Introduction 1 Problems of Interpretive Authority in Wittgenstein's Corpus
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Notes Introduction 1 . See chapter 8, ‘Contested Concepts, Family Resemblances and Tradition’ in Glock, 2008. 2 . This has been a central topic of dispute within religious studies and cognate academic fields. See Asad, 1993; Taylor, 1998; and Smith, 2004. 3 . A recent example of this kind of approach is found in DuBois, 2011. DuBois’s book is a good example of the way a perspicuous overview through concep- tual genealogy can dispel numerous sources of confusion (for example, the debate over whether it is appropriate to classify a tradition like Confucianism as a religion or not). 1 Problems of Interpretive Authority in Wittgenstein’s Corpus 1 . According to one bibliography, over 600 books, articles, or theses have been written on topics relevant to Wittgenstein and religion between the 1950s and the year 2000 (Stagaman, Kraft and Sutton, 2001). 2 . The editors of that now classic collection in analytic philosophy of religion, New Essays in Philosophical Theology , Alasdair MacIntyre and Anthony Flew, chose the name ‘philosophical theology’ over ‘philosophy of religion’ for their collection due to the latter’s association with ‘Idealist attempts to present philosophical prolegomena to theistic theology’ (MacIntyre and Flew, 1955, p. viii). 3 . Norman Malcolm writes of an encounter with Wittgenstein: ‘One time when we were walking along the river we saw a news vendor’s sign which announced that the German government accused the British government of instigating a recent attempt to assassinate Hitler with a bomb. This was the autumn of 1939. Wittgenstein said of the German claim: “It would not surprise me at all if it were true.” I retorted that I could not believe that the top people in the British government would do such a thing. I meant that the British were too civilized and decent to attempt anything so underhand; and I added that such an act was incompatible with the British “national character”. My remark made Wittgenstein extremely angry. He considered it to be a great stupidity and also an indication that I was not learning anything from the philosophical training that he was trying to give me. He said these things very vehemently, and when I refused to admit that my remark was stupid he would not talk to me any more, and soon after we parted ... he kept the episode in mind for several years’ (Malcolm, 1958, p. 30). 4 . These students were Rush Rhees, Yorick Smythies, and James Taylor. 187 188 Notes 5 . Wittgenstein’s original entry reads: ‘Tortur, von der man nur zeitweise heruntergespannt wird, um für weitere Qualen empfaenglich zu bleiben. Ein furchtbares Sortiment von Qualen. Ein erschöpfender Marsch, eine durchhustete Nacht, eine Gesellschaft von Besoffenen, eine Gesellschaft von gemeinen und dummen Leuten. Tue Gutes und freue dich über deine Tugend. Bin krank and habe ein schlechtes Leben. Gott helfe mir. Ich bin ein armer unglücklicher Mensch. Gott erhöre mich und schenke mir den Frieden. Amen ’ (Wittgenstein, 1991, p. 68). 6 . The first remark comes from Philosophical Investigations §23, and the second remark in full reads: ‘Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)’ §373. 7 . Both Brian Clack and Paul Engelmann include the poem alongside their respective discussions of Wittgenstein’s response to it. (Clack, 1999, pp. 46–7, and Engelmann, 1967, pp. 83–4). 8 . Consider for example the anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s use of ‘forms of life’ to depict the deep structure of cultures or the theologian George Lindbeck’s use of ‘language-games’ to articulate the shared cultural and linguistic assumptions religious communities make and that must be acknowledged to support interreligious cooperation. 9 . Now considered to be a pivotal move in early analytic philosophy (especially from Frege), compositionality is the idea that terms have meaning insofar as they participate in a proposition. 10 . Consider for example Cavell, 1966. 11 . See translator’s note in Wittgenstein, 1975, p. 352. 2 Wittgenstein, Biography, and Religious Identity 1 . See McGuinness, 1988; Monk, 1990; and Malcolm, 1958. 2 . Consider Klagge, 2001; and Stern and Szabados, 2004. 3 . Tolstoy writes at the beginning of the final chapter of his Gospel narrative, ‘Therefore, for him who lives, not the self-life, but a common life in the will of the Father, there is no death. Bodily death is for him union with the Father’ (Tolstoy, 1997, p. 201). 4 . Indeed, this is a key point of Yaniv Iczkovits’s recent comprehensive study of Wittgenstein’s approach to ethics in Wittgenstein’s Ethical Thought , 2012. 5 . Consider this remark from ‘Movements of Thought’: ‘Genuine modesty is a religious matter’ (Wittgenstein, 2003b, p. 61). 6 . See Chatterjee, 2005; and Szabados, 2010. 7 . Fergus Kerr argues that while Wittgenstein was not a practicing Catholic, he ‘was never free of his Roman Catholic inheritance – for better or worse! “Once a Catholic, always a Catholic,” in those days! Most convincingly, perhaps, in this ragbag of anecdotal evidence, he liked James Joyce’s book, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, singling out the account of the Jesuit retreat sermon (“particularly well done”) – an infallible test (we may surely say) of “insider” status, however long disavowed, among Catholics of his generation’ (Kerr, 2008, p. 43). While I agree with Kerr that Wittgenstein was never free of his Catholic inheritance, claiming Wittgenstein as a quasi- or lapsed Catholic runs the risk of erasing the Jewish inheritance that also informs Wittgenstein’s complicated identity. Notes 189 8 . Consider for example this passage from 1931: ‘Look on this wart as a regular limb of your body!’ Can one do that, to order? Do I have the power to decide at will to have, or not to have, a certain ideal conception of my body? Within the history of the peoples of Europe the history of the Jews is not treated so circumstantially as their intervention in European affairs would actually merit, because within this history they are experienced as a sort of disease, anomaly, & nobody wants to put a disease on the same level as normal life. We may say: this bump can be regarded as a limb of one’s body only if our whole feeling for the body changes (if the whole national feeling for the body changes). Otherwise the best we can do is put up with it. You may expect an individual to display this sort of tolerance or even to disregard such things; but you cannot expect this of a nation since it is only a nation by virtue of not disregarding such things. I.e. there is a contradic- tion in expecting someone to retain the original aesthetic feeling for his body & also to make the swelling welcome. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 18) 9 . See Chapter 1, note 3 for Malcolm’s recounting of the incident. 10 . This point is also discussed by David Stern and Brian McGuinness in their respective essays in Klagge, 2001. 3 A History of Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion 1 . Compare Neufeld, 2005 and Amesbury, 2012. 2 . Compare Clack, 1999, Arrington and Addis, 2001, Bloemendaal, 2006, and Strandberg, 2006. 3 . See, for example, ‘Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth’ in James, 1978. 4 . Soames includes a fourth tendency, the tendency towards increased speciali- zation in philosophy; however, it seems to me that this speaks more to the tradition begun by Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein and less to those three philosophers themselves. See Soames, 2002, p. xv. 5 . Consider the following remark from the essay: In religion, and in every deeply serious view of the world and of human destiny, there is an element of submission, a realization of the limits of human power, which is somewhat lacking in the modern world, with its quick material successes and its insolent belief in the boundless possi- bilities of progress. ‘He that loveth his life shall lose it’; and there is danger lest, through a too confident love of life, life itself should lose much of what gives it its highest worth. The submission which religion inculcates in action is essentially the same in spirit as that which science teaches in thought; and the ethical neutrality by which its victories have been achieved is the outcome of that submission. (Russell, 1917, p. 31) 6 . For more on the changing role of design arguments through the early- modern period, see John Clayton’s ‘The Debate about God in Early-Modern British Philosophy’ in Clayton, 2006. 190 Notes 7 . To get a sense of how close this association was in the decades following the publication of the Tractatus , see Price, 1935. 8 . While religions can of course observe a great deal of systematicity when it comes to theological doctrines, ordinary religious practitioners rarely share this conceptual rigor. This is perhaps why George Lindbeck’s ‘cultural- linguistic’ analysis of inter-religious dialogue in The Nature of Doctrine (1984) is unsatisfactory as a theory of religion; it presupposes systematicity that ordinarily rarely exists (that is, systematicity is a possibility for theological elites). Since inter-religious dialogue between theological sophisticates is his aim, perhaps this criticism is beside the point. 9 . Ibid., 109ff. This is not to say that mystical thinking and natural theology are opposed – just that much philosophical interest in mysticism in the twen- tieth century coincided with a relative lack of trust in either metaphysical or natural theology. 10 . To borrow an expression from Thomas Nagel’s The View From Nowhere (1986). 11 . Just as famously, Flew adopted something of a deistic attitude around 2004 (see Flew and Habermas, 2004). 12 . On Certainty was written between 1949 and 1951. 13 . In works like On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799), Schleiermacher sought to ground religious faith in experience (that is, the feeling of absolute dependence), rather than in traditional theistic arguments.