CHAPTER EIGHT

THE WITTGENSTEINIAN OF RELIGION IS MISUNDERSTOOD

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s contribution to is not very widely appreciated.1 From among those who bother themselves with such contribution critics are so easy to come by. Though it is D. Z. Phillips, rather than Wittgenstein, who bears the brunt of the criticisms.2 This is so probably because he is the most prolific of all those who dealt with religious matters in a Wittgensteinian manner— which makes it probably right to designate him the doyen of the so-called neo-Wittgensteinians, the propagators of the Wittgenstein- ian philosophy of religion—or because his interest in philosophy of religion and theology is a lot more focused than that of Wittgenstein whose concern is less on matters within religion or theology proper than on how religious matters are spoken of, and whose most signifi- cant contribution is providing philosophical materials to those who would care to specialize in philosophizing about religion (cf. Bar- rett 1991, 258). However the criticisms against the Wittgensteinian

1 One commentator points out that “the impact of Wittgenstein in [analytic philos- ophy of religion] has been minimal is self-evident. . . . philosophy of religion goes on as if [he] never existed, or as if he had never written anything on the philosophy of reli- gion. . . . [He] and his followers have certainly not succeeded in changing the agenda in philosophy of religion” (Moore 2005, 210). But, to put this claim in perspective, this case in the philosophy of religion is probably representative of the case in philosophy as a whole: as suggested by one other commentator, mainstream Anglophone philoso- phy has become practically anti-Wittgensteinian (Hacker 1996, 272). 2 Perhaps one of the most galling of these criticisms is the accusation that Phil- lips, Peter Winch, Normal Malcolm are “being most un-Wittgensteinian” as they are “clinging too closely to some assumption that Wittgenstein was rightly opposed to;” and to top it all is the hope expressed following the accusation that they “could cor- rect an important error in their positive characterization of religion if they were more loyal to the insights of Wittgenstein” (Brambough 1977, 16 and 19). It is as if the critic understands and respects Wittgenstein more than the Wittgensteinians like—of all people—Malcolm. The critic’s absolution of Wittgenstein from blame sounds patron- izing to a Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion. And there are others, too, who are almost as patronizing, like Kai Nielsen (1967, 193–4) who makes explicit his unwill- ingness to lay his criticisms on what he calls “Wittgensteinian ” at Wittgen- stein’s door, Patrick Sherry (1977, 28ff), and John Hick (1984, 46). 190 chapter eight philosophy of religion have a dubious provenance—this is what this chapter argues. Section I presents a selection of these criticisms. Section II shows two distinct traditions where one speaks of God as a being and the other does not. Section II argues that Wittgenstein belongs to the tradition where God is not spoken of as a being. Section IV sug- gests that criticisms against the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion are borne of a misunderstanding owing to the lack of cognizance on the part of the critics of the tradition in which it belongs.

I. The criticisms against Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion

The general issue against the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion— with Phillips at the focal point—is that it propagates theological posi- tions that are so unorthodox as to be bizarre even. One such charge of unorthodoxy—or more bluntly, heresy—is expressed by Renford Brambough thus: It is true that some who have called themselves Christians, and not only in recent times, have repudiated such beliefs [in the substantive exis- tence of God, the historical roots of the Christian religion, the incarna- tion of God in Jesus Christ at a particular time and place], even when they have continued to use for other purposes the language that was designed to express them: but at least until recently they were set down as heretics. Are the modern reinterpreters, including [Phillips, Winch and Malcolm], willing to face . . . the recognition that their understanding of the Christian religion is profoundly unorthodox? Do they cheerfully accept the consequences that all or nearly all Popes and Cardinals, and Luther and Milton and Donne and Saint Thomas Aquinas profoundly misunderstood their faith or faiths? (Brambough 1977, 16–17) Two of those theological positions of the neo-Wittgensteinians are here identified.3 One position—if proof-texting is to be called for—is suggested supposedly in, for instance, declarations such as this:

3 Albeit D. Z. Phillips (1986a, Ch. 1) identifies five positions attributed by critics to the Wittgensteinans, and most of all to him: (a) Religious beliefs are logically cut off from all other aspects of human life, (b) Religious beliefs can only be understood by religious believers, (c) Whatever is called religious language determines what is and what is not meaningful in religion, and (d) Religious beliefs cannot be criticized. However, these five positions seem to share a single theme such that they can be subsumed under ‘fideism’.