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Wittgenstein, Winch and the Social Foundation of

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) Viennese Philosopher

Ludwig Wittgenstein revolutionized 20th c. of with two groundbreaking books: Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. In the latter, he carefully considers the way we acquire and use language and draws a number of conclusions about how we analyze meaning. First, Wittgenstein insisted that words do not derive their meaning from what they refer to but rather from how they are used. He rejects the “referential theory of meaning” and offers instead a “meaning is use” theory of meaning. When we observe the way language is used, what we see are not people simply offering about but rather “language games.” Language is part of an activity that gives context to the things said and so provides a foundation for meaning. He also refers to our use of language as a “form of life.” This captures the that what we believe, how we behave etc. are captured in and to some extent influenced by our language. Wittgenstein wrote in somewhat cryptic fashion. Consider his example of the Beetle:

¶293 Suppose everyone had a box with something in it; we call it a “beetle,” No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word “beetle” had a use in these people’s language? If so, it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. No one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘ and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (Philosophical Investigations, p.100, 1953)

Peter Winch (1926-1997) British Philosopher and Social Scientist

Peter Winch also wrote a groundbreaking book called The Idea of a and its Relation to Philosophy in which he drew on the of Wittgenstein and contemplated their implications for social science. Winch suggested that, if meaning is constituted socially, in the way Wittgenstein suggested, then social science must be centrally concerned with the of meanings (in order to understand society). Questions about society focus not on but on conceptual analysis. As such, social science cannot be understood on the model of natural science.

To give an account of the meaning of a word is to describe how it is used; and to describe how it is used is to describe the social intercourse into which it enters. If social relations between men exist only in and through their ideas, then, since the relations between ideas are internal relations, social relations must be a species of internal relations too. (Idea of a Social Science, p.123, 1958)

For Winch, what the social scientist must understand is what it means to “go on in the same way” in the use of in a society. He also speaks of the necessity of coming to understand what it means to “follow a rule” (vaguely defined) within a social context. Since these are essentially social relations, meaning itself is the product of social construction. Since we act according to meanings (concepts), society is only possible by understanding the language of the group under study. Social Science is basically cross-cultural or ethnography.