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Home , French Fourth Republic

William I. Hitchcock. Restored: Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998. 291 pp. $19.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-8078-4747-3.

Reviewed by Sean Kennedy (University of New Brunswick)

Published on H-Diplo (June, 2001)

On 31 August 1954, the vot‐ fact that the country's problems were legion. Do‐ ed down the treaty establishing the controversial mestically, the challenge of postwar economic re‐ European Defense Community (EDC), which would construction was compounded by a legacy of in‐ have created a supra-national West European ternal political divisions, which soon resurfaced. army. The French Fourth Republic's allies, particu‐ By 1947 France's large Communist party was an larly the , were anxious to re-arm the opposition force rather than part of the governing Federal Republic of (FRG) and bolster coalition. General de Gaulle, who had resigned as West European security, and were thus furious at head of the in 1946, had this outcome. This was especially the case since it then challenged the very existence of the nascent had been the French themselves who had proposed Fourth Republic for a time with his new political the idea in 1950, at a time when the outbreak of the movement, the Rassemblement du Peuple Fran‐ had given especial impetus to the de‐ cais. The often beleaguered centrist coalition of sire to arm the West Germans. Fourth Republic parties which was left to govern had its own inter‐ politicians had initially hoped that the EDC would nal tensions. And after elections in 1951, the party contain a revival of German power, the very no‐ system was characterized by ongoing fragmenta‐ tion of which still disturbed them nearly ten years tion. after the war had ended. But after what seemed to Nevertheless, in the midst of this turmoil a be interminable stalling, they had evidently general strategy for national renewal was devised. changed their minds. To many foreign observers, Although previous attempts to forge a consensus this was at best evidence of a crippling indecisive‐ on the need for state intervention to ensure a co‐ ness on the part of the French political class, at ordinated economic recovery had failed, in 1946 worst destructive petulance. , an experienced administrator with Not so, William Hitchcock tells us in his care‐ vision, and an ability to get along with American fully researched study of French foreign policy in officials, secured the creation of the Commissariat the decade following the Liberation. He argues that General du Plan. This agency, insulated from the the statesmen of the Fourth Republic were able to vagaries of day-to-day politics, was charged with craft a reasonably coherent and frequently effec‐ developing a comprehensive scheme for revamp‐ tive national strategy. This was the case despite the ing France's economy. In Hitchcock's view, the H-Net Reviews

Monnet Plan represented the beginning of a "plan‐ which undermined the notion that it was Germany, ning consensus", which emphasized pragmatism and not the USSR, which was the leading threat to and the need for international economic coopera‐ Europe--led to a fundamental change in tactics. tion, and sidestepped ideological disputes and co‐ Not in goals, though; the French remained deter‐ ercion. Such a framework would be adopted in mined to contain German power. policies regarding Europe, too, as the French This would now be done by emphasizing the "worked to shift the terms of debate away from the need for Franco- German cooperation, allowing traditional language of Franco-German conflict Bonn to take its place among the Western ‐ and toward more palatable concepts of rational pean states, but "in a controlled, politically bal‐ planning and integration of economies." (39) anced, and economically liberal environment" (p. But it took a while for the Fourth Republic's 100). Hitchcock shows, however, that this re-orien‐ statesmen to come around to this, and in the inter‐ tation of French policy did not proceed smoothly. im there was a good deal of frustration. Postwar There was a dispute with the British and Ameri‐ France, to put it mildly, was in an unenviable cans over reevaluating the Occupation Statute for diplomatic position. The country was not included Germany, and there was further wrangling over in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, and was the Saar. On the other hand, their new approach viewed with a mixture of pity and contempt by promised the French a leading role in European many officials of the Big Three. The French did, economic reconstruction, and was embraced by however, obtain a zone of occupation in Germany, their American ally. The Fourth Republic's efforts to and sat on the Allied Control Commission. Their seize the initiative on the German question culmi‐ strategy, initiated under de Gaulle but continued nated in the call for the creation of a European for some time thereafter by of the Coal and Steel Community in May 1950. Inspired Mouvement Republicain Populaire, was to ensure by Monnet, but advanced with vigor by the new that a German state could never again threaten foreign , , the plan provid‐ them. The French sought to detach the Rhineland ed economic security in terms of providing for and Ruhr, integrate the Saar into their own econo‐ continued French access to German coal. Even my, permanently limit Germany's industrial ca‐ more importantly, it also mollified the West Ger‐ pacity, and ensure the use of its resources for West‐ mans by making them partners in an internation‐ ern European reconstruction. Such a strategy al endeavor, and reiterated to the Anglo-Ameri‐ brought the Fourth Republic into prolonged dis‐ cans that the Fourth Republic was interested in putes with its "Anglo-Saxon" allies, as growing con‐ constructive solutions. cern about Soviet power convinced the latter that These achievements were soon imperiled by (West) Germany would have to be revived--careful‐ the Korean War, intensifying concerns about Sovi‐ ly. et aggression, and the subsequent debate over It was not only France's allies that questioned West German rearmament. Between 1950 and 's hard-line strategy. On the domestic front, 1952, French politicians adopted a defense policy politicians such as Andre Philip and Leon Blum broadly analogous to that which had led to the (premier for a short time in 1946-47) from the So‐ Schuman Plan, reflecting a continued belief in the cialist party, and officials such as Monnet and "planning consensus" framework. Confronted with Rene Massigli, the ambassador to Britain, also ad‐ demands from their allies to allow the FRG to con‐ vocated a more conciliatory stance. By 1948, these tribute to Western European defense, they initially various pressures, in conjunction with events such sought to shape the agenda and contain West Ger‐ as the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia-- many within a multinational military structure.

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Yet in the following two years, as we have seen, prominent role in the Western Alliance, and a plans for what became known as the European De‐ leading role in the building of a united Europe. fense Community were undone. The story Hitchcock tells is one of creative This was not because, as some contemporary adaptation on the part of French officials to an ini‐ American officials contended, the French were tially unpropitious situation. The basic parameters "wayward, unreflecting [and] illogical."[1] As within which they had to operate, particularly with Hitchcock points out, the country was deeply di‐ reference to , were established in vided over the EDC, and the changed composition Washington in London.[2] Hitchcock himself of parliament after the 1951 elections made the sit‐ clearly recognizes this. He points out, for example, uation even more difficult. Thereafter, French that in 1949 it was Secretary of State Dean Acheson threats of non-ratification, used partly as leverage who encouraged Schuman to cooperate with the in bargaining for more American funds for their British and Americans by eliminating some plans own rearmament, angered Washington. The to dismantle German industry, and by offering the British, for their part, urged approval of the EDC FRG membership in the . Schu‐ but did not want to get too involved in it. And there man later brought these proposals before his col‐ were problems with West Germany. The French leagues to promote the idea of France assuming perceived the FRG as becoming increasingly arro‐ the leading role in European integration. gant, and feared it would use the imbroglio to Thus, while the Fourth Republic's achievement present itself to the Americans as being a more re‐ was impressive, it was also relative. Relative not liable ally than the Fourth Republic. In sum, the only to the decidedly unequal power relationship EDC seemed to be exacerbating, rather than dis‐ with its allies, but also to the achievements of pelling, tensions within the alliance; within the France's erstwhile foe. After all, during the same French foreign ministry, officials became increas‐ period the Bonn Republic also secured an appre‐ ingly convinced that it did not serve the country's ciable increase in clout. If the debate over West interests. These interests, Hitchcock emphasizes, German rearmament was settled in a manner that had not changed, notwithstanding contemporary allayed French fears, the whole process also, in the accusations that the French were being fickle. view of David Clay Large, partly explains why Rather, their leaders had ultimately concluded that "down the line, the FRG, rather than France, be‐ the EDC was not the proper instrument with which came America's most important ally on the Conti‐ to implement their national strategy. nent."[3] No doubt Germany's innate strength, in Following the collapse of the EDC, the British the context of an escalating Cold War, helps to ex‐ played a crucial role in devising a workable solu‐ plain the priority the Americans gave to encourag‐ tion, though it was not implemented without diffi‐ ing Bonn to develop military capability. But West culty. The FRG's rearmament took place within the German policy-makers also advanced their own framework of the Western and agenda to considerable efect. NATO, which it joined in May 1955. By then the Hitchcock's book complements other recent Fourth Republic had become embroiled in a bloody works which challenge the notion that during the and disastrous war to retain , a conflict immediate postwar era French politics was char‐ which would eventually lead to its collapse three acterized by confusion and drift.[4] In some re‐ years later. But despite this ignominious end, spects, the tale he tells is a familiar one. The inno‐ Hitchcock concludes that the regime had its ac‐ vative quality of Schuman's proposal for the Euro‐ complishments, among them ensuring France a pean Coal and Steel Community has long been rec‐ ognized, to give one example.[5] But Hitchcock's

3 H-Net Reviews account is distinctive in a number of ways. He con‐ vincingly highlights, for instance, how the Euro‐ pean policy of Premier Pierre Mendes France was informed by much the same vision as that of Schu‐ man and Bidault, despite Mendes France's reputa‐ tion for being particularly innovative, energetic, and decisive in comparison to most Fourth Repub‐ lic politicians. More generally, the book is impres‐ sively comprehensive, making use of a wide range of sources from French, British, and American ar‐ chives. It is also a pleasure to read. Hitchcock does not avoid complexity, but his book is well-struc‐ tured, and his writing style is clear and lively. All told, this is a solid, perceptive work, sure to be of enduring use to historians of both the early Cold War and contemporary France. Notes [1]. Quoted in Frank Costigliola, "The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance", Diplomatic History 21:2 (1997), 173. [2]. A point made by Melvyn Leffler in "The Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?", American Historical Review 104:2 (1999), 520. [3]. David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, 1996), 268. [4]. See, for example, Richard Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 1945-1951 (Cambridge, 1995). [5]. Among others, by Herbert Luethy, in France Against Herself: The Past, Politics, and Crises of Modern France (Westport, 1955), 382-385. Copyright 2001 by H-Net, all rights reserved. H- Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web lo‐ cation, date of publication, originating list, and H- Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the Reviews editorial staf at [email protected].

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Citation: Sean Kennedy. Review of Hitchcock, William I. France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. June, 2001.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5194

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