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1. Works by Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Strawson, Dummett

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1. Works by Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Strawson, Dummett BIBLIOGRAPHY The bibliography lists only those works cited in the text. The date used in citations is usually the year in which the work was written or first published. Where a second date is given with the publication details, it is the date of the edition of printing actually used. The following method of quoting is accepted: (name of the author, year of publishing, page(s) or section(s)). When the quotation is from author to which the actual chapter is dedicated, the author's name is omitted. Years and dates put in square brackets indicate the date of composing of the publication (script) under scrutiny. 1. Works by Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Strawson, Dummett (I) AUSTIN, J. L. 1938 'dyaeov and Etil>atf.toVia in the Ethics of Aristotle', in 1961, pp. 1-31. 1939 'Are There A Priori Concepts?', in 1961, pp. 32-54. 1940 'The Meaning of a Word', in 1961, pp. 55-75. 1946 'Other Minds', in 1961, pp. 76-116. 1950a 'Intelligent Behaviour', in Times Literary Supplement, 7 April, p. xi. 1950b 'Truth', in 1961, pp. 117-33. 1953 'How to Talk-some simple ways', in 1961, pp. 134-53. 1954 'Unfair to Facts', in 1961, pp. 154-74. 1956a 'A Plea for Excuses', in 1961, pp. 175-204. 1956b 'Ifs and Cans', in 1961, pp. 205-32. 1956c 'Performative Utterances', in 1961, pp. 233-52. 1958a 'Pretending', in 1961, pp. 253-71. 1958b 'Three Ways of Spilling Ink', in 1961, pp. 272-88. 1961 Philosophical Papers, ed. G. J. Warnock and J. 0. Urmson, Oxford: Ox­ ford University Press (2nd edn. 1970). 1962a La Philosophie Analytique, Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie, no. iv, Paris: Minuit (Austin's contributions in discussions on analytic philosophy), pp. 230-47; 282-304; 330-80. 1962b 'Performative-Constative', trans. G. J. Warnock, in C. E. Caton (ed.), Philosophy and Ordinary Language, Urbana (Ill.): University of Illinois Press, pp. 22-54 (1st edn. 1962a, pp. 271-304). 1962c How to Do Things with Words, ed. J. 0. Urmson and M. Sbisa, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2nd edn. 1975). 1962d Sense and Sensibilia, ed. G. J. Warnock, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (II) DUMMETT, M. A. E. 1954a 'Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, by Peter Geach and Max Black', Mind, 63: 102-5. 1954b 'Can an Effect Precede its Cause?', in 1978b, pp. 319-32. 1955a 'Frege on Functions: A Reply', The Philosophical Review, 64: 96-107. 246 BmuoGRAPHY 1955b 'Critical Notice to The Structure ofAppearance', in 1978b, pp. 29-37. 1956 'Nominalism', in 1978b, pp. 38-49. 1957 'Constructionalism', in 1978b, pp. 50-65. 1958 The Law of Excluded Middle (unpublished). 1959a 'Truth', in 1978b, pp. 1-24. 1959b 'Oxford Philosophy', in Oxford Magazine. 1959c 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics', in 1978b, pp. 166-85. 1960a 'Oxford Philosophy', in 1978b, pp. 431-6. 1960b 'A Defence of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time', in 1978b, pp. 351-7. 1963 'Realism', in 1978b, pp. 145-65. 1967a 'Platonism', in 1978b, pp. 202-14. 1967b 'Frege's Philosophy', in 1978b, pp. 87-115. 1973 Frege: Philosophy of Language, New York: Harper & Row (2nd edn. 1981). 1974 'The Significance of Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis', in 1978b, pp. 375- 419. 1975a 'Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to Be?', in 1978b, pp. 437-58. 1975b 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (I)', in 1993b, pp. 1-33. 1976a 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)', in 1993b, pp. 34-93. 1976b 'Frege and Wittgenstein', in 199lb, pp. 237-48. 1977 Elements of Intuitionism, with the assistance of Roberto Minio, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1978a 'Preface', in 1978b, pp. ix-li. 1978b Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth. 1978c 'What do I Know when I Know a Language?', in 1993b, pp. 94-105. 1981 The Interpretation of Frege 's Philosophy, London: Duckworth. 1982 'Realism', in 1993b, pp. 230-76. 1986 'The Philosophy of Thought and Philosophy of Language', in J. Vuillemin (ed.), Merites et limites des methodes logiques en philoso­ phie, Paris: Vrin, pp. 141-55. 1987 'Replies to Essays', in Michael Dummett. Contributions to Philosophy, ed. B. M. Taylor, Dordrecht: Nijhoff, pp. 219-330. 1989 'Frege', in J. 0. Urmson and J. Ree (eds.), pp. 113-17. 1991a The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, London: Duckworth. 1991b Frege and Other Philosophers, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 199lc Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, London: Duckworth. 199ld 'What is Mathematics About?', in 1993b, pp. 429-45. 1992 'Realism and Anti-Realism', in 1993b, pp. 462-78. 1993a Origins ofAnalytical Philosophy, London: Duckworth. 1993b The Seas ofLanguage, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1995 'The Context Principle: Centre of Frege's Philosophy', in Ingolf Max and Werner Stelzner (Hrsg.), Logik und Mathematik, Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 3-19. BmuoGRAPHY 247 1996 Fabrice Pataut, 'An Anti-Realist Perspective on Language, Thought, Logic and the History of Analytic Philosophy: An Interview with M. Dummett', Philosophical Investigations, 19: 1-33. (III) MOORE, G. E. 1894 'Shall we Take Delight in Crushing our Roses?' 1895 'What is Matter?' 1897 I897 Dissertation. 1898a I898 Dissertation. 1898b 'Freedom', in 1986b, pp. 25-58. 1898c 'Amantium querellae (sic)' 1899a 'Do we Love Ourselves Best?' 1899b 'Vanity of Vanities' 1899c 'The Nature of Judgement', in 1986b, pp. 59-80. 1900a 'Is Conversion Possible?' 1900b 'Should Things be Real?' 1900c 'Necessity', in 1986b, pp. 81-100. 1901a 'Identity', in 1986b, pp. 121-46. 1901b 'The Value of Religion', in 1986b, pp. 101-20. 1902 'Truth', in J. M. Baldwin (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 2 vols., Glouchester (Mass.): Peter Smith (2nd edn. 1960), ii, pp. 716-18. 1903a 'Review of F. Brentano, The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong', International Journal of Ethics, 14: 115-23. 1903b Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1903c 'The Refutation of Idealism', in 1922, pp. 1-30. 1905 'The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception', in 1922, pp. 31-%. 1908 'William James' "Pragmatism"', in 1922, pp. 97-146. 1909a 'Hume's Philosophy' (1909), in 1922, pp. 147-67. 1909b 'The Subject-Matter of Psychology', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 10 (1909-10): 36-62. 1910 'Review of Messer, Empfindung und Denken', Mind, 19: 395-409. 1912 Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2nd edn. 1966. 1914 'The Status of Sense-Data', in 1922, pp. 168-96. 1917 'The Conception of Reality', in 1922, pp. 197-219. 1918a 'Some Judgements of Perception', in 1922, pp. 220-52. 1918b 'The Conception oflntrinsic Value', in 1922, pp. 253-75. 1919 'External and Internal Relations', in 1922, pp. 276-309. 1921 'The Nature of Moral Philosophy', in 1922, pp. 310-39. 1922 Philosophical Studies, London: Routledge. 1923 'Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular?', in 1959, pp. 17-31. 1925 'A Defence of Common Sense', in 1959, pp. 32-59. 1927 'Facts and Propositions', in 1959, pp. 60-88. 1932 'Is Goodness a Quality?', in 1959, pp. 89-101. 1933 'Imaginary Objects', in 1959, pp. 102-14. 1936 'Is Existence a Predicate?', in 1959, pp. 115-26. 1939 'Proof of an External World', in 1959, pp. 127-150. 248 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1940a 'Certainty', in 1959, pp. 227-251. 1940b 'Four Forms of Scepticism', in 1959, pp. 196-226. 1942 'An Autobiography', in Schilpp (ed.), pp. 1-39. 1944 'Russell's "Theory of Descriptions'", in Schilpp (ed.), pp. 175-225. 1953 Some Main Problems of Philosophy, London: Allen & Unwin. 1959 Philosophical Papers, London: Allen & Unwin. 1966 Lectures on Philosophy, ed. C. Lewy, London: Allen & Unwin. 1979 'Moore Papers', quot. according to Paul Levy. 1986a 'Moore Papers', quot. according to Regan 1986b. 1986b The Early Essays, ed. T. Regan, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1991 The Elements of Ethics, ed. T. Regan, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1993 Selected Writings, ed. T. Baldwin, London: Routledge. (N) RUSSELL, B. A. W. 1895 'Review of Heymans, Die Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen Denkens', in 1983, pp. 249-55. 1896a 'Notes on the Logic of the Sciences', in 1990, pp. 3-5. 1896b 'The Logic of Geometry', in 1983, pp. 266-86. 1897a 'Seems, Madam? Nay, It Is', in 1983, pp. 105-11. 1897b An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1898a 'Are Euclid's Axioms Empirical?', in 1990, pp. 325-38. 1898b 'On Quantity and Allied Conceptions', in 1990, pp. 114-35. 1898c 'An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning', in 1990, pp. 153-242. 1899a 'The Classification of Relations', in 1990, pp. 136-46. 1899b 'Was the World Good before the Sixth Day?', in 1983, pp. 112-16. 1899c 'The Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics', in 1990, pp. 261-305. 1900a A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press (2nd edn. 1937). 1900b 'The Principles of Mathematics, Draft of 1899-1900', in 1993, pp. 15- 180. 1901a 'Recent Work on the Principles of Mathematics', in 1993, pp. 363-79. 1901b 'Draft of 1901 ',in 1993, pp. 181-208. 1901c 'Recent Italian Works on the Foundations of Mathematics', in 1993, pp. 350-62. 1902/3 'The Pilgrimage of Life', in 1985, pp. 35-55. 1903a The Principles ofMathematics, London: Allan & Unwin. 1903b 'A Free Man's Worship', in 1918b, pp. 40--7. 1904a 'On History', in 1910a, pp. 60--9. 1904b 'Points about Denoting', in 1994, pp. 305-13. 1904c 'Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions', in 1973, pp. 21-76. 1905a 'The Nature of Truth', in 1994, pp. 490--506. 1905b 'On Fundamentals', in 1994, pp. 359-413. 1905c 'On Denoting', in 1956, pp. 39-56. 1905d 'The Existential Import of Propositions', in 1973, pp. 98-102. BIBLIOGRAPHY 249 1907a 'Some Difficulties in the Theory of Transfinite Numbers and Order Types', Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 4: 29-53.
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