Wittgenstein in Exile
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Rethinking Fideism Through the Lens of Wittgenstein's Engineering Outlook
University of Dayton eCommons Religious Studies Faculty Publications Department of Religious Studies 2012 Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook Brad Kallenberg University of Dayton, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, Christianity Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Other Religion Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons eCommons Citation Kallenberg, Brad, "Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook" (2012). Religious Studies Faculty Publications. 82. https://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub/82 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Religious Studies at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Religious Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Note: This is the accepted manuscript for the following article: Kallenberg, Brad J. “Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71, no. 1 (2012): 55-73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9327-0 Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook Brad J. Kallenberg University of Dayton, 2011 In an otherwise superbly edited compilation of student notes from Wittgenstein’s 1939 Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cora Diamond makes an false step that reveals to us our own tendencies to misread Wittgenstein. The student notes she collated attributed the following remark to a student named Watson: “The point is that these [data] tables do not by themselves determine that one builds the bridge in this way: only the tables together with certain scientific theory determine that.”1 But Diamond thinks this a mistake, presuming instead to change the manuscript and put these words into the mouth of Wittgenstein. -
BWS Newsletter No 18 24/11/2015, 20:45
BWS Newsletter no 18 24/11/2015, 20:45 From: British Wittgenstein Society [[email protected]] Subject: Newsletter no.18 BWS website home August 2013 BWS Newsletter Issue no 18 Contents Nota Bene The Wittgenstein-Skinner Archive Pdf version (216 kb) Nota Bene Arthur Gibson on Wittgenstein’s Conferences rediscovered archive Around the world Wittgenstein postings In early October 1941 German bombers Lecture series attacked Oakington RAF base. Victims Pastures new were rushed to hospital in Cambridge. Housekeeping The only slightly later admission of a Executive Committee polio patient was unnoticed, by-passed, being left untreated for very many hours in a corridor. This is how Wittgenstein’s closest friend Francis Skinner came to die at the age of 29. About BWS Within the week of Skinner’s funeral, in a state of trauma, Ludwig attempted to resign his Philosophy Chair; arranged to leave Cambridge for Guy’s Hospital working to fulfil his, now memorial, plan with Francis; attended Francis’ funeral; reclaimed from Skinner’s family the Wittgenstein- BWS is a British focal point for research and exchange Skinner Archive, and posted them to Skinner’s school of ideas among Wittgenstein scholars and students friend, Reuben Goodstein. Eventually Goodstein gave the throughout the world. Archive to the Mathematical Association. It was a much- appreciated invitation from the Association (and full This Newsletter will be sent exclusively to members of acknowledgement to it in references here), with the the BWS, on a regular basis, in order to draw attention support of Trinity College, for me to research and prepare to updates on the website, or to share as yet unpublished this unpublished Archive for book publication. -
A REDUCTIVE READING of the TRACTATUS Interpretation of the Book Being About How to Defeat Skepticism
2015 Umeå University, Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies Stefan Karlsson Supervisor: Andreas Stokke Examinor: Peter Melander Level: Bachelor’s thesis A REDUCTIVE READING OF THE TRACTATUS Interpretation of the book being about how to defeat skepticism. Content Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 5 Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 6 Traditional readings ................................................................................................................................. 7 Meta-physical interpretations ............................................................................................................. 7 Traditional readings of the nonsense concept in the Tractatus ......................................................... 8 The ineffable truth interpretation ................................................................................................... 8 What can be said and what can be shown ...................................................................................... 9 Modern readings .................................................................................................................................. -
What Calvin and Wittgenstein Had Against Images
Works Cited Green, Mitchell S., and John Williams, eds. Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford: Baker, Gordon P., and P. M. S. Hacker. An Analytical Commentary Clarendon Press, 2007. on the Philosophical Investigations. 4 vols. Chicago - Oxford: Jenkins, Keith, ed. The Postmodern History Reader. London - New University of Chicago Press - Blackwell Publishers, 1980- York: Routledge, 1997. 1996. Kerr, Fergus. Theology after Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. Bloor, David. Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge. New York: Malcolm, Norman. Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? Ed. with Columbia University Press, 1983. a response by Peter Winch. London: Routledge, 1993. Bonnell, Victoria E., and Lynn Avery Hunt, eds. Beyond the McGinn, Marie. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture. Philosophical Investigations. London - New York: Routledge, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 1997. Bouwsma, O. K. Wittgenstein: Conversations, 1949-1951. Ed. J. L. McGrath, Alister. A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986. Western Culture. Oxford - Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Battles, Ford Lewis. Trans. Institutes of the Christian Religion, by Blackwell, 1990. John Calvin. Ed. John T. McNeill. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Monk, Ray. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. The Westminster Press, 1960. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991. Crary, Alice Marguerite, and Rupert J. Read, eds. The New Morse, Christopher. "Raising God's Eyebrows: Some Further Wittgenstein. London - New York: Routledge, 2000. Thoughts on the Concept of the analogia fidei." Union Crary, Alice Marguerite. "Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Relation to Seminary Quarterly Review, 37 (1981-1982): 39-49. -
Dialogical Grammar: Varieties of Dialogue in Wittgenstein's
ISSN: 2325-3290 (online) Dialogical Grammar: Varieties of Dialogue in Wittgenstein’s Methodology Dorit Lemberger Bar-Ilan university Abstract The dialogical character of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations has received scant attention in the literature, given the work’s status in his total oeuvre, and is dismissed as a marginal as compared to the other differences between the Tractatus and the Investigations. The main lines of interpretation that have been proposed see dialogue as a rhetorical technique intended to present erroneous positions and then refute them, as an exemplification of what can be expressed in language (McGinn 1997; Rhees 1998), or as a reflection of Wittgenstein’s informal teaching method (Malcolm 2001; Savickey et al. 1990). The present article adopts the perspective that Wittgenstein’s use of dialogue makes it possible to track the various modes of language-acts, consonant with his directions to examine the daily use of language (Wittgenstein 2009, §116 and esp. §132), “when language is, as it were, idling.” In his later inquiries, Wittgenstein frequently considers the nature of mental states, accompanied by an attempt to characterize the differences between them while at the same time dealing with the cases in which it is difficult to distinguish them. In this process he made a variety of uses of dialogue, each of which embodies a different aspect of language action. Subsequently I will demonstrate that these different uses are not haphazard. A scrutiny of the nature of the dialogue can help us understand the nature of the activity carried out of the state of consciousness. Finally, I propose a distinction among three main types of dialogue: technical, conversational, and reflexive. -
Wittgenstein on Freedom of the Will: Not Determinism, Yet Not Indeterminism
Wittgenstein on Freedom of the Will: Not Determinism, Yet Not Indeterminism Thomas Nadelhoffer This is a prepublication draft. This version is being revised for resubmission to a journal. Abstract Since the publication of Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Freedom of the Will, his remarks about free will and determinism have received very little attention. Insofar as these lectures give us an opportunity to see him at work on a traditional—and seemingly intractable—philosophical problem and given the voluminous secondary literature written about nearly every other facet of Wittgenstein’s life and philosophy, this neglect is both surprising and unfortunate. Perhaps these lectures have not attracted much attention because they are available to us only in the form of a single student’s notes (Yorick Smythies). Or perhaps it is because, as one Wittgenstein scholar put it, the lectures represent only “cursory reflections” that “are themselves uncompelling." (Glock 1996: 390) Either way, my goal is to show that Wittgenstein’s views about freedom of the will merit closer attention. All of these arguments might look as if I wanted to argue for the freedom of the will or against it. But I don't want to. --Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures on Freedom of the Will Since the publication of Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Freedom of the Will,1 his remarks from these lectures about free will and determinism have received very little attention.2 Insofar as these lectures give us an opportunity to see him at work on a traditional—and seemingly intractable— philosophical problem and given the voluminous secondary literature written about nearly every 1 Wittgenstein’s “Lectures on Freedom of the Will” will be abbreviated as LFW 1993 in this paper (see bibliography) since I am using the version reprinted in Philosophical Occasions (1993). -
The Debate Over ›Wittgensteinian Fideism‹ and Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion
The Debate over ›Wittgensteinian Fideism‹ and Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion Thomas D. Carroll Sometimes in a philosophical dispute, conflicting parties debate the truth or falsity of a given proposition. ›A fetus is a person‹, ›The meaning of the truth predicate is captured by the disquotational schema‹, and ›Con- sciousness is an emergent property of complex neural systems‹, are some examples of propositions whose truth and relative warrant are debated in recent philosophical literature. While many philosophical disputes follow this model, not all do. After all, in some philosophical disputes, no uncon- troversial framing of the terms of disagreement is available. Indeed, in some such disputes, it is not the truth of or warrant for a proposition that is be- ing debated, but instead the very words used to describe the disagreement itself. When surveying the scholarly literature over Wittgensteinian fideism, it is easy to get the sense that the principal interlocutors, Kai Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips, talk past one another, but finding the right words for apprais- ing the distance between the two voices is difficult. In this paper, I seek to appreciate this intellectual distance through an exploration of the varying philosophical aims of Nielsen and Phillips, of the different intellectual im- peratives that guide their respective conceptions of philosophical practice. In so doing, I seek to show how a contemplative mode in philosophy may be used to appraise a philosophical dispute and the terms of disagreement. In this case, a contemplative approach to understanding the dispute would frame Nielsen’s and Phillips’ contributions against the backdrop of the ends they conceive philosophy to have. -
The Puzzle of Goethe's Influence on Wittgenstein
James C. Klagge The Puzzle of Goethe’s Influence on Wittgenstein Abstract: Wittgenstein was extensively influenced by Goethe, yet he specifically did not list Goethe as an influence. We examine this problem in connection with a single issue - the nature of causation and explanation: Goethe and Wittgenstein lived in different times that had different world-views (about, among other things, causation and explanation) pervading their life-contexts. How does one endorse a view that has a home in another life-context? Wittgenstein acknowledged but did not resolve this problem. He accepted Goethe's views, without knowing how to publicly endorse them in his times. This puzzle was created for Wittgenstein by his acceptance of crucial aspects of Spengler's philosophy of history. Brian McGuinness characterized Goethe’s place in Wittgenstein’s thinking as follows: To say what Ludwig admired in Goethe would almost be to say what he found remarkable or worthwhile in life, so many are the themes and attitudes from Goethe that recur in his thought.1 Yet in 1931, when Wittgenstein set down a list of the people who influenced his thinking — Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa — Goethe’s name was 2 conspicuously absent. 1 Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life, Young Ludwig (1889-1921), Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, 34-35. 2 The list was published in: Culture and Value, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980 , 19, and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998, 16; Vermischte Bemerkungen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994, 41. At first the list contained only Frege, Russell, Spengler, and Sraffa. -
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951) by Craig Kaczorowski
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951) by Craig Kaczorowski Encyclopedia Copyright © 2015, glbtq, Inc. Entry Copyright © 2004, glbtq, inc. Reprinted from http://www.glbtq.com The Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein is considered one of the most significant thinkers of the twentieth century, especially for his valuable contributions within the field of Linguistic Philosophy. His major works on language and linguistics include Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), and Philosophical Investigations (1953), which was published posthumously. Early Life and Education Born Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein in Vienna on April 26, 1889, he was the youngest of eight children raised in a wealthy and cultured Jewish family. Initially educated privately at home, at the age of 14 he began attending a school in Linz, Austria that specialized in mathematics and natural science. In 1906, he went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering and two years later registered at the University of Manchester in England to study for his doctorate in engineering. Over time, however, Wittgenstein developed a greater interest in mathematics and mathematical logic, and he transferred to Trinity College, University of Cambridge, where he took courses from 1912 to 1913 given by the distinguished philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell. In November 1912, on the recommendation of fellow student John Maynard Keynes, Wittgenstein was elected to the elite Cambridge society known as the Apostles, which at that time had an aura of homoeroticism. This homoerotic atmosphere made Wittgenstein uncomfortable, however, and he stopped attending meetings. Finding Cambridge a less than ideal place to work, since he felt that his fellow academics lacked depth, Wittgenstein went to Skjolden in Norway and continued his mathematical and philosophical investigations in seclusion. -
Wittgenstein on the Nature of British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Philosophy J Wittgenstein and His Times
@Basil Blackwdl Publisher Limitcd 1982 Contents Fiesr published 1982 Basil BlackwelJ Publisher Limited 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, England All rights rcserved. No part ofthis publicarion may bc reproduccd, stored in a retricval system, or trammitted. in an y form or hy any means. clcctronic, mcchanicaJ, photocopying. recording or otherwisc. withollt the prior permission of Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited. Editor's Preface v Anthony Kenny Wittgenstein on the Nature of British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Philosophy J Wittgenstein and his times. Brian McGuinness Freud and Wittgenstein 27 I. Wittgenstein, Ludwig I. McGuinness, Brian J. C. NYlri Wittgenstein's Later Work in '92 B)376.W)64 reiation co Conservatism 44 ISBN 0-63'-11161-1 Rush Rhees Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual 69 G. H von Wright Wittgenstein in relation to his Times 108 Index 121 Printe<! in Great Britain at Thc Blackwell Press Limitcd, Guildford, Landon, Oxford, Worcester. LATER WORK IN RELATION 1'0 CONSERVATISM 45 since Wittgenstein 's position in respect to the body ofconserva Wittgenstein 's Later Work in relation tive literature cannot be satisfactorily dctcrmined in the absence to Conservatism * ofa thorough analysis ofhis unpublished manuscripts. I Still, the interpretation here presented, cven ifmerely an approximation, C. Nyiri seems to me to constitute a necessary step towards a more J. complere pieture of Wittgenstcin's philosophy. Wittgenstein's later philosophy emerged at a time when conservatism - in tbe form of neo-conservatism - was one of the dominant spiritual currents in Germany and Austria; and Wittgenstein received decisive impulses both from authors who deeply influenced this The well-kno"vn fact that in Wittgenstein's later philosophy current and trom representatives ofthe I1ew conservatism itself. -
Wittgenstein's Vienna Our Aim Is, by Academic Standards, a Radical One : to Use Each of Our Four Topics As a Mirror in Which to Reflect and to Study All the Others
TOUCHSTONE Gustav Klimt, from Ver Sacrum Wittgenstein' s VIENNA Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin TOUCHSTONE A Touchstone Book Published by Simon and Schuster Copyright ® 1973 by Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin All rights reserved including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form A Touchstone Book Published by Simon and Schuster A Division of Gulf & Western Corporation Simon & Schuster Building Rockefeller Center 1230 Avenue of the Americas New York, N.Y. 10020 TOUCHSTONE and colophon are trademarks of Simon & Schuster ISBN o-671-2136()-1 ISBN o-671-21725-9Pbk. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-83932 Designed by Eve Metz Manufactured in the United States of America 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 The publishers wish to thank the following for permission to repro duce photographs: Bettmann Archives, Art Forum, du magazine, and the National Library of Austria. For permission to reproduce a portion of Arnold SchOnberg's Verklarte Nacht, our thanks to As sociated Music Publishers, Inc., New York, N.Y., copyright by Bel mont Music, Los Angeles, California. Contents PREFACE 9 1. Introduction: PROBLEMS AND METHODS 13 2. Habsburg Vienna: CITY OF PARADOXES 33 The Ambiguity of Viennese Life The Habsburg Hausmacht: Francis I The Cilli Affair Francis Joseph The Character of the Viennese Bourgeoisie The Home and Family Life-The Role of the Press The Position of Women-The Failure of Liberalism The Conditions of Working-Class Life : The Housing Problem Viktor Adler and Austrian Social Democracy Karl Lueger and the Christian Social Party Georg von Schonerer and the German Nationalist Party Theodor Herzl and Zionism The Redl Affair Arthur Schnitzler's Literary Diagnosis of the Viennese Malaise Suicide inVienna 3. -
Ludwig in Fact and Fiction!
,%vieUJs LUDWIG IN FACT AND FICTION! NICHOLAS GRIFFIN Philosophy I McMaster University Hamilton, ant., Canada L8s 4K1 Brian McGuinness. Wittgenstein: a Life. Vo!. I: Young Ludwig (I88f)-I92I). Paperback: London: Penguin, 1990 (1St ed., 1988). Pp. xiv, 322. £6.99. Ray Monk. Ludwig Wittgenstein: the Duty of Genius. London: Cape; New York: Free P., 1990. Pp. xv, 654. £20.00; U5$29.95. Paperback: New York: Viking Penguin, 1991. U5$15.95. G. H. von Wright, ed. A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Young Man .from the Diary ofDavid Hume Pinsent I9I2-I9I4. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. Pp. xxii, II9. £25.00. Bruce Duffy. The World as I Found It. New York: Tichnor and Fields, 1987. Pp. x, 548. U5$19.95. Theodore Redpath. Ludwig Wittgenstein: a Student's Memoir. London: Duck worth, 1990. Pp. 109. £12.95. Terry Eagleton. Saints and Scholars. London: Verso, 1987. Pp. 145. £9.95. ittgenstein's life has always attracted a good deal of attention. From W his nrst appearance in Cambridge, before his thought was at all note worthy, he was taken to be a remarkable man. The Apostles were fascinated by him: Bloomsbury handled him cautiously but with interest. He became, well before his death-in fact, before he was even middle-aged-a legendary Cambridge eccentric. Elizabeth Anscombe, one of his executors, once declared she would like to have a button which would stop all the interest in Wittgenstein's personal life and leave only the interest in his philosophy: she might as well have been Canute wishing for a button to control the tides.