On the Making of Von Wright and Wittgenstein’S Culture and Value
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Rethinking Fideism Through the Lens of Wittgenstein's Engineering Outlook
University of Dayton eCommons Religious Studies Faculty Publications Department of Religious Studies 2012 Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook Brad Kallenberg University of Dayton, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, Christianity Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Other Religion Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons eCommons Citation Kallenberg, Brad, "Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook" (2012). Religious Studies Faculty Publications. 82. https://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub/82 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Religious Studies at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Religious Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Note: This is the accepted manuscript for the following article: Kallenberg, Brad J. “Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71, no. 1 (2012): 55-73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9327-0 Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook Brad J. Kallenberg University of Dayton, 2011 In an otherwise superbly edited compilation of student notes from Wittgenstein’s 1939 Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cora Diamond makes an false step that reveals to us our own tendencies to misread Wittgenstein. The student notes she collated attributed the following remark to a student named Watson: “The point is that these [data] tables do not by themselves determine that one builds the bridge in this way: only the tables together with certain scientific theory determine that.”1 But Diamond thinks this a mistake, presuming instead to change the manuscript and put these words into the mouth of Wittgenstein. -
David Suchoff Family Resemblances: Ludwig Wittgenstein As a Jewish Philosopher the Admonition to Silence with Which Wittgenstein
David Suchoff Family Resemblances: Ludwig Wittgenstein as a Jewish Philosopher The admonition to silence with which Wittgenstein ended the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) also marks the starting point for the emer- gence of his Jewish philosophical voice. Karl Kraus provides an instructive contrast: as a writer well known to Wittgenstein, Kraus’s outspoken and aggressive ridicule of “jüdeln” or “mauscheln” –the actual or alleged pronunciation of German with a Jewish or Yiddish accent – defined a “self-fashioning” of Jewish identity – from German and Hebrew in this case – that modeled false alternatives in philosophic terms.1 Kraus pre- sented Wittgenstein with an either-or choice between German and Jewish identity, while engaging in a witty but also unwitting illumination of the interplay between apparently exclusive alternatives that were linguistically influenced by the other’s voice. As Kraus became a touchstone for Ger- man Jewish writers from Franz Kafka to Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, he also shed light on the situation that allowed Wittgenstein to develop his own non-essentialist notion of identity, as the term “family resemblance” emerged from his revaluation of the discourse around Judaism. This transition from The False Prison, as David Pears calls Wittgenstein’s move from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investiga- tions, was also a transformation of the opposition between German and Jewish “identities,” and a recovery of the multiple differences from which such apparently stable entities continually draw in their interconnected forms of life.2 “I’ll teach you differences,” the line from King Lear that Wittgenstein mentioned to M. O’C. Drury as “not bad” as a “motto” for the Philo- sophical Investigations, in this way represents Wittgenstein’s assertion of a German Jewish philosophic position. -
What Calvin and Wittgenstein Had Against Images
Works Cited Green, Mitchell S., and John Williams, eds. Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford: Baker, Gordon P., and P. M. S. Hacker. An Analytical Commentary Clarendon Press, 2007. on the Philosophical Investigations. 4 vols. Chicago - Oxford: Jenkins, Keith, ed. The Postmodern History Reader. London - New University of Chicago Press - Blackwell Publishers, 1980- York: Routledge, 1997. 1996. Kerr, Fergus. Theology after Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. Bloor, David. Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge. New York: Malcolm, Norman. Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? Ed. with Columbia University Press, 1983. a response by Peter Winch. London: Routledge, 1993. Bonnell, Victoria E., and Lynn Avery Hunt, eds. Beyond the McGinn, Marie. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture. Philosophical Investigations. London - New York: Routledge, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 1997. Bouwsma, O. K. Wittgenstein: Conversations, 1949-1951. Ed. J. L. McGrath, Alister. A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986. Western Culture. Oxford - Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Battles, Ford Lewis. Trans. Institutes of the Christian Religion, by Blackwell, 1990. John Calvin. Ed. John T. McNeill. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Monk, Ray. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. The Westminster Press, 1960. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991. Crary, Alice Marguerite, and Rupert J. Read, eds. The New Morse, Christopher. "Raising God's Eyebrows: Some Further Wittgenstein. London - New York: Routledge, 2000. Thoughts on the Concept of the analogia fidei." Union Crary, Alice Marguerite. "Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Relation to Seminary Quarterly Review, 37 (1981-1982): 39-49. -
Wittgenstein in Exile
Wittgenstein in Exile “My thoughts are one hundred per cent Hebraic.” -Wittgenstein to Drury, 19491 Wittgenstein was born in 1889 into one of the richest families in Central Europe. He lived and learned at home, in Vienna, until 1903, when he was 14. We have no record of his thoughts about the turn of the last century, but it is unlikely that it seemed very significant to him. The Viennese of the time had little inclination to consider the possibilities of change, and the over-ripe era in which Wittgenstein grew up did not really end until Austria-Hungary’s defeat, in World War I, and subsequent dismantling. But the family in which Wittgenstein grew up apparently felt that European culture had already come to an end in the 1840’s. And Wittgenstein himself felt he belonged to an era that had vanished with the death of the composer Robert Schumann (1810-1856).2 Somewhere in the middle of the Nineteenth Century there was an important change into the contemporary era, of which Wittgenstein did not feel a part. Wittgenstein’s understanding of history, and his consequent self-understanding in relation to his times, was deeply influenced by Oswald Spengler, who in 1918 published The Decline of the West [Der Untergang des Abenlandes]. This book, expanded to a second volume in 1922, and revised in 1923, became a best-seller in post-war Europe. Wittgenstein made numerous references to it in 1930-1931, and acknowledged Spengler as one of his ten noteworthy influences.3 According to Spengler, cultures grow, flower, and deteriorate naturally, according to their own internal form, much as a human being does. -
Dialogical Grammar: Varieties of Dialogue in Wittgenstein's
ISSN: 2325-3290 (online) Dialogical Grammar: Varieties of Dialogue in Wittgenstein’s Methodology Dorit Lemberger Bar-Ilan university Abstract The dialogical character of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations has received scant attention in the literature, given the work’s status in his total oeuvre, and is dismissed as a marginal as compared to the other differences between the Tractatus and the Investigations. The main lines of interpretation that have been proposed see dialogue as a rhetorical technique intended to present erroneous positions and then refute them, as an exemplification of what can be expressed in language (McGinn 1997; Rhees 1998), or as a reflection of Wittgenstein’s informal teaching method (Malcolm 2001; Savickey et al. 1990). The present article adopts the perspective that Wittgenstein’s use of dialogue makes it possible to track the various modes of language-acts, consonant with his directions to examine the daily use of language (Wittgenstein 2009, §116 and esp. §132), “when language is, as it were, idling.” In his later inquiries, Wittgenstein frequently considers the nature of mental states, accompanied by an attempt to characterize the differences between them while at the same time dealing with the cases in which it is difficult to distinguish them. In this process he made a variety of uses of dialogue, each of which embodies a different aspect of language action. Subsequently I will demonstrate that these different uses are not haphazard. A scrutiny of the nature of the dialogue can help us understand the nature of the activity carried out of the state of consciousness. Finally, I propose a distinction among three main types of dialogue: technical, conversational, and reflexive. -
Stellar 08 Cover Page
Stellar Undergraduate Research Journal Oklahoma City University Volume 2, 2008 Stellar Oklahoma City University’s Undergraduate Research Journal Inside are 2007-08 research papers spanning the disciplines at OCU, including criminology, English, economics, music, philosophy, political science, and psychology, representing the exceptional undergraduate research happening at Oklahoma City University. Editor-in-Chief: Gina Jennings Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Terry Phelps Stellar is published annually by Oklahoma City University. Opinions and beliefs herein do not necessarily reflect those of the university. Submissions are accepted from undergraduate students. Address all correspondence to: Stellar c/o The Learning Enhancement Center, 2501 N. Blackwelder Ave., Oklahoma City, OK 73106. All submissions are subject to editing. 2 Contents Because I Do Not Hope to Turn Again:T.S. Eliot as the First Confessional Poet Kristin May……………………………………………………………3 Who Goes First Does Matter Unless No One Goes First: Personal Dyadic Space and Order Amy D. Simpson and Stacie Abla………….………………………...11 The Relationship Between Black Farmers and the United States Department of Agriculture Zachary L. Newland…..........................................................................19 Don’t Be Afraid of the Ball! Wittgenstein on Knowledge of Other Minds Jacob Coleman......................................................................................28 The Effects of Culture, Gender, and Recipient of Money on Moral Comfort Dashala Cubit, Lacey Novinska, and Danny Gering…………………39 -
Rush Rhees on Philosophy and Religious Discourse
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Asbury Theological Seminary Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 18 Issue 4 Article 3 10-1-2001 Rush Rhees on Philosophy and Religious Discourse Lars Hertzberg Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Hertzberg, Lars (2001) "Rush Rhees on Philosophy and Religious Discourse," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 18 : Iss. 4 , Article 3. Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol18/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. RUSH RHEES ON PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE Lars Hertzberg Rush Rhees is primarily known as an expOlmder ofWittgenstein's philosophy. However, his depth and originality as a thinker is increasingly recognized, largely due to the posthumous publication of his Nachlass. In this essay, char acteristic features of Rhees's philosophical style and method are conveyed through comparing and contrasting them with those of Wittgenstein. Rhees, it is found, is more of a dialogical thinker than Wittgenstein. His most distinctive contributions to philosophy were concerned with language and religion. Rhees's views on the unity of language are compared with those of Wittgenstein, and in conclusion Rhees's thinking about religion is presented through a close reading of one of his essays on that topic. -
I Am in Training: Wittgenstein on Language Acquisition Megan J
150 Wittgenstein on Language Acquisition I Am in Training: Wittgenstein on Language Acquisition Megan J. Laverty Teachers College, Columbia University Norm Friesen’s analysis of Wittgenstein as a tragic philosopher of education draws upon an understanding of Wittgenstein’s German influences: Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Karl Kraus, Alfred Loos, Otto Wininger, and Oswald Spengler. According to Friesen, these influences share “a dark view of the world and our place within it,” which inspired Wittgenstein’s deeply pessimistic philosophy of education. Friesen argues that Wittgenstein deliberately brings the experience of learning a language into relation with the way “we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things” in order to highlight that the process of becom- ing a cultured or “conventionalized” being — otherwise known as humanization — necessarily entails “renunciation and brutality.” Friesen may be right that En- glish-speaking philosophers of education have failed to appreciate the full force of Wittgenstein on Abrichtung — the breaking in of an animal by means of obedience training or dressage — but he does not go all the way to establishing that Abrichtung is characteristically brutal and harsh. Wittgenstein uses the word Abrichtung to describe language learning and ed- ucation. As Wolfgang Huemer explains, in German the term is “exclusively used for animals, for training dogs to sit down on the command ‘sit,’ or horses to gallop when the rider performs a certain bodily movement.”1 Thus, to German speakers, Wittgenstein’s suggestion that “we have to abrichten our children” seems quite drastic; it implies that children are animals. According to Friesen, English-speaking philos- ophers of education are inclined to explain away Wittgenstein’s reliance upon the term, and so make his philosophy of education appear far more progressive than it is. -
Linguistic Scepticism in Mauthner's Philosophy
LiberaPisano Misunderstanding Metaphors: Linguistic ScepticisminMauthner’s Philosophy Nous sommes tous dans un désert. Personne ne comprend personne. Gustave Flaubert¹ This essayisanoverview of Fritz Mauthner’slinguistic scepticism, which, in my view, represents apowerful hermeneutic category of philosophical doubts about the com- municative,epistemological, and ontological value of language. In order to shed light on the main features of Mauthner’sthought, Idrawattention to his long-stand- ing dialogue with both the sceptical tradition and philosophyoflanguage. This con- tribution has nine short sections: the first has an introductory function and illus- tratesseveral aspectsoflinguistic scepticism in the history of philosophy; the second offers acontextualisation of Mauthner’sphilosophyoflanguage; the remain- der present abroad examination of the main features of Mauthner’sthought as fol- lows: the impossibility of knowledge that stems from aradicalisationofempiricism; the coincidencebetween wordand thought,thinkingand speaking;the notion of use, the relevanceoflinguistic habits,and the utopia of communication; the decep- tive metaphors at the root of an epoché of meaning;the new task of philosophyasan exercise of liberation against the limits of language; the controversial relationship between Judaism and scepticism; and the mystical silence as an extreme conse- quence of his thought.² Mauthnerturns scepticism into aform of life and philosophy into acritique of language, and he inauguratesanew approach that is traceable in manyGerman—Jewish -
Anti-Metaphysics: 1. Agnosticism (Qv). 2. Logical Positivism (See Scientific Empiricism (1))
Anti-metaphysics: 1. Agnosticism (q.v.). 2. Logical Positivism (see Scientific Empiricism (1)) holds that those metaphysical statements which are not confirmable by experiences (see Verification 4, 5) have no cognitive meaning and hence are pseudo-statements (see Meaning, Kinds of, 1, 5). — R.C. Basic Sentences, Protocol Sentences: Sentences formulating the result of observations or perceptions or other experiences, furnishing the basis for empirical verification or confirmation (see Verification). Some philosophers take sentences concerning observable properties of physical things as basic sentences, others take sentences concerning sense-data or perceptions. The sentences of the latter kind are regarded by some philosophers as completely verifiable, while others believe that all factual sentences can be confirmed only to some degree. See Scientific Empiricism. — R.C. Formal: l. In the traditional use: valid independently of the specific subject-matter; having a merely logical meaning (see Meaning, Kinds of, 3). 2. Narrower sense, in modern logic: independent of, without reference to meaning (compare Semiotic, 3). — R.C. Intersubjective: Used and understood by, or valid for different subjects. Especially, i. lan- guage, i. concepts, i. knowledge, i. confirmability (see Verification). The i. character of science is especially emphasized by Scientific Empiricism (g. v., 1 C). —R.C. Meaning, Kinds of: In semiotic (q. v.) several kinds of meaning, i.e. of the function of an expression in language and the content it conveys, are distinguished. 1. An expression (sen- tence) has cognitive (or theoretical, assertive) meaning, if it asserts something and hence is either true or false. In this case, it is called a cognitive sentence or (cognitive, genuine) statement; it has usually the form of a declarative sentence. -
The Aesthetic Turn
MARK C. TAYLOR The aesthetic turn his paper considers alternative styles of philoso- because it suggests that there is nothing outside or phy, based on art or science, through an investi- beyond style. Art and style, in turn, are inseparable – Tgation of Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger. there is no art without style and no style without art. Carnap’s criticism of Heidegger’s account of das Nichts The distinction, I am suggesting, is not hard-and-fast. is analysed in relation to Immanuel Kant’s theory of Just as there is a religious dimension to all culture, so the imagination. Heidegger’s account of the work of there is an artistic dimension to all creative thinking; art demonstrates philosophies that take science as and just as religion is often most significant where it is their model, over-emphasize cognition, and do not ad- least obvious, so style is often most influential where equately consider the importance of apprehension. it remains unnoticed, and often denied. The choice, then, is not between style and non-style but between a style that represses its artistic and aesthetic aspects, In 1946, Paul Tillich published a seminal essay and a style that explicitly expresses them. In order to entitled ‘The two types of philosophy of religion’ in explore the differences between these two alterna- which he maintained that every philosophy of reli- tives, I begin by examining the debate between two gion developed in the Christian tradition takes one philosophers whose work has played a crucial role of two forms. While Alfred North Whitehead once in framing the debate for almost a century: Rudolf suggested that everyone is born either a Platonist or Carnap and Martin Heidegger. -
Realismus – Relativismus – Konstruktivismus Realism – Relativism – Constructivism
Realismus – Relativismus – Konstruktivismus Realism – Relativism – Constructivism Programm des 38. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums 9. – 15. August 2015 Kirchberg am Wechsel Program of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 9 – 15, 2015 Kirchberg am Wechsel Für aktuelle Programmänderungen beachten Sie bitte die Aushänge oder siehe: http://www.alws.at/program_2015.pdf. www.alws.at Program subject to change, for updates please refer to the postings or go to: http://www.alws.at/program_2015.pdf. Wir danken folgenden Institutionen und Personen für die finanzielle Unterstützung des Symposiums: We thank the following institutions and persons for their financial support of the symposium: Landeshauptmann von Niederösterreich Dr. Erwin Pröll Amt der NÖ Landesregierung, Abteilung Wissenschaft und Forschung Hofrat Dr. Joachim Rössl Mag. Paul Pennerstorfer Mag. Georg Pejrimovsky Mag. Matthias Kafka Marktgemeinde Kirchberg am Wechsel Bürgermeister DI Dr. Willibald Fuchs Gemeinde Trattenbach Bürgermeister Johannes Hennerfeind Raiffeisenbank NÖ-Alpin Direktor Johannes Pepelnik Leader Region Bucklige Welt-Wechselland Leader-Manager Franz Piribauer Kurdirektorin Maria Haarhofer Sound Art Service, Stefan Schlögl Gasthof Grüner Baum, Kirchberg am Wechsel Gasthof St. Wolfgang, Kirchberg am Wechsel Gasthof zur 1000-jährigen Linde, Kirchberg am Wechsel Familie Hennrich Taxi – Autobusunternehmen Karl Mayerhofer Kleinbusunternehmen Ingrid Fahrner Impressum: Eigentümer, Verleger und Herausgeber: Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Redaktion des Programms: Christian Kanzian, Josef Mitterer, Katharina Neges. Visuelle Gestaltung: Sascha Windholz. Druck: Eigner Druck; 3040 Neulengbach. Beiträge, Abstrakta-Heft und Programm wurden mit Hilfe eines von Joseph Wang, Universität Innsbruck, erarbeiteten Datenbankprogramms erstellt. Kontakt: [email protected] Papers, book of abstracts and program were produced using a database application developed by Joseph Wang, University of Innsbruck, Austria.