Nordic Wittgenstein Studies

Home , Blue and Brown Books, Culture and Value

Volume 1

Series Editor Niklas Forsberg (Uppsala University) Editorial Board Sorin Bangu (University of Bergen) Martin Gustafsson (Åbo Akademi University) Kjell S. Johannessen (University of Bergen) Oskari Kuusela (University of East Anglia) Yrsa Neuman (Åbo Akademi University) Bernt Österman (University of Helsinki) Alois Pichler (University of Bergen) Simo Säättelä (University of Bergen) Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christenssen (University of South Denmark, Odense) Sören Stenlund (University of Uppsala) Thomas Wallgren (University of Helsinki) Cato Wittusen (University of Stavanger) Advisory Board Maija Aalto-Heinilä (University of Eastern Finland) Hanne Appelqvist (University of Turku) Avner Baz (Tufts University) Anat Biletzki (Tel Aviv University and Quinnipiac University) Steen Brock (Aarhus University) Kevin Cahill (University of Bergen) David Cockburn (University of Wales) James Conant (University of Chicago) Cora Diamond (University of Virginia) Alberto Emiliani (University of Helsinki) Juliet Floyd (Boston University) Gottfried Gabriel (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena) Dinda L. Gorlée (The Hague, The Netherlands) Herbert Hrachovec (University of Vienna) Allan Janik (University of Innsbruck) James Klagge (Virginia Tech) Michael Kremer (University of Chicago) Camilla Kronqvist (Åbo Akademi University) D. K. Levy (University of Edinburgh) Denis McManus (University of Southampton) Felix Mühlhölzer (Georg-August Universität Göttingen) Jean-Philippe Narboux (Université Bordeaux Montaigne) Joachim Schulte (Universität Zürich) Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (University of Hertfordshire) Stephen Mulhall (New College, University of Oxford) Antonia Soulez (Université de Paris 8) David G. Stern (University of Iowa) Nuno Venturinha (Nova University of Lisbon) David E. Wellbery (University of Chicago) Edward Witherspoon (Colgate University, New York) The series publishes high-quality studies of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work and philosophy. It is affiliated with The Nordic Wittgenstein Society, The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen and The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki. The series welcomes any first rank study of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, biography or work, and contributions in the subject areas of philosophy and other human and social studies (including philology, linguistics, cognitive science and others) that draw upon Wittgenstein’s work. It also invites studies that demonstrate the philosophical relevance of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass as well as purely philological or literary studies of the Nachlass. “Each submission to the series, if found eligible by the series editor, is peer reviewed by the editorial board and independent experts. The series accepts submissions in English of approximately 80 000 – 125 000 words. For further information (about how to submit a proposal, formatting etc.), please contact: [email protected].

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13863 Beth Savickey

Wittgenstein’s Investigations Awakening the Imagination Beth Savickey Department of Philosophy University of Winnipeg Winnipeg, Canada

Chapter 1 contains Goethe’s poem ‘True Enough’ from Goethe, J. W. 1983. ‘True Enough: To the Physicist (1820)’. Selected Poems. Ed. and Trans. Christopher Middleton. Suhrkamp. Chapter 3 contains excerpts from Mighton, John. 1988. Possible Worlds. Toronto: Playwrights Canada Press. The book contains excerpts from Wittgenstein, L. 1969. The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Wittgenstein, L. 1980. Culture and Value. Eds. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman. Trans. P. Winch. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Wittgenstein, L. 1979 On Certainty. Eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Wittgenstein, L. 2001. Philosophical Investigations, third edition. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; and Wittgenstein, L. 1981. Zettel, second edition. Eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Reproduced with permission of Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the kind permission of The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge. Nordic Wittgenstein Studies ISBN 978-3-319-45308-8 ISBN 978-3-319-45310-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-45310-1

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017931657

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017, corrected publication 2018 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: The cover makes use of Wittgenstein Nachlass MS 115, page 118. The Master and Fellows of Trinity College Cambridge and the University of Bergen have kindly permitted the use of this picture

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland The intellect can speak – it can describe the known world, it can draw logical conclusions. But it cannot create speech for the mute. “The talkers…talking the talk of the beginning and the end” cannot do it; only soul, imagination, music, genius can do it. (Lewis Hyde, The Gift) The original version of the book was revised: A credit line for the cover image has been inserted. The erratum to the book is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45310-1_8 Acknowledgements

It is an academic myth that philosophers work alone, more often in the company of texts than of people. Yet this myth prevails, and it affects not only how we live and work but how we respond to the lives and works of others. Where it is not a myth, it is an indictment against the pressures and weaknesses of contemporary academic life. It is my pleasure and good fortune to begin this book with thanks. My thanks to Karen Haupt for her unfailing insight and assistance, and to Eva Pariser, John Lutz, Mark Mendell, Jill Kreitman, Geoff Lasky, Stephen Manning, Ed Miller, and Nicole Speletic for their collegiality and commitment to teaching. Thanks also to Maithili Schmidt, Glenn Magee, Hoyt Hobbs, and Bob Brier for philosophical and professional opportunities and challenges. Sincerest thanks to Carol Leet, Richard McNabb, Susan Dinan, Jeanie Attie, Sara Gronim, Margaret Boorstein, and Kay Sato for accompanying me through the twilight zone and to Katherine Hill-Miller for her patience and good humour on that journey. I thank Marie McGinn, Katheryn Doran, Bob Haverluck, Mark Rowe, and Alois Pichler for helpful comments on earlier versions of this work and for their generosity of spirit (both personal and philosophical). Thanks, in particular, to Jane Forsey for reading every draft, and for every question and conversation in response. And to all of the students who inspired and participated in these philosophical investigations, my sincerest thanks and very best wishes. And, finally, to my family and friends, thank you for everything that is most important; beyond reason, beyond explanation, beyond measure...

vii Contents

Introduction...... xiii

Part I 1 “I’ll Teach You Differences”...... 3 References...... 18 2 Conceptual Delights...... 21 References...... 38 3 Bursting into Drama...... 41 References...... 57 4 Slips of Paper and Performance Art...... 61 References...... 73

Part II 5 Acts of Confession...... 77 References...... 92 6 Therapeutic Acts...... 95 References...... 116 7 Ungrounded Ways of Acting...... 119 References...... 137 Erratum...... E1

Conclusion: The Living Language...... 139 References...... 147

Index...... 149

ix Abbreviations

AWL Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1932–1935 BB The Blue and Brown Books BT The Big Typescript: TS 213 CV Culture and Value LC Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief LE A Lecture on Ethics LFM Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics LPP Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Psychology 1946–1947 LWL Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1930–1932 LWPP 1 Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I LWPP 2 Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 2 OC On Certainty PG Philosophical Grammar PI Philosophical Investigations PO Philosophical Occasions PPO Private and Public Occasions PR Philosophical Remarks RFGB Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough RFM Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics RPP 1 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1 RPP 2 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 2 TLP Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Z Zettel

References to Wittgenstein’s Nachlass are by MS or TS number followed by the page number.

xi Introduction

The Art of Grammatical Investigation

Wittgenstein’s writings have always elicited a wide variety of responses. Diverse approaches to his texts (both academic and non-academic) highlight distinct aspects of his work and enable us to engage with his philosophy in many different ways. Such diversity attests to the philosophical and aesthetic richness and complexity of his work, and it is cause for celebration, not lament. The focus of this book is on the descriptive, improvisational, and performative aspects of Wittgenstein’s investigations.1 These aspects of his work often go unnoticed and something important is lost as a result. Wittgenstein engages in the art of grammatical investigation, a philosophical and aesthetic practice that expresses a consistent regard for the authenticity of actual, living experience, and a critical view of language itself as a possible means of probing and conveying that experience in all of its particulars.2 In his post- 1929 philosophy, Wittgenstein presents interactive and multi-perspectival texts and improvisational exercises that awaken the imagination and encourage readers to open themselves to the live moment; the moment when meaning is in question.3 Wittgenstein writes that he never invented a line of thinking. Instead, he always took one over from someone else and simply seized upon it with enthusiasm for his

1 Throughout this study, ‘performative’ refers to dramatic or artistic performance. It does not denote an utterance by means of which a speaker performs a particular act (such as ‘I promise’ or ‘I bet’). To perform the actions and speak the words of a given situation is to act it out. This study focuses on Wittgenstein’s post-1929 work. The improvisational and performative nature of his grammatical investigations is present as early as 1929. It is also evident throughout what has come to be known as the middle period (roughly 1930–1936). This study makes no claims about the relationship between his early and later writings; the early, middle, or late periods; or the first, second, or third Wittgenstein. Readers are welcome to draw their own conclusions. 2 These words are borrowed from Stern’s writings on Georg Lichtenberg (1742–1799) (Stern 1959: 153). They apply equally well to the philosophical and aesthetic practices of Johann Nestroy (1801–1882) and Karl Kraus (1874–1936). Both Austrian playwrights were influenced by Lichtenberg and influenced Wittgenstein in turn. 3 These words are a definition of ‘liveliness’ offered to Chris Johnston by Adrian Heathfield, who co-directed the 2004 Live Culture event at the Tate Modern in London: ‘It’s to do with opening oneself to that moment, to the live moment, the moment when meaning is in question. It is the moment when meaning falls apart’ (Johnston 2006: 34). xiii xiv Introduction work of clarification (CV 19e). From Karl Kraus, he adopts and adapts the art of grammatical investigation, an aesthetic, ethical, and philosophical practice rooted in Austrian theatre. Wittgenstein reflects on this art in mottos, forewords, and dedica- tions found throughout the Nachlass.4 Chapter 1 examines these passages, which offer insight into the nature of philosophy and challenge our expectations. Wittgenstein notes that ‘people nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them, poets, musicians, etc., to give them pleasure. The idea that these have something to teach them – that does not occur to them’ (CV 36e). Many of Wittgenstein’s mottos and philosophical motifs are taken from Austrian poetry and theatre. Some are play- ful and humorous, while others are serious and reflective. Wittgenstein claims that the spirit of a book has to be evident in the book itself and cannot be described. However, he places his writings among the works of poets, playwrights, artists, and musicians who challenge the spirit of the main current of European and American civilization. According to Wittgenstein, the spirit of this civilization makes itself manifest in its art, architecture, industry, music, politics, and science. He describes its form as one that builds ever more complicated structures and attempts to grasp the world by way of its periphery or in its variety. By contrast, Wittgenstein attempts to grasp the world at its centre or in its essence. He describes the form of his writings as one in which each sentence is try- ing to say the whole thing (i.e. the same thing) over and over again: ‘It is as though they were all simply views of one object seen from different angles’ (CV 7e). He suggests that philosophy ought to be written as a form of poetic composition. Perloff describes this Wittgensteinian poetics as revisionary and notes that his philosophy dramatizes the process of working through particular questions in order to test what can and cannot be said about literary forms, concepts, and facts of life (Perloff 1996: 3). Wittgenstein’s philosophy develops in breadth and depth as he works through these philosophical and aesthetic questions, and we face the following questions in response: Do Wittgenstein’s texts create movement or stupor? Do we become active or passive in response? And do they increase or decrease our intellectual and creative freedom?5 Wittgenstein’s art of grammatical investigation is descriptive. He writes that we must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its purpose from our philosophical problems (PI 109).6 Winch acknowledges that one of the difficulties inherent in the later works concerns what sort of description Wittgenstein is aiming at in philosophy (Winch 1998: 192). Chapter 2 examines the role and complexity of description in his work. He compares descriptions to pictures but asks us to think of a machine drawing, a cross section, or an elevation with measurements that an engineer has before him. In other words,

4 Throughout this study, quotations are taken from Wittgenstein’s posthumous publications (and supplemented with direct references to the Nachlass) for the purpose of accessibility and recognition. 5 These are questions that Berger asks of early Cubist paintings (Berger 1969). 6 For further references, see BB 125, PG 66, PI 126, PI 129, and PI 496; AWL 96-7; RPP 1 633; LWPP 1 121; Z 313-14; and BT 69e. Introduction xv descriptions are working drawings or instruments for particular purposes. Wittgenstein cautions against thinking of a description as a word picture of the facts, for we tend only to think of pictures that hang on walls and portray how things look (these pictures are, as it were, too idle) (PI 291). Thus, like many early twentieth century artists, Wittgenstein seeks a dynamic form of representation (PG 100). As he moves from the Tractatus to the Investigations, philosophy is no longer laid down in propositions but in a language (BT 425). His use of grammar is similar to the early Cubist use of geometry. Geometry and grammar both describe complex forms of life or ways of acting. When carefully viewed, these descriptions burst into drama. Clarity of form is sought in order to present a multi-perspectival or multi- aspectival view of a scene, and this clarity is as philosophically complex as its sub- jects and materials are deliberately modest. Wittgenstein and the early Cubists present dynamic or moving pictures by representing an object or scene from differ- ing viewpoints simultaneously. What is described is never static or assumed to be complete in itself. Both forms of art involve conceptual representation and emphasize creativity and imagination rather than imitation or reproduction. Consequently, our relationship to Wittgenstein’s texts (and Cubist paintings) is not a given. We must become participants, not merely spectators. What are given are the texts (or paintings) themselves in the form in which we now have them, and we must find ourselves in relation to them. As Kerr writes of §1 of the Investigations: ‘Wittgenstein has no more to show us: we might as well stop reading at this point if we want only to hear the result of his work. For most readers, however, it would be premature to go no further’ (Kerr 1989: 50). If we keep reading, we search not for an explanation but for an understanding of what we have read (returning again and again to §1). In the art of grammatical investigation, clarification offers insight not information. The affinity between Wittgenstein’s later writings and early Cubist paintings lies in a common set of aesthetic problems and a shared attempt to alter our way of seeing. Wittgenstein’s multi-perspectival texts present complex two-dimensional grammatical pictures, but his art of grammatical investigation also encourages us to perform or enact improvisational scenes. In other words, written descriptions come off the page through the presentation of words and the actions into which they are woven. True to their cultural roots, Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations are improvisational and performative. Throughout his manuscripts, typescripts, and lectures from the mid-1920s until the early 1950s, static pictures and models give way to language games and participatory exercises.7 Chapter 3 examines the improvisational and performative nature of grammatical investigation. In contrast to pictures that hang on walls and portray how things look, improvisational exercises are dynamic and multidimensional presentations of the use of language. Not only does Wittgenstein incorporate theatre references into his grammatical remarks, but he also equates imagining with playing a part, acting out a role, or portraying a concept

7 The term ‘language game’ is not hyphenated throughout this study, in order to highlight the fact that such exercises are games played with language. This is consistent with Wittgenstein’s use of the expression and the early posthumous publications of his lectures and dictations. xvi Introduction in a play. He repeatedly asks us to imagine real and fictitious scenes. For example, the opening of the Investigations presents numerous improvisational exercises. §1 begins with a shopping example and is followed by the language game of the build- ers. These remarks set the scene for the investigations that follow. The detail and specificity characteristic of improvisational choices is evident throughout Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Improvisational exercises are also inherently interactive. At their best, they offer the pleasure and delight of philosophical play. Wittgenstein’s descriptive pictures and improvisational exercises demonstrate that the art of grammatical investigation is both creative and procreative. As Hyde recognizes, ‘the greatest art offers us images by which to imagine our lives. And once the imagination has been awakened it is procreative, through it we can give more than we were given, say more than we had to say’ (Hyde 1983: 193). Description and improvisation can take many different forms: ‘Think how many different kinds of thing are called ‘description’: description of a body’s position by means of its co-ordinates; description of a facial expression; description of a sensa- tion of touch; of a mood’ (PI 24). Chapter 4 presents a contemporary example of grammatical investigation; the performance art of J. S. G. Boggs. Boggs is an artist who exchanges drawings of money for goods and services. In so doing, he plays out a comparison Wittgenstein draws between words and money. He also demonstrates the latter’s method of using pictures and improvisation. Boggs’ madcap, Socratic, econo-philosophical chase demonstrates the complexity and detail involved in the description of money and, analogously, the description of words (Weschler 1999: 52). As an example of grammatical investigation, his performance art raises important questions about meaning. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that ‘for a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (PI 43). This remark has given rise to the slogan ‘meaning is use’ and various use theories of meaning. However, the simplicity of the slogan and the resulting theories and explanations fail to capture the complexity of the task at hand; that of describing the use of words. Boggs’ drawings and performance art reveal the detail, complexity, and diversity of form inherent in the art of grammatical investigation. In turn, Wittgenstein’s philosophy helps clarify Boggs’ transactions, for both are creative and complex conceptual investigations. The descriptive, improvisational, and performative dimensions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy draw attention to several other neglected aspects of his work. The first is its humour and playfulness. His grammatical remarks and improvisational exercises are funny and engaging. There are remarks that contain jokes and comedic improvisational exercises.8 A second neglected aspect is the collaborative nature of grammatical investigation. Doing philosophy, like speaking a language, is not a solitary act. This affects not only our own philosophical practices but our response to others. In the art of grammatical investigation, criticism becomes a creative contribution to

8 This is consistent with his remark that the depth of philosophy is the depth of a grammatical joke (PI 111). Introduction xvii the original act, not a form of adversarial confrontation. And, finally, a third under- appreciated aspect of his work is the role and importance of imagination. The descriptive, improvisational, and performative aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy often become distorted under the pressure of theory and argumentation. Part II of this study examines three influential and enduring interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Like the reading presented in Part I, all three draw attention to philosophical acts. However, these acts are interpreted as confessional, therapeutic, or the articulation of a commonsense view of the world. (All three readings attempt to return us to ordinary, everyday activities.) As a result, description is replaced by explanation and theory, and public acts are presented as personal or private. Significantly, all three interpretations call into question the practice of philosophy itself. However, nothing stands in starker contrast to the tone, form, and content of Wittgenstein’s philosophical practices. When the art of grammatical investigation is not understood as expressing a deep regard for the authenticity of actual, living experience, philosophy becomes confessional. When a critical view of language as a possible means of probing that experience is not understood as improvisational, philosophy becomes therapeutic. And when a critical view of language as a possible means of conveying that experience is not understood as performative, philosophy becomes the articulation of a commonsense view of the world. Part II of this study examines each of these interpretations in turn. Based on the quotation from Augustine’s Confessions in the opening remark of the Investigations, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is often interpreted as confessional. Public interaction is replaced by private, inner dialogue. Philosophical temptation is understood as a personal inclination to illusion or emptiness, rather than material for collaborative investigation. Such inclination is characterized as the willful sepa- ration of words from the contexts in which they have meaning, one that requires self-interrogation and self-knowledge. Consequently, the aim of philosophy is to bring temptation (and philosophy itself) to an end. However, Wittgenstein’s response to Augustine, and his investigation of the nature of confession itself, challenges such an interpretation. Chapter 5 examines the complexity and subtlety of Wittgenstein’s response to Augustine; a response that helps clarify his place within the philosophical tradition as well as the nature of grammatical investigation. Wittgenstein effectively alters the practice of adversarial criticism by asking us to imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. (And so begin our improvisational exercises.) He also emphasized that confession is a public act, thereby challenging the focus placed on private, inner acts. A second pervasive and enduring reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy interprets grammatical investigation as therapeutic. Chapter 6 examines three standard therapeutic readings. The first compares Wittgenstein’s philosophy to psychoanalysis and the second to therapy (generally), and the third presents philosophy as an illness or as the cause of illness. In other words, therapeutic readings present philosophy as an intellectual or mental illness, or as the treatment of such illness. In all three cases, the aim of philosophy is to bring illness (and philosophy itself) to an end. There is little evidence to support early claims that Wittgenstein’s philosophy was psychoanalysis (or even a kind of psychoanalysis), and he publicly disavowed such xviii Introduction claims in the early 1930s. Further, while Wittgenstein compares specific philosophical methods (or grammatical techniques) to different therapies, Rhees confirms that it is to the problems at hand, not to the person raising them, that such metaphors and methods were applied (Rhees 1967: 77–8). Upon examination, the numerous and varied metaphors used to support therapeutic interpretations are open-ended; they are not only (or necessarily) linked to therapy. Further, the philosophy and therapy analogy is itself only one of many analogies found in Wittgenstein’s writings. It is not the only analogy in his work or of his work, nor is it necessarily the most important. Contrary to therapeutic interpretations, Wittgenstein does not describe philosophy as an intellectual or mental illness (or as the cause of illness), nor does he describe philosophical problems as symptomatic of such illness. He also recognizes that illness metaphors were used extensively during the 1920s and 1930s by philosophers, politicians, journalists, and scientists. These metaphors carried with them negative connotations and associations, and it is possible that Wittgenstein’s references to philosophy and therapy decrease after 1931 because of the growing use of such dangerous phrases. Therapeutic interpretations also focus on the individual, isolating the philosopher from others. Such acts more closely resemble confession than collaborative investigation. Thus, this analogy raises important questions about the role of philosophers and the significance of philosophical acts. We can conclude, following Wittgenstein, that therapeutic readings comparing philosophy to psychoanalysis (or therapy generally) are inaccurate representations of his views, while those that describe philosophy as an illness (or as the cause of illness) clearly con- tradict them. And finally, when Wittgenstein writes that we must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place, he is often read as articulating a commonsense view of the world; a view that returns us to ordinary, everyday (ungrounded) activities. No twentieth century philosopher is further from a commonsense view of the world, and yet no philosopher comes into less conflict with common sense than Wittgenstein. It is important to get a clear view of this paradox in order to appreciate the complexity and subtlety of his grammatical art. Chapter 7 examines Wittgenstein’s response to Moore’s defence of common sense in On Certainty. He challenges Moore’s propositional claims with grammatical investigations that emphasize ways of acting. These writings are often read as if Wittgenstein were caught up in relatively straightforward classical philosophical concerns. In other words, his remarks are interpreted as a response to conventional debates concerning scepticism and common sense. However, Wittgenstein questions and challenges the terms of the debate itself. He attempts to shift the focus from questions of truth to questions of meaning. Throughout his writings, Wittgenstein challenges the concept of common sense. He recognizes that appeals to common sense often represent failures of the imagination, and he claims that there is no commonsense answer to a philosophical problem (BB 58). According to Wittgenstein, philosophy neither begins nor ends with common sense (although they may co-exist). Thus, ‘one can defend common sense against the attacks of philosophers only by solving their puzzle, i.e. by curing them Introduction xix of the temptation to attack common sense, not by reiterating the views of common sense’ (BB 58–9). He also advises that we should not try to avoid philosophical problems by appealing to common sense; instead we should present these problems as they arise with most power (AWL 109). This involves the imaginative description of ways of acting. When Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a particular case, context, or circumstance for the use of a word, he is not asking us to provide grounds or explanations but to describe or enact the use of language. He compares what is cer- tain, or what stands fast for us, to the axis around which a body rotates. The axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it deter- mines its immobility (OC 152). Thus, the need to rotate the axis of reference of our examination involves the dynamic description of language, not the repetition of a commonsense view of the world (PI 108). The confessional, therapeutic, and commonsense interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy do not take into consideration the descriptive, improvisational, and performative aspects of grammatical investigation. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, they each (in their own way) present a general state of affairs (PI 104). Particular and diverse investigations are reduced to one kind of act. These interpretations not only misrepresent particular and diverse practices but obscure the extraordinary range of remarks in which Wittgenstein presents and explores them. For example, in a delightful collection of remarks, he compares philosophy to gardening. Although difficult to reconcile with general confessional, therapeutic, or commonsense interpretations, his gardening metaphors are consistent with the reading presented in Part I, as well as the particular remarks on which the interpretations of Part II are based. 9 The conclusion of this study presents a brief overview of Wittgenstein’s gardening metaphors. Although deeply rooted in the philosophical tradition, the analogy between philosophy and gardening challenges us to see the practice of philosophy in a new light. Alluding to remarks from Socrates to Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein’s gardening metaphors celebrate the richness, diversity, and beauty of language and life. This analogy, with its emphasis on activity and creativity (or creation), challenges numerous negative connotations associated with his work, including the claim that his writings attempt to bring philosophy to an end. Rather, Wittgenstein’s art of grammatical investigation awakens the imagination and offers the promise of new beginnings.

References

Berger, J. (1969). The moment of Cubism and other essays. New York: Pantheon Books. Hyde, L. (1983). The gift: Imagination and the erotic life of property. New York: Vintage Books. Johnston, C. (2006). The improvisation game. London: Nick Hern Books. Kerr, F. (1989). Theology after Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

9 Wittgenstein’s gardening remarks occur more frequently than his well-known remarks on confession, therapy and common sense. xx Introduction

Moore, G. E. (1959). A defence of common sense. In: Philosophical papers (pp. 32–59). New York: The Macmillan Company. Perloff, M. (1996). Wittgenstein’s ladder: Poetic language and the strangeness of the ordinary. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Stern, J. P. (1959). Lichtenberg: A doctrine of scattered occasions. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Weschler, L. (1999). A contest of values. The New Yorker, May 10, pp. 52–55. Winch, P. (1998). Judgment: Propositions and practices. Philosophical Investigations, 21(3), 189–202. Wittgenstein, L. (1969). The blue and brown books: Preliminary studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1979). On certainty (Eds. G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Trans. D. Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1980). Culture and value (Eds. G. H. von Wright & H. Nyman, Trans. P. Winch). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1980). Remarks on the philosophy of psychology (Vol. 1, Eds. G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1981). Zettel (2nd ed., G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Eds., G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1982). Last writings on the philosophy of psychology (Ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & H. Nyman, Trans. C. G. Luckhardt & M. A. E. Aue). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1982). Wittgenstein’s lectures: Cambridge 1932–35 (Ed. A. Ambrose). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1984). Philosophical grammar (Ed. R. Rhees, Trans. A. Kenny). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (2000). Nachlass. The Bergen Electronic Edition. Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. Bergen: Oxford University Press, The University of Bergen, and The Wittgenstein Trustees. Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Philosophical investigations (3rd edn., G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (2013). The big typescript TS 213 (Eds. C. G. Luckhardt & M. A. E. Aue, Trans. C. G. Luckhardt & M. A. E. Aue). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.