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Rush Rhees: Main Publications Rush Rhees: Main Publications Books Without Answers, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1%9. Discussions of Wittgenstein, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. Contributions to Books Introduction to George Boole, Studies in Logic and Probability, London, 1952. ' "Ontology" and Identity in the Tractatus', in Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, ed. Peter Winch, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969. 'Postscript', in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981. 'Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual', in Wittgenstein and His Times, ed. Brian McGuiness, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. Introduction to Jakob Friedrich Fries, Dialogues on Morality and Religion, trans. David Walford, ed. D. Z. Phillips, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. Editorial work etc. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, ed. with an Introduction by R. Rhees, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'A Lecture on Ethics', ed. R. Rhees, Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, 1965. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. C. Barrett, from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966. 'Wittgenstein's Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"', ed. R. Rhees, Philosophical Review, Vol. 77, 1968. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Eine Philosophische Betrachtung, ed. R. Rhees, in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Schriften 5, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'Remarks on Frazer's "Golden Bough"', trans. A. C. Miles and R. Rhees, ed. R. Rhees, The Human World, No. 3, May 1971. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. J.P. Kenny, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974. 201 202 Rush Rhees: Main Publications Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, ed. R. Rhees, trans. R. Har­ greaves and R. White, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975. Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundation of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939, ed. C. Diamond, from notes by R. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees and Yorick Smythies, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness', ed. R. Rhees, trans. Peter Winch, Philosophia, Vol. 6, Nos 3 and 4, Sept.-Dec. 1976. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen uber Frazers Golden Bough, ed. R. Rhees, Brynmill Press, 1979. 'Remarks on Frazer's "Golden Bough"', ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. C. Miles, revised by Rush Rhees, The Human World, No. 3, 1971. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, ed. R. Rhees, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981. Comentarios sobre La Rama Dorada, trans. Javier Esquivel, ed. R. Rhees, National University of Mexico, 1985. Remarques sur le Rameau d'Or de Frazer, trans. Jean Lacoste, Lausanne, Switzerland: Edition L' Age d'Homme, 1982. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'The Language of Sense Data and Private Experi­ ences I and ll', ed. R. Rhees, Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 7, Nos 1 and 2, Jan. and April 1984. Papers 'Social Engineering', Mind, Vol. LVI, 1947. Critical Notice of Maurice Cornforth, Science versus Idealism: An Examination of 'Pure Empiricism and Modern Logic', Mind, Vol. LVI, 1947. 'Politics and Society', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XXIII, 1949. 'Can there be a private language?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XXVIII, 1954. 'Wittgenstein's Builders', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1959-60. 'Miss Anscombe on the Tractatus', Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, Jan. 1960. 'The Tractatus: Seeds of Some Misunderstandings', Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXVII, April 1963. 'Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics', Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXIV, Jan. 1965. 'The Tree of Nebuchadnezzar', The Human World, No. 4, Aug. 1971. 'Comment on ''The Tree of Nebuchadnezzar'' ', The Human World, No. 6, Feb. 1972. 'Language and Reality', The Gadfly, Vol. 5, No.2, May 1982. 'Ethical Punishment', in Value and Understanding, Essays for Peter Winch, ed. Raimond Gaita, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1990. Index addition, 27-30 deliberation, 7, 126-33, 155 admirableness, 112-23 depth, 7, 14, 85-6, 135-51, 179-90 advice, 128-9, 130, 136-40 Descartes, Rene, 135 agreement, 1, &-7, 19, 27-30, 33, 92-4, desert, 157, 162-3 99, 11&-17, 124 Diamond/ Cora, 1-2 analogy, argument from, 145 Dilman, Ilham, 6-7, 110 Anderson, John, 4--5, 11, 61-73 Dinesen, Isak (Baroness Blixen), 129 Anscombe, G. E. M., 46, 48-51 disagreement, see agreement Arendt, Hannah, 141 dogma, 9-10, 195, 197-9 Armstrong, David, 109 Donagan, Alan, 135-6, 146, 147 aspect, 102 Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 134 assertion-condition, 14--16, 29 dualism, 6, 94--7 Augustine, Saint (of Hippo), 19&-7 Dummett, Michael, 14 Austin, J. L., 14, 47 awareness, animal, 3, 54--6 Eichmann, Adolf, 141, 143 ethics, see morality Baker, A. J., 61-5, 73 evidence, 10, 94, 99-100, 102-4, 108-9, Baker, Gordon, 17-19 19s-9 behaviourism, 98 example, see particular belief, 197 existence, 3, 53-9 blame, 151-M, 171-4, 179 Buber, Martin, 144 Flanagan, Owen, 188 Frege, Gottlob, 135 Callicles, 141, 144 cause, 69-73, 153-4, 158-9 Cavell, Stanley, 16, 30, 145 Gaita, Raimond, 7-8 certainty, 92-110, 195, 197-8 generality, 4, 13, 61-73, 112, 188 Cockburn, David, 5-6 Golding, William, 103 cognitivism, 125, 128, 147-8 Gorgias, 141-4 commitment, 5, 74-89 grammar, 12, 14, 16-17, 1s-20, 22, completeness, 13 23-6, 30, 31-2, 46, 115, 136, 146, 147, Conrad, Joseph, 11s-21 198 consequences, 16&-7 grief, 76-7, 81-4, 86, 88, 117 contradiction, 47 guilt, 129 Cook, John, 16, 20 critical enquiry, 69 Hare, R. M., 125 Heath, A. E., 11 Dareste, Camille, 46 Heath, Peter, 170 deception, 7-8, 112-23 Hegel, G. W. F., 164 203 204 Index heroism, 118-21 Nagel, Thomas, 126-8, 139, 165-71, Hertzberg, Lars, 6 173, 174-9 hiddenness, 93-9, 106-9 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 183 Hitler, Adolf, 191 Nominalism, 61-6 Holland, R. F., 3, 191 Holmer, Paul, 10 objectivity, 64, 125, 160 hubris, 178 Oedipus, 171-3 Hume, David, 5, 53-4, 69-73, 84-5, 87, opinion, 13, 18 161 pain, 1, 22-4, 26, 41, 76, 81, 83-5, 92, identity, 72, 74-5 107-8, 157-8, 160-2 indeterminacy, 6 Parfit, Derek, 75-8, 82-3, 85, 86, 87 Parkin, Molly, 171 Jones, J. R., 191 particular, 1-10, 61-73, 74, 78-80, 112, justification, 5, 8, 9, 10, 151-3, 159-64 138, 156-7, 162 perceptual judgements, 95-6 person, 5-8, 74-89, 99-109, 115-23, Kant, Immanuel, 9, 53-4, 140, 144, 164, 124-48 174 Peter, Saint, 178 Kashgar, 24-6 Phillips, D. Z., 9 Kastil, Alfred, 11 philosophy, 8, 12, 13, 118-21, 184 I<ierkegaard, Seren, 146, 182, 189 Pitcher, John, 12-14 Kripke, Saul, 14, 28-9 pity, 23, 88, 107-8, 173 Plato, 113-14, 137, 139, 140-4, 153 language, 14-34: language game, 6, 24, Platts, Mark, 134 35-44, 92-111; private language, Polus, 113-14, 141-3 20-2; see also grammar Popper, Sir Karl, 70-1 laughter, 158 possibility, 20 Lorenz, Konrad, 137 preaching, 195-6 love, 5-6, 74, 77-80, 82, 85, 86, 93-4, proof, 10 97-9, 1os-9, 118, 123, 198 psychological characteristics, 5, 75-89 luck, 9, 165-93 publicity, 22-6 Lucretius, 69 punishment, 8-9, 151-64 Luria, A. R., 24-6 Putnam, Hilary, 30 Luther, Martin, 133 Quinton (Lord), Anthony, 78-80, 82-3, Macintyre, Alasdair, 149, 155-6 88 Mackie, J. L., 149, 160-3 Malcolm, Norman, 2, 4 rationality, 140, 165, 166-8, 173-4, 178 Mann, Thomas, 185 reaction, 3, 8, 37-8, 41, 55-6, 86, 106, materialism, 6, 95-7 158-9, 161-3, 168 meaning, theories of, 1, 14, 30 Realism, 61-4, 67-8, 126, 139 measuring, 16-19 regularity, 17-18, 70-3 Melville, Herman, 131 religion, 10, 69-70, 194-200 Mendus, Susan, 90 resemblance, 4, 62-8 method, 13 retribution, 160 miracle, 46, 48 Rhees, Benjamin Rush, 10 Moore, G. E., 11 Rhees, Rush Or.), 2, 4, 10-11, 12-14, moralism, 190 16-17, 34, 35-44, 73, 109, 110, morality, 7, 101, 112-23, 124-48, 163, 112-23, 124-6, 130-1, 147, 151, 159, 165-90 181-6, 189, 191 Mounce, H. 0., 4-5 Rhees, Rush (Sr.), 10-11 Murdoch, his, 137, 156 Rhys, Morgan John, 10 Musil, Robert, 93, 98, 108 romanticism, see sentimentality Index 205 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 162 time, 31-3, 52-3, 75-7, 81, 84, 86-9, rule, 1, 12-34: moral rule, 180-1 153-6 Rush, Benjamin, 10 Tolstoy, Count Leo Nikolaevich, Russell (Earl), Bertrand, 158 117-18, 121 truth, 94, 96, 112-23, 139, 142 Saint-Hilaire, Etienne & Isidore truth-condition, 14 Geoffroy, 45 trying, 170-1 same, 14-16: see also identity turning into, 46-52 Santayana, George, 70 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 125 uncertainty, see certainty saying, 14-16, 37-44, 136, 139-44 understanding, 103, 197: common scepticism, 69-70 understanding, 49, 59; moral secondary sense, 48 understanding, 133-40, 146-8 Sellcirk, AJexander, 30-1 unity, 13 sense and nonsense, 37-44 universal, see generality sentiment, 161-2, 167-8 sentimentality, 78, 117-21, 134, 137-8, 147 vanishing, 3, 51-9 Sidgwick, Henry, 131 Singer, Isaac Bashevis, 52, 55 weighing, see measuring Slater, John Rothwell, 11 Weil, Simone, 130, 137, 164, 177, 178 Socrates, 8, 51, 140-4, 164 Wiggins, David, 125 Sophocles, 171, 178 will, 9, 167-73, 176-7: freedom of the speaking, see saying will, 179 sport of nature, 45-52 Williams, Bernard, 89, 165, 167-8, Strawson, P.
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