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A Model of Selective Perception: the Effect of Presenting Alternatives Before Or After the Stimulus

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A Model of Selective Perception: the Effect of Presenting Alternatives Before Or After the Stimulus A model of selective perception: The effect of presenting alternatives before or after the stimulus KENT GUMMERMANt probability that ... it would not be adequate for The University of Texas, Austin, Tex. 78712 discrimination {po 549]." Similarly, Gummerman (1971) found a before vs after difference, with s = 2 and Selective perception, a concept supported by recent m = 16, and concluded that selective perception "b.ef.ore/after" studie~, is usually thought to function by "appears to consist of 'instructions' as to which of the g~l1dmg ~he ~xtractlOn of information from briefly stimulus attributes are relevant and should he processed VIewed stimulI. However, recent findings from a related [po 177] ." In this latter study, no before enhancement type of study are not in agreement so a second int~rt:Jretation ~f before/~fter data is developed here. occurred in a second condition, with s = 2 and m = 4. ThIS mterpretatlOn, based 10 part on a statistical decision This outcome was taken to mean that processing on the mode~ taken from signal detection theory, assumes that basis of two stimuli (before condition) was not selective perception functions by guiding the perceptual measurably more efficient than processing on the basis process of comparing extracted stimulus information of four (after condition). The entire set of data from this with internal representations of stimulus alternatives experiment is shown in Table 1. However reasonable these arguments may sound, it Recent studies using Lawrence & Coles's (1954) is now necessary to consider alternative interpretations before/after method have provided data that can be of the data. New findings,1 from an experiment similar interpreted in terms of selective perceptual processing of in purpose to the before/after experiments, show that brief visual stimuli (Egeth & Smith, 1967; Gummerman, the process of extracting information from a stimulus is 1971). This method may be briefly characterized as no more efficient (Le., does not involve dimensions that follows. On each trial, one member of a master stimulus are more likely to be task-relevant) when there are few set, M, containing m items, is presented. For every trial, stimulus alternatives than when there are many. In a subset of M is selected by the E; this subset, S, this experiment, the task was a type of "free contains s items (s m) and always includes the < response"-only one master set, M, was used in a session, presented item. The composition of S is made known to and no trial-by-trial selection of subsets (before/after the Os either before and after the stimulus exposure cueing) was used. The size of M varied from m = 2 to (bef~r~ condition) or only after the exposure (after m = 16 across sessions, and the Os always knew its condition). Thus, at the time the stimulus is being composition. Of course, since the guessing rate is much processed (Le., during the exposure but not afterwards higher when m 2 than when m 16, the raw scores since the masking pattern that should follow = = th~ (percent correct) were greater when m was small; but, stimulus presumably stops processing at the stimulus after the raw scores were adjusted for differences in offset), the 0 operates either on the basis of the reduced guessing rate (using several methods, including ones stimulus set, S (on all before trials), or on the basis of the larger master set, M (on all after trials). In all cases, based on signal detection theory, the constant-ratio rule, the 0 is told the composition of S before he actually and the all-or-none guessing model), no superiority for responds, so his chance performance rate (assuming a m = 2 remained. forced-choice task) is always l/s. Since the selective perception model mentioned Selective perceptual processing is indicated when above predicts superiority for m = 2, another model has performance is better on before trials than on after been formulated-one which draws heavily upon a trials. Egeth & Smith (1967) suggested that their well-established statistical decision model (Birdsall & enhanced before scores were due to the fact that their Peterson, 1954; Green & Bi~dsall, 1964). Developed in Os co~ld "determine which dimensions were likely to be the context of signal detec.tion theory (see Egan & effective for discriminating within a set of alternatives, Clarke, 1966; Green & Swets, 1966), this model assumes that processing efficiency in the "free-response" task is ~d they ~so had the opportunity to use this knowledge m extractmg information from the test picture. The invariant over changes in the value of m and that poor observers in the After conditions could not know what performance for high values of m results solely from the kind of information to extract first; they got what they Table 1 could from the flash, but there was an excellent Proportion Correct Identifications as a Function of Cueing Condition and m (from Gummerrnan, 1971) *ThiS . work was supported in part by the National Science Cueing Condition FoundatIon's U.niversity Science Development Program, Grant GU-1598. Denm~ McFadden and Cynthia R. Gray read drafts of m Before After an early manuscnpt. ----------------------.:..:=~ tAuthor's address: Department of Psychology Mezes 4 846 ~:Jll:.28, The University of Texas at Austin, Ausilit, Texas ______________16 ~.~8~3 '8 ______________~.7~29~ .846 Bull. Psychon. Soc., 1973, Vol. 2 (6A) 365 large number of comparisons that must be made straightforward. Since S has not yet been revealed by the between extracted stimulus information and internal time stimulus processing is complete, the 0 must representations of the m alternatives. This model not operate, at least temporarily, on the basis of the true only describes the free-response data well but also, we master set, M. Assume, therefore, that the m correlations will show, serves as the basis for an extended model that would be made in a free-response condition also are which nicely accounts for the data in Table 1. made in the after condition, so that the 0 would be Fir s t con sider the decision process in a capable of making anyone of m responses. It is free-response situation. If M is completely specified for reasonable, then, to construct the m x m the 0, there exists for each stimulus in M a stimulus-response confusion matrix that would be corresponding representation in the O's memory. The produced in this situation, assuming that the O's information obtained from a stimulus is assumed to be sensitivity remains the same as in the before condition cross-correlated with every representation, producing m (d' = 1.565). From Elliott's tables, we find that the correlations on each trial. Ideally, one correlation would symmetrical 4 x 4 matrix corresponding to d' = 1.565 be high, and m-I correlations would be very low. The has .735 in all cells on the major diagonal and .088 in all process is complicated, however, by random error, which other cells. The symmetrical 16 x 16 matrix leads to the establishment of two distributions of corresponding to d' = 1.565 has .440 on the major correlations which. when appropriately transformed, will diagonal and .037 elsewhere. Thus the 0 who is correct be normal with unit variance and mean equal to zero on .865 of the before trials (where m' = 2) would be (for the m-I correlations between the stimulus and correct, in a free-response task, on .735 of the trials noncorresponding representations) or to d' (for the when m = 4 and on .440 of the trials when m = 16. correlation between the stimulus and its own These lower scores follow directly from the increasing representation). Then, assuming the O's response is number of samples that are taken from the zero-mean always based on the item in memory that correlated distribution as m grows. most highly with the stimulus, the probability of a What happens, then, in an actual after task when correct response is equal to the probability that the knowledge of S follows the stimulus? Assume that the 0 correlation belonging to the distribution with mean makes the response corresponding to the largest equal to d' is larger than the largest of the m-l correlation whenever that item appears in S; but, correlations belonging to the distribution with mean whenever the item with the highest correlation is not equal to zero. This probability is eqUivalent to the represented in S, the 0 cannot give that response-he probability that one drawing from a normal distribution must guess at random between the items in S. Therefore, with mean d' and unit variance is larger than the largest the three events listed below can occur in the after of m-l drawings from a normal distribution with mean condition. zero and unit variance. Birdsall & Peterson (I 9 54) (a) The item with the highest correlation is contained computed this probability for selected values of d' and in S and is, in fact, the stimulus presented. This event m: Elliott (1964) published more extensive tables. Green will occur on .735 of the trials when m = 4 and on .440 & Bridsall (1964) also discussed this type of model. of the trials when m = 16. On all of these trials, the To apply the model to raw scores in a free-response response will be correct. task, one need only convert them to values of d' with (b) The item with the highest correlation is Elliott's tables. If the model is correct, d' will not vary as contained in S and is not the stimulus presented. This a function of m, and this was the outcome of the recent will occur on .088 of the trials when m = 4 and on .037 study mentioned previously (see Note 1).
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