13 17. Steadfast 56 64 6 17. Thoughtless 78 74 5 18. Straightforward 78 68 3 18. Uncertain 22 86 21 IS. Trustworthy 86 98 3 19. ^nfaithful 85 90 3 20. Truthful 92 89 4 2 0 . Unworthy 51 73 10 2 1 . Unadulterated 49 46 1 2 1 . Varying 43 55 A 22. Vigilant 26 75 3 2 2 .Wavering 49 91 44 lie an 65 .40 73.09 22.18 65.00 75.73 20.91 Sigma 18 .48 14*11 29.02 18.48 14.37 24.07 67

TABLE 9

W03DS JUDGED TO BE 2ELATED TO THE HEEIIIED-YÜLGAR DÏLExîSIOH

0 0

î>» 44 -P 44 ° "3 ^ '3 o o o 43 5 S 0 0 o *rt 0 fl ;3 0 II ÎH CH >-i U JH g t g & to CJ 0 0 SlO <^4 fcj cS o 14 0 1 0 -H g Q Q a 0 0 Q a s E4 P=4 Categ;ory Category

Refined Vulgar 1. Conservative 66 39 19 1. Bold 66 85 41 2. Courtly 60 90 3 2. Crude 94 93 17 3. Cultivated 80 92 4 3. Disgraceful 82 90 3 4. Delicate 59 100 43 4. Disgusting 8 8 80 21 5. Dignified 89 93 11 5. Evil 62 61 A 6 . Educated 73 79 21 6 . Indecent 8 8 100 2 7. Esthetic 26 62 1 7. Indiscreet 56 61 2 8 . Genteel 66 82 3 8 . LeTTd • 37 83 3 9. Modest 62 63 29 9. Loose 47 62 A 10. Moral 50 71 A 1 0 . Hasty 30 95 7 11. Heat 62 90 29 11. Obscene 76 100 2 12. Poised 93 93 13 12. Offensive 60 6 8 13 13. Polished 94 96 28 13. Rough 70 91 A 14. Prim 54 67 1 14. Rude 6 6 93 26 15. Prissy 43 55 0 15. Ruthless 65 75 5 16. Proper 74 92 AA 16. Scandalous 67 85 3 17. Pure 62 74 A 17. Shabby 55 65 1 1 18. Reputahle 58 69 3 18. Sinful 6 8 91 4 19. Reserved 71 94 2 19. Sloppy 41 85 1 20. Respectable 78 76 13 20. Thief 53 73 28 21. Smooth 42 65 A 21. Vile 74 97 14 2 2 . Tîellbred 79 97 2 2 2 . THld 62 96 AA

Mean 65.50 79.04 21.59 65.32 83.14 20.59 Sigma 16.50 15.80 24.19 15.82 12.80 23.99 68

represent the number of the group that assigned the -word to a single

category in comparison to the number viho placed the '.vord in any cate­

gory besides the "other" column. This is expressed as a percentage.

For example, if 30 of our 50 judges assigned the •vrord to the -word of

the "other" category then the difficulty level is ZO/oO or 40 per cent.

If 10 of the 20 people "who indicated that they "mere familiar -yyith the

TTord by placing it in some one of the eight categories assigned it to a

single category then the clarity score for that word -would bo 50 per

cent, ^ans and sigmas on each measure for all eight categories are

presented in Table 10. The differences in c lari "by will be discussed

later in connection with the results,

TABLE 10

DIFFICULTY LEVEL, CIASITY, A2ÎD THOHSiDIKS-LORGS FEEQUSb'CY FOE EADS OF THE EIGHT CATEGORIES USED

Difficul-ty level Clari-ty Thomdike-Lorge Category lldean Sigma Bean Sigma Bean Sigma Cheerful 67,09 18.57 88,09 12.50 18,32 29,61

Sad 65,82 16,30 79,45 15,97 2 1 . 8 6 24,39

Broadminded 65.36 18.17 70,05 18.^8 21,59 27.73

Sarrowminded 65,14 14.96 74,14 14,30 20.55 24,47

Sincere 65,40 18.48 73,09 14,11 22,18 29,02

Insincere 65,00 18.48 75,73 14,37 20,91 24,07

Refined 65.50 16,50 79,04 15,80 21,59 24,19

Vulgar 65.32 15.82 83.14 12.80 20.59 23.99 69

Ihe Ssperimental ^rocedur^

Our experimental procedure at this stage required two separate measures. One was a measure of the frequency with which the categories selected are used by subjects— that is, a measure of emergence at the individual level. Our dimensions were chosen in such a way that a group measure is implicit. % know, for example, that "cheerful" is a toim frequently invoked in describing "liked" people and that "vulgar" is fre­ quently invoked as a description of "disliked" people. The second measure required was a measure of accuracy with which the words related by the peer judges to each of the eight categories would be assigned to those sane categories by the experimental subjects, ^he procedures followed to obtain those measures are described below.

lîeasure of emergence. A modified form, of Kelly’s Hole Construct

Repertory Test, Appendix C, p. 1 7 9 was constructed as a measure of individual emergence. The standard list of role titles were used. The number of sorts, or grouping of people to be sorted, was increased from

22 to 24. A major change in the method of administration was set up.

This change consisted of providing subjects with construct dimensions to be used rather than allowing them to develop their own constructs.

Thus the subjects were provided with four ready-made dimensions, eight

categories which they wore required to use in pairs. Allowing them to use the terms singly was felt to be an inadequate measure of the degree to which the dimension was meaningful as a moans of simultaneously noting similarities and differences. The instructions which were given them were as follows- 70

■Qrider each, name tdiich you have listed at the top of the page there are 34: squares. Some of these are circled and some are not. We

'Till be concerned only with those that contain a circle. I^ow if you will look at row number one you will see that three of the nineteen names have circles under them. In row number one, then, we are concerned

only with these three people. Look at the names of the three people and

then choose from the list of words at the bottom of the page some word which describes two of these people but not the third. Then look at

the opposite of the word. If that word describes the third person better than it does the other two, write the word which describes the

two people in the blank provided just at the right of the matrix and its

opposite in the 'blank at the extreme right. Then make a check in the

circles of the two people that are alike.

If the third person is not described by the opposite of the word which describes the other two then no distinction is being made. In

tliat case choose another word from the list and follow the same process.

For example, if in the first row you see persons number 18 and 19 as be­

ing "cheerful" then person number 17 must be described by the term "sad."

This need not mean that this person is the "saddest" person among all of

your acquaintances. It simply means that this is a better description

of him than it is of the other two* If you used the term "cheerful" to

describe two and "vulgar" to describe the third, you may be saving that

all of them could be described as "cheerful," that all of them could be

descri'bed as "vulgar," or neither. So use the terms in pairs. If one

pair does not seem to fit then choose another. You may use any pair as

many times as you choose and you may use them in any order that you choose. 71

Eequiring the subjects to use the terms in pairs ?^s our attempt to insure that the subjects -crere really using the same dimensions of be­ havior that -MB had selected from the group. % seemed further that they -M-ould use most frequently those dimensions which had the most relevance to the dimensions -mhich they used personally. If they used

-the same dimension as the group then it seemed likely that they trould, in general, mean the same thing or be construing the same behaviors which the group -would construe. Thus rre -would expect subjects using a dimension frequently to be in better agreement vdth the judges than those using the terms infrequently. The emergence of a particular end of a dimension would be determined by the frequency with which the same indi-Tidual used one end of the dimension as a descrip-fcion of the paired people in preference to the other. That is, if he described more people Tith one end than "with the other, then that end must be more meaningful or better construed than the other. If it is be-fcter con­ strued then he should be in closer agreement -with the judges on that end than on the o-fcher. These are our measures: (l) the frequency

■pith -which a single dimension is used is our measure of personal rele­ vance of the dimension: (2 ) the frequency -with which one end of the dimension is used -bo describe the paired people, or the people -who are seen as similar, in preference to the other end used to describe the dissimilar person is our measure of the emergence of that end of the dimension.

Since we have chosen dimensions -which make discriminations be-bween valued and non-valueé beha-viors -wb must also assume that -the group of 72 people represented "by the role titles are as often described by terms comoting positive value as by those connoting negative value, other­ wise emergence might occur only as a result of the role titles used.

The forms used for the administration of this portion of the study are presented in Appendix C, p. 180 - Sight forms were used with the only difference between forms being the position of the words on the list of dimensions.

The Measure of Accuracy of ~^sage of the Dimension Related ITords. In previous studies on perceptual selectivity both visual and auditory pre­ sentation of the stimulus material have been used. Postman and Bruner

(3 ) have used a tachistoscopie method of presentation while Vanderplas

&nd Blake (?), and Lazarus, Erickson, and Fonda (2 ) have used auditory presentations. The methods seem to have been equally useful. For the present purpose a tachistos copie presentation did not seem to be feasi­ ble in view of the length of our list of vrords. Determining visual duration thresholds for each of the 176 vrords of which our list is com­ posed was deemed to be an impractical task. Determining auditory thres­ holds for each word seemed equally impractical. However, in view of the equipment available to us an auditory method of presentation was chosen except that instead of using a single subject and H presentations to that subject, we chose to use H subjects and a single presentation of the word.

If we view presentation by the methods previously used as result­ ing in errors of recognition, and errors at each succeedingly lengthened exposure, until the word is correctly recognized, then a measure of the 73 number of errors before récognition might be determined. If N subjects had been used and a single tachistos copie presentation of the v/ord it night be said that those subjects Tdio recognized the word did so be­

cause the word had greater personal relevance. If, then, a list of

■570rds had been given to this group we might expect that from the list a

particular subject would recognize those words which had the greatest

personal relevance and that the same words would not be recognized by

the same individuals. The number of times that -the word had been pre­

viously seen, as demonstrated by Solomon and Hofres (s) would, of course,

also be an influencing factor. This, of course, assumes that the word

TTOuld not be exposed for a duration long enough for all subjects to

recognize it. If we then required the subjects to make a.discrimination

after the word had been recognized and then limited the time available

for making the discrimination still greater, familiarity with the word

would be required before it could be quickly recognized and properly

used. A method similar to this but using an auditory presentation

irs-S chosen as the individual measure of accuracy. The method -m.s used

as follows *■

The 176 words, 22 for each of the 8 categories were alphabetized

and presented to the subjects at five-second intervals, in groups of 16.

Two groups of sixteen were included on each ansver sheet. A 10-second

interval -was allowed be-fcween groupings and a 15-second interval between

pages. The number of every 16th word was announced in order to prevent

the subjects from losing their places. The grouping of sixteen, however,

Was used in order that the grouping might be longer than they could re­ 74 call and check during the interval allotved between groupings. An Ampro tape recorder, ibdel 731, -was used to present the -words. The -words vrere recorded onto the -tape by a person -with extensive speech training and radio -work so -that maximum clari-ty and correct pronunciation might be assured. The forms used during this presentation were the same as those used by the judges and are presented in Appendix C, p. ISO . This method of presentation -was used only -with the experimental group. The control group -was simply given the -words presented on a mimeographed sheet -which they were asked to assign to one of the eight categories provided or to the "other" row, if they did not know the -word or did not think it related to any of the eight categories. The list of words used for the control were in the same order as that presented to the experimental group. The formed used is pjresented in Appendix C, p»i8 l

The instructions to the experimental subjects are given b elow.

The control group -was given the same instructions except that the

-words "look at" were substi-buted for "listen to."

You -will be presented a list of -words. Your task it to listen to each word and then to decide whether that word is related to any of the eight categories given at the left of the answer sheet. If you -hhink a word is related to any of the categories then make a check in the column pro-vided for that word beside the category to «diich you feel the -word is related. If you do not think a -word is related to any of the eight ca-begories or you do not know the word, then make your check in the "other" column. For example, if the first word -were "fastidious" you -would Iddk at each category; then if you decided that it was related to being "cheerful" you would make a check in col-umn one be­ side "cheerful." You are to make only one check in each column and only one check for each word. Then go to the next -word and follow the same proced-ure# 75

The same order of presentation vjsls used with both the control and experimental group. The specially adapted form of the Hole Construct

Repertory was administered first to a group of subjects. After this m s completed the words to be used were presented to the group; in the experimental group by means of the tape recorder, in the control group by means of the mimeographed list of words. The experimental group was allowed only five seconds to assign a word to one of the categories. The control group was allowed to spend as much time per word as needed. Saergence and personal relevance are to be measured by the specially adapted form of the Hole Construct Repertory. An end of a dimension is considered to be emergent if it is used more times to describe the paired people from the triad of people that are pre­ sented than is its opposite. The dimension which is used more frequently is assumed to be the one which has the greatest personal relevance.

Both are, in reality, frequency measures. The fact, however, that use of one end of a dimension requires the use of the opposite, so that similarities are différents must be simultaneously construed, has led us to refer to the frequency with which one end is invoked to describe the paired people as a measure of "emergence.” Actually both ends are used equally frequently, but on each occasion that a dimension is used one end describes more people than the other.

. Accuracy scores on the word list are to be computed by determin­ ing the number of words in each category where the subject is in agree­ ment with peer judges. Thus we have an accuracy score for each of the eight categories for each subject* 76

Subjects. One bundred and five feiaale college imdergraduates at

Ohio State were used as subjects. Sighty-one of these were students in

the introductory course in psychology while twenty-one were residents of

one of the campus dormitories. The difference in these two groups of

subjects is believed to be insignificant since our dimensions were chosen

through the use of female undergraduates. îTone of the subjects used

served as a member of the group of judges used in selecting the list of

related words. Three of the subjects were discarded because they had

not properly followed the experimental procedure.

The experimental group was composed of 55 subjects who were tested

using the procedure described above. The control group was composed of

49 subjects. The control subjects were included only to test the re­

sults of the speeded presentation; that is, to determine if the speeded

presentation had any effect on group performance.

Hypotheses to be Tested

Two groups of hj'potheses are to be tested. The first, the group hypotheses, provide a test of our thinking at the group level without

the benefit of individual predictions, ^ r e we are concerned only with the second ezperimental izustrument used, the eight matched groups

of words. The individual hypotheses will utilize both instruments. It

is expected that these results will accentuate the differences found

with regard to our group predictions. 77

Group Hypotheses to be Tested

It m i l be recalled that tre chose our group dimensions by taking the frequency of usage of each of the poles of the dimensions into con­ sideration as well as the frequency of usage of dimensions. The

"vulgar-refined” dimension was chosen because the word "vulgar” was a frequent description of disliked people while its opposite was an infre­ quent description of liked people even though it was the most frequent antonym, of "vulgar.” The "cheerful-sad" dimension was chosen because

"cheerful” was a frequent description of liked people while its most frequent antonym was seldom used as a description of disliked people; in addition, because "cheerful" vras used with about the same frequency as "vulgar." The "broadminded-narrowminded” dimensions was used because both vrords were equally frequently used and both were used with about the same frequency as the most frequently used words of the other trro dimensions. The fourth dimension, "sincere-insincere,” was chosen because both words were equally frequently used and both were used with more than double the frequency of the other most frequently used words.

The diagram presented in Table 11 will simplify an understanding of the hypotheses to be presented. The letter "S" refers to the word which is emergent; the letter "I," to the word which is implicit; and "E" to the most frequently used of the emergent categories. 78

TABLE 11

TES FOUR DIHSESIOÎÎS USED AIE) GLASSIFICATÏCII OF THE SIGHT TE2SS

Term connoting Term, connoting Dimension positive behavior negative beha-vior Cheerful-sad E B r oadminded-nar ro^wminded E E Sincere-insincere E* E» H.efined--vulgar I E

Hypothesis G-1

Experimental subjects ■will show significantly greater accuracy in their assignment of vrords to emergent ends of dimensions than to their implicit contrasts

In effect, this tests the efficiency of Pos'tman and Bruner's con­

tention that high value is associated 'with accuracy "when compared ivith

our prediction that accuracy is related to emergence. Tvro dimensions

7Û11 be used to test this prediction, the ”cheerful-sad” dimension and

the ’Vulgar-refined” dimension. ?Je have set up these dimensions so that

the positively valued ■word ”cheerful” is emergent on that dimension Tdiile

the negatively valued ■word "vulgar" is emergent on the other. If emer­

gence is the most efficient predictor of accuracy the mean accuracy

score for "cheerful" should be significantly higher than the mean

accuracy score for "sad," and, in addition, the mean accuracy score for

"vulgar" shoTild be significantly higher than the meqn accuracy score

for "refined." If positive value is a more efficient predictor, then the

mean accuracy scores for the t^wo positi-vely valued categories, "cheerful"

and "refined," ■will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy 79

scores for the tvro negatively valued categories.

Hypothesis G-2

Experimental subjects ivill show no significant differ­ ences in accuracy scores between the ends of dimensions where those ends are equally emergent.

For this prediction we m i l use the remaining two dimensions, "broad- ninded-narroiminded" and "sincere-insincere." These two dimensions were chosen because the words outlining the dimensions were used with approx­ imately equal frequency. Since the pairs of iTords are equally emergent there should be equal accuracy with regard to the two ends of each dimension. However, again if positive value is a more efficient pre­ dictor the positively valued vrords should have the highest mean accuracy score.

%rpothesis G-3

Among the terms connoting positively valued behavior the emergent te ms wi ll have significantly higher accuracy scores than the implicit term.

Thus we would expect the accuracy scores for cheerful, broadminded, and sincere each to be significantly higher than the accuracy score for

refined. It may be presumed that this prediction could not be made by

Bruner and Postman. They describe no general method for discriminating between areas of high value.

Hypothe si s G-4

Among; the terms connoting negatively valued behavior the emergent terms will have significantly higher accuracy scores than the implicit term# 80

Sere we ■would expect the accuracy scores for vulgar, insincere and

jiarro'-viainded to be significantly higher than the accuracy scores for

sad. The results -mhich -would obtain here are Tïhat -would be described

as selective vigilance and percep-tual defense by Postman and Bruner.

That is, the subjects higher accuracy scores for the emergent terms

TOuld be the result of selective vigilance and their low score on the

implicit term the result of perceptual defense. How the critical

degree of emotionali-ty believed to be operant in the ease of selective vigilance could be determined is unknown to this writer.

Hypothesis G-5

The accuracy scores for the most frequently used dimension should be significantly higher than the accuracy scores on the less frequently used dimension.

In this case the sincere category should have a significantly higher mean accuracy score than the broadminded category; and the insincere cate­ gory, a higher mean accuracy sooro than the narrow-minded category.

This prediction would be in line -with the differences expected by

Solomon and Hovres.

Hypothesis G-6

The emergent -terms connoting negative behavior will show significantly higher mean accuracy scores than the implicit term connoting positive behavior.

That is, the mean accuracy scores for vulgar, insincere, and narrow­ minded should be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the refined category. 81

Hypothesis G-7

The emergent terms connoting positive behavior ivill show significantly higher mean accuracy scores than the implicit term connoting negative beliavior.

The broadminded, cheerful, and sincere categories, then, should have significantly higher mean accuracy scores than the sad categories.

S'ÆEiary Statement m t h regard to the Group Hypothesis

In general, our predictions put us at odds with the predictions "which

■would be made by Postman and Bruner ( ^ ) at all points, and in line with the prediction ?diich would be made by Solomon and ■“•oives ( 5 ) at all points.

That is, we would be in agreement with Solomon and Howes’ predictions if they would empect that words related to a frequently used -vrord would be sore frequently recognized by virtiae of their relationship to that iTOrd.

This problem does not adequately di fferen'tiate between the points of difference in the two points of view. As far as we can determine from the limited n'umber of reports of their ivork which they have submitted for publication, they are concerned only with the frequency vri.th which particular words are used though they have suggested that this frequency varies considerably from individual to individual. Personal Construct

Theory, on the other hand, does not see the v/ords used as separate from their meaning, particularly if the words can be viewed as constructs for the individual. The concepts of personal constructs carries many im­ plications which mere frequency of usage certainly does not imply. The word "the," for example, is extremely high in frequency of usage and would doubtless be more frequently used than any personal construct of the individual and yet certainly the same predictions would not be made 82

Tvith regard to such a Tsord as night be made v.ith regard to the personal­ ized concepts of an individual. In addition, our measure of emergence is not a frequency measure in the usual sense of the vrord. Instead, it is a measure of the frequency of usage of a particular -word as a means of noting similarities betîveen individuals when the usage of that word requires the usage of an antonym (which is view by a group of judges to be the most frequent antonym) to note differences. Such considerations led us to describe the phenomenon in which we are interested as ”emer- crence . "

Individual hypotheses to be Tested

Our individual hypotheses are similar to the group hypotheses stated above. That is, we would expect the same thing to happen at an individual level that w have predicted at the group level. '.7e know nhich concepts are emergent in the group since we chose our dimensions in such a way that they would be emergent. Vihich end of the dimensions are emergent for individuals, however, remains to be determined. The individual predictions, therefore# require the use of the modified HCBT that was administered. Through the use of the individual measure of emergence which shall be taken from this instrument we expect to accen­ tuate certain differences found at the group level, reveal differences where none existed, and generally demonstrate the usefulness of a measure of the frequency with which one end of a construct dimension is used in preference to the other. It should be kept in mind that while

’.7e chose two of our dimensions on the basis that one end of the dimension was as frequently used in the group as the other, we would not expect 83 this to be true fbr individuals . That is, we would not expect emergenc© of the ends of the dimensions in the group unless approximately half of the subjects in the group from which we chose the dimensions used one pole of the dimension more frequently and the remainder used the opposed end more frequently. Similarly, one pole of a dimension would not be emergent for the group unless the group as a whole consistently used one pole of a dimension in preference to the other.

Hypothesis I-l

The mean accuracy score for the most frequently used dimension of each subject will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score the least frequently used dimension.

That is, we espect to find a direct relationship beiwreen the fre­ quency with whidi a dimension is invoked in describing one’s associates and the degree to which there is agreement with the judges in the delineation of the area of behaviors subsumed by that dimension. This is our measure of personal relevancy of the dimensions used. If a person uses a dimension we assume that the more frequently he uses it the more chance that he means the same thing as the group when he does use it.

Hypothesis 1-2

The mean accuracy score for the emergent ends of each of the four dimensions should be significantly higher than the mean accuracy of the implicit ends of those same dimensions.

For example, on the cheerful-sad dimension the end of the dimension which is emergent for a particular subject should be the end of the dimension on which he is in the greatest agreement with the judges re­ gardless of whether or not that term connotes positive or negative 84

behavior. '% expect that poles of a dimension are not equally well

elaborated, and further that the end of the dimension -nhich is most

readily invoked is where the greatest elaboration has occurred. Since

have chosen group dimensions for the subjects to use rather than

permitting them to invoke their own dimensions we expect the elaboration

to be in the direction of more complete agreement with the judgments of

the group as to the behaviors described.

The results of this prediction should contradict in some cases

the prediction which we made at the group level. There, for example, we

predicted no significant difference between the mean accuracy score for

the sincere category and the mean accuracy score for the insincere

category, "hen individual levels of emergence are taken, into consid­

eration we expect to obtain differences on this dimension as on the

broadminded-narrowminded dimension. Tàe also anticipate a similar

contradiction on the two other dimensions. Were we to choose from our

group of experimental subjects those who invoke the term sad more

frequently than they do the term cheerful, we would expect the mean

accuracy scores on the sad category to be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score on the cheerful category. The same sort of pre­

diction would be made in regard to the refined-vulgar dimension.

Hypothesis 1-5

The negatively valued end of the most frequently used dimension will have a significantly higher mean accuracy score than the positively valued end of the least frequently used dimension.

It is our assumption at this point that the most frequently used

dimension has the greatest personal relevance. If personal relevance 85

Hoans greater personal elaboration then the elaboration for the two ■..•Bnds of a personally relevant dimension should be greater tha-n that for an irrelevant dimension Trahich is presumably a less meaningful dimension for the subject. The prediction here operates as a still more stringent test of our prediction that personal relevance is a more important factor than positive or negative value*

Summary

The method of choosing the dimensions used has been described.

The experimental instruments have been discussed and the experimental procedure outlined. The hypotheses to be tested væro presented as general statements but will be more fully elaborated in the following chapter 7m.th the presentation of the results*

EEFESE17C3S FOR CHAPTER III

1. Rally, George A. The Psychological Constz-uction of Life. Unpub­ lished manuscii.pt, 1953*

2. Lazarus, R. S., Eriks en, C. , and Fonda, C. P., "Personality Synamics and Auditory Perceptual Recognition," J. of Personality, 1950, 19, 471-483*

5. Postman, L., Bruner, J . S., and ^Ginnies, E. ü., "Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception," J. of Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1948, 43, 124-154*

4. Roget, Samuel R., Thesaurus of English Tfords and Phrases. PhiladelphiaÎ David ^ R a y Company, 1952. Revised Edition.

5. Solomon, R. L. and Howes, D. H., "iTord Frequency, Personal Values, and Visual Duration Thresholds,” Psych. Rev., 1951, 58, 256-270,

6. Thorndike, R. L., and Lgrge, I. The Teacher's llord Book of 30,000 ~t7ords. Hew ^ork* Teachers College, Columbia ^haiversity, 1944*

7. Vandenplas, J. M., and Blake, R. R. "Selective Sensitization in Auditory Perception," J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 252-266* CHAPTER IF

RESULTS AIÏÏ) DISCUSSION

lut r o duc ti on

The results of the present study tvill be discussed in tvro sections.

Cur predictions vrill be in essential agreement rrith the predictions

■which it seems that Solomon and Howes (s) would make. They have demon­ strated a relationship between frequency of usage of a vrord and the accuracy of perception of that word (i.e., visual duration threshold).

Vie have, hovrever, carried their prediction one step further. '-Te have extended their notion of accuracy to include accuracy of perception of the area of behavior subs-umed by a vrord. In effect, our predictions are the res-ult of an attempt to demonstrate (l) that frequency of usage of a dimension (outlined by 2 words) is related to accuracy of percep­ tion of the area of behavior subsumed by that dimension and that the order of emergence of the poles of the dimension is related to the accuracy of perception of the behaviors subsumed by the poles of the dimension. Through the use of peer judges we have established vrhich behaviors relate to the poles of our four specially chosen group dimensions by allovnng these judges to choose the vrords v/hich we have related to the words symbolizing our dimensions. Concomitantly, we are also comparing the relative efficiency of high value in the sense that value is used by Postman, Bruner, and ^-roGinnies, (l), and frequen­ cy of usage as predictors of an curacy of perception. In general, it is our hypothesis that vdiether or not the area of beliavior is valued is

— 8 6 — 87 less an indication of accuracy than -whether or not the symbols for -fchose areas of behavior o^e frequently invoked in describing the individuals vdth vdiom a person deals.

Our predictions are made at t-wo levels. The first level ve vdll refer to as the group level. Here our predictions are made using only the frequency of usage of our dimensions and emergence of the poles of our dimensions in the group from -which the dimensions arc chosen as our predictor of accuracy. The second is the individual level. Our pre­ dictions here -will require the use of the modified form of the Hole

Construct Hepertory Test, described on page 69 , as a measure of the frequency vith -ivhich each individual uses each of our four dimensions and as our measure of the order of emergence of the poles of the four dimensions. Our group predictions do not require the use of this instrument since vre chose our dimensions in such a manner that the order of emergence of the poles of the dimensions in the total group -was assured. It is our hypothesis hei-e that these individual measures of frequency and order of emergence -will be even more closely related to accuracy of perception of areas of beha-vior subsumed by o-or- dimensions than is group measure of these usages.

The first section of this chapter -will deal -with the group hypothe­ ses. The hypotheses -will be more fully elaborated in -terms of specific predic-bions derived from the general statements -which -srere presented in the pre-vious chapter. The results of a factor analysis of the inter- rsla-fcionships be'tween the accuracy scores on the eight categories -will be described. The second section -will describe the results of the individual hypo-theses. 88

None of these predictions make use of the control group. This group

7JS.S collected only so that the effectiveness of the timed presentation

of the iTOrd list might be determined. Only one prediction iTOuld be made

Tnth regard to the control group. trould e:jq)ect no significant dif­

ferences among the mean accuracy scores of the eight categories. The

control group ■will be discussed at the close of the section on group

predictions. Since we are interested in the relative accuracy TriLth imich the subjects respond to the different categories our experimental

subjects act as their oim controls with regard to both individual and

group predictions. Complete data for both of the control and experi- nental groups are presented in Tables 30 and 31 , Appendix C pages 182-1 8 5 .

Results of the Group Predictions

nvcothesis G-1

General statement. Subjects will show significantly greater accuracy in their assignment o f words to emergent ends of dimensions than to the implicit contrasts.

Sere we wish to contrast group value (i.e., positive value) with

emergence. The general statement will be tested by using the "two

dimensions where the poles are not used ■with equal frequency in the

group from which they were selected; the "cheerful-sad" dimension and the "refined-vulgar" dimension. In one the positively valued word

"cheerful" is emergent and in the other the negatively valued word

"vulgar" is emergent. For the first dimension we would expect the

positively valued category t o be the one which has the highest mean

accuracy and for the second dimension the negatively valued category to 89 have the highest mean acctjracy. Postman and Bruner, as vre interpret them, vrould predict that the tvro categories having positive value would have the highest mean accuracy scores. Sach of these two predictions will be discussed separately.

Expérimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "cheerful” category will be significantly liigher than the mean accuracy score for the "sad” category.

The mean accuracy score for the "cheorful” category vas 14.26; for

"sad,” 11.09. The difference between the means is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence, t ■ 8.98. Since the tiTO arrays of scores are scores obtained from the sane subjects, the subjects act as their oT-n controls. That is, both the accuracy score for the "cheerful” category and the ”sad" category were scores from the same subject. The correlation between these two arrays of scores was token into consider­ ation in the computation of the tests of significance. The intercorre­ lations betvrecn these two categories and each of the other sin are presented in Table 15. The descriptive statistics for each of the eight categories are presented in Table 12; and the t ’s between all combination of the categories in Table 14. The formula used in the computation of the t ’s is as follows

t a - lüg

- 2^12^ ml m2 90

TABLE 12

ÎÜSAIÎS AND CTHEH DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE EIGHT CATEGORIES USED

S.E. of Category Mean Sigma Mean Cheerful 14.26 2.98 .41 Sad 11.09 3.05 .42

BTnmdml-nden 11.58 3.25 .45 Ear roTsminde d 11.19 3.81 .53

Sincere 12.53 3.09 .43 Inaincere 11.64 3.00 .42

Refined 13.00 3.33 .46 Ynlgar 14.11 3.42 .47

TABLE 13

TABLE OF INTERCORRELATIONS FOR THE EIGHT CATEGORIES OF ACCURACY SCORES

Cheer­ Broad- îJarroTi^- ful Sad minded minded Sincere Insincere Refined Yulgar C .64 .31 .39 .16 .13 — .01 .23 s .32 .29 .08 .15 .11 .40

3 .68 .03 .28 .11 .47

N .11 .31 -.04 .51

Si .36 .21 —.04

In .00 .04 a .34

T 91

Scperimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "vulgar” category i>n.ll be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "refined” category.

The mean accuracy score for the vulgar category is 14.11; and for the refined category, 13.00. The difference between these means is significant beyond the .05 level of confidence, t = 2.08. The result here -would be difficult to predict in terms of value orien-bation since the vjord "vulgar” has negative value; that is, is more often attributed to disliked people. In both this and the preceding hypothesis a single principle, emergence, has led to both predictions. In order to account for both results I*ostinan and Bruner -would have to invoke both the concepts of selective sensitization and selective -vigilance.

Sensitization -would be invoked to explain the results of the first hypothesis and vigilance the results of the second hypothesis. Tlarough using the single concept of emergence -we have predicted both.

In order to compare our predictions further the follo-wing hypothe­ sis is stated.

Experimental statement, -^he mean accuracy score for the -two positively -valued categories of the "cheerful-sad" and "refined--vulgar" dimensions -will not be significantly dif­ ferent from the mean accuracy for the negatively valued categories from those same dimensions.

This hypothesis is not confirmed. The mean accuracy score for the tr/o positively valued categories, "cheerful" and "refined," is 24.11 and for the t-wD n egatively valued categories, 22.83. The difference is in the direction that Pos-kman and Bruner -would predict, and is significant beyond the .05 level of confidence. The t is 2.06 -where 6^ is 4.47.

The next hypothesis takes the positively -valued ends of all of the four dimensions into consideration. 92

2xpe riment al statement. The mean accuracy score for the positively valued ends of the four dimensions I’riLll not be significantly different from the mean accuracy score for the negatively valued ends.

The mean accuracy for the positively valued categories, "cheerful,”

'broadminded,” "sincere," and "refined,” is 51.38 and for their negative­ ly valued contrasts 47.85. The difference is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence. The t is 3.82 '."here 6^ is 6.74. This hypothesis also fhils of confirmation and the results indicate that the positively valued categories have, as Postman and Bruner would predict, higher accuracy scores.

TABLE 14

TEE t ’s FOE THE DIPFESEKCS BSTTiEElI EACH CATEGOSY AITD EACH OTHER CATEGORY

13 13 0 13 0 g-4 u 13 © u So as o 1cS 1k rd o § 1 «-! M CS u •H 1 o M m W 1 « g Cheerful 8.S3 5.30 5.80 3.15 4.76 2.04 .27

Sad .96 .18 2.53 1.00 3.24 6.16

Broadminded .98 3.18 .12 2.34 5.38

îlarroTOninded 2.08 .79 2.53 5.86

Sincere 1.85 .84 2.43

Insincere 2.19 4.00

Refined 2.08

Vulgar 93

Hvpo'fchesis G—2

General statement. Subjects -will show no significant differences in accuracy scores between the ends of dimen­ sions where those ends are equally emergent.

This general statement takes the remaining two dimensions into consideration that were not tested separately in the previous state­ ment. These two dimensions were chosen because the poles of these two dimensions wore used with approximately equal frequency in the group from vdiich the dimensions were chosen.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "sincere" category will not be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "insincere" category’".

The mean for the sincere category is 12.53; for the insincere,

11.64. The difference between the mean is not significant at the .05 level of confidence though it approaches that level, t = 1.85. The trend is in the direction predicted by Postman and Bruner. The posi­ tively valued category again has the highest mean.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "broadminded" category will not be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "narrov/minded" category.

The mean for the broadminded category is 11.58; for the narrovf- minded, 11.19. The difference between the means is not significant at the .05 level, t = .98. The trend, however, as in the previous case, is in the direction of positive value.

In general, this hypothesis is confirmed. Hovrever, it is obvious that there is a trend in the data which supports the hypothesis of a positive relationship between high value and accuracy. Even 94 though the trend is not significant in these tvro cases, -Lvhen all four dimensions are considered the difference resulting proved to be statistically reliable.

TT-iypothehe sis G-3

General statement. Among the categories connoting positively valued behavior the emergent categories 'will have significantly higher accuracy scores than the implicit category.

This hypothesis represents our attempt to differentiate bet'voen positively valued terms ivith regard to frequency of usage. Three separate predictions are considered in this general statement: the comparison of the accuracy scores on the cheerful, broadminded, and sincere categories which are frequently used tomns with the refined category which is an infrequently used term. Each ici 11 be considered separately.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "cheerful" category will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "refined" category.

The difference here is significant beyond the .05 level of confi­ dence and in the expected direction. The mean accuracy score for the cheerful category is 14.26 and for the refined category, 13.00. The t is 2.04.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "broadminded" category w/ill be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "refined" category.

Tliis prediction is not confirmed. The difference is in the direc­ tion opposite to our prediction and is significant beyond the .05 level of confidence. The mean accuracy score for the broadminded category is 95

11.58 and for the refined category, 13.00. The t is 2.34.

Sxperinental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "sincere" category will bo significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "refined" category.

This prediction also fails to be confirmed. The refined category has a higher mean accuracy score although the difference between the means is not significant. The mean for the sincere category is 12.53 and for the refined category 13.00. The t is .84.

The results regarding the general statement are inconclusive. Of the three differences tested, one supports the h^rpothesis vn.th a signi­ ficant difference. One is contrary to the prediction at a significant level of confidence, and the third difference is not statistically reliable. hypothesis 0-4

General statement. Among the categories connoting negatively valued behavior the emergent categories will have significantly higher accuracy scores than the im­ plicit category.

Our problem hero is to predict differences in accuracy between negatively valued categories. again our prediction is ma do in terms of the emergence of the dimension ends. The "narrovmiinded, "

"insincere," and "vulgar" categories are invoked more readily than the

"sad" category and thus should reveal the greatest accuracy.

Ihrperimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "vulgar" category will be significantly higher than the moan accuracy score for the "sad" category. 96

This prediction is confirmed. The mean accuracy score for the vulgar category is 14.11 and for the sad category, 11.09. This differ- snce is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence, t = 6.16.

Stcporimental statement. The mean accuracy s c o t q for the "narrovminded” category rrill be significantly higher than the moan accuracy score for the "sad” category.

This prediction is not confirmed. The difference is in the s:cpectod direction but does not reach a satisfactory level of signifi­ cance. The mean accuracy score for the narronminded category is 11.13 ond for the sad category 11.09, The t is .18.

Ezperimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "insincere" category tTill be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "sad" category.

This prediction also fails to be confirmed. Again the difference is in the e::pectod direction but is statistically unreliable. The t is

1.00.

The general statement of the hypothesis presented above is regarded as confirmed. All of the predictions made are supported by the trends in the data, of which some are statistically roliablo. nipothosi s G-5

General statement. The mean accuracy score for the most frequently used dimension, "sincere-insincere," will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the less frequently used dimension, "broadminded-narrow- minded."

The since re-insincere dimension -vas chosen for testing primarily because the frequency of usage of both polos of the dimension was more than double that of the other emergent categories, and because the poles of this dimension were equally emergent. This dimension is 97

compared Tâth the only other dimension vdiose poles are equally emergent.

Only the one prediction is to bo made hero. That prediction is made in the general statement. The differences resulting are in the

predicted direction though they do not reach a desirable level of con­

fidence. The mean accuracy score for the sincere-insincere dimension

is 24.17 and for the broadminded-narroTnainded dimension, 22.77. The t

is 1.41 'diere 6, is 7.15 (jST^SS). ! d This prediction is, in a manner of speaking, a "long shot." It is

one, hovrevor, rrhich it seems tliat Solomon and Sovres ( 2 ) irould make

vdthout hesitation, he have established that the terms outlining this

dimension are used ■vvith frequencies -vdiich more than double the fre­

quency of usage of any other category, ^f frequency of usage in the

general population from vdiich the dimensions are chosen is to have any

effect it should be at this point. It seems to us, although our sample

is regarded as a part of the general population from vniich the dimen­

sions irere chosen, that personal frequency of usage might be more likely

to reveal differences even though no significant differences are found

in terms of nomothetic frequency.

%?othesis G--6

General statement. The emergent categories connoting negative behavior Trf.ll have accuracy scores which are signi­ ficantly higher than the accuracy score of the implicit category connoting positive behavior.

The three emergent categories having negative value, "narrorcninded,

"insincere," and "vulgar," should be higher in mean accuracy score than

the implicit positively valued category "refined." This prediction

'«vould be contrary to that made by Postman, Bruner and %Ginnies since it 98 predicts that categories have negative value ivill be responded to more accurately than a category having positive value.

Experimental statement. The meah accuracy score for the ’’insincere” category -will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the ’’refined" category.

This prediction is not confirmed. The result is contrary to our prediction. The mean accuracy score for the refiaied category is 13.00 and for the ’’insincere" category, 11.64. The difference is significant beyond the .05 level of confidence, t = 2.19.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "narroTOninded" category "will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy for the "refined" category.

This prediction also fails of confirmation. The result is again contrary to our prediction and the difference is statistically reliable.

The 38an accuracy score for the narroimiinded category is 11.19. The t is 2.53.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "vulgar" category Trill be significantly higher than the man accuracy score for the "refined" category.

This hypothesis has appeared in another form in testing hypothesis

6-1 irhere the result confirmed our prediction.

The results rrith regard to this general hypothesis are inconclu­ sive. All differences are significant though they are in opposed direc­ tions. The refined category, however, was the poorest of the eight categories for our purposes. Têiile it was an. infrequently used cate­ gory, it '.Tas used in the original sample from which the dimensions were chosen with greater frequency than would have been desirable. The con­ tribution that this difference in frequency mahes is difficult to 99 deteraizie at this time, however.

Ir^oothesi^ G-7

General statement. The emergent terms connoting posi­ tive behavior will have mean accuracy scores which are significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the implicit negative category.

This prediction has the advantage of both emergence and positive value. The cheerful, broadminded, and sincere categories are both emergent and positive in value, ^f these measures are significantly related to accuracy then these differences should indicate support for the predi cti ons .

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the ’’cheerful’* oategorj’' will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the ”sad” category.

This hypothesis has appeared in another form (G-1) where the result confirmed our prediction.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the ’’broadminded” category will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the ”sad” category.

This prediction is not confirmed. The mean accuracy score for the broadminded category is 11.58 and for the sad category, 11.09. The dif­ ference is in the expected direction but is not statistically reliable.

T is .96.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the ’’sincere” category will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the ”sad” category.

This prediction is confirmed. The difference between the means is in the expected direction and is significant beyond the .05 level of confidence. The mean accuracy score for the sincere category is 12.53 1 0 0 ar.d for the sad category, 11.09. The t is 2.53.

This prediction is regarded as confirmed. T'.vo of the three differences are in the expected direction and are statistically reliable.

The third is in the expected direction though it does not reach the re- ouirod level of significance.

Suamary and Discussion

Thus feir sixteen different predictions have been made. Eleven of these are confirmed by either trends in the data or significant differ­ ences in the direction predicted. Five of these reach a satisfactory level of significance. Of the remaining five predictions all differ­ ences are in a direction opposite to our predictions. Four of these differences are statistically reliable ; three of 'ïhich are in support of

Bruner and Postman’s contention that positive value is related to greater accuracy ( i ). Apparently, though positive value is in some instances a satisfactory predictor of accuracy, the frequency Td.th which the poles of the four dimensions selected are used allows more efficient predic­ tion. One consideration, however, restrains us from draiving such con­ clusions .

^t will be remembered that our measure of difficulty level is not a typical one. The measure used for matching our groups of words took into consideration only the number of people -sdao said that the vrord belonged in context; that is, it was a measure only of the percentage of the total group of judges who indicated that a word belonged to some one of our eight categories. This indicates nothing about the percentage of people who placed the word in a single category, although we had 10 1 chosen for matching only those "sTords -where -twice as many people assigned a -ivord to one category as assigned it to any other single category.

The failure to take this type of agreement into consideration, -which we earlier referred to as ”clarit;r,” appears to be a major methodological oversight.

As will be noted from the mean clarity scores, presented in Table 10, there are substantial differences in the mean degree of clarity among the eight categories. The manner in which these differences might affect our results is presented in Table 15. The c lari-by scores were computed by de-bermining, from those people "who placed the word in context, the percentage assigning the word to a single category. For example, if only -tr.-enty-flTe of the group of judges assigned a -word to one of the eight ca-fcegories, and all of those people assigned that word to a single category, the clarity score -would be 100. That is, 100 per cent of the people who said that they could use the -word in the context that

-no provided placed the -word in a single category. The clarity score for each of the eight categories represents the mean of the scores for each

-nord assigned to that category.

As a result of a consideration of the effect of this variable on the results of our study, it appears that the diffei-ences in "clarity" for the eight groups of words may have biased the results. Certainly, at least, differences resulting from differences in clari-fcy are con­ founded with our predicted differences, ^n the four of the five cases where our predic-tions are confirmed at a significant level, the dif­ ferences in clari-by favor confirmation of the predictions. ^n the five cases where results are in the opposite direction of our predictions. 102

TABLE 15

SÜ1LLAE.Y OF HYPOTHESES, HESTJLTS, ÈIÎD TES MâlHIER lîT 7ÎHICE DÏFFESEIICES IE CLARITY LEGHT HAirS AFFECTED THE RESULTS

03 o ■r-i O 'r-i 0 u d, O n di ra CL, O o a O P n: 0 P a § CO o •H T) o o: o occ 0 •H CJ o •iH •)—{ -p § 0 >a CQ CO o o o ^ g 2^ - O C.-P +5 p •H ao u O "H 'H 0 -H f-j r - t ?! o o ■g ^ ^ d VJ dH d P 0 b ■P > es o 'h c3 CO c 2 r-) CÎ cS •H rH r—f 0 0 o O C II o o;14 Q o 0 G-l OS* 88.09-79.45 C .09 Yes* Yes Yes Eone 7>R 85.14-79.04 T .04 Yes* Yes Yes Eone ?=E 77.57-77.97 Hone .00 Eo* Eo Eo P o s ) Eeg.*

G-2 JL Si=I 70.05-79.45 I .04 Yes Eo Eo Pos > Eeg.»' b =n 75.09-75.73 E .02 Yes Eo Eo Pos > Eeg.^r

G-3 OR 88.09-79.04 C .09 Yes* Yes Yes Eone G>R 70.05-79.04 R .09 Eo* Eo Yes Eone Si>R 73.09-79,04 R .06 Eo Eo Yes Eone

G-4 7)3 83.14-79.45 V .04 Yes* Yes Yes Eone^^ I>S 75.73-79.45 8 .04 Yes Eo Eo E > r r lOS 74.14-79.45 S .05 Yes Eo Eo E > Lv-

C-5 Si>3H 74.41-72.10 SI .02 Yes Yes Yes Eone

G-6 7>R 83.14-79.04 Y .04 See G-I Yes Yes Eone I>R 75.73-79.04 R .03 Eo* Eo Yes Eone IT)R 74.14-79.04 R .05 Eo* Eo Yes Eone

C-7 OS 88.09-79.45 C .09 See G —1 Yes Yes Eone _j, BiS 70.05-79.45 8 .09 Yes Eo Eo Pos&E > Eeg«Pr\, Si)S 73.09-79.45 8 .06 Yes* Eo Eo Pos'^E > Eeg&I'i^ ♦Difference significant beyond the .05 level of confidence. -^Differences in ne an accuracy appear though differences in clarity do not favor their appearance. *C= Cheerful, S=sad, B=broacbiinded, lI=narrov

In all, there are only seven cases where differences appear which are not favored by differences in clarity. In only tivo of these are the différences significant. The positively valued categories have a mesn accuracy score which is significantly higher than the mean accuracy score fbr the negative categories. The positively valued, emergent category ’’sincere” is significantly higher than the negatively valued, implicit category ”sad.” The remaining five show trends which equally favor emergence and positive value as leading to greater accuracy.

At this point the results appear to be inconclusive. It seemed likely, however, that if these differences in clarity were meaningful they should affect performance in the control group as well as in the experimental group. A consideration of this is discussed in the follovf- ing sections.

Control Group Results

The control group was collected for one purpose only, to determine if the use of the time limit imposed on the experimental group for each word affected results as wo had anticipated. l«o predictions were stated for this group. Only one general prediction would be made. would predict that there would be no significant differences among the mean accuracy scores of the eight categories. The descriptive statistics with regard to these eight categories are presented in Table 16. 104

TABLE 16

LEAîî ACCUSAGY SCORES FOR THE CONTROL G-ROUP ON THE EIGHT CATEGORIES (îI-49)

S.E. of Category Moan Sigma Mean Cheerful 15.06 3.21 .463 Sad 13.63 3.71 .535

Broadminded 11.88 3.50 .505 Narr owminde d 11.88 3.32 .479

Sincere 12.65 2.94 .424 Insincere 12.69 3.56 .514

Refined 13.57 3.21 .463 Vulgar 13.69 5.31 .478

The "cheerful" category, the one having the highest’ clarity score, has the highest mean. It is significantly higher than its opposite, t = 2.80 Tfhere r is .49 and ivould be higher than all of the remaining categories ivhich also have lower clarity scores* The cheerful-sad dimension has a greater difference in clarity score betiveen its poles than any of the other three dimensions, where differences in mean

clarity do not exceed 4 per cent. The mean accuracy scores for the poles

of these three dimensions are almost identical, within the dimension, in spite of differences in clarity. Thus it seems likely that, where

differences in clarity do not exceed 4 per cent, our results are not affected by these differences. This would suggest that only two of the five predictions that are confirmed are confirmed primarily because of

differences in clarity of meaning of the two groups compared. One w%s confirmed in spite of differences in clarity which should have led to 105 non-confinnation. The remaining tifo were not affected by differences in clarity.

Five predictions that were not confirmed appear to have been affected by differences in clarity -which -would favor their non-confirma­ tion. Of those five the differences for three -were in a direction opposite to that vhich -we predicted (i.e., in the direction -which differ­ ences in clarity would favor). In vie-w of these considerations it seems likely that our results have not been grossly affected by the differences in clarity though certainly those differences have confounded the results.

This confounding factor led to a replication of the experimental group nith these differences in clarity corrected. Some additional changes in tho experimental procedure "were made vdiich -will be discus.sod in the clm.ptor on tho results and discussion of the replication.

Factor Analysis of the Relationships between the Arrays of Accuracy Scores

The intercorrelations presented in Table 13 -were factor analyzed using a modified Thurstone method. Four orthogonal factors -were ercbracted and rotated for meaningfulness . A fifth general factor -was rotated in to add to tho clarity of the factor solution. The identifi­ cation and interpretation of each factor is presented below. The rotated factor loadings, the final residual table and the intercorrela­ tions are presented in Table 17. ÏAHI.B 17

ROTATED FACTOR LOADIRGO, FI UAL ilKJIDUAL TARLi!, ADD IRTERCORRGLATICIKI OF THE ACCURACY SCORES

Final Residuals and Intorcorrolationa

"d Td © O ■d 'd ri © H •H U 0 O © na fH h Ü © U b © 0 d © d u Ü •H •H & Rotated Faotor Loading's O 'd o u d - rd d k d •H d © OT CO H« II III IV V r Ü m f^i I

Olieerful 60 #03 01 02 62 •63 -OS 05 -02 01 02 «01 01 ; O Broadminded 00 12 48 05 66 .63 .81 » .. -04 07 -04 -04 08 01 Siuoere 06 02 -10 76 12 • 59 16 03 05 01 06 -02 -03 Refined -04 65 -07 20 00 .35 -01 11 21 02 04 -07 -02 Sad 60 22 -OS -04 47 .71 64 32 08 11 -OS 06 OS Harropffiiinded -02 04 57 OS 72 • 85 89 60 11 -04 29 -04 06 Insinoero -01 -06 12 48 27 .32 13 20 56 00 16 31 -06 Vulgar 03 72 28 —06 45 .76 28 47 -04 84 40 61 04 th^ •80 .89 .58 •84 ;1.72 4.84

Per cent of total variance explained 10 11 .07 11 •22 .61

i 107

Factor One

This factor contains only two categories Tvhich have significant loadings, cheerful and sad. This appears to be the factor "îïhich is most independent of the four. The positive category cheerful has a signifi­ cant loading on only one other factor, the general. Yfords assigned to the sad category seem to occasionally be confused vjith the vulgar category so that "sad" might be regarded as the slang equivalent of "vulgar."

Factor Two

The factor represents the refined-vulgar dimension. These two cate­ gories have the highest loadings on this factor. The confusion between sad and vulgar is not marked though the loading for sad on this factor is significant*

Factor Three

The broadminded-narrowminded categories have the major loadings on this factor. This seems to be the least distinct of the five factors.

The negatively valued ends of other dimensions seem to be somewhat con­ fused with narrowminded with the exception of the "sad" category.

Vulgar, however, it the only negative category which has a significant loading, ^t is interesting to note that this factor makes a major contribution to the general. The broadminded category contains the lowest loading of any of the eight categories on the specific factors.

It seems likely that this is related to the difficulty experienced in selecting words as related to this category. Apparently much confusion exists among college undergraduate females as to what "broadmindedness” 108 really is. The ivords assigned to that category by the judges suggest that this is not broadniindedness in the usual sense of the r-ord but rather seems to be a sort of valuing of freedom from criticism" or

’’permissiveness," or "letting me do rrhat - Trant to do Tjithout criticis­ ing me forvrhat T do."

Factor Four

Sincere and insincere have the major loadings on the fourth factor. 3y virtue of the fact that refined also has a significant leading on this factor, it appears that behaviors generally regarded as being related to "refined" is sometimes identified as being related to being "sincere." The refined category' is also the only positively valued c at ego ry *T hi ch has a significant loading on more than one speci­ fic factor*

Factor Five

The general factor contains significant loadings on six of the eight categories. It seems likely in view of the manner in which the

dimensions were selected that this represents an acceptance-rejection

dimension. Apparently there are two things which lead to quick accep­ tance, cheerfulness (i.e., warmth) and broadmindedness (i.e., permis­

siveness). The sincere category, although it was used as the most

frequent description of liked people, does not load on this factor.

If such behaviors as "sincerity" subsumes arc important, it seems likely

that they are important primarily as secondary considerations. For ex­

ample, cheerfulness and broadmindedness may be the factors which lead 109 to the estahlishing of relationships T'hile sincerity primarily affects the duration of such relationships. The "refined" category has no loading on this ihctor. notv this relates to the fact that it is one of our implicit categories is not kno’Tn. It seems likely, ho'iTOTer, that tliis represented a description of the positively valued behaviors of disliked people in vietr of the fact that this dimension rra.s most fre­ quently used in making discriminations among groups of three disliked people.

Injection of individuals seems to be on a somevhat broader basis, though "narrowmindedness" makes the major contribution. This seems logical since its opposite has the highest loading of the positively valued categories. The lovr loading on "insincere" is interesting,

-t seems plausible to assume that this is not a major reason for rejec­ tion but a bit of behavior which is not entirely unexpected in people.

Qualitative judgments based on the scoring of the modified P.ole Construct

Repertory Test used vmLth this group would support this, ^t vra.s noted there that this is a reasonably frequent description of liked people.

The similar loadings on vulgar and sad further reinforce the feeling that some confusion exists between these two groups of behavior,

In general there seems to be greater clarity among the sets of beliaviors subsumed by the positively valued categories. Only one of the four contains a loading on more than one of the four specific factors. Some greater confusion seems to exist between the negatively valued categories. Sad has a significant loading on the refined-vulgar dimension; vulgar, a significant loading on the broadminded-narrowminded 110 diriensioii; insincere, s one confusion T.d.th narrouiainded though the load­ ing is not significant. From these considerations it seems likely that less confusion, in general, is to he found ™ith regard to behaviors relating to the positively valued categories. This, of course, ivould be in support of Bruner and Postman’s contentions that positive value is related to accuracy. But these are value dimensions that Tre have chosen. In our selection of dimension vre have built in value through requesting descriptions of the behavior of liked and disliked people.

V.hether this is true when personal frequency of usage of the dimensions and categories remains to be tested in connection with the individual predictions*

Summary

The factor analysis of the intercorrelaticns between the accuracy scores for the eight categories strongly supports our pairing of the words Toiich were used to outline our dimensions. Each dimension seems to be reasonably independent of the other four though some minor con­ fusion seems to exist between the negatively valued categories*

The fact that dimensions could be chosen in such a manner and replicated in a factor solution of the accuracy scores on groups of iTOrds assigned by judges as being related to these dimensions seems to the present inriter to be a major finding * ^t suggests that it would be profitable to investigate further the dimensions with which highly integrated well-structured groups judge the behavior of their members•

The group which has been used for the present study can in no sense of the word be regarded as a well-structured group except in the sense Ill that college females constitute a specific group. The finding that dimensions can be chosen from, such a loosely constituted group suggests that more cohesive groups might reveal construct systems -nhich perform much the same function for the group that a personal construct system does for an individual. Such an approach might be a more meaningful method nvith which to investigate problems of leadership and incorpora­ tion of nevr members into groups than has presently been developed.

Tentative plans are being made to explore the usefulness of such an approach with a group which has more structure.

Results on Individual H^/potheses

Testing the individual hypotheses requires the consideration of both of the instruments used, since we are now concerned with emergence at an individual level. The modified form of the Role Construct

Repertory Test discussed was administered in order that we might determine the frequency with which one pole of the dimensions is used by each subject in preference to the other. The measure of emergence which we have used takes into consideration the number of people that are described by a particular pole of a dimension.

^t is Kelly’s contention that the minimum context for the forma­ tion of a personal construct is three people. The subject’s instruc­ tions are to note some way in which two people are alike and yet dif­ ferent from the third when he is presented with three people on whom to foim a construct. Thus, on each occasion that a personal construct dimension is invoked, one pole is used to describe two people. This pole is first to be verbalized and is regarded as the emergent pole of 112 the subject's personal construct diniension. The measure of emergence

•used in this study is based on the relative frequency TTith -ivhich the ends of our eztemally imposed dimensions are used to describe the paired people. For emample, let us assume that on the four occasions that a subject is presented with three people he uses the dimension

"sincere-insincere." ^f on three of these four occasions the cate­ gory "sincere" was first invoked (i.e., used to describe the paired people or people who are seen as similar'* and on only one occasion the category "insincere" first invoked, then the "sincere" pole of the

dimension would be regarded as the ernergent pole. The "insincere" pole

•yrould be regarded as the implicit one. Our individual hypotheses utilize this measure to predict accuracy of assignment of.our list of matched words to their respective categories. The placement of words in the eight categories was based on the use of peer judges.

Hi'potheses I-l

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the most frequently used dimension of each subject will be signi­ ficantly higher than the mean accuracy score of the least frequently used dimension.

This hypothesis is not confirmed. There is no significant dif­

ference between the mean of the most frequently used dimensions and the mean of the least frequently used dimensions. The result, however, is

in a direction opposite to that of our prediction. The mean of the

accuracy score for the most frequently used dimensions is 25.02; and

for the least frequently used, 26.21. The t is 1.07 where 6^ is 7.98.

:'^o significance is attached to the trend found here in view of the fact 113 that oxir hypothesis is maximally handicapped. That is, on many occasions tTTO dimensions were used with equal frequency. On these occasions, the dimension 7ra.s chosen which had the lowest accuracy score sc that the hypothesis might not he favored, ^f our hypothesis is a useful one, how­ ever, this should not adversely affect our results* gi/pothesis 1-2

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the emergent poles of the four dimensions will he significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the implicit poles of the same dimensions.

This prediction is confirmed. The mean accuracy score fot the emergent poles of the four dimensions is 50.83 and for the implicit poles, 48.45. The difference is significant at less than the .05 level of confidence. The resulting t is 2.20 where the 6^ 7.78.

^t will be recalled from our group hypotheses that the four posi­ tively valued ends of the four dimensions had higher mean accuracy scores than the four negatively valued ends. Differences in the same direction for both hypotheses could not result unless the positively valued categories proved to be the most frequently used ones. That is actually the case. Inspection of the emrgence pole of the four dimensions indicates that the categories having positive value are used much more frequently than the negatively valued categories. For exam­ ple, on the cheerful-sad dimension only two of the 53 subjects used the sad category more frequently than the cheerful. Our individual hypothe­ ses were based on the assumption that the terms would be used with equal frequency. A test of this assumption using Chi square indicates that this assumption is not supported. The data are presented in Table 18.

The positively valued categories are used with significantly greater 114

ÏA 3L S 1 8

OBSSEVSD FSSqUEîîCÏSS OF USAGE OF TES POSITIVELY VALUED AND NEGATIVELY VALUED CATEGORIES

Positive ■‘■'•egative Emergent Sne rgent Observed frequency 1029 245

Theoretical frequency 636 656

Z^= 485.68, df = 1, p

of role titles to be used was changed so that this assumption is some­ what better justified. This will bo discussed in greater detail in the

chapter dealing with the replication. TABLE 19

FREQUENCY OF APPLICATION OF EACH CATEGORY TO mill ROLE TITLE

Rolo Titlos 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total ChoerfuX 74 39 41 63 77 70 34 48 18 26 28 7 71 11 10 14 39 61 33 7 64 Sad 12 8 24 16 27 20 30 24 23 36 66 53 13 21 29 17 12 4 25 458 Broadminded 35 40 31 56 43 45 13 29 4 3 11 6 21 33 16 33 43 26 30 520 Narrowiiindod 6 13 36 18 11 16 24 17 13 30 8 22 10 12 51 31 18 15 12 3 63 Sincere 19 71 50 54 61 71 30 56 5 12 45 10 51 44 12 26 13 28 22 685 Insincere 3 0 6 16 7 16 64 15 60 65 17 64 15 11 60 16 11 15 10 461 Refined 7 39 18 39 32 19 12 17 10 14 15 6 25 21 9 15 14 3 21 336 Vulgar 3 2 6 4 7 8 15 6 26 26 23 42 6 6 25 7 4 7 6 229 N 159 212 212 265 265 265 212 212 159 212 212 212 212 159 212 159 159 159 159 3816 N Positive 135 189 140 212 213 205 89 150 37 55 99 31 168 109 47 88 114 118 106 N Negative 24 23 72 63 52 60 123 62 122 157 113 181 44 60 165 71 45 41 53 % Positive 85 89 66 80 80 77 71 79 69 55 72 74 67 % Negative 58 77 74 53 85 78

H H Ü1 116

E^mothesis 1-5

The negatively valued end of the most frequently used di­ mension "Mill have a significantly higher accuracy score than the positively valued end of the least frequently used dimen­ sion.

This prediction is not confirmed. The mean accuracy score for the negatively valued end of the most frequently used dimension of each s ufa- ject is 12.06 and for the positively valued end of the least frequently used dimension of each subject, 12.91. This difference again is in favor of the categories haring positive value although the difference is not significant, t = 1,40 tvhere is 4.39. There is somewhat less possibility of attributing the resulting difference to differences in difficulty level but it is not unlikely that difficulty level has some effect. For example, the least frequently used dimension is the

"refined-vulgar” dimension where the positively valued end, refined, has a mean clarity score of 179 while the mean for the remaining seven categories is .77.

Summary

In general, the results obtained from this group of subjects are questionable. ^n regard to the group hypotheses the data offer some support of the usefulness of a concept of emergence. The results which are obtained, horrever, are confounded with differences in mean clarity of the related words. In most cases these differences in clarity parallel the predictions in such a manner that clear support for the hypotheses is not indicated.

Such support as is offered for the relationship between accuracy 1 1 7 axLd positive value is subject to the sane confounding factor. These considerations led to a replication of the experimental group to be described in the following chapter.

Only the general statements of the individual hypotheses were tested, i^re specific predictions could not be tested since our assump­ tion that the categories used would, for the total group, be equally emergent on two of the dimensions and that one of the two terms on the remaining two only slightly more emergent did not prove to be a valid one. This assumption was tested with our present modified form of the Sole Construct Repertory Test. The result indicated that the positively valued ends of the dimensions were emergent significantly more frequently than the negatively valued ends. This led to major changes in the form of the SGHT used with the replicated group.

a factor analysis of the intercorrelations between the accuracy scores for the four dimensions indicated that five factors provided the most economical explanation of these relationships. Four of these were specific factors and one general. Each of the four specific factors contained one of our four dimensions and essentially no other. In each case on the specific factors the positively valued terms and the nega­ tively valued term which vie had paired on the basis of their use in the sample from which we chose our dimensions proved to have the major loadings. The general factor which ?ra.s rotated in to clarify the factor solution seemed to be related to the manner in which our dimensions were chosen. It pointed to the acceptance-rejaction nature of our dimensions. The fact that our dimensions appear in our factor solution 118 as they Trere chosen has important implications for the study of group hehavior Tsithin Personal Construct Theorj’’.

EEFS2EIIC3S TO C5ÆPTER IT

1. Postman, L., Bruner, J. S., and licGinndes, 3. II. ’’Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception,” J. Abn. Soc. Psychol», 1948, 43, 124-154.

2. Solomon, H. L., and Hov/es, 3. 3., "iTord Frequency, Personal Values, and Visual Duration Thresholds,” Psych. Rev., 1951, 58, 256-270. CHAPTES T

THE HSPLICAEIOxT— HSSULTS DISCUSSION

IntroductioE.

The replication described in this chapter tts-s undertaken in an attempt to clarify the results obtained "with the previous group» The results from the first group seemed to offer some support for the use­ fulness of the concept of emergence but the differences vrere confounded r.lth differences attributable to degree of clarity of meaning of the dimension related TTords» The eight groups of related v/ords (one group for each pole of the four dimensions) -were matched in terms of both degree of difficulty and Thorndike lorge frequency. Introduction of the factor of relatedness of the -words to the four, dimensions seemed to make matching on still a third variable mandatory. Certain other changes were made which itIII be discussed at the appropriate place below.

The Dimension Related hbrds

In our previous group the eight categories of related words -were matched on two variables, difficulty level and Thorndike lorge Fre­ quency. In addition, agreement on a single category had been assured by determining, through the examination of the responses of the judges, that no -word would be used in the final matching on vxhich there was not clear agreement among the peer judges. No word was selected as sho-wing agreement -unless -twice as many of the judges assigned the word to one

- 1 1 9 - 120 category as assigned it to any other single category. The aeasure of difficulty used did not take the meaning of the Trords used into con­ sideration. It represented only the percentage of the judges v/ho indicated that the word could he used in the conterct which we had pro­ vided by assigning that word to some one of the eight categories. In­ asmuch as differences found in the previous group seemed to parallel certain other differences among the groups of related words (which seemed to represent the clarity of meaning of the words), it seemed that matching on still a third variable would have provided more effective control. In the discussion in the previous chapter we referred to this as a measure of "clarity."

As computed, "clarity" is the percentage of the judges (from the judges who did not assign the word to the "other" category) who assigned the word to a single category. For example, if 25 of our 50 judges had assigned a word to the "cheerful" category and the remain­ ing 25 had assigned the word to the "other" category, the difficulty level would have been 50 and clarity score 100. ^f 20 judges had assigned a word to the "other" category and only 15 of those remaining had assigned the word to any other single category, the difficulty level would have been .SO and the clarity score .50.

In order to avoid the necessity of attempting to match words on three variables the measures of difficulty and clarity were combined to form one measure. As will be noted from the two examples given above the product of the difficulty score and the clarity score is eaual to the percentage of the total group of judges who assigned the word to a single category. In the first case the percentage of agreement 121 on a single category tTould have been «50, in tne second .30. The groups of words used w-ere matched by the sane procedure as that described be­ fore, using the percentage of agreement and Thomdike-horge frequency.

An attempt was made to keep: the means for all groups equal on both measures but where a choice had to be made between letting percentage of agreement or Thorndike-lorge frequency -TS-ry, the latter was allowed to vary.

^t TO.ll be remembered that the number of words whdch the judges agreed were to be assigned to the ''broadminded” category ras a limiting factor in the length of the vrord list used. Only twenty-trro words had sufficiently high agreement of the judges that they could be used.

A second limiting factor appeared during this matching. The percentage of agreement of the judges as to the assignment of words to the "cheer­ ful” category was so high that picking the 22 of the 39 words with the loTrest percentage of agreement still left a mean percentage of agree­ ment that was above that of the "broadminded” category. Since our primary interest is in comparison of the poles from a single dimension, the words assigned to the "sad” category ivere matched with the "cheer­ ful” rather than the "broadminded” category. The means and sigmas of the two measures on each of the eight categories are summaried in

Table 20.

These words were administered in the same fashion as in the pre­ vious group except that the time allowed for the assignment of each word was reduced to four seconds. A female speaker was uwed in recording this list of words in place of the previous male speaker. The words. 122

TABLE 20

HELàjr A3TD SIC-LAS 0? THE T'.IO H3A3Ü3SS USED TO lATCE LDEDS FOR EACrl OF THE EIGHT CATEGORIES

Percentage of Agreement Thomdike-Lorge Frequency Category He an Sigma “%an Sigma Cheerful 55.55 17.45 14.14 28.04 3 ad 55.45 22.41 19.32 24.26

Broadminded 50.27 19.11 21.95 28.38 ITarrovaaindod 50.27 20.93 20.27 23.69

Sincere 50.09 20.45 21.91 25.03 Insincere 50.41 19.65 18.45 18.15

Refined 49.77 19.28 21.86 29.65 Vulgar 50.36 18.33 21.95 24.01

in alphabetical order, were administered in groups of ten, forty to a page. Headings were introduced beinveen groups and the words on which the groupings ended were balanced by rearranging the order so that no category had an undue share of ivords which fell at the end of a grouping and hence night be favored by the pauses between the groups. The form, used in recording the responses is presented in Appendix D, page 18?.

The instructions given were the sane as those given in the previous group. The words assigned to each of the eight categories are presented in Tables 21 through 24*

The Role Construct Repertory Test

Our measure of emergence obtained from the sabdified RCRT adminis­ tered in the previous group had been based on the assumption that the

’’role titles” used in the Role Construct Repertory Test would elicit the names of people who would be equally frequently described by the positively J.ÜO

TABLE 21

L’OBUS JUDGED TO BE BELATED TO THE CHEEBFUL-SAD DI%3I'TSI0IT

0 0 q-i kf o »5 o o 1 c 1 to -P o G o •H « •H 'a c ..§ § a p; ©s O :3 {fo o cr Ï cr* u u O G 2 6 O O to S U E-! k ■< E-i ------.-1— ___ Cheerful Sad 1. Amusing 66 12 1. Anguished 68 12 2. Ani’^ahed 40 4 2. Bitter 49 A 5. Blissful 64 2 3. Crabby 29 1 4. Buoyant 46 5 4. Crying 88 AA 5. ..Capricious 15 1 5. Despondent 66 1 6. Carefree 60 3 6. Doleful 54 55 7. Comical 71 4 7. Flat 18 A 8. Cute 39 5 8. Gloomy 96 19 9. Slated 72 1 9. Glum • 96 2 10, Enchanting 36 3 10. Joyles' 88 1 11. Frisky- 56 1 11. Morbid 58 3 12. Genial 44 9 12. liorose 51 3 13. Glad 88 AA 13. Pensive 20 5 14. Hearty 60 18 14. Pessimistic 40 1 15. Jaunty 36 1 15. Sober 32 29 IS. J ocular 32 1 16. Solemn 53 20 17. Joking 78 32 17. Sore 32 38 13. TLrbhful 66 2 18. Sullen 58 13 12. Pleasant 80 AA 19. Sulky 54 3 20. Bollicing 58 1 20. Unpleasant 37 15 21. Refreshing 58 4 21. Uoeful 69 4 22. Vivacious 57 2 22. Lorried 64 A

I^an 55.55 14.14 55,45 19.32

Sigina 17.45 28.04 22.41 24.28 124

TA3IE 22

XHDS JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE BROADITIUDED-HARRCIU.îIîîDED CATEGORY

o o 44 If 44 If O o 1-3 O O 00-p l-g j ^ 1 1 § II D o 1 1 O o o © g o © ?Ï4 sO’ Category II Category II Broadrainded ITar r OTaninde d 1. Arbitrary 38 6 1. Absolute 43 36 2. Compromising 63 17 2. Bent 34 A 5. Equitable 12 2 5. Bigoted 20 1 4, Pair 41 AA 4. Biased 90 5 5. Farsighted 44 1 5. Confined 37 29 6. Fcresighted 39 7 6. Dogmatic 36 2 7. Impartial 56 6 7. Fanatic 40 3 S. Lenient- 54 2 8. Headstrong 60 2 9. Liberal 80 25 9. Inflexible 62 2 10. Logical 32 9 10. Influenced 29 A 11. Objective 50 7 11. Intolerant 64 2 12. Observing 48 26 12. Limited 76 AA 13. Openmindod 87 0 13. Obstinate 46 8 14. Practical 32 A 14. Opinionated 46 0 15. Eational 28 6 15. Partial SO 9 IS. Seasonable 53 26 16. Positive 33 15 17. Sensible 43 22 17. Prejudiced 90 16 18. Tolerant 61 4 18. Radical 41 16 19. Unbiased 84 1 19. Stubborn 18 14 20. Understanding 41 A 20. Swayed 31 36 21. Unprejudiced 82 16 21. Ih-isted 27 42 22. Uise 38 AA 22. Unfair 43 8 lie an 50.27 21.95 50,27 20.27

Sigzza 19.11 28.38 20.93 23.69 125

TilBLE 23

70 EDS JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE 8IITCERE-IHSIHCERE CATEGORY

o 'oO 0 i;-! S-, o I-? o o fc0 4^ o •H1 IC § "O O o o IIo o P O

Signa. 20.45 25.03 19.65 18.15 126

TASLE 24

7/OEDS JUDGED TO BE RELATED TO THE REFIîSD-TüLGAR CATEGORY

o o kCO o o o o 1-4 o o 60 4^ cs a "ë i s -ë # ■V e O O a p! o o ? ^ O o S-« cr" o c Pi (T % #4 O O P, u X 5h O hO Category E-i Category P-. II Se fined Tul■gar 1. Chaste 24 6 1. Base 16 AA 2. Civilized 57 17 2. Bold 56 41 3. Clean 55 AA. 3. Dirty 76 31 4. Courtly 45 3 4. Evil 38 A 5. Cultivated 73 4 5. Horrid 66 13 6. Demure 44 2 6. Immoral 80 4 7. Dignified 83 11 7. Indiscreet 34 2 e . Fastidious 14 2 8. Leirnd 31 3 9. Gentle 47 AA 9. Loathsome ■ 46 4 10. Genteel 54 3 10. Loose 29 A 11. llodest 40 29 11. Loud 68 A 12. lîoral 37 A 12. Obnoxious 56 2 13. Heat 56 29 13. Offensive 49 13 14. Poised 87 13 14. Reckless 18 33 15. Prim 36 1 15. Rude 80 26 16. ^rissy 23 0 16. Ruthless 49 5 17. Pure 46 A 17. Scandalous 57 3 13. Reputable 40 3 18. Shameful 64 9 19. Reserved 67 2 19. Sinful 62 4 20. Smooth 27 A 20. Thief 39 28 21. Sophisticated 63 4 21. Uncouth 63 6 22. Dellbred 77 2 22. Unsophisticated 40 6

life an 49.77 21.86 50.36 21.95

Sigma 19.28 29.65 18.33 24.01 127 arid negatively valued terms. This assumption did not prove to be a valid one since there -cvas a highly significant difference betvjeen the frequen­ cies Tdth Tjhich the positively valued and negatively valued categories

:T8re emergent. An examination of the frequency with vdiich each title

T/as described by each of the eight categories indicated that the majority of the role titles elicited the names of people who received descriptions having positive value. Thus it appeared that the emergence of the negatively valued categories was handicapped by difficulty- of application.

The dimensions which irrere chosen met rather specific requirements.

On the dimension "cheerful-sad," for example, these terms ivere chosen because the term cheerful was a frequent description of liked people while its most frequent opposite, sad, was an infrequent description of dis­ liked people. All of the four dimensions selected were chosen on this

same basis; that is, according to the frequency vd-th which the positive­ ly valued terms was ascribed to liked people and the opposite of this term (hence negatively valued) ascribed to disliked people. This does not take into consideration the frequency with which the negatively valued poles of the dimensions were used to describe liked people.

Consequently, our previous measure of emergence was taken from a some­ what different context in our experimental group than from the group

from which the dimensions were chosen. Our modification of the SCBT

used with this group gives due consideration to this factor.

The previous list of role titles used with the first group of

subjects 'ctsls discarded. The present role titles used requested the

names of six liked people, six disliked people and the self. The names

were then grouped into triads so that the subjects would be required 128 to use each naae six times. The titles vrere grouped in such a manner that there were eight triads of liked people, eight triads of disliked people, three triads of two liked people and the self, three triads of tiro disliked people and the self, two triads of two liked people and one disliked, and two triads of two disliked people and one liked. In all there were 26 triads used. An equal number of liked and disliked people were used (excluding the self) and each person was used an equal number of times. The forms used for this step in the procedure are presented in Appendix D, page 188.

The measure of emergence to be used in this group takes into con­ sideration only the number of times the positively valued term is used as a description of liked people and the number of times the negatively valued term is used as a description of disliked people. Two measures of "personal relevance" are available. One is the total number of times that categories from a particular dimension are used. Tlie other is the number of times that the person uses a particular dimension to describe himself. These two measures vrill be used only with regard to the individual hypotheses as in the previous group. The hypotheses to be tested are identical to those tested previously.

Sub.jects

The subjects used were 47 female undergraduates enrolled in the elementary course in psychology for nurses. Although this group is more homogeneous in interest than the group from which the dimensions were originally chosen, the restricted vocational interest was not deemed to be so limiting as to nullify their usefulness as subjects. 129

SJ.1 o f the subjects iTOre enrolled i n school during the previous school year and hence should have had sufficient contact "srith the general group

of regularly enrolled females that the dimensions chosen from the general group -TTould be understandable to them.

Group H:,n3otheses

H',noothesis G-1

General statement. Subjects Till show significantly greater accuracy in their assignment of words to emergent ends of dimensions than to their implicit contrasts.

This hypothesis tests differences on two dimensions; the cheer­ ful-sad dimension and the refined-vulgar dimension. Each ivill be con­

sidered separately.

Expei-imental statement. The mean accuracy score for the cheerful category will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy for the sad category.

This prediction is confirmed. The mean accuracy score for the

cheerfhl category is 15.02 and for the sad category 13.74. The dif­ ference is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence. The t is

2.69 There the 5d = 3.23.^ Our prediction that the emergent category would be subject to the greatest accuracy has been supported. This hypothesis, however, does not place value and emergence in opposition.

On this occasion the emergent category is the one having positive value. The following hypothesis tests differences when the emergent

category is one having negative value. The t ’s for each category com-

All t ’s are computed by using difference between paired scores. 130 parsd "with. each, of the other categories are presented in Table 25.

Bescriptire statistics for the eight categories are presented in Table

26.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the vulgar category to.11 be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the refined category.

This prediction is not confirmed. The mean accuracy score for the vulgar category- is 12.85 and for the refined, 12.47. The t is .75

There (Td = 3.46. The difference is in the predicted direction but does not reach the required level of significance.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the positively valued ends of the four dimensions Td.ll not be significantly different from the mean accuracy score fbr the four negative ends of those same dimensions.

This prediction is not confirmed. Significant differences exist betiv'een the positively valued and the negatively valued categories.

The mean of the positively valued categories is 53.83 and the negative

50.32. This difference is significant beyond the .01 level of confi­ dence. The t is 3.51 vrhere &ld is 6.15. Thus vihen the total matrix of scores is considered the ends of the four dimensions having positive value are the ends v/here there is the greatest agreement of the subjects vrith the peer judges. This indicates that there is closer agreement on the assignment of Trords to the positively valued categories than to the negative since our accuracy scores are based on the use of

Tjords related to these categories. The comparison of this prediction

TJith that vrhen individual emergence of the poles of the dimensions is taken into consideration toII be discussed Trith the individual hypotheses, 151

TABL3 25

TES t ’s, (Td 133D (Tin-m FOR THE COHPHRISOÎT OF ACCURACY SCORES QE EACH CATEGORY HITE EACH OTHER CATEGORY

Category T Cheerful 2.69* 3.13 5.50 2.81 5.48 4.49 3.68 3.23 4.09 3.54 4.36 4.37 3.85 4.00 .476 .603 .522 .643 .650 .568 .590

Sad 1.18 2.78 .77 2.36 1.54 3.52 3.88 4.69 4.01 3.65 4.51 .519 .572 .692 .591 .538 .665

Broadainded 1.90 .12 2.66 1.18 .44 3.50 4.67 3.97 3.80 4.38 .516 .689 .586 .560 .631

Ear ro7aaiiide d 1.74 .96 .52 1.09 4.13 4.15 4.37 .609 ,602 .512 .645

Si ncere 2.62 1.20 .55 4.25 4.20 4.45 .627 .619 .656

i n s in c e r e 1.57 1.83 5.39 4.75 .574 .701

Refined .75 5.46 .510

Vulgar

t of 2.01 is significant at .05 using a tiTo tail test, 1.65 us in; a one tail test. 132

T.13LE 26

D3SC%IPTIl"E STATISTICS FOR EACH OF TEE El GET CATEGORIES

Category lié an Sigma SE of H Cheerful 15.02 5.33 .564 Sad 13.74 5.34 .493

B ro adminde d 13.13 2.68 .395 ^^ar rowminde d 12.15 5.07 .453

Sincere 13.21 3.33 .565 Insincere 11.57 3.36 .569

Refined 12.47 3.57 .527 Vulgar 12.89 4.03 .602

IT.rpotheses G-2

General statement. Subjects Tn.ll sEott no signiTicant difference in accuracy scores betr/æen the ends of dimensions ivhere those ends are equally emergent*

The differences here are to be tested on t'TO dimensions, the

"sincere-insincere” and the ”broadminded-narrorminded” dimensions . Each mill be reported separately. The ends of each of these tmo dimensions are used equally frequently thou^. the former dimension is used vjith greater frequency than the latter.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "sincere” category will not be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "insincere" category.

The prediction is not confirmed. The difference between the two mean accuracy scores is significant beyond the .05 level of confidence.

The positively valued category has a mean of 13.21 and the negative 11.57,

The results here favor the prediction of Postman and Bruner that high value is associated with greater accuracy. 133

Expérimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the ’’broadminded" category t c .11 not be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the ’’narroTvminded" category.

This prediction is confirmed. ITo significant difference exists betvreen the ttko means. to'iTever, in this case as ivell the positively valued category has the higher mean. The mean for the positively valued category is 13.13 and for the negative, 12.15. The t is 1.90

Then is 3.50. liyp0theses 0-3

General statement. Among the categories connoting posi­ tively valued behavior the emergent categories 'Till have significantly higher mean accuracy scores than the implicit category.

This hypothesis takes three specific predictions into consideration.

In effect, it states that the "refined" category should ha'ge a lovjer mean accuracy score than the three remaining categories. This predic­ tion is made on the basis of the fact that the "refined" category vreis an implicit description of liked people though it ■'.vas the most frequent

opposite of "■vulgar," an emergent description of disliked people.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "cheerful" category vnll be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "refined" category.

This prediction is biased by vdrtue of the fact that the "cheerful" category has a mean percentage of agreement ■which is slightly above that for categories of the remaining dimensions. Thus little significance here can be attached to positive results. The resulting difference here is in the direction predicted and is significant beyond the .01 level

of confidence. The mean for the "cheerful" category is 15.02 and for the "refined," 12.47. The differences in percentage of agreement, how- 134 e v e r, could account for the same results.

3%nerinental statement. The mean accuracy score for the ”hroadminded” category rrill be significantly higher than the fiean accuracy score for the "refined" category.

This prediction is not confirmed. The difference betiveen these t-.TO means is not significant though the differences is in the expected direction. The m.ean for the "broadminded" category is 15.13 and for the "refined" category, 12.47. The t is I.IS r.'here 6"^ is 3.80.

Experim,ental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "sincere" category ndll be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "refined" category.

This prediction is not confirmed. In this case the sincere cate­ gory does not have the advantage of a higher percentage of agreement.

The mean for the sincere category is 13.21, and for the refined category,

12.47. The difference betrreen the tvro categories is not statistically reliable though the difference is in the expected direction. The mean for the "sincere" category is 13.21 and for the "refined," 12.47. The t is 1.20 '.vhere 6^ is 4.20.

5-.pothe si s 0-4

General statement, ^ o n g the categories connoting negatively valued behavior the emergent categories mill have significantly higher accuracy scores than the im­ plicit category.

This hypothesis also involves three predictions. I^o'.vever, all of these predictions are handicapped by there being differences in percentage of agreement which favor the "sad" category in each of the three predic­ tions. The emergent negative categories, "vulgar," "insincere," and

"narroimninded" all have a mean percentage of agreement of 50. The mean percentage of agreement for the "sad" category is 55. ^n only one of ^^5 the three comparisons is the difference in accuracy not significantly in favor of the "sad" category. The three experimental statements are not presented separately since the differences which occur are attribu­ table to differences in percentage of agreement.

Hypothesis G-5

General statement. The accuracy score for the most frequently used dimension will be significantly higher than the accuracy score on the less frequently used dimension.

This hypothesis is concerned only with the comparison between the

dimensions where both ends are equally frequently used. The difference betvreen the two mean accuracy scores for these two dimensions is in a

direction opposite to that predicted. The difference is- not significant.

The t is .51 where 6^ is 6.47. The mean of the broadminded-narrowminded

dimension is 25.28 and the sincere-insincere 24.79.

Hypothesis G-6

General statement. The emergent categories connoting negative behavior will show significantly higher mean accuracy scores than the implicit category connoting positive behavior.

The "vulgar,” "insincere," and "narrowminded" categories are

emergent while the "refined" category is implicit, ^f emergence is

related to accuracy then these three categories should have a higher

mean accuracy score than the "refined" category.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "vulgar" category will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "refined" category. 136

This prediction has been tested at another place, rmere a trend

-rs.s found in the direction of our prediction "cvhich proved not to be

significant.

Expérimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "insincere" category vri.ll be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "refined" category.

This prediction is not confirmed. The "refined" category has a mean of 12.47 and the insincere category a mean of 11.57. The differ­

ence is in a direction opposite to our prediction though it is not

significant. The t is 1.57 vdiere ^ is 3.89.

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "narrovzminded" category vri.ll be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "refined" category.

This prediction also is not confirmed. The refined category

again has the highest mean, 12.47 versus 12.15. The difference betvraen

the means is not significant. The t is .52 vhere 6% is 4.15.

The difference on all of these hypotheses vras in the direction

of a higher mean accuracy score for the positively valued category

although the positively valued category vas implicit.

nypothesis G-7

General statement. The emergent categories connoting positive behavior vri.ll have significantly higher mean accuracy scores than the implicit category connoting negative behavior.

The three hypotheses tested in connection vri.th this general state­

ment consider the three emergent positively valued categories in com­

parison vfith the inplicit negative category. At this point both a con­

sideration of emergence and value vrould lead to this prediction.

That is, prediction from either point of vievr would expect higher scores 137 from the cheerful, ‘broadiniiided, and sincere categories.

Sxperiraental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "cheerful" category tvill be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "sad" category.

This hypothesis has been tested in another place (G-1) vjhere the difference proved to be significant.

Expérimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "broadminded" category ivill be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "sad" category.

This prediction is not confirmed. The "sad" category has a mean accuracy score of 13.74 and the "broadminded" category, 13.13. The

"sad" category, however, is one of the two categories having the highest percentage of agreement. The fact that the differences betiveen the mean accuracy scores is not significant in spite of differences in percent­ ages of agreement can be regarded as evidence that our prediction might have been confirmed had these differences in percentage of agree­ ment not existed. The t for this ccmoarison is 1,13 where is 3.52. a Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the "sincere" category will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the "sad" category.

This prediction also is not confirmed. The same biasing factor discussed in the previous hypothesis also applies here. The sad cate­ gory has the highest mean though the difference betiveen the means is not significant.

Discussion and Summary of Group Be suits

The predictions made and the outcomes for these predictions are

Presented in Table 27. 138

TABLE 27

P2SDICTI0ÎTS AI'ID 0UTC0L3S FOR TES GRCU? HYPOTHESES

Conclusiozi Hypothesis Results This group Rrev. Group G-1 C >S G>S* HP > IE* Hone T > R T > R S > I Hone ?-H P > H* ? > H* ? >H*

G-2 stci S > I* ? >n* P > H 3 = H B >H P >H P >H

G-3 OR C >R* Hone Hone B > R B > R E > I Hone Si> R Si > R E > I Hone

G-4 V > S s Hone Hone I >s 3 > I* Hone E >'I H > S S >H* Hone E >I

G—5 Sil > 3H BE >SiI Hone Hone

G—6 Y > R 7 >R See G-1 See G-1 I > R H > I Hone Hone H >R R>1T ^^one Hone

G-7 C >S C > 3* See G—1 See G-1 B >3 3 > B Hone BP >I H Si> S 3 > Si Hone EP ^ IH*

It %Till be noted from the table above that emergence of the cate­ gories in the group from Trhich the dimensions were chosen lias little effect upon the accuracy with which related words are assigned to cate­ gories. In general, the emergent categories are not responded to Td.th greater accuracy than the implicit categories. There does appear to be 139 a trend, however, in the favor of the emergent categories which proves not to be significant except in most instances. In five instances the emergent categories have means which are higher than the implicit cate­

gories. ITone of these differences proved to be significant in either group. Then a category is both emergent and of positive value there is significantly higher mean accuracy score than for categories which are implicit and negative (for example, cheerful” and ”sad.”). The part that positive value and emergence each contribute is difficult to deter­ mine since in two instances the positively valued categories have

significantly higher mean accuracy scores than the negatively valued

categories. That is, there is higher accuracy for the positively valued

categories mdthout their being more frequently used. In three addi­

tional cases there are differences of the positively valued categories wnich are not statistically reliable.

All of the predictions made with regard to the group hjqjotheses

have taken into consideration only rdiether or not the poles of the

dimensions were emergent in the group of 85 subjects from whose res­

ponses we chose our dimensions. It had been anticipated that differ­

ences would be attenuated in the experimental group where no consider­

ation was given to the individual usage of these categories, and that

the magnitude of these differences would be increased T^en individual

frequency of usage was taken into consideration. In our present group,

in connection with group hypotheses, little support is found for the

usefulness of "emergence” as a measure of the accuracy of assignment

of dimension related words. This is not definitive evidence against

the usefulness of the concept in other respects. The concept is derived 140

fron the empirical ooservation that some individuals seem to invoke

certain dimensions and certain poles of these dimensions more readily

than others. -t was our hypothesis that emergence of a pole of a

dimension ivas related to clear definition of the behaviors subsumed under that pole. This hypothesis is not substantiated when only group measures

are taken into consideration.

Our primary interest is in "personal construct dimensions" and yet

no method presently exists for adequately determining the behaviors

subsumed under a personal construct dimension. It is assumed that a

person is only partially able to communicate these dimensions and the

behaviors subsumed by them since many of these are used at such low

levels of awareness that he is unable to communicate them verbally. Our

use of dimensions I'diich are essentially if not actually group dimensions

together vrith words which are judged to be related to the poles of these

dimensions is only distantly related to the dimensions which individual

members of the group would use. -t was our feeling, however, which

at this point remains to be tested, that those group dimensions which

the subjects would use most frequently would be the most personally

relevant, and since most personally relevant would be more clearly

defined (i.e., in better agreement with the group). Actually, just

the opposite may be the case. The group dimensions used most frequently

by a given individual may be less clearly defined in terms of the

group’s definition of these dimensions due to the fact that the indi­

vidual distorts the meaning of the dimension as defined by the group in

order to make them more personally acceptable. ®r, neither of these

may be the case and the subject may retain the tvro sets of dimensions 141

'the group’s on one hand and his orm. on the other) as separate systems, making translations between them or adopting the group’s dimensions expediently as one •would change one’s garments due to changes in climate.

From the data of this group as -well as the previous one positive value seems to be related to accuracy on more occasions than is frequency

-Rhen individual usage is not taken into consideration. This renders

Solomon and Hofve*s finding of a relationship be-îr/reon the frequency with

Tdiich words appear in a random sample of printed material and the visual duration thresholds somewhat suspect. Certainly the Iovtot mean Thomdike-

Lorge frequency count for the "cheerful" category had little effect on the accuracy scores for that category. To properly compare these measures, however, a co'unt of frequencies of usage in conversational material should be used since the present problem utilized an auditory uresentation of material*

Results on Indi-vidual hypotheses

The individual hypotheses take both instruments used into consid­ eration, the T.erd list and the modified Role Construct Repertory Test.

It will be remembered that the second instrument is to be used to determine the individual frequency of usage of our dimensions (or personal relevance as •we as s'orne frequency of usage indicates) and emer­ gence of the poles of the dimensions. In this group •bwo measures of personal relevance are used. One is the total number of times that the words outlining the dimensions are used. The other is the number of times that the dimension is used for describing the self. In the previous group the emergent pole of a dimension was taken to be the pole 142

of the diaension vrliicli ims nest frequently invoked first in describing

either liked or disliked people. This ~ra.s not felt to be a direct par­

allel to the method by means of "which the dimensions "were chosen. The

dimensions "were chosen by taking account of the number of times that the positively valued poles of the dimensions "iTOre applied to liked people in proportion to the number of times that the negatively valued poles -mere applied to disliked people. Using a measure of emergence

"Which paralleled this more directly seemed to be necessary. Cur measure of emergence in this group is in keeping "with the manner in viiich the dimensions "were chosen.

'.Then the positively valued pole of a dimension is ushd more frequently to describe the liked people than the negatively valued pole is used to describe the disliked people, then the positive pole is con­ sidered to be emergent and the negative, implicit. Uhen the negatively valued pole is used more frequently to descri.be disliked people than the positive is used to describe liked people, the negatively valued pole is considered to be the emergent pole. In the group hypotheses

-.".•e were concerned vdth emergence as determined by group usage. In the present individual hjrpotheses we -will use the indi"vidual measures of personal relevance and emergence as predictors of accuracy. Accuracy, as before, is determined by the agreement of each individual vrith the peer judges. A "vrord is counted as correctly assigned to a category if the individual assigns the "word to the same category* that o'ur group of peer judges assigned the "word. 143

o the ses 1-1

General statement. The nost frequently used dimension of each subject prill be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the least frequently used dimension.

This hypothesis -mas tested in tvro ppays, one using as a measure of frequency (i.e., personal redevance) the total number of times the con­ cepts on one dimension ire re used; the other, using the number of times the constructs lære applied to the self. hh.en there rrere ties the constructs ‘mere applied to the self. Tihen there P’jere ties in frequency each of these measures vra.s used to breah; a tie in the other. The mean accuracy score for the most frequently used dimension resulting v.-hen the first method is used is 26.89 and for the least frequently used dirons ion, 24.36. The difference is in the expected leyel and is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence. The resulting t is 2.39

There the is 7.21. The one tail test for determining the significance of the t rras used since directionality m s predicted.

The second measure using self description gives results in the same direction as the above measure though the difference is not statistically reliable. The mean accuracy score for the dimension

T'hich pvere most frequently applied to the self is 25.96 and for the dimension least frequently applied, 25.36. The t is .61 vjhere <5^ is

6.67. The results here confirm our prediction that the most frequently used dimension mould be subject to the greatest accuracy. Frequency of usage in the general context of the 2CRT is a more predictive measure of accuracy than the frequency of application to the self, hopvever. 144

SrvTothesis 1-2

As previously stated this hypothesis took into consideration all cf the four dimensions "«ith the prediction being that the emergent poles of the dimensions Tfould have significantly higher mean accuracy scores than the implicit poles of the four dimensions. At this time tliis prediction iTill be tested in tiro forms. One -mill consider only the dimensions riiich have the greatest personal relevance. Tlae other mill consider all four dimensions*

îbiperimental statem.ent. The mean accuracy score for the emergent ends of the dimensions which have the greatest personal relevance for each subject will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the implicit ends of the same dimensions.

Tliis hypothesis considers only the dimension which is most frequent­ ly used by each subject.

This prediction is confirmed. The mean accuracy score for the emergent ends of the most frequently used dimensions is 14.15 and for the implicit ends, 12.76. The difference is in the ezpected direction and is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence. The t for this difference is 2.47 where is 3.76.

Using the frequency of self reference measure the prediction is also confirmed. The mean accuracy score for the emergent categories is 13.79 and for the implicit, 12.17. This difference also is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence. The t is 2.78 where

Experimental statement. The mean accuracy score for the emergent ends of the four dimensions will be significantly higher than the mean accuracy score for the implicit ends of the four dimensions. 145

This prediction is also confirmed. The mean accuracy score for the emergent poles of the four dimensions is 53.87 and for the implicit

poles, 50,28. The difference is in the expected direction and is

significant beyond the ,001 level of confidence. The t is 5.27 r/here

61 is 7.44.

These trro predictions confirm our hypothesis that accuracy of

assignment of the dimension related words is related to the emergence

of the poles of the dimensions.

n\po thesis 1-5

Experimental statement. The negatively valued ends of the most frequently used dimensions will have a mean accuracy score idiich is significantly higher than the positively valued category of the least frequently used dimension.

This prediction is not confirmed. The mean accuracy score for

the negative ends of the frequently used dimensions is 12,60 and for

the positive end of the infrequently used dimension 12,21, The dif­

ference betvreen these two means is not significant beyond the ,05 level

of confidence, although the trend is in the expected direction. The t is

.65 where 6% is 4,08. a Vihen this hypothesis is tested using the dimensions most frequently

used to describe the self the trend found above is reversed. The mean

for the negative end of the least frequently used dimension is 12,17

and for the positive end of the least frequently used dimension 12,84,

Again, hoxvever, the difference is not significant. The t is ,97 where 6^

is 4,48. 146

This hypothesis is regarded as the most stringest test of the efficacy of the tvro approaches. If frequency of usage is to affect the use of a dimension it seemed likely that it should affect both poles of the dimension equally. That this hypothesis is not supported in the face of firm support for a relationship bet'.Teen personal rele­ vance and accuracy seems somevdiat incongruous. This incongruity led to some exploration uhich vd.ll be discussed be low.

Summar?/ and Discussion

It will be remembered that our primary interest is to compare emergence and positive value as determinants of accuracy of perception.

Tith regard to the group hypotheses the frequency with which the group used the dimensions did not prove to lead to accuracy of perception of our dimension related VTords. At that time it v/as noted that the four positively valued categories had significantly higher accuracy scores than the negatively valued categories. This difference was significant beyond the .01 level of confidence. In view- of this it seems somewhat parado:d.cal to find, in our individual hypotheses, support for the use of emergence as a predictor of accuracy. This vras precisely what occurred in our previous group, however. At that time v/e concluded that those results were obtained primarily because the emergent cate­ gories were most frequently the positively valued categories. Investi­ gation of the frequency with which the various poles of our four dimensions vrare used to describe the nineteen figures elicited by the role titles indicated that this might have occurred primarily because there wpre not equal numbers of liked and disliked people elicited by 147 the role titles of the Role Construct Repertory'- Test. present group used a modification of this test ivhich assured that the numbers of liked and disliked people were equal. In spite of this fact, hoviever, the same conclusion must be dra"wn. The same results cannot be obtained unless the positively valued categories are used most frequently.

7hen vre take into consideration the number of times that the positively and negatively valued terms are applied ve find that the positively valued descriptions are applied to the six liked and six dis­ liked people more frequently by the 47 subjects than the negatively vs.lued. Vihen this difference is tested by using Chi square and a theoretical frequency which assumes equal frequency of usage the results presented in Table 28 below are obtained*

TA5IS 28

OBSERVED JÜID THEORETICAL FRSQUSHCIES OF USAC-E 0? THE POSITIVELY AHD HEGATIVELY VALUED POLES OF THE DH3HSICHS AND RESULTING CHI SQUARE

Positive Negative Observed frequency 1807 1577

Theoretical fre­ quency 1692 1692

Chi Square 15.64, df-1, p ^ .01

The Chi square of 15.64 is significant beyond the .01 level. Thus at a confidence level of better than .01 we can say that the positively valued descriptions aroused more frequently than the negatively. If the nature of the test did not require the use of one negative each 148

time that the positive tæls -used it seeras likely the confidence level vonld have been even higher. -n this group the more frequent use of

the positively valued categories cannot be attributed to the fact that

the role titles elicited more liked people. TJe can only conclude that

the poles of the dimensions ’.yhich are most frequently emergent (i.e.,

are first invoked) are the positively valued ones.

The paradox of positive results for t'ro predictions adiich -we had

expected vrould be opposed cannot be fully resolved in this study, how­

ever, some light is t h r o m on this paradox when some additional factors

are taken into consideration. VJhat happens when the positively valued

poles which are emergent are compared m t h the positively valued poles which are implicit? In order to make this comparison the accuracy

scores were divided into four groups ; the accuracy scores for the posi­

tively valued emergent poles, for the positively valued implicit poles,

the negatively valued emergent poles, and the negatively valued implicit

poles. The resulting means and sigmas for these groups are presented

in Table 29.

TABLE 29

DESCZIPTI7E STATISTICS FOR TEE CATEGORIES CONSIDERED IN TERtS OF BOTH SIJSRGSIICE AND 7ALÜE

Ifean accuracy S.S. of Grouping _ score .. .Sigma j^an 1. Positive emergent 14.05 3.80 .364 2. Positive implicit 12.63 3.26 .371 3. Negative emergent 12.62 3.50 .399 4. Negative implicit 12.55 3.83 .436 149

'.'ihen the differences he tire en the four ne ans is tested the positively valued categories that are energent are significantly higher than the positively valued categories that are implicit. The mean of the emergent positively valued categories is also s ignificantly higher tlian the remaining trvo categories, "o significant difference e:d.sts among the three groups ivith vhich the positive emergent is compared. The t for the difference betrraen group one and ton is 2.75; one and three, 2.65, and one and four, 2.64,

Thus it appears that emergence has a differential effect on positive and negative categories. If it affected both equally the emergent negative categories should also be significantly higher than the im plicit negative categories. That is not the case, -^f it is a matter of positive value leading to greater accuracy the positively valued categories tiiat are im plicit should be higher than the negative­ ly categories tloat are im plicit. That, also, is not the case. Vie c a n

only conclude that emergence seems to result in clearer construing only

*.7ith regard to the positively valued categories.

It seems possible that our present results may be a function of the types of dimensions that vre have used. First, vre have used group

dimensions. Secondly, they are not dimensions used merely for des­

cribing behavior but rather are dimensions to vrhich positive and negative value are attached. That is, the members of the group appear

to be saying, "This is the vray vre vrant people to behave” and -'this is

the vray vre do not tvant people to behave.” If these lines are clearly

draun and the behaviors clearly understood then it seems not unlikely

that the higher accuracy vmth regard to the positively valued cate- 150 gories is an indication of an increasingly clearer personal definition of the positively valued poles of the group dimensionsThat is, for this group of undergraduate females the areas of behavior subsumed by the terms cheerful, broadminded, sincere, and refined might represent areas of behaviors which these group members are attempting to personally reproduce in order to increase their acceptance in the group. Increas­ ingly clearer definition of the negatively valued ends Tmthout also an understanding of the positively valued ends in these circumstances would seem somewhat difficult. That is, one cannot understand and construe the behaviors in which the group is interested until one has an understanding of the dimensions which the group uses, "Understanding the dimensions means knowing the relevant ends of the dimension. But since these are value dimensions movement (i.e., change in behavior) is toward the valued end of the dimension. Once the dimension is learned the closest definition occurs at the valued end of the dimension.

There is some evidence %’ihich supports such an interpretation. In order to test hypothesis I-l the most frequently used and the least frequently used dimensions load to be deteimined. -f such an interpre­ tation as we have suggested has any validity then the positively valued ends of the dimensions v/hich have the greatest personal relevance should be higher than the negatively valued ends of these same dimen­ sions while this should not be true of the dimensions which have the least personal relevance. Testing the results for the first part of this assumption indicates that the mean accuracy score for the positive­ ly valued ends of the dimensions which are most personally relevant

(i.e., used most frequently) are significantly higher than the negative. 151

The zaeazi for the positively valued categories is 14.30 and for the negative,

12.60. The difference is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence.

The t is 3.20 -cdiere ^ is 3.61. In addition, it is noted that 43 of the

47 times the positively valued category is emergent, -^king this same comparison on the dimensions vrhich have the least personal relevance indicates that the mean for the positively valued poles is 2.21 and for the negatively valued poles, 12.17. The difference in this case is not significant. The t is .07 vdiere 6^ is 3.58. The positive is emer­ gent only 22 out of 47 times here. These comparisons ivere made by using the frequency of application of the dimensions to the sin liked and six disliked people as our measure of personal relevance.

T.hen vre consider the dimension vjhich is most frequently used to describe the self the same results are obtained. The positively valued end of the dimension most frequently applied to the self is

13.74 and for the negative 12.21. The difference here is signi.ficant beyond the .05 level of confidence. The t is 2.61 '.There 6^ is 3.98.

Then the dimensions v/hich are least frequently applied to the self are used there are no significant differences betn-feen the positively valued and negatively valued poles of the di.mensions. 'The mean accuracy score for the positively valued poles is 12.85 and for the negative,

12.51. This difference is not statistically significant. The t is .68

There is 3.38.

These results support the interpretation that has been made. The dimensions vrhich have the greatest personal relevance are the dimensions

Tdiere the clearest definition of the positively valued poles occurs.

The poles of the dimensions which have the least personal relevance are 152 not differentially defined. This also provided gone support for our earlier assumptions about the nature of the group dimensions. At that time it seemed likely that the group dimensions rrhich a given individual mould see as meaningful mould be different from those mhich a s econd individual mould see as meaningful. The results described above occur in spite of the fact that the accuracy scores are chosen from all four of the dimensions. That is, there mas considerable variety in the choice of the most personally relevant dimensions. F o r tmenty-one of our subjects the ”cheerful-sad” dimension had the greatest personal relevance j for fifteen tloe ” since re-insincere” dimension, for eight the "refined-vulgar” dimension, and for tmo the "broadminded-narrom- minded” dimension. The positively valued categories thus seem to be more clearly defined regardless of mhich dimension has the greatest personal relevance.

Tmnlications for Personal Construct Dimension

But me have been talking only about group dimensions. V.hat might this same thinl-mng lead us to suspect about personal construct dimen­ sions? For one it suggests t ’oat for a personal construct dimension elements mhich are subsumed under the end of the dimension mhich is valued by the person and those mhich ■mill be subject to the clearest definition. That is, there is movement here, too; but movement toi’ra.rd personal goals, or goals -mhich are internally imposed, rather than emfcernally imposed. This cannot be construed to mean, hcvrover, that all personal constructs of the individual have ends -.vhere one end in­ consistently more highly valued than the other. Certainly some of these 153 di.Tsnsions are not value dinensicns in the usual sense of the V7crd. 3y this it is meant that there are some dimensions '■.’hero behaviors sub­ sumed under each end of the dimension are equally highly regarded but are not seen as e qually appropriate on different occasions.

As one of the 'ivriter’s colleagues stated, ’’I personally find the dimen­ sion of conformity or non-conformity a valuable one but on certain occasions % find non-conformity to be the area of behaviors riiich m i l lead to the outcomes -vhich - desire.” Such dimensions might be vien-ed as being primarily social rather than personal in nature, allo'mng adaptation to the ix.mediato circumstances or non-adaptation depending upon 17hich leads to the most desirable outcomes ("diich may be a iray of sa^mng that value for these dimensions is determined in terms of tlie immediate situation rather than in terms of the relevance of tliis to other personal construct dimensions). For esnmple, a person nho has quite long range goals may choose to respond to a situation in terms of a set of behaviors vxhich an observer vrould see as leading to an undesirable outcome for the immediate situation. The observer might see conforming as the expedient response. Actually, in the situation, the participant might see conforming as a sacrifice of personal principle, and so choose to respond in terms of behaviors vhich to him result in a more satisfactory outcome. In short, many dimensions may be relevant to a given situation so that the ultimate decision vhich is made may take many issues (i .e ., dimensions) into consideration.

On the type of dimensions ve ha-ve been discussing above certain 154 predictions Trould seen to be in order, which, would follow fron our

present results. Tdiere the ends of personal construct dinensions are

cquallv valued there should be equal elaboration of the areas subsuned by those dinensions. Tito, the closer the relationship bet'vTeen a dimen­

sion of this type and a value dimension, the greater correspondence

there should be between elaboration of the poles of the dimension.

That is, the end of the dimension riiich is most related to the valued

end of the value dimension should have the greatest elaboration, h'e

have already mentioned that on dimensions where one end is valued

more highly than the other the end 'which is most valued '.Till have the

greatest elaboration.

The results of this study suggest that a knowledge of whether or

not value is attached to a particular end of a dimension is important

if one is to know the relative elaboration of the behaviors subsumed

urner the poles of a dimension. The greater the value attached, the

greater the elaboration. Secondly, it appears that emergence of a

particular pole of a dimension is related to value. That is, the more

frequently the end of the dimension is invoked the more likely it is

that value will be attached. Third, it seems likely tliat the relation­

ship found between value and accuracy for the group dimensions wliich

we have used is largely a function of the fact that most of the members

of the group of subjects that we used also value the same ends of the

dimension that we selected. If vre had selected individuals who had dis-

identified themselves with this group it seems logical to assume that

the negatively valued ends of the dimensions vrould be most clearly

construed. Ueither positive value or emergence alone seems to lead to 155 clear delinea'bion o f an area of behavior, "here both occur, hovrever, greater agreenent v.’it h the group is found. Vhether or not emergence is 3 oui va lent to high value cannot be determined by tliis stud;’’. Hoï/- ever, the results of the present study indicate that they vary con- cosEiitantly 'Then using dimensions where the group attaches positive value to one pole of a dimension in preference to another. Finally, though this is a minor aspect of this study, it seems practicable to view groups as construing behavior along certain dimensions, the ends of which are differentially valued. The fact that a factor analysis of the accuracy scores (from a group which is different from that from which the related words are chosen) reveals the same dimerLsions to be a best enplanation of the results is some indication that the dimensions which are chosen exist as meaningful variables in the interrelation- slmps of the group members. This has important implication for the study of the behavior of small groups as "well as perhaps for sub­ cultural and cult'ural groups. CEâPTES 71

SmH,lARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

Eecent woxk: in the area of perception has dealt increasingly with

■vdiat has come to be called "projectile perception." It is evident from a brief survey of studies dealing with set and attention that this recent interest is a revival of an interest in the part that the individual plays in the shaping of his own experiences rather than being the "new look" that it is credited with being. A major share of the current interest in the problem of the part that the individual plays in determining what he sees and to which he therefore responds appears to have been stimulated by the clinical psychologists.

The clinicians have been particularly interested in determining the part that the individual’s past experiences play in the develop­ ment of his current attitudes and the manner in vdiich these attitudes affect the individual’s present relationships. Current work in projec­ tive psychological testing has emphasized the consistency with which the individual responds to his behavioral environment in the face of much less consistency to that environment. Such an emphasis has placed certain assumptions developed from clinical research and quali­ tative clinical judgment in opposition to some of the more classical work in perception. As Tifemer and Wapner (lO) state,

It is also characteristic that in a widely accepted theory a number of facts might not be covered because they are considered peripheral to the main body of explainable data. These so-called peripheral jEhcts, through a shift

— 156 — 157

in emphasis, may suddenly become crucial and may force a revision in theory. Such a shift can be noted today with respect to the projective characteristics of perception... Experimental psychology looked on the problem of projec­ tive perception, because of its experimental unmanage­ ability, as unfit for scientific analysis...It was mainly the success of clinical psychologists using perception as a diagnostic tool which brought this problem of projective perception into the center of interest.

Bruner and Postman in a series of studies following an earlier study by Bruner and Goodman (l) on value and need as organizing factors in perception have demonstrated that high value is associated with quickness of perception of related words presented tachistoscopically

(7 ). This finding has been confirmed in a similar study by Yanderplas

and Blake (s), using an auditory presentation, and by Haigh and Piske

(3 ), using methods somewhat similar to those used in the study by

Postman, Bruner and lîcGinnies (?). B n m e r and Postman’s research led

them to propose the concepts of selective sensitization, perceptual

defense, selective vigilance, and value resonance (e) as temporarily

useful concepts in the explanation of their results. Howes and Solomon

(4 ) took particular exception to the concept of defense and offered an

alternative explanation of the results which established a relationship between value and visual duration threshold. They demonstrated (8)

that the length of visual exposure required for the recognition of the

words presented was related to the Thomdike-Lorge frequency of these

word.s s

It was the information given with regard to value resonance by

Postman (7 ), Bruner and Postman (e), and %Clelland and Idberman

(6) tdiich stimulated the present study. The first two reports indi­

cated that subjects tended to give words related to the word presented 158

TKhen "words sjnabolizing highly valoaed areas of behavior were presented and words contrary in value to the word being presented as "guesses"

Tjhen words related to low value areas were presented. ^Clelland and

Liberman (s), contrary to their esqpectations, had found a high fre­ quency of contravaluant "guesses" even when the words presented repre­ sented highly valued areas. These findings, as well as those of

Solomon and Howes (4 ), suggested that a more efficient explanation of the results of the studies dealing with accuracy of perception and value might be possible within Personal Construct Theory (s).

Personal Construct Theory

Basic to the orientation of Personal Construct Theory is the notion of simultaneous generalization and differentiation in concept formation.

Kelly states (s), cannot express a concept either explicitly or implicitly without involving at least two things which have a likeness and one which is, b y the same token, different" (p. 75). An. individual is seen as developing a series of personal concepts which are referred to as "constructs" rather than concepts because of the added assumption of simultaneous differentiation. The individual then uses this series of "personal constmots" in order to anticipate events. The addition of the differentiation aspect of construct formation means that the constructs Tdaich an individual develops and uses are dimensional in nature. One end of the dimension denotes likenesses and the other end refers to the events from which these likenesses differ. Thus it would not be surprising within Personal Construct Theory to find an individual giving words either similar in meaning or contrary in meaning to words 159 presented tachistoscopically, particularly if the ■words being presented

■were similar to the "words which outlined a personal construct dimension»

Furthermore, it ■would not seem surprising to find certain "words being recognized more readily than others since some of the words presented

■would bear a closer relationship to the particular individual’s personal constructs than others. In addition, it seemed that both words connoting high value and low value (i.e., positive and negative value) would be responded to more quickly if they had personal relevance than either "would be if they were not personally relevant. Thus, an individual might quickly recognize the negatively "valued end of a per­ sonally relevant dimension a3ad very slowly recognize the positively

■valued end of a non-re levant dimension.

The Problem

The present problem is an a"fctempt to demonstrate the manner in

"Which personal relevance might affect recognition of "words presented

"With limited "time for perception. The order of emergence of the poles of a personal construct dimension "when an individual is given an opport"uni"ty to invoke his concepts indirectly "was also investigated as a determinant of the accuracy of his perception, ^t seemed likely that the pole of the dimension "which is first invoked "would be the one that is most clearly defined. For example, if a person used a construct of "social-antisocial" and "social" was the emergent pole of the dimension, it seemed likely "that the behaviors relating to being

"social” would be more clearly defined that the behaviors related to being "antisocial.” That is, being emergent, it would be more readily 1 6 0 invoked.. Being more readily invoked -would mean that more individuals

■would be described by "social." If more persons could be described by its then perhaps the behaviors relating to being "social” would be more clearly defined. Thus this problem represents an attempt to establish a relationship be-tween personal relevance and accuracy on the one hand and be-tween emergence and accuracy on the other.

In order -to test the assumptions "group construct dimensions" vrere used. These "group construct" dimensions -were chosen from terms used frequently by female undergraduates to describe associates -who -were liked and disliked. Frequent use of the group dimensions could then be expected to mean that the indi-vidual found these dimensions personally relevant. Value of the poles of the dimensions irms determined by the manner in -which the poles of the dimensions were applied. The terms ivhich were consistently applied to liked people -were ass-umed to have

"posi-fcive -value; those -which -were consistently applied to disliked people were ass-umed to have negative »

The dimensions were chosen through determining from the responses of 85 subjects -what the antonyms of these words were. Four dimensions were chosen in such a manner that a group measure of the frequency of usage of the dimensions and emergence of the poles of the dimensions

-was as sur red.

Through the use of peer judges words related in meaning to the eight poles of these four dimensions were determined. These words were matched so that the mean difficulty level and Thorndike-Iorge frequency would be equal fbr each of the eight groups of -twen-by-two

■words. The measure of difficul-fay used took into consideration only 161

the percentage of the group of judges who indicated that they were suf­

ficiently familiar with the words to assign them, to one of our eight

categories. Words vrere selected as being related if twice as many of

the judges assigned a word to one category as assigned that same word

to any other single category. At this point wo had eight groups of words (four dimensions) of equal difficulty level and Thomdike-lorge

frequency.

The next step in the procedure was to obtain measures of the

personal relevance of the dimensions, emergence of the poles of the

dimensions, and accuracy of perception of the words related to these

dimensions. A modified form of the Eole Construct Repertory Test des­

cribed by Kelly (S, p. 12?) was used to obtain the first two measures.

However, instead of allowing the subjects to use their own personal con­

structs to describe and contrast the persons used in the sorting procedure

provided for in the test, the 53 female undergraduates were required to

use the "group construct dimensions" which had been selected from the

general group of female undergraduates. The frequency with which the

dimensions were used constitutes our measure of personal relevance.

In applying the prescribed dimensions the subjects were required to

"ilote some imy in ■^^hich two of these people are alike and yet different

from bhe thii-d." The pole of the dimension "vdiich was used most fre­

quently to describe the paired people is considered to be the emergent

pole of that dimension and its opposite the implicit pole. Accuracy of

perception of the dimension-related words ^ s determined by presenting

the words to subjects in such a manner that a minimum of time was

allowed then to assign each word to one o f the eight categories or the 1 6 2

"don't îaaoTjr’ column. An auditory presentation Tvas used ?d.th only a single presentation of the word,

Eesults

The hypotheses to be tested predict a positive relationship be­ tween frequency of usage and accuracy of assignment of the related words, and between emergence of t?ie poles of the dimensions and assign­ ment of the related words. Predictions were made at both the group and individual levels; at the group level by using the group measures of relevance and emergence assured in the selection of the dimensions, and at the individual level through the use of the modified form of the Role Construct Repertory Test. The difference between the accuracy scores for the positively valued categories and the negatively valued categories of the four dimensions was determined in order to test the prediction made by Postman, Bminer and ^ G i m i e s that positive value is related to accuracy and to compare this prediction iTith emergence as a predictor of accuracy, ^n the first group of subjects frequency of usage and emergence at the group level does not appear to be related to accuracy. At this level value appears to be more closely related to accuracy. The positively valued categories had significantly higher mean accuracy scores than the negatively valued categories, t = 3.27.

This is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence.

At the individual level, using the individual measures of personal relevance and emergence, no relationship appears between personal rele­ vance and accuracy. There is, however, a Significant relationship between emergence and accuracy. The categories which are emergent have 165 naan accuracy scores niiich are significantly higher than the mean, accuracy scores for the implicit categories. The difference between these two means is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence.

The finding of a relationship between value and accuracy and also emergence and accuracy suggested that there was significant difference betivean the frequency of emergence of the positively and negatively valued poles of the four dimensions. This was tested using Chi square and a theoretical frequency which assumed equal emergence. The Chi square proved to be 485.68. An analysis of the frequency of application of the poles of each of the four dimensions indicated that the nature of the role titles used in the administration of the test might have led to the more frequent emergence of positively valued poles of the dimen­ sions .

Replication of the study conducted with some change in methodology revealed essentially the same results. îîo relationship appeared between our measures of personal relevance and emergence at the group level, and a relationship was found between positive value and accuracy. The posi­ tively valued poles again proved to have significantly higher accuracy scores than the negatively valued poles of the four dimensions. Again the difference was significant beyond the .01 level of confidence.

At the individual level the most personally relevant dimensions had significantly higher accuracy scores than the dimensions which had the least personal relevance (.Ol^p^.Os). The emergent poles, as in the first group, had significantly higher mean accuracy scores than the implicit poles of the four dimensions. Again the positively valued categories proved to be more often emergent in spite of the fact that 164

an equal number of liked and disliked persons ^rere used in the Sole

Titles of the Sole Construct Repertory Test. This difference was

tested in the same manner as before. The resulting Chi square 'vas

15.54 which is significant beyond the .01 level of confidence (df-l).

^n an attempt to clarify the findings with regard to accuracy

arid value the accuracy scores were divided into four groups and the mean accuracy scores computed for the (l) positively valued poles which were emergent ; (s) positively valued poles which were implicit;

(3 ) the negatively valued categories which were emergent, and (4 ) the negatively valued categories which were implicit. The positively valued emergent categories proved to be significantly higher than any of the remaining three categories. There were no significant differences

among the remaining three categories. In view of the fact that there was no significant difference between the negative implicit and the negative emergent categories, it appears that emergence alone is not a predictor of accuracy of perception. In view of the fact that the

positive implicit category was not significantly higher than the nega­ tive implicit category, it appears that value alone is not a sufficient predictor of accuracy. The fact that both emergence and positive value

coincide before a significant difference is obtained suggests that

frequency has a differential effect on positive than on negatively

valued categories. It seems likely that this occurs because the dimen­

sions which we have chosen are value dimensions *

If change in behavior of the members of this group is in the

direction of the behaviors which are positively valued by the group it might be expected that the positively valued behaviors would become 165 increasingly clearly defined as the individual emergence of these positively valued categories increases. Until the individual construes the dimen si on ishich the group uses, clearer definition of either polo of the dimension is impossible. As the individual begins to think in terms of the dimension that the group uses, the behaviors relating to the positively valued pole of that dimension becomes increasingly

•well elaborated. This rationale is supported by the fact that (l) the difference be-tween the mean accuracy scores for the positive and negative categories is significant b eyond the .05 level of confidence for the most frequently used dimension but not for the least frequently used dimension, and (2 ) the difference be-tween the mean accuracy score for the emergent ends and the implicit ends of the most frequently used dimension is significant beyond the .05 level of confidence. This is not true of the least frequently used dimension. Thus it seems safe to assume that -the dimensions -which have the clearest défini-tion are the dimensions 'which have the greatest personal relevance. It seems further that the posi-tively valued ends of the personally relevant dimensions tend to become more frequently used and more clearly defined than the negative*

EEF3HENCSS FOB. CHAPTER VI

1. Bruner, J. S., and Goodman, G. G,, "Value and ^eed as Organizing Factors in Perception," J . of Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1947, 42, 43-44.

2. Bruner, J. L,, and Postman, L. An Approach to Social Perception. In IT. Dennis (Ed.), Current Trends in Social Psychology. Pittsburg : University of Pittsburg ^res’s, 1948.

3. Haigh, G., and Fiske, D. W., "Corroboration of Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception," J. Abn. Soc. Psÿchol., 1952, 47, 394-399. 16 G

4 , H o w b s , D. H., and Solomon, R . L » , ”A Uote on ^Ginnies’ Smotionality and Perceptual Defense,” Psych. Rev», 1949, 56, 244-251.

5, Kelly, George A., ”The Psychological Construction of ^dfe.” Unpublished manuscript, 1955.

6, McClelland, D. C ., and liberman, A. -M., "The Effect of Keed for Achievement on Recognition of Need Related Words,” J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 236-241.

7. Postman, 1., Bruner, S., and ^Ginnies, S. M., "Personal Values as selective Factors in Perception," of Abn. and Soc. Psychol., 1948, 48, 124-154.

8. Solomon, R. L., and Howes, D. H,, "Word Frequency Personal Values and Visual Duration," Psych. Rev., 1951, 58, 256-270.

9. Vandenplas, U. M., and Blake, R. R., "Selective Sensitization in Auditory Perception," J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 252-266.

10, Werner, H., and Wapner, S., "sensory-tonic Field Theory of Perception," J. of Personality, 1949, 18, 83-107. APP3ÎTDIX A

F032iS USED IÎÎ THE SELECTION OF THE DliûEIISIOUS

— 167 — ROI," GCKSTRÜ(!ï ill':P OR TOR Y Ï'FSÏ Ü Instructions

ïhiB test is comprised of throe sheets * (l) the Test Sheet, (2) the Overluy Sheet and (S) this Instruction Sheet « The test is desired to help the examiner better to understand you and some of tho people who have played a part in your life.,

'.lo Start with the Overlay Shoots Beginning with your own name write the first names of the pthsens described, V/rite their nmeo in the diagonal blanks. If you cannot remember a person's first name write his last name or something about him which will clearly bring to your mind the per.ion-'s identity^ You may k^ep this Overlay Sheetc The examiner will be interested only in what you write on the Test Sheet,

2, Next, lay the Overlay Sheet sidewise across the top of the Tost Sheet so that the numbered blanks correspond to the numbered columns in the grid. Note that the letters "M" and "P" apnear at the heads of Columns 10-to 19, inolusivo,, If the person whose name appears at the, top of Co 1mm 10 is a man, encircle the "K", if a woman, encircle the "F"» Do the same in the remaining columns,

3, ÎÎOW move the Overlay Sheet down over the Terb Sheet until it is just abovu the first row of squares. Note that the throe squares ut the extreme right have circles in them. This moans that you are first to consider the three people whoso names appe ar on your Overlay Sl^et in the last three oolumns-"Co1umns 17, 10 and 19. Think about these three people. Are two of them alilco i^ £ome important way that distinguishes them from the third person? Keep thinking about theni until you rembmber the important vmy in which "two of them are alike and which sets them off from the third person.

When you #ave decided which two it is and the important way in v/hich they are alike put an "X" in the two circles cori'oaponding to the two that are alikoo m Do not put any mark in the third circle, S

Now write in the blank under "CONSTRUCT" the word or short phrase that tells how these tv/o are alike.

Next write in the blank under "CONTRAST" what you consider to bo the opposite of this chraoteristico i When you #ave decided which two it is and the important way in which they are alike put an "X" in the two circles corresponding to the two that are alikoo h-» Do not put any mark in the third circle. &

Now write in the blank under "CONS'i'RUCT" the word or short phrase that tells how these tvfo ore alike»

Next write in the blank under "CONTRAST" what you consider to bo the opposite of this chraoteristioo

4, Now'consider each of the other sixteen persons whose names appear at tho heads of Columns 1 to 16» In addition to the persona whom you have marked with an "X” which ones also have this important chracteristic? lut a check mark (/) ■ not an under the name of each other person who h-is this important character­ istic-,

5, Now sliUo the Overlay ■SJicet down to the second royi. Think about persons Number 14„ 15 and 16-=the throe who have circles under their names» In what important way are iwo of these distinguished from the third? i'ut "X’s"' in the circles to show which trjo are alike» Write the CONSTRUCT : end the CONTRAST in tho blanks at the right just as you did before. Then consider the other sixteen persons. Check the ones who also have the chracteristic you have noted»

6o Complete the test in the way ^(uu have done the first two rows. Write your name and th« dato on tlic Test Sh^et and give it to the examiner» You may keep or destroy the other two «hee"Fs» 169

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FCHÎS USED HI THE SELSCTIOU OF THE DIMEUSIOÏÏ BELATED TIOSDS

- 171 - 172

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vTOSDS-miCH JUDGES AGREED BSLCSTGED TO THE CHESBFUL-^^ DBiSUSION

Cheerful Sad amusing bitter o-ni-mn-had. blue beaming cheerless blissful complaining buoyant crabbed capricious crying carefree dejected comical depressed cure despondent delightful dismal elated doleful enchanting do-mncast enjoyable droopy frisky flat fun gloomy gay glum genial grim glad joyless gleeful melancholy goodnatured miserable happy moody hearty morbid jaunty morose jocular mournful joking pained jolly pensive jcrsrial pessimistic joyful remorseful lively sober merry solemn mirthful sore playful sorrowful pleasant sullen pleasing sulky refreshing tearful rollocking unhappy smiling unpleasant sparkling woeful sunny worried vivacious 175

WDHDS JüDGES AGSSED BELONGED TO THE BE0AD1HIÎD2D-NAHR0V&IINDED DIÎÜES'TSION

B roadmnnde d Narrcraainded c csapromi sing absolute equitable bent fair biased farsighted bigoted foresighted blind impartial confined keen dogmatic lenient fanatic liberal headstrong logical inflexible objective influenced observing intolerant openroinded . limited practical obstinate rational onesided reasonable opinionated sensible partial tenroerate positive tolerant prejudiced unbiased radical unp re judic e d stubborn ■wise "twisted unfair warped 176

■HDED3 lïHICH JUDGES AGHEED BELONGED TO THE SnîCEBE-ÏNSINCEHE DHâENSION

SiOBoro insincere accountable ambiguous careful changing c ons c i enti ous cheat considerate confusing consistent counterfeit constant crooked dependable deceitful earnest deceiving enduring deceptive faithful dishonest frank disloyal genuine evasive honest fake honorable false just fickle liable indefinite loyal irresponsible mindful neglectful’ noble •questionable reliable sneaky- responsible superficial solid suspicious sound thoughtless stable uncertain steadfast unfaithful steady unsound straightforward unsteady trustworthy vmtrue truthful ■untrus-two rthy true ■un-worthy un adulte rated varying Tigilant ■wavering worthy ■weak 177

TîDSDS JUDGES AGHEED BELONGED TO THE REFIKED-YULGAR DII3EHSI0IT

RefizLod Vulgar charming base civilized bold clean brutish c ons e rvative clumsy conventi onal coarse courhly crude cultivated dirty cultu red disgraceful delicate disgusting demure evil dignified filthy educated foul elegant hozurid esthetic immoral fasti dious indecent genteel indiscreet gentle letTd modest loathsome neat loose poised loud polished nasty polite obscene prim obnoxious prissy offensive proper rough pure roTïdy reputable rude reserved ruthless respectable scandalous smooth shabby sophisticated shameful Tvellbred sho eking sinful sloppy thief uncouth vile ■wild ^ P E N D I Z C

FOPJÆS TISSD 1ST TES COLLECTION OF THE SSPE2U£ENTAL DATA

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Xg.XnslnoerG Ib» Sinooro 3a » Sad 3bo Choorful 2a*Vulgar 2b* Rofînod l^a* Narrowmlndod Ij.b* Broadminded 180

1 Sad i I- - - ! ^ : 1 _ . 1. . . I i I jBroadminded ' | 1 ? 1 i .i ; Harrov/minded i ’■ k--- 1- - 1- — 1— !— 1— I— L Sincere

Insincere

Refined

iT nlgar

Dther

' - ■ - - - 1 i Cheerful ; | i I » . [ 1 X'"T j ' - : ! ; - . I Sad 1 1 ! ■ 1 ' i i - i ! : 1 ...... 1 Broadminded : | ! 1 - 1 !.. 1 ( ; narrowminded 1 ■ i ! Sincere j 1 j Insincere | i ! i ; Refined ! ; , ' I : . .. .■ jvulgar i 1 : I 1 1 Other 1 ... . - "■ — ■ ' -- I 1 1 1 8 0

<5,

/ 3

3 0 ïlo absolut© 23 b i g o t e d 28«g]a d 17«positive 5 o unprejudiced 7« b i t t e r 2 9 0 h a p p y loipraotloal 60 unworthy 8; b l i n d 30eheadstrong 19oprlra 7 0 v a r y i n g 9o blissful 3i ; h o a r t y 2 0 e p r l s s y 8« vigilant l O o b o l d 32ohonorab!b 2 1 . p r o p e r 9 « vile 11 «buoyant P a g e t hree 2 2 «pure lOo vivacious: 12«caprlcious 31e impartial 23« r adical U n w a v e r i n g llooarofre© 2 , i n d e c e n t 2%«rational 12o War p e d Iq.; ca r e f u l i n d e f i n i t e 25 «reasonable 13e W ô llbred 15Ôchanging I:ie indiscreet 26«reliable lq.«wild Id«complaining infle x i b l e 27«remorseful I5 «wise 17Ôcompromising 6; influenced 28«reputable l6«v/orried IBfConflned 70 intolerant 29«reserved 19«confusing 86 irresponsible lOorespectable 20;conscientious 9 o ‘j a u n t y 31«rollicking glpconservatlve 10; jooujer 3 2 o r o u g h 22;conalstent 1 1 ; j o king Pa g e five S'jpcoimtorfoit 12Ô joyless 5 1 o ru d e 2q.o co u r t l y 130just r u t h l e s s 2 5 o crooked ll|.fikoon s c a n d a l o u s 2 0 t c r u d e 1 5 « lenient I sens Ible 27ocult Ivated 1 6 0 l e w d d i a b b y aoocuto 17 ; liable ÎI sinful 29odeceltful i B o l l b e r a l s l p p p y 3Oodeo0ivlng 19o l l m i t e d ll s m o o t h 31«deceptive 20« l ogical 9 « * s n e a k y H 32«dejeoted 21oloose 1 0 ; s o b e r H Pa g © Tv/o 2 2 ; l o y a l 1 1 «solemn 21. delicate 23«melancholy 12« sore 2o dependable 24.; mi n d f u l 13«sound 3; dignified 25 «mirthful Iq;. stable I. * J M ^ A 1H.ntAodfnat Jl Y 0 X 3 . a C J U 3 yjo «X11.I.UX 29odôO0Îtful i B o l i b e r a l 7o s l p p p y 3Oûdeo0ivlng 19ollraitod 8; s m o o t h 3 1 êdecoptîv0 20«loglcal 9 o * s n e a k y 3 2 odejscted 21 o loose l o ; s o b e r Pag© Tv/o 22;loyal 11 0s o l e m n 2 1 . delicate 23;melanoholy 12;sore 2 o dependable 21}.; mi n d f u l 13osound dignified 2è ; m l r t h f u l Iq;. stable disgraceful 2D«mis0rable IpoSteadfaat ^0 disgusting 27 «.modest 16ostubborn 6 ; disloyal 280mo r a l 17;straightforward 7* doleful 29;moros0 18;aullen o« dogmatic 3 0 ; n a s t y 1 9 ; sunny 9 e’downcast 3i ; n o a t 2O0superficial io;oduc'at0d 32 oneglectful 21«suspicious lloOla tod Page f o u r 2 2 o s u l k y 1 2 Ô enchanting l|.l. noble 23 ot e a r f u l 13 «.enduring 2 , objective 2q.o tempe rate Iq.; equitable 3 . o b s c e n e 2 5 o t h i a f Iboosthotic q.0 obstinate 260thoughtless l6 ;0vaslv© 5 o observing 27 0tolerant IToevll do offensive P S o t w i s t e d l ô ô f a l r 7o o n e s i d e d 29otrustworthy 1 9 «fals0 8o openmlnded 30.trughful 2 0 ;fanatic 9 o opinionated 31«unadulterated Plôfarslghted lOppalned 32.unbiased 22,f3a t 11 opart lal 182

TABLE SO

SCORES ON THE IIODIFIED ROLE CONSTRUCT REPERTORY TEST AND CATEGORIES OF RELATED WORDS FOR THE EEPERLIBNTAL GROUP

Role Constrzct Repertory Test Frequency Masures Word List Accuracy Scores n3 0 1 r4 •H E r4 1 E © © <2 S E o E o Pi k o a E P, o P! § eS o CS S o & © 1 s o »r4 to ri P! CS u A CO r-i 2 cS E •H X eg •ri o CO m 1 CO > O CO 1 s CO « fS I. 5 1 7 1 6 2 2 0 14 13 12 9 13 8 16 16 2. 9 0 4 2 6 0 5 0 13 12 13 12 15 12 15 17 5. 7 0 8 1 7 0 1 0 16 15 16 12 6 8 13 13 A. 2 6 0 2 3 2 6 3 12 11 13 12 5 11 12 11 5. 4 0 4 4 5 2 5 0 10 5 10 8 13 8 16 11 S. 13 0 2 0 6 2 1 0 11 6 7 9 16 14 12 6 7* 6 0 9 2 6 1 0 0 18 12 12 13 13 11 10 12 8. 5 4 4 2 0 3 4 2 12 11 9 8 9 12 12 14 9v 11 1 5 2 4 1 2 0 19 12 10 9 13 15 12 10 10. 6 0 5 2 6 1 3 1 12 10 11 15 14 15 11 12 11. 7 0 4 2 7 2 2 0 12 12 9 13 15 18 16 15 12. 7 3 5 3 2 2 2 0 8 6 11 10 15 7 13 17 13. ' 9 1 2 1 5 1 3 2 13 10 9 4 15 10 15 14 lA. 7 0 6 1 8 2 0 0 13 9 14 13 13 14 13 17 15. 9 0 2 0 10 2 1 0 11 6 7 2 12 10 11 7 15. 4 1 4 0 6 1 6 2 16 11 18 15 11 12 13 19 17. 9 0 3 1 9 1 1 0 13 11 13 9 11 10 15 15 18. 7 0 6 0 7 3 1 0 15 12 7 3 12 8 17 7 19. 10 1 1 1 7 3 1 0 14 10 4 10 11 7 7 10 20. 2 0 5 0 13 4 0 0 15 6 14 15 10 14 3 9 21. 8 1 3 6 3 1 2 0 19 16 9 13 14 11 20 19 22. 7 0 3 4 4 1 4 1 7 6 7 9 11 10 17 17 23. 9 1 3 2 3 1 4 1 15 12 7 8 8 7 11 15 2A. 7 2 6 2 5 0 2 0 15 15 12 12 16 15 12 14 25. 5 1 6 1 6 2 3 0 15 13 15 14 14 19 13 14 26. 4 2 2 3 9 2 1 1 12 9 8 8 9 12 14 15 27. 4 2 4 2 5 2 4 1 15 r 13 16 11 12 15 14 28. 7 1 4 0 8 0 4 0 18 13 14 19 13 10 14 15 29. 5 0 4 5 4 2 3 1 9 8 15 10 9 14 12 14 30. 8 0 4 0 9 0 1 2 12 7 8 4 15 12 13 9 31. 8 3 7 0 4 2 0 0 14 13 15 14 6 11 13 18 32. 3 5 3 3 0 2 6 2 15 11 10 7 12 14 12 13 33. 4 1 5 1 5 1 4 3 17 8 14 12 8 11 10 16 34. 7 0 5 0 10 1 1 0 16 14 15 17 18 14 12 16 35. 9 1 2 0 7 1 4 0 18 15 13 11 13 10 15 17 36. 11 0 7 1 4 0 1 0 17 12 8 10 12 9 13 11 37. 7 0 4 1 6 2 3 1 18 13 11 13 15 15 16 20 185

TABLE 30 (cont.)

SCORES OR THE M)DIPIED ROLE COÎISTRUCT REPERTORY TEST MD CATEGORIES OF RELATED TfORDS FOR THE SXP3RIIŒJITAL GROUP

Role Construct Repertory Test Frequency Masures Word ïdst Accuracy Scores •0 '3 '0 ■3 o o k« 1-1 •H E 1-1 •rHA 3 o o ■3 E O •0 u s o u S-, o § § % ! o 3 3 a cS o •H & O u •H hù o o { C «M ® o u 3 to M •H a u •H c: CO a Î3 CO s Pg g o CO a s CO « > 38. 5 0 5 0 5 5 3 1 19 15 10 10 16 11 9 11 39. 10 0 4 1 6 0 3 0 13 10 10 9 14 11 13 11 40. 0 2 3 4 3 2 6 4 16 9 12 17 16 13 12 17 41. 9 0 9 1 0 3 2 0 10 11 11 12 8 9 12 13 42. 6 0 5 0 9 1 3 0 16 15 10 13 10 5 11 18 43. 4 1 5 0 5 4 4 1 18 13 20 17 20 14 16 15 44. 8 1 5 0 7 0 3 0 17 11 14 17 16 16 18 17 45. 7 0 1 0 9 2 4 1 14 12 16 17 10 10 15 21 46. 11 0 3 0 5 0 3 2 16 13 12 15 12 13 1 16 47. 9 0 5 2 2 1 5 0 14 14 15 14 18 14 12 14 48. 3 3 2 1 9 0 5 1 13 12 8 7 12 16 12 15 49. 7 1 2 2 4 3 3 2 20 19 15 11 11 16 12 16 50. 6 2 5 0 3 2 4 2 13 13 17 13 13 12 16 16 51. 7 0 7 2 7 0 1 0 11 14 11 7 15 11 13 15 52. 5 1 3 2 6 3 4 0 17 9 12 9 14 6 18 17 53. 7 0 3 1 6 0 5 2 10 8 8 7 15 10 10 7 184

TABLE SI

SCOBSS OH THE MODIFIED BOLE COHSTB.UCT BSPBECOBY TEST AîID CATEGOBIES OF RELATED 1TOBDS FOB THE COHTBOL GBOTJP

Bole Construct Repertory Test ______Frequency Measures______Word List Accurs.cy Scores o 'CJ © ê 1— ! n •H g Î-1 C g 2 o o p o o -cs <;-! k k o ?-» 1 ! o § c si 1 1 è a o c£ u O •H •H hù o o! u •H •H & o •o O u CO <;-i r - i o ■n u § CO f— 1 X eS u •H a 2 ♦rt A o CO CQ CO 1-1 « o CO pa iM CO

1. 5 0 5 1 10 0 2 1 14 14 10 12 7 8 14 14 2. 3 5 3 1 8 0 3 1 14 16 12 11 12 8 10 15 3. 4 4 9 1 6 0 0 0 15 15 10 14 19 14 10 17 4. 10 0 3 0 6 5 0 0 16 18 15 12 7 18 15 19 5, 2 6 0 4 2 3 1 6 15 15 14 15 10 11 17 17 6. 8 0 5 1 3 4 2 1 9 5 14 12 10 10 11 7 7. 4 1 2 1 5 3 8 0 20 18 14 15 16 17 20 21 8. 7 1 5 0 11 0 0 0 16 16 14 13 16 17 14 14 9. 7 0 2 4 5 1 5 0 11 16 5 5 13 16 11 19 10. 7 0 6 0 7 0 2 2 14 11 14 14 13 ■ 10 17 15 11. 4 4 4 1 4 3 3 1 18 21 14 14 17 17 15 17 12. 16 0 6 2 3 1 5 1 11 9 8 12 13 13 9 14 13. 5 1 5 0 8 2 3 0 17 14 10 8 8 11 14 10 14. 6 1 5 1 8 0 3 0 16 10 14 14 15 12 12 9 15. 7 0 3 0 9 2 2 1 20 17 16 15 18 19 13 17 IS. 8 1 0 3 4 3 4 1 15 17 11 10 14 6 13 16 17. 4 3 2 3 5 2 3 2 19 16 11 8 10 11 15 15 18. 5 1 6 0 3 1 7 1 15 17 19 14 16 9 15 12 19. 7 0 3 0 6 4 3 1 11 13 8 12 9 8 6 9 20. 6 1 3 3 2 2 3 4 10 14 7 7 11 16 11 16 21. 6 1 1 4 4 3 2 3 17 14 12 12 10 15 10 8 22. 0 0 3 0 10 8 3 0 20 17 12 15 12 17 21 17 23. Z 6 3 2 1 5 0 5 11 11 13 12 10 9 10 11 24. 4 3 3 2 8 2 2 0 17 3 12 18 16 16 12 17 25. 7 0 5 2 5 0 5 0 14 11 11 6 12 13 17 12 26. 6 1 3 5 9 0 0 0 16 17 11 15 18 14 17 16 27. 2 0 8 2 3 1 4 4 10 11 15 14 16 13 13 15 28. 4 0 2 5 5 1 5 2 20 18 16 15 14 20 18 16 29. 5 0 5 3 6 4 1 0 18 18 17 15 16 13 17 17 30. 8 0 9 0 4 0 3 0 9 13 11 10 10 10 13 12 31. 12 0 4 1 4 0 3 0 10 7 3 2 11 5 8 10 32. 3 0 6 2 7 1 5 0 16 11 S 6 11 14 9 8 33. 4 2 8 3 3 2 2 0 21 19 16 11 10 11 17 18 34. 11 0 6 1 4 1 1 0 16 13 4 7 12 10 13 14 35. 5 2 5 5 5 0 2 0 9 14 16 13 11 12 11 12 185

TAnLB 31 (cont.)

SC03SS ON TH3 MODIFIED HOLE CONSTStJCT BSPSHTOSY TS3T AIîD C^EGORIES OF SELATED YilDRDS FOR THE CONTROL GROUP

Role Construct Repertory Test ______Frequency Measures______Vford List Accuracv Scores

T3 - § © S ’ZS S3 © •I-Î g f— I S3 © g •H © © 2 u o © Ï4 0-, o -o o F3 S3 d u - 1 I o S3 § © aS 8 •rt •H bO o eS •H T-l & O u S3 03 CM r H © r s S^ § (a Chi ed k •H tS E •rt S3 o 0 5 m S CO W « ■ ê 05 CQ 05 H (§ 36. 7 1 8 0 7 0 1 0 15 14 10 15 10 8 19 13 37. 8 0 3 0 11 0 2 0 16 11 11 10 13 12 14 8 38. 2 2 4 2 7 2 3 2 12 9 9 10 14 15 15 12 39. 7 1 4 0 7 0 5 0 16 10 12 15 11 14 16 11 40. 6 0 7 0 7 2 1 1 IS 14 13 14 10 17 14 14 41. 7 0 2 1 7 3 4 0 15 16 18 18 15 14 19 13 42. 10 1 2 1 7 0 3 0 18 10 11 13 11 12 12 13 43. 7 0 2 5 3 4 3 9 17 17 12 15 12 14 11 16 44. 6 0 4 1 6 0 6 1 16 16 11 13 9 8 12 13 45. 5 1 3 0 10 4 0 1 19 13 11 14 14 10 14 13 45. 9 1 4 0 8 0 2 0 14 9 16 12 17 17 11 10 47. 5 0 10 0 2 0 7 0 16 16 6 8 15 18 14 16 48. 9 1 7 1 2 0 3 1 12 9 9 10 14 9 15 8 49. 10 2 4 3 1 2 2 0 18 15 16 10 12 11 11 15 APP3ÏÏDIX D poms USED HI t h e cqllectioii o f d a t a h i t h e HSPLICATIOII S2CPEEIÏ2EHT

" X86 187

iCheerful •

Sad jSad isFdid-'.' >MInded

Sincere Sincere

Insincere Insincere

Refined {Refined

Other Other

3 0

Sheerful Cheerful

Sad Sad

Broad- Broad— Minded I-iinded Harrow- Harrow— Minded Minded

Sincere iincere

Insincere

Refined ±te fined

Vulgar Vulgar

Other Other 187

iCheerîul

iSincere

Insincere

iHefined

Vulgar

Other

Cheerful

Sad.

Broad— I-Iinded

iincere

Insincere

Vulgar

Other 188

Î ? 1 ■ : I

c;

'V

‘•V, o a u n o d /'/ o o o u O! /U a> 00 O © i l f* u O d O D O /"f O O m * ô I 0 M 0 0o O Q 4 9 ô o c> #»>‘V 0o o y* ^ f 6 d ^i9 r-s>*m «

lo.o ChoGrfnl Ibo Sad 3a o Sincore 3b. Insincere

2a 0 Broadminded 2b o Karrov/minded ija. Kefined hb, Vulgar TABLE 32

SCORES ON THE MODIFIED ROLE CONSTRUCT REPERTORY TEST AND CATEGORIES OF RELATED WORDS FOR THE REPLICATION GROUP

Role Construot Repertory Test Froquenoy Mgasures Frequency of Frequency of Usage of Application of Frequency of Usage of Dimensions the Dimensions Dimension Poles to the Self Word List Accuracy Scores 'd

SCORES ON THE MODIFIED ROLE CONSTRUCT REPERTORY TEST AND CATEGORIES OF RELATED WORDS FOR THE REPLICATION GROUP

Role Construct Ropartory Toab Frequency Mpgauros Frequency of Frequency of Application of Frequency of Usage of Usage of the Dimensions Dimension Poles____ Dimensions to the Self Word List Accuracy Scores 'd © © '0 -S (■< © o A « A A « nj 3 I 8 A s 8 A A I 0 § qS I o <0 A § •H bO h •H to (0 (H H W H 1> to M 8 t ) h A I 'ï I I I rA d 1 d Î •H 3 to % o to to (? I W « t=- Ü w to Âi Ü I o w m 1 19 14 11 14 17 13 15 13 19. 16 4 1 8 4 5 4 7 32 2 1 2 1 15 13 16 12 15 11 15 15 20. 9 7 6 4 6 8 4 4 27 1 3 1 2 16 12 15 14 13 8 10 8 21, 8 4 9 9 6 11 3 2 21 24 24 9 2 0 2 2 1 12 12 15 13 20 14 9 8 92. 13 6 7 7 4 10 2 3 30 18 21 9 2 1 0 21 18 14 17 11 8 12 16 2 1 16 10 7 15 0 0 6 42 30 0 0 4 2 0 15 12 16 13 11 15 15 14 24, 13 3 6 3 2 12 5 6 24 18 21 15 3 1 2 0 14 12 15 15 18 13 16 16 2d. 11 6 4 0 7 5 0 6 30 12 24 12 2 2 2 2 16 16 18 15 11 16 11 16 26. 17 0 2 3 3 3 4 18 27 9 9 33 2 0 2 0 12 10 13 11 5 10 3 6 27. 5 1 10 4 10 10 0 0 9 27 42 0 1 2 3 3 15 19 12 14 18 20 20 15 28. 3 2 1 3 13 7 5 4 12 9 39 18 1 0 2 20 13 13 17 18 16 16 17 29. 9 0 6 5 10 12 0 10 15 15 33 15 1 1 3 1 12 17 13 11 16 5 11 15 30. 14 4 4 0 7 2 0 8 27 9 15 27 2 0 3 1 2 21 14 7 10 16 3 9 12 31. 10 3 4 4 11 9 2 12 18 1 1 2 2 14 12 11 11 17 13 11 14 32. 6 3 1 12 9 7 10 3 15 1 1 2 0 1 2 19 14 15 12 13 16 16 11 33. 4 5 8 3 6 1 3 7 24 3 0 3 11 10 15 11 3 10 11 34. 8 2 5 7 10 1 2 12 18 2 1 0 1 2 3 14 10 9 17 14 15 11 12 35. 11 6 2 7 4 7 8 6 24 H 0 17 16 11 8 14 12 17 18 36. 13 5 4 8 8 7 0 0 30 4 1 1 8 TABIÆ 32 (oont.)

SC01U3S ON THE MODIFIED ROLE'CONSTRUCT REPERTORY TEST AND CATEGORIES OF R I M E D WORDS FOR THE REPLICATION GROUP

Rolo Construct Repertory Test Frequency Masures Frequency of Frequency of Application of Frequency of Usage of Usage of the Dimension Dimension Poles _____ Dimensions to the Self Word List Accuracy Scores 'd •d T) © 'd © 0 © ■d •C f4 © 'd Fl © F) •H H •H •H © © TJ p •H d 0 © tS 0 Ü © V 0 V- u Ü © Ft 'd p © FI d "d o © 0 F) d I o Ko ® d •H •H LO © d u Ü ♦H •ri 0 «Ü o O k 0 W 44 f-4 M to m ^ H > M ^ ^ © o u Fl W 44 r4 .£j CJ Fi ^ c5 C 5 •H - H 0 0© pi0 I1 I1 I1 I I I I I rd d h d •rl ,d © d ÜCOpQé(Z)HP:it>CJWWPHOPPC-'/(Wm CO H Pi t> CJ m to o CO m 5 CO l-l M >

37, 5 2 10 1 5 4 5 8 15 21 18 24 1 2 1 2 19 21 15 16 14 11 14 15 38. 12 2 4 10 7 7 4 4 21 21 21 15 1 2 3 0 19 12 12 15 20 8 11 16 39. 8 5 2 10 11 2 6 4 27 18 21 12 4 1 1 0 8 7 7 9 11 6 9 11 40. 7 5 4 4 8 4 6 8 18 15 21 24 1 1 3 1 18 16 13 9 8 10 16 11 41. 3 6 6 3 8 4 8 8 18 15 18 27 2 1 1 2 9 15 15 8 8 10 12 8 42. 6 1 1 5 7 4 10 4 12 15 21 30 1 1 2 2 15 17 12 13 17 16 12 7 43. 6 8 7 8 14 2 0 1 27 21 27 3 2 2 2 0 7 11 13 9 12 6 9 0 44, 12 1 7 5 4 10 2 8 24 21 18 15 8 2 1 0 17 16 17 12 14 17 11 15 45. 5 6 4 3 14 1 2 3 24 16 27 12 1 1 2 2 9 11 10 9 7 5 7 7 46, 14 6 9 1 1 3 1 10 36 21 6 16 4 1 0 1 16 16 18 13 11 16 12 17 47. 14 7 5 2 5 7 0 7 36 12 18 12 3 2 0 1 19 17 14 8 12 12 14 16 AIJTOBIOC-HAPnT

, Vü.llian Henry Lyle, Jr., ■raas bora in lit. Sterling, Kentucky

on July 14, 1921. I receiTred my secondary school education at Ashland

Senior High School, Ashland, Kentucky. 1-%- first year of college «as

completed at Drake University in Bes ibines, lo^wa. in 1940, Following the completion of mj'’ military service I re-entered college at Kansas

Sta.te Teachers College in Pittsburg, -^^-ansas in 'January of 1947, I served

for tTvo years as student assistant in the Vocational Guidance Service at that school and received my Bachelor of Arts degree there in 1949,

1 then enrolled in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University where I received my Master of Arts degree in clinical psychology in

1951, During my graduate work at The Ohio State University ^ served

successively as Trainso in the Veterans Administration Clinical

Psychology Training Program, October 1949-September 1951; as Research

Assistant at the Ohio State University, September 1951-September 1952;

and Teaching Assistant in the Department of Psychology, September 1952-

June 1953, During the Summer Quarter of 1953 -L devoted full time to the completion of the r e qui rement s for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Psychology.

- 192 -